In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-2725

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GREGORY J. KUCZORA,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 15-CR-214 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2018 — DECIDED DECEMBER 14, 2018

____________________

Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Gregory Kuczora falsely represented 

to unwary investors that he could help them secure millions 

of dollars in financing. In return they paid him large sums of 

money to cover fees, which Kuczora pocketed for personal 

use before disappearing. For this conduct he pleaded guilty

to one count of wire fraud, and the district judge imposed an 

above-Guidelines prison sentence of 70 months. Kuczora 

argues that the judge did not adequately explain the upward 
2 No. 17-2725

variance and failed to give him advance notice of the 

grounds that supported it. He also argues that the sentence 

is substantively unreasonable.

We affirm. The district judge thoroughly explained his 

reasoning, and we have never held that a judge must give 

advance warning of an upward variance. To the contrary, 

every defendant is on notice that the court has the discretion 

to impose a sentence above, below, or within the Guidelines 

range based on the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Finally,

the 70-month sentence is not substantively unreasonable. 

Although the Guidelines can be a rough approximation of 

what § 3553(a) warrants, the judge did not exceed his broad 

discretion in concluding that a heavier penalty was justified

here.

I. Background

After Kuczora lost his finance job in 2007, he styled himself as the managing director of KCS Financial, a phony 

finance firm he ran out of his basement in Elgin, Illinois. In 

an attempt to lure loan applicants, he falsely represented 

that KCS Financial had been operating for more than a 

decade in 12 different countries. Two years later he began 

telling applicants that he could secure financing for their 

proposals through Kensington Capital Partners, Ltd., another fake company whose London mailing address forwarded

straight back to the basement in Elgin.

Once a potential applicant showed interest, Kuczora 

would ask for a wire transfer of $10,000 to $25,000 as an 

underwriting fee. But as soon as he had his fee, he would 

gradually disappear. At first he would make up excuses for 

delay—for instance, that his nonexistent legal department 
No. 17-2725 3

was considering the application. Eventually he stopped 

responding altogether. Over four years Kuczora defrauded 

as many as 68 victims of as much as $1,216,755. He spent 

that money largely on personal expenses—everything from 

his family’s necessities to a luxury car and an expensive 

horse. 

In November 2015 a grand jury indicted Kuczora on two 

counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.1 Surprisingly, even that did little to curb his appetite for fraud. In 

2016 he devised a new scheme in which he represented that 

he could obtain funding for humanitarian groups from a 

fictional source of U.S. notes and bonds purportedly worth 

billions of dollars.

After his indictment for the first scheme, Kuczora delayed the progress of his criminal case for as long as possible 

before finally pleading guilty to one count of wire fraud.

Kuczora did not object to the factual findings in the Presentence Report (“PSR”), including a finding that he defrauded 

68 victims. The judge accordingly adopted the PSR findings

as undisputed. The judge also heard testimony from six 

victims. They shared heartbreaking stories of the toll the 

fraud took on their lives—among other things, bankruptcy, 

depression, and homelessness. Kuczora likewise called 

several witnesses, including one person who claimed to have

 1 Although Kuczora lived in Illinois, the government brought charges in 

the Eastern District of Wisconsin where several victims lived and used 

local banks. See United States v. Balsiger, No. 17-1708, 2018 WL 6441478, at 

*9 (7th Cir. Dec. 10, 2018) (holding that venue was proper in a wire-fraud 

case brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 because some of the victims lived in 

the relevant district and because the defendant “caused wire transfers in 

and out of the district in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme”).
4 No. 17-2725

received some legitimate financing help from KCS Financial. 

But when pressed, even that witness conceded that his 

projects never received the promised funds and he had to 

file for bankruptcy.

The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 

33 to 41 months in prison. The judge accepted that range as a 

starting point but concluded that it fell short of what was 

appropriate under § 3553(a). He found that a 70-month 

sentence was necessary to reflect the seriousness and sophistication of the offense and to deter similar white-collar crime.

II. Discussion

On appeal Kuczora raises two claims of procedural error.

He challenges the adequacy of the judge’s explanation for 

the above-Guidelines sentence and the judge’s failure to give 

advance notice of the grounds on which he was considering 

an upward variance. We review both procedural challenges 

de novo. United States v. Lockwood, 840 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 

2016). Kuczora also raises a substantive challenge to the 

reasonableness of the sentence, which we review for abuse 

of discretion. See id. at 903.

Kuczora first argues that the judge failed to give a sufficient explanation for the upward variance from the Guidelines range. To be sure, a judge must “adequately explain the 

chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review 

and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). But contrary to 

Kuczora’s argument, there is no need to identify “‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the 

Guidelines range.” Id. at 47. In fact, so long as the judge 

explains why the result is appropriate under § 3553(a), there 
No. 17-2725 5

is no need to directly “explain why a sentence differs from 

the Sentencing Commission’s recommendation.” United 

States v. Kirkpatrick, 589 F.3d 414, 416 (7th Cir. 2009).

Here, the judge calculated the correct Guidelines range, 

which he properly observed was the starting point for his 

deliberations. The judge then provided a full and adequate 

explanation for an upward variance. He emphasized that the 

fraud was deliberate, lasted for four years, and affected 

68 people—a significant number of victims.2 The judge also 

highlighted the fraud’s devastating impact on the six victims 

who testified at the sentencing hearing. And although

Kuczora pleaded guilty, the judge found that he nonetheless 

failed to show real remorse. Finally, the judge stressed the 

sophisticated nature of the offense and the special role 

deterrence plays in the context of white-collar crime, where 

the decision to break the law is generally calculated rather 

than impulsive. 

Kuczora’s primary complaint is that the Guidelines account for many of these factors. For instance, the Guidelines 

range already reflected the fact that Kuczora defrauded 

more than ten victims. Likewise, the judge could have 

applied a Guidelines enhancement based on the sophistication of the scheme. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). He did not 

do so, yet he relied on the degree of sophistication as a 

justification for imposing a sentence above the range. 

Kuczora contends that the judge was required to explain

why the Guidelines did not adequately capture those factors.

 2 Kuczora disputes this number, but it comes from the PSR’s factual 

statement, which he did not object to.
6 No. 17-2725

But our precedent is clear that “the sentencing court need 

not frame its explanation of a sentence in terms of a departure from the guidelines range.” United States v. Courtland, 

642 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2011). All the judge must do is 

“explain why the sentence is appropriate under the statutory

criteria.” Kirkpatrick, 589 F.3d at 416. (emphasis added). And 

the judge did exactly that. 

Kuczora contends that we applied a different rule in 

Lockwood, where we said that a sentencing court’s reasoning 

must “includ[e] an explanation for any deviation from the 

Guidelines range.” 840 F.3d at 900. That simply means that 

in deviating from the Guidelines range, a judge must explain 

why the higher sentence is appropriate—which the judge 

did here. Even if the Guidelines and § 3553(a) sometimes 

overlap, we have never held that a judge must go further 

and articulate why specific Guidelines factors inadequately 

account for the nature of the crime, the defendant’s background, or any other statutory factor. In fact, we have used 

the exact language from Lockwood in cases explicitly rejecting 

Kuczora’s interpretation. See, e.g., Courtland, 642 F.3d at 550 

(“[W]e ask whether the sentencing court erred by ... failing 

to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an 

explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. But 

recent case law indicates that the sentencing court need not 

frame its explanation of a sentence in terms of a departure 

from the guidelines range ... .”) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). To be perfectly clear, we hold once 

again that as long as a judge uses a properly calculated 

Guidelines range as a starting point, he may explain a

decision to vary from that range with reference to the statutory factors alone.
No. 17-2725 7

Kuczora’s second procedural challenge is that the judge 

failed to provide him with advance notice of the grounds on 

which he might deviate from the Guidelines range. Yet our 

precedent is clear that a judge “is not required to give advance notice of a sentence above the guidelines range.” 

United States v. Hayden, 775 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2014). To 

the contrary, defendants are always “on notice post-Booker

that sentencing courts have discretion to consider any of the 

factors specified in § 3553(a).” United States v. Walker, 

447 F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, like in Walker, 

Kuczora had “full knowledge of all the facts on which the 

district court relied.” Id. The judge’s analysis was rooted in 

the PSR, and Kuczora affirmatively chose not to object to 

that information. No forewarning was required.

Kuczora insists nonetheless that the judge should have 

given him advance notice of which facts in the PSR might

form the basis of an above-Guidelines sentence so his lawyers could prepare accordingly. But we have never required 

that, and for good reason. A notice requirement would 

significantly limit a judge’s ability to consider a sentence

outside the Guidelines range: unless the judge were to 

formally preview his own reasoning, he could vary upward

only when justified by prehearing arguments already raised 

by the parties or the probation office. To curb a judge’s 

sentencing discretion in this way would be fundamentally 

inconsistent with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),

and its successors.

In addition to the procedural challenges, Kuczora claims 

that the 70-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

We review that challenge for abuse of discretion. See 

Lockwood, 840 F.3d. at 903. Even though the judge settled on 
8 No. 17-2725

a sentence above the advisory range, “[t]here is no presumption that a sentence outside the [G]uidelines[] range is 

unreasonable.” United States v. Aldridge, 642 F.3d 537, 544 

(7th Cir. 2011).

And this particular above-Guidelines sentence lies well 

within the judge’s broad Booker discretion. Kuczora’s fraudulent scheme was both deliberate and calculated, and it 

wreaked havoc in dozens of lives. The Guidelines range was 

enhanced because Kuczora took advantage of more than ten

victims. Yet his scheme defrauded almost seven times that 

many. And while the Guidelines range was increased because more than $550,000 was at stake, the fraud was almost

twice that amount according to the government’s estimate.

(Kuczora himself puts the number at around $750,000.) Most

importantly, Kuczora preyed on those desperate for funding, 

so the numbers alone may fail to capture the damage he 

inflicted. The judge heard six victims’ tragic stories, and it 

was not unreasonable to elevate the sentence accordingly.

Nor do we have any reason to second-guess the judge’s 

conclusion that Kuczora has not shown remorse. He waited

until the eleventh hour to plead guilty, and after his indictment he devised yet a second fraudulent scheme. It was 

reasonable to think a much longer sentence was necessary to 

deter a third. 

In sum, the judge did not err. He fully explained why the 

§ 3553(a) factors justified an above-Guidelines sentence, and 

that sentence was well within his discretion.

AFFIRMED.