5842 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 26 / Friday, February 7, 1997 / Notices

Addo-Yobo was convicted in the United

States District Court for the Southern

District of New York on one count of

mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341

and one count of conspiracy to commit

Medicaid and mail fraud in violation of

18 U.S.C. 371.

By letter dated June 27, 1994, the

United States Department of Health and

Human Services notified Dr. Addo-Yobo

that he was being excluded, pursuant to

42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a), from participation

in Medicare, Medicaid, Maternal and

Child Health Services Block Grant and

Block Grants to States for Social

Services programs for a period of five

years.

The Acting Deputy Administrator

concludes that in light of the revocation

of Dr. Addo-Yobo’s state medical

license, he is not currently authorized to

handle controlled substances in the

State of New York. The DEA does not

have statutory authority under the

Controlled Substances Act to issue or

maintain a registration if the applicant

or registrant is without state authority to

handle controlled substances in the

state in which he conducts his business,

21 U.S.C. 802(21), 823(f), and 824(a)(3).

This prerequisite has been consistently

upheld. See Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58

Fed. Reg. 51,104 (1993); James H.

Nickens, M.D., 57 Fed. Reg. 59,847

(1992); Roy E. Hardman, M.D., 57 Fed.

Reg. 49,195 (1992). Here, it is clear that

Dr. Addo-Yobo is not currently

authorized to handle controlled

substances in the State of New York.

Therefore, Dr. Addo-Yobo is not

currently entitled to a DEA registration.

Because Dr. Addo-Yobo is not entitled

to a DEA registration due to his lack of

state authorization to handle controlled

substances, the Acting Deputy

Administrator concludes that it is

unnecessary to address whether Dr.

Addo-Yobo’s DEA registration should be

revoked based upon his exclusion from

participating in Medicare/Medicaid

programs.

Accordingly, the Acting Deputy

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement

Administration pursuant to the

authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823

and 824 and 28 C.F.R. 0.100(b) and

0.104, hereby orders that DEA

Certificate of Registration, AA2601981,

previously issued to Charles AddoYobo, M.D., be, and it hereby is,

revoked. The Acting Deputy

Administrator further orders that any

pending applications for renewal of

such registration be, and they hereby

are, denied. This order is effective

March 10, 1997.

Dated: January 31, 1997.

James S. Milford,

Acting Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–3049 Filed 2–6–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

[Docket No. 95–16]

Mark J. Berger, D.P.M.; Continuation of

Registration With Restrictions

On December 23, 1994, the Deputy

Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA), issued an Order

to Show Cause to Mark J. Berger, D.P.M.

(Respondent) of Riverwoods, Illinois,

notifying him of an opportunity to show

cause as to why DEA should not revoke

his DEA Certificate of Registration,

BB2461604, and deny any pending

applications for renewal of such

registration as a practitioner under 21

U.S.C. 823(f), for reason that his

continued registration would be

inconsistent with the public interest

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4).

By letter dated January 17, 1995, the

Respondent, acting pro se, filed a timely

request for a hearing, and following

prehearing procedures, a hearing was

held in Chicago, Illinois on April 12,

1995, before Administrative Law Judge

Mary Ellen Bittner. At the hearing, the

Government called witnesses and

introduced documentary evidence and

Respondent testified in his own behalf.

After the hearing, the Government

submitted proposed findings of fact,

conclusions of law and argument, and

Respondent submitted a post hearing

brief. On April 11, 1996, Judge Bittner

issued her Opinion and Recommended

Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Decision, recommending that

Respondent’s DEA registration not be

revoked, but be restricted in that

Respondent shall not prescribe,

administer or otherwise dispense any

controlled substances for any member of

his family or himself, and shall handle

controlled substances only in treating

podiatric patients and not for any

purpose outside the usual practice of

podiatry. Neither party filed exceptions

to Judge Bittner’s Opinion and

Recommended Ruling, and on May 14,

1996, the record of these proceedings

was transmitted to the Deputy

Administrator.

The Acting Deputy Administrator has

considered the record in its entirety,

and pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 1316.67,

hereby issues his final order based upon

findings of fact and conclusions of law

as hereinafter set forth. The Acting

Deputy Administrator adopts, in its

entirety, the Opinion and

Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Decision of the

Administrative Law Judge. His adoption

is in no manner diminished by any

recitation of facts, issues and

conclusions herein, or of any failure to

mention a matter of fact or law.

