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THE G20 SEOUL SUMMIT 

LEADERS’ DECLARATION 

NOVEMBER 11 – 12, 2010 

1. We, the Leaders of the G20, are united in our conviction that by working together we can 

secure a more prosperous future for the citizens of all countries. 

2. When we first gathered in November 2008 to address the most severe world recession our 

generation has ever confronted, we pledged to support and stabilize the global economy, 

and at the same time, to lay the foundation for reform, to ensure the world would never 

face such upheaval again. 

3. Over the past four Summits, we have worked with unprecedented cooperation to break 

the dramatic fall in the global economy to establish the basis for recovery and renewed 

growth. 

4. The concrete steps we have taken will help ensure we are better prepared to prevent and, 

if necessary, to withstand future crises. We pledge to continue our coordinated efforts and 

act together to generate strong, sustainable and balanced growth. 

5. We recognize the importance of addressing the concerns of the most vulnerable. To this 

end, we are determined to put jobs at the heart of the recovery, to provide social 

protection, decent work and also to ensure accelerated growth in low income countries 

(LICs). 

6. Our relentless and cooperative efforts over the last two years have delivered strong results. 

However, we must stay vigilant. 

7. Risks remain. Some of us are experiencing strong growth, while others face high levels of 

unemployment and sluggish recovery. Uneven growth and widening imbalances are 

fueling the temptation to diverge from global solutions into uncoordinated actions. 

However, uncoordinated policy actions will only lead to worse outcomes for all. 

8. Since 2008, a common view of the challenges of the world economy, the necessary 

responses and our determination to resist protectionism has enabled us to both address the 

root causes of the crisis and safeguard the recovery. We are agreed today to develop our 

common view to meet these new challenges and a path to strong, sustainable and 

balanced growth beyond the crisis. 

9. Today, the Seoul Summit delivers: 

 the Seoul Action Plan composed of comprehensive, cooperative and country-specific 

policy actions to move closer to our shared objective. The Plan includes our 

commitment to: 

- undertake macroeconomic policies, including fiscal consolidation where 

necessary, to ensure ongoing recovery and sustainable growth and enhance the 

stability of financial markets, in particular moving toward more marketdetermined exchange rate systems, enhancing exchange rate flexibility to reflect 

underlying economic fundamentals, and refraining from competitive devaluation 
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of currencies. Advanced economies, including those with reserve currencies, 

will be vigilant against excess volatility and disorderly movements in exchange 

rates. These actions will help mitigate the risk of excessive volatility in capital 

flows facing some emerging countries; 

- implement a range of structural reforms that boost and sustain global demand, 

foster job creation, and increase the potential for growth; and 

- enhance the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) to promote external 

sustainability. We will strengthen multilateral cooperation to promote external 

sustainability and pursue the full range of policies conducive to reducing 

excessive imbalances and maintaining current account imbalances at sustainable 

levels. Persistently large imbalances, assessed against indicative guidelines to be 

agreed by our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, warrant an 

assessment of their nature and the root causes of impediments to adjustment as 

part of the MAP, recognizing the need to take into account national or regional 

circumstances, including large commodity producers. These indicative 

guidelines composed of a range of indicators would serve as a mechanism to 

facilitate timely identification of large imbalances that require preventive and 

corrective actions to be taken. To support our efforts toward meeting these 

commitments, we call on our Framework Working Group, with technical 

support from the IMF and other international organizations, to develop these 

indicative guidelines, with progress to be discussed by our Finance Ministers 

and Central Bank Governors in the first half of 2011; and, in Gyeongju, our 

Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors called on the IMF to provide an 

assessment as part of the MAP on the progress toward external sustainability 

and the consistency of fiscal, monetary, financial sector, structural, exchange 

rate and other policies. In light of this, the first such assessment, to be based on 

the above mentioned indicative guidelines, will be initiated and undertaken in 

due course under the French Presidency. 

 a modernized IMF that better reflects the changes in the world economy through 

greater representation of dynamic emerging markets and developing countries. These 

comprehensive quota and governance reforms, as outlined in the Seoul Summit 

Document, will enhance the IMF’s legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness, making 

it an even stronger institution for promoting global financial stability and growth. 

 instruments to strengthen global financial safety nets, which help countries cope with 

financial volatility by providing them with practical tools to overcome sudden 

reversals of international capital flows. 

 core elements of a new financial regulatory framework, including bank capital and 

liquidity standards, as well as measures to better regulate and effectively resolve 

systemically important financial institutions, complemented by more effective 

oversight and supervision. This new framework, complemented by other 

achievements as outlined in the Seoul Summit Document, will ensure a more 

resilient financial system by reining in the past excesses of the financial sector and 

better serving the needs of our economies. 

 the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth that sets out our commitment 
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to work in partnership with other developing countries, and LICs in particular, to 

help them build the capacity to achieve and maximize their growth potential, thereby 

contributing to global rebalancing. The Seoul Consensus complements our 

commitment to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and focuses on 

concrete measures as summarized in our Multi-Year Action Plan on Development to 

make a tangible and significant difference in people’s lives, including in particular 

through the development of infrastructure in developing countries. 

 the Financial Inclusion Action Plan, the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion 

and a flexible SME Finance Framework, all of which will significantly contribute to 

improving access to financial services and expanding opportunities for poor 

households and small and medium enterprises. 

 our strong commitment to direct our negotiators to engage in across-the-board 

negotiations to promptly bring the Doha Development Round to a successful, 

ambitious, comprehensive, and balanced conclusion consistent with the mandate of 

the Doha Development Round and built on the progress already achieved. We 

recognize that 2011 is a critical window of opportunity, albeit narrow, and that 

engagement among our representatives must intensify and expand. We now need to 

complete the end game. Once such an outcome is reached, we commit to seek 

ratification, where necessary, in our respective systems. We are also committed to 

resisting all forms of protectionist measures. 

10. We will continue to monitor and assess ongoing implementation of the commitments 

made today and in the past in a transparent and objective way. We hold ourselves 

accountable. What we promise, we will deliver. 

11. Building on our achievements to date, we have agreed to work further on macroprudential policy frameworks; better reflect the perspective of emerging market 

economies in financial regulatory reforms; strengthen regulation and oversight of shadow 

banking; further work on regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets; 

improve market integrity and efficiency; enhance consumer protection; pursue all 

outstanding governance reform issues at the IMF and World Bank; and build a more 

stable and resilient international monetary system, including by further strengthening 

global financial safety nets. We will also expand our MAP based on the indicative 

guidelines to be agreed. 

12. To promote resilience, job creation and mitigate risks for development, we will prioritize 

action under the Seoul Consensus on addressing critical bottlenecks, including 

infrastructure deficits, food market volatility, and exclusion from financial services. 

13. To provide broader, forward-looking leadership in the post-crisis economy, we will also 

continue our work to prevent and tackle corruption through our Anti-Corruption Action 

Plan; rationalize and phase-out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies; 

mitigate excessive fossil fuel price volatility; safeguard the global marine environment; 

and combat the challenges of global climate change. 

14. We reaffirm our resolute commitment to fight climate change, as reflected in the Leaders' 

Seoul Summit Document. We appreciate President Felipe Calderón’s briefing on the 

status of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations, as well as 
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Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s briefing on the report of the High-Level Advisory Group 

on Climate Change Financing submitted to the UN Secretary-General. We will spare no 

effort to reach a balanced and successful outcome in Cancun. 

15. We welcome the Fourth UN LDC Summit in Turkey and the Fourth High-Level Forum 

on Aid Effectiveness in Korea, both to be held in 2011. 

16. Recognizing the importance of private sector-led growth and job creation, we welcome 

the Seoul G20 Business Summit and look forward to continuing the G20 Business 

Summit in upcoming Summits. 

17. The actions agreed today will help to further strengthen the global economy, accelerate 

job creation, ensure more stable financial markets, narrow the development gap and 

promote broadly shared growth beyond crisis. 

18. We look forward to our next meeting in 2011 in France, and subsequent meeting in 2012 

in Mexico. 

19. We thank Korea for its G20 Presidency and for hosting the successful Seoul Summit. 

20. The Seoul Summit Document, which we have agreed, follows. 

 
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THE SEOUL SUMMIT DOCUMENT 

Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth 

1. Our unprecedented and highly coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus worked to bring 

back the global economy from the edge of a depression. This has highlighted that the 

world would benefit from more effective international cooperation. In Pittsburgh, we 

launched the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth and committed to 

work together to assess the collective implications of our national policies on global 

growth and development, identify potential risks to the global economy, and take 

additional actions to achieve our shared objectives. 

2. Since then, we have made important progress through our country-led, consultative 

Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) of the Framework: 

 Supportive economic policies have been put in place to promote ongoing recovery 

and job creation; 

 Explicit commitments have been made to put public finances on a sustainable track; 

 Strong measures have been adopted and are being implemented to safeguard the 

stability of our financial system; 

 Important structural reforms have been launched and/or planned to boost global 

demand and potential growth; and 

 Significant steps have been taken to strengthen the capacity of international financial 

institutions (IFIs) in support of development. 

3. Since we last met, the global recovery continues to advance, but downside risks remain. 

We are resolved to do more. Our strengthened collaborative and collective policy actions 

can further safeguard the recovery and lay a solid foundation for our shared objectives of 

strong, sustainable and balanced growth. 

The Seoul Action Plan 

4. Today we are launching the Seoul Action Plan. We shaped the Plan with unity of purpose 

to: 

 ensure an unwavering commitment to cooperation; 

 outline an action-oriented plan with each member’s concrete policy commitments; 

and 

 deliver on all three objectives of strong, sustainable and balanced growth. 

5. Specifically, we commit to actions in five policy areas with details of specific 

commitments by G20 members set out in the Supporting Document. 

6. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies: We reaffirm the importance of central banks’ 

commitment to price stability, thereby contributing to the recovery and sustainable 

growth. We will move toward more market-determined exchange rate systems and 

enhance exchange rate flexibility to reflect underlying economic fundamentals and 

refrain from competitive devaluation of currencies. Advanced economies, including those 

with reserve currencies, will be vigilant against excess volatility and disorderly 
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movements in exchange rates. Together these actions will help mitigate the risk of 

excessive volatility in capital flows facing some emerging market economies. 

Nonetheless, in circumstances where countries are facing undue burden of adjustment, 

policy responses in emerging market economies with adequate reserves and increasingly 

overvalued flexible exchange rates may also include carefully designed macro-prudential 

measures. We will reinvigorate our efforts to promote a stable and well functioning 

international monetary system and call on the IMF to deepen its work in these areas. 

7. Trade and Development Policies: We reaffirm our commitment to free trade and 

investment recognizing its central importance for the global recovery. We will refrain 

from introducing, and oppose protectionist trade actions in all forms and recognize the 

importance of a prompt conclusion of the Doha negotiations. We reaffirm our 

commitment to avoid financial protectionism and are mindful of the risks of proliferation 

of measures that would damage investment and harm prospects for the global recovery. 

With developing countries’ rising share in world output and trade, the goals of global 

growth, rebalancing and development are increasingly interlinked. We will focus efforts 

to resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth 

in developing countries, low-income countries (LICs) in particular: infrastructure, human 

resources development, trade, private investment and job creation, food security, growth 

with resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization and knowledge 

sharing. In addition, we will take concrete actions to increase our financial and technical 

support, including fulfilling the Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments 

by advanced countries. 

8. Fiscal Policies: Advanced economies will formulate and implement clear, credible, 

ambitious and growth-friendly medium-term fiscal consolidation plans in line with the 

Toronto commitment, differentiated according to national circumstances. We are mindful 

of the risk of synchronized adjustment on the global recovery and of the risk that failure 

to implement consolidation, where immediately necessary, would undermine confidence 

and growth. 

9. Financial Reforms: We are committed to take action at the national and international 

level to raise standards, and ensure that our national authorities implement global 

standards developed to date, consistently, in a way that ensures a level playing field, a 

race to the top and avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism and regulatory 

arbitrage. In particular, we will implement fully the new bank capital and liquidity 

standards and address too-big-to-fail problems. We agreed to further work on financial 

regulatory reforms. 

10. Structural Reforms: We will implement a range of structural reforms to boost and sustain 

global demand, foster job creation, contribute to global rebalancing, and increase our 

growth potential, and where needed undertake: 

 Product market reforms to simplify regulation and reduce regulatory barriers in order 

to promote competition and enhance productivity in key sectors. 

 Labor market and human resource development reforms, including better targeted 

benefits schemes to increase participation; education and training to increase 

employment in quality jobs, boost productivity and thereby enhance potential growth. 
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 Tax reform to enhance productivity by removing distortions and improving the 

incentives to work, invest and innovate. 

 Green growth and innovation oriented policy measures to find new sources of growth 

and promote sustainable development. 

 Reforms to reduce the reliance on external demand and focus more on domestic 

sources of growth in surplus countries while promoting higher national savings and 

enhancing export competitiveness in deficit countries. 

 Reforms to strengthen social safety nets such as public health care and pension plans, 

corporate governance and financial market development to help reduce precautionary 

savings in emerging surplus countries. 

 Investment in infrastructure to address bottlenecks and enhance growth potential. 

In pursuing these reforms, we will draw on the expertise of the OECD, IMF, World Bank, 

ILO and other international organizations. 

11. MAP beyond the Seoul Summit: In addition, we will enhance the MAP to promote 

external sustainability. We will strengthen multilateral cooperation to promote external 

sustainability and pursue the full range of policies conducive to reducing excessive 

imbalances and maintaining current account imbalances at sustainable levels. Persistently 

large imbalances, assessed against indicative guidelines to be agreed by our Finance 

Ministers and Central Bank Governors, warrant an assessment of their nature and the 

root causes of impediments to adjustment as part of the MAP, recognizing the need to 

take into account national or regional circumstances, including large commodity 

producers. These indicative guidelines composed of a range of indicators would serve as 

a mechanism to facilitate timely identification of large imbalances that require preventive 

and corrective actions to be taken. To support our efforts toward meeting these 

commitments, we call on our Framework Working Group, with technical support from 

the IMF and other international organizations, to develop these indicative guidelines, 

with progress to be discussed by our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in 

the first half of 2011; and, in Gyeongju, our Finance Ministers and Central Bank 

Governors called on the IMF to provide an assessment as part of the MAP on the 

progress toward external sustainability and the consistency of fiscal, monetary, financial 

sector, structural, exchange rate and other policies. In light of this, the first such 

assessment, to be based on the above mentioned indicative guidelines, will be initiated 

and undertaken in due course under the French Presidency. 

12. We have a shared responsibility. Members with sustained, significant external deficits 

pledge to undertake policies to support private savings and where appropriate undertake 

fiscal consolidation while maintaining open markets and strengthening export sectors. 

Members with sustained, significant external surpluses pledge to strengthen domestic 

sources of growth. 

13. Recognizing the benefits of the Framework, we agreed to expand and refine the countryled, consultative MAP by including monitoring of the implementation of our 

commitments and assessment of our progress toward achieving our shared objectives. 

This process will be adopted in 2011 under the French Presidency. 
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International Financial Institution Reforms

14. When the world was in the middle of the global financial crisis, we met and agreed to 

provide the IFIs with the resources they needed to support the global economy. With our 

agreements to increase their resources substantially and endorse new lending instruments, 

the IFIs mobilized critical financing, including more than $750 billion by the IMF and 

$235 billion by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). Financial markets 

stabilized and the global economy started to recover. Even in the midst of the crisis, we 

knew that further reforms of the IFIs were required. 

15. We committed to modernize the institutions fundamentally so that they better reflect 

changes in the world economy and can more effectively play their roles in promoting 

global financial stability, fostering development and improving the lives of the poorest. 

In June 2010, we welcomed the reforms to increase the voting power of developing and 

transition countries at the World Bank. We also remained committed to strengthening the 

legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of the IMF through quota and governance 

reforms. 

Modernized IMF governance 

16. Today, we welcomed the ambitious achievements by the Finance Ministers and Central 

Bank Governors at the Gyeongju meeting, and subsequent decision by the IMF, on a 

comprehensive package of IMF quota and governance reforms. The reforms are an 

important step toward a more legitimate, credible and effective IMF, by ensuring that 

quotas and Executive Board composition are more reflective of new global economic 

realities, and securing the IMF’s status as a quota-based institution, with sufficient 

resources to support members’ needs. Consistent with our commitments at the Pittsburgh 

and Toronto Summits, and going even further in a number of areas, the reforms include: 

 Shifts in quota shares to dynamic emerging market and developing countries and to 

under-represented countries of over 6%, while protecting the voting share of the 

poorest, which we commit to work to complete by the Annual Meetings in 2012. 

 A doubling of quotas, with a corresponding rollback of the New Arrangements to 

Borrow (NAB) preserving relative shares, when the quota increase becomes 

effective. 

 Continuing the dynamic process aimed at enhancing the voice and representation of 

emerging market and developing countries, including the poorest, through a 

comprehensive review of the quota formula by January 2013 to better reflect the 

economic weights; and through completion of the next general review of quotas by 

January 2014. 

 Greater representation for emerging market and developing countries at the 

Executive Board through two fewer advanced European chairs, and the possibility 

of a second alternate for all multi-country constituencies. 
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 Moving to an all-elected Board, along with a commitment by the IMF’s membership 

to maintain the Board size at 24 chairs, and following the completion of the 14th 

General Review, a review of the Board’s composition every eight years. 

17. We reiterate the urgency of promptly concluding the 2008 IMF Quota and Voice Reforms. 

We urge all G20 members participating in the expanded NAB to accelerate their 

procedures in completing the acceptance process. We ask the IMF to report on the 

progress, in accordance with agreed timelines, toward effective implementation of the 

2010 quota and governance reforms to our Finance Ministers and Central Bank 

Governors at their periodic G20 meetings. 

18. When combined with the already agreed voice reform of the World Bank, these represent 

significant achievements in modernizing our key IFIs. They will be even stronger players 

in promoting global financial stability and growth. We asked our Finance Ministers and 

Central Bank Governors to continue to pursue all outstanding governance reform issues 

at the World Bank and the IMF. 

Surveillance 

19. We recognize the importance of continuing the work on reforming the IMF’s mission and 

mandate, including strengthening surveillance. 

20. IMF surveillance should be enhanced to focus on systemic risks and vulnerabilities 

wherever they may lie. To this extent, we welcome the decision made by the IMF to 

make financial stability assessments under the Financial Sector Assessment Program 

(FSAP) a regular and mandatory part of Article IV consultation for members with 

systemically important financial sectors. We call on the IMF to make further progress in 

modernizing the IMF’s surveillance mandate and modalities. These should involve, in 

particular: strengthening bilateral and multilateral work on surveillance covering 

financial stability, macroeconomic, structural and exchange rate policies, with increased 

focus on systemic issues; enhancing synergies between surveillance tools; helping 

members to strengthen their surveillance capacity; and ensuring even-handedness, candor, 

and independence of surveillance. We welcome the IMF’s work to conduct spillover 

assessments of the wider impact of systemic economies’ policies. 

Multilateral Development Banks 

21. We reiterate our commitment to completing an ambitious replenishment for the 

concessional lending facilities of the MDBs, especially the International Development 

Association, to help ensure that LICs have access to sufficient concessional resources. 

Strengthened global financial safety nets 

22. As the global economy became more interconnected and integrated, the size and 

volatility of capital flows increased significantly. The increased volatility was a source of 

instability during the financial crisis. It even adversely affected countries with solid 

fundamentals and the effects were greater on those with more open economies. These 

problems persist. Current volatility of capital flows is reflecting the differing speed of 

recovery between advanced and emerging market economies. National, regional and 

multilateral responses are required. Strengthened global financial safety nets can help 
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countries to cope with financial volatility, reducing the economic disruption from sudden 

swings in capital flows and the perceived need for excessive reserve accumulation. 

23. Therefore, we asked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to prepare policy 

options to strengthen global financial safety nets for our consideration at this Summit. 

 

24. We welcome the following achievements from our mandate: 

 The enhancement of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) including the extension of its 

duration and removal of the access cap. Countries with strong fundamentals and 

policies will have access to a refined FCL with enhanced predictability and 

effectiveness. 

 The creation of the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) as a new preventative tool. The 

PCL allows countries with sound fundamentals and policies, but moderate 

vulnerabilities, to benefit from the IMF’s precautionary liquidity provision. 

 The recent decision by the IMF to continue its work to further improve the global 

capacity to cope with shocks of a systemic nature, as well as the recent clarification 

of the procedures for synchronized approval of the FCLs for multiple countries, by 

which a number of countries affected by a common shock could concurrently seek 

access to FCL. 

 The dialogue to enhance collaboration between Regional Financing Arrangements 

(RFAs) and the IMF, acknowledging the potential synergies from such collaboration. 

25. Building on the achievements made to date on strengthening global financial safety nets, 

we need to do further work to improve our capacity to cope with future crises. Therefore, 

we asked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to explore, with input from 

the IMF: 

A. A structured approach to cope with shocks of a systemic nature. 

B. Ways to improve collaboration between RFAs and the IMF across all possible areas 

and enhance the capability of RFAs for crisis prevention, while recognizing regionspecific circumstances and characteristics of each RFA. 

26. Our goal is to build a more stable and resilient international monetary system. While the 

international monetary system has proved resilient, tensions and vulnerabilities are 

clearly apparent. We agreed to explore ways to further improve the international 

monetary system to ensure systemic stability in the global economy. We asked the IMF to 

deepen its work on all aspects of the international monetary system, including capital 

flow volatility. We look forward to reviewing further analysis and proposals over the 

next year. 

Financial Sector Reforms 

27. The global financial system came to a sudden halt in 2008 as a result of reckless and 

irresponsible risk taking by banks and other financial institutions, combined with major 

failures of regulation and supervision. While our initial priority was to move quickly to 
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stabilize financial markets and restore the global flow of capital, we never lost sight of 

the need to address the root causes of the crisis. We took our first step at the Washington 

Summit, where we developed the Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform. Since 

then, we built on the progress made in London, Pittsburgh, and Toronto, and together, 

took major strides toward fixing the financial system with the support from the 

international organizations, particularly the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel 

Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 

Transformed financial system to address the root causes of the crisis 

28. Today, we have delivered core elements of the new financial regulatory framework to 

transform the global financial system. 

29. We endorsed the landmark agreement reached by the BCBS on the new bank capital and 

liquidity framework, which increases the resilience of the global banking system by 

raising the quality, quantity and international consistency of bank capital and liquidity, 

constrains the build-up of leverage and maturity mismatches, and introduces capital 

buffers above the minimum requirements that can be drawn upon in bad times. The 

framework includes an internationally harmonized leverage ratio to serve as a backstop to 

the risk-based capital measures. With this, we have achieved far-reaching reform of the 

global banking system. The new standards will markedly reduce banks’ incentive to take 

excessive risks, lower the likelihood and severity of future crises, and enable banks to 

withstand – without extraordinary government support – stresses of a magnitude 

associated with the recent financial crisis. This will result in a banking system that can 

better support stable economic growth. We are committed to adopt and implement fully 

these standards within the agreed timeframe that is consistent with economic recovery 

and financial stability. The new framework will be translated into our national laws and 

regulations, and will be implemented starting on January 1, 2013 and fully phased in by 

January 1, 2019. 

30. We reaffirmed our view that no firm should be too big or too complicated to fail and that 

taxpayers should not bear the costs of resolution. We endorsed the policy framework, 

work processes, and timelines proposed by the FSB to reduce the moral hazard risks 

posed by systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and address the too-big-tofail problem. This requires a multi-pronged framework combining: a resolution 

framework and other measures to ensure that all financial institutions can be resolved 

safely, quickly and without destabilizing the financial system and exposing the taxpayers 

to the risk of loss; a requirement that SIFIs and initially in particular financial institutions 

that are globally systemic (G-SIFIs) should have higher loss absorbency capacity to 

reflect the greater risk that the failure of these firms poses to the global financial system; 

more intensive supervisory oversight; robust core financial market infrastructure to 

reduce contagion risk from individual failures; and other supplementary prudential and 

other requirements as determined by the national authorities which may include, in some 

circumstances, liquidity surcharges, tighter large exposure restrictions, levies and 

structural measures. In the context of loss absorbency, we encourage further progress on 

the feasibility of contingent capital and other instruments. We encouraged the FSB, 

BCBS and other relevant bodies to complete their remaining work in accordance with the 

endorsed work processes and timelines in 2011 and 2012. 

31. In addition, we agreed that G-SIFIs should be subject to a sustained process of mandatory 
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international recovery and resolution planning. We agreed to conduct rigorous risk 

assessment on these firms through international supervisory colleges and negotiate 

institution-specific crisis cooperation agreements within crisis management groups. 

Regular peer reviews will be conducted by the FSB on the effectiveness and consistency 

of national policy measures for these firms. 

32. We reaffirmed our Toronto commitment to national-level implementation of the BCBS’s 

cross-border resolution recommendations. To support implementation at the national 

level, we welcomed the BCBS’s planned stock taking exercise of these recommendations. 

We called on the FSB to build on this work and develop attributes of effective resolution 

regimes by 2011. 

33. Delivering on our commitment in Toronto, we endorsed the policy recommendations 

prepared by the FSB in consultation with the IMF, on increasing supervisory intensity 

and effectiveness. We reaffirmed that the new financial regulatory framework must be 

complemented with more effective oversight and supervision. We agreed that supervisors 

should have strong and unambiguous mandates, sufficient independence to act, 

appropriate resources, and a full suite of tools and powers to proactively identify and 

address risks, including regular stress testing and early intervention. 

Implementation and international assessment, including peer review 

34. But our reform efforts are an ongoing process. It is essential that we fully implement the 

new standards and principles, in a way that ensures a level playing field, a race to the top 

and avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism and regulatory arbitrage. We 

recognized different national starting points. 

35. We reaffirmed today our full commitment to action and implementation. 

36. At the national level, we will incorporate the new standards and principles into relevant 

legislation and policies. At the global level, international assessment and peer review 

processes should be substantially enhanced in order to ensure consistency in 

implementation across countries and identify areas for further improvement in standards 

and principles. In this regard, we recognized the value of the FSAP jointly undertaken by 

the IMF and the World Bank, and the FSB’s peer review as means of fostering consistent 

cross-country implementation of international standards. 

37. We also firmly recommitted to work in an internationally consistent and nondiscriminatory manner to strengthen regulation and supervision on hedge funds, OTC 

derivatives and credit rating agencies. We reaffirmed the importance of fully 

implementing the FSB’s standards for sound compensation. We endorsed the FSB’s 

recommendations for implementing OTC derivatives market reforms, designed to fully 

implement our previous commitments in an internationally consistent manner, 

recognizing the importance of a level playing field. We asked the FSB to monitor the 

progress regularly. We welcomed ongoing work by the Committee on Payment and 

Settlement Systems and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 

(IOSCO) on central counterparty standards. We also endorsed the FSB’s principles on 

reducing reliance on external credit ratings. Standard setters, market participants, 

supervisors and central banks should not rely mechanistically on external credit ratings. 
13 

38. We re-emphasized the importance we place on achieving a single set of improved high 

quality global accounting standards and called on the International Accounting Standards 

Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board to complete their convergence 

project by the end of 2011. We also encouraged the International Accounting Standards 

Board to further improve the involvement of stakeholders, including outreach to, and 

membership of, emerging market economies, in the process of setting the global 

standards, within the framework of independent accounting standard setting process. 

39. In addition, we reiterated our commitment to preventing non-cooperative jurisdictions 

from posing risks to the global financial system and welcomed the ongoing efforts by the 

FSB, Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information (Global Forum), 

and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), based on comprehensive, consistent and 

transparent assessment. We reached agreement on: 

 The FSB to determine by spring 2011 those jurisdictions that are not cooperating 

fully with the evaluation process or that show insufficient progress to address weak 

compliance with internationally agreed information exchange and cooperation 

standards, based on the recommended actions by the agreed timetable. 

 The Global Forum to swiftly progress its Phase 1 and 2 reviews to achieve the 

objective agreed by Leaders in Toronto and report progress by November 2011. 

Reviewed jurisdictions identified as not having the elements in place to achieve an 

effective exchange of information should promptly address the weaknesses. We urge 

all jurisdictions to stand ready to conclude Tax Information Exchange Agreements 

where requested by a relevant partner. 

 The FATF to pursue its successful work in identifying non-cooperative jurisdictions 

as well as regularly updating a public list on jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies, 

with next update being in February 2011. 

40. We reaffirmed the FSB’s role in coordinating at the international level the work of 

national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies in developing and 

promoting the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial 

sector policies in the interest of global financial stability. We asked the FSB to bring 

forward for review by Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors well before our 

next meeting in 2011 proposals to strengthen its capacity, resources and governance to 

keep pace with growing demands. We welcomed the FSB’s outreach. We endorsed the 

establishment of regional consultative groups. We welcomed the FSB report on progress 

in the implementation of G20 recommendations for strengthening financial stability and 

look forward to another progress report at our next meeting. 

Future work: Issues that warrant more attention 

41. While we have made significant progress in a number of areas, there still remain some 

issues that warrant more attention: 

 Further work on macro-prudential policy frameworks: In order to deal with systemic 

risks in the financial sector in a comprehensive manner and on an ongoing basis, we 

called on the FSB, IMF and BIS to do further work on macro-prudential policy 

frameworks, including tools to mitigate the impact of excessive capital flows, and 
14 

update our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors at their next meeting. 

These frameworks should take into account national and regional arrangements. We 

look forward to a joint report which should elaborate on the progress achieved in 

identification of best practices, which will be the basis for establishing in the future 

international principles or guidelines on the design and implementation of the 

frameworks. 

 Addressing regulatory reform issues pertaining specifically to emerging market and 

developing economies: We agreed to work on financial stability issues that are of 

particular interest to emerging market and developing economies, and called on the 

FSB, IMF and World Bank to develop and report before the next Summit. These 

issues could include: the management of foreign exchange risks by financial 

institutions, corporations and households; emerging market and developing 

economies’ regulatory and supervisory capacity where necessary, including with 

regard to local branches of foreign financial institutions which are systemic in their 

host country and development of deposit insurance schemes; financial inclusion; 

information sharing between home and host supervisory authorities on cross border 

financial institutions; and trade finance. 

 Strengthening regulation and supervision of shadow banking: With the completion of 

the new standards for banks, there is a potential that regulatory gaps may emerge in 

the shadow banking system. Therefore, we called on the FSB to work in 

collaboration with other international standard setting bodies to develop 

recommendations to strengthen the regulation and oversight of the shadow banking 

system by mid-2011.

