### October 12, 2014



# D r af t
P R E T R I A L 

## D I S C O V E R Y I N 

## F O R E N S I C 

## E V I D E N C E 

## C A S E S


### P O L I C I E S 

### 1. Pretrial disclosure of forensic evidence should be comprehensive and reciprocal — subject to the U.S. Constitution and the law of privilege. The prosecution’s disclosure obligation should apply whether or not the information will be used at trial. The defense obligation should apply to evidence that is intended for use at trial, including the opinions of testify ing experts who have not performed any

testing. 1 

### 2. The results of all forensic examinations and all expert opinions should be recorded; oral reports should be reduced to writing. The results of examinations and expert opinions should be recorded at the time the examination is conducted or an opinion is formed — or promptly thereafter. 3. The results of all forensic examinations, expert opinions, and related case documents (e.g., bench notes, graphs, electropherograms, calibration reports, etc.) should be subject to disclosure. 4. An expert witness’s qualifications should be subject to disclosure, including a list of publications authored and a list of recent cases in which the witness testified as an expert at trial. 2 

### 5. Disclosure should be timely , although all items need not be disclosed at the same time:

a. Disclosure of initial laboratory reports should occur as soon as practicable after completion of the examination so that counsel has sufficient time to consult with an expert — which may require apply

ing for funds to retain an expert — and to permit retesting.

b. Disclosure of all other items should occur as requested and no

1 Th e o p in io n s o f

co n su ltin g ex p erts are n o t su b j ect to d isclo su

re d u e to co n s titutio n al p ro t ectio n s. Mo reo v er, th e atto rn ey - clien t p riv ileg e an dw ork p ro du ct d octrin e m ay f o reclo se d isco v ery

o f certain m aterial. 2 Fo r ex am

ple: F E D
. R. C IV
. P

. 2 6 (a)(2 )(B) (“ th e w itn ess’ s q u alif icatio n s , in clu d in g a list o f

all p u blicatio n s au th o redinth e p rev io u s 1 0 y ears”; “ a list o f all o th er cases in w h ich , d u rin g th e p rev io u s 4 y ears, th e w i tn ess testif i ed as an ex p ert at trial o r b y

d ep o sitio n ”). [On e su b co m m i ttee m em

b er b eliev es th is req u i rem en t m ay b e to o o n ero u s.] 

### 1

### later than 90 day s before the scheduled trial date. 3 

### 6. There should be a continuing duty to disclose throughout the trial until sentencing. For exculpatory evidence, the duty

to disclose should apply

after sentencing. 4


### 7. I nformation, such as laboratory testing protocols, quality assurance procedures, accreditation and audit reports, proficiency testing results, and internal validation studies, should be readily accessible — preferably by posting on the internet or electronically upon request. 8. Forensic evidence should be preserved both before and after trial — until appeals are exhausted and sentences served. J urisdictions should promulgate procedures concerning the preservation and retention of evidence. 5 

### Evidence should not be unnecessarily consumed during testing, and consumptive testing should not be done without notice to the defense if a defendant has been charged. 9. The defense has the right to inspect and retest forensic evidence that is under the custody

or control of the prosecution. The prosecution has the right to inspect and retest forensic evidence that is under the custody or control of the defense and that the defense intends to use at trial.

D I R E C T I V E 

### R E C O MM E N D A T I O N S 

### 1. The Attorney

General should direct federal prosecutors, forensic laboratories within the Department of J ustice, and laboratories under contract with the Department of Justice to follow the policies outlined above that are applicable to their duties.
2. The Attorney

General should recommend amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that are consistent with the above policies.
3. The Attorney

General should request that the Organiz ation for Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) consider these policies in their best practices and standards development.

3 Fo r ex am

ple: F E D
. R. C IV
. P

. 2 6 (a)(2 )(D) (“ at least 9 0 d ay s b ef ore th e d ate set f o r trial o r f

o r th e case to b e read y

f o r trial”). 4 S

ee ABA M ODE L R

ULE S OF P R OF ’ L C ONDUCT , R. 3 .8 (9 ) (d iscu ssin g p ro secuto r’ s o b lig atio n

w h en h e o r sh e learn s o f

cred ib le an dm aterial ev id en ce o f in n o cen ce af

ter trial). 5 Th e reg u latio n s w ill n eed to tak e acco u nt o f b u lk item s an dsitu atio n s in

w h ich rep resen tativ e sam

p les are su f

f icien t. S ee ABA S T A

NDA RDS F OR C RIMI

NA L J UST I CE , DNA E V I DENCE § 1 6

- 2 .6 (b ) (3 d ed . 2 0 07 ). 

### 2

### 4. The Attorney General should ask other jurisdictions to consider adopting the policies outlined above.

B A C K G R O U N D 

### Discovery

requires adversaries in litigation to exchange certain categories of information before trial. Discovery procedures were introduced in civil litigation in the 1930s. This reform effort was based on a belief that justice would be better served if “trials by ambush” were avoided. Moreover, once both sides had a better understanding of the evidence, the chances for a settlement were thought to increase. The same policies should apply in criminal cases. According to President Bush’s DNA Initiative, “[ e] a rly disclosure can have the following benefits: [ 1] Avoiding surprise and unnecessary delay . [ 2] I dentifying the need for defense expert services. [ 3] Facilitating exoneration of the innocent and encouraging plea negotiations if DNA evidence confirms guilt.” 6 

### The first part of this document addresses general considerations relating to pretrial disclosure, such as the policy arguments supporting comprehensive discovery , the timing of discovery , prosecutorial discovery , etc. The second part examines different ty

pes of discoverable materials such as reports, bench notes, etc. The last part discusses the Brady rule, which concerns the disclosure of exculpatory

evidence.
I. G E N E R AL 

### C O N S I D E R

A T I O N S 

### A. Need f

or Discovery The need for pretrial discovery of forensic evidence in criminal cases is critical. “[ E] xpert witnesses are almost impossible to cross-examine and expert testimony almost impossible to rebut without intensive pretrial preparation.” 7 

### An advisory note to the federal discovery rule echoed this view: “[ I ] t is difficult to test expert testimony

at trial without advance notice and preparation.” 8

6 P RE SI D ENT B USH ’ S DNA I NI T I A T IV E : P RI

NCIPLE S OF F ORE

NSI C DNA F OR O F F I CE RS OF T HE C O URT
.

7 Rezn eck , Th e New Fed era l Ru les o

f Crimin a l Pro ced

u re , 5 4 G E O

. L .J

. 1 27 6 , 1 2 7 8 (1 96 6 ).

8 S

ee F E D
. R. C RIM
. P

. 1 6 (1 9 7 5 ), ad v iso ry co m m ittee’ s n o t e rep rin ted

a t 6 2 F.R.D. 3 1 2 (1 9 7 4 ). S

ee a lso Co m

m en tary , ABA S T A

NDA RDS RE L

A T I NG T O D I SCOV E R

Y A ND P ROCE DURE B E F ORE T RI A L 6 7 (Ap p ro v edDraf

t 1 9 70 ) (“ Th e n eed f

o r f u ll an df air d isclo su

re is esp ecially ap p aren t w i th

resp ect to scien tif

ic p ro o f an dth e testim ony

o f ex p erts.”). 

### 3

### Moreover, the failure to disclose exculpatory forensic evidence has play ed a role in many

DNA exonerations. 9 

### The Earl W a shington case is an example. The State did not give the defense the report indicating W ashington was excluded by

that characteristic [ lack of the Transferrin CD protein]

. I nstead, the State gave the defense an “amended” report. W ithout having done any new tests, the altered report stated that the results of the Transferrin CD testing “were inconclusive.” The original lab repot came to light decades later when W ashington filed a civil rights lawsuit after his exoneration 1 0


### W a shington came within nine day s of execution. The leading neutron activation case, United States v. Stifel , 1 1 

### illustrates the dangers of restrictive discovery . Stifel was charged with sending a bomb through the mail. The bomb exploded and killed a victim after delivery . The prosecution’s evidence included the results of neutron activation analy sis, which was used to compare bomb debris (viny l tape, metal cap, cardboard mailing tube, and paper gummed label) and similar items obtained from Stifel’s place of employ ment. The prosecution expert testified that the metal cap and tape were “of the same manufacture” and from the “same batch” — one day ’s manufacturing production. 1 2 

### This testimony “depends on the existence of sufficient background information.” 1 3 

### Stifel was convicted, and his conviction upheld on appeal. During his imprisonment, Stifel filed a request under the Freedom of I

n formation Act (FOIA), which revealed several things, including

9 So m e o f

th ese cases, su chas th e Ro l an d o Cru z an dRo y Bro w n cases are d iscu ssed b elo w . S ee Bran d o n

L . Garrett & P eter J . Neu f eld , In va lid

Fo ren sic S

cien ce Testimo n

y a n d W ro n g fu l Co n victio n s , 9 5 V A

. L

. RE V
. 1 , 4 7 (2 0 09 ) (d iscu ssin gcases o f Cu rtis McCarth y , Earl W ash in g to n , W i lliam s Greg o ry , L af o n so Ro llin s, Ken n ethW aters). 10 Bran d o n

L . Garrett, C ONV I CT I NG T HE I NNOCE

NT : W HE RE C RIM I

N A L P ROSE CUT I ONS G O W RONG 1 0 8 (2 0 1 1 ) (d iscu ssin g J o h n W illis case). S

ee a lso M A RGAR

E T E DDS , AN E X PENDA BL

E M A N , T H E N E A R
- E X E CUT I ON OF E A RL W A SHI NG T ON J R
. (2 00 3 ) (ex am in in g th e W ash in g to n

case); Eric M. Freed m an , Ea rl W a sh i n gto n ’s Ord

ea l , 2 9 H OF ST RA L

. RE V
. 10 9 8 (2 0 0 1 ); P au l C. Gian n elli,. W ro n g fu l Co n victio ns a nd

Fo ren s ic S

cien ce: Th e Need

to Reg u l a te Crime La b s , 8 6 N.C. L

. RE V
. 1 6 3 (2 0 0 7 ).

11 4 3 3 F.2 d4 3 1 (6 th Cir. 1 9 7 0 ). 12 Id

. at 4 3 6. 13 Den n is S. Karj ala, Th e Eviden tia ry Uses o f Neu tro n Activa tio n An a lysis , 5 9 C A L
. L

. RE V
. 99 7 , 1 0 1 4 (1 9 71 ): “ N o co m preh en siv e b ack g ro u

n dstu d ies h av e b eenp u

b l ish edo n any o f th e m aterials in v o lv edinth is case. . . . Th e Six th Circu it o pin io n

d o es n o t say

w h eth er th e exp ert attem

p tedto su b stantiate h is claim s w ith p urp o rted b ack g ro un dstu d i es carried o ut in g o v ern m en t

lab o rato ries, b ut th e av ailab le ev id en ce in d i cates th at su chstu d ies sh o u l din any ev en t b e reg ard edw ith

su s p icio n .” Th e ex p erts w ere also criticized : “ [F]ew ex p erts h av e u sed ap pro p riate care in lim itin g th eir testim o ny . . . .” Id

. at 1 0 24

. 