The Acting Deputy Administrator

finds that Respondent is a podiatrist

initially licensed to practice in the State

of Illinois in the early 1980’s. However,

as of at least March 1984, Respondent

had never been licensed to handle

controlled substances in the State of

Illinois.

In March 1984, the Illinois

Department of Registration and

Education (now known as the

Department of Professional Regulation

and hereinafter referred to as DPR)

received information from DEA that

Respondent had recently ordered 500

Quaalude tablets (the brand name for

methaqualone) after methaqualone had

been rescheduled in Illinois from

Schedule II to Schedule I. As a result of

this information, a DPR investigator and

a local police officer went to

Respondent’s office on March 8, 1984,

intending to conduct an administrative

search and take possession of the

Quaalude tablets. Respondent

acknowledged ordering the Quaalude,

but stated that he kept the tablets at his

home due to recent break-ins or

attempted break-ins. Respondent was

told that his possession of Quaalude

was illegal and he agreed to relinquish

the drugs after seeing his last patient of

the day. Subsequently, Respondent

admitted that he had self-administered

1,000 to 1,500 Quaalude tablets over a

period of approximately a year and a

half to relieve pain caused by an injury.

Respondent then consented to a

search of his office, which revealed an

empty bottle labeled 100 Quaalude, an

open bottle of Empirin with codeine (a

Schedule III controlled substance) with

79 tablets missing, and an open bottle of

diazepam (a Schedule IV controlled

substance) with 22 tablets missing.

Respondent advised the officers that he

had no records for the dispensation of

these controlled substance.

After being taken into investigative

custody, Respondent consented to the

search of his home. This search revealed

two empty 100-tablet bottles and one

empty 500-tablet bottle of Quaalude,

two full 100-tablet bottles of Quaalude,

seven Empirin with codeine tablets,

plant material suspected to be cannabis,

and drug paraphernalia.

A review of DEA order forms revealed

that during the period November 11,

1982 through January 23, 1984,

Respondent ordered the following

controlled substances: 2,500 dosage
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 26 / Friday, February 7, 1997 / Notices 5843

units of Quaalude, 100 dosage units of

Empirin with codeine #3, 100 dosage

units of Valium 5 mg., 100 dosage units

of Valium 10 mg., 500 Dexedrine 5 mg.,

and 100 dosage units of Tenuate Dospan

75 mg. Respondent did not maintain

any records regarding these drugs in

violation of both state and Federal laws.

Respondent was subsequently

charged in the Circuit Court of Cook

County, Illinois with one count of

possession of cannabis with intent to

deliver, one count of possession of

methaqualone with intent to deliver,

and one count of unlawful dispensing of

methaqualone. Following a bench trial,

Respondent was convicted on June 18,

1984, of possession of a controlled

substance and sentenced to three years’

probation.

Respondent testified during the

hearing before Judge Bittner that in 1981

he had ruptured and then re-ruptured

his Achilles tendon, and that he took

methaqualone to enable him to sleep.

He further testified that he never sold

methaqualone or prescribed,

administered or dispensed it to anyone

else and that he realizes in retrospect

that he should not have taken it.

On March 23, 1984, DPR filed a

complaint against Respondent alleging

that Respondent obtained and selfadministered controlled substances

when not properly registered to handle

controlled substances in the State of

Illinois. On May 11, 1984, Respondent

and DPR entered into a Stipulation and

Recommendation for Settlement

pursuant to which Respondent agreed

that his license to practice podiatry

would be indefinitely suspended; he

would not petition for restoration of his

license for at least nine months from the

effective date of the Podiatry Examining

Committee’s (Committee) order

approving the settlement; he would

obtain counseling and rehabilitation;

and he would not apply for an Illinois

controlled substance license for at least

two years after the effective date of the

order. On June 20, 1984, the Committee

approved the Stipulation and

Recommendation for Settlement, and on

July 11, 1984, the Director of DPR issued

an order adopting the terms of the

settlement. Subsequently, on September

19, 1984, Respondent surrendered his

previous DEA Certificate of Registration.

Following the reinstatement of his

state podiatry license and the issuance

of his license to handle controlled

substances in the State of Illinois,

Respondent executed a new application

dated February 27, 1990, for DEA

registration as a practitioner in

Schedules II through V. On that

application, Respondent answered

‘‘yes’’ to the question which asked:

Have you ever been convicted of a crime

in connection with controlled substances

under State or Federal law, or ever

surrendered or had a DEA registration

revoked, suspended or denied, or ever had a

State professional license or controlled

substance registration revoked, suspended,

denied, restricted or placed on probation?

Applicants who respond affirmatively

to this question are required to explain

their answers on the back of the

application form. Respondent’s

explanation referred to his lack of a

separate state license to handle

controlled substance, and his arrest for

ordering controlled substances without

the proper licensure. Respondent

claimed in his explanation that he ‘‘did

not knowingly violate the state licensing

requirement, since I did not know about

it.’’ Respondent’s explanation however,

did not mention his conviction for

possession of methaqualone, the state’s

suspension of his license to practice

podiatry, or the surrender of his

previous DEA Certificate of Registration.

Following receipt of Respondent’s

application, the DEA Chicago office

issued a Notice of Hearing advising

Respondent that there would be an

informal hearing regarding his

application. This informal hearing

resulted in a memorandum of

understanding being executed on

August 30, 1990, by Respondent and

representatives of the United States

Attorney’s Office and DEA. The

memorandum of understanding stated

that the Notice of Hearing had alleged

that (1) Respondent had been the

defendant in an information charging

him with three felony violations of the

Illinois Controlled Substances Act:

possession of more than 30 grams of

methaqualone with intent to deliver,

possession of cannabis with intent to

deliver, and unlawful dispensing of

methaqualone; and (2) Respondent had

been found guilty of possession of a

controlled substance and sentenced to

three years’ probation. The

memorandum of understanding further

stated that Respondent had been ‘‘fully

advised of the prohibited acts which

have occurred’’ and had agreed to

comply with the provisions of the

Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and its

implementing regulations and, more

specifically, that he agreed that (1) he

would ‘‘prescribe and dispense

controlled substances in strict

accordance with the [CSA] and the

regulations issued thereunder’’; (2) ‘‘any

prescriptions written for controlled

substances by the Respondent will be

for medical purposes and will be issued

within the usual course of professional

practice for which the Respondent is

registered with the [DEA] and

professionally licensed by the State’’; (3)

‘‘Respondent’s handling of controlled

substances * * * shall be limited to

controlled drugs in Schedules III

through V and that the Respondent not

be allowed to handle any controlled

substance found in Schedule II for a

period of not less than one (1) year

* * *’’; and (4) when renewing his DEA

registration Respondent would ‘‘answer

fully and truthfully any question

regarding if the Respondent has ever

been convicted of a crime in connection

with controlled substances under State

or Federal law, or ever surrendered or

had a DEA registration revoked,

suspended or denied, or ever had a State

professional license or controlled

substance registration revoke[d], denied,

restricted or placed on probation.’’

Other than the memorandum of

understanding, there is no other

evidence in the record as to what was

discussed during the course of the

informal hearing. Shortly after

execution of the memorandum of

understanding, Respondent was issued

DEA Certificate of Registration

BB2461604, however there is nothing in

the record to indicate what schedules of

controlled substances were listed on the

Certificate of Registration.

On June 28, 1993, Respondent

executed a renewal application for DEA

registration BB2461604 in Schedules II

through V. On this application,

Respondent had answered ‘‘yes’’ to the

same question that he had answered

affirmatively on his 1990 application for

registration. Respondent testified that he

had photocopied his 1990 explanation

and pasted it onto the back of the 1993

application, stating,

I was giving what I thought was more new

information and I wasn’t omitting anything

purposely. I thought conviction, surrender of

license, etc., was known to the DEA and

there was no reason to give a long, detailed

explanation of that. I believe this was

common knowledge.

Certainly, I didn’t falsify anything. I did

omit things, but not in a purposeful way. I

would’ve gladly listed the things that I

thought the DEA would’ve wanted me [sic]

on the application, had I known that this is

what they wanted. I didn’t know that.

Respondent also testified that ‘‘[t]he

things that have happened, 11 years ago,

I can’t change that. And I’m not trying

to exonerate my involvement in that.’’

