66502 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 244 / Friday, December 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

(1) If no corrosion is detected, prior to

further flight, apply a protective compound

to the areas specified in the service bulletin,

in accordance with the service bulletin.

(2) If any corrosion is detected, prior to

further flight, repair it in accordance with a

method approved by the Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate.

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116. Operators

shall submit their requests through an

appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, International Branch,

ANM–116.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the International Branch,

ANM–116.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

(d) The actions shall be done in accordance

with Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42–

57–0044, dated May 30, 1995; or Aerospatiale

Service Bulletin ATR42–57–0044, Revision 1,

dated June 28, 1995; which contain the

specified effective pages.

Service bulletin referenced and date Page No. Revision level

shown on page

Date shown on

page

ATR42–57–0044, May 30, 1995 ....................................................................... 1–17 ................................... Original ............. May 30, 1995.

ATR42–57–0044, Revision 1, June 28, 1995 ................................................... 1, 4, 6–8, 15–16 ................. 1 ....................... June 28, 1995.

2, 3, 5, 9–14, 17 ................. Original ............. May 30, 1995.

This incorporation by reference was

approved by the Director of the Federal

Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)

and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained

from Aerospatiale, 316 Route de Bayonne,

31060 Toulouse, Cedex 03, France. Copies

may be inspected at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of

the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

Note 3: The subject of this AD is addressed

in French airworthiness directive 95–127–

063(B), dated August 2, 1995.

(e) This amendment becomes effective on

January 23, 1998.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on

December 11, 1997.

Gilbert L. Thompson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 97–32999 Filed 12–18–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 93–ANE–08; Amendment 39–

10260; AD 97–26–17]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Teledyne

Continental Motors IO–360, TSIO–360,

LTSIO–360, IO–520, LIO–520, TSIO–

520, LTSIO–520 Series, and RollsRoyce plc IO–360 and TSIO–360 Series

Reciprocating Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes

an existing airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to certain Teledyne

Continental Motors (TCM) IO–520 and

TSIO–520 series reciprocating engines,

that currently requires ultrasonic

inspection for subsurface fatigue cracks

in crankshafts installed in TCM IO–520

and TSIO–520 series engines and

replacement of the crankshaft if a crack

is found. This amendment adds a

requirement to remove crankshafts

manufactured using the airmelt process

and replace them with crankshafts

manufactured using the vacuum arc

remelt (VAR) process, incorporates new

ultrasonic inspection criteria in the AD,

adds engine series TCM IO–360, TSIO–

360, LTSIO–360, IO–520, LIO–520,

TSIO–520, LTSIO–520 and Rolls-Royce,

plc IO–360 and TSIO–360 to the

applicability, and revises the economic

impact analysis. This amendment is

prompted by reports of crankshaft

failures due to subsurface fatigue

cracking on engines that had been

inspected in accordance with the

current AD. The actions specified by

this AD are intended to prevent

crankshaft failure and subsequent

engine failure.

DATES: Effective January 23, 1998.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of January 23,

1998.

ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from Teledyne Continental Motors, P.O.

Box 90, Mobile, AL 36601; telephone

(334) 438–3411. This information may

be examined at the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), New England

Region, Office of the Assistant Chief

Counsel, 12 New England Executive

Park, Burlington, MA 01803–5299; or at

the Office of the Federal Register, 800

North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700,

Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerry

Robinette, Aerospace Engineer, Atlanta

Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Small

Airplane Directorate, Campus Building,

1701 Columbia Ave., Suite 2–160,

College Park, GA 30337–2748;

telephone (404) 305–7371, fax (404)

305–7348.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to

add an airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to certain Teledyne

Continental Motors (TCM) IO–360,

TSIO–360, LTSIO–360, IO–520 and

TSIO–520 series reciprocating engines

was published as a supplemental notice

of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) in the

Federal Register on August 24, 1995 (60

FR 43995). That proposal would have

superseded AD 87–23–08, Amendment

39–5735 (52 FR 41937, October 30,

1987), which currently requires

ultrasonic inspection of TCM IO–520

and TSIO–520 series engines for subsurface fatigue cracks in the crankshaft

and replacement of the crankshaft, if a

crack is found. The proposed AD would

have retained the ultrasonic inspection,

but would have required the removal of

crankshafts manufactured using the

airmelt process and required

replacement with crankshafts that were

manufactured using the vacuum arc

remelt (VAR) process. The proposed AD

would have also expanded the affected

population of engines to add the TCM

IO–360, TSIO–360 and LTSIO–360

series engines to the IO–520 and TSIO–

520 series engines affected by AD 87–

23–08. That proposal was prompted by

reports of crankshaft failures due to

subsurface fatigue cracking on engines

that had been inspected in accordance

with AD 87–23–08. That condition, if
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 244 / Friday, December 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 66503

not corrected, could result in crankshaft

failure and subsequent engine failure.

