RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 20a0058p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL FISHER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

┐

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

┘

No. 18-5847

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 3:17-cv-00814—William Lynn Campbell, Jr., District Judge.

Argued: May 9, 2019

Decided and Filed: February 27, 2020

Before: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Constance Mann, THE LAW OFFICES OF CONSTANCE MANN, Franklin, 

Tennessee, for Appellant. Stanley E. Graham, WALLER LANSDEN DORTCH & DAVIS, 

LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Constance Mann, THE LAW OFFICES 

OF CONSTANCE MANN, Franklin, Tennessee, for Appellant. Stanley E. Graham, Brittany 

Stancombe Hopper, WALLER LANSDEN DORTCH & DAVIS, LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for 

Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Michael Fisher began working on 

Defendant Nissan North America’s factory floor in 2003. Approximately 12 years later, Fisher 

>
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 2

went on extended leave for severe kidney disease and, ultimately, a kidney transplant. When he 

returned to work, he was still recovering from the transplant, and his attendance suffered. Fisher 

proposed several different accommodations, some of which were not provided. When he 

received a final written warning about his attendance, he left work and did not return. Fisher 

filed suit, centrally claiming that Nissan failed to accommodate his disability and to engage in 

the interactive process, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the Act), 42 

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to Nissan. Because 

material factual disputes remain on some of Fisher’s claims, we AFFIRM in part and 

REVERSE in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2003, Nissan hired Fisher as a production technician on its factory line. He 

primarily worked in the Fits rotation, attaching doors, hoods, and trunks to new vehicles. 

Fisher consistently received positive performance evaluations. At his ten-year 

evaluation, for example, he met requirements in 16 categories and exceeded requirements in the 

remaining 6. His supervisor complimented his “great attitude,” writing that he would like to 

make Fisher “a key trainer because it seems you do very well at teaching and showing others 

how to do the job the right way.” Fisher had few disciplinary problems. He estimated that he 

might have been “written up” two or three times during his 14 years at the plant, though there are 

no written warnings in the record. He did receive occasional “counseling”—the disciplinary step 

before a verbal warning—and one verbal warning for calling in sick without enough leave time 

to cover his absence. But in 2013, his supervisor noted that Fisher had “been doing better the[] 

last couple months” with regard to attendance and told him to “keep up the good work.”

Then, Fisher’s kidney problems worsened. In 2015, he discussed his illness with the Fits 

supervisor, explaining that his kidney function, which had been low for years, had dropped more. 

Hoping to continue working, Fisher asked his supervisor for a transfer to an easier position. The 

supervisor responded, “I could put you somewhere, but it ain’t for this kind of stuff. You just 

need to go on, go on out.” So, Fisher went on extended leave, drawing long-term disability 

payments.
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 3

In August 2016, Fisher received a kidney transplant. For months after the surgery, he 

remained easily fatigued. The antirejection medicines caused serious side effects that Fisher 

described as “almost like having the flu every day.” If he exerted himself to the point of 

sweating, his kidney function decreased and the symptoms worsened. His doctor estimated that 

it would take a year to become accustomed to the medicines.

But by October, Fisher’s leave was running out, and his disability payments were ending. 

Nissan’s human-resources manager warned Fisher that if he was not able to extend his leave, he 

could lose his job; she also said he could not return to work with restrictions When Fisher raised 

this situation with his doctor, she cleared him to return to work on October 17, 2016.

When Fisher returned to work, he was placed in what everyone hoped would be an easier 

position, building doors in the Closures rotation. Fisher acknowledged that the move was well 

intentioned, but when he began the work, he found that it was “10 times harder” than Fits. He 

requested extra breaks or to work half-time and was refused. When he asked for a transfer to a 

different position, his supervisor’s response was equivocal: “yes, maybe, you know, we’ll see.”

Around the same time, on October 20, Fisher’s doctor wrote Nissan a letter explaining 

that Fisher was “risk[ing] his health” and that, “ideally,” Fisher needed “at least another month 

[off work] to build up his strength.” She also wrote that he “would benefit from being 

transitioned into his job gradually, perhaps working half-time for a few weeks before doing fulltime work.” Before a decision was reached on Fisher’s pending transfer request, the humanresources manager informed Fisher that he had been granted extra leave.

A few weeks later, Fisher’s doctor wrote another letter, this time certifying that Fisher 

was “medically cleared to return to work” but needed bathroom breaks to prevent damage to the 

transplanted kidney. In late November—a month before his extended leave ran out—Fisher 

returned to work a second time, this time (per his request) back at his old position in Fits.

The work was challenging. Fisher had not acclimated to his antirejection medicines, and 

his flu-like symptoms continued. He also needed time off for doctor’s appointments but had no 

leave time left. He began to miss work more frequently—and to be disciplined for his absences. 

First, he got a verbal warning for going home early on December 21 and January 4 and calling in 
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 4

sick on January 11. A week later, he received a written warning for leaving early on January 19 

and calling in sick on January 25. And finally, on February 3, he was issued a final written 

reminder for leaving early on January 27 and being late on January 31. According to Fisher, all 

these absences were related to his kidney.

As each warning was issued, Fisher met with supervisors and human resources to discuss 

his attendance. Fisher testified that he always described his kidney transplant and requested 

potential accommodations. For example, after being warned about missing work for a doctor’s 

appointment in December, Fisher asked his supervisor “again” if there was an easier position, 

such as checking bolts or working in final fit. The supervisor responded, “I feel for you, but my 

hands are tied.” Fisher suggested working half days but “Nissan had already talked to [his] 

doctor about that and said no, that’s not an option.” And Nissan made “such a big deal about” 

Fisher’s requests for extra breaks that he eventually “left it alone.”

When describing his final meeting with human resources on February 3, Fisher explained 

that he was pessimistic because he had “asked them before” for help. He nonetheless attempted 

again to describe his illness and his doctor’s suggestions for his return to work. One humanresources representative said Nissan needed restrictions, not suggestions, and Fisher responded 

that he had not been permitted to return to work with restrictions. The representative “went 

ballistic” and said that Fisher could not “just be going home for a stomachache.” According to 

Nissan’s notes from the meeting, Fisher said that the company was “not willing to work with 

[him]” and requested “another job.” Human resources asked, “If you cannot come to work, what 

will moving you to another job accomplish?” Fisher responded, “Let’s do it and we’ll see.” 

Without further discussion of the possibility of a transfer, Nissan’s representatives issued the 

final warning.

At the end of the meeting, a representative told Fisher that he had “never seen anybody 

come back” from a final written warning. So, Fisher left the plant without informing his 

supervisors and did not return. A week later, he was terminated for absenteeism.

Fisher then filed suit against Nissan, bringing disability-related claims under the ADA 

and its state equivalent, the Tennessee Disability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103, as well as a 
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 5

tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary 

judgment to Nissan on all claims, and Fisher appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Failure to Accommodate

Fisher’s central claims against Nissan arise under the ADA. The ADA was enacted in 

response to congressional findings highlighting “the continuing existence of unfair and 

unnecessary discrimination and prejudice [that] denies people with disabilities the opportunity to 

compete on an equal basis.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). When the Act was amended in 2008, 

“Congress reasserted its goal of ‘provid[ing] clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards’ to 

implement a ‘comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 

individuals with disabilities.’” Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2018) 

(alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), (2)). 

To that end, the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the 

basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Act’s broad definition of discrimination includes 

“not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 

otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such 

covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 

operation of the business of such covered entity.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Kleiber v. 

Honda of Am. Mfg., 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2007). 

Fisher claims that Nissan discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his 

disability. The district court granted summary judgment to Nissan on this claim. We review a 

district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing “all justifiable inferences” in his favor. Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The central question is “whether the evidence 

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided 

that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52. 
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 6

1. Direct or Indirect Evidence

The parties dispute which test applies to Fisher’s failure to accommodate claim. 

ADA discrimination claims are analyzed under two different rubrics, depending on whether the 

plaintiff relies on “direct” or “indirect” evidence of discrimination. See Ferrari v. Ford Motor 

Co., 826 F.3d 885, 891–92 (6th Cir. 2016). Direct evidence of disability discrimination “does 

not require the fact finder to draw any inferences [to conclude] that the disability was at least a 

motivating factor.” Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 853 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

We have explained why the distinction between direct and indirect is “vital”:

When an employer acknowledges that it relied upon the plaintiff’s handicap in 

making its employment decision[,] the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting 

approach is unnecessary because the issue of the employer’s intent, the issue for 

which McDonnell Douglas was designed, has been admitted by the defendant and 

the plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of his or her 

disability.

Ferrari, 862 F.3d at 892 (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because failure to accommodate is listed in the Act’s definition of disability 

discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), “claims premised upon an employer’s failure to 

offer a reasonable accommodation necessarily involve direct evidence (the failure to 

accommodate) of discrimination. . . . [I]f the fact-finder accepts the employee’s version of the 

facts, no inference is necessary to conclude that the employee has proven this form of 

discrimination.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 868 (citation omitted). A substantial body of our caselaw 

confirms this distinction. See, e.g., Brumley v. UPS, 909 F.3d 834, 839 (6th Cir. 2018); EEOC v. 

Dolgencorp, LLC, 899 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2018); Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 853; Meade v. 

AT&T Corp., 657 F. App’x 391, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2016); Belasco v. Warrensville Heights City 

Sch. Dist., 634 F. App’x 507, 514 (6th Cir. 2015); Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp., 610 F. App’x 

519, 526 (6th Cir. 2015); Horn v. Knight Facilities Mgmt.-GM, 556 F. App’x 452, 454–55 (6th 

Cir. 2014); Cash v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 548 F. App’x 330, 334 (6th Cir. 2013).

Despite this robust precedent, Nissan argues that “a per se rule applying the direct 

evidence test to all accommodation cases would conflict with the numerous published and 

unpublished decisions of the Sixth Circuit.” As Nissan points out, we have occasionally—
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 7

though generally in unpublished cases—analyzed a failure-to-accommodate claim under the 

indirect test. See, e.g., Keogh v. Concentra Health Servs., 752 F. App’x 316, 326 (6th Cir. 

2018); Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 883 F.3d 595, 603 (6th Cir. 

2018); Aldini v. Kroger Co. of Mich., 628 F. App’x 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2015); Johnson v. 

Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 443 F. App’x 974, 982–83 (6th Cir. 2011). These cases do not explain 

why they apply the indirect test rather than the direct, nor do they distinguish Kleiber and its 

progeny. And each can be traced back to a single case, DiCarlo v. Potter, that applied the 

indirect test when analyzing a failure to accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act, not the 

ADA. 358 F.3d 408, 419 (6th Cir. 2004).1 Our court, sitting en banc, has explained that though 

the two statutes have many similarities, they are not identical. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition 

Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314–17 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Kleiber, our foundational case 

establishing that ADA failure to accommodate claims are analyzed pursuant to the direct test, 

controls.

Fisher also provides additional direct evidence of discrimination, in the form of an 

alleged policy against accommodating “personal” disabilities. According to both Fisher’s 

testimony and notes from a nurse at his doctor’s office, Nissan refused to allow him to return to 

work with restrictions. When Fisher requested transfers to easier positions, one supervisor 

insisted that easier positions “ain’t for this kind of stuff” and another said his “hands [were] 

tied.” Yet Fisher claimed to have heard of at least two coworkers who were permitted 

restrictions and reassignments to easier positions after suffering on-the-job injuries. One of his 

supervisors explained the difference in a memo, writing that “Nissan does not accommodate 

personal restrictions.” In records from Fisher’s visits to Nissan’s medical department, the 

diagnosis reads only “[p]ersonal.” Factual disputes as to Nissan’s policies regarding assignment 

to easier positions remain. 

Because the record reflects that Fisher’s claim was based on Nissan’s failure to offer a 

reasonable accommodation, it involves direct evidence of discrimination under the ADA. See 

Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 853. Under the direct-evidence framework, Fisher bears the burden of 

1Tracing the citation chain back further, DiCarlo relies on another Rehabilitation Act case, Gaines v. 

Runyon, 107 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (6th Cir. 1997), for the indirect test.
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 8

establishing (1) that he is disabled, and (2) that he is “‘otherwise qualified’ for the position 

despite his or her disability: (a) without accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged 

‘essential’ job requirement eliminated; or (c) with a proposed reasonable accommodation.” 

Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 869 (quoting Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir.

2004)). Nissan bears the burden of “proving that a challenged job criterion is essential, and 

therefore a business necessity, or that a proposed accommodation will impose an undue hardship 

upon” Nissan. Id. (citation omitted). Notably, although “[a] defendant may use a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory rationale as a shield against indirect or circumstantial evidence of 

discrimination,” such a “neutral policy is of no moment” under the direct test. Dolgencorp, 899 

F.3d at 435 (emphasis omitted). In other words, an employer “may not illegitimately deny an 

employee a reasonable accommodation” pursuant to “a general policy and use that same policy 

as a” so-called “neutral basis for firing him.” Id.

Because Nissan does not dispute that Fisher is disabled, we proceed to the second 

element of Fisher’s proof.

2. Otherwise Qualified

When Fisher returned to work in late November 2016, he left early or called out sick 

without leave time to cover his absences because he “was still healing and still getting used to 

the [antirejection] medicine.” Nissan argues that these absences render Fisher unqualified for his 

position. 

But this logic does not apply if the absenteeism is caused by an underlying failure to 

accommodate a disability. “Imagine,” we have instructed, “a school that lacked an elevator to 

accommodate a teacher with mobility problems. It could not refuse to assign him to classrooms 

on the first floor, then turn around and fire him for being late to class after he took too long to 

climb the stairs between periods.” Dolgencorp, 899 F.3d at 435. In other words, even though 

presence in the classroom when the bell rings is an attendance requirement, a tardy teacher is not 

unqualified if his tardiness results from his employer’s unwillingness to accommodate. If, by 

contrast, no reasonable accommodation would cure the attendance problem—as, for example, 

when an employee is not medically cleared to work at all, see Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods 
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 9

Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998), or blames his absences on car problems rather than 

disability, see Stanciel v. Donahoe, 570 F. App’x 578, 580 (6th Cir. 2014)—the employee is not 

qualified. See also Williams v. AT&T Mobility Services LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 394 (6th Cir. 2017) 

(rejecting a failure to accommodate claim in part because “Williams provided no explanation for 

how Thompson’s specific recommendation of ten-minute breaks every two hours would 

alleviate” anxiety attacks that could happen at any time). “Hence ‘failure to consider the 

possibility of reasonable accommodation for known disabilities, if it leads to discharge for 

performance inadequacies resulting from the disabilities, amounts to a discharge solely because 

of the disabilities.’” Dolgencorp, 899 F.3d at 435 (quoting McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. 

Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).

Brenneman v. MedCentral Health System, 366 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2004), exemplifies this 

distinction. There, as here, the employer argued that the plaintiff was not qualified “due to his 

excessive absenteeism.” Id. at 419. The plaintiff in Brenneman “had been absent 193 times and 

had arrived late or left early on 34 occasions within the five years preceding his termination,” 

even though “regular attendance” was an essential function of the position. Id. at 419–20. In 

analyzing this argument, we began from the proposition that “even if defendant had granted 

plaintiff medical leave for those absences which plaintiff specifically alleges were [disability]-

related,” the plaintiff “would not have been qualified” for his position. Id. at 418–19 (emphasis 

added). Under Brenneman’s logic, absenteeism that is unrelated to disability may indeed render 

a plaintiff unqualified. For purposes of the “otherwise qualified” analysis, absenteeism that can 

be cured with a reasonable accommodation is treated differently.

Fisher stated on the record that all the absences were “because of [his] kidney.” In its 

briefing, Nissan does not dispute this point.2 Thus, Fisher’s absences do not in and of 

themselves render him unqualified for his position. Instead, under Dolgencorp, we ask whether 

those absences could have been avoided with reasonable accommodation—or, as in Brenneman, 

whether no reasonable accommodation would cure them. 

2At oral argument, Nissan argued for the first time that some of Fisher’s absences were unrelated to his 

disability. See Oral Argument at 23:28–24:12, Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., No. 18-5847 (6th Cir. May 9, 2019). This 

argument is forfeited. See Conlin v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 714 F.3d 355, 360 n.5 (6th Cir. 2013). Even if 

we were to consider the argument, it would simply create a factual dispute.
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 10

3. The Proposed Accommodations

The ADA requires employers to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 868. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of 

showing “that an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of 

cases.” U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002). The defendant then must show 

either “special (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the 

particular circumstances,” id. at 402, or that the proposed accommodation eliminates an essential 

job requirement, Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 869. The reasonableness of a proposed accommodation is 

a question of fact. Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998). 

In his briefing, Fisher identifies three potential accommodations that could have aided his 

transition back to full-time employment: a transfer to a different position, extra breaks, or a 

temporary part-time schedule. If one of these three accommodations passes muster, summary 

judgment in Nissan’s favor is not appropriate.

We begin with Fisher’s transfer requests. The Act defines reasonable accommodation to 

include “reassignment to a vacant position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). To show disability 

discrimination in the reassignment context, a plaintiff must show either that “he requested, and 

was denied, reassignment to a position for which he was otherwise qualified” or that “he 

requested and was denied some specific assistance in identifying jobs for which he could 

qualify.” Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 258 (6th Cir. 2000). If an 

employee requests assistance in identifying vacant positions—even a request as generic as “I 

want to keep working for you—do you have any suggestions?”—then “the employer has a duty 

under the ADA to ascertain whether he has some job that the employee might be able to fill.” Id. 

at 257 (brackets omitted) (quoting Miller v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 

1997)). The employee is not required to use magic words such as “accommodation” and 

“disability”; rather, we ask whether “a factfinder could infer that [the interaction] constituted a 

request for an accommodation.” Smith v. Henderson, 376 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2004). Then, 

“to overcome summary judgment, the plaintiff generally must identify the specific job he seeks 

and demonstrate that he is qualified for that position.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 870.
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 11

Fisher testified that in his “various meetings” with human resources, he always discussed 

his kidney failure and his need for accommodation. Fisher states that though he did not 

understand the ADA framework, he knew he “had some kind of right to either, you know, try to 

hold onto my job, you know, maybe get a little bit of assistance, help somehow, somewhere, 

something,” but that Nissan provided neither assistance nor explanation. The one meeting for 

which the record contains contemporaneous notes confirms this. When the human-resources

representative asked Fisher if there was “something we can do,” Fisher said (among other 

requests), “Give me another job.” Nissan responded, “If you cannot come to work, what will 

moving you to another job accomplish?”, and then informed him of the disciplinary decision.

Fisher testified that he had a friend who was injured while working at Nissan and was 

placed in an inspection position, checking bolts and hoods. Fisher repeatedly requested a similar 

move, as is shown by one interaction between Fisher and his supervisor after Fisher’s second 

return to work:

I had a doctor’s appointment, I think it was in December, and . . . when I 

came back and they told me that I was—[my supervisor,] Chris [Hargrove,] told 

me that I was going to be wrote up for that, for missing that—for missing that day 

that I went to the doctor’s. I had asked him again, I mean, there has got to be 

something easier here. I have seen you—I have been here for 14 years. I know—

you know, I could check bolts on the cars, I could check—I can go to final fit, 

work final fit. I mean, you have moved people all over the plant before I know 

. . .

And [Hargrove]—he said, “I feel for you, but my hands are tied. You 

know, there is pretty much nothing I can do.”

A reasonable factfinder could conclude that these interactions constituted a request for 

accommodation, including both for specific transfers (to a bolt-checking position or to final fit) 

and for “assistance in identifying jobs for which [Fisher] could qualify.” Burns, 222 F.3d at 258; 

see also Smith, 376 F.3d at 535. 

Nissan was therefore obliged to take three steps: (1) “identify the full range of alternative 

positions for which the individual satisfies the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

prerequisites”; (2) “determine whether the employee’s own knowledge, skills, and abilities 

would enable her to perform the essential functions of any of those alternative positions, with or 
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 12

without reasonable accommodations”; and (3) “consider transferring the employee to any of 

these other jobs, including those that would represent a demotion.” Burns, 222 F.3d at 257 

(quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998)). For example, in 

Burns itself, the employee was not qualified for the clerical position he requested, so the 

employer invited him to interview for a sales position. Id. at 251. There is no evidence in the 

record of comparable attempts by Nissan to identify suitable alternative positions for Fisher.

Nissan now submits that there was no suitable position. In particular, Nissan focuses on 

one of Fisher’s requests, to be a so-called “offline” worker. Offline workers substitute for 

employees who need to step away from the production line for any reason, such as for a 

bathroom break. But Fisher conceded during his deposition both that “there was no opening” for 

an offline position and that he had been denied such a position “years ago” because he lacked 

seniority. Either admission suffices to deem that request unreasonable. First, if there was no 

opening, the position was not “vacant,” as required by 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). C.f. Rorrer v. 

City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1044 (6th Cir. 2014); Hoskins v. Oakland Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 

227 F.3d 719, 729 (6th Cir. 2000). And second, it is not “reasonable in the run of cases” for a 

disability-related request for accommodation to “trump the rules of a seniority system.” U.S. 

Airways, 535 U.S. at 403. Fisher has not shown any “special circumstances” (such as the 

employer’s failure to abide by its seniority system), see id. at 405, that could overcome that 

general proposition.

But in his request for accommodation, Fisher identified other positions, such as checking 

bolts or moving to final fit. Seniority rules did not bar such a transfer; Fisher knew of an 

employee junior to him who checked bolts and hoods. Like that junior employee, Fisher 

indicated that he was qualified to inspect vehicles, a position apparently less challenging than the 

jobs he had worked for more than a decade. And Fisher insisted that he could have been placed 

in a position checking bolts when he requested the move. The record contains no evidence to the 

contrary, much less any evidence showing that final fit was full or that all other inspection 
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 13

positions were occupied. A factfinder could therefore credit Fisher’s statement that there were 

vacant positions.3

Nissan is then afforded an opportunity to show that Fisher’s transfer request would create 

an undue hardship or remove an essential function of the job. See Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 869. 

Nissan does not do so, instead pointing out that Fisher’s earlier transfers to Closures and back to 

Fits proved unsuccessful. This attempt to accommodate Fisher is to Nissan’s credit but has no 

bearing on whether a subsequent transfer request was unreasonable. The burden is on Nissan to 

present fact-specific evidence of hardship, and it has not done so.

Because a factfinder could conclude both that Fisher was qualified for a vacant inspection 

position he identified and that he requested and was denied assistance in identifying other 

available positions, Nissan is not entitled to summary judgment on the failure to accommodate 

claim. We therefore need not consider whether Fisher’s other proposed accommodations might 

also have been reasonable.

B. Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

Next, Fisher alleges that Nissan failed to engage in the ADA’s mandatory interactive 

process of determining how best to accommodate his disability. 

“Once an employee requests an accommodation, the employer has a duty to engage in an 

interactive process.” Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 857. From that point, “both parties have a duty to 

participate in good faith.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871. Once the employee “establishes a prima 

facie showing that he proposed a reasonable accommodation,” Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1041, “the 

employer has the burden of showing how the accommodation would cause an undue hardship,” 

Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 202–03 (6th Cir. 2010). If the interactive 

process was triggered but not successfully resolved, “courts should attempt to isolate the cause of 

the breakdown and then assign responsibility.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871 (quoting Bultemeyer v. 

Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996)). For example, though an 

3Fisher requests that we take judicial notice of additional evidence of vacancies at that factory. Having 

already concluded that whether a vacancy existed is a disputed and material fact, it is unnecessary for this court to 

resolve Fisher’s motion for judicial notice.
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 14

employer is not required to propose counter accommodations, such a proposal may be “evidence 

of good faith.” Jakubowski, 627 F.3d 203. On the other hand, an employer who “determine[s] 

what accommodation it [is] willing to offer before ever speaking with” the employee does not 

participate in good faith. Mosby-Meachem, 883 F.3d at 606. 

When Fisher first returned to work after his surgery, in October 2016, Nissan took steps 

to facilitate his transition. First, Nissan transferred him to Closures, hoping the position would 

be easier than his work in Fits. This transfer to a vacant position (as well as the subsequent 

transfer back to his old position when Closures proved more strenuous than Fits) was an attempt 

at accommodating Fisher’s disability and evidences good-faith participation in the interactive 

process as of October 2016. When Fisher’s doctor requested he be given more time off work, his 

leave was extended—a second attempt at accommodation. Thus, as of Fisher’s return to Fits in 

November 2016, Nissan was participating in the interactive process in good faith. 

In late December of that year and January of the next, Fisher’s repeated absences 

demonstrated that he was still struggling with his kidney transplant. As discussed above, Fisher 

proposed at least one reasonable accommodation in that period: a transfer to an inspection 

position. A factfinder could also conclude that he requested assistance in identifying other 

vacant positions.

Those suggestions implicated Nissan’s continuing mandatory duty of good-faith 

participation in the interactive process. See Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1041. At a minimum, Nissan 

was then required to “show[] how the accommodation would cause an undue hardship,” 

Jakubowski, 627 F.3d at 202–03, or “that a challenged job criterion is essential,” Hedrick, 355 

F.3d at 452. As discussed above, Nissan has not carried this burden. Nor is there any evidence 

that, from late December through early February, as Fisher’s need for accommodation became 

even more apparent, Nissan took any steps that evidenced good-faith participation in the 

interactive process, such as proposing counter accommodations. See id. at 203. Because a 
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 15

factfinder could conclude that Nissan bears the responsibility for its failure to respond to Fisher’s 

renewed requests for accommodation, Nissan is not entitled to summary judgment.4

C. Discovery Dispute

Fisher also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

reopen discovery while, in a different employment suit involving different parties, allowing 

reopening of discovery where it benefited the employer. See Order, Bolden v. Lowe’s Home 

Ctrs., LLC, No. 3:17-CV-741 (M.D. Tenn. June 20, 2018) (D.E. 45).

Decisions regarding discovery are reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion 

standard and reversed only if “the reviewing court is left with ‘a definite and firm conviction that 

the court below committed a clear error of judgment.’” Pittman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 901 

F.3d 619, 642 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Sols., Inc., 

326 F.3d 687, 700 (6th Cir. 2003)). In reviewing a denial of additional discovery time, we 

consider factors including “when the moving party learned of the issue that is the subject of 

discovery, how the discovery would affect the ruling below, the length of the discovery period, 

whether the moving party was dilatory, and whether the adverse party was responsive to prior 

discovery requests.” Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2006).

The district court’s rejection of Fisher’s motion rested primarily on the first factor. 

As the court explained, Fisher’s request to subpoena a hiring agency did not warrant an extension 

because “Plaintiff’s counsel was aware of the involvement of [the agency] prior to [Fisher’s] 

deposition being taken.” Fisher does not dispute that reasoning on appeal, though he does 

reference Nissan’s delay in completing Fisher’s deposition. Such delay might favor deadline 

extension if the deposition raised new issues. But Fisher knew both the identity of the agency 

and the relevance of vacancies prior to his own deposition. We affirm the district court’s refusal 

to reopen discovery.

4The district court also analyzed and dismissed claims of harassment and discriminatory discharge under 

the ADA. Fisher does not mention those claims on appeal. Fisher likewise asserted a claim under the Tennessee 

Disability Act in his complaint but does not mention that statute or cite any cases interpreting it in his briefs before 

us. Because Fisher does not pursue these claims on appeal, he has forfeited any challenge to their dismissal. See 

Conlin, 714 F.3d at 360 n.5. 
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 16

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Finally, Fisher argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to 

Nissan on his tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

The parties agree that this claim is analyzed under Tennessee law. In Tennessee, “[t]he 

elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim are that the defendant’s conduct 

was (1) intentional or reckless, (2) so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society, and 

(3) resulted in serious mental injury to the plaintiff.” Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 

196, 205 (Tenn. 2012). 

Tennessee courts have cautioned that discrimination “does not automatically give rise to 

the imposition of liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Arnett v. Domino’s 

Pizza I, LLC, 124 S.W.3d 529, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). As the Tennessee appellate court 

recognized in a race discrimination claim, discriminatory behavior is “insulting and humiliating” 

and “at the very core of the federal Civil Rights Acts and the Tennessee Human Rights Act.” Id. 

The court was concerned, however, that if the two were coterminous, then “virtually every action 

brought under these [anti-discrimination] statutes would include an intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim.” Id. This logic applies here. See Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of 

Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1111 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, under Ohio law, 

“an employee’s termination, even if based upon discrimination, does not rise to the level of 

extreme and outrageous conduct without proof of something more” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

As a component of such claim, Fisher would have to show serious mental injury. On this 

point, Fisher points to his testimony that Nissan’s behavior upset him so much that he called his 

wife in tears. But in Rogers, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the mental injury element 

was not satisfied when a mother tending her son’s neglected grave introduced evidence that she 

was “emotional,” “tearful,” and honestly upset by the conditions of the cemetery. Rogers, 

367 S.W.3d at 211. Fisher’s claim likewise fails because he has not demonstrated that he 

“suffered physiological or psychological symptoms, sought medical or professional treatment, or 
No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 17

incurred any significant impairment in [his] daily functioning resulting from [Nissan’s] conduct.” 

Id.

We therefore affirm the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to Nissan on 

the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment on Fisher’s 

ADA claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process, 

AFFIRM the refusal to extend discovery and the grant of summary judgment on the claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.