NO. 07-03-0513-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D MARCH 25, 2004

______________________________ RANDY JACKSON, APPELLANT

V. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A PPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 09083 9-00-A; H ONORABLE HAL MINE R, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before QUINN and REAVIS and CAMPBELL , JJ.
MEMORAND UM OPINION Appellant

Randy Jackson, an inm ate, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order denying his motion for summary judgment and dismissing hi s claims aga inst the Texas Departme nt of Crim inal Jus tice purs uant t o ch apter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We dismiss this purported ap peal for want of jurisdiction.2

The order wa s signed on Octobe r 15, 200 3, Jackso n’s requ est for fi ndings o f fact and conclusions of law

was filed on November 6, 2003, and the notice of appeal was filed
on December 8, 2003. Noticing that the request for findings and the notice o f appeal were both filed beyond the time allowed by Rule 296 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 26.1 of the Texas Rules of Appell ate Procedure, by letter dated February 17, 2004, this Court requested that Jackson reasonably explain on or before March 15, 2004, why this app eal shou ld not bedismisse d for wan t of jurisd iction.
Jackson timely responded explaining that he d id not receive actual notice of the trial court’s order until sometime between October 17th and October 20th and that the date he mailed his request for findings of fact on November 5, 2003, is within the 20 daydeadline provided by Rule296. Heurges tha t pursuan t to Rule 306a(4), the time period in which to file his request for findings of fact should not have b egun until he receive d actua l knowledge of the signing of the trial court’s o rder of dismissal.
Rule 306a(4) of the Te xas Rul es of Civ il Proce dure extends the plenary power of

a trial court when a party adversely affected by a judgment fails to receive n otice or actual knowledge of the signing of the judgment wit hin 20 days after it is signed. If notice or actual knowledge of a signed judgment is not recei ved until 20 days after it is signed, the appella te timetable commences on the date n otice is actually received. However, the timetable may not begin more than 90 days after the judgment is signed. Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a); see alsoTex. R. Civ. P. 306a(4); In re Simpson, 932 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex .App.--3

Amarillo 1996, no writ). It is incum bent upon the party complaining of late notice to prove bysworn motion, notice, and hearing in the trial court the date on which he or his attorney first received notice or actual knowledge of the signing of the ju dgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 3 06a(5 ). After a hearing on a 306a(5) motion, the party must obtain a signed order specifying the date that notice or actual knowledge was first recei ved. Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(c). Without adhering to the proper procedures and procurement of an order from the trial court fin ding thedate on which no tice or a ctual kno wledge was received, this Court cannotdepart from the original appellate timetable. Nothing in the record before us indicates that Jackson complied with proper procedures in the trial court; thus, hi s request for findings of fact was due to be filed on November 4, 2003. Failure to timel y file the requestdeprived him of the additional time in w hic h to file hi s notice of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(4 ). Thus, t he notic e of appe al was d ue to be filed no later than November 14, 2003, making the notice of appeal filed on December 8, 2003, untimely. Accordingly, without an order from the trial court rec iting the date when Jackson first received notice of the order of dismissal, we must adhere to theoriginal appellate deadlines and dismiss this purported appeal for want of jurisdiction. Tex. R. App

. P. 42.3(a). Jackson also filed a motion for

extensi on of timein whic h to filehis brie f togethe r with his response to this Court’s letter of February 17, 2004. Having determined we are without jurisdiction, the motio n is moot

. Don H. Reavis Justice