 Further work on regulation and supervision of commodity derivative markets: We 

called especially on IOSCO’s taskforce on commodity futures markets to report to 

the FSB for consideration of next steps in April 2011 on its important work. 

 Improving market integrity and efficiency: We called on IOSCO to develop by June 

2011 and report to the FSB recommendations to promote markets’ integrity and 

efficiency to mitigate the risks posed to the financial system by the latest 

technological developments. 

 Enhancing consumer protection: We asked the FSB to work in collaboration with the 

OECD and other international organizations to explore, and report back by the next 

summit, on options to advance consumer finance protection through informed choice 

that includes disclosure, transparency and education; protection from fraud, abuse 

and errors; and recourse and advocacy.

Fighting Protectionism and Promoting Trade and Investment 

42. Recognizing the importance of free trade and investment for global recovery, we are 

committed to keeping markets open and liberalizing trade and investment as a means to 

promote economic progress for all and narrow the development gap. The importance of 

free trade and open markets is illustrated by the joint report of the OECD, ILO, World 

Bank and WTO on the benefits of trade liberalization for employment and growth. These 

trade and investment liberalization measures will help achieve the G20 Framework 

objectives for strong, sustainable and balanced growth, and must be complemented by 
15 

our unwavering commitment to resist protectionism in all its forms. We therefore 

reaffirm the extension of our standstill commitments until the end of 2013 as agreed in 

Toronto, commit to rollback any new protectionist measures that may have risen, 

including export restrictions and WTO-inconsistent measures to stimulate exports, and 

ask the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD to continue monitoring the situation and to report 

publicly on a semi-annual basis. 

43. With respect to the WTO Doha Development Round, we welcome the broader and more 

substantive engagement of the past four months among our representatives in Geneva. 

Bearing in mind that 2011 is a critical window of opportunity, albeit narrow, this 

engagement must intensify and expand. We now need to complete the end game. We 

direct our negotiators to engage in across-the-board negotiations to promptly bring the 

Doha Development Round to a successful, ambitious, comprehensive, and balanced 

conclusion consistent with the mandate of the Doha Development Round and built on the 

progress achieved. Once such an outcome is reached, we commit to seek ratification, 

where necessary, in our respective systems. 

44. We strongly believe that trade can be an effective tool for reducing poverty and 

enhancing economic growth in developing countries, LICs in particular. To support LIC 

capacity to trade, we welcome the adoption of the Multi-Year Action Plan on 

Development. We note our commitment to at least maintain, beyond 2011, Aid for Trade 

levels that reflect the average of the last three years (2006 to 2008); to make progress 

toward duty-free quota-free market access for least developed country (LDC) products in 

line with our Hong Kong commitments, without prejudice to other negotiations, 

including as regards preferential rules of origin; to call on relevant international agencies 

to coordinate a collective multilateral response to support trade facilitation; and to 

support measures to increase the availability of trade finance in developing countries, 

particularly LICs. In this respect, we also agree to monitor and assess trade finance 

programs in support of developing countries, in particular their coverage and impact on 

LICs, and to evaluate the impact of regulatory regimes on trade finance. 

45. We recognize the potential for faster growth in Africa, which could be unlocked by 

African plans for deeper regional economic integration. We therefore commit to support 

the regional integration efforts of African leaders, including by helping to realize their 

vision of a free trade area through the promotion of trade facilitation and regional 

infrastructure. We call on the MDBs and WTO to collaborate with us in supporting this 

endeavor.

Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth 

46. The crisis disproportionately affected the most vulnerable in the poorest countries and 

slowed progress toward achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 

As the premier economic forum, we recognize the need to strengthen and leverage our 

development efforts to address such challenges. 

47. At the same time, narrowing the development gap and reducing poverty are integral to 

achieving our broader Framework objectives of strong, sustainable and balanced growth 

by generating new poles of growth and contributing to global rebalancing. We are 

therefore using our best efforts for a rapid increase in the share of global growth and 

prosperity for developing countries, LICs in particular. 
16 

48. We commit to work in partnership with other developing countries, LICs in particular, to 

help them build the capacity to achieve and maintain their maximum economic growth 

potential. We have thus developed a consensus for the G20’s contribution to global 

development efforts in line with our Toronto mandate. 

49. We endorse today the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth (Annex I) and 

its Multi-Year Action Plan on Development (Annex II). 

50. The Seoul Consensus and the Multi-Year Action Plan are based on six core principles: 

 First, an enduring and meaningful reduction in poverty cannot be achieved without 

inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth, while the provision of ODA, as well as 

the mobilization of all other sources of financing, remain essential to the 

development of most LICs. 

 Second, we recognize that while there are common factors, there is no single 

formula for development success. We must therefore engage other developing 

countries as partners, respecting national ownership of a country’s policies as the 

most important determinant of its successful development, thereby helping to ensure 

strong, responsible, accountable and transparent development partnerships between 

the G20 and LICs. 

 Third, our actions must prioritize global or regional systemic issues that call for 

collective action and have the potential for transformative impact. 

 Fourth, we recognize the critical role of the private sector to create jobs and wealth, 

and the need for a policy environment that supports sustainable private sector-led 

investment and growth. 

 Fifth, we will maximize our value-added and complement the development efforts of 

other key players by focusing on areas where the G20 has a comparative advantage 

or could add momentum. 

 And finally, we will focus on tangible outcomes of significant impact that remove 

blockages to improving growth prospects in developing countries, especially LICs. 

