62754 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 227 / Tuesday, November 25, 1997 / Notices

Marketing Division during normal

business hours.

Done at Washington, DC this 14th day of

November 1997.

Daniel L. Van Ackeren,

Director, Livestock Marketing Division,

Packers and Stockyards Programs.

[FR Doc. 97–30878 Filed 11–24–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–EN–P

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Grain Inspection, Packers and

Stockyards Administration

Posting of Stockyards

Pursuant to the authority provided

under Section 302 of the Packers and

Stockyards Act (7 U.S.C. 202), it was

ascertained that the livestock markets

named below were stockyards as

defined by Section 302(a). Notice was

given to the stockyard owners and to the

public as required by Section 302(b), by

posting notices at the stockyards on the

dates specified below, that the

stockyards were subject to the

provisions of the Packers and

Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended (7

U.S.C. 181 et seq.).

Facility No., name, and location of stockyard Date of posting

AR–173, Centerton Livestock Auction, Centerton,

Arkansas.

Oct. 6, 1997.

KY–175, Kentucky Livestock Exchange,

Owenton, Kentucky.

Oct. 28, 1997.

NC–172, Martin County

Horse Auction, Oak City,

North Carolina.

Oct. 23, 1997.

Done at Washington, DC this 14th day of

November 1997.

Daniel L. Van Ackeren,

Director, Livestock Marketing Division,

Packers and Stockyards Programs.

[FR Doc. 97–30877 Filed 11–24–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–EN–P

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Grain Inspection, Packers and

Stockyards Administration

Deposting of Stockyards

Notice is hereby given, that the

livestock markets named herein,

originally posted on the dates specified

below as being subject to the Packers

and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended

(7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), no longer come

within the definition of a stockyard

under the Act and are therefore, no

longer subject to the provisions of the

Act.

Facility No., name, and location of stockyard Date of posting

KS–115, Concordia Livestock Auction,

Concordia, Kansas.

May 7, 1952.

MD–119, Kolb’s Sale Barn,

Woodsboro, Maryland.

June 3, 1996.

NC–138, Wells Livestock

Market, Inc., Wallace,

North Carolina.

July 10, 1959.

NC–150, Jefferson Stockyard & Grill, Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina.Nov. 22, 1978.

TX–162, El Paso Livestock

Auction Co., Inc., El

Paso, Texas.

Nov. 15, 1967.

VA–110, Southside Livestock Markets, Inc.,

Farmville, Virginia.

Mar. 20, 1961.

WA–121, Sunnyside Livestock Market, Inc., Sunnyside, Washington.Oct. 5, 1959.

This notice is in the nature of a

change relieving a restriction and, thus,

may be made effective in less than 30

days after publication in the Federal

Register without prior notice or other

public procedure. This notice is given

pursuant to section 302 of the Packers

and Stockyards Act ( 7 U.S.C. 202) and

is effective upon publication in the

Federal Register.

Done at Washington, DC this 14th day of

November 1997.

Daniel L. Van Ackeren,

Director, Livestock Marketing Division

Packers and Stockyards Programs.

[FR Doc. 97–30879 Filed 11–24–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3210–KD–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Critical Foundations: Protecting

America’s Infrastructures

AGENCY: Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of availability and

request for comments.

SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce

announces the availability of and seeks

public comment on ‘‘Critical

Foundations: Protecting America’s

Infrastructures,’’ the report of the

President’s Commission on Critical

Infrastructure Protection. The

Commission was established by

Executive Order in July 1996 to conduct

a comprehensive study of the physical

and electronic (‘‘cyber’’) threats to and

vulnerabilities of the nation’s critical

infrastructures and recommend a

national policy for protecting the

infrastructures and assuring their

continued operation. The executive

order provided for a Commission

comprised 10 members from the Federal

government and 10 members from

outside the Federal government. When

the Commission terminated on October

13, 1997, some of the Commission’s staff

was retained to assist the Principals

Committee, Steering Committee, and

Advisory Committee in reviewing the

report and preparing recommendations

to the President. Notwithstanding the

substantial public input that went into

development of the Commission’s

findings and recommendations, their

significance makes them worthy of

additional public discussion and

comment.

DATES: Comments should be submitted

no later than January 9, 1998.

