MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 7 ME 181 Docket: Cum

- 16

- 523 Submitted

On	B riefs : May	25,	2017 Decided: August	17,	2017 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and ALEXANDER ,	JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY , JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. BENJAMIN	J.	RUPERT
HJELM,	J. [¶1] After	a	nonjury	trial	held	in the	District	Court	( Portland, Kelly, C. J. ) , Benjamin	 J.	 Rupert	 was	 adjudicated	 of	 having	 committed two traffic infractions

. Rupert appeals, arguing that	the	court	erred	by	denying a motion in	which	he asserted	a	purported “right” t o	be represented in	this matter by	a person	who	is	 not	licensed	 to	 practice	law	in	Maine

. Because no	 such	 right
exists

— and	 because , in	 fact , that third

- party representation	 would	 have constituted	 the	 unauthorized	 practice	 of	 law,	 which	 is	 a	 crime

— the	 court correctly	denied	the	motion,	and we	affirm	the	judgment. [¶ 2 ] In	July	2016, a Scarborough police	officer observed	a	vehicle being driven erratically	 and speeding in	 a	 thirty

- five

- mile

- per - hour zone. She initiated	a	traffic	stop	and issued	Rupert ,	the	operator	of	the	vehicle, a traffic2

summons for	operating	a	motor	vehicle	in	excess	of	the	posted	speed	limit, see 29

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 2073(3)	 (201 6) ,	 and	 failing	 to	 maintain	 control	 of	 a	 motor vehicle, see 29

- A M.R.S.	§ 2118	(2016)

. [¶ 3 ] Rupert contested	 the	 alleged	 violation s ,	 and	 a	 nonjury	 trial	 was held	 in	 November	 2016. The	 State	 was	 represented	 at	 the	 hearing	 by	 the officer	who	had	issued	the	ticket, see 4	M.R.S.	§	807 (3)(M)	(2016) , 1 and	Rupert was	 unrepresented. At	 the	 commencement	 of	 th e	 hearing,	 Rupert	 filed	 a “motion	 to	enforce	[his]	right	 to	plead	and	manage	his	ow n	cause	by	himself and	by	any	person	of	a	decent	and	good	moral	character,”	explaining	 that	he was	“tryin g	 to	get	help	 from	 [his]	 father. ” The	court	recessed	 the	hearing	 to review	the	motion	and	take	up	other cases also scheduled	for	hearing

. [¶ 4 ] Whe n	 the	 heari ng in	 Rupert’s	 case resumed,	 the	 court sought	 to clarify the	issue,	stating, “S o	your	memorandum	indicates	you	believe that you have	both	the	right	to	represent	yourself	and to have	somebody	else represent you	who	is	 not	 a	lawyer .”	 	 Rupert	 confirmed	 that	 the	 court’s	 understanding

was	 correct. The	 court	 then	 granted	 the	 motion	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 Rupert

1 Pursuant	 to 4	M.R.S.	§	807(3)(M)	(2016) , the	statutory	prohibition	against the	unauthorized practice	of	law	does	not apply	to “[a] law	enforcement	officer,	as	defined	in	Title	29

- A,	section	101, subsection	 30,	 who	 is	 not	 an	 attorney	 but	 who	 is	 representing	 the	 State	 in	 the	 prosecution	 of	 a traffic	infraction,	as	defined	in	Title	29

- A,	section	101,	subsection	85,	when	representation	i n	that matter	has	been	approved	by	the	prosecuting	attorney .”3 requested	to represent	himself ,	but	denied	his	request	to	be	represented	by	a
person — namely,	his	father

— who	is	not	authorized	to	p ractice	law. [¶ 5 ] During	the	hearing, Rupert	extensively	cross

- examined	the	officer both	on	the	alleged	violations	and	on	extrinsic	matters,	but	declined	to	testify himself. Based	on	the unrebutted evidence	presented by	the	State ,	 the	court entered	a	ju dgment	 finding that	Rupert	had	committed	the	violations alleged in	 the	 summons and imposing	 fines	 totaling	 just	 over	 $300. Rupert	 timely appealed. See 14	M.R.S.	§ 1901	(2016) ; M.R.	App.	P.	2(b)(3). [¶ 6 ] Contrary to	 Rupert’s	 contention,	 there	 is	 no	 legal	 authority	 in
Maine

— constitutional	 or	 otherwise

— that creates a	 right	 for	 him to be represented in this matter by a person ,	not	licensed	to	practice	law	in	Maine, who	would not merely	provide silent	support,	but wou ld	act as	an	advocate

— to	 participate,	 in	 other	 words,	 as	 a	 licensed	 attorney	 would

. In	 fact,	 as	 we have	 previously	 explained,	 “[i]t	 is	 a	 Class	 E	 crime	 to	 practice	 law	 in	 Maine without	first	obtaining	admission	to	the	bar.” Haynes	v.	Jackson ,	2000	ME	11, ¶	13,	744	A.2d	1050 ; see 4	M.R.S.	§	807 (1)

- (2)	(2016 ) .		There	are	a	number	of exceptions	 to	 the	 statute	 prohibiting	 the	 unauthorized	 practice	 of	 law, including	 one	 allowing a	 person	 to	 “plead[]	 or	 manag[e]	 that	 person’s own cause	in	court.” 4	M.R.S.	§	807 (3) (B) (2016) ; see	also 4	M.R.S.	§	860	(2016)

.4 Neither section	 807(3)(B) n or	 any	 other statutory	 exception	 or	 court	 rule , however, entitles Rupert	to	be	represented in	this	case by	a	person	who	is	not admitted	 to	 the	 Maine	 bar

. 2 See	 Haynes ,	 2000	 ME	 11 ,	 ¶ 14,	 744	 A.2d	 1050 (explaining	 that	although,	“[a]t	one	 time,	any	citizen	of	good	moral	character

. . .	 was	 permitted	 [by	 statute]	 to	 represent	 his	 principal,”	 the	 Legislature deleted	that statutory	language	in	1931	in	the	same enactment that	made	it	a
cri me	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 unauthorized	 practice	 of	 law (quotation	 marks omitted) ); State	 v.	 Simanonok ,	 539	 A.2d	 211 ,	 212 (Me.	 1988) (stating	 that “[f]or	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 client,	 the	 general	 public,	 and	 the	 courts, [the] practice	of	law	is	reserved	to	person s	who	have	established	their	qualification therefor	by	admission	to	the	bar ”)

. [¶ 7 ] The	 trial	 court’s	 ruling	 also did not	 amount	 to	 a	 constitutional deprivation .	 	 A lthough	 a	 party’s	 right	 to	 proceed	 without	 counsel has	 been recognized	as	a	fundamental	right	protected , at	least in	criminal	proceedings, by	 the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution,

see Indiana	v.	Edwards ,	554	U.S.	164,	170	(2008) ; Faretta	v. California ,	422	U.S. 806,	818

- 21 (1975) ; State	v.	Hofland ,	2012	ME	129,	¶	14,	58	A.3d	1023 , that

2 We	 have recognized that	 a	 court	may,	in	its	 discretion,	 allow	 an	 unrepresented	 party	 to	 be accompanied	in	 court	 by	 a	 “personal	 support	 person”	 who	 does	 not	 act	 as	 an	 advocate. State	 v. Murph y ,	2017	ME	165,	¶	10,

--- A.3d

--- .5 right	has	never	been	held	to	encompass	the	right	to legal representation by	a person	 not	 admitted	 to	 the	 bar , see Herrera

- Venegas	 v.	 Sanchez

- Rivera , 681 F.2d	41 ,	42 (1st	Cir.	1982) (“The	federal	courts	have	consistently	rejected attempts	at	 third

- party	lay	 representation.”)

. Further,	 because	 this	is	a	 civil matter	 involving	 a	 traffic	 infraction, Sixth	 Amendment	 protections	 do	 not apply. See U.S.	 Const.	 amend.	 VI; 29

- A	 M.R.S § 103( 1)	 (2016)

. Therefore, contrary	 to	 Rupert’s	 contention,	 no fundamental	 right was	 affected	 by	 t he court’s	denial	of his request to	be	represented	by	his	father , and consequently the	 application	 of	 the	 statutory	 provision	 allowing the	 law	 enforcement officer,	who	was	not	a	licensed	attorney, to	represent	the	State did	not	rise	to the	level	of	an	equal	protection	violation. See 4	M.R.S.	§	807(3)(M); Tri State Rubbish ,	Inc. v.	Town	of	New	Gloucester ,	634	A.2d	1284,	1287	(Me. 1993)

. [¶ 8 ] B ecause	 Rupert has	 not	 identified	 any	 federal	 or	 State constitutional	provision,	statute, or	common	law	authority contravened by	the court	when	it	denied his	request	t o	be	represented	by	a	person	not	authorized to	practice	law	in	Maine ,	we	affirm the	judgment. The	entry	is: Judgment affirmed.6 Benjamin	J.	Rupert,	appellant pro	se Stephanie	 Anderson,	 District	 Attorney,	 and	 Emily	 E.	 Collins,	 Asst.	 Dist.	 Atty., Prosecutorial	District No. Two,	Portland,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Violations Bureau	docket	number	TI

- 2016

- 1194648 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY