Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 27 / Monday, February 10, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 5907

to the area unless you harvested the crop, in

which case we will use the harvested

production. If you do not continue to care for

the crop, our appraisal made prior to

deferring the claim will be used to determine

the production to count; and

(2) All harvested production from the

insurable acreage.

(3) Harvested production which, due to

insurable causes, is determined not to meet

the United States Standards for Fresh

Cranberries if available, or would not meet

those standards if properly handled, or does

not meet the quality requirements of the

receiving handler if the United States

Standards for Fresh Cranberries, if not

available, and such harvested production has

a value less than 75 percent of the market

price for cranberries meeting the minimum

requirements will be adjusted by:

(i) Dividing the value per barrel of such

cranberries by the market price per barrel for

cranberries meeting the minimum

requirements; and

(ii) Multiplying the result by the number of

barrels of such cranberries.

11. Written Agreements

Designated terms of this policy may be

altered by written agreement in accordance

with the following:

(a) You must apply in writing for each

written agreement no later than the sales

closing date, except as provided in section

11(e);

(b) The application for a written agreement

must contain all variable terms of the

contract between you and us that will be in

effect if the written agreement is not

approved;

(c) If approved, the written agreement will

include all variable terms of the contract,

including, but not limited to, crop type or

variety, the guarantee, premium rate, and

price election;

(d) Each written agreement will only be

valid for one year (If the written agreement

is not specifically renewed the following

year, insurance coverage for subsequent crop

years will be in accordance with the printed

policy); and

(e) An application for a written agreement

submitted after the sales closing date may be

approved if, after a physical inspection of the

acreage, it is determined that no loss has

occurred and the crop is insurable in

accordance with the policy and written

agreement provisions.

Signed in Washington, DC, on January 31,

1997.

Kenneth D. Ackerman,

Manager, Federal Crop Insurance

Corporation.

[FR Doc. 97–3130 Filed 2–7–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–FA–P

Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service

9 CFR Part 78

[Docket No. 96–045–2]

Brucellosis in Cattle; State and Area

Classifications; New Mexico

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Affirmation of interim rule as

final rule.

SUMMARY: We are adopting as a final

rule, without change, an interim rule

that amended the brucellosis regulations

concerning the interstate movement of

cattle by changing the classification of

New Mexico from Class A to Class Free.

We have determined that New Mexico

meets the standards for Class Free

status. The interim rule was necessary

to relieve certain restrictions on the

interstate movement of cattle from New

Mexico.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The interim rule was

effective on November 18, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr.

Michael J. Gilsdorf, Senior Staff

Veterinarian, Brucellosis Eradication

Staff, VS, APHIS, suite 3B08, 4700 River

Road Unit 36, Riverdale, MD 20737–

1231, (301) 734–7708.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In an interim rule effective and

published in the Federal Register on

November 18, 1996 (61 FR 58625–

58626, Docket No. 96–045–1), we

amended the brucellosis regulations in

9 CFR part 78 by removing New Mexico

from the list of Class A States in

§ 78.41(b) and adding it to the list of

Class Free States in § 78.41(a).

Comments on the interim rule were

required to be received on or before

January 17, 1997. We did not receive

any comments. The facts presented in

the interim rule still provide a basis for

the rule.

This action also affirms the

information contained in the interim

rule concerning Executive Order 12866

and the Regulatory Flexibility Act,

Executive Orders 12372 and 12988, and

the Paperwork Reduction Act.

Further, for this action, the Office of

Management and Budget has waived the

review process required by Executive

Order 12866.

List of Subjects in 9 CFR Part 78

Animal diseases, Bison, Cattle, Hogs,

Quarantine, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements,

Transportation.

PART 78—BRUCELLOSIS

Accordingly, we are adopting as a

final rule, without change, the interim

rule that amended 9 CFR 78 and that

was published at 61 FR 58625–58626 on

November 18, 1996.

Authority: 21 U.S.C. 111–114a–1, 114g,

115, 117, 120, 121, 123–126, 134b, and 134f;

7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.2(d).

Done in Washington, DC, this 4th day of

February 1997.

Terry L. Medley,

Administrator, Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Service.

[FR Doc. 97–3216 Filed 2–7–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–34–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 71

RIN 3150–AF58

Fissile Material Shipments and

Exemptions

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is amending its

regulations regarding the shipment of

exempt quantities of fissile material and

the shipment of fissile material under a

general license. This emergency final

rule restricts the use of beryllium and

other special moderating materials (i.e.,

graphite and deuterium) in the

shipment of fissile materials and

consigns quantity limits on fissile

exempt shipments. These amendments

are necessary to correct a recently

discovered defect in the current

regulations which could permit, in

special circumstances, nuclear

criticality to occur in shipments of

fissile materials which are permitted to

take place without specific Commission

approval. The regulatory defect is not

indicative of unsafe fissile material

shipments in the past. Rather, it was

identified by Babcock & Wilcox (B&W)

during preparation for shipment of an

unprecedented type of fissile material

that could result in nuclear criticality

under current requirements. This

unique material is produced as a waste

product from processing of strategic

material resulting from operations to

commercially downblend weaponsusable fissile material from the former

Soviet Union. Although this rule is

being issued as an immediately effective

final rule, the Commission is requesting

public comment and will revise the rule

if necessary.
5908 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 27 / Monday, February 10, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

1Fissile material is defined in 10 CFR Part 71 and

49 CFR Part 173 as: Plutonium-238, plutonium-239,

plutonium-241, uranium-233, uranium-235, or any

combination of these radionuclides. Packages used

for shipment of materials containing these

radionuclides must meet specific standards and

operating limits designed to preclude nuclear

criticality during transport, unless expected by

specific regulations (e.g. 10 CFR 71.53 or 49 CFR

173.453).

2For transportation purposes, nuclear criticality

means a condition in which an uncontrolled, selfsustaining and neutron-multiplying fission chain

reaction occurs. Nuclear criticality is generally a

concern when sufficient concentrations and masses

of fissile material and neutron moderating material

exist together in a favorable configuration. The

neutron moderating material cannot achieve

criticality by itself in any concentration or

configuration. It can enhance the ability of fissile

material to achieve criticality by slowing down

neutrons or reflecting neutrons.

DATES: This final rule is effective on

February 10, 1997. Comments must be

received by March 12, 1997. If public

comments require changes in the rule,

timely notice will be published in the

Federal Register.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be

submitted either electronically or in

written form. Mail written comments to:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch. Hand

deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville

Pike, Rockville, MD between 7:30 am

and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. For

information on submitting comments

electronically, see the discussion under

Electronic Access in the Supplementary

Information Section. Copies of

comments received may be examined at

the NRC Public Document Room, 2120

L Street NW. (Lower Level),

Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Naiem S. Tanious, Office of Nuclear

Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001, telephone (301) 415–

6103, E-mail:

INTERNET:NST@NRC.GOV

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On September 11, 1996, an NRC fuel

cycle facility licensee, Babcock &

Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division

(B&W), notified NRC by telephone that

it had discovered that the NRC and U.S.

Department of Transportation (DOT)

regulations (10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR

173.453, respectively) on fissile exempt

shipments do not provide adequate

criticality safety for certain shipments of

fissile material 1 (enriched uranium

containing beryllium oxide.)

Specifically, B&W discovered through

calculations, that a shipment, intended

to be shipped pursuant to § 71.53(d),

containing large amounts of an exempt

concentration of enriched uranium in

the presence of beryllium, could result

in a nuclear criticality. 2 B&W indicated

that a beryllium oxide-enriched

uranium mixture would be produced as

a waste product from its processing of

strategic material resulting from

operations to commercially downblend

weapons-usable fissile material from the

former Soviet Union. B&W promptly

notified the NRC of its concern,

provided its calculations to the NRC,

and made commitments not to make any

such shipments. The NRC staff

subsequently reviewed and verified

B&W’s calculations and determined that

expeditious revisions to NRC

regulations are needed to correct the

deficiency because an inadvertent

nuclear criticality in the public domain

could involve fatalities, health effects

from the resulting radiations, and

extensive clean-up costs.

The criticality safety problem brought

to NRC’s attention with respect to

§ 71.53 caused the NRC staff to review

10 CFR Part 71 to determine whether

any other provisions of this Part might

be similarly deficient. The general

licenses in §§ 71.18 and 71.22 provide

for criticality control by limiting the

quantity of fissile material in a single

package (i.e., similar to the quantitybased fissile exemptions in 10 CFR

71.53). Section 71.18 also assigns a

criticality transport index (pursuant to

§ 71.4) to each package. These sections

were found to have deficiencies

comparable to those discovered in

§ 71.53 in that there are no restrictions

placed on special moderating materials

(i.e., materials which would increase the

number of neutrons available to cause

fission as compared with ordinary

water), and § 71.22 has the additional

deficiency of not limiting the total

amount of fissile material in a

conveyance. During the NRC staff’s

review, sections § 71.20 and § 71.24,

which also provide general licenses,

were found to be adequate in that the

moderators of concern were excluded.

Packages for shipments made in

accordance with a fissile material

exemption in § 71.53 or the general

license in § 71.18 or § 71.22, are not

required to be certified by NRC. The

intent of §§ 71.53, 71.18, and 71.22 is

that any materials packaged and

shipped in accordance with the limits in

these sections (and the other applicable

sections of 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR

Part 173) are incapable of an inadvertent

criticality. The B&W analyses

demonstrated that a deficiency exists in

these requirements.

