alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Steven Ray PICKLES a/k/a Michael Lee Sharp, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-862.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 6, 1974.

*101James A. Gardner, Public Defender, and E. Earl Taylor, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Guy E. Labalme, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

MANN, Chief Judge.

There are two questions in this appeal, one of which we have recently answered in Platt v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 291 So.2d 96, Opinion filed March 6, 1974. Here as in the Platt case, there was a question whether the proof of value of articles stolen is sufficient to support a conviction of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny. As in the Platt case there was no satisfactory recognition of the burden of the prosecution to prove the felonious intent of the defendant and, as in the Platt case, this conviction is rescued from reversal by sheer accident. The property stolen included a typewriter which cost approximately $300 and was delivered on the day of the burglary. In addition, a check writer and some checks were missing. We hold that the evidence in this case established beyond any reasonable doubt that the value of the property stolen was in excess of $100 and that the felonious intent is established in spite of the prosecution’s failure to acknowledge its burden of proof.

In due course some of the stolen checks were filled in payable to Michael L. Sharp, and cashed at a Publix supermarket, to which they were returned when the forgery was discovered. The objection was made that this was an impermissible use of evidence of other crimes. We. disagree. This is the sort of case the *Williams*rule1 contemplates. The possession of recently stolen property bearing on the original burglary which was charged in this case is admissible to prove the main offense. Only one fleeting mention of forgery was made, and that offense did not become a feature of the trial on this one. It is always helpful in these cases, of course, if the trial judge instructs the jury that the purpose of introducing evidence of another crime is to prove some fact at issue in the present trial. We think the procedure made mandatory for Louisiana courts in State v. Prieur, La.1973, 277 So. 2d 126, goes far to clarify many of the problems which come up in connection with *Williams*rule testimony. In this case, however, the evidence of the extraneous offense is necessarily involved in the proof of the one for which the defendant was tried. The record being without error, the judgment and sentence are

Affirmed.

HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.

1

. Williams v. State, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 654.
**Exhibit 23.4**

 

**Consent of Independent Auditors**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (File No. 333-174039) of Thermon Group Holdings, Inc. pertaining to the Thermon Group Holdings, Inc. Restricted Stock and Stock Option Plan and Thermon Group Holdings, Inc. 2011 Long-Term Incentive Plan of our report dated October 31, 2010, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Thermon Group Holdings, Inc., which report appears in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Thermon Group Holdings, Inc. for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2011.

 

/s/ Shanghai JiaLiang CPAs

 

 

Shanghai, Peoples Republic of China

June 15, 2011

 

----
#### Manuel GOMEZ-PELICO, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 01-71866.

INS No. [ AXX XXX XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 12, 2002.*

Decided Aug. 15, 2002.

Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, TASHIMA, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Manuel Gomez-Pelico, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of *810Immigration Appeals’ denial of his application for asylum and withholding of deportation. We have jurisdiction pursuant to former 8 U.S.C. § llOSa(a),1 and we deny the petition.

The BIA’s determination that an alien is not eligible for asylum must be upheld if it is “ ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’ ” *INS v. Elias-Zaca-rias,*502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (citation omitted). “It can be reversed only if the evidence presented ... was such that a reasonable .factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.” *Id.*When an alien seeks to overturn the BIA’s adverse determination, “he must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” *Id.*at 483-84; *see also Cordon-Garcia v. INS,*204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir.2000); *Ghaly v. INS,*58 F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir.1995).

Where an asylum claim is involved, an alien must show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution that is “both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” *Fisher v. INS,*79 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc). Additionally, the claimed persecution must be on account of one of the grounds set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). *See id.*at 962.

The guerillas’ single threat to Gomez-Pelico does not rise to the level of persecution. *See Lim v. INS,*224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir.2000); *see also Gui v. INS,*280 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir.2002). Additionally, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that the threat was made on account of his political opinion, if any. *See Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. at 482-83; *Sangha v. INS,*103 F.3d 1482, 1490-91 (9th Cir.1997).

Petition DENIED.2

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts-of this circuit except as 9th Cir. R. 36-3 may provide.

1

. Because Gomez-Pelico was placed into administrative proceedings before April 1, 1997, but the BIA decision did not issue until November of 2001, the transitional rules of the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 govern the review of this appeal. *See Kalaw v. INS,*133 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (9th Cir.1997).

