SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4792-18

JESSICA WATLEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LOUIS WATLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Argued December 15, 2021 – Decided January 12, 2022

Before Judges Hoffman, Whipple and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket 

No. FM-20-0939-12.

Louis Watley, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Jessica Watley, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Louis Watley appeals from a post-judgment Family Part order 

entered on June 14, 2019. We affirm. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant and plaintiff Jessica Watley were married on April 12, 1998. 

Defendant was incarcerated in October 2000 and was paroled October 2011. 

While defendant was incarcerated, plaintiff continued to operate defendant's tax 

preparation business to support herself and their child. She also paid property 

taxes on defendant's pre-marital Irvington commercial real property during his 

incarceration. 

On December 16, 2013, the parties' Final Judgment of Divorce (FJOD)

was entered after the Family Part judge's November 21, 2013 oral opinion after 

trial. The court awarded defendant the Irvington property as a pre-marital asset 

but awarded plaintiff a judgment of $175,000 and granted plaintiff a lien on the 

Irvington property, which was ordered to be paid by defendant no later than May 

15, 2014. The court ordered a sale of the Irvington property in the event 

defendant did not pay the $175,000 sum by May 15, 2014. 

Defendant appealed the FJOD, which we affirmed December 29, 2015. 

Watley v. Watley, No. A-2545-13 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2015).

On June 30, 2015, the Family Part ordered defendant removed and 

restrained from the Irvington property and held him in violation of litigant's 

rights because he did not pay the lien. The court appointed a real estate agent 

to list the Irvington property for sale and gave plaintiff power of attorney to sign
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the listing agreement with the real estate agent and to close title on the property. 

Plaintiff was ordered to first dispose of net proceeds of the sale in the following 

manner: $175,000 plus $2,000 in attorneys' fees, plus interest relating to the date 

of payment to plaintiff. The court also authorized plaintiff to apply for a bench 

warrant for defendant's arrest if he did not comply with this order. 

Notwithstanding the court's order, neither party did anything to further the 

required resolution. Plaintiff gave defendant almost one year and a half to come 

up with a solution to move his business from the Irvington property and did not 

seek to eject him from the premises until October 25, 2016. 

In August 2018, defendant moved to hold plaintiff in contempt of court 

for failure to abide by the divorce judgment; to order plaintiff to, among other 

things, vacate the Irvington property; pay his attorneys' fees;1to leave 

defendant's business effects at the Irvington property; and appoint a new real 

estate agent to sell the property. On September 4, 2018, plaintiff filed a crossmotion asking the court to change the deed to the Irvington property to her name 

in lieu of the amount defendant owed her, and that defendant pay her an 

additional $12,681 in reimbursement for property taxes she had paid on the 

1

 Defendant's Notice of Motion was unsigned by his attorney, and the amount 

of fees he sought was left blank. The court stated in the September 21, 2018 

hearing that defendant sought $4,002 in attorneys' fees. 
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building as well as compel defendant to pay child support arrears, attorneys' fees 

previously awarded in the 2015 order, and funds toward the couple's daughter's 

car expenses. 

On September 21, 2018, a different judge heard oral argument on the 

motions and reiterated defendant was supposed to either pay plaintiff $175,000 

or sell the property and that plaintiff's conduct also violated court orders. On 

October 4, 2018, the court ordered the parties to select a real estate appraiser to 

complete an appraisal of the Irvington property, with the cost divided between 

them, to list the property for sale and for plaintiff to vacate the premises. The 

court ordered the net proceeds from the property sale to be placed in defendant's 

attorney's trust account. 

On January 21, 2019, defendant filed an Order to Show Cause seeking 

settlement and payoff of the lien on his property and reimbursement for business 

losses. He requested for the court to hold plaintiff in contempt and sought rent 

payment from plaintiff and for her to restore the Irvington property "back to its 

original condition of the day [defendant] took control of the property in October 

2015[.]" Plaintiff filed a cross-motion, asking that defendant pay interest on the 

lien; that the court appoint a real estate appraiser; and that defendant contribute 

to their daughter's college and car expenses. 
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On March 6, 2019, the court again ordered defendant to pay plaintiff

$175,000 and that those funds be held in trust until the necessary discharges 

were filed to remove the lien on the property in Irvington. Defendant's brother 

agreed to pay plaintiff $175,000 on his brother's behalf, and the funds were 

ordered to be held in plaintiff's attorney's trust account until plaintiff discharged 

the lis pendens. 

The court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $8,429.45, which 

included $2,000 owed to her from the divorce judgment, plus accrued interest 

of $6,429.45 against the $175,000 lien at the judgment rate. The court calculated 

the interest based on defendant's non-payment of the $175,000 for the period 

between the final judgment of divorce, May 14, 2014, and December 31, 2015, 

the date by which the court concluded it would be reasonable for the Irvington 

property to have been sold. Both parties agreed that this amount was acceptable 

to them. On March 6, 2019, the court denied defendant's request for attorneys'

fees he incurred relative to the Notice of Motion and Notice of Cross-Motion 

which resulted in the October 4, 2018 order.

On April 16, 2019, defendant filed a second Order to Show Cause, which 

sought to: (1) rescind the court's order barring him from the Irvington property; 

(2) order plaintiff to provide keys to the Irvington property; (3) compel plaintiff
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to reimburse defendant for filing fees; and (4) discharge the lien on the Irvington 

property. 

The court declined to rescind the order that had barred defendant from the 

Irvington property and found defendant already had a copy of the keys to the 

property but ordered plaintiff to pay defendant fifty dollars for her delay in 

turning over the keys and filing for a discharge of the lis pendens. The court 

found "that she unnecessarily dragged her feet." Plaintiff discharged the lis 

pendens on April 19, 2019. 

Defendant additionally asserted that the house was so damaged that he 

could not stay there, nor could he sell the property. The court distilled the most 

recent order to simple issues:

[A]s we sit here today, two of the pieces of relief that 

you're requesting, the discharge of the lis pendens and 

the turn over of the keys have already been 

accomplished. . . . Most of these other issues that you're 

talking about in terms of her allegedly having left the 

property in, in poor condition, having trashed the 

property, frankly, those issues aren't even before me 

because . . . in your motion papers you haven't 

requested anything to that effect.

The court found that the condition of the Irvington property was not before 

the court, had already been addressed, and was repetitive of an insurance issue 

from five years ago. This appeal followed.
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Our review of the trial court's factual findings is limited. Elrom v. Elrom, 

439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015). "Generally, 'findings by the trial 

court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible 

evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). In 

Family Part matters, this "[d]eference is especially appropriate when the 

evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Cesare, 

154 N.J. at 412 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[L]egal 

conclusions are always reviewed de novo." Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. at 433-34 

(citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 

(1995)).

On appeal defendant argues plaintiff's conduct exhibited contempt of 

court and her actions were fraudulent and criminally motivated and the court 

was in error when it found in plaintiff's favor and the court also erred when it 

failed to award defendant counsel fees. We disagree.

We typically decline to consider arguments not properly raised at the trial 

court when there was ample opportunity to do so. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J.

1, 20 (2009). An issue that has been determined on the merits in a prior appeal 

cannot be relitigated in a later appeal of the same case. State v. Cusick, 116 N.J. 

Super. 482, 485 (App. Div. 1971). "An appellate court, when reviewing trial 
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errors, generally confines itself to the record." State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 

201-02 (1997). An issue properly presented must also be adequately briefed. 

See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) ("An 

issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived."). All of the arguments raised by 

defendant fall into these categories, and thus are without sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the 

following.

The trial court has discretion in awarding counsel fees in matrimonial 

matters. R. 4:42-9(a)(1); R. 5:3-5(c); Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 233 

(1971). We should not disturb a matrimonial counsel fee decision absent a 

showing of "an abuse of discretion involving a clear error in judgment." Tannen 

v. Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248, 285 (App. Div. 2010). See also Occhifinto v. 

Olivo Constr. Co., LLC, 221 N.J. 443, 453 (2015) (an award of counsel fees 

under Rule 4:42-9(a)(6) involves the exercise of sound discretion by the trial 

court).

During the September 21, 2018 hearing, which resulted in the October 4, 

2018 order, the court explained that it would hear argument on the relief 

requested by both parties, which included "ordering the plaintiff to pay the [] 

defendant['s] [attorneys'] fees in the amount of $4,002 within ten days." 
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Defendant argues he was denied attorneys' fees but does not specify what 

fees. He refers us to the transcript from the February 22, 2019 hearing, where

he asked for attorney's fees that he had expended in a prior motion. The court 

then explained it had "denied the request for attorney's fees . . . without prejudice 

. . . because again, there was no delineation in the bill as to those expenses for 

which it is going to be." In the March 6, 2019 order that followed, the court

denied defendant's request for plaintiff to reimburse him for attorneys' fees "he 

incurred relative to the Notice of Motion and Notice of Cross-Motion which 

resulted in the [o]rder of October 4, 2018. . . ." 

The record contains no evidence of what attorneys' fees defendant

requested, and no evidence as to why he had requested $4,002 and when. 

Therefore, the trial judge's response that he was denying defendant's request 

because there was "no delineation in the bill as to those expenses" was 

reasonable. Thus, we conclude there is no abuse of discretion involving a clear 

error in judgment.

Affirmed.