IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 07–1226 

Filed January 23, 2009 

STATE OF IOWA, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR HENRY COUNTY, 

 Defendant. 

 Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Henry County, John G. 

Linn, Judge. 

 Original certiorari action brought by State to challenge legality of 

district court’s decision in postconviction relief proceeding, holding 

application of Iowa Code section 903A.2 (2001) to inmate violated 

Ex Post Facto Clause. WRIT ANNULLED. 

 Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek and 

Forrest Guddall, Assistant Attorneys General, for plaintiff. 

 Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for defendant. 

 
 2 

TERNUS, Chief Justice. 

 Inmate Denny Propp brought a postconviction relief action 

challenging a determination by the department of corrections (DOC) that 

he was ineligible to receive earned-time credits after he was removed 

from a sex offender treatment program for misconduct. See generally

Iowa Code § 903A.2 (2005) (providing for reduction in sentence for good 

conduct and satisfactory participation in specified programs). Propp 

claimed this application of the governing statute, as amended in 2001 

and 2005, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the offense for 

which Propp was incarcerated was committed prior to the amendments. 

The district court held the DOC’s application of amended section 903A.2 

to Propp violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and 

Iowa Constitutions. The State brought this original certiorari action to 

challenge the legality of the district court’s decision. Because we 

conclude the district court’s ruling was correct, we annul the writ of 

certiorari. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

 Propp is currently incarcerated at the Mount Pleasant Correctional 

Facility on a twenty-five-year sentence for his 1997 conviction of thirddegree sexual abuse.1 At the time of his sentencing, section 903A.2 

allowed Propp to reduce his sentence through good-time credits. See 

Iowa Code § 903A.2 (Supp. 1997).2 Pursuant to the 1997 statute, Propp 

 

1The record does not reveal the date of Propp’s offense that resulted in this 

sentence. 

2In pertinent part, the 1997 version of section 903A.2 provided: 

903A.2 Good time. 

 1. Each inmate committed to the custody of the director of the 

department of corrections is eligible for a reduction of sentence for good 

behavior in the manner provided in this section. For purposes of 

calculating the amount of time by which an inmate’s sentence may be 
 3 

was eligible for a sentence reduction of one day for each day of good 

conduct and, in addition, could earn a further reduction of up to five 

days per month for satisfactory participation in a variety of activities and 

programs, including treatment programs established by the director of 

the DOC. Id. The director of the DOC was authorized to establish rules 

specifying what constituted “satisfactory participation” in employment, 

treatment, and other programs for purposes of sentence reduction. Id.

§ 903A.4 (1997). 

 In 2000, while Propp was still serving his sentence, the legislature 

amended section 903A.2. 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1173, § 4. Under the new 

statute, “[a]n inmate . . . serving a category “A” sentence is eligible for a 

reduction of sentence equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the 

inmate demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in any 

program or placement status identified by the director to earn the 

reduction.” Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)(a) (2001) (emphasis added). Thus, 

effective January 1, 2001, inmates like Propp with category “A” sentences 

were eligible to earn a reduction in their sentence only by demonstrating 

 

reduced, inmates shall be grouped into the following two sentencing 

categories: 

a. . . . An inmate of an institution under the control of the 

department of corrections who is serving a category “A” sentence is 

eligible for a reduction of sentence equal to one day for each day of good 

conduct while committed to one of the department’s institutions. In 

addition, each inmate who is serving a category “A” sentence is eligible 

for an additional reduction of up to five days per month if the inmate 

participates satisfactorily in any of the following activities:

 (1) Employment in the institution. 

 (2) Iowa state industries. 

 (3) An employment program established by the director. 

 (4) A treatment program established by the director. 

 (5) An inmate educational program approved by the director. 

Iowa Code § 903A.2 (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). Propp had a category “A” sentence. 
 4 

good conduct and satisfactorily participating in any program identified by 

the director. Id. In other words, good conduct alone was no longer 

enough to qualify an inmate for a reduction in sentence under amended 

section 903A.2; earned-time credits, as they were now labeled, were also 

contingent on satisfactory participation in programming. 

 In 2005, the statute was amended once again, this time with 

respect to sex offenders. See 2005 Iowa Acts ch. 158, § 32. This 

amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added the following provision to 

section 903A.2: “However, an inmate required to participate in a sex 

offender treatment program shall not be eligible for a reduction of 

sentence unless the inmate participates in and completes a sex offender 

treatment program established by the director.”3 Iowa Code § 903A.2 

(Supp. 2005). To implement this legislation, the DOC adopted a policy 

providing that inmates required to participate in sex offender treatment 

programs (SOTP) who refused treatment, were removed from treatment, 

or failed program completion criteria would not be eligible for earnedtime credits. 

 Based upon his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse, Propp 

was required to participate in the SOTP. Propp began the treatment 

program, but was removed from the SOTP for misconduct in April 2006. 

Although Propp did not lose credits he had already earned, he was 

deemed ineligible to receive further earned-time credits until he was 

reinstated to the program. Prior to his removal from the SOTP, his 

tentative date of discharge was January 27, 2009; after his removal, his 

 

3The practice of the DOC is to allow an inmate required to participate in a sex 

offender treatment program to earn credits while awaiting placement in the program 

rather than being deemed ineligible until completion of the program. This 

interpretation of the statute is not challenged in this case. 
 5 

new tentative discharge date was June 12, 2012. In October 2006, 

Propp was reinstated to the SOTP, resulting in a new tentative date for 

discharge of May 20, 2009. Thus, Propp’s time in prison was extended 

by approximately four months due to his temporary ineligibility to 

accumulate earned-time credits. 

 After exhausting his administrative remedies, Propp filed a 

postconviction relief action, claiming his loss of earned-time eligibility 

violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses of the United States 

and Iowa Constitutions.4 Propp requested that his original tentative 

discharge date of January 27, 2009, be reinstated. After hearing, the 

district court ruled application of the amended version of section 903A.2 

to Propp violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The court 

ordered the DOC to reinstate Propp’s original tentative discharge date. 

The court rejected Propp’s contention that his due process rights had 

been violated. 

 The State then filed this certiorari action. Because we agree with 

the well-reasoned decision of the district court, we annul the writ of 

certiorari. 

II. Scope of Review. 

 The issue in this case involves a constitutional provision, the 

Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, “we review the case de novo in light of 

 

4Propp does not claim that requiring him to participate in the SOTP is itself a 

violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Cf. Schreiber v. State, 666 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Iowa 

2003) (holding statute requiring inmates to submit blood specimens for DNA profiling 

did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws). Nor does he claim he could 

not be disciplined in some manner for unsatisfactory participation. Cf. id. (holding 

imposition of discipline for refusal to supply blood specimen did not violate 

Ex Post Facto Clause). Propp only claims his unsatisfactory performance cannot, 

consistent with the Constitution, lengthen his sentence by reducing his ability to earn 

credits that he could have earned under the statutory scheme in effect at the time he 

committed his offense. This claim was not asserted in Schreiber. 
 6 

the totality of the circumstances and record upon which the 

postconviction court ruling was made.” Rushing v. State, 382 N.W.2d 

141, 143 (Iowa 1986). Because neither party suggests a basis to 

distinguish the Federal Ex Post Facto Clause from the Iowa ex post facto 

clause, we will limit our discussion to the federal provision with the 

understanding that our analysis applies equally to the state provision. 

III. Governing Legal Principles. 

The United States Constitution provides: “No State shall . . . pass 

any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. For 

constitutional purposes, an ex post facto law is 

any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously 

committed, which was innocent when done, which makes 

more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its 

commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of 

any defense available according to law at the time when the 

act was committed . . . . 

Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169, 46 S. Ct. 68, 68, 70 L. Ed. 216, 217 

(1925); accord Schreiber v. State, 666 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Iowa 2003). It is 

the second type of law––one that makes the punishment for a crime more 

burdensome after its commitment––that is of concern here. 

 The purpose of the prohibition against ex post facto laws is “to 

assure legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit 

individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.” Weaver v. 

Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28–29, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 23 

(1981). This prohibition also “restricts governmental power by 

restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” Id. at 29, 101 

S. Ct. at 964, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 23. In Weaver, the Court stated that “two 

critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post 

facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring 

before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by 
 7 

it.” Id. An offender is disadvantaged when the law “makes more onerous 

the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment.”5 Id. at 36, 

101 S. Ct. at 968, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 27. 

 In Weaver, the issue was “whether a Florida statute altering the 

availability of . . . ‘gain time for good conduct’ [was] unconstitutional as 

an ex post facto law when applied to [Weaver], whose crime was 

committed before the statute’s enactment.” Id. at 25, 101 S. Ct. at 962, 

67 L. Ed. 2d at 20–21. The state statute in place at the time of Weaver’s 

offense and sentencing provided a formula for deducting gain-time 

credits from the sentences of prisoners who had no disciplinary 

infractions and who satisfactorily performed “ ‘the work, duties and tasks 

assigned to him.’ ” Id. at 26, 101 S. Ct. at 962–63, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 21 

(quoting Fla. Stat. § 944.27(1) (1975)). Gain-time credits were calculated 

every month and at an increasing rate: five days per month for the first 

two years of sentence, ten days per month for the third and fourth years, 

and fifteen days per month for the fifth and subsequent years of 

sentence. Id. at 26, 101 S. Ct. at 963, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 21. 

 In 1978, after Weaver’s crime and sentencing, the Florida 

legislature enacted a new formula for monthly gain-time credits: three 

days per month for the first two years, six days per month for the third 

 

5Subsequent to its decision in Weaver, the Court clarified that not any 

disadvantage to the offender satisfies the second element of the ex post facto analysis: 

After Collins [v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 

30 (1990)], the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a 

legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of “disadvantage,” nor 

. . . on whether an amendment affects a prisoner’s “opportunity to take 

advantage of provisions for early release,” . . . but on whether any such 

change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty 

by which a crime is punishable. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1602 n.3, 131 

L. Ed. 2d 588, 595 n.3 (1995). 
 8 

and fourth years, and nine days per month for the fifth and subsequent 

years. Id. at 26, 101 S. Ct. at 963, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 21. Weaver objected 

to the application of the new formula to him, claiming the reduced 

accumulation of monthly gain-time credits under the new statute 

extended his time in prison by over two years in violation of the 

prohibition against ex post facto laws. Id. at 27, 101 S. Ct. at 963, 67 

L. Ed. 2d at 22. 

 In determining whether the new statute was retrospective, the 

Court stated “[t]he critical question is whether the law changes the legal 

consequences of acts completed before its effective date.” Id. at 31, 101 

S. Ct. at 965, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 24. For purposes of Weaver’s claim, the 

Court recast this question to ask whether the Florida statute “applies to 

prisoners convicted for acts committed before the provision’s effective 

date.” Id. Because the State conceded it was using the new statute to 

calculate gain time available to Weaver, whose crime was committed 

before the new statute was enacted, the Court concluded the law 

changed the legal consequences attached to Weaver’s crime. Id. The 

Court rejected the State’s argument the statute was not retrospective 

because gain time was not part of Weaver’s original sentence. Id. at 31–

32, 101 S. Ct. at 965–66, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 24–25. Regardless of whether 

gain time is technically part of a sentence, the Court noted, “it is in fact 

one determinant of [Weaver’s] prison term,” and therefore, “his effective 

sentence is altered once this determinant is changed.” Id. at 32, 101 

S. Ct. at 966, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 25. The Court pointed out “a prisoner’s 

eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into 

both the defendant’s decision to plea bargain and the judge’s calculation 

of the sentence to be imposed.” Id. See generally Meier v. State, 337 

N.W.2d 204, 206–07 (Iowa 1983) (reversing defendant’s conviction based 
 9 

on counsel’s failure to advise defendant prior to guilty plea to reduced 

charge that sentence for charged offense could be shortened through 

good-conduct time). The Court concluded the statute “substantially 

alters the consequences attached to a crime already completed,” and 

therefore was a retrospective law. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33, 101 S. Ct. at 

966, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 25. 

 The Court then considered whether the statute made “more 

onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment.” Id.

at 33–36, 101 S. Ct. at 966–68, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 25–27. The Court 

observed: 

On its face, the statute reduces the number of monthly gaintime credits available to an inmate who abides by prison 

rules and adequately performs his assigned tasks. By 

definition, this reduction in gain-time accumulation 

lengthens the period that someone in petitioner’s position 

must spend in prison. 

Id. at 33, 101 S. Ct. at 967, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 26. The Court concluded, 

because “the new provision constricts the inmate’s opportunity to earn 

early release,” it violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Id. at 

35–36, 101 S. Ct. at 968, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 27. 

 The Weaver case is helpfully contrasted with the Court’s decision 

in California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 

S. Ct. 1597, 131 L. Ed. 2d 588 (1995). In the latter case, an inmate, 

Morales, claimed a statute changing parole hearing procedures violated 

the Ex Post Facto Clause. Morales, 514 U.S. at 503–04, 115 S. Ct. at 

1600, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 593. At the time of Morales’s crime and 

sentencing, inmates eligible for parole were entitled to annual hearings 

before the board of parole on their suitability for release. Id. at 503, 115 

S. Ct. at 1600, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 593. After his sentencing, however, the 

statute was changed to authorize the board to defer hearings after the 
 10 

initial one for a period of up to three years under specified conditions. 

Id. Morales had a hearing before the board and was found unsuitable for 

parole. Id. The board then deferred a subsequent hearing for three years 

pursuant to the new statute. Id. 

Morales claimed the new law effectively increased his sentence in 

violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 504, 115 S. Ct. at 1600, 131 

L. Ed. 2d at 593. The Court disagreed, distinguishing Weaver and other 

similar cases. It noted these cases “held that the Ex Post Facto Clause 

forbids the States to enhance the measure of punishment by altering the 

substantive ‘formula’ used to calculate the applicable sentencing range.” 

Id. at 505, 115 S. Ct. at 1601, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 594. In Morales, by 

contrast, the statute had no effect on the standards for fixing a prisoner’s 

eligibility for parole and did not change the substantive formula for 

securing any reductions in sentence. Id. at 507, 115 S. Ct. at 1602, 131 

L. Ed. 2d at 595. 

 In a subsequent case, Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S. Ct. 

891, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1997), the Court considered whether a statute 

that retroactively canceled an inmate’s provisional early release credits 

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 519 U.S. at 436, 117 S. Ct. at 893, 

137 L. Ed. 2d at 69. Relying on its decision in Weaver, the Court 

determined the application of the statute, which had been enacted after 

the inmate was sentenced, violated the prohibition against ex post facto 

laws. Id. at 442–45, 117 S. Ct. at 896–98, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 73–75. The 

Court distinguished Morales, noting that in Morales it was speculative 

whether the change in parole hearing policy would have any effect on any 

prisoner’s actual term of confinement. Id. at 443–44, 117 S. Ct. at 897, 

137 L. Ed. 2d at 73–74. The Court concluded it was unnecessary to 
 11 

speculate in the case before it whether the new statute had a detrimental 

effect on the inmate: 

Unlike the California amendment at issue in Morales, the 

[amended] statute [here] did more than simply remove a 

mechanism that created an opportunity for early release for a 

class of prisoners whose release was unlikely; rather, it 

made ineligible for early release a class of prisoners who 

were previously eligible––including some like petitioner, who 

had actually been released. 

Id. at 447, 117 S. Ct. at 898, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 75–76. We turn now to the 

case before us. 

IV. Discussion. 

 A. Retrospective Application. Our first task in determining 

whether amended section 903A.2 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is to 

ascertain whether the law has retrospective effect. In the context of the 

present case, the question is whether the amended statute applies to 

prisoners convicted for offenses committed before the provision’s effective 

date. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S. Ct. at 965, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 24. 

Clearly, it does. The DOC has implemented a policy making any inmate 

required to participate in the SOTP who refuses treatment, is removed 

from treatment, or fails to meet program completion criteria ineligible for 

earned time. Therefore, the amended statute applies to prisoners such 

as Propp who were convicted for an offense committed before the 

amendment’s effective date. The amendment is, therefore, retrospective. 

See Stansbury v. Hannigan, 960 P.2d 227, 235–36 (Kan. 1998) (holding 

similar statutory amendment was retrospective when applied to inmate 

who committed his crime before amendment’s enactment). 

 The State argues this conclusion is inconsistent with the purpose 

of the ex post facto prohibition, which is to give fair warning of the effect 

of statutory provisions and permit individuals to rely on those provisions 
 12 

until they are changed. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28–29, 101 S. Ct. at 

964, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 23. It argues, “Propp was on notice since July 1, 

2005 that he had to stay in the SOTP to collect his good time credits.” 

But the focus of the State’s analysis is misplaced. The question is not 

whether Propp was on notice when he committed the misconduct that 

resulted in his dismissal from the SOTP that he would lose his eligibility 

to earn a reduction in his sentence. The question, as the Court made 

clear in Weaver, is whether Propp knew when he committed his crime and 

was sentenced that he would not be eligible for a reduction in his 

sentence by merely following prison rules, but would also have to 

successfully participate in sex offender treatment. 

B. Impact on Punishment. We next consider whether the 

amended statute increases the penalty by which Propp’s crime is 

punishable or, stated differently, whether it makes the punishment for 

his crime more onerous. Lynce, 519 U.S. at 442, 117 S. Ct. at 896, 137 

L. Ed. 2d at 72; Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n.3, 115 S. Ct. at 1602 n.3, 

131 L. Ed. 2d at 595 n.3. We think the statute at issue here has the 

same prohibited effect as did the statute in Weaver. At the time Propp 

was sentenced,6 he could earn a one-day reduction in his sentence for 

each day of good conduct, and he could earn an additional reduction of 

up to five days per month for participation in various programs. See

Iowa Code § 903A.2 (Supp. 1997). Thus, if Propp behaved, he received 

good-time credits. If he refused to participate in available programs, he 

did not receive any additional credits, but he still earned his one day of 

credit for each day of good conduct. 

 

6We focus on the date of Propp’s sentencing because the record does not reveal 

the date of his crime. 
 13 

 In contrast, by virtue of the subsequent amendments in 2001 and 

2005, Propp can no longer earn credits merely by following institutional 

rules. Now he must follow the rules and satisfactorily participate in any 

programs required by the director. Thus, if Propp does not participate in 

the SOTP, but behaves in every other way, he will have a longer period of 

incarceration under the amended statute than he would have had under 

the statute in effect at the time of his sentencing. 

 The State argues the amended statute did not make Propp’s 

punishment for his crime more onerous, however, because “[t]he formula 

that is used to compute earned time has been changed only in a way that 

actually benefits him.” While it is true that an inmate can now earn 1.2 

days of earned-time credits per day rather than one day of good-time 

credits as under the old formula, as we have already explained, the 

requirements to qualify for this credit have changed considerably. The 

United States Supreme Court was unpersuaded by a similar argument in 

Weaver. In Weaver, the state argued the net effect of the new statute 

was to increase availability of gain-time reductions because the new 

statute provided for discretionary grants of additional gain time that were 

unavailable under the former statute. 450 U.S. at 34–36 & n.18, 101 

S. Ct. at 967–68 & n.18, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 26–27 & n.18. The Court was 

not convinced by this argument: 

[N]one of these provisions for extra gain time compensates 

for the reduction of gain time available solely for good 

conduct. The fact remains that an inmate who performs 

satisfactory work and avoids disciplinary violations could 

obtain more gain time per month under the repealed 

provision . . . than he could for the same conduct under the 

new provision . . . . To make up the difference, the inmate 

has to satisfy the extra conditions specified by the 

discretionary gain-time provisions. . . . In contrast, under 

both the new and old statutes, an inmate is automatically 

entitled to the monthly gain time simply for avoiding 

disciplinary infractions and performing his assigned tasks. 
 14 

Id. at 35, 101 S. Ct. at 967–68, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 27. 

 This passage aptly describes the situation presented by Propp’s 

challenge to amended section 903A.2. Under the old statute, Propp was 

automatically entitled to one day of good-conduct time for each day he 

avoided a disciplinary violation. Now, he has to satisfy extra conditions––

satisfactory participation in programming––to receive any earned-time 

credits. Stated differently, under the original statute, Propp lost 

eligibility for five days of good-time credit each month he did not 

satisfactorily participate in a treatment program, but he remained eligible 

for thirty days of good-conduct credit, assuming a thirty-day month, 

notwithstanding his unsatisfactory participation. Under the new statute, 

his failure to satisfactorily participate renders him ineligible to earn any

reduction in his sentence, even if he has no disciplinary infractions. We 

are convinced this difference is a substantive change in the formula used 

to calculate a reduction in sentence because, as in Weaver, it 

“retroactively decreas[ed] the amount of [earned]-time awarded for an 

inmate’s good behavior.” Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441, 117 S. Ct. at 896, 137 

L. Ed. 2d at 72 (characterizing issue in Weaver). Therefore, application 

of the amended statute to Propp violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See 

Stansbury, 960 P.2d at 236 (holding similar statutory amendment 

violated Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to inmate who committed his 

crime before enactment of amendment).7

 

7The facts of Stansbury are remarkably similar to this case. Under the statutory 

scheme in effect when Stansbury committed his crime, inmates could earn eighty 

percent of the available good-time credits by avoiding any disciplinary violations. 