2

. Because Gomez-Pelico did not meet the eligibility requirements for asylum, he was not entitled to withholding of deportation either. *See Ghaly,*58 F.3d at 1429.
Policy on Treatment of Stock Options in the Event of Retirement
 1)
    
    For purposes of this policy, a member of the Board of Directors (the Board) of Idera
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.(Idera) will be deemed to have retired if:
 a)
    
    the director resigns from the Board or determines not to stand for
reelection and has served as a director for more than 10 years, orb)
    
    the director does not stand for reelection or is not nominated for
reelection due to the fact that he or she is or will be older than 75 at the end of
such directors term.
 2)
    
    For purposes of this policy, an employee of Idera will deemed to have retired if the
employee terminates his or her employment with Idera, has been an employee of Idera for
more than 10 years and is older than 65 upon termination of employment.3)
    
    If a director or employee retires, then (i) all outstanding options will automatically
vest in full and (ii) the period during which the director or employee may exercise the
options will be extended to the expiration of the option under the plan.
 
 *
    
    Approved by the Board of Directors and Compensation Committee on December 14, 2010.
#### William KAHN, Joseph Shapiro, Moe Goldman, and Arthur Greenfield, Appellants, v. JADE WINDS CONSTRUCTION CORP., a Florida corporation and Jade Winds Association. Inc., a Florida non-profit corporation, Appellees.

No. 70-402.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 21, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
256 La. 355

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lorene KNOX.

No. 50521.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 26, 1970.

In re: Lorene Knox applying for writs of certiorari and mandamus.

Writs refused. We find no error of law in the rulings complained of.
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS

 

I, Thos. E. Capps, certify that:

        1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Consolidated Natural Gas Company:

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.
1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________ NO. 09-17-00263-CR



### ____________________ DEIDRA MOORE WARE, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee

___________________ __________________ __________________ _________________ On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 16-316318

___________________ __________________ __________________ _________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Deidra Moore Ware has filed a motion to dismiss her appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2. Because a request to dismiss the appeal is signed by appellant personally and joined by counsel of record, and no opini on has issued in this appeal, the motion is granted.
APPEAL DISMISSED.

_______ _________________________ STEVE McKEITHEN Chief Justice2 Submitted on February 6, 2018 Opinion Delivered February 7, 2018 Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Ho rton and Johnson, JJ.
#### Gerald D. YANKS, Appellant, v. UNION MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 68-953.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

June 17, 1969.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 227 (Tuesday, November 25, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 62768]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-30892]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. RP97-408-000]


Trailblazer Pipeline Company; Notice of Informal Settlement 
Conference

November 19, 1997.
    Take notice that an informal settlement conference will be convened 
in this proceeding on December 4, 1997 at 10:00 a.m., to continue 
through December 5, 1997 as needed, at the offices of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, DC, 
for the purpose of exploring the possible settlement of the above-
referenced docket.
    Any party, as defined by 18 CFR 385.102(c), or any participant as 
defined by 18 CFR 385.102(b), is invited to attend. Persons wishing to 
become a party must move to intervene and receive intervenor status 
pursuant to the Commission's regulations (18 CFR 385.214).
    For additional information, please contact Robert Young at (202) 
208-5705 or Thomas Burgess at (202) 208-2058.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-30892 Filed 11-24-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Exhibit 10.33


 


AMENDMENT TO SAFE


 


THIS AMENDMENT TO SAFE (this
 “Amendment”) is made as of October 5, 2021 by and between FlexEnergy Power Solutions, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company (the “Company”), and RNS Flex, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“Investor”),
with respect to the SAFE issued as of August 16, 2021 by the Company to the Investor (the “SAFE”).


 


NOW, THEREFORE, the parties, intending to be legally
bound, hereby agree as follows:


 


1.          Amendment.
The first paragraph of the SAFE is hereby amended to delete “October 5, 2021” therefrom and replace such date with “October
29, 2021”.


 


2.          Miscellaneous.
Except as expressly modified or amended by this Amendment, all terms and provisions of the SAFE shall remain in full force and effect.
This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original. This Amendment will be governed
by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, regardless of the laws that might otherwise govern under applicable
principles of conflicts of law.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company
and Investor have each caused this Amendment to be executed by their respective duly authorized officer as of the day and year first above
written.


 


	COMPANY:	INVESTOR:



 





	FlexEnergy Power Solutions, LLC	RNS Flex, LLC
	 	 
	 	By: RNS Management, , LLC, its Manager
	 	 









	By:	/s/ Wes Kimmel	 	 
	 	Wes Kimmel, CFO	 	 	By:	/s/ Mallory McCamant
	 	 	 	Name:	Mallory McCamant
	 	 	 	Title:	 CFO / Asst Manager
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2473 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

275 Penn Avenue in Salem, Ohio, as the ‘‘Howard Arthur Tibbs Post Office’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 13, 2021 

Mr. JOHNSON of Ohio (for himself, Mr. BALDERSON, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. DAVIDSON, Mr. GIBBS, Mr. GONZALEZ of Ohio, Mr. JORDAN, Mr. JOYCE

of Ohio, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. LATTA, Mr. RYAN, Mr. STIVERS, Mr. TURNER, and Mr. WENSTRUP) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 275 Penn Avenue in Salem, Ohio, as the 

‘‘Howard Arthur Tibbs Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. HOWARD ARTHUR TIBBS POST OFFICE. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 275 Penn Avenue in Salem, 

6 Ohio, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Howard Ar7 thur Tibbs Post Office’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2473 IH

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Howard Arthur Tibbs 

5 Post Office’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
257 La. 611

#### Kermit A. WILLIAMS and John D. Koontz v. The PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE.

No. 51122.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 4, 1971.

