Filed 2/9/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JONI FRASER, 

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ALI FARVID et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B324831

 Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC724217

APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County. Gregory W. Alarcon, Judge. Affirmed.

Cummins & White and Eric M. Khodadian for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Mark R. Weiner & Associates and Michael H. Park for 

Defendants and Respondents.

_____________________________
2

SUMMARY

Plaintiff Joni Fraser was attacked by two pit bulls who 

escaped from a single-family residence their owner, Hebe Crocker

(Ms. Crocker or tenant), leased from Ali Farvid and Lilyana 

Amezcua (defendants or landlords). Plaintiff sued Ms. Crocker 

and defendants. Plaintiff settled with Ms. Crocker. A jury found 

plaintiff proved that defendants had actual knowledge of the 

dangerous propensity of Ms. Crocker’s dogs and could have 

prevented foreseeable harm to plaintiff. The jury found plaintiff 

suffered damages of more than $600,000.

The trial court granted defendants’ motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), finding no substantial 

evidence was produced at trial demonstrating defendants’ 

knowledge of the dogs’ dangerous propensities.

Our review of the record confirms the trial court’s ruling 

was correct. We therefore affirm the judgment for defendants.

THE ISSUE

We begin by describing the legal principle governing this 

case. 

“Under California law, a landlord who does not have actual 

knowledge of a tenant’s dog’s vicious nature cannot be held liable 

when the dog attacks a third person. . . . Without knowledge of a 

dog’s propensities a landlord will not be able to foresee the 

animal poses a danger and thus will not have a duty to take 

measures to prevent the attack.” (Donchin v. Guerrero (1995)

34 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1838 (Donchin).) This “actual knowledge 

rule” can be satisfied “by circumstantial evidence the landlord 

must have known about the dog’s dangerousness as well as direct 

evidence he actually knew.” (Ibid.)

Here, we agree with plaintiff there was evidence from 

which the jury could have disbelieved defendants’ testimony that

they did not know there were any dogs on the property. But the 
3

only other evidence plaintiff relies on to establish defendants

actually knew the dogs were dangerous—other than challenges to 

defendants’ credibility—was an e-mail from a next-door neighbor 

about the state of the property. This e-mail is neither direct nor 

circumstantial evidence that defendants knew or must have 

known the tenant’s dogs were vicious.

We quote the entire e-mail in question, sent on May 29, 

2017, about 15 months before plaintiff was attacked (the May 

2017 e-mail): “Hi Lilyana and Ali – [¶] I hope that you are 

getting a nice mini break with the holiday. [¶] Lorne and I 

wanted to let you know of your house. We aren’t sure how much 

you know. There is a new person living there. It is the same 

woman but it seems she may be either subletting or have an 

extended guest. [¶] We are not sure about your arrangement 

with the tenants. But your lawn and side yard are overgrown. A 

family of ferral [sic] cats were living in your side yard. I don’t 

know what will happen to the babies as we saw the mom dead in 

the driveway of another neighbor yesterday (and what prompted 

me to let you know). This is from the side we share. The weeds 

on your side are taller than the bushes between our homes. [¶] 

On the good end, they are no longer burning left over marijuana 

plants and they are so quiet. Even the 2 guard dogs in the back 

are quiet. [¶] Hopefully, it’s just the outside and inside is in good 

repair. We are not sure if you have a property manager who can 

check things out. [¶] We do miss having neighbors that we can 

talk to. [¶] Leigh.” 

Plaintiff contends this e-mail “itself constitutes ‘substantial 

evidence’ of [defendants’] knowledge that the dogs were 

dangerous.” Plaintiff argues the e-mail’s reference to two “guard 

dogs,” plus defendants’ “false exculpatory statements” that they 

did not know the tenant kept any dogs on the property,
4

“constitutes affirmative evidence of actual knowledge that the 

dogs were vicious.” 

Defendants, on the other hand, contend none of this 

constitutes evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer 

they knew or must have known of the dogs’ vicious nature. We 

find the law supports defendants’ position and that, on this 

record, the trial court correctly granted JNOV. 

FACTS

1. The Background

On August 14, 2018, while she was walking her dog in the 

neighborhood, plaintiff was attacked by Ms. Crocker’s two pit 

bulls (the August 2018 attack). The dogs had escaped from 

Ms. Crocker’s back patio after someone left the gate unlatched. 

The facts about the attack and the severity of plaintiff’s injuries 

are not disputed.

Defendants, a married couple, have owned the subject 

property since 2005. They lived there from 2006 until August 

2012, when they moved to Orange County. While they lived in 

the home, they became friends with their next-door neighbors, 

Lorne Platt and Leigh Ramos-Platt. Leigh Ramos-Platt is the 

neighbor who sent the May 2017 e-mail; she and defendant 

Ms. Amezcua were both doctors, with different specialties, on the 

faculty at USC. 

In December 2015, defendants leased the property to 

Ms. Crocker for a one-year term, and after that Ms. Crocker 

continued to rent the premises on a month-to-month basis. The 

lease prohibited subletting without permission and prohibited 

dogs without permission.

About a year after she moved in, Ms. Crocker acquired the 

dogs, and after “rehabilitat[ing]” them on a friend’s ranch for six 

months, she brought the dogs to the property. She testified they 
5

were her emotional support dogs; she did not ask the defendants’ 

permission; and “never explicitly told them about my dogs.” 

As stated earlier, in May 2017, Ms. Ramos-Platt sent 

Ms. Amezcua the e-mail that is at the heart of plaintiff’s case. 

Ms. Amezcua replied to the May 2017 e-mail later the same day. 

She thanked Ms. Ramos-Platt for “letting us know,” and stated: 

“I am ccing Ali [her husband, defendant Mr. Farvid] and hope 

maybe Ali and Lorne can talk? Ali is in charge of the property 

and all has been ok in respect to payments and when we send our 

handyman for repairs. Certainly I am sure we can address the 

weed situation . . . and I am not sure how we can figure out the 

subletting issues.” 

As mentioned, the attack occurred in August 2018, and in 

October 2018, plaintiff filed this lawsuit.

Defendants did not produce the May 2017 e-mail in 

discovery. At her deposition in April 2019, defendant

Ms. Amezcua testified she had no communications from anyone 

about dogs on the premises. (At trial, Ms. Amezcua testified that 

she gets more than 100 e-mails a day, and that e-mails to her 

USC work e-mail account from an outside e-mail account (such as 

the May 2017 e-mail) get erased “every 2 years or a year.”

Ms. Ramos-Platt testified she was not aware of any USC policy of 

deleting e-mails older than two years; she said she had e-mails 

she sent to colleagues as early as 2009.)

In May 2019, Ms. Ramos-Platt forwarded the May 2017 email to counsel for plaintiff, in response to a subpoena, saying it 

was the only e-mail she had “regarding communication with the 

landlords.” 

Ms. Amezcua did not authenticate the May 2017 e-mail 

when plaintiff’s counsel asked her to do so in June 2019 (and did 

not ask her husband to look for it in his e-mail), but she did 

authenticate the e-mail at trial.
6

2. Trial Testimony

Defendant Mr. Farvid testified that prior to the attack, he 

had no idea the dogs were there, and no one ever told him there 

were guard dogs on the property. He testified that if he had seen 

any dogs being kept on the property, he “would have brought that 

up with Ms. Crocker,” “especially if they were these dogs,” 

because that would have been a breach of the lease. When he 

was shown the May 2017 e-mail at trial, he said he did not recall 

seeing the e-mail before. 

Defendant Ms. Amezcua also answered, “Not that I recall,” 

to the question whether, prior to the attack, she knew there were 

any dogs on the premises. 

At trial, Ms. Amezcua was questioned about her reference 

to a handyman in her reply to the May 2017 e-mail, and about 

her interrogatory response, which stated she did not have a 

handyman. She again said she did not have a handyman, and 

“I’ve not sent a handyman to the property.” Mr. Farvid testified 

there was no handyman he sent to the property to perform 

repairs while Ms. Crocker was living there. Ms. Ramos-Platt 

testified she saw a handyman come to the property “maybe a few 

times,” “[b]ut definitely after . . . I sent the email someone did 

come by and they cleaned up the yard.” 

Ms. Ramos-Platt testified that after the August 2018 

attack, defendant Ms. Amezcua called her. When she returned 

the call, Ms. Amezcua told her, “ ‘Remember, I didn’t know that 

there were dogs on the property.’ ” At trial, Ms. Ramos-Platt did 

not remember whether the conversation was before or after she 

(Ms. Ramos-Platt) produced the May 2017 e-mail in May 2019, 

but “it probably was after.” 

Ms. Ramos-Platt testified that she talked to Ms. Amezcua 

about the dogs one other time, earlier in 2017 before the May 

2017 e-mail, after a “Grand Rounds” lecture Ms. Ramos-Platt had 
7

given at USC. In that conversation about “the house” and “the 

kids” and other things, Ms. Ramos-Platt “also mentioned that 

[Ms. Crocker] had dogs.” Defendants’ previous tenants had had a 

small dog, and Ms. Amezcua asked Ms. Ramos-Platt, “ ‘You mean 

a small dog?’ and I had mentioned to her ‘these are not small 

dogs.’ ” 

Ms. Ramos-Platt also testified that when she wrote the 

May 2017 e-mail, “I was really trying to convey what is going on 

next door. It wasn’t to convey that there were aggressive dogs. It 

was to convey that there were large dogs there and I’m being 

completely honest here.” She also testified that the reason she 

called the dogs “guard dogs” was “[b]ecause they are large and 

they are pit bulls.” She stated she had never seen the dogs “being 

aggressive to any other person,” and had she done so, she would 

have called defendants and told them about it. 

Mr. Platt testified that after the May 2017 e-mail, he and 

defendant Mr. Farvid had a conversation about Ms. Crocker not 

cleaning up after her dogs. Mr. Platt did not specifically recall 

Mr. Farvid’s response, but “to the best of my recollection, oh, you 

know, I’m concerned and we’ll try to take care of it.” Mr. Farvid 

did not seem shocked that there were dogs on his property. The 

conversation “was not just the dogs, but, umm, just the yard and 

kind of upkeep in general. [¶] We were concerned about both our 

own sort of property and just the condition in general how it 

might affect us, and then also for them and their property being 

just looked after generally.” 

Mr. Farvid also testified that, before the August 2018 

attack, he had a conversation with Mr. Platt about Ms. Crocker 

not cleaning up after her dogs. Then he immediately repeated 

that he did not know about the dogs prior to the attack. He said 

the conversation with Mr. Platt was “never a conversation about 

the dogs. It was about the cleaning inside the property which 
8

include the hedges and the front yard and general trash around 

the place.” 

One of the two defendants conducted an annual inspection 

of the property in 2016 and 2017, and Mr. Farvid inspected the 

property, including the backyard, within the six months before 

the August 2018 attack on plaintiff. He said he never saw any 

dogs or any evidence of dogs during his inspections. He also did 

not recall anyone being there other than Ms. Crocker, and said he 

would have raised the issue with Ms. Crocker if he thought other 

people were living there.

Alan Zhang and Bianca Griffin began subletting rooms 

from Ms. Crocker in early 2018. Mr. Zhang testified that he was 

at home during Mr. Farvid’s 2018 inspection; he walked past 

Mr. Farvid while he and Ms. Crocker were inspecting the ceiling; 

and Mr. Farvid must have seen him. Mr. Zhang also said he did 

not know and had “no memory of the dogs being there on the day 

of that inspection.” 

There was also testimony from Susan Murray that in June 

2017, the dogs attacked her 20-pound dog while she and her 

husband were walking their dogs. Ms. Murray had a puncture 

wound on her index and middle fingers inflicted by one of the pit 

bulls while she was trying to separate the dogs. However, 

Ms. Murray did not report the attack to animal control 

authorities. She did not want the dogs to be put down, and she 

believed Ms. Crocker would always leash her dogs in the future 

and that “it wouldn’t happen again.” She also testified she never 

had any communication with either of defendants.

Ms. Crocker testified the dogs were “there” during 

Mr. Farvid’s 2018 inspection. She also testified the dogs had 

“free range” in the house, including the backyard, the upstairs 

master bedroom, and the living room. She did not recall 

Mr. Farvid having seen the dogs during the inspection, since the 
9

inspection was “just for the ceiling” and “mostly to inspect water 

damage.” 

