NO. 95-246 IN THE SUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATE OFMONTANA 1995

STOCKADE ENTERPRISES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. KEVIN AHL,Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,

In and for the County of Flathead, The Honorable Ted 0. Lympus, Judge presiding.

COUNSELOFRECORD:

For Appellant: Randall A. Snyder; Snyder &Noble, Bigfork, Montana

For Respondent: James C. Bartlett; Hash, O'Brien &Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana

Filed: Submitted on Briefs: October 12, 1995 Decided: October 31, 1995Justice W.William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Stockade Enterprises, Inc. (Stockade) appeals the Eleventh Judicial District Court's denial of its motions to modify or to vacate anarbitration award. Weaffirm. Thedispositive issue onappeal is whether the District Court erred in refusing to partially vacate or to modify the arbitration award.Stockade commencedthis action against Kevin Ah1 (Ahl) in an attempt to collect onaconstruction lien. Pursuant to awritten agreement between Stockade andAhl, the District Court ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute. Theparties signed aStipulation to appoint anarbitrator. TheStipulation provided in part: Wilmer E. Windhamshall serve asthe arbitrator in this litigation, with his decision to be binding on the parties andthe Court.

. . .[Iln this case his decision is final and binding andthe District Court must adopt his decision asafinal judgment. The court signed the Order appointing Mr. Windham as the arbitrator. TheOrder reads in part: [The arbitrator's] decision shall be final and binding and the District Court shall adopt his decision as a final judgment. After the arbitrator issued the award, Stockade moved the District Court to vacate or to modify the awardonthe grounds that the award wasbeyond the scope of inquiry, in error, andcontrary to law. TheDistrict Court denied Stockade's motion to modify the award. In its Order andRationale, the court declined to perform I'an extensive review of the file and the transcript of the 2arbitration hearing." Instead, the court determined that judicial

review of the arbitrator's decision wasprecluded by the parties' Stipulation andthe court's Order. Thecourt quoted the provision of the Order stating the arbitrator's decision was final and binding onthe parties andthe court. Based onthe provisions of the Stipulation andOrder, the District Court concluded that "there simply is no authority on which this Court can set aside the award." Accordingly, the court did not review the arbitrator's decision andmadenofindings regarding the award. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate or modify the arbitration award? Our standard in reviewing a court's refusal to modify or vacate an arbitration award is whether the court abused its discretion. Mayv. First National PawnBrokers (1994), 269Mont. 19, 21-22, 887P.2d 185, 187; Duchscher v. Vaile (1994), 269Mont. 1, 5, 887 P.2d 181, 184. Wenote that the parties andthe District Court improperly focused their attention onthe provisions of the Stipulation andOrder to the effect that the arbitrator's decision is binding and final. The District Court was incorrect in concluding that there is "no authority" authorizing the court to set aside the award. Regardless of the "binding" nature of the arbitration procedure, the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA) does provide the court with authority to set aside an award. However, judicial review of an arbitration award is strictly limited bythe statutory provisions governing arbitration found in

3the MUM. Sections 27-5-312 and -313, MCA;m, 887P.2d at 187;

Duchscher, 887P.2d at 183. Montana adopted the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act in 1985. Sections 27-5-312 and-313, MCA,establish the grounds to modify, to correct, or to vacate an arbitration award, These sections generally limit the district court's review to allegations of fraud, partiality, misconduct, excess of power, or technical problems in the execution of the award. Duchscher, 887 P.2d at 183. Section 27-5-312, MCA,provides: Vacating anaward. (1) Uponthe application of aparty, the district court shall vacate anaward if: (a) the awardwas procured bycorruption, fraud, or other undue means; (b) there wasevident partiality byanarbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; (d) the arbitrators refused topostpone the hearing uponsufficient cause being showntherefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy orotherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of 27- 5-213, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or (e) there was no arbitration agreement and the issue wasnot adversely determined in proceedings under 27-5-115 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. Section 27-5-313(l), MCA,provides: Modification or correction of award by court. (1) Upon application madewithin 90days after delivery of acopy of the award to the applicant, the district court shall modify or correct the award if: (a) there wasanevident miscalculation of figures or anevident mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award; (b) the arbitrators awarded upon a matter not submitted to themandthe award maybecorrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; or

4Cc) the award is imperfect in amatter of form not

affecting the merits of the controversy. Thus, the MDAA'S authorization of judicial review of arbitration awards is very limited in scope. Wehave held that these provisions donot permit acourt to review the merits of the controversy. May, 887 P.2d at 190; Duchscher, 887 P.2d at 184. The party seeking to vacate, to modify, or to correct an arbitration awardbears the burden of alleging andproving that one of the statutorily enumerated grounds exists. Mav, 887 P.2d at 189; Duchscher, 887 P.2d at 184. Therefore, in order to trigger the District Court's authority to review the arbitration award, Stockade hadto properly raise oneof the grounds in §§27-5-312 or -313, MCA. Stockade failed to doso. Stockade presented the District Court with four issues in support of its motion to modify/vacate the arbitration award: 1. Is there substantial evidence to support the findings of fact andconclusions of law? 2. Does the evidence support afinding that Plaintiff assaulted Defendant and is there a proper award of damages? 3. Canthe District Court modify or correct the award in afashion consistent with the evidence? 4. Was the award of attorneys fees arbitrary and capricious? [Emphasis added.] None of the above issues raised by Stockade address the limited bases of judicial review set forth in 5527-5-312 and -313, MCA. Onthe contrary, Stockade's issues all raise questions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the award. Although Stockade's brief referenced §27-5-313, MCA,Stockade failed to

5address the statutory criteria that would trigger judicial review.

Instead, Stockade propounded an extremely broad scope of judicial review, as follows: "Here, the Arbitrator abused his discretion, transcended or ignored evidence anddid substantial injustice to Plaintiff. In nearly every respect, this Court can modify and correct the award, based solely onthe evidence." Clearly, there is nobasis for such abroad standard of judicial review. Neither the District Court nor this Court hasanyauthority to engage in a "sufficiency of the evidence" review of anarbitration award. The District Court understated its statutory authority to vacate or to modify anarbitration award. Nonetheless, under the pleadings in this case, the court correctly concluded that it hadnoobligation to engage in an extensive review of the transcript to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence. Wehold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the award. Toinvoke the courts' power of review, the grounds set forth in §§ 27-5-312 and -313, MCA, must be raised by the party challenging the arbitration award. Stockade advances nogrounds that satisfy these criteria. Hadeither of the parties read our two recent decisions in this area, namely MavandDuchscher, they would have known that petitioning the courts to review an arbitration award based on the sufficiency of the evidence is beyond our scope of judicial review. Affirmed.

6I We concur: