PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 23-1489

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STONEMOR, INC.

v.

THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 469,

Appellant

_______________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

For the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 3-22-cv-1388)

District Judge: Honorable Georgette Castner

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Argued

March 5, 2024

Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 10, 2024)

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2

Raymond G. Heineman

Seth B. Kennedy [ARGUED]

Kroll Heineman Ptasiewicz & Parsons

91 Fieldcrest Avenue Suite 35

Edison, NJ 08837

 Counsel for Appellant

Elizabeth Mincer

Leah A. Mintz [ARGUED]

Robert M. Palumbos

Duane Morris

30 S. 17th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

 Counsel for Appellee

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 469 

(the “Union”) appeals the District Court’s decision vacating an 

arbitration award. “[C]ourts are restricted in reviewing the 

decision of an arbitrator resolving a labor dispute under a 

collective bargaining agreement ... [b]ut that deference is not 

unlimited.” Monongahela Valley Hosp., Inc. v. United Steel 

Workers Int’l Union, 946 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 2019). Here, 

the arbitrator evinced a manifest disregard for the underlying

collective bargaining agreement when she held that a grievance 

by the Union was timely filed, so we will affirm the District 

Court’s judgment.
3

I. FACTS

Appellee StoneMor, Inc. operates cemeteries and 

funeral homes. Maintenance workers at two of its cemeteries 

unionized and certified the Union as their exclusive bargaining 

representative. The Union then entered into negotiations for a 

collective bargaining agreement with StoneMor. 

Those parties came to a tentative agreement (the 

“Agreement”), which they signed and through which they 

intended to be “legally bound.” (J.A. at 59; see also J.A. at 81 

(“This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties 

hereto[.]”).) The Agreement was to remain “tentative until 

ratified by a majority of the [cemetery maintenance] 

employees[.]” (J.A. at 59; see also J.A. at 62 (“These 

Agreements are tentative until ratified by the employees.”).) It

provided a grievance procedure, giving the Union ten days to 

write StoneMor about a disagreement “as to the interpretation 

of or alleged violation of” the Agreement. (J.A. at 71.) The 

Agreement emphasized that “[t]ime is of the essence” in the 

handling of disputes. (J.A. at 71.) If the parties could not settle

a dispute, it would be subject to binding arbitration. 

The Agreement was ratified on October 5, 2020. Soon 

after, StoneMor sent the Union a cleaned-up draft that mostly 

tracked the ratified Agreement but contained what StoneMor 

described as a clarification of a wage provision granting

employees a salary increase every October 1st. The parties 

disagreed on whether the pay bump would occur on the justpassed October 1st, or instead was meant to begin on October 

1st of the next year. The Union contested the proposed change 

in the language of the wage provision, and StoneMor 

responded, “You can file a grievance, if you wish, and we will 
4

arbitrate the issue.” (J.A. at 177.) Later that month, StoneMor 

sent another draft Agreement with the same proposed change. 

The Union did not file a grievance at that time, nor did it file 

one on October 30th when the maintenance employees’ 

paychecks arrived without the contested salary increase. In

November 2020, the Union sent the draft Agreement 

containing the originally agreed-upon language of the wage

provision. The parties finally executed the Agreement

containing that original wage provision on December 29, 2020. 

On January 5, 2021, seven days after the Agreement 

was executed, but over ninety days after it had been ratified, 

the Union filed its grievance over the meaning of the disputed 

wage provision. Arbitration followed. The parties asked the 

arbitrator to resolve the dispute and determine if the grievance 

was timely filed. The arbitrator held that the grievance was

timely filed and then found in favor of the Union on the merits. 

On timeliness, she reasoned that the contested provision 

had been unresolved from ratification on October 5, 2020, until 

execution of the finalized Agreement on December 29, 2020. 

StoneMor did not include the originally agreed-upon wage

provision in any of its cleaned-up drafts after ratification; it was 

not included again until the Union’s November 2020 draft. By 

the arbitrator’s lights, “it was reasonable that the Union would 

ensure that the [originally agreed-upon] language was 

incorporated in the [final Agreement] before it filed a 

grievance[.]” (J.A. at 55.) The arbitrator continued: 

“Moreover, the Union was not required to file a grievance 

while the parties were continuing to clarify and negotiate the 

provisions of the [Agreement] until the [Agreement] was fully 

executed.” (J.A. at 55.) She found that the Agreement was 

executed on December 29, and that the Union filed its 
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grievance less than 10 days later, on January 5. Thus, the 

arbitrator held, it was timely. 

StoneMor petitioned the District Court to vacate the 

arbitrator’s award under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 

§ 10. The Court granted that petition, holding that the award

had no basis in the underlying Agreement. The Court reasoned 

that “[t]he [Agreement] was enforceable as soon as it was 

ratified by the Union members” on October 5, 2020, and that 

the grievance provision was triggered by at least October 30, 

2020, when the paychecks arrived without a salary increase. 

