NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

IROBOT CORPORATION,

Appellant

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

SHENZHEN ZHIYI TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., DBA

ILIFE,

Intervenor

______________________

2018-1690

______________________

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-1057.

______________________

Decided: April 19, 2019 

______________________

WILLIAM M. JAY, Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by DAVID 

ZIMMER, Boston, MA. 

 RONALD TRAUD, Office of the General Counsel, United 

States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, 

argued for appellee. Also represented by DOMINIC L.
2 IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC

BIANCHI, WAYNE W. HERRINGTON, PANYIN HUGHES. 

 NICHOLAS A. BROWN, Greenberg Traurig LLP, San 

Francisco, CA, argued for intervenor. Also represented by 

JONATHAN D. BALL, New York, NY. 

 ______________________

Before DYK, MAYER, and BRYSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge BRYSON.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner, iRobot Corporation (“iRobot”) appeals the 

United States International Trade Commission’s (“ITC’s”) 

final decision terminating its investigation regarding U.S. 

Patent No. 9,486,924 (“the ’924 patent”). Because we agree 

with the ITC’s construction of the claim term “instructions,” which iRobot agrees is determinative of infringement, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

iRobot is the owner of the ’924 patent and the manufacturer of a line of cleaning robots, named Roomba®. The 

’924 patent relates to such robots. Independent claims 1 

and 12 of the ’924 patent, which are at issue in this case, 

recite

1. A method of cleaning a room, the method 

comprising:

transmitting from a cleaning robot to a mobile phone a status of the cleaning robot; and 

receiving at the cleaning robot from the mobile phone, in response to an operator command input at the mobile phone and at least 

in part indicative of a schedule, information 

including instructions configured to cause a 
IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC 3

processor of the cleaning robot to execute a 

cleaning operation in the room according to 

the schedule, wherein executing the cleaning 

operation in the room according to the schedule comprises:

leaving a stationary charging device at which 

the cleaning robot is docked according to the 

schedule, and

navigating about a floor surface of a room.

* * *

12.A method of controlling a cleaning robot to 

clean a room, the method comprising:

initiating formation of a wireless communication link between the cleaning robot and a 

mobile phone; and

entering an operator command input into the 

mobile phone to cause the mobile phone to

transmit, using the wireless communication 

link, information to the cleaning robot, the 

operator command input being at least in 

part indicative of a schedule, and the information comprising instructions configured to 

cause a processor of the cleaning robot to perform operations including executing a cleaning operation in the room according to the 

schedule, wherein executing the cleaning operation in the room according to the schedule 

comprises:

leaving, according to the schedule, a stationary charging device at which the cleaning robot is docked, and 

navigating about a floor surface of the room.
4 IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC

’924 patent, col. 12, ll. 51–64 (emphasis added); id. col. 13, 

l. 32–col. 14, l. 3 (emphasis added). 

On May 23, 2017, the ITC instituted an investigation 

under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1337, based on a complaint filed by iRobot alleging infringement of the ’924 patent. The Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”) construed the term “instructions,” which appears in independent claims 1 and 12 of the ’924 patent, to 

mean “software program or machine executable code.” J.A. 

49–58.

Based on this construction, respondents Shenzhen 

Zhiyi Technology Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen Silver Star Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.; Hoover Inc.; and Royal Appliance Manufacturing Co. d/b/a TTI Floor Care North 

America, Inc. (collectively, “respondents”) filed an unopposed motion for summary determination of non-infringement of the ’924 patent. Because the parties did not 

dispute that the respondents’ accused products do not infringe any claims of the ’924 patent under the ALJ’s construction of “instructions,” the ALJ granted the 

respondents’ motion. On January 16, 2018, the ITC determined not to review the ALJ’s initial decision, and the decision therefore became final. iRobot appeals. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6). We review 

the ITC’s claim construction determinations de novo except 

for subsidiary facts based on extrinsic evidence, which we 

review for substantial evidence. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Int’l 

Trade Comm’n, 873 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, iRobot’s sole argument is that the claim 

term “instructions” should have been construed to mean 

“scheduling information,” as opposed to “program or machine executable code.” iRobot argues that its proposed 

construction could include, for example, a simple instruction to begin the cleaning cycle.
IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC 5

We conclude that the ITC’s claim construction was correct for several reasons. First, as the ITC found, “the plain 

and ordinary meaning of ‘instructions’ in this field is ‘program or machine executable code.’” J.A. 55. This would, 

according to the ITC, require transmission of some form of 

program or application that communicates to the robot’s 

processor what to do. There is no indication in the specification that the patentee intended to act as its own lexicographer to define “instructions” in a way inconsistent with 

its plain meaning.