In re: Parish of East Baton Rouge applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge. 242 So.2d 29.

Writ denied. Under the facts found by the Court of Appeal, the result is correct.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Clifton JONES.

No. 60107.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 2, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1978.

Miriam G. Waltzer, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
June 2010. U.S. Position.

IDB – “Guide for Acceptance of the Use of Country Procurement Systems”

[revised version, document GN-2538-6]

The U.S. abstained on June 16, 2010 on the revised version of the IDB’s “Guide for Acceptance 

of the Use of Country Procurement Systems”.

As we have emphasized repeatedly in the IDB Board since December, we believe that given the 

complexity of the proposed changes and the need for heightened transparency whenever 

considering procurement issues, this document requires a public comment period prior to Board 

approval. We are deeply disappointed then that the IDB did not release the document for public 

comment, particularly in the light of the priority IDB Governors have placed on improving 

disclosure and transparency, reflected in the “Cancun Declaration” and accompanying overview 

framework.

We strongly support assistance to strengthen the procurement capacity of the public sector in 

IDB borrowing countries.

We believe the amendments to the validation guide as a result of U.S. comments have improved 

the document. We particularly value drafting changes that provide clarity regarding ongoing 

requirements with respect to international competitive bidding, international short listing of 

consultants, mandatory use of the Bank’s standard bidding documents, and the maintenance of 

key provisions of the Bank’s existing procurement policy and consultant policy.

However, this lengthy, complex document would benefit from public review. Such a review is 

consistent with an institution that truly values transparency in practice, not just as an aspirational, 

theoretical goal.

IDB Management’s response that such a review would have unduly delayed the adoption of the 

new policy is entirely unpersuasive in light of the length of time that management took to release 

the draft guide to the IDB Executive Board.

Despite the IDB Board’s failure to agree to a public comment period prior to IDB Board 

approval of the Guide on June 16, 2010, we are pleased the IDB has put the validation guide and 

strategy document on the IDB website, in both English and Spanish, so that they are available to 

the public. We call on the IDB to consider the comments received and incorporate them as 

appropriate. We urged the IDB Board to insist on a public comment period before proceeding 

with changing the Bank’s procurement policy and consultant policy.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JANUARY 6, 2022

NO. 03-21-00387-CV

T. D., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 53RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES GOODWIN, BAKER AND SMITH

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE BAKER

This is an appeal from the decree terminating appellant’s parental rights to Sam and Leon, signed

by the trial court on July 23, 2021. Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the 

Court holds that there was no reversible error in the decree. Therefore, the Court affirms the 

trial court’s termination decree. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no 

adjudication of costs is made.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. German MARTINEZ-GUIDO, Appellant.

No. 02-1686.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 21, 2002.

Filed Aug. 23, 2002.

Before LOKEN, BYE, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

After a jury trial, German Martinez-Guido was convicted of conspiring to dis*53tribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846, and possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court1 sentenced Martinez-Guido to 188 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396,18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the district court erred in applying a 2-level role-in-the-offense enhancement. In his pro se supplemental brief, Martinez-Guido argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; that the court and defense counsel violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c); that, although Congress made methamphetamine a Schedule III controlled substance with a maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment, the Attorney General changed it to a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of the separation of powers; and that his sentence violates *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

We reject these arguments seriatim. The district court did not clearly err in imposing the 2-level role enhancement based on the evidence that Martinez-Guido directed at least one other person, *see United States v. Van Chase,*137 F.3d 579, 583-84 (8th Cir.1998); the ineffective-assistance claims are not properly before us, *see United States v. Martin,*59 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir.1995); Rule 11 is not applicable because Martinez-Guido pleaded not guilty and went to trial, *see*Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c); the separation-of-powers argument was not raised below and thus we do not address it except to say that we find no plain error, *see United States v. Kempis-Bonola,*287 F.3d 699, 701 (8th Cir.2002) (standard of review), *petition for cert, filed,*No. 02-5415 (July 15, 2002); and there was no *Apprendi*violation.

Following our independent review, *see Benson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

1

. The HONORABLE ROBERT W. PRATT, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.