J-A04026-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DWIGHT A. LANGLEY

Appellant No. 124 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence dated December 16, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005743-2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED JUNE 27, 2017

Appellant Dwight A. Langley appeals the judgment of sentence 

imposed after he was convicted of possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance.1 Appellant claims that the affidavit in support of the 

warrant failed to establish probable cause to search his house. We affirm.

The relevant facts follow. On August 21, 2014, Sergeant Timothy 

Bernhardt of the Upper Darby Police Department applied for a warrant to 

search 6818 Clover Lane in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania for controlled 

substances and related items. The affidavit of probable cause stated in 

pertinent part:

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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In June of 2014, the Upper Darby Township Police 

Department received a drug complaint from a citizen in good 

standing in the community. The complainant stated that drugs 

were being sold from within 6818 Clover Lane, Upper Darby 

Pennsylvania, 19082. Specifically, the complainant said people 

were coming and going in the early morning hours of the day to 

purchase drugs specifically, marijuana from within 6818 Clover 

Lane . . . . In June of 2014, [Sergeant Bernhardt] received 

information from the Drug Enforcement Administration, 

Philadelphia office, regarding drugs being sold from 6818 Clover 

Lane . . . . This complainant also stated that drugs were being 

sold from within 6818 Clover Lane . . . . In both complaints the 

information was the same, that a black male by the name 

Dwight Langley, was the male who lived and sold drugs from 

6818 Clover Lane . . . . In the Drug Enforcement 

Administration’s tip, it was also stated that the male, Dwight 

Langley, keeps large amounts of marijuana in the basement of 

6818 Clover Lane . . . . [Sergeant Bernhardt], based upon 

experience and knowledge, knows this type of behavior which is 

described is highly consistent with places and people that are 

trafficking in controlled substances. Also, it was stated that 

Dwight Langley drives a gray Nissan Armada, which he owns.

Through investigation, [Sergeant Bernhardt] discovered 

that a 50 year old black male (d.o.b. 08/24/1964) by the name 

of Dwight Langley lived at 6818 Clover Lane, Upper Darby, 

Pennsylvania, 19082. [Sergeant Bernhardt] and assisting 

officers conducted surveillance on the property at 6818 Clover 

Lane on several occasions throughout the month of August 2014. 

While conducting this surveillance, [Sergeant Bernhardt] 

observed a large black male exit and enter the property on 

numerous occasions at different times of the day and night. 

[Sergeant Bernhardt] conducted a photo search through J-NET[2]

of Dwight Langley b/m (d.o.b. 08/24/1964), which did reveal a 

photograph of a black male named Dwight Langley (d.o.b. 

08/24/1964), this being the same male that [Sergeant 

Bernhardt] and assisting officers observed entering and exiting 

the property at 6818 Clover Lane . . . . [Sergeant Bernhardt] 

____________________________________________

2

 J-NET is an abbreviation for the Pennsylvania Justice Network, “the 

Commonwealth’s system of providing immediate justice information to law 

enforcement agencies.” Commonwealth v. Carr, 887 A.2d 782, 783 (Pa. 

Super. 2005).
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also observed a photo taken of Dwight Langley (d.o.b. 

08/24/1964) in connection with an arrest by the Upper Darby 

Township Police Department in 2005. While conducting 

surveillance officers did observe on several occasions the black 

male known as Dwight Langley driving a gray Nissan Armada, 

bearing Pennsylvania registration . . . . [Sergeant Berhardt] also 

conducted a criminal history check through J-NET for Dwight 

Langley. Langley was arrested for the following offenses:

(1) . . . .

(2) In November of 2005 Dwight Langley was 

arrested by the Upper Darby Township Police Department 

as an adult using the name Dwight Ainsworth Langley for 

the following offenses: Possessing of a Controlled 

Substance By an Unregistered Person Except by 

Prescription is Unlawful, Manufacture of a Controlled 

Substance, Receiving Stolen Property, Criminal Attempt 

Possession of Firearm with Altered Manufacturer’s Number, 

Use of Drug Paraphernalia. As a result of this arrest, 

Dwight Ainsworth Langley was found not guilty.

[Sergeant Bernhardt] did a check through the Upper Darby 

Township Database and located several incidents in which 

Dwight Langley was associated with the address 6818 Clover 

Lane, Upper Darby Pennsylvania, 19082.