REPORT AVAILABILITY AND ADDRESSES:

The report is available electronically

from the Commission’s transition office

site on the World Wide Web: http://

www.pccip.gov/.

Comments may be sent to the

Commission at P.O. Box 46258,

Washington, DC 20050–6258.

Comments may also be submitted by

facsimile to 202–696–9411, or by

electronic mail to

Comments@pccip.gov. Comments

submitted by facsimile or electronic

mail need not also be submitted by

regular mail.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The

Commission at 703–696–9395.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Executive

Order 13010 of July 15, 1996 (61 FR

37347), as amended, established the

President’s Commission on Critical

Infrastructure Protection and its

associated Principals Committee,

Steering Committee, and Advisory

Committee as described below. A

complete text of the Executive Order

may also be found at the Commission’s

website (http://www.pccip.gov).

A Statement of the Problem

Certain national infrastructures are so

vital that their incapacity or destruction

would have a debilitating impact on the

defense or economic security of the

United States. These critical

infrastructures include

telecommunications, electrical power

systems, gas and oil storage and

transportation, banking and finance,

transportation, water supply systems,

emergency services (including medical,

police, fire, and rescue), and continuity

of government services. Threats to these

critical infrastructures fall into two

categories: physical threats to tangible

property (‘‘physical threats’’), and

threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or

computer-based attacks on the

information or communications
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 227 / Tuesday, November 25, 1997 / Notices 62755

components that control critical

infrastructures (‘‘cyber threats’’).

Because many of these critical

infrastructures are owned and operated

by the private sector, it is essential that

the government and private sector work

together to develop a strategy for

protecting them and assuring their

continued operation.

Commission Membership

The Commission comprised one

member each from the Department of

the Treasury, Department of Justice,

Department of Defense, Department of

Commerce, Department of

Transportation, Department of Energy,

Central Intelligence Agency, Federal

Emergency Management Agency,

Federal Bureau of Investigation,

National Security Agency. These

agencies also appointed members from

the private sector. The Commission

Chair was designated by the President

from the private sector.

The Principals Committee

The Commission reported to the

President through a Principals

Committee, which is charged to review

any reports or recommendations before

submission to the President. The

Principals Committee comprises the

Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of

Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of

Commerce, Secretary of Transportation,

Secretary of Energy, Director of Central

Intelligence, Director of the Office of

Management and Budget, Director of the

Federal Emergency Management

Agency, Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs, Assistant to

the Vice President for National Security

Affairs, Assistant to the President for

Economic Policy and Director of the

National Economic Council, and

Assistant to the President and Director

of the Office of Science and Technology

Policy.

The Steering Committee

The Commission’s day-to-day work

was overseen by a Steering Committee

on behalf of the Principals Committee.

The Steering Committee comprised five

members: The Deputy Secretary of

Defense, the Attorney General, the

Deputy National Security Advisor, the

Vice President’s Domestic Policy

Advisor and the Chair of the

Commission itself. The Steering

Committee received regular reports on

the progress of the Commission’s work

and approved the submission of reports

to the Principals Committee.

Advisory Committee

The Commission received advice from

an Advisory Committee composed of

individuals appointed by the President

from the private sector, academia, and

local government who were

knowledgeable about critical

infrastructures. The Committee will

study the report and provide advice to

the Steering Committee.

Mission

As provided in the Executive Order,

the Commission was to consult with the

public and private sector owners and

operators of the critical infrastructures

and others that have an interest in

critical infrastructure assurance issues

and that may have differing perspectives

on these issues. The Commission was to

assess the scope and nature of threats to

and vulnerabilities of the critical

infrastructures; determine the legal and

policy issues raised by efforts to protect

critical infrastructures and assess how

they might be addressed; recommend a

comprehensive national policy and

implementation strategy for protecting

critical infrastructures and assuring

their continued operation; and propose

any statutory or regulatory changes

necessary to effect its recommendations.

Sector Studies

The Commission divided its work

into these five ‘‘sectors’’ based on the

common characteristics of the included

industries:

• Information and communications.

• Banking and finance.

• Energy, including electrical power,

and oil and gas production and storage.

• Physical distribution, including

transportation and oil and gas

distribution.

• Vital human services, including

water supply, emergency services and

government services.

Public Hearings and Outreach

The Commission conducted extensive

meetings with a range of professional

and trade associations concerned with

the infrastructures, private sector

infrastructure users and providers,

academia, state and local government

agencies, consumers, federal agencies,

and many others. Of special interest

were five public meetings in five major

cities.

Overview of the Report’s Findings

1. New Thinking is Required in

Cyberspace. It is not surprising that

infrastructures have always been

attractive targets for those who would

do us harm. In the past we have been

protected from hostile attacks on the

infrastructures by broad oceans and

friendly neighbors. Today, the evolution

of cyber threats has changed the

situation dramatically. In cyberspace,

national borders are no longer relevant.

Potentially serious cyber attacks can

be conceived and planned without

detectable logistic preparation. They can

be invisibly reconnoitered,

clandestinely rehearsed, and then

mounted in a matter of minutes or even

seconds without revealing the identity

and location of the attacker.

Formulas that carefully divide

responsibility between foreign defense

and domestic law enforcement no

longer apply as clearly as they used to

and, in some instances, you may have

to solve the crime before you can decide

who has the authority to investigate it.

2. We Should Act Now to Protect our

Future. The Commission has not

discovered an imminent attack or a

credible threat sufficient to warrant a

sense of immediate national crisis.

However, the Commission found that

our vulnerabilities are increasing

steadily while the costs associated with

an effective attack continue to drop. The

investments required to improve the

situation are still relatively modest, but

will rise if we procrastinate.

3. Infrastructure Assurance is a

Shared Responsibility. National security

requires much more than military

strength. While no nation state is likely

to invade our territory or attack our

armed forces, we are inevitably the

target of ill will and hostility from some

quarters. Disruption of the services on

which our economy and well-being

depend could have significant effects,

and if repeated frequently, could

seriously harm public confidence.

Because our military and private

infrastructures are becoming less and

less separate, because it is getting harder

to differentiate threats from local

criminals from those from foreign

powers, and because the techniques of

protection, mitigation, and restoration

are largely the same, we conclude that

responsibility for infrastructure

protection and assurance can no longer

be delegated on the basis of who the

attacker is or where the attack

originates. Rather, the responsibility

should be shared cooperatively among

all of the players.

Overview of the Report’s

Recommendations

1. A Broad Program of Education and

Awareness. Possible undertakings

include White House conferences,

National Academy of Science studies,

presentations at industry and

government associations and

professional societies, development and

promulgation of elementary and

secondary curricula, and sponsorship of

graduate studies and programs.
62756 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 227 / Tuesday, November 25, 1997 / Notices

2. Infrastructure Protection through

Industry Cooperation and Information

Sharing. Sector-by-sector cooperation

and information sharing would take

place in the context of partnerships

between owners and operators and

government. These partnerships would

identify and share best practices. The

National Institute of Standards and

Technology, the National Security

Agency, and the Department of Energy’s

National Laboratories would provide

technical skills and expertise required

to identify and evaluate vulnerabilities

in the associated information networks

and control systems. Sector cooperation

might begin with sharing information

and techniques related to risk

management assessments. This could

evolve into the development and

deployment of ways to prevent attacks,

and if attacks occur, to mitigate damage,

quickly recover services, and

reconstitute the infrastructure

3. Reconsideration of Laws Related to

Infrastructure Protection. Some laws

capable of promoting infrastructure

assurance efforts are not as clear or

effective as they could be. Others

operate in ways that may be unfriendly

to security concerns. Sorting them all

out will be a lengthy and complex

undertaking, involving efforts at local,

state, federal, and international levels.

The report identifies specific existing

laws that could be modified to support

infrastructure protection.

4. A Revised Program of Research and

Development. While some of the basic

technology needed to improve

infrastructure protection already exists,

it is not yet widely deployed. In all

areas of activities aimed at protecting

and assuring the infrastructure,

mitigating damages, and responding and

recovering from attacks, additional

research effort is needed. The

Commission recommends increasing

government spending in research and

development on capabilities such as

intrusion detection.

