<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<meta name="cp:revision" content="3">
<meta name="meta:word-count" content="27249">
<meta name="extended-properties:Application" content="Microsoft Office Word">
<meta name="meta:last-author" content="bjkaczmarski">
<meta name="dc:creator" content="Stephanie Kordick">
<meta name="extended-properties:Company" content="USDA APHIS MRPBS ITD CSB">
<meta name="meta:print-date" content="2010-06-25T18:15:00Z">
<meta name="xmpTPg:NPages" content="80">
<meta name="dcterms:created" content="2010-06-25T18:15:00Z">
<meta name="dcterms:modified" content="2010-06-25T20:27:00Z">
<meta name="meta:character-count" content="155321">
<meta name="extended-properties:Template" content="Normal.dotm">
<meta name="X-TIKA:Parsed-By" content="org.apache.tika.parser.DefaultParser">
<meta name="X-TIKA:Parsed-By" content="org.apache.tika.parser.microsoft.OfficeParser">
<meta name="extended-properties:TotalTime" content="19200000000">
<meta name="Content-Length" content="1374208">
<meta name="meta:page-count" content="80">
<meta name="Content-Type" content="application/msword">
<title></title>
</head>
<body><p></p>
<p>APHIS Risk Analysis of the Status of Hungary Regarding Classical Swine Fever 
</p>
<p>Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
</p>
<p>Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export
</p>
<p>Regionalization Evaluation Services Staff
</p>
<p>May 2009</p>
<p><b><u>Table of Contents
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1">4<a href="_Toc210305324"><u>Executive Summary</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1">7<a href="_Toc210305325"><u>Introduction</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1">8<a href="_Toc210305326"><u>Hazard Identification</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1">10<a href="_Toc210305327"><u>Release Assessment</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">11<a href="_Toc210305328"><u>1.</u>
<u>Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">21<a href="_Toc210305329"><u>2.</u>
<u>Disease status in the region</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">25<a href="_Toc210305330"><u>3.</u>
<u>The status of adjacent regions with respect to the agent</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">28<a href="_Toc210305331"><u>4.</u>
<u>The extent of an active disease control program</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">30<a href="_Toc210305332"><u>5.</u>
<u>Vaccination status of the region</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">31<a href="_Toc210305333"><u>6.</u>
<u>Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">32<a href="_Toc210305334"><u>7.</u>
<u>Movement control and biosecurity from regions of higher risk</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">41<a href="_Toc210305335"><u>8.</u>
<u>Livestock demographics and marketing practices</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">45<a href="_Toc210305336"><u>9.</u>
<u>Disease surveillance</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">51<a href="_Toc210305337"><u>10.</u>
<u>Diagnostic laboratory capabilities</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">54<a href="_Toc210305338"><u>11.</u>
<u>Emergency response capabilities</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">56<a href="_Toc210305339"><u>12.</u>
<u>Summary of Release Assessment Risks</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1">63<a href="_Toc210305340"><u>Exposure assessment</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1">66<a href="_Toc210305341"><u>Consequence assessment</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1">69<a href="_Toc210305342"><u>Risk Estimation</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1">70<a href="_Toc210305343"><u>Appendices</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">70<a href="_Toc210305344"><u>Appendix 1: 2005 annual report to the EU</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">72<a href="_Toc210305345"><u>Appendix 2:  Hungary Import Statistics, 2005-2007</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1">74<a href="_Toc210305346"><u>References</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p><b>

</b></p>
<p><b><u>Abbreviations
</u></b></p>
<p>APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
</p>
<p>BIP Border Inspection Post
</p>
<p>CFR Code of Federal Regulations </p>
<p>CSF Classical Swine Fever
</p>
<p>CVO Chief Veterinary Officer 
</p>
<p>EC European Commission
</p>
<p>EU European Union
</p>
<p>FVO Food and Veterinary Office of the European Commission 
</p>
<p>MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
</p>
<p>OIE World Organization for Animal Health
</p>
<h1>Executive Summary
</h1>
<p>Hungary submitted a request to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) in December 2001, seeking recognition as a region free of classical swine fever (CSF).  Upon receipt of this request, APHIS initiated an evaluation of the CSF status of Hungary.  This report represents APHIS’ evaluation of Hungary with regard to the status, infrastructure, and control measures in place for CSF.  It includes an assessment of CSF surveillance measures, import practices, laboratory capacity, emergency response procedures, and other factors that could influence the risk of CSF introduction into the United States via imports of swine, swine semen, and pork and pork products from Hungary. 
</p>
<p>On May 1, 2004, Hungary and nine other countries became new Member States of the European Union (EU).  As part of the accession process, Hungary adopted the decisions and directives of the European Commission (EC) regarding animal health, welfare, and animal identification, including those pertaining to CSF.  These decisions and directives were transposed into Hungarian law and became the basis for new standard operating procedures by the time of accession.  Hungary also adopted the harmonized EC legislation regarding import, export, and trade of live swine, pork, and pork products.
</p>
<p>Since a previous APHIS analysis of the EU prior to accession of the 10 new Member States concluded that the EC control measures for CSF are effective [1, 2], this evaluation focuses in large part on the implementation of EC controls in Hungary. 
</p>
<p>Supporting documentation for this evaluation consists of documentation provided by the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, observations from a site visit conducted in November 2004, information from the OIE, peer-reviewed articles, reports of missions conducted by the Food and Veterinary Office of the European Commission, and other technical sources.  This risk analysis was conducted according to OIE guidelines and therefore includes a hazard identification, a release assessment, an exposure assessment, a consequence assessment, and a risk estimate.  The hazard under consideration is the CSF virus.  
</p>
<p><i>Release Assessment</i></p>
<p>Although there is no evidence that CSF is present in domestic swine in Hungary, the disease is present in wild boar.  APHIS has identified several pathways by which CSF virus could be introduced into the domestic swine population of Hungary.  The first, and most significant route, is through contact with infected wild boar, either those already within Hungary or those in adjoining countries.  The second is through exposure to infected swine or their products from other EU Member States or third countries, which could lead either to direct inoculation of domestic pigs, or introduction of the virus into naive wild boar with subsequent movement into the domestic swine population.  And third is through exposure to contaminated objects (vehicles, passengers, etc.) from other EU Member States or third countries which are experiencing outbreaks of CSF, again either due to direct contact, or secondary contact via wild boar.
</p>
<p>The above risks are mitigated by a surveillance system and emergency response capability sufficient to detect and control CSF within the wild boar population, reducing the potential exposure risk to domestic swine.  Hungary has recently displayed this capacity through its detection of infected wild boar and its implementation of control measures to identify and remove infected animals, while surveying the domestic population in the affected area and enforcing enhanced biosecurity measures.  Current surveillance practices for CSF in wild boar have demonstrated the ability to detect evidence of circulation of the virus within this population.  In case of a recognized disease incursion, the Hungarian veterinary services have proven to be well trained and equipped to contain the outbreak.
</p>
<p>Additional mitigations include effective routine biosecurity measures at domestic swine holdings, such as restricting human and vehicular traffic, required sanitary procedures for people and vehicles, coupled with enhanced measures within wild boar infected areas, including pig movement prohibitions and indoor housing requirements, will continue to provide crucial barriers to the introduction of CSF into the domestic population.  Prohibitions against waste feeding in Hungarian law combined with frequent inspection of farms for waste feeding substantially mitigates the possibility of transmission through this route.
</p>
<p>Provisions in 9 CFR 94.24 for breeding swine, pork and pork products and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine semen substantially mitigate the risk associated with more permissive trade practices with the EU common market by restricting the sourcing of swine for export or slaughter from regions where CSF is known to exist or that are restricted due to CSF.  They also prohibit commingling of live swine, pork, or pork products with such commodities from regions not considered low risk for these diseases and place certain restrictions on the use of transportation equipment for live swine.  Requirements for FSIS inspection and approval of exporting slaughterhouses, as well as approval of semen collection centers by the national government of the exporting country, ensure further mitigation of the export risk. 
</p>
<p>APHIS concludes that there is no evidence that CSF virus currently exists in the domestic swine population in Hungary, although it has been detected in wild boar in two counties within Hungary.  APHIS also concludes mitigations in place within Hungary, including import controls, biosecurity in swine holdings, waste feeding prohibitions, surveillance in domestic swine and wild boar, and control measures in infected areas due to wild boar result in a low risk of the disease entering into swine holdings, particularly commercial holdings that are more likely to trade in swine.  APHIS also concludes that there is an equivalent low level of risk across all of the EU Member States with respect to CSF provided that the restrictions in 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 are applied.  </p>
<p><i>Exposure Assessment
</i></p>
<p>APHIS also assessed the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine populations in the United States to CSF viruses carried by pork or pork products, live swine, and their genetic material imported from Hungary.  The assessment concluded that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to these viruses via waste feeding was low.  Although the unmitigated potential for exposure to these viruses via live animals or genetic material was comparatively high, APHIS concluded that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible U.S. livestock via meat or meat products, live animals, or genetic material from Hungary was low.  
</p>
<p><i>Consequence Assessment
</i></p>
<p>Finally, APHIS assessed the biologic and economic consequences of introducing CSF virus into the United States.  This assessment concluded that CSF virus has the potential to cause significant distress and suffering in affected animals.  The economic costs of control and eradication of this disease would be substantial, and export losses due to restrictions imposed by trade partners on animals and products susceptible to these diseases could run into billions of U.S. dollars.  
</p>
<p><i>Risk Estimation
</i></p>
<p>In summary, although a CSF outbreak in the United States would likely have severe animal health and economic consequences, APHIS considers the risk of infected live swine, pork, or pork products entering the United States from Hungary and exposing U.S. livestock given the mitigations specified in 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38, to be very low.  
</p>
<h1>Introduction
</h1>
<p>Hungary submitted a request to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) in December 2001, seeking recognition as a region free of classical swine fever (CSF).  Upon receipt of this request, APHIS initiated an evaluation of the CSF status of Hungary.  This report represents APHIS’ evaluation of Hungary with regard to the status, infrastructure, and control measures in place for CSF.  It includes an assessment of CSF surveillance measures, import practices, laboratory capacity, emergency response procedures, and other factors that could influence the risk of CSF introduction into the United States. 
</p>
<p>On 1 May 2004, Hungary and nine other countries became new Member States of the European Union (EU).  As part of the accession process, Hungary adopted the decisions and directives of the European Commission (EC) regarding animal health, welfare, and identification, including those pertaining to CSF.  These decisions and directives were transposed into Hungarian law and became the basis for new standard operating procedures by the time of accession.  Hungary also adopted harmonized EC legislation regarding import, export, and trade of live swine, pork, and pork products.
</p>
<p>Previous APHIS analyses of the original 15 Member States, plus four of the ten new Member States as of May 2004 (Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Poland) concluded that the EC control measures for CSF are effective.  Therefore, this evaluation focuses in large part on the implementation of EC controls in Hungary to ascertain whether it should be added to the existing list.  
