United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-2858

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ricky Pulley

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa

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Submitted: March 16, 2023

Filed: August 1, 2023

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Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.

In February 2022, Ricky Pulley pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court1 ultimately 

sentenced Pulley to 87 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Pulley challenges the 

1

The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa. 
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district court’s calculation of the advisory sentencing range under the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”). Specifically, Pulley argues the 

district court erroneously decided Pulley’s past conviction for aggravated vehicular

hijacking in violation of 720 Illinois Compiled Statutes § 5/18-4(a)(3) was a crime 

of violence, and thus it should not enhance his offense level under § 2K2.1 of the 

Guidelines. We affirm. 

“We review a district court’s determination that a prior conviction is a crime 

of violence under the Guidelines de novo.” United States v. Long, 906 F.3d 720, 

725 (8th Cir. 2018). “The relevant definition of a violent felony under the [Armed 

Career Criminal Act] and the definition of a crime of violence under the [G]uidelines 

are so similar that we generally consider cases interpreting them interchangeably.” 

United States v. Brown, 916 F.3d 706, 708 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. 

Sykes, 914 F.3d 615, 620 (8th Cir. 2019)). “As with the ACCA, our 

precedent . . . require[s] courts to use the categorical approach to determine whether 

an offense qualifie[s] as a crime of violence.” United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 

2319, 2326 (2019). 

In using the categorical approach, a court “looks to the fact of conviction and 

the statutory elements of the prior offense.” Martin v. United States, 904 F.3d 594, 

596 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Headbird, 813 F.3d 1092, 1095 (8th 

Cir. 2016)). “In these situations, ‘we must presume that the conviction rested upon 

nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized, and then determine whether 

even those acts’” are a crime of violence. United States v. Schneider, 905 F.3d 1088, 

1091 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013)). 

Pulley argues his past conviction of the Illinois offense of aggravated 

vehicular hijacking is not a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2(a) of the 

Guidelines, which relevantly states: 

The term ‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state 

law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that--
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(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another, or (2) is murder, voluntary 

manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, 

robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a 

firearm . . . or explosive material . . . . 

The first portion of the statute is known as the “force clause,” while the second 

portion is referred to as the “enumerated offenses” clause. See, e.g., United States 

v. Martin, 15 F.4th 878, 883 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. McMillan, 863 F.3d 

1053, 1056 (8th Cir. 2017). 

Pulley argues the version of the Illinois statute under which he was convicted 

does not require the crime be committed “knowingly,” but instead also covered 

reckless acts, making vehicular hijacking not a crime of violence. Pulley’s previous 

conviction for vehicular hijacking was under the 2005 version of 720 Illinois

Compiled Statutes §§ 5/18-3(a) and 4(a).2

 The section at issue is section 5/18-3(a), 

which states, “A person commits vehicular hijacking when he or she takes a motor 

vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or 

by threatening the imminent use of force.” 

Although this is a matter of first impression in this circuit, we do not approach 

this question with a blank slate. In Sykes, we held a conviction for vehicular 

hijacking is a crime of violence because, under Illinois law, we “could not ‘conceive 

of a situation in which a defendant could commit vehicular hijacking without using 

or threatening the use of physical force or violence.’” 914 F.3d at 620–21 (cleaned 

up) (quoting People v. Wooden, 16 N.E.3d 850, 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)). In Sykes, 

however, the conviction for vehicular hijacking was under an updated version of the 

statute, which defined the crime as when “[a] person . . . knowingly takes a motor 

2

Specifically, Pulley’s conviction was for aggravated vehicular hijacking in 

violation of §§ 5/18-3(a) and 4(a). Section 4(a) states, “[a] person commits 

aggravated vehicular hijacking when he or she violates Section 18-3; and . . . 

carries . . . or is otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon . . . .” 
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vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or 

by threatening the imminent use of force.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/18-3(a) (2012)

(emphasis added). Thus, this case is not directly controlled by Sykes because Pulley 

was convicted under an older version of the statute containing different language. 

Further, since Sykes, the Supreme Court has held statutes requiring merely a 

reckless use of force do not qualify as crimes of violence under the force clause. See 

Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1830, 1834 (2021) (plurality opinion). 

After Borden, the force clause “categorically excludes crimes that can be committed 

recklessly” under both the ACCA and the Guidelines. United States v. Hoxworth, 

11 F.4th 693, 695 (8th Cir. 2021); accord United States v. Frazier, 48 F.4th 884, 

886–87 (8th Cir. 2022). 

Therefore, the issue here is whether, under the pre-2012 version of the Illinois 

statute, Pulley could have been convicted for reckless vehicular hijacking. We 

conclude the answer is no. Indeed, there is no precedential basis to determine 

vehicular hijacking can be committed recklessly. To the contrary, when interpreting 

this same version of the statute, the Illinois Court of Appeals concluded: 

[T]he act of taking a motor vehicle from a person by the use of force or 

by threatening the imminent use of force necessarily involves at least 

the contemplation that violence might be necessary to carry out the 

crime. Moreover, defendant has not suggested, nor can we conceive of, 

a situation in which a defendant could commit vehicular hijacking 

without using or threatening the use of physical force or violence. 

Wooden, 16 N.E.3d at 855. 

Further, with similar crimes we have reasoned that even when there is “a 

theoretical possibility that . . . [a] conviction could be based on reckless conduct,” 

we must apply the “realistic probability” principle. United States v. Bragg, 44 F.4th 

1067, 1078 (8th Cir. 2022). Applying this principle, we have held there was “no 

realistic probability that a person would be charged with and convicted of Illinois 
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armed robbery based on merely reckless conduct.” Id. Further, “[w]hen a robbery 

is committed or attempted, common sense dictates that the perpetrator either intends 

to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property, or knowingly 

uses . . . the property in such a manner.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People 

v. Jones, 595 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ill. 1992)). 

The same is true here. There is neither a precedential case nor a realistic 

situation in which vehicular hijacking would not be considered a crime of violence 

as it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Like the crime of armed 

robbery analyzed in Bragg, 44 F.4th at 1078, there is no realistic probability that one 

could recklessly take possession of “a motor vehicle from the person or the 

immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent 

use of force.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/18-3(a) (2005); accord United States v. 

Norris, 835 F. App’x. 892, 893–94 (7th Cir. 2021) (applying the same reasoning to 

conclude vehicular hijacking is a crime of violence under the same version of section

5/18-3(a)). Therefore, we hold Pulley’s vehicular hijacking conviction constitutes a 

crime of violence under the force clause.3

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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3

Since Pulley’s vehicular hijacking conviction is a crime of violence under the 

force clause, it is not necessary for us to explore the issue of whether it constitutes a 

crime of violence under the enumerated offenses clause.