However, Respondent further testified

that, ‘‘[f]or the past 11 years, I’ve been

totally in accordance with the law. And

for the past five years, since receiving

my DEA license, I’ve been totally in

accordance with the law.’’

During the course of his testimony,

Respondent stated that he had never

falsified any state application. On cross-
5844 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 26 / Friday, February 7, 1997 / Notices

examination, Respondent conceded that

he had been convicted of attempted

petty theft, a misdemeanor, 1970, yet he

answered ‘‘no’’ on a 1982 DPR

application to the question, ‘‘Have you

ever been convicted of a criminal

offense in Illinois or in another state or

in federal court, other than a minor

traffic violation?’’ Respondent explained

that he answered in the negative

because he thought the question referred

to felony convictions only. As to the

conviction, Respondent testified that he

was 18 years old, and that ‘‘I shouldn’t

have been [convicted], it wasn’t even

me,’’ but upon his attorney’s advice, he

pled to a misdemeanor.

Respondent contends in his brief that

he was prejudiced because the

Government failed to provide him

notice in advance of the hearing that the

1982 DPR application would be at issue

in these proceedings. At the hearing, the

Government offered into evidence the

1982 application and a police report of

the incident that led to his 1970

conviction. Judge Bittner properly

rejected the admission of these

documents into evidence since they

were not supplied to Respondent in

advance of the hearing as required by

the Administrative Law Judge’s

prehearing ruling on March 29, 1995,

and therefore did not consider the

application as affirmative evidence

against Respondent. Judge Bittner did

however, allow Respondent to be crossexamined about the contents of the

documents. The Acting Deputy

Administrator concurs with Judge

Bittner’s conclusion that, ‘‘a major issue

in this proceeding was Respondent’s

alleged misstatements on his

application for DEA registration, and in

these circumstances * * * examination

as to his truthfulness in other

applications was a proper subject of

cross-examination, and that the

Government was entitled to use the

prior application and police report for

impeachment purposes.’’

The Government in its posthearing

filing argues that Respondent materially

falsified two applications for

registration and that such falsification

provides an independent statutory basis

for revocation of Respondent’s DEA

Certificate of Registration pursuant to 21

U.S.C. 824(a)(1). However, the

Government did not assert that 21

U.S.C. 824(a)(1) was a basis for the

proposed revocation in either the Order

to Show Cause or in any of its

prehearing filings, and the issue in this

proceeding, agreed upon by the parties,

makes no reference to 824(a)(1) as a

basis for revocation. Therefore, the

Acting Deputy Administrator does not

consider whether Respondent’s

registration should be revoked pursuant

to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1).

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and

824(a)(4), the Deputy Administrator may

revoke a DEA Certificate of Registration

and deny any pending applications, if

he determines that he continued

reigstration would be inconsistent with

the public interest. Section 823(f)

requires that he following factors be

considered:

(1) The recommendation of the

appropriate State licensing board or

professional disciplinary authority.

(2) The applicant’s experience in

dispensing, or conducting research with

respect to controlled substances.

(3) The applicant’s conviction record

under Federal or State laws relating to

the manufacture, distribution, or

dispensing of controlled substances.

(4) Compliance with applicable State,

Federal, or local laws relating to

controlled substances.

(5) Such other conduct which may

threaten the public health and safety.

These factors are to be considered in

the disjunctive; the Deputy

Administrator may rely on any one or a

combination of factors and may give

each factor the weight he deems

appropriate in determining whether a

registration should be revoked or an

application for registration be denied.

See Henry J. Schwartz, Jr., M.D., Docket

No. 88–42, 54 FR 16,422 (1989).

Regarding factor one, it is undisputed

that Respondent’s license to practice

podiatry was suspended in 1984.

However, it is also undisputed that such

license was restored sometime prior to

his 1990 application for DEA

registration and that he was issued a

state controlled substance registration.

From the evidence in the record, it

appears that Respondent has practiced

without incident since being issued his

state licenses. Therefore, the Acting

Deputy Administrator concurs with

Judge Bittner’s conclusion that this

factor weighs in favor of Respondent’s

continued registration.

