alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Miguel PAYRET, Jr., Petitioner, v. OSCEOLA FARMS, EMPLOYERS SERVICE CORPORATION, et al., Respondents.

No. 42692.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 7, 1972.

Certiorari denied.

ROBERTS, C. J., and BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, J., dissents.
<TABLE>
                                                                 EXHIBIT 11.01




                       JSB FINANCIAL, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY
                 STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
               (Unaudited, In Thousands, except per share amounts)

<CAPTION>

                                                         Year Ended        Three Months Ended
                                                        December 31,          December 31,
                                                        ------------          ------------
                                                      1996        1995       1996        1995
                                                      ----        ----       ----        ----

<S>                                                 <C>         <C>         <C>         <C> 

Primary earnings per share:


Shares used in computing earnings per share:


  Weighted average number of shares outstanding:     10,062      10,604      9,776      10,538


  Assuming  exercise of options reduced by the
   number of shares which could have been purchased
   at average stock price with proceeds from
   exercise of such options                             469         534        464         503
                                                     ------      ------     ------      ------


Common stock and common stock equivalents            10,531      11,138     10,240      11,041


Earnings:


Net Income                                          $26,725     $22,174     $7,287      $5,915


Earnings per common and common equivalent share       $2.54       $1.99      $ .71       $ .54





Earnings per share - assuming full dilution:


Shares used in computing earnings per share:


  Weighted average number of shares outstanding      10,062      10,604      9,776      10,538


  Assuming  exercise of options reduced by the
   number of shares which could have been purchased
   at period end stock price with proceeds from
   exercise of such options                             505         548        477         504
                                                     ------      ------     ------      ------


Common stock and common stock equivalents            10,567      11,152     10,253      11,042


Earnings:


Net Income                                          $26,725     $22,174     $7,287      $5,915


Earnings per common share assuming full dilution      $2.53       $1.99      $ .71       $ .54


</TABLE>
## COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 11

- 00036

- CR

DOYLE DWAYNE SHIFFLE TT APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 90TH DISTRICT COURT OF YOUNG COUNTY

------------


### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 

### AND JUDGMENT

- --------- We abated this cause on September 20, 2011 so that trial counsel, Hon.

Mark H. Barber, could show cause why he should not be held in contempt of

court for failing to complete and file appellant’s brief as ordered

. At the hearing

held September 3 0, 2011 , Barber testified that he had been “hit with four different

appeals at the same time”; that “along with [his] practice, [he] just got behind”;

and that he had “lost his staff” on August 29

, 2011, and had “been in disarray

since then.” Barber also testified that he was “just about done on” Appellant’s

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

brief, that he just needed to “edit it one more time,” and that he ha d planned to

file it that day.

But Appellant testified at the hearing that he no longer wishes to pursue

this appeal, and he filed “ Appellant = s Motion To Dismiss Appeal ” below

. Although filed in the trial court instead of this court, t h at motion otherwise

complies with rule 42.2(a) of the rules of appellate procedure. Tex. R. App. P.

42.2(a). No decision of this court having been del ivered before we received this

motion, we decline to exercise our contempt powers, grant Appellant’s motion to

dismiss, and dismiss th is appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a), 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App

. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: October 20, 2011
**EXHIBIT 23.2**

 

**[LETTERHEAD OF MILLER AND LENTS, LTD. APPEARS HERE]**

 

March 16, 2006

 

HugotonRoyalty Trust

P.O.Box 830650

Dallas,TX 75283-0650

 

Re:             HugotonRoyalty Trust2005 Annual Report on Form 10-K

 

Gentlemen:

 

Thefirm of Miller and Lents, Ltd., consents to the use of its name and to the useof its report dated February 20, 2006, regarding the Hugoton Royalty TrustProved Reserves and Future Net Revenue as of December 31, 2005, in the 2005Annual Report on Form 10-K.

 

Millerand Lents, Ltd., has no interests in the Hugoton Royalty Trust or in anyaffiliated companies or subsidiaries and is not to receive any such interest aspayment for such reports and has no director, officer, or employee otherwiseconnected with Hugoton Royalty Trust. We are not employed by Hugoton RoyaltyTrust on a contingent basis.

 

Yours very truly,

 

MILLER AND LENTS, LTD.

 

 
|   | By                | /s/  JAMES C. PEARSON |   |
|--------|-------------------|-----------------------|--------|
|   | James  C. Pearson |
|   | Chairman          |

 

----
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 234 (Friday, December 5, 1997)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 64273-64274]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-31905]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

20 CFR Part 340

RIN 3220-AB32


Recovery of Benefits

AGENCY: Railroad Retirement Board.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In an interim rule published August 1, 1997, the Railroad 
Retirement Board (Board) amended part 340 of its regulations to reflect 
its authority to compromise debts provided that the amount recoverable 
does not exceed $100,000 exclusive of interest. The amendment conformed 
the Board's regulations to present law. This document adopts the 
interim rule as final without change.

DATES: Effective Date: This regulation is effective August 1, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Secretary to the Board, Railroad Retirement Board, 844 North 
Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas W. Sadler, Senior Attorney, 
Railroad Retirement Board, 844 North Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois 
60611, (312) 751-4513, TDD (312) 751-4701.


[[Page 64274]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 8(b) of Public Law 101-552, enacted 
November 15, 1990, amended section 3711 of title 31 of the United 
States Code to increase from $20,000 to $100,000 (or a higher amount if 
so prescribed by the Attorney General) the amount of a claim that an 
agency is authorized to compromise. Consistent with the change in the 
law, the Board is amending Sec. 340.13 of its regulations under the 
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act to reflect this change in law.
    The Board, with the concurrence of the Office of Management and 
Budget, has determined that this is not a major rule for the purposes 
of Executive Order 12866. Therefore, no regulatory analysis is 
required. This rule does not involve any information collection 
requirements.
    The Board published this rule as an interim final rule on August 1, 
1997 (62 FR 41270), and comments were invited by September 30, 1997. No 
comments were received. Accordingly, the interim final rule is adopted 
as a final rule without change.

    Dated: November 25, 1997.

    By Authority of the Board.
Beatrice Ezerski,
Secretary to the Board.
[FR Doc. 97-31905 Filed 12-4-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7905-01-P
RESTORE ACT Direct Component Multiyear Plan Matrix — Department of the Treasury 

Applicant Name:

1. CUMULATIVE DIRECT COMPONENT ALLOCATION AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION TO APPLICANT:

3. Primary Direct Component Eligible Activity

Further Described in Application (Static Field) 4. Activity Title (Static Field)

5. Location ‐  Municipality(ies)

(Static Field, locations also shown

on attached map)

6. Total Funding Resources For Activity Budget (refer to Instructions) 7. Proposed Start Date mm/yyyy

8. Actual

Start Date

mm/yyyy

(Static Field)

9. 

D

6a. Direct ComponentContribution

6b. Other RESTORE Act

Contribution

6c. Other Third Party

Contribution 6d. Total Project Budget

Infrastructure projects benefittingthe economy or ecological

resources, including port

infrastructure

Waterfront Restoration Plan on

the Pithlachascotee River, Phase 1 Port Richey, Florida $667,000.00 $375,000.00 $1,042,000.00 December‐15 D

Restoration and protection of the

natural resources, ecosystems,

fisheries, marine and wildlifehabitats, beaches, and coastal

wetlands of the Gulf Coast Region Orange Lake Restoration Project New Port Richey, FL $100,000.00 $494,000.00 $594,000.00 December‐15 D

Infrastructure projects benefitting

the economy or ecological

resources, including port

infrastructure

Sunwest Park Construction ‐ Phase

2 Construction Hudson, Florida $195,000.00 $3,905,000.00 $4,100,000.00 December‐15 D

12. TOTAL FUNDING FOR BUDGET (refer to Instructions) $962,000.00 $0.00 $4,774,000.00 $5,736,000.00

Pasco County, FL

According to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. The valid OMB control number for this information collection is 1505‐0250. Comments concerning the time required to c

instructions, search existing data resources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information, should be directed to the Department of the Treasury, RESTORE Act Program, 1500 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20220.

$996,233.64 

2. TOTAL ALLOCATIONS PLUS KNOWN FUNDS NOT YET DEPOSITED IN TRUST FUND FOR DIRE

COMPONENT:



[Type text] Pasco County Project Map [Type text]

SunWest Park

Port Richey 

Waterfront 

Revitalization

Orange Lake 

Restoration
[Type text] Pasco County Project Map [Type text]

Waterfront Park Revitalization Project
[Type text] Pasco County Project Map [Type text]

Orange Lake Project

New Port Richey,

FL

Orange Lake
[Type text] Pasco County Project Map [Type text]

Sunwest Project

SunWest Park
EX-4.2





 Exhibit 4.2 

CERTIFICATE OF CORPORATE DOMESTICATION OF DRAGONEER GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES CORP. II 

Pursuant to Section 388 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the “DGCL”) 

Dragoneer Growth Opportunities Corp. II, presently a Cayman Islands exempted company limited by shares (the “Company”), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY: 

1. The Company was first incorporated on September 25, 2020 under the laws of the Cayman Islands. 

2. The name of the Company immediately prior to the filing of this Certificate of Corporate Domestication with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware
in accordance with Section 388 of the DGCL was Dragoneer Growth Opportunities Corp. II. 
 3. The name of the Company as set forth in the Certificate
of Incorporation being filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware in accordance with Section 388(b) of the DGCL is “Cvent Holding Corp.” 