5. A National Organization Structure.

To implement the recommendations the

following new organizations and revised

roles for existing organizations are

recommended:

Office of National Infrastructure

Assurance as the top-level policy

making office connected closely to the

National Security Council and the

National Economic Council;

Infrastructure Assurance Support

Office to house the bulk of the staff that

would be responsible for follow-through

on the Commission’s recommendations;

Information Sharing and Analysis

Center to begin the step-by-step process

of establishing a realistic understanding

of distinguishing actual attacks from

coincidental events;

National Infrastructure Assurance

Council of industry CEOs, Cabinet

Secretaries, and representatives of state

and local government to provide policy

advice and implementation

commitment;

Lead Agencies, designated within the

Federal government, to serve as a

conduit from the government into each

sector and to facilitate the creation of

sector coordinators, if needed; and

Sector Coordinators to provide the

focus for industry cooperation and

information sharing, and to represent

the sector in matters of national

cooperation and policy;

Warning Center to identify anomalous

events indicating that the infrastructure

is under attack and alert the Information

Sharing and Analysis Center for

dissemination of bulletins and threat

advisories to infrastructure

stakeholders.

William Reinsch,

Under Secretary of Commerce, Bureau of

Export Administration.

[FR Doc. 97–30851 Filed 11–24–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3110–$$–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of the Census

The Census Advisory Committee

(CAC) on the African American

Population, the CAC on the American

Indian and Alaska Native Populations,

the CAC on the Asian and Pacific

Islander Populations, and the CAC on

the Hispanic Population

AGENCY: Bureau of the Census,

Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.

Pursuant to the Federal Advisory

Committee Act (P.L. 92–463 as amended

by Pub. L. 94–409, Pub. L. 96–523, and

Pub. L. 97–375), we are giving notice of

a joint meeting followed by separate and

concurrently held (described below)

meetings of the CAC on the African

American Population, the CAC on the

American Indian and Alaska Native

Populations, the CAC on the Asian and

Pacific Islander Populations, and the

CAC on the Hispanic Population. The

joint meeting will convene on December

11–12, 1997 at the Bureau of the Census,

Francis Amasa Walker Conference

Center, Federal Building 3, 4700 Silver

Hill Road, Suitland Maryland 20746.

Each of these Committees is

composed of nine members appointed

by the Secretary of Commerce. They

provide an organized and continuing

channel of communication between the

communities they represent and the

Bureau of the Census on its efforts to

reduce the differential in the population

totals from Census 2000 and on ways

that decennial census data can be

disseminated to maximize their

usefulness to these communities and

other users.

The Committees will draw on past

experience with the 1990 census

process and procedures, results of

evaluations and research studies, and

the expertise and insight of their

members to provide advice and

recommendations during the research

and development, design, planning and

implementation phases of Census 2000.

The agenda for the December 11

combined meeting, which will begin at

9 a.m. and end at 5 p.m., is as follows:

(1) Introductory Remarks and Updates;

(2) What Is the Master Activity

Schedule? How Will it Work for Census

2000 Dress Rehearsal Plans?; and (3)

Building Partnerships.

The agendas for the four separate

committees in the concurrent meetings

held at various times during the day are

as follows:

The CAC on the African American

Population: (1) Review Issues From Last

Meeting; (2) Discussants’ Review of the

Topics for the Plenary Sessions; (3)

Review Responses to Recommendations;

and (4) Discussion of Topics with Staff.

The CAC on the American Indian and

Alaska Native Populations: (1) Review

Issues From Last Meeting; (2)

Discussants’ Review of the Topics for

the Plenary Sessions; (3) Review

Responses to Recommendations; and (4)

Discussion of Topics with Staff.

The CAC on the Asian and Pacific

Islander Populations: (1) Review Issues

From Last Meeting; (2) Discussants’

Review of the Topics for the Plenary

Sessions; (3) Review Responses to

Recommendations; and (4) Discussion

of Topics with Staff.

The CAC on the Hispanic Population:

(1) Review Issues From Last Meeting; (2)

Discussants’ Review of the Topics for

the Plenary Sessions; (3) Review

Responses to Recommendations; and (4)

Discussion of Topics with Staff.

The agenda for the December 12

combined meeting, which will begin at

8:45 a.m. and end at 4:15 p.m., is as

follows: (1) Report on the 2000 Census

Advisory Committee Meetings; (2)

Process of Determining the Final

Proposals on Tabulation of Race and

Ethnic Data in Federal Statistical

Systems; (3) How Will the OMB

Proposal on Tabulation of Race and

Ethnic Data Be Implemented in the

Dress Rehearsal Tabulations? (4) What

Standard Products Should the Census