IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs June 7, 2011

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GUY ALVIN WILLIAMSON 

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Tipton County

No. 6572 Joseph H. Walker, Judge

No. W2011-00049-CCA-R3-CD - Filed August 19, 2011

The defendant, GuyAlvin Williamson, was convicted by a TiptonCountyCircuit Court jury

of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun and possession of a firearm while

under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. He was sentenced to an effective

term of three years, suspended to probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss the indictment and that the

evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for convicted felon in possession of

a handgun. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT,JR.

and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.

Gary Antrican, District Public Defender; and Parker O. Dixon, Assistant Public Defender,

for the appellant, Guy Alvin Williamson.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Counsel; D.

Michael Dunavant, District Attorney General; and James Walter Freeland, Jr., Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

This case arises out of the pat-down of the defendant outside a motel room in

Covington, Tennessee, during which officers discovered a handgun. As a result, the

defendant was indicted on charges of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun

and possession of a handgun while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. 
Suppression Hearing

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss the indictment,

arguing that he was detained and searched without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,

based on information received from an anonymous tip. 

At the suppression hearing, Officer William Nelson with the Covington Police

Department testified that he was working the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift on May 31, 2009,

when he received a dispatch from 911 to respond to room twenty-one at the Baxter Motel

because of “[a]n armed party and possible robberyin progress.” Officer Nelson was familiar

with the Baxter Motel and noted that the area was “known to be a place where local

prostitutes, addicts, and sellers hang out.” Officer Nelson “had a possible description of two

subjects,” one of whom he identified as the defendant. Officer Nelson said that the

defendant’s clothes matched the description he had received, but Officer Nelson did not

“have it listed what the exact description given was” of the suspect. 

When he arrived at the location, Officer Nelson saw two individuals standing on the

second floor walkway balcony outside of room twenty-one. He and other Covington Police

Department officers approached the individuals, and Officer Short conducted a Terry frisk

of both men for officer safety. The frisk of the defendant revealed a small revolver in his

right front shorts pocket. The defendant denied knowing to whom the gun belonged or how

it had gotten into his pocket. 

On cross-examination, Officer Nelson acknowledged that the warrant he signed did

not indicate that an armed robbery was in progress, explaining that he did not mention an

armed robbery in the warrant “[b]ecause it wasn’t validated. We didn’t charge him with

robbery. . . . We didn’t have a corroborating witness to that.” Officer Nelson stated that

dispatch had informed him that there was a possible armed robbery in progress, but upon

listening to a recording of the call, he acknowledged that the report of an armed robbery in

progress might not have come from dispatch. However, he maintained that “[i]f not given

by Dispatch[,] it’s when we arrived on the scene, but, yes, sir, there was an allegation of an

armed robbery in progress.” 

Officer Nelson acknowledged that dispatch did not provide anyinformation regarding

the race or sex of the suspect, any kind of physical description, or the kind of clothes the

suspect was wearing. He further acknowledged that the dispatch call did not provide

information concerning how many people were around the area, about potential future

movements or actions of the armed party, how long the armed party had been at the location,

or specific information about the armed party’s gun. Asked whether he had any reason to

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believe that someone was in danger, Officer Nelson replied, “Armed party would mean the

public is in danger because there’s possibly an armed party.” 

Officer Nelson testified that, upon encountering the defendant and another man

outside room twenty-one, he believed they were armed and dangerous “[b]ecause they were

in front of the room given in the dispatch.” Officer Nelson testified that, including himself,

there were a total of six officers at the scene, but not every officer went upstairs to room

twenty-one to confront the suspects. Although his weapon was holstered, he could not recall

whether the other officers’ weapons were also holstered.

On redirect examination, Officer Nelson estimated that it was “a minute or less” from

the time he received the call from dispatch of an armed party standing outside room twentyone to the time he arrived at the Baxter Motel. 

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress and dismiss the indictment

against him.

 

Trial

At trial, Officer Michael Short with the Covington Police Department testified that 

he was working as a patrolman on the 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. shift on May 31, 2009. He was

dispatched to the Baxter Motel at 1:25 a.m. in response to a complaint of an armed party in

room twenty-one of the motel, and he arrived at the scene less than a minute after receiving

the call. He noted that five other officers responded to the scene as well. As he was walking

up the stairs to go to roomtwenty-one, Officer Short saw a white male exit room twenty-one,

so he approached and patted down the individual. Finding nothing, Officer Short then went

into the room to make sure no one else was present. Officer Short noted that, meanwhile,

the defendant was standing approximately three doors down from room twenty-one, and

Officer Rodney McCurrie approached him and patted him down. Officer McCurrie

discovered a small handgun, a Rossi .22 caliber revolver, which was designed to expel a

projectile, in the defendant’s possession. Thereafter, the defendant was placed under arrest. 

On cross-examination, Officer Short said he observed the handgun found on the

defendant and noted that “[t]he grips [were] loose [o]n it.” He also noted that it was not

loaded and, when he tried to pull the trigger, the hammer did not recoil and the cylinder did

not rotate. Thus, he hypothesized that the gun was not capable of being fired in its

condition. 

On redirect examination, Officer Short stated that, even if found not guilty, the

defendant could not receive the handgun back because it is a firearm and he is a convicted

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felon. Thereafter, the State submitted a certified copy of a previous felony judgment of

conviction against the defendant. 

Officer RodneyMcCurrie with the Covington PoliceDepartment testified that during

the earlymorning hours of May 31, 2009, he was dispatched to the Baxter Motel in response

to an armed party complaint. Arriving at the scene in less than a minute, Officer McCurrie

observed Officer Garrian with his weapon out and pointed at a subject on the balcony of the

motel. Officers Short and Baskin were with a white male on the second floor, and two

African-American male subjects were also on the balcony. Officer McCurrie testified that

he was met at the stairwell by an African-American male who pointed up to the defendant

on the second floor balcony and said that he was armed. Officer McCurrie approached the

defendant and patted him down, finding a small revolver pistol in his right pocket. The

defendant smelled of alcohol and had loud, slurred speech. On cross-examination, Officer

McCurrie elaborated that the defendant was standing on the balcony a couple ofrooms down

from room twenty-one. 

After the conclusion of the proof, the jury convicted the defendant as charged.

ANALYSIS

I. Motions to Dismiss and Suppress

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

evidence and dismiss the indictment against him. He asserts that he “was detained and

searched without probable cause or reasonable suspicion based upon an anonymous tip.” 

When this court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence,

“[q]uestions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and

resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of

fact.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The party prevailing at the

suppression hearing is afforded the “strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all

reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Keith,

978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998). The findings of a trial court in a suppression hearing

are upheld unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. See id. However, the

application of the law to the facts found by the trial court is a question of law and is

reviewed de novo. State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Crutcher, 989

S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997)). “[I]n

evaluating the correctness of a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress, appellate

courts may consider the proof adduced both at the suppression hearing and at trial.” State

v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998).

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Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section

7 of the Tennessee Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and

seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. “These constitutional

provisions are designed to ‘safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against

arbitrary invasions of government officials.’” Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865 (quoting Camara

v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). A search or seizure conducted without a

warrant is presumed unreasonable, and evidence obtained as a result will be suppressed

“unless the prosecution demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or

seizure was conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. (citations

omitted).

One such exception to the warrant requirement is an investigatory stop, and

subsequent frisk, as authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 27 (1968), when an officer has

a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense

has been or is about to be committed. State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992). 

Additionally, Terry authorizes a protective frisk if “the police officer has a reasonable

suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the suspect is armed.” State v. Bridges,

963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). In evaluating whether a

police officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts, a court

must consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn.

2000). The totality of the circumstances includes, but is not limited to, an officer’s objective

observations, information from other law enforcement personnel or agencies, information

from citizens, known patterns of criminal offenders, or deductions based upon an officer’s

experience. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d at 294. When evaluating the reasonableness of a police

officer’s suspicion, consideration can be given to the nature of the crime suspected. State

v. Winn, 974 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (“A frisk has been upheld as

reasonable when the suspected crime might typically involve the use of a weapon; for

example, a suspicion of robbery, burglary, rape, assault with a weapon, homicide, and large

scale narcotics trafficking might allow an officer to reasonably infer that a weapon might be

in the possession of the suspect.”).

In denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court found that Officer

Nelson responded to a radio complaint of “some sort of armed encounter” at the Baxter

Motel and had “a brief citizen encounter with the defendant, who was standing in a public

place on a walkway used to access all rooms on that floor.” The court observed that the

officer noted the defendant smelled of alcohol and had slurred speech. The court concluded

that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief investigatory detention and patdown of the defendant, for officer safety, based on the complaint that someone was armed. 

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We initiallyacknowledge that the court somewhat erred in stating that Officer Nelson

conducted the search of the defendant, when Officer Nelson’s testimony was that he was

present when another officer conducted the search. However, such error is inconsequential

to the determination of the issue. The evidence shows that the officers responded to a 911

call of an armed subject, around 1:30 in the morning, at a motel known to be the place of

frequent criminal activity. In addition, the trial court implicitly accredited Officer Nelson’s

testimony that he learned upon arriving at the scene that there was an allegation of an armed

robbery in progress. The defendant was in the close vicinity of the motel room given in the

dispatch, and he was pointed out to Officer McCurrie by an African-American male at the

scene as the armed individual. Even though it was an anonymous tip which directed the

police officers to the area, the detention of the defendant was fully justified by what the

officers learned and observed once they arrived at the scene. In light of the totality of the

circumstances, we conclude that the police had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant

and that their search of the defendant was permissible under Terry and its progeny.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of being a

convicted felon in the possession of a handgun, arguing that the gun was “not capable of

expelling a projectile.” When the sufficiency of the convicting evidence is challenged, the

relevant question of the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the

trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by

the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-

92 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given

the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754

S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the

trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in

favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our

supreme court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and

the jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human

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atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 212

Tenn. 464, 370 S.W.2d 523 (1963)).

“A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant is

initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant has

the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d

913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307 provides, in pertinent part: “A person

commits an offense who possesses a handgun and has been convicted of a felony.” Id. § 39-

17-1307(c)(1). “Handgun” is defined as “any firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve

inches (12") that is designed, made or adapted to be fired with one (1) hand.” Id. § 39-11-

106(a)(16). “‘Firearm’ means any weapon designed, made or adapted to expel a projectile

by the action of an explosive or any device readily convertible to that use[.]” Id. § 39-11-

106(a)(11).

The defendant does not dispute his status as one previously convicted of a felony. He

only contends that because the handgun was not operable, he could not be convicted of the

crime of felon in possession of a handgun. However, operability of the handgun is not

required by the statute – only design, make, or adaption to expel a projectile is required.

Officer Short clearly testified that the .22 caliber Rossi pistol found on the defendant was

designed to expel a projectile. Our research has revealed no Tennessee case that has ruled

on this issue, nor has the defendant provided this court with such. However, our research has

revealed, as mentioned by the State in its brief, a D.C. Circuit case addressing a similar

definition of firearm as applicable to a federal felon in possession of a firearm statute and

concluding that there is no requirement that the firearm be operable. United States v. Gwyn,

481 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (where “firearm” is defined as “‘any weapon . . . which

will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an

explosive[,]’” inoperability has no bearing on whether the weapon is a “firearm” within the

meaning of the relevant statute). See also United States v. Rivera, 415 F.3d 284, 285 (2nd

Cir. 2005); United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Perez, 897 F.2d 751, 754 (5th

Cir. 1990) (stating that “[a]n inoperable firearm is nonetheless a firearm”); United States v.

York, 830 F.2d 885, 891 (8th Cir. 1987). Even if the gun was presently inoperable, it was

designed to expel a projectile, and thus the defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirmthe judgments ofthe trial

court. 

_________________________________

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE

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