4. The jurisdiction that constituted the seat, siege social, or principal place of business or central administration of the Company, or any other equivalent
thereto under applicable law, immediately prior to the filing of this Certificate of Corporate Domestication in accordance with the provisions of Section 388 of the DGCL was the Cayman Islands. 

5. The domestication has been approved in the manner provided for by the document, instrument, agreement or other writing, as the case may be, governing the
internal affairs of the Company and the conduct of its business or by applicable non-Delaware law, as appropriate. 

The corporate domestication of the Company shall be effective upon the filing of this Certificate of Corporate Domestication and the Certificate of
Incorporation in accordance with Section 388 of the DGCL and with the Secretary of State of Delaware. 
 [Signature page follows]













 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Certificate to be executed by its duly authorized officer on
this [•] day of [•], 2021. 
  

					
	 DRAGONEER GROWTH

OPPORTUNITIES

	 CORP. II, a Cayman Islands exempted

company limited by shares

			
	            	 	By:	 	  

		 	Name:	 	
		 	Title:	 	


 [Signature Page to Certificate of Corporate Domestication]
EXHIBIT 11.4

<TABLE>

CPI CORP. COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE - BASIC
(in thousands of dollars or shares except per share amounts)
Forty-weeks Ended November 14, 1998 and November 8, 1997

<CAPTION>
                                           Forty-weeks Ended
                                         ----------------------
                                          Nov. 14,    Nov. 8,  
                                            1998        1997   
                                         ---------    ---------
<S>                                      <C>          <C>
Basic:
  Net earnings (loss) applicable to 
    common shares                        $  6,932     $ (1,752)
                                         =========    =========
Shares:
  Weighted average number of
    common shares outstanding              17,624       17,378 
  Less:  Treasury stock - weighted
    average                                (7,661)      (5,584)
                                         ---------    ---------
  Weighted average number of common
    and common equivalent shares
    outstanding                             9,963       11,794 
                                         =========    =========
Net earnings (loss) per common and 
    common equivalent shares             $   0.70     $  (0.15)
                                         =========    =========
</TABLE>













                              30
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

John R. Holley and Ailza M. Holley, * From the 35th District

Court of Brown County,

 Trial Court No. CV1407271.

Vs. No. 11-15-00046-CV * February 10, 2017

Holley and Taylor, Inc.; Pamela K. Holley, * Memorandum Opinion by Bailey, J.

individually and as independent executor (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

of the Estate of Mary Marshall Holley, Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

Deceased; and Melinda McDaniel,

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there 

is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s 

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed. The costs 

incurred by reason of this appeal are taxed against John R. Holley and Ailza M. 

Holley.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 20
- 00460
- CR

Rodolpho Cipriano Gomez, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 22ND DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, NO. CR2003
- 159, THE HONORABLE R. BRUCE BOYER, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In 200 5 , a jury convicted appellant Rodolpho Cipriano Gomez of the offense of engaging in a criminal activity , see Tex. Penal Code § 71.02 (a)(5) , and the district court sentenced him to sixty years ’ imprisonment. Thi s Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on appeal. See Gomez v. State , No. 03

- 05

- 00842

- CR, 2008 WL 4603574, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Austin Oct. 16, 2008, pet. ref ’ d) (mem. op. , not des ignat ed for publication). Earlier th is year, Cipriano
Gomez filed a pro se motion for judgment nunc pro tunc in the trial court

. See Blanton v.
State , 369 S.W.3d 894, 897

- 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (explaining purp ose of nunc pro tunc judgment is to allow co rrection of clerical error s w hen there is d iscr epancy between judgment
p ronounced in court and judgment reflected in record)

. The trial court denied t he motion. Cipriano Gomez has filed a notice of appeal from the trial court ’ s order.

In response, the State has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that we lack jur is diction to review the trial court ’ s order. We agree. “The standard for determining2

jurisdiction is

. . . whether the appeal is authorized by law.” Abbott v. State , 27 1 S.W.3d 694,
69 6

- 9 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Tex. Const. art. V, § 6(a) ). In cr iminal cases, an appeal is authorized only when a trial court “enters a judgment of guilt or other appealable order.” Tex. R. App. Proc. 25.2(a)(2) ; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.02

. Cipriano Gomez filed a response to the motion to dismiss, relying on th e Texas Court of Criminals Appeals’ decision in Blanton to argue that a nunc pro tunc judgment is an appealable order. See Blanton , 369 S.W.3d at 903

- 04

. However, Cipriano Gomez does not appeal from a nunc pro tunc judgment issued after the trial
court g ranted a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc

— he appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. An order denying a judgment nunc pro tunc does not result in a new judgment and is not an appealable order. S ee , e.g. , Abb ot t , 271 S. W.3d
at 697 ; Everett v. State , 82 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2002, pet. dism ’ d) ; see also Aleman
v. State , No. 03

- 14

- 00576

- CR, 2014 WL 5656540, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Austin Oct. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publicati on) (dismissin g appeal in similar case )

.