Ms. Crocker continued to live at the property and pay rent 

through March 2019. At her deposition, she testified that she 

had a conversation with Mr. Farvid about her dogs for the first 

time about a month or two after the August 2018 attack. She 

told him they were emotional support dogs; that her psychiatrist 

confirmed they were emotional support dogs; that Mr. Farvid 

“met my dogs and they were very nice”; and Mr. Farvid told her 

he was “a dog person” and he let her keep the dogs. Ms. Crocker 

also testified that Mr. Farvid “requested that I would move out 

because I couldn’t keep the dogs there,” and she “wasn’t ready to 

part with the dogs at the time so I decided to just leave . . . .” 

3. The Verdict and the Trial Court’s JNOV Ruling

As stated at the outset, the jury found (9 to 3) both 

defendants had actual knowledge of the dangerous propensity of 

the dogs and had the ability to prevent foreseeable harm to 

plaintiff. The jury found Ms. Crocker 60 percent responsible, and 

each of defendants 20 percent responsible. Plaintiff’s damages 

amounted to $604,977.10. 

In its ruling on defendants’ JNOV motion, the trial court 

found there was “an absence of any evidence that Defendants 

Farvid and Amezcua had actual knowledge that Ms. Crocker’s 

dogs were dangerous and vicious prior to the incident involving 

Plaintiff.” The court reviewed the evidence, observing (for 

example) that: Mr. Platt testified he never informed defendants 

the dogs were dangerous, and his main concern was the condition 

of the house and yard that might affect property values. 

Ms. Ramos-Platt acknowledged she never saw the dogs being 

aggressive or vicious and never told either defendant they were 

aggressive or vicious. The court described testimony from several 

other witnesses, none of whom provided any evidence defendants 
10

knew or must have known the dogs were dangerous before the 

August 2018 attack. (This included testimony from the animal 

control officer who investigated the attack and found no prior 

incidents involving the dogs.) 

As for the May 2017 e-mail from Ms. Ramos-Platt 

mentioning “the 2 guard dogs,” the court stated: “In fact, the

‘guard dog’ comment says nothing to warn anyone about these 

dogs’ dangerous propensities but has been used by Plaintiff’s 

counsel to suggest that this comment, not remembered by 

Ms. Amezcua, is compelling proof that both Mr. Farvid and 

Ms. Amezcua had knowledge of the dangerous and vicious 

propensities of the two dogs.” The court found the comment 

lacked “sufficient substantiality” to support a finding that 

defendants knew the dogs had dangerous propensities. The court 

concluded: 

“[T]he fact that the words ‘guard dog’ [were] contained in a 

lengthy email, albeit in a positive light, constitutes no evidence 

that Defendants had knowledge of Ms. Crocker’s dogs’ dangerous 

propensities. The colloquial use of the term ‘guard dogs’ was 

used by Ms. [Ramos-]Platt in a positive light and not as a 

warning, in no way put the Defendant landlords on notice as to 

dangerous propensities, as compared to a commercial setting 

when guard dogs are likely trained to protect through 

intimidation the property they are guarding.” 

The court also rejected plaintiff’s contention that defendant

Mr. Farvid’s allegedly false statements denying knowledge of the 

dogs on the premises “equate[d] to knowledge of the vicious 

propensities of the dogs.” The court found the precedent on 

which plaintiff relied (Donchin, discussed post) was 

distinguishable because in that case evidence of the landlord’s

false statement was bolstered by other evidence the landlord 

knew of the dogs’ vicious propensities. 
11

The trial court entered judgment for defendants on 

October 10, 2022, and this timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

“A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be 

granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no 

substantial evidence in support.” (Sweatman v. Department of 

Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) The standard of 

review on appeal is the same: “whether any substantial 

evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—supports the jury’s 

conclusion.” (Ibid.)

As already mentioned, to establish a landlord’s liability, the 

plaintiff must present either direct evidence the landlord actually 

knew about the dog’s dangerousness or circumstantial evidence 

that the landlord must have known. (Donchin, supra, 

34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1838; see Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975)

44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514, fn. 4 (Uccello) [“[A]ctual knowledge can 

be inferred from the circumstances only if, in the light of the 

evidence, such inference is not based on speculation or conjecture. 

Only where the circumstances are such that the defendant ‘must 

have known’ and not ‘should have known’ will an inference of 

actual knowledge be permitted.”].)

We agree with the trial court that there is neither direct 

nor circumstantial evidence that defendants knew or must have 

known Ms. Crocker’s dogs were dangerous. We turn to plaintiff’s 

specific arguments.

1. The May 2017 E-mail

Plaintiff contends the May 2017 e-mail alone constitutes 

substantial evidence defendants “were told the dogs were 

dangerous, because calling the pit bulls ‘guard dogs’ was the 

same thing as calling them ‘vicious’ or ‘dangerous.’ ” Plaintiff 
12

says guard dogs “are presumed vicious,” citing Portillo v. Aiassa 

(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135 (Portillo). 

Plaintiff misrepresents Portillo, substituting an ellipsis for 

the portion of a direct quotation that shows Portillo has no 

application in this case. Plaintiff omits the underlined portion of 

this passage: “It is reasonably foreseeable that a guard dog kept 

in a business open to the general public will injure someone; the 

purpose of such animals is to protect the premises and it is highly 

unlikely that they are docile by nature.” (Portillo, supra, 

27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135, underscore added.) Portillo goes on to 

observe that, had the landlord inspected the liquor store before 

renewing the lease (as was his duty as a lessor of property for a 

purpose involving admission of the public (id. at p. 1134)), he 

would have observed a “Beware of Dog” sign and a newspaper 

article posted near the door, discussing the dog’s recent attack on 

an attempted robber in the store, and thus learned of the dog’s 

dangerous propensities.1 (Portillo, at p. 1135.)

1 Plaintiff also omits pertinent facts in quotations from or

descriptions of Frederickson v. Kepner (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 905, 

908-909 (pet store proprietors who kept 75-pound German police 

dog tied on commercial premises as a watchdog, where there had 

been attempted robberies at a nearby store, “and permitted the 

dog to be unfettered only in the evenings and when accompanied 

by someone” allowed inference owner knew of dog’s dangerous 

nature), and Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at pages 510, 507-508

(reversing nonsuit after opening statement; a reasonable 

inference of landlord’s knowledge could be drawn from the 

opening statement; facts included several visits by landlord to the 

property, and several drives past the residence to visually inspect 

the premises, where he observed the large German Shepherd dog; 

“Beware of Dog” signs the tenant placed and kept on the fences

throughout the tenancy; meter readers were warned of a “bad 
13

In short, Portillo is inapt. Its holding is that “a landlord 

has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the inspection of his 

commercial property and to remove a dangerous condition, which 

includes a dog, from the premises, if he knew, or in the exercise of 

reasonable care would have known, the dog was dangerous and 

usually present on the premises.” (Portillo, supra, 

27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.) Indeed, Portillo distinguished cases 

involving a family pet kept in a single-family residence (id. at 

pp. 1136-1137), where the landlord has “ ‘no duty to inspect the 

premises for the purpose of discovering the existence of a tenant’s 

dangerous animal.’ ” (Id. at p. 1137, italics omitted.) As we have 

seen, in such a case the plaintiff is required to establish the 

landlord actually knew or must have known the dogs were 

dangerous. (Uccello, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 514 & fn. 4.)

Much of the remainder of plaintiff’s argument about the 

“guard dog” e-mail as substantial evidence is addressed to two 

points: that defendants “knew the guard dogs were pit bulls” and 

“knew the pit bulls were large.” Most of the argument consists of 

a screed about “common knowledge” that pit bulls “have a 

reputation for and are known for their vicious propensity,” along 

with references to definitions of pit bulls, dog bite statistics, and 

blogs and other websites—without any citation to the record in 

this case. Plaintiff states she “is not arguing that all pit bulls are 

vicious nor asking that the Court take judicial notice that all pit 

bulls are vicious.” But that is exactly what she is doing, and 

what this court cannot do.

dog” and to take precautions before entering the premises, and 

more). These cases in no way resemble the facts in this record.
14

In sum, there is no reasonable basis for drawing an 

inference from the May 2017 e-mail that defendants knew or 

must have known the dogs were dangerous.