As to factor two, Respondent’s

experience in dispensing controlled

substances, it is uncontested that

sometime in 1982 until his arrest in

March 1984, Respondent ordered and

self-administered controlled substances

while not properly registered to handle

controlled substances in the State of

Illinois. The Acting Deputy

Administrator concludes that the fact

that Respondent dispensed controlled

substances without proper state

licensure is properly considered under

factor four regarding Respondent’s

compliance with applicable state law.

The Acting Deputy Administrator

concurs with Judge Bittner’s conclusion

that under this factor, the question is

whether Respondent’s actions would

have been medically appropriate had he

been properly registered with the State.

Respondent claims that he had a

legitimate medical reason for using the

drugs he ordered. The Acting Deputy

Administrator concludes that

Respondent’s use of methaqualone after

January 1, 1984, when it was

rescheduled into Schedule I in the State

of Illinois, was clearly improper.

However, the Acting Deputy

Administrator agrees with Judge Bittner

that the record is insufficient to warrant

a finding that Respondent’s selfadministration of controlled substances

prior to January 1, 1984 was for no

legitimate medical purpose. There is

nothing in the record concerning

whether the substances are not

appropriate to treat the conditions for

which Respondent used them, whether

Respondent’s treatment of such

conditions was outside the scope of his

practice of podiatry, or whether the selfadministration of controlled substances

was impermissible in the State of

Illinois.

Also relevant to this factor is the

Respondent’s uncontroverted testimony

that he never prescribed, administered,

or otherwise dispensed controlled

substances to anyone else, and that he

has properly handled controlled

substances since his DEA registration

was restored in 1990.

The Acting Deputy Administrator

concurs with Judge Bittner’s conclusion

regarding factor three. While

Respondent was charged with

possession of controlled substances

with intent to deliver and with unlawful

distribution of a controlled substance,

he was ultimately convicted of

possession of methaqualone. Thus,

Respondent has no conviction record

relating to the manufacture, distribution

or dispensing of controlled substances.

Regarding factor four, it is undisputed

that during the events in question in the

early 1980’s, Respondent failed to

maintain records regarding his handling

of controlled substances in violation of

both Federal and state law. See 21

U.S.C. §§ 827 and 842(a)(5) and I.R.S.

Chap. 561⁄2 § 1306. In addition,

Respondent violated state law from

1982 to March 1984, by handling

controlled substances when not

properly registered by the State of

Illinois and by possessing methaqualone

after January 1, 1984, when it was

placed into Schedule I in Illinois.

As to factor five, on his 1990

application for registration, Respondent

did not give a complete explanation for

his affirmative response to the questions

about whether he had ever been
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 26 / Friday, February 7, 1997 / Notices 5845

convicted of a controlled substance

related crime, had ever surrendered a

DEA registration or had one revoked,

suspended, denied, or had a state

professional license or controlled

substance registration revoked,

suspended, denied, restricted or placed

on probation. Thereafter, Respondent

was issued a Notice of Hearing which

alleged that Respondent had been

charged with three felony violations of

state law and that he had been found

guilty of one count of possession of a

controlled substance. As Judge Bittner

correctly notes, ‘‘[a]s far as this record

shows, the Notice of Hearing did not

make any reference to Respondent’s

explanation on his application of his

answer to the liability question.’’

Respondent then participated in an

informal hearing with DEA personnel

and a representative from the United

States Attorney’s Office. Again as Judge

Bittner correctly notes, ‘‘there is no

evidence about the discussion at that

meeting and, more specifically, about

whether any of the government

personnel advised Respondent that his

statements on his [1990] application for

DEA registration were inadequate.’’

Respondent ultimately entered into a

memorandum of understanding in

August 1990 wherein he agreed to

‘‘answer fully and truthfully’’ the

questions on renewal applications.

However, there is nothing in the

memorandum of understanding that

documents that Respondent was told

that his previous explanation on the

1990 application was inadequate, nor

was there any testimony at the hearing

as to whether the parties discussed the

meaning of this provision of the

memorandum of understanding.

Respondent was then issued a DEA

registration. Given the lack of evidence

in the record that Respondent was

advised that his answer in 1990 was

inadequate, it is reasonable to accept

Respondent’s explanation for giving the

same answer on his 1993 renewal

application. Respondent testified, ‘‘I

figured if this was good enough the first

time, it’s good enough the second time.’’