* * *

2) The Upper Darby Police Department received a call 

through Delaware County Emergency Services Center for 

an Interrupted Burglary. The Upper Darby Township 

Uniformed Patrol Division responded and spoke to a Black 

male, who identified himself as Dwight Langley. Mr. 

Langley advised the responding officer he was the 

homeowner. Upon uniform police arrival, Delaware County 

Emergency Services Center advised two males were seen 

exiting the house and last seen running down the rear 

alley. Responding Officer[s] observed a large clear plastic 

bag of marijuana lying on the ground next to the rear 

door. The bag of marijuana was returned and placed into 

evidence. No further police action was taken at that time.

* * *
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Within 48 hours of the application of this search warrant, 

two trash bags were obtained from 6818 Clover Lane, Upper 

Darby, Pennsylvania, which had been placed in the rear alley for 

pickup by the Upper Darby Township Sanitation Department. 

Located in the trash bags, [Sergeant Bernhardt] found the 

following items: mail addressed to resident of 6818 Clover Lane, 

two (2) clear plastic type bags, each bag containing residue from 

a green vegetable matter.

[Sergeant Bernhardt] did conduct a field test using a Narco 

Test Kit on the residue from a green vegetable matter, which 

resulted in a positive reaction for the presence of marijuana. 

The residue was taken from the two clear plastic type bags 

located in the trash bags.

Aff. of Probable Cause, 8/21/14, at 1-4 (some formatting added). 

The search warrant application was granted, and Sergeant Bernhardt 

and other members of the Upper Darby police department executed the 

warrant at approximately 12:30 p.m. on August 22, 2014. N.T., 10/27/15, 

at 36. Inside the house, police found approximately 69 pounds of marijuana 

(most of which was in the basement); two digital scales; Ziploc bags; 

$7,100 in cash; notes with names, numbers, and dates; Appellant’s 

passport; and mail addressed to Appellant at 6818 Clover Lane. Id. at 42-

51, 54-72; N.T., 10/28/15, at 49.

Prior to trial, Appellant moved to suppress all evidence found during 

the search of his house. The trial court held a suppression hearing on 

February 4, 2015. At the beginning of the hearing, Appellant’s counsel 

stated, “[w]e are challenging the four corners of the search warrant. We’re 

challenging the probable cause.” N.T., 2/4/15, at 10. Appellant’s counsel 
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added that he was also “arguing that in the section of the application that 

refers to items to be searched and seized that that is an overbroad request 

and basically an exploratory search warrant.” Id. at 11. On February 18, 

2015, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

Appellant was tried by a jury, which found Appellant guilty of 

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. On December 16, 

2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to sixteen to sixty months’ 

incarceration. On January 7, 2016, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

On March 8, 2016, Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement 

that asserted the warrant “failed to present sufficient factual averments of 

the kind and quantity necessary to establish probable cause to search the 

property.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 3/8/16, at 1. The trial court’s Rule 

1925(a) opinion construed Appellant’s issue as only a challenge to the 

overbreadth of the warrant. Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10. The opinion, however, 

did not address the other arguments that Appellant raised at the suppression 

hearing and which he again raises on appeal. Those arguments are 

presented in connection with the following issue stated in Appellant’s brief:

Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress 

evidence seized pursuant to the execution of a search warrant in 

his case when the factual basis for the warrant failed to establish 

probable cause to search the property in question?
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Appellant’s Brief at 2.3 

This Court has explained:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and 

may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. 

The suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 

conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary 

review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining 

a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 34–35 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citation omitted).

In analyzing whether a warrant was supported by probable 

cause, judicial review is confined to the four corners of the 

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s claim is waived because during 

the suppression hearing, Appellant argued only “that the affidavit was too 

broad in its scope rendering it constitutionally impermissible.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. We disagree with this characterization of 

Appellant’s argument before the trial court, and note that Appellant stated at 

the suppression hearing, “We are challenging the four corners of the search 

warrant. We’re challenging the probable cause.” N.T., 2/4/15, at 10; see 

id. at 27-32 (arguing the tips were not corroborated and did not establish 

probable cause). In this appeal, Appellant does not pursue the argument 

that the warrant was overbroad. Appellant’s Brief at 15 n.7.
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affidavit. Probable cause, of course, is a practical, non-technical 

conception requiring a consideration of the totality of the 

circumstances. 

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 

practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 

including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons 

supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability 

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 

particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is 

simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial 

basis . . . for concluding that probable cause existed. 

Finally, since no factual question is involved in a four corners 

analysis of the sufficiency of a warrant affidavit, the issue is one 

of law as to which our review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Coleman, 830 A.2d 554, 560 (Pa. 2003) (citations, 

quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Before we begin our discussion of Appellant’s issue, we note that the 

trial court’s opinion did not address Appellant’s precise probable cause 

argument. Instead, the trial court focused on the issue Appellant has now 

abandoned, the alleged overbreadth of the warrant. However, the trial 

court’s failure to explain its reasoning with respect to the probable cause 

issue does not prevent us from making a determination of whether, based 

on the four corners of the warrant affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial 

basis for finding probable cause to search Appellant’s house. The question 

before the trial court was a question of law, which we resolve de novo

regardless of the trial court’s specification of its legal theory. See 

Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 837 A.2d 480, 487 n.11 (Pa. Super. 
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2003) (trial court’s failure to address issue in its opinion did not hamper 

appellate review because, in deciding issues of law, appellate court need not 

defer to conclusions of trial court). Indeed, where the trial court does not 

issue a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion explaining the reasons for its order, an 

appellate court may resolve questions of law without remanding for further 

explanation of the trial court’s ruling. Commonwealth v. Hall, 867 A.2d 

619, 640 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“even if the trial judge failed to provide a 

1925(a) opinion we would still be within our rights not to order a remand” 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), appeal denied, 895 A.2d 

549 (Pa. 2006). We therefore are free to determine whether, as a matter of 

law, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable 

cause existed.

Staleness

Appellant first argues: “Virtually all of the information offered in 

support of the warrant in [this] case was stale, and, thus, could not serve to 

establish probable cause to search his residence.” Appellant’s Brief at 16 

(some capitalization removed). In particular, Appellant notes that the tips 

were provided more than two months prior to the application for the 

warrant, his 2005 drug arrest was almost nine years prior to the application, 

and no date was given for other incidents connecting him to 6818 Clover 

Lane. Id. at 20-21 (citing, among other cases, Commonwealth v. Novak, 

335 A.2d 773 (Pa. Super. 1975)). 
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“Settled Pennsylvania law establishes that stale information cannot 

provide probable cause in support of a warrant.” Commonwealth v. 

Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super.) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 

57 A.3d 68 (Pa. 2012). This Court has explained:

Age alone . . . does not determine staleness. The 

determination of probable cause is not merely an exercise in 

counting the days or even months between the facts relied on 

and the issuance of the warrant. Rather, we must also 

examine the nature of the crime and the type of 

evidence.

Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). “Mere lapse in time between 

discovery of criminal activity and issuance of a search warrant will not 

necessarily dissipate probable cause[,] and a showing that criminal activity 

is likely to have continued up to the time of issuance of a warrant will render 

otherwise stale information viable.” Commonwealth v. Karns, 566 A.2d 

615, 617 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 578 A.2d 

927 (Pa. 1990).

In Karns, police obtained a search warrant based in part on tips from 

two informants that Karns was growing a large quantity of marijuana in his 

house. 566 A.2d at 616-17. Karns argued that the warrant was invalid 

because the affidavit of probable cause did not state when the tips were 

given, and thus did not demonstrate the freshness of the information on 

which it relied. Id. at 617. This Court rejected that argument, observing 

that the size of the alleged marijuana-growing operation indicated that it 

was conducted over a continuous period of time. Id. In addition, we noted 
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that one of the informants told police one week before the search warrant 

was issued that Karns would be harvesting his crop within the next month. 

Id. Considering that “probable cause determinations must be based on 

commonsense, nontechnical analysis,” we held that the magistrate and trial 

court properly determined that probable cause had been established. Id. at 

617-18 (quoting Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 925 (Pa. 1985)).

Here, while the police received the tips approximately two months 

before they obtained the search warrant for Appellant’s house, and 

Appellant’s drug arrest was years earlier, the tips and prior arrest were not 

the only information on which the police relied in obtaining the warrant. 

Indeed, the police found marijuana residue in the trash outside of 

Appellant’s house less than 48 hours before they applied for the search 

warrant. This discovery was consistent with the tips, which specified that 

Appellant was selling marijuana, and it suggested that the drug activity was 

continuing. See Hoppert, 39 A.3d at 363; Karns, 566 A.2d at 617. One of 

the tips also specified that Appellant kept a large quantity of marijuana in his 

basement, which indicated a large-scale, ongoing operation. See Hoppert, 

39 A.3d at 363; Karns, 566 A.2d at 617. Because the older information 

suggesting an ongoing operation was corroborated by the newer, consistent 

information, we reject Appellant’s argument that the information in the 

warrant was too stale to support a finding of probable cause. See 

Coleman, 830 A.2d at 560; Karns, 566 A.2d at 617.
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Appellant’s reliance on Novak is misplaced. In Novak, the affidavit of 

probable cause stated that an informant told police he had bought drugs 

from Novak more than a dozen times in the last two months. 335 A.2d at 

774. Because no specific dates were provided, this Court assumed that the 

transactions occurred in the most remote part of the two-month time period, 

seven weeks before police applied for the search warrant. Id. at 774-75. 

We held that because there was no evidence of continued illegal activity, the 

seven-week-old information in the affidavit was too stale to support a finding 

of probable cause. Id. at 775-76. Here, unlike in Novak, there was more 

recent evidence (marijuana residue in the trash recovered within 48 hours 

prior to the application for the search warrant) that corroborated the older 

information and indicated that the drug operation was ongoing.

Corroboration

Appellant next argues that, “[e]ven if the tips cited in the Affidavit 

were not stale, they could not have provided support for the warrant 

because their contents lacked the indicia of reliability necessary to establish 

probable cause.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant notes that the affidavit 

does not state that the sources had provided reliable information in the past, 

and it does not contain declarations against interest. He contends that the 

additional information in the affidavit had “virtually no corroborative value.” 

Id. at 23. 

With regard to tips from anonymous sources, we have said:
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Ordinary citizens, like ordinary witnesses, generally do not 

provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday 

observations. Likewise, . . . the veracity of persons supplying 

anonymous tips is by hypothesis largely unknown, and 

unknowable. . . . Yet, such tips, particularly when supplemented 

by independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the 

solution of otherwise “perfect crimes.” While a conscientious 

assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is required by the 

Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for 

anonymous citizen informants is not.

Commonwealth v. Singleton, 603 A.2d 1072, 1074 (Pa. Super. 1992) 

(quoting Gray, 503 A.2d at 925); see Commonwealth v. Cramutola, 676 

A.2d 1214, 1216 (Pa. Super. 1996) (“The law is clear that information 

provided to the police by an anonymous source can establish probable cause 

so long as it is corroborated by police investigation”).

An anonymous report that is not itself sufficient to establish probable 

cause “may be sufficiently corroborated by independent observation of a 

suspect’s conduct, if the latter tends to confirm the information in the report 

or otherwise to support a conclusion that the suspect is engaged in 

committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Corleto, 477 A.2d 863, 865-66 

(Pa. Super. 1984) (emphasis and citation omitted). In a number of cases, 

“‘innocent details’ and/or conduct ‘consistent with activity of law abiding 

citizens’ were used in whole or in part to confirm an informant’s report of 

criminal activity, thus justifying the issuance for a search warrant.” Id. at 

866. In reviewing a magistrate’s determination of probable cause, “it should 

be remembered that while mere suspicion is inadequate, the affidavit need 
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only set forth a probability, and not a prima facie case, of criminal activity.” 

Id.

In Corleto, a first-time informant contacted the police to report that 

he had seen Corleto sell cocaine at his apartment. 477 A.2d at 864. The 

police then conducted surveillance and saw numerous people briefly visit 

Corleto’s apartment in a short period of time. Id. This Court held that, 

although the frequent short visits could be consistent with non-criminal 

activity, they tended to corroborate the informant’s report. Id. at 866. We 

concluded that based on the totality of circumstances, the magistrate could 

reasonably conclude that Corleto was selling drugs from his apartment. Id.

Here, police found marijuana residue and mail addressed to the 

resident of 6818 Clover Lane in the trash placed outside of Appellant’s 

house. As Appellant suggests, it is possible that the marijuana in the trash 

was for personal use or that the trash came from someone who had 

mistakenly received mail sent to Appellant’s address. However, the affidavit 

only had to establish a probability, and not a prima facie case, of criminal 

activity. See Corleto, 477 A.2d at 866. Based on our review of the 

affidavit, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that the 

magistrate had a substantial basis for making the practical, commonsense 

decision that there was a reasonable probability that contraband would be 

found inside Appellant’s house at the time the warrant was issued, and we 
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affirm the judgment of sentence. See Coleman, 830 A.2d at 560; 

Freeman, 150 A.3d at 34-35.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/27/2017