A ccordingly, we grant the State ’ s motion and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

__________________________________________ Jeff Rose, Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Kell y Dismissed fo r Want of Jurisdiction Filed: October 6 , 2020 Do Not Publish
#### In the Interest of S. J. J., a child.

No. 76-1756.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 9, 1977.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Laurie Sistrunk, Asst. Public Defender, and Frank B. Kessler, Chief, Appellate Division, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Paul H. Zacks, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee State of Fla.

PER CURIAM.

After a probation violation hearing, the trial court entered an order on August 3, 1976, finding the minor to be in violation of probation but continued the minor on probation. We find the evidence insufficient to support that portion of the order finding a violation of probation. See *Demchak*v. *State,*351 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); *Robbins v. State,*318 So.2d 472 (Fla. 4th *1103DCA 1975); *Brown v. State,*305 So.2d 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). However, we find the order proper in all other respects. Accordingly, the order is hereby modified to ex-elude the finding of a violation of probation; and the order is affirmed as modified.

ANSTEAD, DAUKSCH and LETTS, JJ., concur.
#### Katrina Shipman, Appellant, v Mount Sinai Hospital et al., Respondents.

[736 NYS2d 338]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Karla Moskowitz, J.), entered May 15, 2000, dismissing the complaint pursuant to an order which, in this medical malpractice action, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff’s experts base their opinions that defendants’ malpractice caused plaintiff’s injuries on the premise that pitocin was administered prior to delivery. Assuming in plaintiff’s favor that her injuries, which did not manifest themselves until many months after delivery, could have been caused by administration of pitocin prior to delivery, it remains that plaintiff failed to rebut defendants’ prima facie showing that pitocin was administered only after delivery. Such prima facie showing included the affidavit and deposition testimony of the nurse who created the record that plaintiff contends shows that pitocin was administered prior to delivery, the deposition testimony of the defendant doctors who were personally involved in the labor and delivery, and an expert’s affidavit that at the time of this 1974 delivery it was common practice to administer pitocin after delivery of the placenta in order to stop bleeding. The only evidence on which plaintiff’s experts *295relied to support their contention that pitocin was administered prior to delivery was the deposition testimony of the then director of defendant hospital’s obstetrics department, also a defendant, who was not personally involved in the treatment of plaintiff or her mother, and who was responding to a hypothetical, general question when he said that pitocin might be administered prior to delivery in a precipitous labor. Such testimony was properly held insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether pitocin was administered to plaintiff’s mother prior to delivery *(cf., Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 325-326; *Burt v Lenox Hill Hosp.,*141 AD2d 378). Concur — Williams, J.P., Andrias, Buckley and Marlow, JJ.
#### Charles Roger JORSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A. VANKNOCKER; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-16670.

D.C. No. CV-97-03719-CRB.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 12, 2002.*

Decided Aug. 16, 2002.

Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Jorss’ request for oral argument is denied.

MEMORANDUM**

Charles Roger Jorss, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *see Wyatt v. Terhune,*280 F.3d 1238, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2002), and we affirm.

Prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in federal court, regardless of the form of relief sought. *See*42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); *Booth v. Churner,*532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). Because Jorss concedes that he only pursued his grievance through the first of several available levels of review and because the Supreme Court has declined to read a futility exception into § 1997e(a), *see Booth,*532 U.S. at 741 & n. 6, the district court properly dismissed Jorss’ action without prejudice.

Jorss’ contention that the district court erred in applying the rule of *Booth*to his case on remand is without merit. *See United States v. Newman,*203 F.3d 700, 701-702 (9th Cir.), *cert, denied,*531 U.S. 866, 121 S.Ct. 160, 148 L.Ed.2d 108 (2000) (explaining that rules of federal law applied by the Supreme Court must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review).

Jorss’ remaining contentions lack merit.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Andrew J. SCIAMBRA et al. v. Honorable Edwin W. EDWARDS, Governor of the State of Louisiana.

No. 53172.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 19, 1973.

In re: Andrew J. Sciambra, John J. Casey and Janet Lynn Covacevich applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 270 So.2d 167.

Application denied. The judgment complained of is correct.