### 4

### discrepancies about the background tests on the viny l tape. 1 4 

### As a result, Stifel filed a post-conviction petition, alleging a due process violation — the failure to disclose exculpatory

evidence. The district court disagreed that the expert had misrepresented the facts on this issue, but noted the misleading character of this information in overturning the conviction. 1 5 

### I n short, Stifel was entitled, through FOI A, to more information about the prosecution’s case after he was convicted than he was entitled to when preparing for his trial. 1 6 

### This material would have been discoverable in a civil trial.
B. Constitutional Considerations
I n addition to the policy

reasons supporting discovery , a defendant’s rights to confrontation, 1 7 

### effective assistance of counsel, 1 8 

### and due process often turn on pretrial disclosure. As the Supreme Court has noted, due process “speak[ s] to the balance of forces between the accused and his accuser.” 1 9 

### One commentator remarked that “the inequality of investigative resources between prosecution and defense is likely

to have its maximum impact in the presentation of evidence which must be analy

zed and developed in the laboratory or hospital.” 2 0 

### Hence, pretrial discovery

“lessen[ s] the imbalance which may result from the State’s early and complete investigation in contrast to [ defendant’s] . . . late and limited investigation.” 2 1


### C. Evidentiary Considerations Finally , Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence presupposes

14 Un itedStates v . Stif el, 5 9 4 F. Su

p p . 1 5 2 5 (N.D. Oh io 1 9 8 4 ). Th e FOIA req u est also d isclo sedth e ex isten ce o f an o th er su sp ect. 15 “ [H]ad th e d ef

en se k n o w n o f th e No v em

b er 1 9 6 8 tests p erf

orm edb y Sco tt o n tap e o btain edf

ro m P ly m o uth Ru b ber Co m p any , it co u l dh av e u sedth is ev id en ce to f urth er im p eachth e cred ib ility

o f Sco tt’ s scien tif

ic m eth od s.” Id

. at 1 5 4 3

. 16 Af

ter h is release, Stif

el w en t to law

sch o o l an db ecam e anatto rn ey
. 17 Th e Su

p rem e Co urt’ s recen t co n f ro n t atio n j urisp ru d en ce m ak es p retrial d isclo su re o f th e b asis o f

exp ert testim o ny

critical. S

ee W illiam s v . Illin o i s, 1 3 2 S. Ct. 2 2 2 1 (2 0 1 3 ). 18 Ina recen t case co n cern in g in ef f ectiv e assistan ce o f

co un sel, th e Su

p rem e Co urt w ro te: “ Crim in al cases w ill arise w h ere th e o n ly

reaso n ab le an dav ailab le d ef en se strateg y

req u ires co n s u ltatio n

w ith ex p erts o r in tro du ctio n

o f ex pert ev i d en ce.” Harrin g to n v . Rich t er, 1 3 1 S. Ct. 7 7 0 , 7 8 8 (2 0 11 ). S

ee a lso Hin to n

v . Alab am a, 1 3 4 S. Ct. 1 0 81 (2 0 1 4 ) (f in d in g co u

n sel in ef f ectiv e f o r f ailin g to un d erstan dh o w

to retain a d ef

en se ex pert). 19 W ard iu s v . Oreg o n , 4 1 2 U.S. 4 7 0 , 4 7 4 (1 9 7 3 ). 20 Rezn eck , su

p ra n o te 7 , at 1 2 7 8

. 21 State v . Co o k , 2 0 6 A.2 d3 5 9 , 3 6 3 (N.J . 1 96 5 ). 

### 5

### comprehensive discovery

. 2 2 

### The rule provides: “Unless the court orders

otherwise, an expert may

state an opinion — and give the reasons for it — without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. But the expert may be required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination.” According to the drafters, Rule 705 “assumes that the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential for effective cross-examination. . . . Rule 26(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as revised, provides for substantial discovery in this area, obviating in large measure the obstacles which have been raised in some instances to discovery of findings, underly

ing data, and even the identity of the experts.” 2 3 

### Unfortunately , as explained below, there is no “substantial discovery ” in criminal cases. 2 4


### D. Civil vs Crim inal Litigation Discovery

in civil cases is far more comprehensive than in criminal litigation. This is somewhat surprising because “the policy of avoiding trial by ambush or surprise has even greater application in the criminal context, where the stakes are much higher and the obligation of the State to see that justice is done is much greater than that of the private litigants in a civil dispute.” 2 5


### I n civil cases, discovery

includes (1) automatic identification of expert witnesses, (2) their qualifications, (3) comprehensive written reports, and (4) special deposition procedures for experts. 2 6 

### I n contrast, unsupported conclusory reports are permitted in criminal cases — i.e., those that “summariz [ e] the results of an unidentified test conducted by an anony mous technician.” 2 7 

### Moreover, only a few states authoriz e discovery depositions in criminal litigation. Depositions in criminal cases are ty

p ically limited to the preservation of testimony

. 2 8 

### Thus, counsel may

depose their own witnesses if that witness may be unavailable at trial, but counsel may

not depose the other party ’s witnesses. The disparity

between discovery

rules in civil and criminal actions is not based on science. As one court put it, “there are no scientific grounds for

22 Ov er f

orty j urisd ictio n s h av e ad op tedev id en tiary ru les b ased

o n th e Fed eral Ru les o f Ev id en ce. 23 F E D
. R. E V I D
. 7 0 5 ad v iso ry co m m i ttees n o te (1 9 7 5 ). 24 Co m

p reh en siv e p retrial d isco v ery m ay also serv e a q u ality

assu ran ce f un ctio n
. Ex p erts, lik e m o st p eo p le, m ay b e m o re co n scien tio u s if th ey k n o w th at th eir w o rk

w ill b e critically rev iew ed

.

25 Scip io v . State, 9 2 8 So . 2 d1 1 38 , 1 1 4 5 (Fla. 2 0 0 6 ). 26 F E D
. R. C IV
. P . 2 6 . See i n fra Ap pen d ices A & B. 27 Un itedStates v . Bentley , 8 7 5 F.2 d 1 1 1 4 , 1 1 2 3 (5 th Cir. 1 9 89 ) (d issentin g o p in io n ) (h o sp ital rep o rt o n urin e test rev ealin g p resen ce o f can n ab in o id s). 28 S

ee F E D
. R. C RIM
. P

. 1 5

. 

### 6

### withholding information in the discovery process.” 2 9 

### A National Academy of Sciences DNA report recommended extensive discovery : “All data and laboratory records generated by

analy sis of DNA samples should be made freely available to all parties. Such access is essential for evaluating the analy sis.” 3 0 

### The report goes on to state that “[ t] h e prosecutor has a strong responsibility to reveal fully

to defense counsel and experts retained by the defendant all material that might be necessary in evaluating the evidence.” 3 1


### E. Argum ents Against Def e nse Discovery Opponents of liberal discovery in criminal cases have argued that discovery will (1) encourage perjury, (2) lead to the intimidation of witnesses, and, (3) be a one-way

street because of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 3 2 

### W ith forensic evidence, however, these traditional arguments against criminal discovery lose whatever force they might otherwise have. The first argument fails because “it is virtually impossible for evidence or information of this kind to be distorted or misused because of its advance disclosure.” 3 3 

### Also, there is no evidence that the intimidation of experts is a major problem, perhaps because the evidence can often be re-examined by another expert. 3 4 

### Finally , the Self-incrimination Clause, as presently interpreted by the Supreme Court, presents little impediment to reciprocal prosecution discovery of scientific proof — as discussed the next section. 3 5

29 State v . Tan k ersley , 9 5 6 P .2 d4 8 6 , 4 9 5 (Ariz. 1 9 9 8 ). 30 N A T I ONA L RE SE A RCH C OUNCIL , DNA T E CHNOL OG Y I N F O RE N SI C S CI E

NCE 1 4 6 (1 9 9 2 ); see a lso id

. at 1 0 5 (“ Case reco rd s – su chas n o tes, w o rk sh eets, au to rad io g rap h s, an d p o p u latio n

d atab an k s –

an do t h er d ata o r reco rd s th at su p po rt ex am i n ers’ co n clu s io n s are p rep ared , retain edb y

th e lab o rato ry , an d m ad e av ailab le f o r in sp ectio n

o n co urt o rd er af

ter rev iew

o f th e reaso n ab len ess o f

a req u est.”); N A T I ONA L RE SE A RCH C O U NCI L , T HE E VA L

UA T I ON OF F ORE

NSI C DNA E V I D ENCE 1 6 7- 6 9 (1 99 6 ) (“ Certain l y , th ere are n o strictly scien tif ic j u stif i catio n s f o r w ithh o ld in g in f

o rm atio n in th e d isco v ery

p ro cess, an din

Ch ap ter 3 w e d iscu ssed

th e im p o rtan ce o f f u ll, w rittend o cum en tatio n

o f all asp ects o f

DNA lab o rato ry

o p eratio n s. Su chd o cum en t atio n w o u ldf acilitate tech n ical rev i ew

o f lab o rato ry

w ork , b o th

w ith in th e lab o rato ry

an d b y o ut sid e exp erts . . . .”).

31 Id

. at 1 4 6. 32 2 C HA RL

E S A L A N W RI G HT & A RT HUR R. M I LLE R , F E DE RA L P RA CT I CE A ND P ROCE DURE § 2 5 2 , at 3 6

- 3 7 (2 ded . 1 9 8 2 ).

33 Co m

m en t ary , ABA S T A

NDA R DS F OR C RIMI

NA L J UST I CE , D I SCOV E RY A N D P ROCE DURE B E F ORE T RI A L 6 7 (Ap p ro v edDraf

t 1 9 7 0). 34 2 W AYNE L A F AV E & J E ROD I SRA E L , C RIM I N A L P R OCE DURE § 1 9 .3 , at 4 9 0 (1 9 8 4 ) (“ On ce th e rep o rt is p rep ared , th e scien t if i c ex p ert’ s p o sitio n

is n o t read ily

in f lu en ced , an d th eref o re d isclo su

re p resen t s little d an g er o f p ro m p tin g p erj u

ry o r in tim id atio n .”). 35 See d iscu ssio n

o f p ro secut io n

d isco v ery in

fra

. 