The NRC has already taken a number

of actions to resolve the potential safety

problem identified by B&W. First, the

NRC obtained a commitment from B&W

not to ship Be-U materials without prior

NRC authorization and confirmed this

commitment in a Confirmatory Action

Letter (CAL) dated October 10, 1996.

Subsequently, the CAL was superseded

by an immediately effective

Confirmatory Order Modifying License

dated December 16, 1996, which

imposed B&W’s commitment as a

legally binding license condition. The

NRC had no reason to doubt B&W’s

earlier voluntary commitment because

B&W had demonstrated its concern for

safety by bringing the problem in the

first place to the NRC’s attention.

However, the NRC staff also believed

that, given the significance of this issue

for public health and safety, the NRC

needed to exercise its full authority to

assure itself and the public that the one

licensee known to be in a position to

make potentially unsafe shipments was

legally prevented from doing so pending

completion of this rulemaking.

On December 5, 1996, NRC also

issued NRC Information Notice 96–63 to

all NRC licensees authorized to possess

special nuclear material. The purpose of

this information notice was to alert all

such licensees to this problem so that

any of them who might be in a position

to make potentially unsafe shipments

could take appropriate measures.

The NRC also brought this problem to

the attention of the U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT) and the U.S.

Department of Energy (DOE). DOT is a

co-regulator of fissile material

shipments and is currently revising its

parallel regulations in 49 CFR Part 173

on an expedited basis. DOE makes many

shipments of fissile exempt material

each year.

Discussion

The safety problem uncovered by the

B & W calculations, and verified by the

NRC, involves quantities, geometries,

and concentrations of fissile materials

and moderators which could result in

criticality when shipped in compliance

with sections of the regulations for

which criticality analyses are not

required. The current regulations (fissile

exemptions in § 71.53 and the general

licenses in §§ 71.18 and 71.22) are based

on the assumption that water is the only

moderator which might be present in

fissile exempt shipments. These rules

are assumed to provide inherent

criticality safety without a need for

shippers to perform separate analyses.

However, some moderators (herein

referred to as special moderating

materials) can increase the number of
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 27 / Monday, February 10, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 5909

neutrons available to cause fission as

compared to ordinary water and result

in the potential for criticality in

shipments where these moderators are

present, even though the shipments are

in compliance with 10 CFR 71.53 and

49 CFR 173.453.

Until recently, the presence of special

moderating materials in significant

quantities in NRC-regulated shipments

of fissile exempt materials was not

anticipated. However, certain

international initiatives, including

efforts of reduction in stockpiles of

strategic material by processing for

commercial use, have resulted in the

greater likelihood of inclusion of these

materials in NRC regulated shipments.

The materials proposed to be shipped

by B&W, which prompted this final

rule, resulted from such a source. A

recent contract was awarded to B&W to

process weapons-usable enriched

uranium materials from the Republic of

Kazakstan. The waste product of the

processing, a uranium-beryllium

filtercake, met the fissile exemption

provisions in 10 CFR 71.53(d) and 49

CFR 173.453(d). However, B&W used a

computer model of the enriched

uranium-beryllium oxide waste

packages, to demonstrate that if the

packages were loaded for shipment into

a sea-land container, and at the

regulatory fissile exempt concentration

limit, adequate confidence in nuclear

criticality safety would not have been

provided. NRC has verified through

independent analyses that the concerns

raised by the B&W analysis are valid

and apply to other geometries and

moderating characteristics as well. To

guard against inadvertent criticality, this

final rule restricts shipments of fissile

material with three special moderating

materials: beryllium, graphite, and

deuterium.

However, limiting beryllium,

graphite, and deuterium to trace

quantities would not completely

eliminate the possibility of criticality in

fissile exempt or generally licensed

shipments. There is also a need to limit

the quantity of material in a single

consignment (the B&W criticality model

calculations were performed using 200

cm high infinite slab configuration). The

problem of a lack of control on the total

amount of fissile exempt material in an

exempt shipment, was originally

identified during the revision process

for the 1996 Edition of the International

Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s)

‘‘Regulations for the Safe Transport of

Radioactive Material,’’ Safety Series No.

6, 1996. The problem was addressed in

Safety Series No. 6, 1996, by adopting

a consignment limit on the amount of

fissile exempt material that a shipper

could transport as a private carrier or

deliver to a common carrier for

shipment. The NRC cannot presently

enforce a limit on the total quantity of

fissile material in a common carrier

shipment because the regulations do not

require a transport index for each

package or require shipment by

exclusive use. The latter would restrict

the ability to use common carriers,

while requiring a transport index would

negate much of the advantage gained by

the exemption. Consignment limits are

enforceable and represent a practical

operating limit that would prevent the

potentially unsafe accumulation of

fissile exempt materials during

shipment.