Since the issuance of that SNPRM,

TCM has revised and improved the

ultrasonic test procedure and the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

determined that the proposed AD

should reference this new procedure. In

addition, the FAA has also determined

that TCM LIO–520 and LTSIO–520 and

Rolls-Royce, plc IO–360 and TSIO–360

series engines are affected and should

be included in this proposal as they are

identical in design and manufacturing

process. The number of Rolls-Royce, plc

engines that were added was small,

estimated to be 500 worldwide. The

added TCM engines were affected only

by the repetitive ultrasonic inspection

requirements, as they already have VAR

crankshafts.

Since those changes expanded the

scope of the originally proposed rule,

the FAA determined that it was

necessary to reopen the comment period

to provide additional opportunity for

public comment. On March 12, 1997,

the FAA issued a second SNPRM ( 62

FR 15133, March 31, 1997).

Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the

making of this amendment. Due

consideration has been given to all

comments received from these three

notices: 41 to the original NPRM, 26 to

the SNPRM, and 4 to the second

SNPRM.

One group of commenters state that

the AD should be withdrawn, since the

listed price of the replacement part is

not believed to be accurate nor will it

be available for a sustained period of

time. The FAA concurs in part. Since

the original issuance of the NPRM, the

cost of the exchange crankshaft has

increased from $2,222 to $2,599 and the

cost analysis has been corrected to

reflect this new price. This price

assumes the customer exchanges an

airmelt crankshaft for a VAR crankshaft.

However, some commenters have stated

that the price of the crankshaft is $7,000

or higher, but this is based on the

outright purchase price without an

exchange crankshaft (actual TCM List

Outright prices currently range from

$7,407 to $8,979). The cost analysis is

based on the exchange price because the

applicability of this action is limited to

registered owners of the specified TCM

engine models, and it is assumed these

owners have crankshafts installed in

their engines.

One group of commenters state that

the AD should be withdrawn, since the

data used for the NPRM is invalid and

the handling of the data is not

statistically correct. The FAA does not

concur. The data used to justify the AD

is valid; as stated previously, it is

derived from crankshaft failures where

the failure mode was determined by

engineering evaluation of numerous

failure events, which included reviews

of engine operating histories, analytical

engine teardowns, and laboratory

analyses of the failed crankshafts. The

FAA participated in many of these

investigative activities.

One commenter (ARSA) presented

data from repair stations which they

insist is the only valid data. Their data

is derived from ultrasonic inspection of

airmelt and VAR crankshafts and shows

29 airmelt removals out of 3,821

crankshafts inspected and 3 VAR

removals out of 488 crankshafts

inspected. They then conclude that

statistically there is no difference in the

two types of crankshafts. Their

statistical comparison of the number

they found to the number they

inspected is invalid. The comparison

must be made to the total population.

A better comparison is to combine

their inspection data with the FAA/

TCM failure data. This is still not

completely accurate but it includes all

the data currently available. When this

is done, there are 77 airmelt ‘‘events’’

out of an initial population of 23,000

and 7 VAR ‘‘events’’ out of an initial

population of 35,800; this comparison

showed an airmelt to VAR ‘‘event’’ rate

of 17 to 1. An ‘‘event’’ is either

crankshaft removal per ARSA data or

crankshaft failure per FAA/TCM data.

When the one set of ARSA data is

combined with the latest FAA/TCM

data (the latest data includes failures for

1993 through 1996), there are 89 airmelt

‘‘events’’. There were no VAR

subsurface fatigue failures for 1993

through 1996. The population of the

engines has changed since this process

was initiated and continues to change,

literally each day, which makes failure

rate comparisons extremely difficult, if

not impossible, to accurately calculate;

the airmelt population is now estimated

at 10,100. The FAA has determined that

the failure rate is high enough to

warrant an AD.