Therefore, the Acting Deputy

Administrator concludes that while

Respondent may have technically

violated the memorandum of

understanding by failing to provide full

and truthful answers on future

applications, such a violation is

understandable given that he was

apparently not told his earlier

explanation was inadequate.

The Acting Deputy Administrator

concurs with Judge Bittner’s conclusion

that the Government has not established

by a preponderance of the credible

evidence that Respondent’s continued

registration would be inconsistent with

the public interest. While Respondent

handled controlled substances from

1982 to March 1984 without proper

state authorization and failed to

maintain the required records, these

events occurred over 12 years ago, and

there is no evidence in the record that

Respondent has improperly handled

controlled substances since being issued

a DEA registration in 1990. In addition,

there is no evidence in the record that

Respondent was ever advised that the

explanation on his 1990 application was

not sufficient, and therefore his use of

the same explanation on his 1993

application is understandable.

Judge Bittner recommended that

Respondent’s registration not be

revoked, but that it be subject to the

following restrictions:

(1) Respondent shall not prescribe,

administer or otherwise dispense any

controlled substances for any member of

his family or himself.

(2) Respondent shall handle

controlled substances only in treating

podiatric patients, and not for any

purpose outside the usual practice of

podiatry.

Under the circumstances of this case,

the Acting Deputy Administrator finds

Judge Bittner’s recommended

restrictions to be reasonable. Therefore,

the Acting Deputy Administrator

concludes that Respondent’s DEA

registration should be continued in

Schedules II through V subject to Judge

Bittner’s recommended restrictions. It

should be noted that it is unclear from

the record, which schedules Respondent

is currently registered to handle. He

applied for Schedule II through V in

1990, however, the memorandum of

understanding executed in August 1990

states, ‘‘[t]hat Respondent’s handling of

controlled substances pursuant to his

Federal controlled substances

registration upon issuance of such

registration by the DEA, shall be limited

to controlled drugs in Schedules III

through V and that Respondent not be

allowed to handle any controlled

substance found in Schedule II for a

period of not less than one (1) year from

the date of the execution of the

agreement.’’ His 1993 renewal

application, which is the subject of this

proceeding, indicates that Respondent

wishes his registration to be renewed in

Schedules II through V. Regardless of

Respondent’s current authorization, the

Acting Deputy Administrator concludes

that in light of all of the evidence,

Respondent should be registered in

Schedules II through V subject to the

above-referenced restrictions.

Accordingly, the Acting Deputy

Administrator of the Drug Enforcement

Administration, pursuant to the

authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823

and 824, and 28 C.F.R. 0.100(b) and

0.104, hereby orders that DEA

Certificate of Registration BB2461604,

issued to Mark J. Beger, D.P.M., be

continued, and any pending

applications be granted in Schedules II

through V, subject to the above

restrictions. This order is effective

March 10, 1997.

Dated: January 30, 1997.

James S. Milford,

Acting Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–3082 Filed 2–6–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

Manufacturer of Controlled

Substances; Notice of Registration

By Notice dated July 25, 1996, and

published in the Federal Register on

July 31, 1996, (61 FR 39986), Guilford

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Attn: Ross S.

Laderman, 6611 Tributary Street,

Baltimore, Maryland 21224, made

application to the Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) to be registered as

a bulk manufacturer of cocaine (9041),

a basic class of controlled substance

listed in Schedule II.

No comments or objections have been

received. DEA has considered the

factors in 21 U.S.C. § 823(a) and

determined that the registration of

Guilford Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to

manufacture cocaine is consistent with

the public interest at this time.

Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 823

and 28 CFR §§ 0.100 and 0.104, the

Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office

of Diversion Control, hereby orders that

the application submitted by the above

firm for registration as a bulk

manufacturer of the basic class of

controlled substance listed above is

granted.

Dated: January 9, 1997.

Gene R. Haislip,

Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration.

[FR Doc. 97–3083 Filed 2–6–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

[Docket No. 95–20]

Jospeh S. Hayes, M.D.; Grant of

Restricted Registration

On January 25, 1995, the Deputy

Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) issued an Order

to Show Cause to Joseph S. Hayes, M.D.

(Respondent) of Bristol, Tennessee,

notifying him of an opportunity to show