Therefore, this final rule restricts

special moderating materials and

includes consignment limits on

shipments of fissile materials under the

provisions of §§ 71.22 and 71.53. This

final rule also restricts special

moderating materials under the

provisions of § 71.18. Together these

changes will eliminate the possibility of

inadvertent criticality during shipments

made in compliance with 10 CFR 71.18,

71.22, or 71.53. The NRC anticipates

that DOT will issue parallel revisions to

49 CFR Part 173. Accordingly, NRC and

DOT are coordinating the necessary

revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR

Part 173.

Compatibility With the IAEA Standards

On September 9, 1996, the Board of

Governors of the IAEA approved the

1996 revisions to Safety Series No. 6.

Among the changes in these revised

IAEA regulations are that consignment

limits and limits on the types of

moderators were placed on the fissile

exemptions in paragraph 672 of Safety

Series No. 6, 1996. The changes to 10

CFR Part 71 made by this rulemaking

are generally compatible with the

changes made to IAEA Safety Series No.

6, 1996. Future revisions to 10 CFR Part

71 and 49 CFR Part 173 are planned by

NRC and DOT, respectively, to bring

them into general accord with other

sections of IAEA Safety Series No. 6,

1996.

One area in which this final rule for

10 CFR Part 71 is not compatible with

IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1996,

paragraph 672 is that graphite was

added as a special moderating material

in the 1995 revisions to 10 CFR Part 71

(60 FR 50248), but does not appear in

IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1996.

[Graphite is limited by the current

general licenses in 10 CFR 71.20 and

71.24.] The NRC believes that it is

appropriate to continue to limit graphite

(being a special moderating material) in

domestic regulations for shipment of

fissile material. Therefore, the revisions

to the fissile exemptions in 10 CFR

71.53 and the general licenses in 10 CFR

71.18 and 71.20 provide for exclusion of

other than trace quantities of graphite.

Alternatives Considered

To determine the appropriate

amendments to 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22,

and 71.53, the NRC staff considered the

following three alternatives:

1. The No-Action Alternative. This

alternative is not acceptable to the NRC.

Shipments of fissile material (Be-U

mixtures) meeting the fissile material

exemption requirements could be made

in a configuration that does not

maintain criticality safety during

transport. Therefore, this alternative was

not pursued.

2. Eliminate the fissile material

exemption. This alternative is not

acceptable to the NRC. Elimination of

fissile material exemption, while

solving the criticality safety problem

identified by B&W, would create other

problems. Many packages, such as those

containing low-level radioactive waste

materials (e.g., ion-exchange resins),

contain only trace concentrations of

fissile nuclides, which are incidental to

the overall radioactivity of the package

contents, and criticality events are not

credible for shipments of these

packages. The § 71.53 fissile material

exemptions are applied for these

shipments, and there is a continuing

need to provide for this application.

Elimination of § 71.53 would place an

additional burden and cost on many

shippers whose shipments posed no

criticality safety concerns. Therefore,

this alternative was not pursued.

3. Revise the fissile material

exemptions in § 71.53 and the general

licensees in §§ 71.18 and 71.22 to

exclude the presence of special

moderating materials such as beryllium,

deuterium and graphite in other than

trace quantities, and place consignment

limits on shipments. Together these

changes solve the criticality safety

problem identified by B&W and the

related problem of the potential

accumulation of an unsafe quantity of

fissile materials in a shipment. Given

the limited number of affected

shipments and the small number of

licensees involved, some additional

costs on shippers may be expected

because they can no longer use the

fissile material exemptions and general

licenses for materials with beryllium,

deuterium and graphite in other than

trace quantities, and because some

shipments may have to be divided to

meet the consignment limits. It keeps

the exemption and general license

provisions available for other shippers.
5910 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 27 / Monday, February 10, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

This alternative was chosen by the NRC

staff, and is the basis for the following

specific changes in §§ 71.18, 71.22, and

71.53.

Changes in 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, and

71.53

Section 71.18

The title of § 71.18: General license:

Fissile material, limited quantity per

package, remains the same. Also

paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) in § 71.18

remain the same. The old paragraph (d)

in § 71.18 is replaced by three new

paragraphs: (d), (e), and (f). The new

paragraph (d) covers general licenses for

packages containing no more than a

type A quantity of radioactive material

where fissile material is mixed with

substances having an average hydrogen

density greater than water (defined in

§ 71.20). The new paragraph (e) restricts

the quantity of beryllium, graphite, or

hydrogenous material enriched in

deuterium in a package to no greater

than 0.1% of the fissile material mass.

The new paragraph (f) is a modification

of the old paragraph (d) that includes a

simplified formula for calculation of the

minimum transport index.

Section 71.22

The title of § 71.22: General License:

Fissile material, limited quantity,

controlled shipment, remains the same.

Also paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) in

§ 71.22 remain the same. The old

paragraph (d) is modified with the

addition of a new table and

accompanying formula which restrict

the mass of uranium-235 and other

fissile material in a controlled shipment.

The table gives both new limits of 290

g and 180 g for uranium-235 and other

fissile materials, when these materials

are mixed with substances having

hydrogen density greater than water; the

table also gives the old § 71.22 limits for

shipments of U–235 and other fissile

material when mixed with substances

having a hydrogen density less than or

equal to water. The new paragraph (e)

restricts the quantity of beryllium,

graphite, or hydrogenous material

enriched in deuterium in a package to

no greater than 0.1% of the fissile

material mass. Paragraph (f) is the same

as old paragraph (e).

Section 71.53

The title of § 71.53 remains the same.

The introductory paragraph restates the

old § 71.53 language that packages are

exempted from the fissile material

standards of § 71.55 and § 71.59;

however, the same paragraph restricts

these exempted packages to only

situations when beryllium, graphite, or

deuterium is not present in quantities

exceeding 0.1% of the fissile material

mass. A new paragraph (a) is added

which contains a formula and an

accompanying table to limit individual

consignment, but also includes the

requirements in old paragraphs (a),

(b)(1) and (2), and (d) . The remainder

of § 71.53 (paragraphs (b), (c), and (d))

is essentially the same as the old § 71.53

(paragraphs (c), (f), and (e)).

Good Cause for Immediate Adoption

The Commission is promulgating this

emergency final rule because the

problem of regulatory safety limits over

quantities and concentrations of fissile

material and moderators, which has

been demonstrated to permit criticality

in at least one proposed shipment, is an

important safety issue meriting

immediate corrective action. An

accidental nuclear criticality in the

public domain would very likely

involve fatalities, health effects from the

resulting radiations, and extensive

clean-up costs.

Shipments of fissile exempt material

are normally made without any

associated criticality analysis because in

the past it has been assumed that the

regulations provide inherent criticality

safety. However, B&W’s contemplated

shipment demonstrates that this

assumption is not correct for all possible

types of shipments. While the

Commission expects that B&W’s

commitment, as expressed in the NRC’s

Confirmatory Order, not to undertake

shipments without the prior approval of

the NRC, and the Information Notice

issued to all licensees authorized to

possess special nuclear material, will

prevent an unsafe shipment from

occurring pending revision of its rules,

the Commission does not track

shipments by licensees made under the

provisions of 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, or

71.53. Moreover, the nature of the

materials being imported and shipped

domestically has recently changed due

to initiatives with the States of the

former Soviet Union to reduce weaponsusable material such as high-enriched

uranium. The materials B&W had

intended to ship were byproducts from

processing this type of material.

Shipments made under 10 CFR 71.18,

71.22 or 71.53 are made without specific

NRC approval and the possibility exists

that a licensee could unwittingly make

an unsafe shipment in reliance upon the

present rules. Thus, the Commission

must amend its rules quickly to prevent

unsafe shipments from occurring.

For the reasons stated above, the

Commission finds good cause, pursuant

to Section 553(b)(B) of the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5

U.S.C. 553(b)(B)), to dispense with

notice and prepromulgation public

comment as being impracticable and

contrary to the public interest. Further,

the Commission finds, pursuant to

Section 553(d)(3) of the APA (5 U.S.C.

553(d)(3)), that good cause exists for

making these amendments immediately

effective because the need to have these

regulations in place outweighs the

inconvenience, if any, to licensees who

may need to alter shipping plans.

Nevertheless, the Commission is

providing a 30-day post-promulgation

public comment period during which

interested persons are invited to submit

their comments to the Commission.

Within a reasonable time after the end

of the comment period, the Commission

will publish a statement in the Federal

Register containing an evaluation of the

significant comments received and any

revisions of the rule to be made as a

result of the comments.

Electronic Access

Comments may be submitted

electronically, in either ASCII text or

WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or

later), by calling the NRC Electronic

Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The

bulletin board may be accessed using a

personal computer, a modem, and one

of the commonly available

communications software packages, or

directly via Internet. Background

documents on the rulemaking are also

available, as practical, for downloading

and viewing on the bulletin board.

If using a personal computer and

modem, the NRC rulemaking subsystem

on FedWorld can be accessed directly

by dialing the toll free number (800)

303–9672. Communication software

parameters should be set as follows:

parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop

bits to 1 (N,8,1). Using ANSI or VT–100

terminal emulation, the NRC

rulemaking subsystem can then be

accessed by selecting the ‘‘Rules Menu’’

option from the ‘‘NRC Main Menu.’’

Users will find the ‘‘FedWorld Online

User’s Guides’’ particularly helpful.

Many NRC subsystems and data bases

also have a ‘‘Help/Information Center’’

option that is tailored to the particular

subsystem.

The NRC subsystem on FedWorld can

also be accessed by a direct dial phone

number for the main FedWorld BBS,

(703) 321–3339, or by using Telnet via

Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703)

321–3339 to contact FedWorld, the NRC

subsystem will be accessed from the

main FedWorld menu by selecting the

‘‘Regulatory, Government

Administration and State Systems,’’

then selecting ‘‘Regulatory Information

Mall.’’ At that point, a menu will be
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 27 / Monday, February 10, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 5911

displayed that has an option ‘‘U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission’’ that

will take you to the NRC Online main

menu. The NRC Online area also can be

accessed directly by typing ‘‘/go nrc’’ at

a FedWorld command line. If you access

NRC from FedWorld’s main menu, you

may return to FedWorld by selecting the

‘‘Return to FedWorld’’ option from the

NRC Online Main Menu. However, if

you access NRC at FedWorld by using

NRC’s toll-free number, you will have

full access to all NRC systems, but you

will not have access to the main

FedWorld system.

If you contact FedWorld using Telnet,

you will see the NRC area and menus,

including the Rules Menu. Although

you will be able to download

documents and leave messages, you will

not be able to write comments or upload

files (comments). If you contact

FedWorld using FTP, all files can be

accessed and downloaded but uploads

are not allowed; all you will see is a list

of files without descriptions (normal

Gopher look). An index file listing all

files within a subdirectory, with

descriptions, is available. There is a 15-

minute time limit for FTP access.

Although FedWorld also can be

accessed through the World Wide Web,

like FTP, that mode only provides

access for downloading files and does

not display the NRC Rules Menu.

For more information on NRC bulletin

boards call Mr. Arthur Davis, Systems

Integration and Development Branch,

NRC, Washington, DC 20555–0001,

telephone (301) 415–5780; e-mail

AXD3@nrc.gov.

Finding of No Significant

Environmental Impact: Availability

The Commission has determined,

under the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the

Commission’s regulations in Subpart A

of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not

a major Federal action significantly

affecting the quality of the human

environment, and therefore an

environmental impact statement (EIS) is

not required.

The Commission’s ‘‘Final

Environmental Statement on the

Transportation of Radioactive Material

by Air and Other Modes,’’ NUREG–

0170, dated December 1977, is NRC’s

generic EIS, covering all types of

radioactive material transportation by

all modes (road, rail, air, and water).

The total limited quantity impacts were

included in the overall transportation

risk assessment in NUREG–0170 and

found to be acceptable. The radiological

safety impact estimates in this EIS

clearly bound the impacts for limited

quantity shipments of fissile material

containing special moderating materials.

This final rule affects only a small

subset of the limited quantity

shipments, i.e., those that contain both

fissile material and special moderating

materials. NUREG–0170 does not

specify the annual number of limited

quantity, fissile material shipments

containing special moderating materials,

but does estimate that 50,000 NRCcertified fissile material packages (used

for larger quantities of, and/or more

highly enriched, fissile materials) would

be shipped in 1985. The number of

shipments affected by this final rule is

a small fraction of the NRC certified

fissile package shipments because fissile

materials containing special moderating

materials are less common than

moderately enriched fissile materials.

The options available to licensees

under this final rule include shipping

the material using different

administrative controls (i.e., shipping it

as a fissile material and not using the

quantity-limited exemption/general

license) or reducing the special

moderating material concentration to

specified limits. The NRC staff believes

the first option may prove more

economical because the increase in cost

in making a single shipment under

fissile material controls is less than that

involved in reducing or removing the

special moderating material. Under this

option, the same number of shipments

are made as before the rule change, but

shipments of fissile materials containing

special moderating material would be

made in NRC certified packages. Under

the latter option, the concentration of

special moderating material might be

reduced through additional processing,

perhaps involving dilution or

extraction. This option may involve

additional transportation, either due to

the increase in shipment volume due to

dilution, or the transportation of

extracted materials. Since the quantities

of affected fissile materials are relatively

small, staff believes the additional

transportation would also be small.

The two options provide the added

nuclear criticality safety control the rule

seeks, either through the use of NRCcertified packages, and the

administrative controls associated with

their use, or through the reduction of

the concentration of special moderating

materials to an acceptably low level.

Thus, the ultimate environmental

impact of the rule is beneficial in that

criticality safety is increased.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This final rule does not contain a new

or amended information collection

requirement subject to requirements of

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing

information collection requirements

were approved by the Office of

Management and Budget, approval

number 3150–0008.

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor,

and a person is not required to respond

to, a collection of information unless it

displays a currently valid OMB control

number.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act

In accordance with the Small

Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has

determined that this action is not a

major rule and has verified this

determination with the Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs,

Office of Management and Budget.