Stansbury, 960 P.2d at 231–33. The remaining twenty percent was awarded on a 

discretionary basis based on several factors, including the inmate’s participation in 

programs. Id. at 231. An amendment enacted after Stansbury’s crime provided that an 

inmate’s refusal to participate in assigned programs would result in the withholding of 

100% of the available good-time credits. Id. at 232. Stansbury refused to sign a sex 

abuse treatment program (SATP) agreement, and as a result, his good-time credits were 
 15 

 For the same reasons, we reject the State’s argument that the 

statute merely changed the conduct that was required to earn credits. 

As the State correctly points out, prison officials have the ability to 

change institutional rules without violating the prohibition against 

ex post facto laws. See Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 

1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 1992). In Jones, the 

court rejected a challenge to a statute requiring inmates to give blood 

specimens for DNA analysis, stating: 

 The Ex Post Facto Clause does not prevent prison 

administrators from adopting and enforcing reasonable 

regulations that are consistent with good prison 

administration, safety and efficiency. . . . 

 It is precisely because reasonable prison regulations, 

and subsequent punishment for infractions thereof, are 

contemplated as part of the sentence of every prisoner, that 

they do not constitute additional punishment and are not 

classified as ex post facto. Moreover, since a prisoner’s 

original sentence does not embrace a right to one set of 

regulations over another, reasonable amendments, too, fall 

within the anticipated sentence of every inmate. 

962 F.2d at 309–10. 

 The flaw in the State’s attempt to categorize the amendment at 

issue here as a mere change in prison regulations is that the statutory 

scheme in effect in 1997 clearly treated compliance with institutional 

rules and participation in treatment programs distinctly: an inmate was 

rewarded for good behavior separately from the good-time credits he 

received for participating in programming. Analyzing the present 

 

withheld. Id. at 230. The Kansas Supreme Court concluded the effect of the 

amendment upon Stansbury “was to extend his conditional release date based upon his 

failure to earn good time credits because of his refusal to participate in the SATP.” Id.

at 235. The court held the application of the amended statute to Stansbury violated the 

prohibition against ex post facto laws. Id. at 236. 

 We acknowledge there are decisions from other states that are contrary to 

Stansbury and our holding in this case. These cases are either factually 

distinguishable, are not consistent with Supreme Court precedent, or are simply 

unpersuasive. 
 16 

situation from the aspect of notice, we think a person in Propp’s position 

who was sentenced under the earlier version of section 903A.2 would 

have been on notice that institutional rules change over time. 

Accordingly, someone in Propp’s position would also have been on notice 

that the precise conduct required to qualify for good-conduct credits may 

also vary over time. Nevertheless, a person in Propp’s position would 

have had the expectation that, if he simply complied with institutional 

rules, he could cut his sentence in half. That is not the case under the 

current statutory scheme for earned-time credits. Even if Propp complies 

with institutional rules, he will not earn any reduction in his sentence 

unless he also satisfactorily participates in the SOTP. We think this case 

is indistinguishable from Weaver, in which the Court found an 

ex post facto violation because “an inmate who performs satisfactory 

work and avoids disciplinary violations could obtain more gain time per 

month under the repealed provision . . . than he could for the same 

conduct under the new provision.” 450 U.S. at 35, 101 S. Ct. at 967, 67 

L. Ed. 2d at 27. Because this description is equally true for Propp, we 

conclude the punishment for his crime has been made more onerous in 

violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

V. Disposition. 

The district court correctly determined the DOC’s application of 

amended section 903A.2 to inmates whose crimes predated the 

amendments violates the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws. 

Therefore, the court did not act illegally in ordering the State to reinstate 

Propp’s original tentative discharge date of January 27, 2009. We annul 

the writ of certiorari. 

WRIT ANNULLED.