UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5098

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOE BOB CLARK, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior

District Judge. (2:10-cr-00182-RGD-TEM-1)

Submitted: June 1, 2012 Decided: June 12, 2012

Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Walter B. 

Dalton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Norfolk, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, 

Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Joe Bob Clark, Jr., appeals his conviction and thirtymonth sentence following his guilty plea to one count of 

traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register or 

update a registration, as required by the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA” or “the Act”), in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006). Clark argues that, in 

enacting SORNA, Congress (1) violated the non-delegation 

doctrine by impermissibly delegating legislative functions to 

the Attorney General, namely, the discretion to determine 

whether SORNA’s registration requirements should apply to sex 

offenders like Clark, who were convicted prior to the Act’s 

enactment; and (2) exceeded its authority under the Commerce 

Clause. Clark further argues that the retroactive application 

of SORNA to a pre-enactment offender violates the Ex Post Facto 

Clause. For the reasons that follow, we reject these arguments 

and affirm. 

Prior to entering a conditional guilty plea, Clark 

moved to dismiss the indictment against him, raising the same 

constitutional claims pressed on appeal. The district court 

denied the motion. We review de novo the district court’s 

denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment. United States v. 

Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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“The non-delegation doctrine is based on the principle 

of preserving the separation of powers between the coordinate 

branches of government.” United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 

1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 2009). Congress’ delegation of authority 

to another branch of government does not offend the nondelegation doctrine as long as Congress has delineated an 

“intelligible principle” guiding the exercise of that authority.

J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409

(1928). Even a general legislative directive is a 

constitutionally sufficient intelligible principle if Congress 

“clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency [that] 

is to apply it, and the boundaries of th[e] delegated 

authority.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 

(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Clark contends that there is no intelligible principle 

guiding the Attorney General’s exercise of his discretion. 

Although this court has yet to resolve this issue in a published 

decision, this court has rejected this argument in three 

unpublished, non-binding decisions. See United States v. 

Rogers, No. 10-5099, 2012 WL 698890 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2012)

(unpublished after argument), petition for cert. filed, __ 

U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. May 16, 2012) (No. 11-10450); United States v. 

Stewart, Nos. 11-4420/4471, 2012 WL 130746 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 

2012), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2012 WL 1390242 (U.S. May 21, 
4

2012); United States v. Burns, 418 F. App’x 209 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(unpublished after argument). As was the court in Rogers, we 

are “satisfied that the persuasive reasoning of the panels in 

Burns and Stewart . . . fully disposes of the claim here.” 2012 

WL 698890, at *2. This disposition is also in accord with the 

published opinions from several of our sister circuits, which 

have squarely rejected the non-delegation argument. See, e.g., 

United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2010) 

(concluding that the Attorney General’s delegated authority is 

“highly circumscribed” because SORNA “includes specific 

provisions delineating what crimes require registration; where, 

when, and how an offender must register; what information is 

required of registrants; and the elements and penalties for the 

federal crime of failure to register” (internal citations 

omitted)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3487 (2010); United States 

v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 264 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that 

SORNA’s statement of purpose is a guiding intelligible 

principle); Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1213-14 (describing SORNA’s 

broad policy goals as intelligible principles). Based on these 

persuasive authorities, we too reject Clark’s non-delegation 

argument. 

Turning to Clark’s Commerce Clause and ex post facto 

claims, Clark aptly concedes that these issues are foreclosed by 

this court’s decision in United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 
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(4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010). A panel 

of this court cannot “overrule or reconsider a precedent set by 

another panel.” United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 486 n.8 

(4th Cir. 2002). We thus hold that Clark’s ex post facto and 

Commerce Clause challenges to SORNA fail.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED