J-S44032-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.J.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.A.G., MOTHER

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 234 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree and Order December 20, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001144-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0001725-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: F.E.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.A.G., MOTHER

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 236 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree and Order December 20, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001146-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0001727-2014
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IN THE INTEREST OF: J.C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.G., MOTHER

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 237 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree and Order December 20, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001147-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0001728-2014

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2018

B.G. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decrees and Orders entered on 

December 20, 2017, which granted the Petitions filed by the Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services (“DHS” or the “Agency”), and involuntarily 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to three of her children: C.J.C., a male 

born in February 2003; F.E.C., a female born in May 2009; and J.H.C., a 

female born in June 2011 (collectively, “the Children”).

1

 The trial court 

additionally changed the Children’s permanency goals to adoption, pursuant 

to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.2 After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 The Decrees and Orders were entered pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

2 DHS did not seek to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to 

another son, S.L.C. (born in September of 2006). The Children and S.L.C.’s 

father, G.H.C. (“Father”), consented to the termination of Father’s parental 

rights as to Children and S.L.C. The court confirmed Father’s consent and 

entered Decrees terminating his parental rights to the Children and S.L.C. on 

December 20, 2017. Father did not appeal the termination of his parental 

rights and has not participated in this appeal.
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Dating back to 2005, DHS received reports regarding the Children being 

neglected. N.T., 12/20/17, at 39-40. In 2013, DHS received additional 

reports regarding the neglect and sexual abuse of the Children. Id. at 23. 

Specifically, the referral alleged S.L.C. had engaged in sexualized behaviors 

with F.E.C., who was four years old at the time. Id. Further, the referral 

indicated Father watched pornography with the Children. Id. at 40. A safety 

plan was implemented requiring line-of-sight supervision at all times to 

prevent further abuse. Id. Mother did not abide by the safety plan, and S.L.C. 

perpetrated additional sexual abuse against F.E.C. Id. at 41. There were also 

allegations that C.J.C. had sexually abused F.E.C. Id. at 40. 

 On July 30, 2014, the juvenile court adjudicated the Children 

dependent. At that time, C.J.C. was living with his maternal grandparents,

and S.L.C. had been hospitalized due to his aggressive behavior. Id. at 24. 

Pursuant to the Orders adjudicating the Children dependent, Mother retained 

physical custody of F.E.C. and J.H.C. However, the Orders required Father to 

move out of the home, while Mother was to locate an appropriate adult to 

move into the home and assist her with the care of F.E.C. and J.H.C. 

Subsequently, on August 1, 2014, F.E.C. and J.H.C. were placed in foster care,

as Mother could not locate another adult who could assist her. Id. at 43. 

On November 23, 2016, DHS filed Petitions to change the Children’s 

permanency goals to adoption. On November 28, 2016, DHS filed Petitions 

to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children. The court 
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conducted a hearing on the Petitions on December 20, 2017. DHS presented 

the testimony of Sharita Lee (“Ms. Lee”), a Turning Points Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case manager for the family. DHS also presented 

the testimony of licensed psychologist Dr. Erica Williams (“Dr. Williams”), who 

conducted a parenting evaluation with respect to Mother. Further, C.J.C. 

testified on his own behalf. Mother attended the hearing, represented by 

counsel, but did not testify.3 On December 20, 2017, the court entered 

Decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The court also 

entered Orders changing the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. 

____________________________________________

3 The Children had the benefit of both a guardian ad litem and legal counsel. 

Our Supreme Court, in In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 183 (Pa. 

2017) (plurality) held that 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) requires that counsel be 

appointed to represent the legal interests of any child involved in contested 

involuntary termination proceedings. The Court noted that legal interests are 

synonymous with the child’s preferred outcome, but the child’s best interests 

are determined by the court. Id. Here, the court appointed legal counsel for 

the Children. Counsel conducted limited cross-examination of Ms. Lee and 

gave no indication that she spoke to the Children. Further, the Children’s legal 

counsel has not filed a brief in this Court or joined the brief of another party. 

See, e.g., T.M.L.M., 184 A.3d at 590 (noting that counsel’s duty to represent 

a child does not stop at the conclusion of the termination of parental rights 

hearing). Despite these issues, the record reveals the Children’s preferred

outcomes are consistent with the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental 

rights. C.J.C. testified he understood the concept of adoption and wants to be 

adopted by M.G., his maternal uncle, with whom he is currently placed. N.T., 

12/20/17, at 72-73. Further, F.E.C. and J.H.C. are bonded and happy in their 

current placement and do not want to leave. Id. at 51. 
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Mother timely filed Notices of appeal and Concise Statements of errors 

complained of on appeal.4

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. [Whether] Mother substantially complied with the Family 

Service Goals as agreed between [Mother] and [CUA]?

2. [Whether] [s]evering parental rights would not best serve the 

emotional needs of [the Children?]

3. [Whether] [t]he goal change would not serve the best interests 

of [the Children?]

4. [Whether] [r]easonable efforts were not made, within the 

meaning of Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 

§ 6351(f)(9)[?]

Mother’s Brief at 6.5

We review these claims mindful of our standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

____________________________________________

4 This Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated these appeals for review. 

5 While Mother references J.C. in her Statement of Questions Involved, her 

argument focuses on the Children. Therefore, we construe Mother’s reference 

to J.C. as a typographical error. Additionally, we have re-ordered Mother’s 

issues for ease of disposition.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

We have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so

“clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter 

of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). This Court 

may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental 

rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) 
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(en banc). Here, we focus our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which 

provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under Section 2511(a)(2) as 

follows:

 As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for 

termination of parental rights[,] where it is demonstrated by clear 

and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the 
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child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.” ... 

 This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for termination 

under § 2511(a)(2): 

 A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can 

seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon 

parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the 

1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of 

performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who 

refuses to perform the duties. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

Mother appears to assert the trial court improperly terminated her 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a),6 as Mother completed “her goals 

of parenting and domestic violence [counseling by] ... attend[ing] therapy and 

medication management[,] ... attend[ing] visits with her [C]hildren[,] ... [and] 

attend[ing] medical appointments and appointments at the [C]hildren’s 

schools.” Mother’s Brief at 15. Mother asserts she only failed to maintain 

stable housing. Id. Further, Mother argues she did not receive appropriate 

____________________________________________

6 Mother does not specifically cite Section 2511(a) in this portion of her 

Argument, although her quotation of the trial court’s Opinion corresponds with 

the trial court’s analysis of Section 2511(a). Throughout Mother’s brief, she

does not cite relevant authority regarding the involuntary termination of 

parental rights. Accordingly, she risks waiver of her issues. See In re Estate 

of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209-10 (Pa. Super. 2012) (noting that the argument 

portion of the appellate brief must contain a discussion and citation of 

pertinent authorities and failure to cite relevant legal authority constitutes 

waiver of the claim on appeal); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)-

(c). However, we decline to find waiver in this instance, as the shortcomings

do not impede our review.
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services to enable her to properly understand what she learned in parenting 

and domestic violence classes until six months prior to the termination hearing 

and was excluded from family therapy. Id.

The trial court explained its decision to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a) as follows:

Case Manager, [Ms.] Lee, CUA Case Manager with Turning Points, 

testified credibly that this family became known to DHS back in 

2005, when there were reports of neglect and sexual abuse. The 

IHPS 2013 referral stated that the older sibling, S.L.C., had 

sexualized behaviors towards F.E.C., who was four years old at 

that time. In–Home Services were put into place, and 

ultimately[,] DHS obtained [Orders of Protective Custody] for all 

four Children. F.E.C.[] and J.H.C. were removed from Mother’s 

care in August 2014. C.J.C. was removed from Mother’s care and 

placed with his Maternal Grandparents. The eldest sibling, S.L.C., 

was placed at Fairmount due to aggressive behavior.

[Ms. Lee] opined that Mother still lacks the skills to parent the 

Children[,] given her intellectual disabilities and developmental 

delays, without the supervision of another adult. Ms. Lee noted 

that Mother had completed parenting classes[;] however, Mother 

had not benefited from completing the classes based on her 

interaction with the Children. Since [Ms. Lee] has been involved 

with the case, Mother has not made progress towards being able 

to independently parent [the] Children.

Dr. Williams provided the [c]ourt with clear, convincing, and 

persuasive [e]xpert testimony, stating she completed a [parenting 

capacity evaluation] on Mother in October 2015. At that time[,]

Mother did not present with a capacity to provide safety and 

permanency for [the] Children. She recommended therapy to 

help her understand the victimization that each of the Children

had endured, [and] understand the different people who 

perpetrated that victimization[,] so that she can begin to support 

the Children. Mother also did not present with cognitive

functioning that would allow her to learn to take information in at 

the same rate as an average intelligent person. So[,] another 

recommendation for Mother was to understand her deficits and 
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her overall functioning. Another recommendation for Mother was 

to obtain and maintain appropriate housing for at least six 

months. Dr. Williams recently met with Mother and noted that 

she was still not able to maintain housing without one of the

alleged perpetrators living in the home. Further, she could not 

obtain appropriate housing[,] despite having a financial resource 

to obtain it. Dr. Williams specifically addressed this issue[,]

stating that [] Mother is compliant with various SCP goals and 

objectives, and that can be viewed as a strength of hers. 

However, [despite] almost three years of compliance with each of 

the objectives, Mother still has not been able to grow her skills to 

provide safety and permanency for her Children.

[The trial court] relied on this evidence[,] that was clear and 

convincing[,] that although Mother may have appeared to have 

complied with many of the requirements for her goals, she 

nonetheless has not complied with certain goals, and has not 

recognized what [the] Children have been subjected to, and what 

their needs are. [The trial court was] not persuaded that Mother 

can or will remedy the conditions which brought the Children into

court supervision. Nor [was] the [c]ourt persuaded that Mother 

will be able to fulfill her parental responsibilities in the future.

Based on the evidence presented, [the trial cout] found clear and 

convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) (1), (2), (5) and (8).

Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/18, at 28-30.

The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights is appropriate pursuant to subsection 2511(a)(2). 

The family became involved with DHS as a result of sexual abuse perpetrated 

by S.L.C. against F.E.C. N.T., 12/20/17, at 23. After a safety plan was 

implemented requiring line-of-sight supervision, Mother did not abide by the 

safety plan[,] and F.E.C. suffered additional sexual abuse. Id. at 40-41. 

C.J.C. later disclosed sexual abuse by Father with respect to all four children, 

including incidents of sexual abuse perpetrated in front of the other children. 
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Id. at 35, 44. C.J.C. reported consistently hearing screams from F.E.C. and 

S.L.C. as a result of the abuse. Id. at 44. While Mother was in the home at 

the time the abuse occurred, she did nothing to stop it, claiming she was 

unaware of the abuse. Id. at 44-45.

Additionally, the Children have various special needs. C.J.C. is 

diagnosed with ADHD, depression and behavioral issues. Id. at 30. F.E.C. 

has an intellectual disability and is delayed developmentally and academically. 

Id. J.H.C. has profound developmental delays and speech issues. Id.

Mother’s objectives were to be consistent with visitation, participate in 

individual therapy and medication management, attend parenting classes and 

domestic violence counseling, and to maintain stable housing. Permanency 

Review Order, 12/1/14; N.T., 12/20/17, at 24-25. The only goal Mother failed 

to comply with involved maintaining stable housing. N.T., 12/20/17, at 52. 

Dr. Williams noted that compliance was a strength of Mother’s. Id. at 68. 

With respect to housing, Mother obtained appropriate housing for 

approximately five months in 2016, after which she moved because she could 

not keep up with the expenses. Id. at 29. Even during those five months, 

CUA did not recommend reunification because Mother lacked the skills to 

parent the Children, given their intellectual disabilities and developmental 

delays, without another adult present. Id. at 29-30. Mother indicated she 

was living with someone, but the person with whom she was living did not 
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want to be involved with DHS and, therefore, Mother would not give DHS her 

address. Id. at 48. 

For a period of time, Mother had unsupervised visits with Children. On 

one of the visits, Mother took F.E.C. and J.H.C. to her parents’ home, where 

C.J.C. was living. Id. at 50. Despite the prior reports of sexual abuse, F.E.C. 

reported that Mother failed to maintain line-of-sight supervision while visiting 

C.J.C. Id. F.E.C. returned from other visits and indicated they were at the 

mall all day with Mother and her boyfriend. Id. at 45-46. Mother’s boyfriend 

would discipline the Children, despite CUA’s recommendations that Mother not 

allow him to do so. Id. at 46. Further, the Children reported that they were 

hungry, and strangers would give them food because Mother did not have any 

money. Id. Due to Mother’s lack of judgment and control for the Children’s 

safety, her visits went back to being supervised. Id. 

While Mother completed parenting classes, Ms. Lee did not believe that 

Mother had benefited from them, based on Ms. Lee’s observation of Mother’s 

visits. Id. at 46-47. Additionally, Ms. Lee did not believe that Mother had

made progress towards being able to independently parent the Children. Id.

at 49. Further, despite Mother participating in a program specifically designed 

for individuals with disabilities for six months, Ms. Lee still did not see any 

improvement in Mother’s ability to manage the Children’s behavior. Id. at 54.

Dr. Williams testified regarding Mother’s parenting capacity evaluation. 

Id. at 57. Dr. Williams performed the evaluation in 2015, concluding Mother 
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lacked the capacity to provide safety or permanency to any of the Children. 

Id. at 60. Dr. Williams observed that, while Mother did not directly harm the 

Children, Mother was present for many of the reported acts, across multiple 

households, and failed to serve in a protective role for the Children. Id. at 

65. Mother’s housing concerned Dr. Williams, because she could not maintain 

housing without one of the alleged perpetrators of abuse living in the home. 

Id. at 62. Further, after Mother left Father, she was in another abusive 

relationship, demonstrating to Dr. Williams that Mother is not in a position to 

independently maintain her own safety or living standards, and as a result, 

could not care for herself, let alone the Children. Id. at 67. Given Mother’s 

compliance with her goals, the fact that she did not grow her parenting skills 

demonstrated to Dr. Williams that Mother’s skills in this regard are at capacity. 

Id. at 68.

Accordingly, it is clear that Mother is incapable of caring for the Children,

and that she cannot or will not remedy her parental incapacity. The Children 

have not lived with Mother since 2014. As this Court has stated, “a child’s life 

cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity 

necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a 

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of 

R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Therefore, we affirm the portion 
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of the trial court’s Decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2).

Having determined termination is appropriate pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we next review whether the requirements of Section 2511(b) are 

satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental 

rights under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant 

to Section 2511(b). Id. at 1008.

Our Supreme Court has explained that,

if the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the 

child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such 

as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 

781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M. 

a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held 

that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In 

re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed below, evaluation 

of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any 

bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on 

the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-

63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). When evaluating a parental bond, 

“the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and 
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caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does 

not require a formal bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 

(internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Mother argues that Ms. Lee, the case manager, “did not testify in any 

detail on the quality of the bond between [the C]hildren and [Mother,]” instead 

focusing on the bond between J.H.C., F.E.C., and L.T. (“Foster Mother”). 

Mother’s Brief at 16. Mother faults the trial court for not “reflecting on the 

emotional bond between [the C]hildren and Mother.” Id.

The trial court determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

best served the Children’s needs and welfare, explaining that

Ms. Lee, [the] Case Manager from CUA, Turning Points[,] provided 

credible, persuasive testimony regarding the Children’s physical 

and emotional needs and best interests. She stated she has 

visited F.E.C., and J.H.C., in the home of pre-adoptive caregiver, 
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[Foster Mother], who have been in [Foster Mother’s] care for 

almost three years. [Ms. Lee] noted that these two children have 

made tremendous progress, both with their trauma therapy, 

academically and socially, since they were placed with [Foster 

Mother]. The [c]hildren are bonded with [Foster Mother] and turn 

to her for love and support. [Ms. Lee] has also visited with C.J.C., 

who is placed with his [m]aternal [u]ncle[, M.G.,] who lives with 

[m]aternal [g]randparents also. She stated [that] the [c]hild 

adamantly told her that he want[s] to be adopted.

C.J.C., who was 14 years and 10 months [old] at the time of the 

hearing, testified before the [c]ourt and stated that he 

understands what adoption is about and that he wants to be 

adopted by [M.G.]

Therefore, the [c]ourt found that clear and convincing testimony 

was provided that the Children would not suffer irreparable harm 

if Mother’s rights were terminated and that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights and adoption would be in their best 

interest.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/18, at 31-32.

The record supports the trial court’s conclusion. F.E.C. and J.H.C. are 

placed together with Foster Mother. They have resided with Foster Mother 

since approximately 2014, and Foster Mother provides a pre-adoptive home. 

Id. at 32. Both F.E.C. and J.H.C. call Foster Mother “mommy” and are very 

bonded with Foster Mother. Id. at 33-34. F.E.C. has progressed academically 

and socially in Foster Mother’s care. Id. at 34. Further, she no longer acts 

inappropriately with adults, and men in particular. Id. She is thriving in the 

foster home and is bonded with Foster Mother. Id. J.H.C. has also progressed

substantially in Foster Mother’s care. Id. at 35. When J.H.C. was placed with 

Foster Mother, she was three years old. She could not verbalize any words

and had issues with her growth. Id. She is currently able to function 
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normally, although she still has intellectual disabilities that require parenting 

that is consistent. Id. Both children turn to Foster Mother for love and support 

and have a primary parent/child bond with Foster Mother. Id. at 33-34. 

Further, F.E.C. and J.H.C. had no reaction to separating from Mother. Id. at 

31-32. Ms. Lee opined that neither F.E.C. nor J.H.C. would suffer irreparable 

harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Id. at 34. 

C.J.C. resides in a home with his maternal uncle, M.G., and his maternal 

grandparents. Id. at 36. C.J.C. is adamant that he wants to be adopted by 

M.G. Id. at 37, 72-73. C.J.C. visits with Mother weekly, but has expressed 

that often times he does not want to visit with Mother. Id. at 37. Ms. Lee 

opined that C.J.C. would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were 

terminated. Id. at 38. 

While Mother faults the trial court for its analysis of Mother’s bond with 

the Children, she acknowledges “Ms. Lee did not testify in any detail on the 

quality of the bond between [the C]hildren and [Mother].” Mother’s Brief at 

16. Given the lack of evidence of a bond between Mother and the Children, 

the trial court appropriately focused its analysis on other factors. As the 

record supports the trial court’s conclusion that involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights best serves the needs and welfare of the Children, we 

affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(b).
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Next, Mother challenges the trial court’s change of goal for the Children 

to adoption under Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351, and 

55 Pa. Code § 3130.74. 

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we 

review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).

Regarding the disposition of dependent children, the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6351(e)-(g), provides the criteria for a permanency plan. The 

court must determine a disposition best suited to the safety and protection, 

as well as the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g). With a goal change petition, the trial court 

considers the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan 

developed for the child; the extent of progress made towards 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement; the appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by which the goal 

for the child might be achieved.

In Interest of A.N.P., 155 A.3d 55, 67 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting In re 

A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007)).

We have further noted that

[w]hen a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper 

placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not on what 

the parent wants or which goals the parent has achieved. 

Moreover, although preserving the unity of the family is a purpose 

of the [Juvenile] Act, another purpose is to “provide for the care, 
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protection, safety, and wholesome mental and physical 

development of children coming within the provisions of this 

chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6301(b)(1.1). Indeed, “[t]he 

relationship of parent and child is a status and not a property right, 

and one in which the state has an interest to protect the best 

interest of the child.”

In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006) (some citations omitted).

In Mother’s third and fourth issues, she argues that the trial court erred 

in changing the Children’s permanency goal to adoption. Mother asserts that 

the services provided to her were not calculated to meet her individual needs, 

as Mother’s intellectual disabilities required a targeted program. Mother’s 

Brief at 16. Mother also faults DHS for permitting Foster Mother to participate 

in family therapy, while excluding Mother. Id. at 14-15. Mother 

acknowledges that she participated in a service for individuals with intellectual 

disabilities, but asserts that her participation for approximately six months

prior to the goal change hearing was insufficient. Id. at 14. Mother concludes 

that because DHS “did not meet its obligation to make all reasonable efforts[,]

a goal change was not appropriate.” Id. at 17.

The trial court explained its decision to change the Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption as follows:

Competent and persuasive evidence was presented to this [c]ourt

by the [c]ase [m]anager that reasonable efforts were made by the 

Agency to give Mother the avenue for reunification with her 

[c]hildren. And clear, convincing and persuasive expert testimony 

was presented by Dr. Williams that[,] although Mother did use the 

referrals and resources provided to her by the Agency, she never 

gained the skills to parent [the] Children, nor the insight to their 

trauma and their needs and welfare. Mother also did not gain the 

skills to provide safety and permanency for [the] Children.
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Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/18, at 32-33.

The record supports the trial court’s decision to change the Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption. Despite Mother’s participation in multiple 

programs to assist her, she did not demonstrate an ability to appropriately 

parent the Children. Dr. Williams believed her parenting skills are at capacity. 

Further, even while participating in a “targeted” program, Mother did not 

demonstrate an increase in her parenting skills. Finally, while Mother claims 

she was excluded from family therapy, the record reveals that Foster Mother 

was asked to participate by the therapist because the therapy involved 

caregivers. N.T., 12/20/17, at 53. Based on Mother’s lack of progress and 

the status of the Children in their foster homes, the record supports the trial 

court’s decision to change the Children’s permanency goal to adoption.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s Decrees and 

Orders.

Decrees and Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/18/18