</p>
<p>Supporting information for this evaluation consists of documentation provided by the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, observations from a site visit conducted in November 2004, information from the OIE, peer-reviewed articles, reports of missions conducted by the Food and Veterinary Office of the European Commission, and other technical sources.  This risk analysis was conducted according to OIE guidelines and therefore includes a hazard identification, a release assessment, an exposure assessment, a consequence assessment, and a risk estimate.  The hazard under consideration is the CSF virus.  
</p>
<h1>Hazard Identification
</h1>
<p>APHIS identifies several animal diseases listed by the OIE as primary hazards when considering trade in animals and animal products from foreign regions.  The foreign animal diseases of primary concern are listed in APHIS regulations.  One of these diseases is CSF.  Since CSF virus is exotic to the United States, before opening trade in live swine, pork, and pork products with a region or country considered to have been affected with CSF, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis to support rulemaking. 
</p>
<p>CSF, also known as hog cholera, is a contagious and economically damaging viral disease of domestic swine and wild boar with worldwide distribution.  It is caused by the CSF virus of the family Flaviviridae, genus <i>Pestivirus </i>[3].  CSF virus is stable between pH 4 and 10 [4] and is also stable at low temperatures [5].  Laboratory confirmation of infection, essential during an outbreak situation, is complicated by the close antigenic relationship of the CSF virus with bovine viral diarrhea virus and border disease virus [3]. 
</p>
<p>The incubation period for CSF is 2-14 days [6].  The virus multiplies in the epithelial crypts of the tonsils and may be carried to local lymph nodes and into the bloodstream for distribution throughout the body [7].  Blood and all tissues, secretions and excretions of sick and dead animals are sources of virus [6].  CSF virus has been recovered from muscle and lymph nodes of infected pigs, and high titers of virus have been isolated from bone marrow [8].  The disease may also be introduced or spread via infected semen [9].  
</p>
<p>CSF can spread in an epidemic form as well as establish enzootic infections in domestic swine and wild boar populations.  Infection generally spreads directly from pig to pig, but products including fresh, frozen, or cured pork can remain infectious to other pigs via the oral route [10].  Imported pig products are frequently implicated in the introduction of CSF virus into previously disease-free regions, primarily through the practice of swill feeding [11].  Dahle and Liess [12] demonstrated that the oral infectious dose of CSF virus is very low.  Indirect transmission may occur via movement of people, wild animals, and inanimate objects such as live-haul trucks [13].
</p>
<p>The role of wild boar as a virus reservoir and possible source of infection for domestic pigs is well known.  Transmission of CSF from wild boar to domestic swine has been reported to occur via direct [14-16] as well as indirect [11, 17] contact, and transmission from domestic swine to wild boar has also been demonstrated to occur [18, 19].  In countries that are free of CSF in domestic swine, epidemics in wild boar are typically initiated by deliberate or accidental swill feeding.  Abnormal mortality and sometimes obviously sick animals are the first indicators of CSF introduction into a wild boar population [20].
</p>
<p>Four distinct clinical forms of CSF have been described, including acute, chronic, congenital, and mild [19, 21].  The acute form involves a disease progression of 2-4 weeks and is characterized by high fever, generalized illness, hemorrhagic lesions, immunosuppression with secondary infections, and high mortality.  The chronic form may last 30-90 days before death and usually involves older swine or congenitally infected piglets.  Congenitally infected piglets may develop symptoms of chronic CSF within 3-6 months, or may never develop symptoms but are persistently viremic and continuously shed virus.  Mild CSF is typically seen only in sows and may result from exposure to a low virulent strain.  Infected sows can continuously shed virus to their young and to other swine they directly contact. 
</p>
<h1>Release Assessment
</h1>
<p>A release assessment describes the biological pathway(s) necessary for an importation activity to introduce pathogenic agents into a particular environment and estimates the probability of that introduction [22].  This release assessment addresses the 11 factors described under 9 CFR 92.2 for evaluation of foreign animal disease status.  Risk factors and issues of concern, which may directly or indirectly affect the risk estimate, are identified during this process and described at greater length in Section 12, including existing mitigation measures.  APHIS evaluated the current status of Hungary with regard to CSF as well as potential pathways for disease introduction that may present a risk for the United States.  <b>
</b></p>
<p><b>Main findings 
</b></p>
<h2>1.
Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services 
</h2>
<p><i>1.1
Organization structure and function of competent authority
</i></p>
<p><i>1.1.1
Central veterinary authority </i></p>
<p>In Hungary, the State Veterinary Service is overseen by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), located in the capital Budapest.  The MARD is responsible for animal health, welfare and feed, and has most of the responsibility for food.  An overview of the Central Veterinary Authority can be found in Figure 1 [23, 24].
</p>
<p>Figure 1. Organization of the State Veterinary Services of Hungary</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image1.emf" alt="image1.emf"></p>
<p>Ref [24]
</p>
<p>Within MARD, the Department of Food Chain Safety, Animal and Plant Health (FCSAPH) was created in August 2006 as part of the reorganization and merger of services within government agencies in an attempt to streamline operations and optimize a shrinking work force [23, 24].  
</p>
<p>In March of 2008 the FCSAPH was divided into two new Departments: the Department for Food Chain Safety (DFCS) and the Department for Food Chain Development (DFCD).  The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) acts as the State Secretary for Food Chain Control, while the Department of Food Chain Safety is headed by the deputy CVO [24].  
</p>
<p>The DFCS is comprised of four divisions, including the division of animal health and welfare, division of administration and coordination, division of food and feed control, and division of plant protection, while the DFCD includes the division of food industry and the division of public relations.  Together they are responsible for strategic planning, legislation, and international affairs for food and feed issues [24].
