IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-31171

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSHUA EDWARDS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 6:17-CR-3-4

Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Joshua Edwards appeals his jury conviction on one 

count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100 

grams or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and 

21 U.S.C. § 846. He contends that the district court erred in denying his 

motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on grounds that his Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 26, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a speedy 

trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972). To determine whether this 

right has been violated, a court must balance four factors: (1) the length of the 

delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his speedy

trial rights; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. 

United States v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). The determination involves a mixed question of law 

and fact: We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

application of the Barker test de novo. Id. at 303-04.

The record reflects that Edwards was indicted on March 16, 2017, and 

that his trial commenced approximately 16 months later, on July 30, 2018. 

Although this delay was sufficient to trigger an examination of the remaining 

Barker factors, see United States v. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 230 (5th 

Cir. 2003), it was not sufficient to create a presumption of prejudice or weigh 

in Edwards’s favor, see United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 432 (5th Cir. 

2009); see also United States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Neither does the second Barker factor weigh in Edwards’s favor. The 

record reflects that the case is complex and that Edwards acquiesced in much 

of the post-indictment delay. Although the trial date was continued because of 

his codefendant’s last-minute substitution of counsel, Edwards has pointed to

no evidence that the delay was the result of the Government’s negligence or 

that the Government intentionally caused the delay to gain a tactical 

advantage against him at trial. See Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d at 232. 

Nonetheless, because Edwards promptly asserted his right to a speedy trial 

and sought to sever his case from that of his codefendant on learning that the 

trial date would likely be continued, the third Barker factor does weigh in his 

favor. See Harris, 566 F.3d at 432.

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Because only one of the first three Barker factors weighs in Edwards’s 

favor, he had to prove actual prejudice sufficient to outweigh the other factors

to prevail on his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. See United 

States v. Bishop, 629 F.3d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 2010). Edwards’s assertion that 

he suffered actual prejudice because he was detained for 451 days prior to the 

commencement of his trial is insufficient to make this showing. See United 

States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 213 (5th Cir. 2007). There was therefore no Sixth 

Amendment violation, and the district court did not err in denying Edwards’s 

motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. See Parker, 505 F.3d at 330.

Edwards also contends that the district court committed reversible plain 

error by failing to instruct the jury on the elements of the conspiracy’s object 

crimes. He argues that the error affected his substantial rights because his 

theory of defense—that he was a user and buyer but not a seller of heroin—

raised questions as to the elements of the object crimes. 

The district court committed an error that was clear or obvious when it 

failed to instruct the jury on the elements of the conspiracy’s object crimes. See

United States v. Vaglica, 720 F.2d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, 

Edwards has not shown that this clear or obvious error amounted to reversible 

plain error. See United States v. Piper, 912 F.3d 847, 860 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 139 S. Ct. 1639 (2019). The district court (1) explained that Edwards 

was charged with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 

heroin and (2) gave the pattern jury instructions for a controlled substance 

conspiracy and the definitions of “possession,” “knowingly,” and “willfully.”

The district court did not, however, instruct the jury as to the elements of 

distribution and possession with intent to distribute, but the defense did not 

raise questions as to the nature of the acts constituting these offenses or 

whether Edwards’s codefendant and others were members of the charged 

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conspiracy. Rather, Edwards’s claim that he was a mere user and buyer of 

heroin challenged whether he was a member of that conspiracy, i.e., whether 

he willfully joined in the conspiracy with the intent to further its unlawful 

purpose of distributing or possessing with intent to distribute heroin. The 

district court correctly instructed the jury on these issues, see United States v. 

Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 333-34 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and the record 

contains ample evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Edwards 

was a heroin dealer and willful member of a conspiracy to distribute or possess 

with intent to distribute heroin. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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