### 7

### F. Prosecution Discovery The policy reasons for defense discovery also apply

to the prosecution. Prosecution discovery of expert reports and inspection of tangible objects is widely sanctioned. In some jurisdictions, prosecution discovery is permitted only if the defense first seeks discovery from the prosecution (i.e., reciprocal discovery ). 3 6 

### I n other jurisdictions, prosecution discovery is not conditioned on defense discovery

. 3 7


### 1. Self-Incrimination Clause The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of prosecution discovery in W illiams v. Florida , 3 8 

### which involved a state statute requiring the defense to notify

the prosecution of its intention to offer an alibi defense and to provide the names of its alibi witnesses. The defendant argued that the statute violated the Self-incrimination Clause. Rejecting this argument, the Court found that the statute did not amount to “compulsion” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment: “At most, the rule only compelled petitioner to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information that the petitioner from the beginning planned to divulge at trial.” 3 9 

### The “accelerated discovery ” rationale applies to prosecution discovery of forensic reports that the defense intends to introduce at trial but not to reports prepared by

experts who will not be witnesses (i.e., consulting experts). I n Binegar v. Eighth Judicial District Court , 4 0 

### the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that a discovery

statute violated the Fifth Amendment because it had “a greater effect than simply

compelling the defendant to accelerate the timing of disclosures that the defendant intended to divulge at trial ... . Under [ one provision] , the defendant would be forced to disclose witness statements and the results or reports of mental and phy sical examinations and scientific tests or experiments, even if the

36 Fed eral Ru le 1 6 is anex am ple. S ee a lso Del. Su

p er. Ct. Crim . R. 1 6 (b ); Fla. R. Crim . P . 3 .2 2 0 (d )(2 )(ii); Io w a R. Crim . P . § 2 .1 4 (2 ); N.J . R. Crim . P . 3 .1 3

- 3(b ); N.D. R. Crim . P

. 1 6 (b ); R.I. Sup er. Ct. Crim . R. 1 6 (b ); Ten n . R. Crim . P . 1 6 (b )(1 ); Va. S. Ct. R. 3 A:1 1 ©; W y o . R. Crim . P . 1 8 (d ).

37 E.g ., Alask a R. Crim . P . 1 6 (b ); Me. R. Crim . P . 1 6 A© & (d ); Min n . R. Crim . P

. 9 .0 2 ; Mo . R. Crim . P . 2 5 .0 5 (A)(1 ); N.M. R. Crim . P . 5

- 5 0 2 (a) (m an d ato ry ); Or. Rev . Stat. § 1 3 5 .8 3 5 (2 ); W ash . Su

p er. Ct. Crim . R. 4 .7 (g ). 38 3 9 9 U.S. 7 8 (1 9 70 ). 39 Id

. at 8 5

. 40 9 1 5 P .2 d8 8 9 (Nev . 1 9 9 6 ). 

### 8

### defendant never intended to introduce the statements or materials at trial.” 4 1 

### There is a second ground for rejecting a Fifth Amendment challenge. The Self-incrimination Clause prohibits only compulsion directed at the suspect. According to the Supreme Court, “the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, being personal to the defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial.”4 2 

### Accordingly , compelling defense counsel to reveal forensic reports would not necessarily

violate the privilege. 4 3



### 2. Due Process Clause The Supreme Court left several issues unresolved in W illiams . The discovery statute in that case provided for liberal defense discovery , and the Court indicated that a due process issue would have been presented if reciprocal defense discovery had not been provided. I n W ardius v. Oregon , 4 4 

### which also involved a notice of alibi rule, the Court confronted this issue. Because the statute in W ardius made no provision for reciprocal defense discovery , the Court found a due process violation: “[ T] he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants.” 4 5 

### I n short, due process precludes prosecution discovery of forensic reports and evidence in the absence of reciprocal defense discovery

. 4 6


### * * * * *

41 Id

. at 8 9 4 . So m e state co urts rej ect th e W illia ms ratio n ale as a m atter o f state co n s titutio n al law

. S

ee S co tt v . State, 5 1 9 P .2 d 7 7 4 , 7 8 5 (Alask a 1 9 7 4); State v . Sum m erv i l le, 9 4 8 P .2 d4 6 9 (Alask a 1 9 97 ) (reaf f irm i n g S co tt). 42 Un itedStates v . No b les, 4 2 2 U.S. 2 2 5 , 2 3 4 (1 9 7 5 ) (co m p elledp ro du ctio n

o f d ef en s e in v estig ato r’ s n o t es d oes n o t v io late f i f th am en dm en t b ecau se it in v o lv edn o co m pu lsio n o f th e d ef en d an t); Gip so n

v . State, 6 0 9 P .2 d1 0 3 8 , 1 0 4 4 (Alask a 1 9 8 0 ) (co m p elledd isclo su

re o f d ef en s e f i rearm ex p ert’ s rep o rt d o es n o t

v io l ate th e f

if th am en d m en t); Izazag a v . Su perio r Co urt, 8 1 5 P .2 d3 0 4 (Cal. 1 9 9 1 ).

43 S

ee 5 W

. L A F AV E E T A L ., C RIMI NA L P ROCE D URE § 2 0 .4 (b ), at 4 5 0- 5 1 (3 ded

. 2 0 0 7 ) (“ Self

- in crim in atio n

o b j ectio n s to d isclo su

re o f scien tif ic rep o rts h av e un i f

o rm ly b een rej ected o n

th e g ro un dth at ‘ n o d isclo s ure o f an y k in d , b y d ef en d an t, is in v o lv ed

inth i s issu e.’ ”). 44 4 1 2 U.S. 4 7 0 (1 97 3 ). 45 Id

. at 4 7 2. 46 S

ee Grey v . State, 1 7 8 P .3 d1 5 4, 1 6 0 (Nev . 2 0 0 8 ) (“ [T]o th e ex ten t th at NRS 1 7 4 .2 3 4 (2 ) im

p o ses su cha n o nrecip ro cal b urd en o f d isclo su re [reg ard in g d ef

en se ex p erts] o n

a crim in al d ef

en d an t, it is u n co n stitu

tio n al un d er th e Un itedStates Co n stitu tio n an d th e Nev ad a Co n stitu tio n ... . Th e State m ay

n o t in sist th at trials b e ru n as a ‘ search f

o r tru th ’ so f

ar as d ef en se w itn esses are co n cern ed , w h ile m aintain in g ‘ p ok er g am e’ secrecy f o r its o w n w i tn esses. It is f un d am en tally

un f air to req u ire a d ef

en d an t to d i v

u lg e th e d etails o f

h is o w n case w h ile at th e sam e tim e su b j ectin g h im

to th e h azard o f

surp rise co n cern in gref

utatio n o f th e v ery p i eces o f ev id en ce w h ichh e d isclo s edto th e State.”). 

### 9

### I n sum, there is neither a legal nor policy reason to prevent prosecution discovery of the forensic reports and opinions of defense experts who will testify at trial. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(1)© requires a summary of defense witness testimony if the defense seeks a summary of prosecution experts’s testimony . Defense experts who will not testify are ty pically exempt from discovery ; the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel (Sixth Amendment), the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product doctrine are the bases for this exemption.
G. Tim eliness of

Discovery To be useful, disclosure must occur sufficiently before trial for counsel to have adequate time for preparation. For example, in one case the Eighth Circuit observed: “The government not only produced the DNA evidence a month late, but it did so almost literally on the eve of trial, making it virtually impossible, absent a continuance, for defendants to evaluate and confront the evidence against them. DNA evidence is scientific and highly technical in nature; it would have required thorough investigation by defense counsel, including almost certainly retaining an expert witness or witnesses.” 4 7 

### However, all discoverable material need not be provided at one time. Defense counsel needs some information, such as initial laboratory reports, as early as possible in order to consult with an expert. Because the overwhelming majority of defendants are indigent, counsel may need time to file an application for funds to retain an expert. I n contrast, disclosure of other material may often be postponed or never requested if plea negotiations commence. Federal Civil Rule 26 makes a distinction between “initial disclosure” and subsequent disclosure.
H. Continuing Duty to Disclose Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 recogniz es a “continuing duty to disclose” forensic reports if, prior to or during trial, new reports are prepared. 4 8 

### I n United States v. Kelly , 4 9 

### neutron activation tests were conducted after the trial court ordered discovery

of forensic reports. The defense, however, was not informed of the tests until trial. After recogniz ing the prosecution’s continuing duty to disclose the tests results, the Second Circuit wrote: “The course of the

47 Un itedStates v . Dav is, 2 4 4 F.3 d6 6 6 , 6 7 1 (8 t h Cir. 2 0 01 ). See a lso Miller v

. State 8 0 9 P .2 d 1 3 1 7 , 1 3 1 9

- 2 0 (Ok la. Crim . Ap p . 1 9 9 1 ) (“ [I]t w as ap p ro x im ately tw o w eek s af

ter th e d ead lin e o rd ered b y

J u d g e Ow en s th at Ms. Gilch rist m ailedth e h air ev id en ce to th e ap p ellan t’ s exp ert. Th u s, ap p ellan t' s exp ert receiv edth e ev id en ce six an do n e- h alf d ay s b ef o re trial b eg an .”). 48 F E D
. R. C RIM
. P

. 1 6 (c). 49 4 2 0 F.2 d2 6 (2 dCir. 1 9 6 9 ). 

### 10

### government smacks too much of a trial by ambush, in violation of the spirit of the rules. A new trial is required, with a fair opportunity for the defense to run its own neutron activation tests of the material . . . .” 5 0


### I n Scipio v. State , 5 1 

### a medical examiner investigator realiz ed that he had been mistaken in his deposition testimony , but this information was not given to defense prior to the trial. The court held that the State “had an obligation to disclose any

material change in that statement.” 5 2


### II. T Y P E S O F 

### D I S C O V E R A B L E 

### M A T E R

I A L 

### A. Oral Reports Most jurisdictions make forensic reports discoverable but many do not make preparing a report mandatory . Roy Brown spent fifteen y

ears in prison for murder before he was exonerated by DNA evidence. 5 3 

### The case rested largely on bite marks on the victim’s body , which a local dentist testified matched Brown’s teeth. 5 4 

### Unbeknownst to the defense, a forensic odontologist had analy z ed the bite marks on the victim and concluded that the one mark he could interpret excluded Brown as the source of the mark. The prosecutor, however, “never asked [ the odontologist] to file an official report . . .. I nstead, the prosecutors relied on another expert, a local dentist, whose testimony helped convict Mr. Brown.” 5 5 

### Only later did the opinion of the forensic odontologist come to light. At one time, oral reports were not discoverable under Criminal Rule 16. As a result, the defendant in United States v. Shue 5 6 

### was not entitled to the verbal report of an FBI

photographic expert who compared pictures of Shue with those of a bank robber. The expert made the comparison the night before he testified —

50 Id

. at 2 9

. See a l so Un itedStates v . Barrett, 7 0 3 F.2 d1 0 7 6, 1 08 0

– 8 1 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 3 ); Un itedStates v . Bo n ey , 5 7 2 F.2 d3 9 7 , 4 0 3 (2 dCir. 1 97 8 ) (d ru grep o rt); Un itedStates v

. Bo ck iu s, 5 6 4 F.2 d1 1 9 3, 1 19 7

– 9 8 (5 th Cir. 1 97 7 ) (p o larim eter test); State v . W ilso n , 5 0 7 N.E.2 d 1 1 0 9 , 1 1 1 0 –1 2 (Oh io 1 9 8 7 ) (f ailure to u

p d ate NAA rep o rt resu ltedin“ t rial b y am b u sh ”); Acev ed o v . State, 4 6 7 So . 2 d2 20 , 2 2 4 (Miss. 1 9 8 5 ) (state v io latedco n tin u in gduty to d isclo se reg ard in g g un sh ot resid u e test).