</p>
<p>Table 1 shows the number of staff positions at the headquarters level, including the total number of available positions as well as filled positions, within the MARD Departments of Food Chain Control and Development.
</p>
<p>Table 1. Staffing of MARD       <img src="embedded:image2.emf" alt="image2.emf"></p>
<p>Ref [24]</p>
<p>The Hungarian Food Safety Office (HFSO) is under the joint control of the Ministry of Health (MH) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MSAL).  The HFSO was established by Government Decree No. 66/2003 under control of the MARD, but in coordination with the MH and MSAL in order to allow the agencies to work together towards ensuring human health and consumer protection and to maintain public confidence in safe and wholesome food.  All authorities responsible for controls of feed and food are required to cooperate with this office under a series of cooperative agreements [23]. 
</p>
<p>The Central Agricultural Office (CAO) was established in January 2007 by Government Decree 274/2006.  The head of the CAO reports to the Minister of MARD, but also acts within the oversight of the State Secretary of Food Chain Control for to operational issues [24].  
</p>
<p>The CAO includes three functional areas, one of which is Food Chain Safety.  The Food Chain Safety branch of the CAO includes five Directorates; the Veterinary Diagnostics Directorate, the Animal Health and Animal Welfare Directorate, the Food and Feed Safety Directorate, the Veterinary Medicinal Products Directorate, the Plant Protection Directorate, and an audit division.  The County Agricultural Offices (County AOs) are also under the supervision of the CAO’s Food Chain Safety branch.  In line with Government Decree 138/2007, most food safety functions which had previously been under the control of the Ministry of Health were reallocated to the CAO as part of the reorganization in 2006 [24]. 
</p>
<p>Staffing levels for the Food Chain Safety branch of the CAO are presented in Table 2.  At the time the information was submitted by Hungary all positions were filled.
</p>
<p>Table 2. Staffing of Food Chain Safety branch of CAO 
</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image3.emf" alt="image3.emf"></p>
<p>Ref [24]</p>
<p>The central competent authorities for animal health are the DFCSAPH and the CAO’s Directorate for Animal Health and Animal Welfare (DAHAW) [23].
</p>
<p>The central animal health authorities are responsible for implementing Community laws, preparing new national regulations that incorporate Commission regulations, reporting to and contact with the OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) and European Commission Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General, coordination of the local authorities, central coordination of the control of CSF should it occur (as the National Epidemiological Center), implementation of the surveillance plan for CSF, planning and conducting simulation exercises for outbreak preparedness purposes, performing risk assessments for the whole country for CSF, and performing data collection, analysis, and strategy planning for animal disease detection, control, and eradication purposes .
</p>
<p><i>1.1.2
Regional Veterinary Services (Administrative Unit)
</i></p>
<p>Hungary is administratively divided into 19 Counties (see Figure 2).  Every County seat as well as Budapest (the capital) contains a County Agricultural Office (County AO), each of which is under the supervision of a Director General.  The County AO serves as the regional branch of the Veterinary Services, and each includes a County Directorate for Food Chain Safety and Animal Health (County DFCSAH). </p>
<p>Figure 2. Map of Hungarian counties
</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image4.png" alt="image4.png"></p>
<p>The total number of staff in the County DFCSAH is approximately 1,660 full time employees, which is a decrease of approximately 500 employees since 2005, including 800 official veterinarians and professionals with university degrees, including other veterinarians, food engineers, and animal nutrition engineers [23, 24].
</p>
<p>The County DFCSAH are responsible for oversight of the District Veterinary Offices (DVO), Food Hygiene units (in charge of licensing and inspection at processing plants), as well as any County laboratories or border inspection posts (BIPs) that are present within the County.  The District Offices (105 total), in turn, oversee the performance of the Official Veterinarians (OVs) as well as private practitioners that have been authorized by the Ministry to carry out animal health duties on behalf of the government.  Along with the District Offices, municipalities may also perform veterinary tasks related to animal health, such as reporting of notifiable diseases, restricting animal movement, and issuing animal passports [23].
</p>
<p>The District animal health authorities are responsible for ensuring that all animal keepers within their jurisdiction are in compliance with the law, maintaining all data concerning their animal health status (including number of animals of different species, number of holdings, etc.), and forwarding these data to the central authorities, and legal coordination of disease control activities in the case of an outbreak (Local Epidemiological Center) [24].  
</p>
<p>In addition, Veterinary Act CLXXVI of 2005 authorizes the Minister, in concert with the Hungarian Chamber of Veterinarians, to mobilize private veterinarians for use in performing public functions when needed[25].  Private veterinarians operating in an official capacity are overseen by the District Office of the jurisdiction in which they operate [23].
</p>
<p>APHIS defines an administrative unit as the smallest jurisdiction that could be demonstrated to have “effective oversight of normal animal movements into, out of, and within that jurisdiction, and that, in association with national authorities, if necessary, has effective control over animal movements and animal diseases locally” [26].  Hungary has defined the County as the smallest administrative unit which is capable of controlling animal movements and diseases [27]. </p>
<p><i>1.2
Legal authority for animal health activities - Incorporation of European Commission (EC) legislation</i></p>
<p>Hungary has been a member of the European Union (EU) since May 1, 2004, and as such, has incorporated EC legislation into its own regulations where applicable.  At the time of its entry, Hungary created a unit (EU Integration and Informatics Division) within its central veterinary offices to explicitly handle the incorporation of EC legislation into Hungarian law.  
</p>
<p>There are three types of EC legislations that are active within Member States:  legislation that is binding for all EU Member States with or without transposition into national legislation (Commission Decisions and Regulations); legislation that must be accepted and enforced by the Member States (Council Directives); and guidelines by which the Member State legislation may enact their own legislation.  The adaptation of these guidelines does not have to be word-for-word; however, the core of the guidelines must be followed by each Member State [28].  
</p>
<p>The primary article of EC legislation pertaining to control of CSF is Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever (as amended) [29].  Hungarian Decree No. 75/2002 (VIII.16.) FVM of MARD contains the transposed rules on prevention, control and eradication of CSF from EU Council Directive 2001/89/EC.  The EC protocols were closely followed when CSF was detected in the wild boar population of Hungary in January of 2007 [27, 30].  Commission Decision 2002/106/EC of 1 February 2002 approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory test for the confirmation of classical swine fever (as amended) is directly applicable to Member States without needing to be transposed [31].
</p>
<p>General requirements regarding animal health have been incorporated into Hungarian law in Veterinary rules Act No. CLXXVI of 2005.  This Act provides for a unified official supervision of veterinary services and lays down the authority for the official veterinary services to rapidly take measures to deal with problems that occur at any point in the food chain.  Articles in this Act cover the organization and duties of the State Veterinary Service, quarantine authority, and provisions for indemnity.  They also address the requirement for animal owners to notify veterinarians of the presence or possibility of animal diseases in their holdings.  In the case of notifiable diseases as provided in the Annex (including CSF), reporting protocols from the veterinarian to the official veterinary services exist, including the provision of penalties for non-reporting [24, 25, 30].  
</p>
<p><i>1.3
Swill feeding prohibition</i></p>
<p>Swill feeding has been banned in Hungary since 2004.  Hungarian Decree No. 71/2003 (VI.27.) FVM on animal by-products not intended for human consumption addresses requirements for handling catering waste and includes a prohibition on feeding this material to all farm animals, including swine [32].  Hungarian Decree No. 75/2002 (VIII.16.) FVM (section 28) also prohibits the feeding of catering waste, including all household waste, to pigs [30, 32].
</p>
<p>Local veterinary officials at the level of the DVO have primary responsibility for oversight of the swill feeding ban at both the production and consumption levels [28].  Backyard farms are inspected by local veterinary officials during the course of all farm visits conducted during the year for any reason.  A checklist is used to verify that swill feeding is not occurring [33].  Only facilities or individuals approved by the State veterinary authority are permitted to receive catering waste.  Swill is permitted to be received by renderers and individuals who maintain dogs, and may be fed to circus animals or at animal shelters.  In the case of dog feeders, farm animals are prohibited from residing on the premises or even at a separate location under common ownership.  According to Hungarian officials, each holding containing swine received a letter from the State Veterinary Services advising them of allowable feeds based on Decree No. 75/2002 after it went into effect [28].
</p>
<p>Establishments that produce catering waste (restaurants, industrial kitchens, etc.) are under the control of the County DFCSAH [32].  Veterinary officials notified each restaurant and catering establishment that they were prohibited from selling their waste to swine owners.  Each establishment is required to maintain a contract with an animal processing plant (typically a renderer) or dog feeder and is required to provide their contracts upon inspection by the official veterinarian [28]. 
</p>
<p>Catering waste from international transport is incinerated under the supervision and control of County veterinary officials [32].
</p>
<p><i>1.4
Financial resources 
</i></p>
<p>According to Act No. CLXXVI of 2005, the necessary costs of executing the duties of the State Veterinary Service are provided for from the central budget and from the administrative service fee revenues [25].     
</p>
<p>The total resources available to the Hungarian State Veterinary Services for 2005 included 20.26 billion HUF (106.2 million USD).  Eleven billion of this originated from administrative service fees while the remainder was derived from the Central Budget.  Of the total amount, 2.73 billion HUF (14.3 million USD) was allocated to pay staff costs (including social security benefits) with the remainder spent on material expenditures.  This amount does not include compensation of producers in the event of an emergency or prevention activities [27].  The amount of compensation funding is planned ahead of time and secured annually within the central budget by the Minister of Agriculture in conjunction with the Minister of Finance (see Section 11 for additional information) [34].</p>
<p>Provisions for compensation to animal owners for animals killed or found dead or of materials, utensils or objects destroyed or animal disposal costs incurred because of any of the notifiable diseases listed in the Annex to the Act (including CSF) are provided for under Article 10 of Act CLXXVI of 2005.  Funding for this purpose is ensured on an annual basis within the central budget.  Compensation is not paid when it has been determined that notifiable conditions were not reported as required or other misconduct has occurred.  In addition, Article 45 enables the DFCSAHs to impose fines in the range of 20,000 to 3 million HUF (125 – 20,000 USD) for all infringements [23, 25].</p>
<p><i>1.4
Audit system </i></p>
<p>The Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) of the EC’s Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General conducts audits of all Member States that include the provisions of any of the agreements on sanitary measures applicable to trade in live animals and animal products with third countries.  Under Commission Decision 98/139/EC [35], the audited Member State must investigate and correct any identified sources of noncompliance within a given timeframe or may face sanctions applied by the EC.
</p>
<p>Additionally, Article 24 of animal health Act No CLXXVI of 2005 spells out the requirement for a nine member body to audit the national control plan for epidemiology, food hygiene, animal welfare, veterinary products and feedstuffs.  The report is provided to the CVO with detailed rules for conduct of the audit provided in Ministerial Decision 1/2006 [23, 24].
</p>
<p>Therefore, Hungary established an independent Audit Division was within the CAO under its Food Chain Safety branch.  Internal checks are carried out by designated experts from the central Directorates of the CAO and will cover the County offices.  The Division will audit headquarter services as well as the County offices.  An SOP (which takes into account Commission Guidelines) for audits and internal checks was adopted in October 2007.  The internal checks were introduced in order to overcome resource constraints in the Audit Division (2.5 FTE).  During 2007, 3 audits and 24 internal checks were conducted, while in 2008 29 audits and 169 internal checks (including 30 with regard to animal health and 60 on food and feed) are planned [23].</p>
<p><i>1.5
Training of Veterinary Personnel
</i></p>
<p>Hungarian officials have developed a number of training options for veterinary professionals.  Simulations are conducted at both the national and County level.  Training for County level veterinary staff is mandatory and must be attended for 1 week every year.  The County level course is offered twice over 2 weeks so that the entire national veterinary force is not absent at the same time.  In addition, there is an ongoing continuing education program.  Training materials reviewed during the APHIS site visit appeared to be focused on several diseases of relevance [28].  
</p>
<p>Other agencies, including those handling human health issues, are occasionally invited to participate in disease simulation exercises.  Additionally, veterinary services officials have conducted training for animal transporters regarding animal welfare, notifiable disease reporting requirements, and epidemiologic issues [28].   
</p>
<p>During the site visit, officials at the County DFCSAH (at the time referred to as the County Animal Health and Food Control Station) described various public outreach programs.  They showed the team members newspaper articles describing CSF as well as a flier that had been developed for hunters.  Publications in veterinary journals were cited, and translations of these were available [28].
</p>
<p>In addition, emergency response training is conducted on a regular basis.  These trainings are held at two levels, one aimed at disease experts and members of the National Disease Control Center (NDCC), and one directed at other staff members.  Training of the expert group is organized four times a year within Hungary for those staff members; in addition, two staff members participate in the annual training course organized by the EC.  Training of support staff occurs both centrally and locally and includes alarm drills at least twice a year with simulation exercises at least twice every five years [32].  
</p>
<p>See additional training for BIP personnel under Section 7.1.2.</p>
<p><i>1.6
Discussion</i></p>
<p>The veterinary service of Hungary appears to have sufficient legal structure and authority to conduct CSF monitoring activities on a regular basis and to act quickly to control the disease if it occurs (as has been seen recently during the detection of CSF in wild boar along the northern border of Hungary with Slovakia; see Section 2). 
</p>
<p>The official veterinary services are well organized at the central, regional and local levels.  Private veterinarians interact well with official veterinarians at the local level with respect to routine functions such as premises registration and swill feeding inspections.  In addition, training activities are regularly carried out at multiple levels, public awareness campaigns are conducted, and contingency plans are kept updated at the regional and local offices visited.  
</p>
<p>Waste feeding to domestic swine has been prohibited and local veterinary officials (in concert with private veterinarians authorized to carry out official functions) are actively involved in regularly monitoring for the possibility of the occurrence of swill feeding on farms.  
</p>
<p>The primary concern is with regard to declining personnel levels and concerns for continuation of some funding sources.  However, to date Hungary appears to be able to maintain daily operational functions through reorganization of the veterinary services in order to streamline staff functions, and also through the employment of additional private veterinarians in performing official functions for disease control purposes as needed (additional funding sources have been legislated for this purpose).  
</p>
<h2>2.
Disease status in the region </h2>
<p>CSF has not been detected in domestic swine in Hungary since 1993.  That outbreak was limited in scope and was quickly eradicated by stamping out.  No additional cases of CSF were detected until January of 2007, when CSF virus was found in a wild boar that had been hunted and killed in Nógrád County, near the border with Slovakia.  Submission of tissues for routine testing revealed the animal to be positive for the presence of CSF virus.  
</p>
<p>2.1
CSF in domestic swine
</p>
<p>The last case of CSF in domestic swine in Hungary occurred in 1993 as part of an outbreak involving four premises in the villages of Mérk and Vállaj, both located in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County near the border with Romania.  The affected holdings were all backyard farms.  The total number of infected pigs was 38 (3 pigs on one premises, 4 pigs on two premises, and 27 pigs on a third premises).  The diagnoses were based on clinical investigation, necropsy, histopathologic examination, and virus detection by immunofluorescence.  All pigs in the infected herds were killed and the premises were disinfected.  Protection and surveillance zones were established around the infected herds and all pig herds in the zones received clinical surveillance, with necropsy and virological testing of all those found dead.  In addition, serologic surveys were conducted in all herds within the zones 30 days after stamping out was completed in the affected herds.  All killed pigs were transported to a designated and supervised processing plant in a closed, approved container [34].
</p>
<p>The source of the infection was not identified.  Spread of the infection within domestic farms in Hungary appeared to be facilitated by the small distance between farms (less than one kilometer between the first two farms); however, the exact mode of transmission was not determined.  Detection of the index case was through passive surveillance based on notification by the owner [32].  The date of detection of the index case was May 19, 1993.  It is estimated that infection was introduced 3-5 days prior [30]. </p>
<p>2.2
CSF in wild boar</p>
<p>In January 2007, CSF virus was identified in five wild boar in Nógrád County, near the border with Slovakia.  An infected area with a boundary of 10 km around each of the three initial outbreak sites was immediately established upon confirmation of the disease and the protective measures specified in Council Directive 2001/89/EC were implemented.  These included a hunting ban, compulsory notification and examination of dead wild boar, localization of wild boar by feeding, required shooting and reporting of all sick wild boar, and increased control of wild boar.  Within the domestic swine population, controls included movement restrictions of domestic swine, a requirement to house domestic swine indoors and prevent any direct or indirect contact with wild boar, registration of all holdings and census of all pigs within the infected zone, and notification of all individuals residing within the infected area of specific measures to be taken [36]. 
</p>
<p>A National CSF Expert Group met on January 25, 2007, and declared the entire County of Nógrád as an infected area.  By this date two additional cases of CSF in wild boar within the County had been detected and the measures above were extended to the entire County.  Additionally, the hunting ban order was refined to prohibit group hunting but to permit individual hunting with a requirement that all shot wild boar be evaluated serologically and virologically [36, 37].  Additional measures were implemented by the Expert Group at this time including the following for domestic pig operations:  required disinfection of personnel entering and exiting pig holding buildings, the use of hygienic measures by all persons coming into contact with wild boar, required testing of all dead or sick pigs with CSF signs of disease on a holding, and a prohibition on the movement of pigs, as well as their semen, embryos or ova from the infected area for intra-Community trade.  In addition, all wild boar shot or found dead within the County were required to be inspected by an official veterinarian and examined for CSF [38].  A public information campaign was carried out within the affected areas [39].
</p>
<p>Additional cases of CSF were found over the next several months, all of which were in the designated infected area.  However, because of cases of CSF found in wild boar in Slovakia in September 2007, just across the border from Pest County, the CSF infected zone in Hungary was extended to include the northern section of Pest County [39].  Shortly after this time, in December 2007, CSF was found in wild boar on the Hungarian side of the border in Pest County.  By July 2008, a total of 195 cases of CSF in wild boar had been identified; 108 in Nógrád County and 87 in Pest County [40].  
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2006/805/EC [41], which established a list of CSF-affected Member States or regions in which CSF had been detected solely in wild boar, included parts of Germany, France and Slovakia, and the entire territory of Bulgaria in November of 2006 when it went into effect.  This legislation established movement restrictions for domestic animals from the affected regions in order to prevent spread of infection to non-affected regions.  Nógrád County in Hungary was added by amendment (Commission Decision 2007/152/EC) in March of 2007 and in December of 2007 Commission Decision 2007/862/EC added an adjoining portion of northern Pest County.  Commission Decision 2008/631/EC extended the date of the restrictions on affected areas to July 31, 2009.</p>
<p>As of June 2008 the National CSF Expert group approved a new CSF Action Plan for the eradication of CSF, which includes several additional measures, primarily the extension of the current CSF infected area to include additional parts of Heves and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén counties (see Figure 3).  The rationale for this action was the finding of cases close to the border of these counties combined with a lack of effective barriers to prevent spread of the disease to the non-infected counties.  The new CSF infected area includes both natural borders (Danube River) and artificial borders (E71 motorway and other main roads) that are more effective in preventing the movement of wild boar [40].
</p>
<p>Figure 3.  Expanded boundary of CSF infected area (in yellow), Hungary, July 2008.
</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image5.emf" alt="image5.emf"></p>
<p>Ref [40]</p>
<p>Additional enhanced elements in the revised Action Plan include more effective control of individual hunting, particularly with respect to the disposal of viscera of wild boars (in a category 1 processing plant, which has been approved to dispose of high risk materials, instead of burial on site), an increase in allowable hunting in the infected area, and additional virological testing in the surveillance zone (10km zone surrounding the infected area) [40].  
</p>
<p>There has been one additional case of CSF detected in wild boar in 2009.  </p>
<p><i>Discussion:  
</i></p>
<p>CSF virus has not been detected in the domestic swine population of Hungary since 1993.  In January 2007 the virus was detected in wild boar in Nógrád County adjacent to the border with Slovakia.  Additional cases were found throughout 2007 and 2008 in Nógrád County as well as Pest County, near the border with Slovakia.  One additional case has been detected in wild boar thus far in 2009.</p>
<p>In response to these cases in wild boar, Hungary has been quick to implement protective measures in the affected area in compliance with EC legislation [29, 31], initially designating an infected zone of 10 km around the first three virus positive cases, and subsequently widening the infected zone to include additional areas when necessary due to the presence of cases or proximity to known cases.  These measures are in addition to the existing biosecurity measures that were already in place prior to the outbreak and which were observed at both backyard farms and large commercial operations containing swine (see Section 8).
</p>
<p>Despite Hungary’s quick and comprehensive response to the initial cases of CSF in wild boar, additional cases were found through enhanced hunter surveillance in the infected area.  The continued presence of CSF in wild boar in many countries adjacent to Hungary (see section 3) poses a concern for continued movement of the virus into the Hungarian wild boar population.  Therefore, additional cases of CSF in wild boar may be found in Hungary.  If this is the case, biosecurity measures as well as garbage feeding prohibitions will become predominant in preventing movement of the disease from wild boar into the domestic swine population, especially commercial swine that will most likely candidates for export to the US.  There is no evidence that CSF has been transmitted from wild boar to domestic swine in Hungary.
</p>
<p>Previous APHIS analyses of CSF in the EU have assumed that endemic disease in wild boar in the EU could potentially be transmitted to domestic animals.  If this were to occur in Hungary the risk of importation of infected swine, pork and pork products and swine semen would be mitigated by the restrictions imposed by 9 CFR 94.24 and 9 CFR 98.38.   </p>
<h2>3.
The status of adjacent regions with respect to the agent</h2>
<p>Hungary shares a border with seven countries (see Figure 4), four of which are members of the EU (Austria, Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia), and three of which are EC designated third countries (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Ukraine).  Romania joined the EU most recently, on January 1, 2007. 
</p>
<p>Figure 4.  Map of Hungary and surrounding countries.