2. False Exculpatory Statements

Plaintiff contends that defendants’ “false exculpatory 

statements” that they were unaware of any dogs being kept on 

the property “constitutes evidence that they knew the dogs were 

dangerous pursuant to Donchin v. Guerrero.” We do not agree.

In Donchin, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff “introduced 

sufficient evidence casting doubt on the landlord’s credibility to 

create a triable issue whether he did know the dogs were 

dangerous.” (Donchin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1835.) The 

court concluded the landlord’s “false exculpatory statements 

denying any knowledge of the rottweilers’ existence and his 

further denial he granted permission for their presence on his 

property may be used to infer guilty consciousness as to his 

knowledge of the dogs’ viciousness.” (Id. at p. 1839.) Donchin 

framed the issue before the court as whether the court “—or a 

subsequent fact finder—” could be asked “to disbelieve [the 

defendant’s] denial and thereby to believe the opposite, that is, to 

find he did possess the requisite knowledge. At this stage, of 

course, we only have to ask whether [the plaintiff] has introduced 

enough evidence to create a triable issue [the defendant’s] denial 

should be disbelieved. If so, summary judgment was 

inappropriate.” (Id. at p. 1840.) 

The court explained that the landlord “made the 

exculpatory statement as soon as he received the summons and 

complaint describing the rottweilers’ attack,” and the landlord 

“himself admitted his exculpatory statement to be false by later 

filing a response to interrogatories admitting he knew about the 

dogs from the rental agreement and from his visits to the 
15

property where he claimed he had played with the dogs.” 

(Donchin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1842.) Indeed, the landlord 

testified that he enjoyed playing with the dogs when he went to 

collect the monthly rent payments. (Id. at p. 1835.) The 

landlord’s “false exculpatory statement denying he knew his 

tenant had dogs on the leased property is evidence of the falsity 

of his later denial he knew the rottweilers had vicious 

propensities.” (Id. at p. 1843.) The fact finder could “reasonably 

infer [the landlord] falsely denied he knew the dogs were 

dangerous from his initial false denial of knowledge they even 

existed.” (Ibid.)

But in Donchin, there was a great deal more evidence than 

just false exculpatory statements. The court further concluded 

that “[t]he affirmative evidence the landlord was aware of the 

dogs’ vicious propensities reinforces the inference he was not 

credible in denying knowledge of those propensities.” (Donchin, 

supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1843.) The neighbor across the street

declared he was afraid of the rottweilers. He complained to the 

tenant, another neighbor and the animal control department. 

(Ibid.) According to this neighbor, “the dogs frequently ran loose 

around the neighborhood, lunging towards both people and other 

dogs. [The neighbor] stated he was so afraid of the dogs he kept a 

baseball bat outside his back door as a safety measure.” (Id. at 

p. 1836.)

A UPS courier stated he was afraid of the dogs; he saw 

them once a week and every time they would growl, show their 

teeth, ram the fence and try to jump over it; they appeared 

extremely ferocious. (Donchin, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1843.) 

An expert on animal behavior described why it was unlikely the 

landlord was unaware of the rottweilers’ vicious propensities; 

through the landlord’s visits to the property, and as a relative 
16

stranger, “ ‘he had undoubtedly witnessed displays of territorial 

aggressive behavior in these dogs.’ ” (Id. at p. 1844.)

Donchin correctly found that on the record before the court, 

there were material triable fact issues such that summary 

judgment was improvidently granted. But Donchin did not hold 

that the landlord’s false exculpatory statement that he did not 

know his tenant owned dogs, without any other direct or 

circumstantial evidence, was substantial evidence sufficient to 

support a verdict that the landlord knew the dogs were vicious. 

Donchin must be read and understood in the context in which the 

opinion was written—reversal of summary judgment; it is not 

precedent for what constitutes substantial evidence to support a 

verdict after trial.2

In this case, there is no evidence at all of defendants’ 

knowledge of the dogs’ vicious propensities. No one other than 

Ms. Crocker and Susan Murray (the person who was bitten in the 

June 2017 incident) had any knowledge the dogs were dangerous 

before the August 2018 attack, and they told no one. No one, 

2 See Ayon v. Esquire Deposition Solutions, LLC (2018)

27 Cal.App.5th 487, 498 (“Donchin gave inadequate attention to

the need for a plaintiff to present substantial evidence. The point

of the summary judgment procedure is to test whether the

plaintiff has enough evidence to support a jury verdict.

Substantial evidence, however, is not synonymous

with any evidence. Rather, substantial evidence must be

sufficient to support the essential elements underlying a verdict.

[Citation.] Take the example Donchin invoked about a criminal

defendant lying about an alibi. That evidence may be relevant,

and thus admissible, on the question of the defendant’s guilt, but

it would certainly not be substantial. That is, we would not

uphold a jury verdict if the only evidence tying the defendant to

the crime was a false claim about an alibi.”).
17

including Mr. Platt and Ms. Ramos-Platt, ever said anything to 

defendants about the dogs being dangerous. Under these 

circumstances, the inconsistencies in defendants’ testimony about 

their knowledge of any dogs on the property cannot, standing 

alone, justify an inference they knew or must have known the 

dogs were vicious. 

Plaintiff points to another judge’s January 2020 ruling 

denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the 

Donchin analysis (and adding that defendants failed to 

distinguish that case). Plaintiff also points to the trial court’s 

denial of defendants’ motion for nonsuit. (The court stated that 

“[w]ithout those two words in the email, ‘guard dogs,’ the court 

would grant the motion for nonsuit.”) But plaintiff cites no 

authority suggesting the trial court is bound by those rulings, 

and we find neither is helpful to our analysis.

3

3. Respondeat Superior Liability

Finally, plaintiff contends that, even if there was no 

substantial evidence of defendants’ knowledge, the trial court 

should have denied the JNOV motion “because: 1) substantial 

evidence supported [plaintiff’s] responde[a]t superior theory of 

liability, which did not require proving prior knowledge of the 

dogs’ vicious propensities and 2) by telling Ms. Crocker that she 

could keep her dogs, [defendants] ratified Ms. Crocker’s conduct 

of keeping vicious dogs on the Premises.” Plaintiff is mistaken.

3 Plaintiff also contends the fact that defendants “did 

nothing” after the attack, allowing Ms. Crocker to keep the dogs 

until she moved out in the spring of 2019, is “corroborating 

evidence” they knew the dogs were dangerous. Events 

transpiring after the attack “are irrelevant . . . to the issue of [the 

defendant’s] knowledge of the dog’s vicious nature.” (Uccello, 

supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 509, fn. 2.) 
18

The jury was instructed on plaintiff’s theory of vicarious 

liability—that Ms. Crocker was defendants’ agent or employee

and defendants are therefore responsible for her conduct. 

Plaintiff claims there was substantial evidence Ms. Crocker 

worked for defendants as their “onsite property manager” and the 

August 2018 attack “arose from the course and scope of that 

agency/employment.” This evidence is that she sublet rooms in 

the house and collected rent from her subtenants, and also that 

defendants reduced Ms. Crocker’s rent by $50 a month in 

exchange for “maintenance of the outside of the property . . . like 

keeping the yard.” 

The cited evidence does not show defendants employed 

Ms. Crocker as a “property manager,” and in any event, there is 

no evidence Ms. Crocker was acting within the scope of any such 

purported employment or agency when plaintiff was harmed. 

Moreover, the special verdict form did not ask the jury to make 

either of those determinations. 

Nor is there any merit to plaintiff’s claim that defendants 

ratified Ms. Crocker’s conduct by allowing her to keep her dogs 

after the attack. Indeed, plaintiff does not identify or discuss the 

elements of a ratification claim. The trial court correctly 

concluded there was no evidence of ratification, and the jury was 

not instructed on and made no finding on ratification.

DISPOSITION

The order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

and the judgment in favor of defendants are affirmed. 

Defendants are to recover costs on appeal.

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

WILEY, J. VIRAMONTES, J.