51 9 2 8 So . 2 d1 1 3 8 (Fla. 2 0 0 6 ). 52 Id

. at 1 1 42 . Flo rid a is o n e o f f ew states th at p erm i t

d isco v ery

d ep o sitio n s. 53 S

ee P eo p le v . Bro w

n , 6 0 0 N.Y.S.2 d5 9 3 (A.D. 1 9 9 3 ) (up h o ld in g co n v ictio n ). Th e o d o n to lo g ist’ s o p in io n co u ldalso b e ch aracterized as Bra d y m aterial. See in

f ra
. 54 Fern an d a San to s , Eviden ce fro m Bite Ma rks, It Tu rn s Ou t, Is No t so Elemen t

a r y , N.Y. T I ME S , J an . 2 8 , 2 0 0 7, at W K4

.

55 Fern an d a San to s , W ith DNA Fro m Exh u med

Bo d y, Ma n Is Fin a lly Free , N.Y. T I ME S , J an . 2 4, 2 0 0 7 , at A2 1

.

56 7 6 6 F.2 d1 1 2 2 , 1 1 3 5 (7 th Cir. 1 9 8 5 ). 

### 11

### without the defense’s knowledge. Similarly , a police officer in United States v.

Johnson 5 7 

### testified as an Emergency Medical Technician without notice to the defense. Although the defense argued that the testimony was “highly

prejudicial” because it contradicted an important aspect of the defense case, the Eleventh Circuit merely noted that there is no right to a witness list and Rule 16 was not implicated because “no . . . reports were made in this case.”5 8 

### This omission was rectified in federal practice with an amendment to Rule 16, which now requires a summary of an expert’s testimony

. 5 9 

### Most states have not adopted a comparable provision.
B. Forensic Reports Although virtually all jurisdictions make laboratory reports discoverable, the contents of the reports are not specified. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 6 0 

### a recent Supreme Court case, illustrates this problem. The laboratory report in that case “contained only the bare-bones statement that ‘[ t] he substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’ At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what tests the analy sts performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analy sts may not have possessed.” 6 1 

### The 2009 NAS report made similar comments: “Some reports contain only identifying and agency information, a brief description of the evidence being submitted, a brief description of the ty pes of analy sis requested, and a short statement of the results (e.g., ‘the greenish, brown plant material in item #1 was identified as marijuana’), and they include no mention of methods or any

discussion of measurement uncertainties.” 6 2


### I n 1989, the J ournal of Forensic Sciences, the official publication of the American Academy

of Forensic Sciences, published a sy mposium on the ethical responsibilities of forensic scientists. One article described a number of unacceptable laboratory reporting practices, including (1) “preparation of reports containing minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’ ammunition for cross-examination,” (2) “reporting of findings without an interpretation on the assumption that if an interpretation is required it can be provided from the witness box,” and (3) “[ o] mitting some significant point from a report to trap an

57 7 1 3 F.2 d6 5 4 (1 1 th Cir. 1 9 8 3 ). 58 Id

. at 6 5 9. 59 F E D
. R. C RIM
. P . 1 6 (a)(1 )(G). 60 1 2 9 S. Ct. 2 5 27 (2 0 0 9 ). 61 Id

. at 2 5 37 . A lab o rato ry rep o rt statin g th at a seized su b s tan ce is “ Hero in

HCl” is n o t v ery

in f o rm ativ e. Un itedStates v . P ark er, 4 9 1 F.2 d5 1 7, 5 2 5 (8 t h Cir.1 9 73 ) (Bu reauo f Narco tics an dDan g ero u s Dru g s lab rep o rt).

62 N A T I ONA L RE SE A RCH C OUNCIL , S T RE NG T HENI

NG F ORE

NSI C S CI EN C E I

N T HE UNI T E D S T A T E S : T HE P A T H F O RW A RD 2 1 (2 0 0 9).

### 12

### unsuspecting cross-examiner.” 6 3 

### All of these practices undermine the purpose of

pretrial discovery

. 1. Ultimate Conclusions Along with information specify ing the procedure used in the analy sis, the report should set forth the expert’s ultimate conclusions as well as specific test results. For example, in Pierce v. State , 6 4 

### the prosecution expert conducted serological tests on body

fluids in a rape case. Her report, which was turned over to the defense, contained specific test results but not her conclusion — that the rapist was a non-secretor. On appeal, the court ruled the report sufficient: “An expert’s opinion of the conclusions which can be drawn from test results in a particular case in no way

alters the actual facts of the case. Accordingly , the ultimate opinion of the expert is not necessary for either the preparation or the presentation of the defense.” 6 5 

### This approach undermines the purpose of discovery . Civil Rule 26 requires disclosure of “a complete statement of all opinions.” Similarly , a federal court wrote that Rule 16 entitles the accused to the lab report but not to a “comprehensive preview of the government’s [ expert] opinion testimony .” 6 6 

### This problem was rectified somewhat in the federal sy stem when the “summary” provision was added to Rule 16 — a provision that most states do not have.
2. Limitations of the Analysis The report should contain an express statement of the limitations of the technique. The 2004 NAS report on bullet lead noted: The conclusions in laboratory reports should be expanded to include the limitations of compositional analy sis of bullet lead evidence. I n particular,

63 Do u g las M. L u cas, Th e Eth ica l Resp o n sib i lities o f th e Fo ren sic S

cien tist: Exp lo rin g

th e Limits , 3 4 J

. F ORE NSI C S CI . 7 1 9 , 7 2 4 (1 9 8 9 ). L u cas w as th e Directo r, Th e Cen tre o f Fo ren sic Scien ces, Min istry o f th e So licito r Gen eral, To ro n to , On tario . As o n e scien t ist h as o b serv ed : “ Fo r a rep o rt f ro m a crim e lab o rato ry

to b e d eem edco m

p eten t , I th ink

m o st scientists w o u ldreq u ire it to co n tain a m in im um o f three elem en ts: (a) a d escrip tio n o f th e an aly tical tech n iq u es u sedinth e test req u ested b y th e g o v ern m en t o r o th er p arty , (b ) th e q u an titativ e o r q u alitativ e resu l ts w ith

any ap p ro p riate q u alif

icatio n s co n cern in g th e d eg ree o f certain ty su rro un d in g th em , an d(c) an ex p lan atio n o f an y n ecessary

p resum p tio n s o r in f

eren ces th at w ere n eed edto reach th e co n clu sio n s.” P ro f esso r An n a Harriso n , Mo un t Ho ly o k e Co lleg e, S ymp o siu m o n S cien ce a n d Th e Ru les o

f Leg a l Pro ced ure , 1 0 1 F.R.D. 5 9 9 , 6 3 2 (1 9 8 4 ). 64 7 8 6 P .2 d1 2 5 5 (Ok l. Crim . 1 9 9 0 ). 65 Id

. at 1 2 63

. 66 Un itedStates v . Co le, 7 0 7 F. Su p p . 9 9 9, 1 0 0 4 (N.D. Ill. 1 9 8 9 ). 

### 13

### a further explanatory comment should accompany the laboratory conclusions to portray

the limitations of the evidence. . . . Finally , measurement data (means and standard deviations) for all of the crime scene bullets and those deemed to match should be included. 6 7 

### The 2009 NAS forensic science report also addressed this issue: Reports “must include clear characteriz ations of the limitations of the analy ses, including measures of uncertainty

in reported results and associated estimated probabilities where possible.” 6 8


### 3. Comprehensible Reports The 2004 NAS bullet lead report also recommended that “a section of the laboratory

report translating the technical conclusions into language that a jury could understand would greatly facilitate the proper use of this evidence in the criminal justice sy stem.” 6 9 

### The ABA Standards on DNA contain a comparable provision. The commentary to Standard 16-3.3 explains: This Standard requires that a section of the laboratory report translate the scientific result into language that a nonscientist would understand. The purpose of forensic DNA testing is to assist the criminal justice sy stem in fulfilling its function to convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent. Accordingly , participants in the sy stem need to understand the significance of the test results. Overworked prosecutors and defense attorney s do not alway s have time to sort through data in order to appreciate the probative value of the lab analy sis. They will, in any

case, find a comprehensible summary useful in consulting with and questioning persons with greater expertise than they possess. J urors may

also welcome a written summary that they can understand without “translation” by an expert. Nobody

is in a better position to summariz e the results for the participants than the examiners themselves. 7 0


### C. Bench Notes & Related Docum ents The lack of bench notes is often cited in laboratory scandals. The W est

67 N A T I ONA L RE SE A RCH C OUNCIL , F ORE NSI C ANA L

YSI S : W E I G HI

NG B ULLE T L E A D E V I DENCE 1 1 0- 1 1 (2 00 4 ).

68 NRC F O RE

NSI C S CI ENCE R

E PORT , su p ra n o t e 6 2, at 2 1

- 22

. 69 W E I G HI

NG B ULL

E T L E A D E V I DENCE , su

p ra n o te 6 7 , at 1 1 0

- 1 1

. 70 DNA S T A

NDA RDS , su

pra n o te 5 , at § 1 6

- 3 .3 (c) cm t. at 7 5

. 

### 14

### Virginia, 7 1 

### Chicago, 7 2 

### Houston, 7 3 

### and FBIexplosive unit 7 4 

### investigations all found

inadequate documentation in forensic case files. Moreover, in one Supreme Court case, Delaware v. Fensterer , 7 5 

### an analy st testified that he could not remember which of three methods he had used to determine that hair found at a murder scene had been forcibly

removed. He apparently neglected to record this critical information.
1. Contemporaneous Recording DNA Advisory

Board Standards require laboratories to adopt and follow written procedures for taking and maintaining case notes to support the conclusions drawn in laboratory reports — in particular, a case record containing all documentation generated by examiners relating to case analy sis is standard

71 S

ee Inre In v estig atio n

o f th e W . Va. State P o lice Crim e L ab ., Sero lo g y Div ., 4 3 8 S.E.2 d5 0 1 , 5 08 (W . Va. 1 9 9 3 ) ((1 ) rep o rtin g th at m u ltip le item s h adb eentested , w h en o n ly a sin g le item

h adb eentested ; (2 ) rep o rtin g in co n clu siv e resu lts as co n clu siv e; (3 ) rep eated ly alterin g lab o rato ry

reco rd s ; (4 ) g ro u

p in g resu lts to create th e erro n eo u s im p ressio n th at g en etic m ark ers h adb eeno b tain edf

ro m all sam ples tested ; (5 ) f

ailin gto rep o rt co n f

lictin gresu lts); W alter F. Ro w e, Co mmen ta ry , in

E DWARD C ONNORS E T A L ., C ONV I CT E D BY J URI E S , E X ONE RA T E D BY S CI ENCE : C A SE S T UDI E S I N T HE U SE OF DNA E V I D ENCE T O E ST A BLI SH I NNOCE NCE A F T E R T RI

A L x v ii- x v iii (1 9 96 ) (“ It is also clear th at incase af t er case, d ef

en se co un sel f

ailedto rev iew

th e case n o tes o f th e p ro secutio n ’ s f

oren s ic sero lo g ists. Ev en a lay p erso n w o u ldh av e seenth e Fred Z ain s ’ s w rittenrep o rts an dsw o rntestim o ny w ere co n t

rad ictedb y

h is case n o tes.”). 72 S

ee L etter f

ro m P ro f esso r Geo rg e F. Sen sab au g h , Un iv ersity o f Calif o rn ia at Berk eley , Oct. 1 6 , 2 0 0 3 (“ Ov erall, th e d o cum en tatio n o f th e lab w o rk

as d escrib edinth e th ree p ag es o f lab n o tes is in ad eq u ate an din co m p lete. Mo reo v er, th e f

o rm al lab rep o rts d escrib ed resu lts o f testin g f o r w h ichth ere is n o reco rdinth e lab n otes. In sh o rt, th e d o cum en tatio n inth is case f alls sh o rt o f

accep tedscientif

ic stan d ard s.”). 73 S

ee T HI RD RE P ORT OF T HE I NDE PENDENT I NV E ST I G A T OR F O R T HE H OUST ON P OL I CE D E P ’ T C RIM E L A B ORA T ORY A ND P ROPE R T Y R OOM 2 8 (J un e 3 0 , 2 0 0 5 ) (“ Am o n g o th er p ro b lem s it id en t if

ied , th e 2 0 0 2 DP S au d it f oun d th at n o su chw

rittenp ro cedures [f

o r case n o tes an dlab rep orts] ex isted

an did en tif

iednum ero u s d ef

icien cies in

th e d ocum en tatio n

co n tain edinth e lab rep o rts.”).

74 S

ee O F F I C E OF I N SPE CT OR G ENE RA L , U .S. D E P ’ T OF J UST I CE , T HE FBI L A BORA T ORY : AN I NV E ST I G A T I O N I NT O L A BORA T ORY P RA CT I CE S A ND A L LE G E D M I SCONDUCTI N E X PL OSIV E S
- RE L

A T E D A ND O T HE R C A SE S (Ap ril 1 9 9 7 ) (reco m m en din g th e p rep aratio n

o f ad eq u ate case f iles to su p po rt rep o rts; “ Th e Ru d o lp h f iles an dso m e o f

Martz’ s w o rk

un dersco re th e im p o rtan ce o f

case f iles co n tain in g all th e d o cum en tatio n n ecessary

f or an o th er ap pro p riately q u alif iedex am in er to b e ab le to un d erstan dan d rep licate th e ex am in ers’ s d ata an dan aly s is. W e en co un tered th e p ro b lem

o f in co m p lete o r m issin g d o cum entatio n inm an y case f iles.”). 75 4 7 4 U.S. 1 5 (1 9 85 ). Nev erth eless, th e Su p rem e Co urt d eclin edto f in da co n f ro n tatio n v i o latio n inth is situ atio n . Ho w ev er, o n rem an dth e Delaw are Sup rem e Co urt h eld th e o p in io n

in ad m i ssib le, b ut

o n ev id en tiary , rath er th an

co n stitu tio n al, g ro un ds. Acco rd in g to th e co u rt: “ W h ile a w itn ess’ s m ere lacko f m em o ry as to a p articu lar f

act m ay g o o n ly to th e w eig h t o f th at ev id en ce, an ex pert w itn ess’ s in ab ility to estab l ish

a su f f icien t b asis f

o r h is o p in io n

clearly ren d ers th e o p in io n

in ad m issib le un d er D.R.E. 7 05 .” Fen s terer v . State, 5 09 A.2 d1 10 6 , 1 1 0 9

- 1 0 (Del. 1 9 8 6 ). 

### 15

### practice. 7 6 

### However, the standards do not specify that the notes be recorded contemporaneously

with the examination, a deficiency noted in a 2004 In spector General Report: [ C] ontemporaneous documentation is important to ensure that the case file accurately

reflects the work performed on each evidence item that is tested. I f staff members are allowed to delay recording observations and test results until after they have examined all the items for a case or have completed all of their work for the day, their documentation may not be fully accurate. Also, staff members may be unduly influenced by

protocol requirements when rely

ing on memory , and document what they know should have occurred when their recollection is vague. 7 7


### I n other words, delay

ed entries are subject to cognitive bias.
2. Discovery Bench Notes Timothy Spencer was the first person executed based on DNA evidence. 7 8 

### Yet, when the defense sought discovery of the prosecution expert’s “work notes,” which formed the basis of his report, the motion was denied, and the Virginia Supreme Court upheld this ruling. 7 9 

### I n contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recogniz e d that “fair trial and due process rights are implicated when data relied upon by

a laboratory

in performing tests are not available to the opposing party for review and cross examination.” 8 0


### D. Qualif

ications of

Exam iner
I n criminal cases, the disclosure of background information about the qualifications of the expert is often not required to be disclosed. According to one court, “Certainly , the identity of a particular expert witness would not be of significance.” 8 1 

### I n contrast, Civil Rule 26 rejects this view; it requires the following: (1) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years; (2) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 y ears, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (3)

76 DNA Ad v iso ry

Bo ard Stan dard 1 1 .1 (1 9 98 ). 77 O F F I CE OF I NSPE CT OR G ENE RA L , U.S. D E P ’ T OF J UST I CE , A UDI T RE PORT , T HE C OMBI NE D DNA I NDE X S YST E M 1 0 7 (2 0 0 1 ). 78 S

ee Mu rd erer Pu t to Dea th in Virg in ia : First U.S . Execu t io n Ba sed o n DNA Tests , N.Y. T I ME S , Ap r. 2 8 , 1 9 9 4

.

79 Co m

m o n w ealth v . Sp en cer, 3 84 S.E.2 d 7 8 5 , 7 9 1 (Va. 1 9 8 9). 80 State v . Sch w artz, 4 4 7 N.W .2 d4 2 2 , 4 2 7 (Min n . 1 9 8 9 ). 81 Un itedStates v . Ho llan d , 8 8 4 F.2 d3 5 4 , 3 5 7 (8 t h Cir. 1 9 89 ). See a lso Un i ted States v . Kro h

n , 5 5 8 F.2 d3 9 0, 3 9 4 (8 th Cir.1 9 7 7 ). 

### 16

### a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony

in the case. An unacceptable number of experts — both prosecution and defense witnesses — have lied about their credentials. 8 2 

### I n one case a serologist testified that he had a master’s degree in science, “whereas in fact he never attained a graduate degree.” 8 3 

### I n another case the death penalty was vacated when it was discovered that a prosecution expert, who “had testified in many cases,” had lied about her professional qualifications: “[ S] he had never fulfilled the educational requirements for a laboratory technician.” 8 4


### E. Right to Inspect and Retest Forensic Evidence Many jurisdictions recogniz e a defendant’s right to retest evidence in the prosecution’s possession 8 5 

### but not all. For example, in Frias v. State , 8 6 

### the defense sought to analy

z e independently the cocaine exhibits used by the state at trial. The trial court refused, and the I ndiana Supreme Court found no error. The court reasoned that the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine the expert, had access to the laboratory reports, and had raised no question about the accuracy of the results. 8 7 

### Other courts impose conditions on retesting — for example,

82 E.g ., Mad d o x v . L o rd , 8 1 8 F.2 d1 0 5 8 , 1 0 6 2 (2 dCir. 1 9 8 7 ) (sero lo g i st testif ied f alsely ab o ut acad em ic cred en tials); Klin e v . State, 4 4 4 So . 2 d1 10 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Ap p . 1 9 8 4 ) (p sy ch o lo g ist co n v ictedo f p erj u ry f o r claim in g h e h ada d o cto rate d urin g Ted Bu n d y trial); P eo ple v . Alf an o, 4 2 0 N.E.2 d1 11 4 , 1 1 1 6 (Ill. Ap p . 1 9 8 3 ) (arso n expert testif

iedf alsely ab o ut h is acad em ic cred en tials); State v . Eld er, 4 3 3 P .2 d4 62 (Kan . 1 9 6 7 ) (lab tech n ician co n v ictedo f p erj ury f o r m isrep resen tin g h i s edu catio n al b ack g ro u n d ); State v . DeFro n zo , 3 9 4 N.E.2 d1 02 7 , 1 0 3 0 (Oh io C.P . 1 9 7 8 ) (lab an aly st p lead edg u ilty to 8 co un ts o f

f alsif icatio n f or m isstatin g h is acad em ic cred en tials). S

ee a l so Mich ael Sak s, Preva len ce a n d Imp a ct o f Eth ica l Pro blems in Fo ren sic S

cien ce , 3 4 J

. F ORE

NSI C S CI

. 7 7 2 (1 9 8 9 ) (listin go th er cases); J am es Starrs, Mo u n teb a n ks Amo n g Fo ren sic S

cien tists , in

2 F ORE

NSI C S CI ENCE H A

NDBOOK 1 , 7 , 2 0

- 29 ®. Saf ersteined

. 1 9 8 8 ); An n o tatio n , Perju r y o r W ilfu lly Fa lse Testimo n

y o f Exp ert W

itn ess a s Ba sis fo r New Tria l o n Gro u n d

o f Newly Disco vered

Evid en ce , 3 8 A.L .R.3 d8 1 2

. 83 Do ep el v . Un i tedStates, 4 3 4 A.2 d4 4 9 , 4 6 0 (D.C. Ap p. 1 98 1 ). 84 Co m

m o n w ealth v . Mo un t, 2 5 7 A.2 d5 78 , 5 7 9 (P a. 1 9 6 9 ). 85 ABA S T A

NDA RDS F OR C RI MI

NA L J UST I CE , D I SCOV E RY § 1 1

- 3 2 (b ) (3 ded . 1 9 9 6 ) (“ Up o n m o tio n , eith er p arty

sh o u ldb e p erm ittedto co n du ct ev alu atio n s o r tests o f p h y sical ev id en ce inth e p ossessio n o r co n tro l o f

th e o th er p arty

w h ichis su b j ect to d isclo su

re.”). 86 5 4 7 N.E.2 d8 0 9 (In d . 1 9 8 9 ). 87 Id

. at 8 1 3. Oth er cases h av e also d en iedth e rig ht to retest b ecau s e th e d ef en dan t’ s rig h t

to cro ss- ex am i n e th e p ro secutio n ’ s exp erts w as d eem edsu f f icien t. S ee P eo p le v

. An derso n , 2 7 6 N.W .2 d9 24 , 9 2 6 (Mich . Ap p . 1 9 79 ); P eo p le v . Bell, 2 5 3 N.W .2 d7 2 6 , 7 2 9 (Mich

. Ap p . 1 9 7 7 ); Co m

m o nw ealth

v . Do rsey , 4 0 5 A.2 d5 1 6 , 5 2 1 (P a. Su p er. 1 97 9 ). 

### 17

### requiring a preliminary showing that a retest is “critical” 8 8 

### or will be “favorable.” 8 9 

### Cross-examination is not a substitute for retesting, and whether the results will be favorable cannot be determined until testing.
I n contrast, a number of courts have recogniz e d that the right to retest evidence is constitutionally based: “[ F] undamental fairness is violated when a criminal defendant . . . is denied the opportunity to have an expert of his choosing . . . examine a piece of critical evidence whose nature is subject to vary ing expert opinion.” 9 0 

### Retesting is a safeguard against deliberate misrepresentation — for example, cases where a serologist “reported results of lab tests that he did not in fact conduct” 9 1 

### or where a laboratory analy st represented that tests had been performed when “no such tests were ever conducted.” 9 2 

### More commonly , it is a protection against negligence. For example, in some instances, the defense may find something that was overlooked. Imbler v. Craven 9 3 

### exemplifies this point. At I mbler’s murder trial, a prosecution fingerprint expert testified that two partial fingerprints were found on a raz or case that the killer had left at the scene. A positive identification could not be made because of the fragmentary nature of the prints. After the trial, a defense expert examined the razor case, discovering a third print that excluded Imbler. 9 4 

### I n a nother fingerprint case, the expert simply got it wrong: “The fingerprint expert’s testimony was damning — and it was false.” 9 5

88 Gray

v . Ro w ley , 6 0 4 F.2 d3 8 2 , 3 8 4 (5 th Cir. 1 9 7 9 ) (ex am in atio n

o f sem en ev id en ce n ot “ critical”).

89 State v . Ko enn eck e, 5 4 5 P .2 d1 2 7, 1 3 3 (Or. 1 9 7 6 ) (rig h t to test w eap on s co n ditio n edo n

p relim i n ary

sh o w in g th at resu l t s w ill b e f av o rab le to d ef

en d an t). 90 Barn ard v . Hen d erso n , 5 1 4 F.2 d7 4 4 , 7 4 6 (5 t h Cir. 1 9 7 5 ). Acco rd W h ite v

. Mag g io , 5 5 6 F.2 d1 3 5 2 , 1 3 5 7 (5 th Cir. 1 9 7 7 ); W arren v . State, 2 8 8 So . 2 d 8 2 6 , 8 3 0 (Ala. 1 9 7 3 ); McNu tt v . Su

p erio r Co urt, 6 4 8 P .2 d1 2 2 , 1 2 4 (Ariz. 1 9 8 2 ); State v . Han so n , 2 7 8 N.W .2 d1 9 8 , 2 0 0 (S.D. 1 9 7 9 ).

91 State v . Ru

y b al, 4 0 8 A.2 d1 2 84 , 1 2 8 5 (Me. 1 97 9 ). 92 State v . DeFro n zo , 3 9 4 N.E.2 d1 02 7 , 1 0 3 1 (Oh io C.P . 1 9 7 8 ). 93 2 9 8 F. Su

p p. 7 95 (C.D. Cal. 1 9 69 ), a ff’d , 4 2 4 F.2 d 6 3 1 (9 th

Cir. 1 9 7 0 ). 94 Id

. at 8 0 9- 1 0 . Af ter h is release f

ro m p riso n , Im

bler su edth e p ro secuto r f o r un law f u l p ro secutio n . In Im

b ler v . P ach tm an , 4 2 4 U.S. 4 09 (1 9 7 6), th e Su p rem e Co urt h eldth at p ro secut o rial im

m un ity p reclu d ed

reco v ery
. 95 State v . Caldw ell, 3 2 2 N.W .2 d 5 7 4, 5 86 (Min n . 1 9 8 2 ). See a lso Sim o n A. Co le, Mo re Th a n Zero : Acco u ntin g fo r Erro r in La ten t Fin g erp rin t Iden tifica tio n , 9 5 J

. C RIM
. L

. & C RIMI NOL OG Y 9 8 5 , 1 0 40 (2 0 0 5 ) (“ in f in g erp rin t p ractice th e co n cep t is v acu o u s”). P ro f esso r Co le id en tif iedtw en ty

- tw o m isid entif icatio n s , w

h ichh e arg u es “ are m o st lik ely o n ly th e tip o f th e p ro v erb ial iceb erg o f

actu al cases o f

f in g erp rin t m isattrib utio n .” Id

. at 9 9 1 . Th e m isid entif i catio n cases in clu d e so m e th at in v o lv ed(1 ) v erif icatio n b y o n e o r m o re o th er ex am in ers, (2 ) ex am i n ers certif iedb y th e In tern atio n al Asso ciatio n o f Id en tif icatio n , (3 ) p ro cedures u sin ga six teen

- p o in t stan d ard , an d(4 ) d ef

en se ex p erts w

h o co rro b o rated m isid en tif i catio n s m ad e b y

p ro secutio n 

### 18

### F. Right to Preservation of Evidence
1. U.S. Constitution Retesting, of course, is possible only if the evidence is preserved. I n Arizona v. Y

oungblood , 9 6 

### the Supreme Court addressed a defendant’s right to the preservation of evidence. The case involved the failure to preserve semen in a sexual assault case. The evidence was critical. Nevertheless, the Court held that due process is violated only if the government acted in b a d faith in destroy ing the evidence, a very

restrictive standard. The police conduct in the case did not satisfy this standard: “The failure of the police to refrigerate the clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be described as negligent.” 9 7


### Commentators have criticiz ed the Y oungblood

bad-faith test because it focuses on the individual officer’s state of mind and not the police department policies. Thus, it provides no incentive for police departments to adopt standard operating procedures to ensure the proper collection and preservation of evidence. L arry Youngblood was later exonerated through DNA testing — after having spent nine y ears in prison. I n response, a DNA scientist, told a reporter:
W e now have before us a flawed legal precedent that stands on the shoulders of an innocent man . . .. For those organiz ations that are poorly run or mismanaged or don’t give a damn, . . . the Youngblood case was a license to let down their guard and be lazy . The effect that had was generally to lower the standards of evidence collection. 9 8



### 2. State Constitutions Most state courts have rejected the bad-faith test as a matter of state constitutional law. 9 9 

### The Alabama Supreme Court, for instance, has recogniz ed

exp erts. 96 4 8 8 U.S. 5 1 (1 9 88 ).

97 Id

. at 5 8

. 98 Barb ara W h iteak er, DNA Frees In ma te Yea rs After Ju stices Rejected Plea , N.Y. T I ME S , Au g . 1 1 , 2 00 0 , at A1 2 (q u otin g Dr. Ed w ard Blak e).

99 S

ee State v . Mo rales, 6 5 7 A.2 d5 8 5 , 5 9 4 n .2 0 (Co nn . 1 9 9 5 ) (“ Ap p aren t ly o n ly Arizo n a an dCalif

o rn ia . . . h av e co n clu d edth at th eir state ch arters o f f er th e sam e lim itedd eg ree o f p ro tectio n

as th e f ed eral co n stitu

tio n ”; “ L i k e o ur sister states, w e co n clu d e th at th e g o o do r b ad f aith o f th e p o lice inf

ailin g to p reserv e p o ten tially u sef u l ev id en ce [sem en

stain s th at co u ldh av e b eentestedf

o r DNA] can n ot b e d isp o sitiv e o f w h eth er a crim in al d ef

en d an t h as b eend ep riv ed o f du e p ro cess o f

law . Acco rd in g l y , w e, to o , rej ect th e litm u s test o f b adf aith o n th e p art o f

th e p o lice, w h ichth e Un i tedStates Su p rem e Co urt ad o p tedun d er th e f ed eral co n stitu

tio n in Yo u n g b lo o d .”); Th o rn e v . Dep artm en t o f P u b lic Saf ety , 7 7 4 P .2 d1 3 2 6, 1 33 1 n .9 (Alask a 1 9 8 9 ); State v . Mataf

eo , 7 8 7 P .2 d6 7 1 , 6 73 (Haw . 1 9 9 0 ); Co m m o nw ealthv . Hen d erso n , 5 8 2 N.E.2 d4 9 6 , 

### 19

### an exception to the bad faith test where the evidence is so critical to the defense as

to make a criminal trial without it “fundamentally unfair.” 1 0 0 

### The court applied this exception in a toxic waste dumping prosecution where the sole evidence, the samples tested, was not preserved. Similarly , the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Y oungblood

and set forth a three-pronged analy sis: (1) the degree of negligence or bad faith involved, (2) the importance of the missing evidence, considering the probative value and reliability of secondary

or substitute evidence that remains available, and (3) the sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to sustain the conviction. 1 0 1


### 3

. DNA Preservation Statutes The problem is that most jurisdictions have not prescribed procedures for the retention of evidence after trial. Only with the advent of DNA profiling have some states legislated on the issue. 1 0 2 

### The ABA Standards on DNA 1 0 3 

### and NI ST

4 9 7 (Mass. 1 99 1 ); State v . Osak alum i, 4 61 S.E.2 d5 0 4 , 5 1 2 (W . Va. 1 9 9 5 ); State v . Delisle, 6 4 8 A.2 d6 3 2 , 6 4 3 (Vt. 1 9 9 4 ).

100 Ex p arte Gin g o , 6 0 5 So . 2 d1 2 3 7 , 1 2 4 1 (Ala. 1 9 9 2). S ee a lso Gurley

v . State, 6 3 9 So .2 d5 5 7 (Ala. Crim . Ap p . 1 9 9 3 ) (f ailu re to p reserv e m

urd er v ictim ’ s w allet f

o r d ef en se testin g v io lates state co n stitu tio n ). 101 Ham

m o n dv . State, 5 6 9 A.2 d8 1, 8 7 (Del. 1 9 8 9 ) (“ W e rem ain co n v in ced th at f un d am en tal f

airn ess, as an

elem en t o f

d u e p ro cess, req u ires th e State’ s f ailure to p reserv e ev id en ce th at co u ldb e f

av o rab le to th e d ef

en d an t ‘ [to ] b e ev alu ated

inth e co nt ex t o f

th e en tire reco rd .’ . . . W h en

ev i d en ce h as n o t b eenp reserv ed , th e co n du ct o f th e State’ s ag en ts is a relev an t co n s id eratio n , b ut it is n o t d eterm in ativ e.”) (citatio n o m itted ). 102 E.g ., C A L
. P ENA L C ODE § 1 41 7 .9 (a) (W est Su p p . 2 0 0 5 ) (“ No tw i th stan d in g an y o th er p ro v isio n

o f law an dsu b j ect to su b div isio n (b ), th e ap p ro p riate g o v ern m en t al en tity sh all retainall b io lo g ical m aterial th at is secured inco nn ectio n w ith a crim in al case f

o r th e p erio do f tim e th at an y

p erso n rem ain s in carcerated inco nn ectio n w ith th at case.”); D.C. C ODE § 2 2

- 4 1 3 4 (2 0 0 1 ) (“ L aw

en f o rcem en t ag en cies sh all p reserv e b io l o g ical m aterial th at w as seizedo r reco v ered as ev id en ce inth e in v estig atio n o r p ro secutio n

th at resu ltedinth e co n v ictio n o r ad j u d icatio n

as a d elin q u en t f

o r a crim e o f

v io l en ce an dn o t co n su

m edinp rev io u s DNA testin g f o r 5 y ears o r as lo n g as an y

p erso n in carcerated inco nn ectio n w ith th at case o r in v estig atio n rem ain s incu sto d y , w h ich ev er is lo n g er.”); T E X
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. ANN
. art. 3 8 .3 9 (a) (Vern o n Su p p .2 0 03 ) (“ Ina crim in al case inw

h icha d ef en d an t is co n v icted , th e atto rn ey rep resen tin g th e state, a clerk , o r an y o th er o f f icer in p o s sessio n

o f ev id en ce d escrib edb y

Su b sectio n (b ) sh all en s ure th e p reserv atio n o f th e ev id en ce.”); T E X
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. ANN
. art. 3 8 .3 9(b ) (Vern o n Su p p .2 0 0 3 ) (Th is req u irem en t ap p lies to ev id en ce th at (1 ) w as in p o ssessio n

o f th e State d urin g th e p ro secutio n o f th e case, an d(2 ) at th e tim e o f co n v ictio n

w as k n ow n to co ntain

b io lo g i cal m aterial th at, if su bj ected to scien tif

ic testin g , w o u ldm o re lik ely th an n o t estab lish th e id en tity

o f th e p erso n co m m ittin g th e o f

f en se o r ex clu d e a p erso n

f ro m th e g ro u p o f p erso n s w

h o co u ldh av e co m

m itted th e o f f en se.). 103 S

ee ABA S T A

NDA RDS F OR C RIMI

NA L J U ST I CE , DNA E V IDENCE § 1 6

- 2 .6 (b ) (3 d ed . 2 0 0 7 ) (“ P ro perty

co n tain in g DNA ev id en ce o b tain ed inaninv estig atio n

w h ichh as resu ltedin th e p ro secutio n

o f a p erso n o r p erso n s f

o r h o m icid e, rap e o r o t

h er serio u s o f

f en se, an dth e ex tract f ro m su chev id en ce, if

an y h as b eeno b tain ed , sh o u ldb e retain edina m ann er th at w ill p reserv e th e DNA ev id en ce u n til all p erso n s ch arg edh av e b eenco n v ictedo f ano f f en se, o r ad

j u d icated as 

### 20

### recommendations 1 0 4 

### use the completion of a convict’s sentence as the termination

date.
III. B R AD Y 

### R U L E 

### : E X C U L PA T O R Y 

### E V I D E N C E


### I n Brady v. Maryland, 1 0 5 

### the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution is required to disclose exculpatory information to the defense if it is material. Brady issues are not uncommon in expert-testimony cases. For example, in Connick v. Thompson , 1 0 6 

### the prosecution failed to provide the defense with a laboratory report, which stated that the perpetrator had blood ty pe B. The defendant had blood ty pe O. Thompson was convicted of murder. A month before his scheduled execution, the lab report was discovered. After his acquittal at a retrial, the defendant filed a civil rights action against the prosecutor for failing to adequately train his staff on their Brady obligations. Although the Bradyviolation was conceded, the Supreme Court ruled that “a pattern of violations is necessary to prove deliberate indifference in § 1983 civil rights actions alleging failure to train prosecutors concerning their Bradyobligations.” 1 0 7 

### However, the Court added: “Among prosecutors’ unique ethical obligations is the duty to produce Brady evidence to the defense. An attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is subject to professional discipline, including sanctions, suspension, and disbarment.” 1 0 8


### A. Lim itations of Brady Rule Bradyis far more limited than may first appear. First, the rule applies only to exculpatory

evidence. I

n many prosecutions, the inculpatory evidence is more significant. Bradydoes not address this ty pe of evidence, and there is no general constitutional right to discovery

. 1 0 9 

### Second, only evidence that is both exculpatory and “material” is subject to disclosure under Brady . This requirement has produced much litigation. For example, in one case an inconclusive handwriting report “was not exculpatory , but

h av in g en g ag edin

co n du ct co n stitu

tin g su chano f

f en se, an d h av e ex h au stedth eir ap p eals an d serv edth eir sen t en ces o r co m m itm en ts.”). 104 T E CHNI CA L W ORK I NG G ROUP ON B I OL OG I CA L E V I DENCE P R E SE RV A T I ON , NIST, T HE B I OL OG I C A L E V IDENCE P RE SE RV A T I ON H A

NDBOOK : B E ST P RA CT I C E S F OR E V I DENCE H A N DLE RS (2 01 3 ). 105 3 7 3 U.S. 8 3 (1 9 63 ). 106 1 3 1 S. Ct. 1 3 50 (2 0 1 1 ). 107 Id

. at 1 3 66

. 108 Id

. at 1 3 62

- 6 3

. 109 S

ee W eath erf

ord v . Bursey , 4 2 9 U.S. 5 4 5 , 5 5 9 (“ Th ere is n o g en eral co n s titutio n al rig h t to d isco v ery ina crim in al case . . . .”).



### 21

### merely not inculpatory .” 1 1 0 

### Similarly , a report showing that hair from a rape defendant was not found at the scene of the crime was deemed a “neutral” report. 1 1 1 

### Yet, as one court correctly understood, “such a characteriz ation [ as neutral] often has little meaning; evidence such as this may , because of its neutrality , tend to be favorable to the accused. W hile it does not by

any means establish his absence from the scene of the crime, it does demonstrate that a number of factors which could link the defendant to the crime do not.” 1 1 2 

### Similarly , in Bell v. Coughlin , 1 1 3 

### the prosecution failed to turn over FBI ballistics test results to the defense. “The lab positively matched a cartridge shell (B3) to the .45 caliber pistol but reported that no conclusion could be reached with respect to the two bullets (J /R2 and J /R4) in its possession. . . . Thus, although the results of the FBItests may

be characteriz ed as mixed, they clearly contained exculpatory material.” 1 1 4


### I n the Brady context, “materiality ” has a distinct meaning. It does not mean relevant; it means “outcome determinative,” 1 1 5 

### a stringent standard. The issue has arisen in numerous scientific evidence cases. 1 1 6 

### I n Nelson v. Zant , 1 1 7 

### the critical evidence was a hair found on the victim’s body . The state’s expert testified that the hair not only could have come from the defendant but that it could only

have come from about 120 people in the entire Savannah area. The prosecution failed to disclose that the FBI had also examined the hair and had concluded that the hair was not suitable for comparison purposes. On review, the prosecution argued that this evidence was not “material” within the meaning of

110 Un itedStates v . Hau f f , 4 7 3 F.2 d1 3 5 0 , 1 3 5 4 (7 th Cir. 1 9 7 3 ). 111 No rris v . Slayto n , 5 4 0 F.2 d1 2 41 , 1 2 4 4 (4 th Cir. 1 9 7 6 ). In Sad l er v . State, 8 4 6 P .2 d3 7 7 (Ok la. Crim . Ap p . 1 99 3 ), p ro secutio n ’ s f ailure to tu

rn o v er “ in co n clu siv e” DNA rep o rt d idn o t v io late Bra d

y . 112 P atler v . Slayto n , 5 0 3 F.2 d4 7 2 , 4 7 9 (4 th Cir. 1 9 74 ) (FBI lab rep o rt o n sh oep rin t, so il sam

p le, h air sam

p le, m urd er w eap on , an dclo th in g ). 113 8 2 0 F. Su

p p. 7 80 (S.D.N.Y.), a

ff’d , 1 7 F.3 d 3 9 0 (2 dCir. 1 9 9 3 ). 114 Id

. at 7 8 6- 8 7

. 115 Th e su

p pressedev id en ce is m aterial “ o n ly if th ere is a reaso n ab le p ro b ab ility th at, h adth e ev i d en ce b eend isclo sedto th e d ef en se, th e resu l t o f

th e p ro ceed in g w o u l dh av e b een d if f eren t.” Un itedStates v . Bag ley , 4 7 3 U.S. 6 67 , 6 8 2 (1 9 85 ). 116 E.g

. , Bo nn ell v . Mitch ell, 3 0 1 F. Su pp . 2 d 6 9 8 , 7 2 6

- 2 7 (N.D. Oh io 2 0 04 ) (“ Reg ard in g th e n eg ativ e test resu lt o f th e g un n i t rates o n th e d ef en d an t’ s j ack et, th ere is n o reaso n ab le p ro b ab ility

th at th e o utco m e o f

th e trial w o u ldh av e b eend i f f eren t h adth is test resu lt b eenad m itted . As th e f

o ren sic scien tist in

th is case testif

iedreg ard in gan o th er m atter, a n eg ativ e test resu lt d oes n o t m ak e a p o s i tiv e f in d in g .”). Bu t see P eo p le v . Salazaar, 3 Cal. Rp tr. 3 d2 6 2 , 2 7 9 (Cal. Ct. Ap p . 2 00 3 ) (“ [W ]h ile th ere is su f f i cien t ev id en ce inth e reco rd to af f irm th e co n v ictio n , w e can n o t b e co n f

id en t in th e j ury ’ s v erd ict b ecau se o f th e Bra d y v io latio n . Had th e j ury b een aw are o f Dr. Rib e’ s cred i b i lity

p ro b lem s, w

h ichw o u ldh av e cast d ou b t o n th e p ro secutio n ’ s inv estig atio n , th e case w o u l dh av e b eencast ina d if f eren t lig h t

w ith a reaso n ab le p ro b ab ility

o f a d if f eren t resu l t.”). 117 4 0 5 S.E.2 d2 5 0 (Ga. 1 9 9 1 ). 

### 22

### Brady . The Georgia Supreme Court reversed. 1 1 8 

### Finally , Brady is a trial right; it does not necessarily guarantee timely pretrial disclosure. Many commentators have concluded that the B rady doctrine is ineffective in accomplishing its goal and that an “open file” discovery statute is far more effective than Brady in ensuring a fair trial. I n sum, comprehensive pretrial discovery obviates most Bradyissues and covers inculpatory evidence, which Brady does not.
B. Ethical Rules Rules of professional responsibility require the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. 1 1 9 

### The rule does not require “materiality ” — all exculpatory

evidence should be disclosed, whether material or not. However, not all states have adopted such rules.
C. Application of

Brady Rule to Crim e Labs The Supreme Court has extended B rady to cover exculpatory information in the control of the police, 1 2 0 

### and some courts have explicitly included crime labs.

118 S

ee a lso B A RRY S CHE CK E T A L ., A CT UA L I NNOCE NCE : F IV E D AYS T O E X E CUT I ON A ND O T HE R D I SPA T CHE S F ROM T HE W RONG L Y C ONV I CT E D 1 74 (2 0 0 0 ) (“ An aly st Maria P u l lin g rep orted th at Rey

n o ld s m atch edn o n e o f

th e trace ev id en ce. Sh e sig n edth e rep o rt an df o rw ard ed it to th e f ro n t d esk o f th e lab f o r d eliv ery

to th e p ro s ecu to r an dth e d ef en se. Bu t th e ex cu lp ato ry rep ort w as n ev er d eliv ered to th e d ef en se. Ten y ears later, th e v o lun teer co un sel . . . o b tain ed DNA ex o n eratio n s o f

b o th m en . . . . Th at w as w

h en P u l lin g f irst learn ed

th e case h adg o n e to trial. W h en

sh e f o un do ut th at h er rep o rt h adb eenco n cealed , sh e w as asto n ish ed .”). 119 ABA M ODE L R ULE S P R OF ’ L C ONDUCT , R. 3 .8 (Sp ecial Resp o n s ib ilities Of A P ro secuto r: “ (d ) m ak e tim ely d isclo su re to th e d ef

en se o f all ev id en ce o r in f

orm atio n k n o w n to th e p ro secut o r th at ten d s to n eg ate th e g u ilt o f th e accu sedo r m itig ates th e o f f en se, an d , inco nn ectio n w ith sen ten cin g , d i sclo se to th e d ef en se an dto th e trib un al all u n p riv i l eg edm itig atin g in f

orm atio n k n o w n to th e p ro secuto r, ex cep t w h en th e p ro s ecu to r is reliev edo f th is resp o n sib ility

b y a p ro tectiv e o rd er o f

th e trib un al.” Th e ABA Crimin a l Ju stice S ta n d a r d s also p ro v id e th at a p ro secut o r sh ou ldd i sclo s e “ [a]n y m aterial o r in f

o rm atio n w ith in th e p ro secuto r’ s p o ssessio n o r co nt ro l w h ichten d s to n eg ate th e g u ilt o f th e d ef en d an t.” A BA S T A

NDA RDS F O R C RIMI

NA L J UST I CE , D I SCOV E RY § 1 1- 2 .1 (a)(v iii) (3 ded . 1 9 9 6 ).

120 Ky les v . W h itley , 5 1 4 U.S. 4 1 9, 4 38 (1 9 9 5 ): [I]t m ay b e saidth at n o o n e d o u

b ts th at p o lice in v estig ato rs so m etim es f ail to in f o rm a p ro secuto r o f

all th ey k n o w . Bu t n eith er is th ere an y serio u s d o u

b t th at “ p ro ced ures an d reg u latio n s canb e estab lish edto carry[th e p ro secuto r’ s] b urd en an dto in su

re co m m un icatio n o f all relev an t in f

o rm atio n o n each case to ev ery

law y er wh o d eals w i th it.” Sin ce, th en , th e p ro s ecu to r h as th e m ean s to d isch arg e th e g o v ern m en t ’ s Bra d y resp on sib ility

if h e w ill, an y

arg um en t f

o r ex cu sin ga p ro secut or f ro m d i sclo sin g w

h at h e 

### 23

### For example, the California Supreme Court noted that a laboratory examiner “worked closely

” with prosecutors and was part of the investigative team. The Court concluded that the “prosecutor thus had the obligation to determine if the lab’s files contained any

exculpatory

evidence, such as the worksheet, and disclose it to petitioner.” 1 2 1


### I n another case, a federal court wrote that an experienced crime lab technician “must have known of his legal obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the prosecutors, their obligation to pass it along to the defense, and his obligation not to cover up a Brady violation by perjuring himself.” 1 2 2 

### W hile the expert should have been on notice about perjury , it is less clear that the B rady obligation would be known to lab personnel — without the prosecutor tutoring the lab. How often do prosecutor’s discharge this duty ? Many lab examiners have never heard of Brady

.

d o es n o t h ap p en

to k n o w ab o ut b o ils d o w

n to a p lea to su

b stitu te th e p o l ice f

o r th e p ro secuto r, an dev en

f or th e co urts th em selv es, as th e f in al arb iters o f

th e g o v ern m en t’ s o b lig atio n

to en su re f air trials. 121 In re Bro w

n , 9 5 2 P .2 d 7 1 5 , 7 19 (Cal. 1 9 9 8). 122 Ch arles v . City

o f Bo s to n , 3 6 5 F. Su

p p . 2 d8 2 , 8 9 (D. Mass. 2 0 0 5). Bu t see Villasan a v . W ilh o it, 3 6 8 F.3 d 9 7 6 (8 th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ) (en b an c); Mo w b ray v . Cam ero n

Co un ty , 2 7 4 F.3 d2 6 9 , 2 7 8 (5 th

Cir. 2 0 0 1 ) (n o case h as ex ten d ed Bra dy l i ab i lity to lab o rato ry

tech n ician s). 

### 24

### A P P E N D I X 

### A: F E D E R A L 

### C I V I L 

### R U L E 

### 26 Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery (a) Required Disclosures. (1) Initial Disclosure.

. . . (2) Disclosure of

Expert Testim ony. (A) In General. I n addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1), a party

must disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705. (B) Witnesses Who Must Provide a Written Report. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this disclosure must be accompanied by a written report – prepared and signed by the witness – if the witness is one retained or specially

employ e d to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party ’s employ ee regularly involve giving expert testimony

. The report must contain: (i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; (ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; (iii) any exhibits that will be used to summariz e or support them; (iv) the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years; (v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 y ears, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case. (C) Witnesses Who Do Not Provide a Written Report . Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, if the witness is not required to provide a written report, this disclosure must state: (i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and (ii) a summary

of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify

. (D) Tim e to Disclose Expert Testim ony. A party must make these disclosures at the times and in the sequence that the court orders. Absent a stipulation or a court order, the disclosures must be made: (i) at least 90 day s before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial; or

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### (ii) if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party

under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or ©, within 30 day s after the other party ’s disclosure. (4) Trial Preparation: Experts. (A) Deposition of

an Expert Who May Testif y . A party may depose any

person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. I f

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires a report from the expert, the deposition may

be conducted only

after the report is provided. (B) Trial-Preparation Protection f or Draf t Reports or Disclosures. Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.

(C) Trial-Preparation Protection f or Com m unications Betw een a Party’s Attorney and Expert Witnesses. Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect communications between the party ’s attorney and any witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications: (i) relate to compensation for the expert’s study or testimony ; (ii) identify

facts or data that the party ’ s attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; or (iii) identify

assumptions that the party ’s attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.

(D) Expert Em ployed Only f or Trial Preparation. Ordinarily , a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employ ed by

another party

in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. But a party may do so only : (i) as provided in Rule 35(b); or (ii) on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.

. . . (2) Expert W itness. For an expert whose report must be disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the party ’s duty to supplement extends both to information included in the report and to information given during the expert’s deposition. Any additions or changes to this information must be disclosed by the time the party ’s pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.

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### A P P E N D I X 

### B: F E D E R A L 

### C R I M I N A L 

### R U L E 

### 1 6 (a) Governm ent’s Disclosure. (1) Inf orm a tion Subject to Disclosure.

. . . (E) Docum ents and Objects. Upon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions of any

of these items, if the item is within the government’s possession, custody , or control and: (i) the item is material to preparing the defense; (ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; or (iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant. (F) Reports of

Exam inations and Tests. Upon a defendant’s request, the government must permit a defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph the results or reports of any

phy sical or mental examination and of any scientific test or experiment if: (i) the item is within the government’s possession, custody , or control; (ii) the attorney

for the government knows--or through due diligence could know--that the item exists; and (iii) the item is material to preparing the defense or the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial. (G) Expert w itnesses . – At the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a written summary of any testimony

that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial. I f the government requests discovery under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(ii) and the defendant complies, the government must, at the defendant’s request, give to the defendant a written summary of testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as evidence at trial on the issue of the defendant’s mental condition. The summary provided under this subparagraph must describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness’s qualifications. (b) Def endant’s Disclosure. (1) Inf orm a tion Subject to Disclosure.

. . . (B) Reports of

Exam inations and Tests. I f a defendant requests disclosure under Rule 16(a)(1)(F) and the government complies, the defendant must permit the government, upon request, to inspect and to copy or photograph the results or reports of any phy sical or mental examination and of any scientific

27

### test or experiment if: (i) the item is within the defendant’s possession, custody , or control; and (ii) the defendant intends to use the item in the defendant' s case-in-chief at trial, or intends to call the witness who prepared the report and the report relates to the witness’s testimony

. (C) Expert w itnesses. The defendant must, at the government’s request, give to the government a written summary of any testimony

that the defendant intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as evidence at trial, if — (i) the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(G) and the government complies; or (ii) the defendant has given notice under Rule 12.2(b) of an intent to present expert testimony

on the defendant' s mental condition. This summary

must describe the witness’s opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness’s qualifications. (C) Continuing Duty to Disclose. A party who discovers additional evidence or material before or during trial must promptly disclose its existence to the other party

or the court if: (1) the evidence or material is subject to discovery or inspection under this rule; and (2) the other party

previously

requested, or the court ordered, its production.

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