(J.A. at 18; 21.) The Court said the ruling that the Union was 

reasonable and within its rights to wait until January to pursue 

a grievance was contrary to the plain meaning of the 

Agreement. The Union has now timely appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION

1

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court may 

overturn an arbitrator’s award only if the “award was procured 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 185. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(E). “On appeal from 

a district court’s ruling on a motion to confirm or vacate an 

arbitration award, we review its legal conclusions de novo and 

its factual findings for clear error[,]” CPR Mgmt., S.A. v. Devon 

Park Bioventures, L.P., 19 F.4th 236, 244 n.8 (3d Cir. 2021) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and we “apply 

the same standard the district court should have applied.” 

Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & 

Energy Workers Int’l Union, 385 F.3d 809, 815 (3d Cir. 2004). 

As the party moving to vacate, StoneMor “bears the burden of 
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by corruption,” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1), if the arbitrators were 

corrupt or guilty of misconduct, id. § 10(a)(2)-(3), or if “the 

arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 

them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 

matter submitted was not made[,]” id. § 10(a)(4). An arbitrator 

exceeds her powers if her award fails to “draw[] its essence 

from the collective bargaining agreement.” United 

Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 

593, 597 (1960); see Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 

466 F.2d 1125, 1130 n.11 (3d Cir. 1972) (finding Steelworker’s

principles consistent with 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)). 

“It’s a steep climb to vacate an arbitration award.” 

France v. Bernstein, 43 F.4th 367, 377 (3d Cir. 2022). 

Nevertheless, our review is “not toothless,” and we will reverse 

if the arbitrator “rewrites the contract[.]” Indep. Lab’y Emps.’

Union, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Rsch. & Eng’g Co., 11 F.4th 210, 

219 (3d Cir. 2021).

2

Here, the arbitrator did just that. The Agreement, by its 

terms, became final once “ratified by a majority of the 

employees[.]” (J.A. at 59.) After that happened on October 5, 

2020, the Agreement, including its grievance provision, was

binding upon the parties. The Union acknowledges that, as it 

should, since the pertinent language is crystal clear. (See J.A. 

proof.” PG Publ’g, Inc. v. Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh, 19 

F.4th 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2021).

2 Because it garnered a majority vote, Judge Bibas’s

“concurrence” is, in fact, the majority opinion in Independent

Laboratory Employees’ Union, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Research

& Engineering Co. 11 F.4th 210, 211 (3d Cir. 2021).
7

at 206 (“[The Court:] [Y]ou agree that on October 5th, 2020, 

the agreement was ratified and it becomes a binding agreement 

at that point in time; correct? [Union:] Yes, your Honor.”).) 

Despite the clarity of that provision, the arbitrator declared, “It 

is reasonable that the Union would ensure that the [originally

agreed-upon] language was incorporated in the [final 

Agreement] before it filed a grievance asserting that the 

Employer violated the [Agreement].” (J.A. at 55.) There is, 

however, no “reasonableness” exception to the grievance 

procedure in the Agreement. In fact, the parties explicitly 

agreed that “time [was] of the essence.” (J.A. at 71.) The 

arbitrator’s holding was not based on anything in the 

Agreement. See Monongahela, 946 F.3d at 201 (overturning 

arbitrator award “[w]here an arbitrator inject[ed] a restriction 

into a contract to which the [employer] did not agree”). 

Instead, the arbitrator simply asserted that “the Union was not 

required to file a grievance while the parties were continuing 

to clarify and negotiate the provisions of the [Agreement] until 

the [Agreement] was fully executed.” (J.A. at 55.) That 

holding directly contradicts the Agreement’s express language

setting ratification, and not execution, as the binding date for 

the Agreement. See Southwest Airlines Co. v. Transport 

Workers, 912 F.3d 838, 846 (5th Cir. 2019) (overturning an 

arbitrator’s award that set execution as the binding date instead 

of ratification as required by the collective bargaining 

agreement). Thus, the arbitration award “reflects a manifest 

disregard of the agreement[,]” Monongahela, 946 F.3d at 199, 

and was rightly vacated.

The Union argues that the parties’ negotiations after 

ratification demonstrate that that “the parties had not reached a 

meeting of the minds ... on an essential term of the contract[.]” 

(Reply Br. at 6.) But that is the very circumstance covered by 
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the grievance procedure, which was binding upon the parties at 

ratification. If the Union did not like StoneMor’s interpretation 

of the wage provision, and StoneMor did not relent, the Union 

could and should have filed a grievance within ten days. It did 

not, and so its grievance was not timely filed. The arbitrator’s

decision to the contrary cannot stand because it ignores that the 

grievance procedure was mandatory at ratification.

3

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment 

of the District Court vacating the arbitrator’s award.

3 The Union also argues that each paycheck is a 

continuing violation which ought to toll the grievance time 

limit. The Union, however, did not raise this argument at the 

District Court, accordingly, it is forfeited. DirectTV Inc. v. 

Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007). Though the 

District Court raised the issue sua sponte, it did so in the 

context of continuing negotiations, not paychecks, so the 

Union’s paychecks argument remains unpreserved. 

While an appropriate remedy following a properly 

vacated arbitrator’s award may often be “to remand the case 

for further arbitration proceedings[,]” Major League Baseball 

Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001) (per 

curiam), here, StoneMor only challenged the District Court’s 

vacatur of the arbitration award but not its failure to remand. 

Thus, we will not disturb the order vacating the arbitration 

award without remand.