Second, the specification contemplates that a mobile 

phone would transmit programming information. The 

summary of the invention begins by stating that “[t]he invention provides a method and apparatus for configuring a 

robotic device to operate according to a user defined schedule.” ’924 patent, col. 2, ll. 34–36. The specification explains that a “scheduling application program” can either 

be “pre-installed or [received from] a communication device” and that “upon a loading of a scheduling application 

program . . . a user can enable the robotic device to run autonomously according to the received scheduling information.” Id. col. 4, ll. 48–51. The patent makes clear that 

“[t]he communication device can also be used to load configuration information such as a scheduling application 

program . . . such that the robotic device can run autonomously without further user input upon storing user define 

[sic] scheduling information.” Id. col. 5, ll. 58–63. The 

specification elaborates at length about the sorts of “configuration information” that are transferred to the robotic 

vacuum. See id. col. 6, l. 20–col. 7, l. 11; id. col. 7, l. 53–col. 

8, l. 4. Such “configuration information” can include, for 

example, “information 22 for upgrading the existing capabilities of the robotic device or reprogramming the device 

to carry out new tasks.” Id. col. 6, ll. 37–40. “Further upgrading or reprogramming information 22 can include programs and applications allowing the robotic device to carry 

out completely new tasks . . . or ‘learning’ programs and 
6 IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC

applications allowing the robotic device to adapt its own 

programming based on information gained through carrying out specified tasks.” Id. col. 6, ll. 46–53. 

Third, the parties agree that the “configuration information” discussed throughout the specification refers to information that programs the robotic device—i.e., 

communicates how the robotic device should work.1 We

therefore find it not insignificant that the claims also use 

the term “configured” when referring to the “instructions” 

 

1 The dissent suggests that “configuration” does not 

necessarily mean programming. Dissenting Op. 4–5. But 

the specification equates “configured” and “programmed,” 

’924 patent, col. 7, l. 53–54, and the patentee itself distinguished configuration information from scheduling information and defines “configuration information” as 

“information that tells the robot how to work, and includes 

‘a scheduling application program’ that allows the robot, 

once it receives and ‘stor[es] user define[d] scheduling information,’ to ‘run autonomously without further user input,’” Blue Br. 6 (emphasis in original). The examples cited 

by the dissent do not suggest otherwise. The dissent points 

out that the term “configuration” is sometimes used to denote a physical arrangement, Dissenting Op. 5, but the 

specification is consistent in using “configured” and “configuration information” to mean “programmed” or “programming,” see, e.g., ’924 patent, col. 6, ll. 37–40 (“The 

configuration information 12 can also include information 

22 for upgrading the existing capabilities of the robotic device to carry out new tasks.”); id. col. 7, ll. 57–58 (“The communication device 12 can also be configured to 

communicate scheduling information 16 to the robotic device.”). Compare id. col. 10, ll. 65–67 (“In the system configuration 120 shown in FIG 6B, a mobile robotic device 104 

is linked to a communication device 102 through a cable 

122.”).
IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC 7

transmitted to the robotic device. Though the language is 

somewhat different—the claims refer to “instructions configured,” whereas the specification refers to “configuration 

information”—we conclude that use of the concept of “configuration” to refer to the “instructions” of the claims suggests that those “instructions” relate to programming the 

robotic vacuum; in other words, that the “instructions” 

transmitted comprise a “program or machine executable 

code.”

Fourth, the specification makes clear that “instructions” are only a subset of “information,” but that subset 

must be transmitted. Both the claims and the specification 

contemplate the transmission of scheduling information 

from the mobile device to the robotic vacuum that does not 

fall within the definition of “instructions.” See, e.g., id. Fig. 

7 (depicting the transmission of “scheduling information” 

separate from the transmission of “configuration information”). But the claims require the transmission of “information including instructions,” as well as other selected

information. Id. col. 12, l. 57 (emphasis added); accord id. 

col. 13, ll. 40–41 (“information comprising instructions”). 

And the specification states that “[i]n various embodiments 

of the invention the transmitted information can include 

control and scheduling information, control and configuration information, or control, configuration, and scheduling 

information.” Id. col. 3, ll. 50–53. In other words, “instructions” are a subset of “information,” which must be included in the information transmitted from the mobile 

device to the robotic vacuum. Even though other “scheduling information” can be transmitted, which is not “instructions,” the claims are not satisfied without communicating 

the “instructions” subset of such “information.” 

Finally, the claims are not designed to coincide with 

the broad scope of the specification. iRobot argues that the 

claims of the ’924 patent must be understood to require 

transmission of “scheduling information” because the specification discloses embodiments wherein “scheduling 
8 IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC

information,” but not a “program or machine executable

code,” are transmitted to the robotic vacuum. The patentee, like the dissent, relies partly on Figure 7, which discloses, in some instances, the transmission of scheduling 

information absent the transmission of a program. Id. Fig. 

7. But the fact that Figure 7 discloses embodiments where 

programming information is not transmitted is of no significance here. We are unconvinced that the claims must be 

coextensive with the specification. The ’924 patent is a continuation of U.S. Patent Application No. 11/166,891 (“the 

’891 application”), which included claims of much broader 

scope than those at issue here. For example, the ’891 application included one independent claim directed to only 

“communicating the scheduling information from the remote device to the robotic device,” ’891 application, cl. 6, 

and another directed to the transmission of “information”

that comprises “at least one of configuring the robotic device and providing scheduling information for the robotic 

device,” id. at cl. 11 (emphasis added). Given that the ’924 

patent and its parent application have an identical specification, and because the ’891 application was filed with

claims relating to a breadth of embodiments wherein the 

“information” transmitted to the robotic device is something other than a “program or machine executable code,” 

we find no reason to construe the claims here such that 

they are coextensive with the specification.

CONCLUSION

Because we agree with the ITC’s construction of the 

term “instructions,” we hold that the ITC did not err in 

granting summary determination of non-infringement and 

dismissing the investigation as to the respondents. We 

therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

IROBOT CORPORATION,

Appellant

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

SHENZHEN ZHIYI TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., DBA

ILIFE,

Intervenor

______________________

2018-1690

______________________

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-1057.

______________________

BRYSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The technology in this case is not complex, and for the 

most part the patent is easy to parse. The problem resides 

principally in a single claim term, the word “instructions.” 

Unfortunately, that term appears for the first time in the 

claims (except for two usages in an entirely different context in the specification), and the meaning of the term is 

therefore not immediately apparent. The International 

Trade Commission’s administrative law judge construed 
2 IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC

the claim to have the technical meaning of “software program or machine executable code,” and this court today 

agrees with that construction. I would read the term as 

having a non-technical meaning such as “directions,” “commands,” or “orders.” The difference leads to a different construction of independent claims 1 and 12 of the ’924 patent 

and a difference in outcome for this appeal. I therefore respectfully dissent.

Independent claims 1 and 12 require a user to enter a 

command into a mobile phone that is “at least in part indicative of a schedule.” Information is then sent from the 

phone to the cleaning robot. That information includes “instructions configured to cause a processor of the cleaning 

robot” to execute a cleaning operation. The “command” entered into the phone corresponds to the “instructions” sent 

by the phone to the robot.

Figure 7 of the ’924 patent makes clear that it is not 

necessary that the “instructions” sent by the phone to the 

robot include a downloadable software program or application. Instead, the instructions can be a simple direction to 

begin the cleaning process or to do so at a particular time. 

Figure 7 notes that the communication device, such as a 

mobile phone, can load configuration information, such as 

a scheduling application, in the robotic device. See Fig. 7,

step 146 (“Store Configuration Information (e.g., Scheduling Application) in Robotic Device”). That step is “[o]nly 

necessary,” Figure 7 explains, if the pertinent configuration information is “not already installed” on the robotic device. Then, in separate steps, the user can enter scheduling 

information into the communication device (step 150), and 

that scheduling information can be transmitted to the robotic device (step 154), after which the robotic device can 

operate autonomously according to the scheduling information (step 158). 

The best interpretation of Figure 7 and the portion of 

the specification that describes it (’924 patent, col. 11, line 
IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC 3

42, through col. 12, line 28) is that the scheduling information is distinct from the scheduling application that is 

either already installed in the robot or is installed from the 

communication device before the entry of the “scheduling 

information.” The specification explains that for a robotic 

device without a pre-installed scheduling application program, or a robotic device needing reprogramming, “the 

communication device can be used to load the required configuration information into the robotic device.” ’924 patent, 

col. 11, ll. 42-46. At that point, the robotic device is “ready 

for use.” Id., col. 11, ll. 53-54.

The next step, according to the specification, is that the 

communication device “can be used to provide scheduling 

information or direct control information into the robotic 

device.” Id., col. 11, ll. 57-60. The scheduling information 

is then loaded and stored in the robotic device’s memory, 

which enables the robotic device to “run autonomously, 

based on this stored scheduling information.” Id., col. 11, 

line 65, through col. 12, line 4.

Read in light of those portions of the specification, the 

claim limitation “instructions configured to cause a processor of the cleaning robot” to execute a cleaning operation is 

most naturally interpreted as referring to the scheduling 

information that is sent from the communication device to 

trigger the operation of the cleaning application that has 

previously been loaded into the robot.

The administrative law judge’s construction of the term 

“instructions” is limited to a program or application that is 

downloaded from the mobile phone, which is referred to as 

“configuration information” in the patent. The administrative law judge’s construction does not include signals that 
4 IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC

simply direct the robot’s processor to clean according to a 

schedule.1

That construction seems to me to be incorrect. All that

is required by the claim language is that the information 

sent from the mobile phone to the robot’s processor include 

“instructions configured to cause” the robot’s processor to 

execute a cleaning operation. Absent any indication that 

the term “instructions” was being used as a term of art—

and there is no such indication in the specification—the 

plain meaning of that claim limitation is that the message 

sent from the mobile phone must cause the robot to clean 

as directed by that message. 

Obviously, the signal sent from the mobile phone must 

be in a form that can be understood by the processor. That 

is not to say, however, that the signal must be in the form 

of a “program” or an application. It can be as simple as a 

direction to clean “now,” or to clean “according to the previously installed schedule,” or to begin a cleaning cycle 

within a designated period of time.

The parties agree that the patent contemplates that 

the mobile phone can send programming information to the 

robot’s processor. The question posed by the claim construction issue is whether the signals sent to the robot’s 

processor must be in the form of programming information. 

In my view, the language of the claims and the relevant 

discussion in the specification indicate that they do not. 

 

1 Although the scope of the reference in the administrative law judge’s opinion to “machine executable code” 

was not entirely clear, the Commission’s lawyer acknowledged at oral argument that the administrative law judge 

used the term “machine executable code” in a restrictive 

sense, requiring that the mobile phone download a program or application to infringe.
IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC 5

The intervenor focuses on the use of the term “configured” in the phrase “instructions configured to cause a processor of the cleaning robot” to execute a cleaning 

operation. According to the intervenor, the use of that term 

invokes the term “configuration information” that is used 

in the specification to refer to information that configures 

the robot’s processor by programming it. But the terms 

“configured” and “configuration” are used numerous times 

in the specification, not always in reference to the software 

programming or machine executable code. Throughout the 

specification, for example, the patent refers to the “configuration” of various components of the system, including the 

mobile phone, the mobile phone display, and the system as 

a whole. In those contexts, the term is not used to refer to 

programming or machine executable code. See, e.g., ’924 

patent, col. 5, line 66, through col. 6, line 1 (referring to 

“one possible configuration of a combined scheduling tool 

and communication device”); id., col. 10, ll. 19-21 (referring 

to a display on the mobile phone that is “configured to show 

information received from a robotic device”); id., col. 10, ll. 

31-32 (referring to user inputs that “are configured to provide direct control commands to a mobile robotic device”). 

Thus, it seems clear that the patent uses the term “configured” to refer to any arrangement of components that performs a particular function, and does not restrict the use of 

that term to software programs or machine executable 

code.

Even if the term “configured” is interpreted to mean 

“programmed,” that does not mean that the “instructions” 

that are “configured to cause a processor of the cleaning 

robot to perform” a cleaning operation must consist of a 

program or application that is downloaded to the robot’s 

processor. Sending programmed instructions is quite different from sending the program or application itself.

Because I interpret the contested claim language as applying to a system in which the command that is entered

at the mobile phone and transmitted to the robot’s 
6 IROBOT CORPORATION v. ITC

processor must simply direct the processor to cause the robot to execute a cleaning operation, I disagree with the 

claim construction adopted by the administrative law 

judge. I would therefore reverse the Commission’s summary determination of non-infringement.