51. The Seoul Consensus also identifies nine key pillars where we believe actions are 

necessary to resolve the most significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and 

resilient growth in developing countries, LICs in particular: infrastructure, human 

resource development, trade, private investment and job creation, food security, 

growth with resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization and

knowledge sharing. The Multi-Year Action Plan then outlines the specific, detailed 

actions to which we commit in order to address these bottlenecks, including to: 

a) Facilitate increased investment from public, semi-public and private sources and 

improve the implementation and maintenance of national and regional infrastructure 

projects in sectors where there are bottlenecks. We agree to establish a High-Level 

Panel (HLP) to recommend measures to mobilize infrastructure financing and review 

MDBs’ policy frameworks. We will announce the Chair of the HLP by December 
17 

2010; 

b) Improve the development of employable skills matched to employer and labor market 

needs in order to enhance the ability to attract investment, create decent jobs and 

increase productivity. We will support the development of internationally comparable 

skills indicators and the enhancement of national strategies for skills development, 

building on the G20 Training Strategy; 

c) Improve the access and availability to trade with advanced economies and between 

developing and LICs. Our action plans on trade are discussed in paragraphs 42 to 45 

above; 

d) Identify, enhance and promote responsible private investment in value chains and 

develop key indicators for measuring and maximizing the economic and employment 

impact of private sector investment; 

e) Enhance food security policy coherence and coordination and increase agricultural 

productivity and food availability, including by advancing innovative results-based 

mechanisms, promoting responsible agriculture investment, fostering smallholder 

agriculture, and inviting relevant international organizations to develop, for our 2011 

Summit in France, proposals to better manage and mitigate risks of food price 

volatility without distorting market behavior. We also welcome the progress of the 

Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, as well as that of other bilateral and 

multilateral channels, including the UN Committee on World Food Security, and 

invite further contributions; 

f) Improve income security and resilience to adverse shocks by assisting developing 

countries enhance social protection programs, including through further 

implementation of the UN Global Pulse Initiative, and by facilitating implementation 

of initiatives aimed at a quantified reduction of the average cost of transferring 

remittances; 

g) Increase access to finance for the poor and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 

Our action plans for financial inclusion and associated implementation mechanisms 

are discussed in paragraphs 55 to 57 below; 

h) Build sustainable revenue bases for inclusive growth and social equity by improving 

developing country tax administration systems and policies and highlighting the 

relationship between non-cooperative jurisdictions and development; and 

i) Scale up and mainstream sharing of knowledge and experience, especially between 

developing countries, in order to improve their capacity and ensure that the broadest 

range of experiences are used to help tailor national policies. 

52. We commit to and prioritize full, timely and effective implementation of the Multi-Year 

Action Plan, understanding its high potential to have a positive transformative impact on 

people’s lives, both through our individual and collective actions and in partnership with 

other global development stakeholders. We will continue to work closely with relevant 

international organizations to push these actions forward. 
18 

53. We reaffirm our commitment to achievement of the MDGs and will align our work in 

accordance with globally agreed development principles for sustainable economic, social 

and environmental development, to complement the outcomes of the UN High-Level 

Plenary Meeting on the MDGs held in September 2010 in New York, as well as with 

processes such as the Fourth UN LDC Summit in Turkey and the Fourth High-Level 

Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Korea, both to be held in 2011. We also reaffirm our 

respective ODA pledges and commitments to assist the poorest countries and mobilize 

domestic resources made following on from the Monterrey Consensus and other fora. 

54. We further mandate the Development Working Group to monitor implementation of the 

Multi-Year Action Plan, so that we may review progress and consider the need for any 

further steps at the 2011 Summit in France. Development based on the Seoul Consensus 

will therefore be an enduring part of future G20 Summits. What we promise, we will 

deliver. 

Financial Inclusion

55. We reiterate our strong commitment to financial inclusion and recognize the benefits of 

improved access to finance to lift the lives of the poor and to support the contribution of 

SMEs to economic development. We welcome the stock taking report on successful and 

scalable models of SME financing in developing economies. We have developed the 

Financial Inclusion Action Plan based on our Principles for Innovative Financial 

Inclusion as the work program for the coming year. 

56. Working with the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, the Consultative Group to Assist the 

Poor and the International Finance Corporation, we commit to launch the Global 

Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) as an inclusive platform for all G20 countries, 

interested non-G20 countries and relevant stakeholders to carry forward our work on 

financial inclusion, including implementation of the Financial Inclusion Action Plan. The 

GPFI’s efforts over the next year will include helping countries put into practice the 

Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion, strengthening data for measuring financial 

inclusion, and developing methodologies for countries wishing to set targets. We agree 

that the GPFI should report to us on its progress at our 2011 Summit in France. 

57. Recognizing the vital role of SMEs in employment and income generation, we welcome 

the strong response to the G20 SME Finance Challenge and the innovative models for 

scaling up private SME finance that have emerged from the competition and congratulate 

the winners. We have constructed a flexible SME Finance Framework to mobilize grant, 

risk capital and private financing by using existing funding mechanisms and the new 

SME Finance Innovation Fund to finance the winning proposals and other successful 

SME financing models. We welcome the commitment of Canada, Korea, the United 

States and the Inter-American Development Bank of $528 million to the Framework 

through grants and co-financing. 

Energy 

Fossil Fuel Subsidies

58. We reaffirm our commitment to rationalize and phase-out over the medium term 

inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, with timing based 
19 

on national circumstances, while providing targeted support for the poorest. We direct our 

Finance and Energy Ministers to report back on the progress made in implementing 

country-specific strategies and in achieving the goals to which we agreed in Pittsburgh 

and Toronto at the 2011 Summit in France. 

59. We note the preliminary report of the IEA, World Bank and OECD and ask these 

organizations, together with OPEC, to further assess and review the progress made in 

implementing the Pittsburgh and Toronto commitments and report back to the 2011 

Summit in France. 

60. We recognize the value of the sharing of knowledge, expertise and capacity with respect 

to programs and policies that phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.

Fossil Fuel Price Volatility 

61. We recognize the importance of a well-functioning and transparent market in oil for 

world economic growth. We strongly support the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI) and ask 

the IEF, IEA and OPEC for a report suggesting specific steps in order to improve the 

quality, timeliness and reliability of the JODI Database. The report should include a 

proposed timeframe and implementation strategy, which will explore the ways to 

improve data availability on oil production, consumption, refining and stock levels, as 

appropriate. An intermediate report should be submitted to the February 2011 Finance 

Ministers’ meeting, with the final report submitted to the April 2011 Finance Ministers’ 

meeting. We also request the IEF, IEA, OPEC and IOSCO to produce a joint report, by 

the April 2011 Finance Ministers’ meeting, on how the oil spot market prices are assessed 

by oil price reporting agencies and how this affects the transparency and functioning of 

oil markets.

62. We support the establishment of the IEF charter to strengthen the producer-consumer 

dialogue, and welcome the IEF plan, developed in cooperation with the IEA and OPEC, 

to hold an annual symposium with major relevant institutions on energy market outlooks. 