One group of commenters state that

the AD should be withdrawn, since they

operate 10–12 of these engines with no

failures to date. The commenters’

justification is that in complying with

the AD there is no increase in aviation

safety but expenses and operating costs

will increase. The FAA does not concur.

These five comments were all identical

but with different signatures. No

technical justification was given for not

publishing the AD. The FAA is aware of

the costs this AD will impose on

operators, but has determined that an

unsafe condition exists which must be

addressed by performing the actions

required by this AD. These actions are

necessary to return the affected engines

to the level of safety established at the

time the engine design was type

certified by the FAA.

One group of commenters state that

the AD should be withdrawn, since

unreported propeller strikes have

contaminated the data and cannot be

eliminated; therefore, the data is

invalid. The FAA does not concur. The

history of the engines for each data

point was evaluated to eliminate any

data from propeller strikes and

improper operation; however, there is

the remote possibility that some of the

failures were due to a propeller strike or

improper operation. There is no way to

be 100% sure that all failures due to

propeller strikes and improper

operation were eliminated from the

data. The data, however, is reliable

enough that the FAA feels that the AD

is warranted.

One group of commenters state that

the AD should be withdrawn, since the

FAA did not use the service difficulty

reports (SDR) database to validate the

findings of the AD; therefore, the data is

not valid. The FAA does not concur. As

stated in the SNPRM, the SDR database

does not identify cracks as being

subsurface fatigue cracks or originating

from some other source, nor does it

easily identify airmelt versus VAR. This

information may not have been

available at the time the ‘‘M’’ or ‘‘D’’

report was submitted. The FAA requires

the submission of ‘‘M’’ or ‘‘D’’ reports in

certain cases and certainly encourages

submittal of all pertinent findings. The

SDR database may be used to determine

if a particular part/engine is

experiencing a problem; however, it

may not be possible to determine the

exact nature of the problem. Using data

sources other than the SDR database

does not invalidate the FAA’s

determination that an AD is warranted.

One commenter states that the AD

should be made applicable to engines

installed on single-engine aircraft only,

since with twin-engine aircraft the

second engine is available. The FAA

does not concur. Although the second

engine is available, the accident/

incident data shows that a high

percentage of engine out incidents

involving twin-engine aircraft result in

off airport landings/crashes. For this

reason, engines installed on twins

should remain in the AD.

One commenter states that TCM

should identify VAR crankshafts on the

propeller flange instead of on the cheek,

as this would allow the identification of

VAR crankshafts without separating the

case halves. The FAA does not concur.
66504 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 244 / Friday, December 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

If the crankshaft has had an ultrasonic

inspection in accordance with TCM

Service Bulletin M87–5, Revision 1, or

AD 87–23–08, the heat code, the letter

‘‘V’’ (only if it is a VAR crankshaft) and

the letter ‘‘U’’ will be vibroetched on the

propeller flange. If the ‘‘V’’ is missing

then it is an airmelt crankshaft. In

addition, this AD requires compliance at

overhaul or whenever the crankshaft is

removed from the engine so that the

internal marking will be visible. Of

course, any new crankshaft purchased

from TCM will be VAR, and even if

TCM started to mark them now there is

still over a decade of production which

have no marking on the exterior.

One commenter states that the IO–360

series engines should be removed from

the AD’s applicability, as verbal contact

with their members (800 total, 225 using

the IO–360 engine) indicate no

problems. The commenter believes that

the failures are associated with ground

strikes and improper operation of

engines with under 1,200 hours total

time. The FAA does not concur. The

issue of propeller strikes and improper

operation has been previously

addressed. The FAA data shows that 5

of the 8 IO/TSIO–360 airmelt crankshaft

failures occurred on IO–360 engines (the

data from ARSA does not differentiate

between 360 and 520 series engines). Of

the five IO–360 failures, two had more

than 1,200 hours total time.

One group of commenters state that

the AD should be withdrawn, since the

time in service of the engines are not

accurately represented in FAA data

because TCM rebuilt engines are

included in data. Engines with serial

numbers (S/Ns) lower than 300000 are

reserved by TCM for rebuilt engines.