Backfit Analysis

The NRC has determined that a

backfit analysis is not required for this

final rule because these amendments do

not involve any provisions that would

require backfits as defined in 10 CFR

Part 50.109(a)(1).

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71

Criminal penalties, Hazardous

materials transportation, Nuclear

materials, Packaging and containers,

Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

For the reasons set out in the

preamble and under the authority of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,

as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553,

the NRC is adopting the following

amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.

PART 71—PACKAGING AND

TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE

MATERIAL

1. The authority citation for Part 71

continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 161,

182, 183, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 933, 935, 948,

953, 954, as amended sec. 1701, 106 Stat.

2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2092,

2093, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2297f); secs.

201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as

amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842,

5846).

Section 71.97 also issued under sec. 301,

Pub. L. 96–295, 94 Stat. 789–790.

2. Section 71.18 is revised to read as

follows:

§ 71.18 General license: Fissile material,

limited quantity per package.

(a) A general license is issued to any

licensee of the Commission to transport
5912 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 27 / Monday, February 10, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

fissile material, or to deliver fissile

material to a carrier for transport,

without complying with the package

standards of subparts E and F of this

part, if the material is shipped in

accordance with this section.

(b) The general license applies only to

a licensee who has a quality assurance

program approved by the Commission

as satisfying the provisions of subpart H

of this part.

(c) Except as provided in paragraph

(d) of this section, this general license

applies only when a package contains

no more than a Type A quantity of

radioactive material, including only one

of the following:

(1) Up to 40 g of uranium-235;

(2) Up to 30 g of uranium-233;

(3) Up to 25 g of the fissile

radionuclides of plutonium, except that

for encapsulated plutonium-beryllium

neutron sources in special form, an A1

quantity of plutonium may be present;

or

(4) A combination of fissile

radionuclides in which the sum of the

ratios of the amount of each

radionuclide to the corresponding

maximum amounts in paragraphs (c) (1),

(2), and (3) of this section does not

exceed unity.

(d) For packages where fissile material

is mixed with substances having an

average hydrogen density greater than

water, this general license applies only

when a package contains no more than

a Type A quantity of radioactive

material, including only one of the

following:

(1) Up to 29 g of uranium-235;

(2) Up to 18 g of uranium-233;

(3) Up to 18 g of fissile radionuclides

of plutonium, or

(4) A combination of fissile

radionuclides in which the sum of the

ratios of the amount of each

radionuclide to the corresponding

maximum amounts in paragraphs (d)

(1), (2), and (3) of this section does not

exceed unity.

(e) Except for the beryllium contained

within the special form plutoniumberyllium sources authorized in

paragraph (c) of this section, this general

license applies only when beryllium,

graphite, or hydrogenous material

enriched in deuterium is not present in

quantities exceeding 0.1% of the fissile

material mass.

(f)(1) Except as specified in paragraph

(f)(2) of this section for encapsulated

plutonium-beryllium sources, this

general license applies only when, a

package is labeled with a transport

index not less than the number given by

the following equation, where the

package contains x grams of uranium235, y grams of uranium-233, and z

grams of the fissile radionuclides of

plutonium:

Minimum Transport Index = (0.25x +

0.33y + 0.4z).

(2) For a package in which the only

fissile material is in the form of

encapsulated plutonium-beryllium

neutron sources in special form, the

transport index based on criticality

considerations may be taken as 0.025

times the number of grams of the fissile

radionuclides of plutonium.

(3) Packages which have a transport

index greater than 10 are not authorized

under the general license provisions of

this part.

3. Section 71.22 is revised to read as

follows:

§ 71.22 General license: Fissile material,

limited quantity, controlled shipment.

(a) A general license is issued to any

licensee of the Commission to transport

fissile material, or to deliver fissile

material to a carrier for transport,

without complying with the package

standards of Subparts E and F of this

part, if limited material is shipped in

accordance with this section.

(b) The general license applies only to

a licensee who has a quality assurance

program approved by the Commission

as satisfying the provisions of Subpart H

of this part.

(c) This general license applies only

when a package contains no more than

a Type A quantity of radioactive

material and no more than 400 g total

of the fissile radionuclides of plutonium

encapsulated as plutonium-beryllium

neutron sources in special form.

(d) This general license applies only

when:

(1) The mass of fissile radionuclides

in the shipment is limited such that the

grams of u

X

grams of o

Y

ranium 235 ther fissile material − + ≤ 1

where X and Y are the mass defined in

the table following paragraph (d)(2) of

this section; or

(2) the encapsulated plutoniumberyllium neutron sources are in special

form and the total mass of fissile

radionuclides in the shipment does not

exceed 2500 g.

PERMISSIBLE MASS LIMITS FOR SHIPMENTS OF FISSILE MATERIAL

Fissile material

Fissile material mass (g)

mixed with

substances

having a hydrogen density

less than or

equal to water

Fissile material mass (g)

mixed with

substances

having a hydrogen density

greater than

water

Uranium-235(X) ........................................................................................................................................................ 500 290

Other fissile material(Y) ........................................................................................................................................... 300 180

(e) Except for the beryllium contained

within the special form plutoniumberyllium sources authorized in

paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section,

this general license applies only when

beryllium, graphite or hydrogenous

material enriched in deuterium is not

present in quantities exceeding 0.1% of

the fissile material mass.

(f) This general license applies only

when shipment of these packages is

made under procedures specifically

authorized by DOT, in accordance with

49 CFR Part 173 of its regulations, to

prevent loading, transport, or storage of

these packages with other fissile

material shipments.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 27 / Monday, February 10, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 5913

4. Section 71.53 is revised to read as

follows:

§ 71.53 Fissile material exemptions.

Fissile materials meeting the

requirements of one of the paragraphs in

(a) through (d) of this section are exempt

from fissile material classification and

from the fissile material package

standards of §§ 71.55 and 71.59, but are

subject to all other requirements of this

part. These exemptions apply only

when beryllium, graphite, or

hydrogenous material enriched in

deuterium is not present in quantities

exceeding 0.1 percent of the fissile

material mass.

(a) Fissile material such that

grams of u

X

grams of o

Y

ranium 235 ther fissile material − + ≤ 1

for an individual consignment, where X and

Y are the mass limits defined in table

following paragraph (a)(3) of this section,

provided that:

(1) Each package contains no more

than 15 g of fissile material. For

unpackaged material the mass limit of

15g applies to the conveyance; or

(2) The fissile material consists of a

homogeneous hydrogenous solution or

mixture where the minimum ratio of

hydrogen atoms to fissile radionuclide

atoms (H/X) is 5200 and the maximum

concentration of fissile radionuclides

within a package is 5 g/liter; or

(3) There is no more than 5g of fissile

material in any 10 liter volume of

material and the material is packaged so

as to maintain this limit of fissile

radionuclide concentration during

normal transport.

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PACKAGES CONTAINING FISSILE MATERIAL

Fissile material

Fissile material mass (g)

mixed with

substances

having an average hydrogen density

less than or

equal to water

Fissile material mass (g)

mixed with

substances

having an average hydrogen density

greater than

water

Uranium-235(X) ........................................................................................................................................................ 400 290

1Other fissile material(Y) ......................................................................................................................................... 250 180

(b) Uranium enriched in uranium-235

to a maximum of 1 percent by weight,

and with total plutonium and uranium233 content of up to 1 percent of the

mass of uranium-235, provided that the

fissile material is distributed

homogeneously throughout the package

contents and does not form a lattice

arrangement within the package.

(c) Liquid solutions of uranyl nitrate

enriched in uranium-235 to a maximum

of 2 percent by weight, with a total

plutonium and uranium-233 content not

exceeding 0.1 percent of the mass of

uranium-235, and with a minimum

nitrogen to uranium atomic ratio (N/U)

of 2.

(d) Plutonium, less than 1 kg, of

which not more than 20 percent by mass

may consist of plutonium-239,

plutonium-241, or any combination of

these radionuclides.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day

of February, 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John C. Hoyle,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 97–3175 Filed 2–7–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7950–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission

18 CFR Part 157

[Docket No. RM81–19–000]

Project Cost and Annual Limits

Issued February 4, 1997.

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the authority

delegated by 18 CFR 375.307(e)(1), the

Director of the Office of Pipeline

Regulation computes and publishes the

project cost and annual limits specified

in Table I of § 157.208(d) and Table II

of § 157.215(a) for each calendar year.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1, 1997.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael J. McGehee, Division of

Pipeline Certificates, OPR (202) 208–

2257.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Publication of Project Cost Limits

Under Blanket Certificates; Order of the

Director, OPR

Section 157.208(d) of the

Commission’s Regulations provides for

project cost limits applicable to

construction, acquisition, operation and

miscellaneous rearrangement of

facilities (Table I) authorized under the

blanket certificate procedure (Order No.

234, 19 FERC ¶ 61,216). Section

157.215(a) specifies the calendar year

dollar limit which may be expended on

underground storage testing and

development (Table II) authorized under

the blanket certificate. Section

157.208(d) requires that the ‘‘limits

specified in Tables I and II shall be

adjusted each calendar year to reflect

the ‘GNP implicit price deflator’

published by the Department of

Commerce for the previous calendar

year.’’

Pursuant to § 375.307(e)(1) of the

Commission’s Regulations, the authority

for the publication of such cost limits,

as adjusted as inflation, is delegated to

the Director of the Office of Pipeline

Regulation. The cost limits for calendar

years 1982 through 1997, as published

in Table I of § 157.208(d) and Table II

of § 157.215(a), are hereby issued.