We call on the IEF, IEA and OPEC to produce a joint report and common communiqué, 

highlighting their respective outlooks and their short, medium and long-term forecasts for 

oil market supply and demand. We welcome their ongoing work on the linkages between 

oil physical and financial markets. 

63. Welcoming the June and November 2010 IOSCO reports, we ask IOSCO to further 

monitor developments in the oil OTC markets and report to the FSB for consideration of 

next steps, for improved regulation and enhanced transparency of the oil financial market 

in April 2011 by Finance Ministers and other relevant Ministers, informed by the work of 

the Energy Experts Group. We ask the Energy Experts Group to extend its work on 

volatility to other fossil fuels as a second step. 

Global Marine Environment Protection 

64. We welcome the progress achieved by the Global Marine Environment Protection 

(GMEP) initiative toward the goal of sharing best practices to protect the marine 

environment, to prevent accidents related to offshore exploration and development, as 

well as marine transportation, and to deal with their consequences. We recognize the 

work done by the GMEP Experts Sub-Group and take note of the progress made on 
20 

reviewing international regulation of offshore oil and gas exploration, production and 

transport with respect to marine environmental protection as a first step to implement the 

Toronto mandate. 

65. Future work on the GMEP initiative should benefit from relevant findings, as they 

become available, from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 

in the United States and the Montara Commission of Inquiry in Australia. We ask the 

GMEP Experts Sub-Group to provide a further report, with the support of the IMO, 

OECD, IEA, OPEC, International Regulators Forum, and International Association of 

Drilling Contractors and, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, to continue work on 

the effective sharing of best practices at the 2011 Summit in France.

Climate Change and Green Growth 

66. Addressing the threat of global climate change is an urgent priority for all nations. We 

reiterate our commitment to take strong and action-oriented measures and remain fully 

dedicated to UN climate change negotiations. We reaffirm the objective, provisions, and 

the principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 

including common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. We 

thank Mexico for hosting the UNFCCC negotiations to be held in Cancun beginning at 

the end of November 2010. Those of us who have associated with the Copenhagen 

Accord reaffirm our support for it and its implementation. We all are committed to 

achieving a successful, balanced result that includes the core issues of mitigation, 

transparency, finance, technology, adaptation, and forest preservation. In this regard, we 

welcome the work of the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing 

established by the UN Secretary-General and ask our Finance Ministers to consider its 

report. We also support and encourage the delivery of fast-start finance commitments. 

67. The ongoing loss of biodiversity is a global environmental and economic challenge. 

Both climate change and loss of biodiversity are inextricably linked. We acknowledge 

the outcomes of the global study on the economics of ecosystems and biodiversity. We 

welcome the successful conclusion of COP10 in Nagoya. 

68. We are committed to support country-led green growth policies that promote 

environmentally sustainable global growth along with employment creation while 

ensuring energy access for the poor. We recognize that sustainable green growth, as it is 

inherently a part of sustainable development, is a strategy of quality development, 

enabling countries to leapfrog old technologies in many sectors, including through the 

use of energy efficiency and clean technology. To that end, we will take steps to create, as 

appropriate, the enabling environments that are conducive to the development and 

deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy technologies, including policies and 

practices in our countries and beyond, including technical transfer and capacity building. 

We support the ongoing initiatives under the Clean Energy Ministerial and encourage 

further discussion on cooperation in R&D and regulatory measures, together with 

business leaders, and ask our Energy Experts Group to monitor and report back to us on 

progress at the 2011 Summit in France. We also commit to stimulate investment in clean 

energy technology, energy and resource efficiency, green transportation, and green cities 

by mobilizing finance, establishing clear and consistent standards, developing long-term 

energy policies, supporting education, enterprise and R&D, and continuing to promote 

cross-border collaboration and coordination of national legislative approaches. 
21 

Anti-Corruption 

69. Recognizing that corruption is a severe impediment to economic growth and 

development, we endorse the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan (Annex III). Building on 

previous declarations, and cognizant of our role as leaders of major trading nations, we 

recognize a special responsibility to prevent and tackle corruption and commit to 

supporting a common approach to building an effective global anti-corruption regime. 

70. In this regard, we will lead by example in key areas as detailed in the Anti-Corruption 

Action Plan, including: to accede or ratify and effectively implement the UN 

Convention against Corruption and promote a transparent and inclusive review process; 

adopt and enforce laws against the bribery of foreign public officials; prevent access of 

corrupt officials to the global financial system; consider a cooperative framework for 

the denial of entry to corrupt officials, extradition, and asset recovery; protect 

whistleblowers; safeguard anticorruption bodies. We are also committed to undertake a 

dedicated effort to encourage public-private partnerships to tackle corruption and to 

engage the private sector in the fight against corruption, with a view to promoting 

propriety, integrity and transparency in the conduct of business affairs, as well as in the 

public sector. 

71. The G20 will hold itself accountable for its commitments. Beyond our participation in 

existing mechanisms of peer review for international anti-corruption standards, we 

mandate the Anti-Corruption Working Group to submit annual reports on the 

implementation of our commitments to future Summits for the duration of the AntiCorruption Action Plan. 

Business Summit 

72. Recognizing the importance of private sector-led growth and job creation, we welcome 

the Seoul G20 Business Summit held on November 10 and 11 that convened global 

business leaders under the theme “The Role of Business for Sustainable and Balanced 

Growth”. We look forward to continuing the G20 Business Summit in upcoming 

Summits. 

Consultation 

73. We recognize, given the broad impact of our decisions, the necessity to consult with the 

wider international community. We will increase our efforts to conduct G20 

consultation activities in a more systematic way, building on constructive partnerships 

with international organizations, in particular the UN, regional bodies, civil society, 

trade unions and academia. 

74. Bearing in mind the importance of the G20 being both representative and effective as 

the premier forum for our international economic cooperation, we reached a broad 

consensus on a set of principles for non-member invitations to Summits, including that 

we will invite no more than five non-member invitees, of which at least two will be 

countries in Africa. 

 
22 

ANNEXES (http://www.seoulsummit.kr/outcomes/)

 

I. Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth 

II. Multi-Year Action Plan on Development 

III. Anti-Corruption Action Plan 

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT (http://www.seoulsummit.kr/outcomes/)

I. Policy Commitments by G20 Members