The FAA does not concur. The FAA

agrees that many of the engines listed

are rebuilt by TCM, where the time in

service of the crankshaft cannot be

accurately determined, but the

crankshaft would be considered high

time. However, there are other engines

listed which are ‘‘first run’’ with low

time in service failures. The data

supports the FAA’s position that the

failures are random and time in service

is not the determining factor.

One group of commenters state that

the AD should be withdrawn, since

there will be a loss of revenue to the

repair stations, overhaulers, etc. Some

commenters state that TCM is replacing

the crankshafts in rebuilt engines at no

charge to the customer, thereby

reducing the potential for overhauls.

The commenters state that they have

lost numerous overhauls because their

customers have elected to buy a TCM

rebuilt engine instead of paying for an

overhaul. The commenters consider this

an unfair business practice and feel that

the FAA is furthering this scheme by

issuing an AD.

The FAA disagrees. The commenters

ignore the FAA’s determination that an

unsafe condition is likely to exist or

develop on engines of this type design.

The FAA recognizes that competition

affects the profitability of entities

engaged in the aviation industry, but

denies any scheme to aid one

competitor over another. That the

original manufacturer of these engines

has elected to compete in the overhaul

market does not affect the FAA’s

determination that an unsafe condition

exists or the need for this AD to address

that safety issue.

One commenter states that the cost is

shown as an annual amount but should

have been shown as a total amount. The

commenter believes this economic

analysis is unprecedented and irregular

and undermines the confidence of the

aviation general public in the

rulemaking process. The FAA does not

concur. The FAA normally shows costs

on an annual basis when compliance

with an AD will be extended over a long

time frame. The total costs are generally

shown, but in this case, as stated in the

SNPRM, ‘‘The FAA estimates that

approximately 10% of the affected

engines will be overhauled each year’’;

thus it should be clear that it will take

approximately 10 years before all the

affected engines are in compliance. The

total cost is easily derived by

multiplying the annual cost estimate by

10. This issue was avoided in the

second SNPRM by showing both annual

and total costs.

Two commenters state that the cost

estimate is too low, as a big cost in

procuring a new crankshaft is not stated;

i.e., the shipping/freight cost, which

should be included in the cost estimate

for this AD. The FAA concurs. Since the

FAA’s cost estimate of a replacement

crankshaft is based on an ‘‘exchange’’

part, the FAA concurs that the costs of

shipping are appropriately included as

direct cost of the replacement part.

Shipping costs will vary widely

however, and the FAA has no

reasonable means to estimate those

costs. Therefore, the FAA will use the

commenters’ estimate of $100 for

shipping costs and adjust the cost

analysis accordingly.

One commenter states that the AD

should be withdrawn, since the

economic impact does not include the

cost to remove the engine and propeller

from the airplane and to reinstall them.

The FAA does not concur. The AD is to

be accomplished at overhaul or

whenever the crankcase is separated.

Since the engine and propeller, in either

case, must be removed anyway, there

will be no additional expense to

remove/reinstall the engine and

propeller in order to comply with the

AD.

One commenter states that the FAA

should acquire more data about the

currently required ultrasonic inspection

before issuing the AD. The commenter

questions whether any of the engines

that failed that were listed in the TCM

data had undergone the required

ultrasonic inspection. The FAA does not

concur. Of the failures listed in the

FAA/TCM data, 22 airmelt and 1 VAR

had been inspected one or more times

in accordance with AD 87–23–08 and/

or TCM SB M87–5, or M87–5, Revision

1. All of the crankshafts in the data

provided by ARSA (29 airmelt and 3

VAR) were removed from service

because they failed the ultrasonic

inspection.

One group of commenters state that

the AD should be withdrawn, since the

data on which the FAA’s determination

that an unsafe condition exists was not

available to the commenter for review.

The FAA does not concur. The

commenters have filed a number of

comments with the AD docket file that

indicate a careful review of available

data from a number of sources,

including the docket file. The FAA

denies that the information available in

the docket file is inadequate to warrant

AD action. While some information

cannot be included in the public docket

file due to the proprietary nature of the

information, the FAA has placed in the

docket a summary of the data on which

it bases its determination that an unsafe

condition exists, that the unsafe

condition is likely to exist or develop on

other products of the same type design,

and that this AD is necessary to address

this safety concern.

One commenter states that in Note 2

of the proposed AD, reference was made

to the term magnaflux; the commenter

correctly points out that magnaflux is a

registered trademark and should not be

used in this context. The generic

terminology magnetic particle

inspection should be used instead. The

FAA concurs and has revised this final

rule accordingly.

Two commenters state that the AD

should be withdrawn, since the FAA

has failed to address comments made to

the previous NPRM and SNPRM. The

FAA does not concur. The purpose of

the SNPRM is to continue the fact

gathering process. For clarity, certain

comments were partially addressed in

the SNPRMs; however, all comments

have been addressed in the processing

of this final rule.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 244 / Friday, December 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 66505

One commenter states that the AD

should be withdrawn, since the FAA

has not substantiated the inclusion of

the Rolls-Royce, plc engines which are

not US type certificated. The FAA does

not concur. The FAA stated in the

second SNPRM that the Rolls-Royce, plc

engines are identical in design and

manufacturing process, which

substantiates their inclusion. It is true

that there is no US type certificate for

these engines; however, these engines

are accepted for use on US type

certificated airplanes, and several are

installed on US registered aircraft.

Therefore, TCM service information and

FAA ADs apply to these engines.

One commenter states that the AD

should be withdrawn, since a number of

alternatives to AD action already exist

and they have been shown to be as

effective as an AD. The alternatives

include the current TCM service

information, special TCM pricing,

strong sales of TCM rebuilt engines and

attrition of older airmelt crankshafts.

The FAA does not concur. There was

TCM service information prior to the

initial issuance of the original NPRM

and that did not affect the failure rate.

The special TCM pricing has helped but

is not enough to warrant no AD action.

Strong sales of TCM rebuilt engines and

attrition of older crankshafts certainly

help the situation, but, again, are not

sufficient to warrant no AD action. The

data reflects the need for the AD and

does not show that the alternatives

presented are as effective as an AD.

One commenter states that the AD

should be withdrawn since the SNPRM

mandates a standard maintenance

practice which is in conflict with FAA

internal guidance on the issuance of

ADs. The FAA does not concur. The

problem here is not a maintenance

procedure, but a manufacturing process,

and it affects all the affected engines

regardless of who is performing the

maintenance, or the quality of

maintenance. The FAA has determined

that an unsafe condition exists or can

develop on these crankshafts. It is

therefore incumbent on the FAA to

issue an AD.

After careful review of the available

data, including the comments noted

above, the FAA has determined that air

safety and the public interest require the

adoption of the rule with the changes

described previously. The FAA has

determined that these changes will not

increase the scope of the AD.

The FAA estimates that 10,100

engines are installed on aircraft of U. S.

registry and will need to have the

crankshaft replaced, that it will take

approximately 1 work hour per engine

to determine the type of crankshaft

installed and that the average labor rate

is $60 per work hour. Required parts

will cost approximately $2,599 and

shipping will cost approximately $100.

Based on these figures, the cost impact

of replacing crankshafts on U. S.

operators is estimated to be $27,865,900

over a 10-year period or $2,786,590

annually.

The FAA further estimates that 59,300

engines with VAR crankshafts installed

would require ultrasonic inspections

and the estimated cost of performing an

ultrasonic inspection is $200. The FAA

estimates that approximately 10%, or

5,930 engines, would need to be

overhauled annually, so the estimated

total cost impact for ultrasonic

inspections is $1,186,000 annually.

Therefore, the FAA estimates the total

cost impact of the AD to be $27,865,900

over a 10-year period, plus an additional

$1,186,000 annually for the repetitive

ultrasonic inspections.

The regulations adopted herein will

not have substantial direct effects on the

States, on the relationship between the

national government and the States, or

on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612,

it is determined that this final rule does

not have sufficient federalism

implications to warrant the preparation

of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this action (1) is not a

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under

Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a

‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3)

will not have a significant economic

impact, positive or negative, on a

substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has

been prepared for this action and it is

contained in the Rules Docket. A copy

of it may be obtained from the Rules

Docket at the location provided under

the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air Transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Incorporation by reference,

Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration amends part 39 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

removing Amendment 39–5735 (52 FR

41937, October 30, 1987) and by adding

a new airworthiness directive,

Amendment 39–10260, to read as

follows:

97–26–17 Teledyne Continental Motors

and Rolls-Royce, plc: Amendment 39–

10260. Docket 93–ANE–08. Supersedes

AD 87–23–08, Amendment 39–5735.

Applicability: Teledyne Continental

Motors (TCM) IO–360, LTSIO–360, TSIO–

360, IO–520, LIO–520, LTSIO–520 and

TSIO–520 series reciprocating engines built

on or prior to December 31, 1980; rebuilt

TCM IO–360, LTSIO–360, TSIO–360, IO–520,

LIO–520, LTSIO–520 and TSIO–520 series

reciprocating engines with serial numbers

lower than those listed in TCM Critical

Service Bulletin (SB) No. CSB96–8, dated

June 25, 1996; TCM factory overhauled IO–

360, LTSIO–360, TSIO–360, IO–520, LIO–

520, LTSIO–520 and TSIO–520 series

reciprocating engines with serial number of

901203H and lower; and Rolls-Royce, plc IO–

360 and TSIO–360 series reciprocating

engines with any serial number. These

engines are installed on but not limited to the

following aircraft: Raytheon (formerly Beech)

models 95–C55, 95–C55A, D55, D55A, E55,

E55A, 58, 58A, 58P, 58PA, 58TC, 58TCA,

S35, V35, V35A, V35B, E33A, E33C, 35–

C33A, 36, A36, F33A, F33C and A36TC;

Bellanca model 17–30A; Cessna models

172XP, A185, A188, T188C, 206, T206, 207,

T207, 210, T210, P210, 310R, T310P, T310Q,

T310R, 320D, 320E, 320F, 336, 337, T337,

P337, 340, 401, 402, 414 and T41B/C;

Colemill conversion of Commander 500A;

Goodyear Airship Blimp 22; Maule Model

M–4–210, M–4–210C, M–4–210S, M–4–210T,

and M–5–210C; Mooney model M20–K;

Navion model H; Pierre Robin HR 100; The

New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (formerly Piper

Aircraft Company) models PA28–201T,

PA28R–201T, PA28RT–201T, PA34–200T

and PA34–220T; Prinair Dehavilland Heron;

Reims models FR172, F337 and FT337; and

Swift Museum Foundation, Inc. models GC–

1A and GC–1B equipped with the IO–360

engine.

Note 1: This airworthiness directive (AD)

applies to each engine identified in the

preceding applicability provision, regardless

of whether it has been modified, altered, or

repaired in the area subject to the

requirements of this AD. For engines that

have been modified, altered, or repaired so

that the performance of the requirements of

this AD is affected, the owner/operator must

request approval for an alternative method of

compliance in accordance with paragraph (d)

of this AD. The request should include an

assessment of the effect of the modification,

alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition

addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe
66506 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 244 / Friday, December 19, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

condition has not been eliminated, the

request should include specific proposed

actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent crankshaft failure and

subsequent engine failure, accomplish the

following:

(a) At the next engine overhaul, or

whenever the crankshaft is next removed

from the engine, after the effective date of

this AD, whichever occurs first, determine if

the crankshaft was manufactured using the

airmelt or vacuum arc remelt (VAR) process

in accordance with the identification

procedure described in TCM Critical SB No.

CSB96–8, dated June 25, 1996. If the

crankshaft was manufactured using the

airmelt process or if the manufacturing

process is unknown, remove the crankshaft

from service and replace with a serviceable

crankshaft manufactured using the VAR

process.

(b) For all TCM IO–360, LTSIO–360, TSIO–

360, IO–520, IO–520, LTSIO–520 and TSIO–

520 and Rolls-Royce, plc IO–360 and TSIO–

360 engine models that have VAR

crankshafts installed, regardless of serial

number; at the next and every subsequent

crankshaft removal from the engine case or

installation of a replacement crankshaft, prior

to crankshaft installation in the engine,

conduct an ultrasonic inspection of the

crankshaft in accordance with the procedures

specified in TCM Mandatory SB No. MSB96–

10, dated August 15, 1996, and, if necessary,

replace with a serviceable part.

Note 2: Accomplishment of the ultrasonic

inspection required by this AD does not

fulfill any requirements for magnetic particle

inspection or any other inspections specified

in TCM or Rolls-Royce, plc overhaul

manuals.

(c) The ultrasonic inspection of the

crankshaft must be performed by a nondestructive test (NDT) ultrasonic (UT) Level

II inspector who is qualified under the

guidelines established by the American

Society of Nondestructive Testing or MIL–

STD–410 or FAA-approved equivalent, or

must be trained by TCM personnel or their

designated representative on how to

accomplish and conduct this inspection

procedure. The person approving the engine

for return to service is required to verify that

the UT inspection was accomplished in

accordance with the requirements of this

paragraph.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta

Aircraft Certification Office. Operators shall

submit their requests through an appropriate

FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add

comments and then send it to the Manager,

Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office.

Note 3: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this airworthiness directive,

if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta

Aircraft Certification Office.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the aircraft to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

(f) The actions required by this AD shall be

done in accordance with the following TCM

service documents:

Document No. Pages Date

CSB96–8 ........... 1–6 June 25, 1996.

Total pages: 6.

MSB96–10 ........ 1–3 August 15, 1996.

Total pages: 3.

This incorporation by reference was

approved by the Director of the Federal

Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)

and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained

from Teledyne Continental Motors, P.O. Box

90, Mobile, AL 36601; telephone (334) 438–

3411. Copies may be inspected at the FAA,

New England Region, Office of the Assistant

Chief Counsel, 12 New England Executive

Park, Burlington, MA; or at the Office of the

Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street,

NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(g) This amendment becomes effective on

January 23, 1998.

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on

December 12, 1997.

Jay J. Pardee,

Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 97–33142 Filed 12–18–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 97–SW–50–AD; Amendment

39–10261; AD 97–26–18]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter

France Model SA–360C Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for

comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD) that is

applicable to Eurocopter France Model

SA–360C helicopters. This action

requires replacement of the main gear

box (MGB) input bevel pinion (bevel

pinion). This amendment is prompted

by service reports of bevel pinion

fatigue cracking. This condition, if not

corrected, could result in failure of the

MGB and a subsequent forced landing.

DATES: Effective January 5, 1998.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules

Docket must be received on or before

January 20, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Office of

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 97-SW–50-

AD, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663,

Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Shep Blackman, Aerospace Engineer,

FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Rotorcraft

Standards Staff, 2601 Meacham Blvd.,

Fort Worth, Texas 76137, telephone

(817) 222–5296, (817) 222–5961.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

Direction Generale De L’Aviation

(DGAC), which is the airworthiness

authority for France, recently notified

the FAA that an unsafe condition may

exist on Eurocopter France Model SA–

360C helicopters with MGB, part

number (P/N) 360A32–2000—all dash

numbers, installed. The DGAC advises

that replacement of the MGB bevel

pinion, P/N 360A32–1021–20, is

necessary at 1,000 hours time-in-service

(TIS) intervals to prevent fatigue

cracking of the bevel pinion, failure of

the MGB, and a subsequent forced

landing.

Eurocopter France has issued Service

Bulletin No. 01.35, dated January 14,

1997, which specifies replacement of

the MGB bevel pinion at 1,000 hour TIS

intervals. The DGAC classified this

service bulletin as mandatory and

issued DGAC AD 97–027–041(B), dated

February 12, 1997, in order to assure the

continued airworthiness of these

helicopters in France.

This helicopter model is

manufactured in France and is type

certificated for operation in the United

States under the provisions of section

21.29 of the Federal Aviation

Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the

applicable bilateral airworthiness

agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral

airworthiness agreement, the DGAC has

kept the FAA informed of the situation

described above. The FAA has

examined the findings of the DGAC,

reviewed all available information, and

determined that AD action is necessary

for products of this type design that are

certificated for operation in the United

States.

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on other Eurocopter France

Model SA–360C helicopters of the same

type design registered in the United

States, this AD is being issued to

prevent bevel pinion fatigue cracking,

failure of the MGB, and a subsequent

forced landing. This AD requires

replacement of the bevel pinion at

specified TIS intervals.

None of the Eurocopter France Model

SA–360C helicopters affected by this

AD action are on the U.S. Register. All