</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image6.png" alt="image6.png"></p>
<p>Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook
</p>
<p>APHIS recognizes Austria in 9 CFR 94.9 and 94.10 as part of an EU region that is low risk for CSF.  As a low-risk region, Austria can export breeding swine, pork, and pork products to the United States provided they meet certain mitigating conditions specified in 9 CFR 94.24.  According to the OIE website, the last outbreak of CSF in Austria was in wild boar in 2001 [42]. 
</p>
<p>APHIS is currently evaluating the CSF status of both Slovakia and Slovenia.  Slovakia has detected cases of CSF in domestic swine as recently as July 2008 in a backyard pig farm located near the border with Hungary, across from Pest County in the same district (Levice) as a case of disease in wild boar identified in February of the same year (XS).  Cases of CSF in wild boar have been identified continuously within a belt across Slovakia from Hungary to the Czech Republic, which is defined as a restricted zone for CSF according to Commission Decision 2006/805/EC.  The number of cases of CSF in the wild boar population appears to be in decline, likely as a result of a vaccination program in this population [43].  Slovenia has not reported a case of CSF since 1996, at which time an outbreak in domestic swine was identified in Domžale, which is located in the center of the country.  After stamping out and disinfection were completed no further cases were reported.  No occurrences of CSF in wild boar have been found since 1996 [42].  APHIS does not consider either of these countries to pose undue risk to the domestic swine population of Hungary.
</p>
<p>Croatia reported a series of outbreaks of CSF in domestic swine throughout the country beginning in July 2006 through April 2008, including several outbreaks between 20 and 50 km from the border with Hungary (near Zala and Somogy counties in Hungary).  In total 129 outbreaks were confirmed in over 11 counties.  CSF was also detected in wild boar in Vukovarsko-Srijemska County, Croatia, approximately 50 miles from the border with Hungary.  As of May, 2008 the outbreak was determined to be extinguished and protective measures lifted [44].  APHIS has not evaluated Croatia for CSF.
</p>
<p>According to OIE, Serbia and Montenegro was known to have had widespread CSF in its domestic swine population as recently as 2005.  Subsequent vaccination in the domestic swine population was implemented in order to control the outbreak [44].  Data for more recent periods are not available; however, no evidence suggests that CSF has been eradicated in this country.  Additionally, APHIS has not evaluated Serbia and Montenegro and does not currently recognize Serbia and Montenegro as free of CSF.    
</p>
<p>According to the OIE, Ukraine reported its last CSF outbreak in July 2001 [42].  The outbreak was in wild boar located in the forested zone of Trachtemirivskae regional landscape park, which is centrally located within Ukraine.  Disease control measures included quarantine, hunting of weak or sick animals, and vaccination of all domestic swine within a 3-km radius.  The quarantine on the park was lifted in August 2001 [45].  APHIS has not evaluated the CSF status of Ukraine and, consequently, does not currently recognize Ukraine as CSF-free.
</p>
<p>CSF has been enzootic within the entire territory of Romania for the last few years, but currently appears to be under control.  Upon becoming a member of the EU (approved by Commission Decision 2006/802/EC [46]), Romania implemented a national control program which has subsequent been updated and approved for 2008 (Commission Decision 2007/870/EC).  The program currently encompasses vaccination of domestic pigs in both commercial and non-commercial holdings and oral vaccination of wild boar.  During 2005, there were 1504 documented outbreaks in domestic pigs, in 2006 there were 803 reported outbreaks, and in 2007 there were 168 outbreaks in domestic pigs.  So far there have been no outbreaks reported in domestic pigs for 2008 [47].  
</p>
<p>As per Commission Decision 2006/779/EC, amended by Commission Decision 2007/630/EC) [48], live pigs, as well as porcine semen, ova and embryos and pig meat products (excepting heat treated products) from Romania are not permitted into the EU until December 31, 2009.  The time period has been extended once and, if necessary, may be reevaluated for further extension as necessary.  
</p>
<p><i>Discussion:
</i></p>
<p>Five of the seven countries surrounding Hungary have a current or recent history of CSF in their domestic and/or wild boar populations, with some outbreaks occurring near to the Hungarian border.  It should be expected that these countries will continue to provide a potential source of infection for Hungary’s wild boar population, as evidenced by the initial identification of infected wild boar in Hungary adjacent to the border with Slovakia.  Also, in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region, APHIS has concluded that the risk of endemic CSF in wild boar being transmitted to commercial swine is sufficiently mitigated by the harmonized control measures in place [1, 2], and this evaluation suggests that conclusion should apply equally to Hungary.
</p>
<p>In addition, Hungary has demonstrated its ability to detect cases of CSF in wild boar through surveillance measures.  Veterinary officials have acted quickly and effectively in imposing restrictions aimed at limiting the opportunity of the virus to move from the wild boar population to domestic swine and implementing enhanced surveillance measures to detect the virus if it were to enter this population.
</p>
<h2>4.
The extent of an active disease control program
</h2>
<p>In response to the detection of CSF in wild boar along the border with Slovakia, Hungary has continued to exercise disease control and prevention measures within the infected area and surveillance zone as prescribed in Hungarian Decree 75/2002 and in the contingency plan for CSF in accordance with Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 [27, 32, 39].  </p>
<p>Disease control measures in wild boar located in the infected area include the implementation of hunting restrictions, including prohibitions on group hunting, but continued allowance of individual hunting with the requirement that all shot boar must be evaluated both serologically and virologically.  In addition, all wild boar shot or found dead within the affected County are required to be inspected by an official veterinarian and examined for CSF [36-38].
</p>
<p>In domestic swine located within the infected zone, many control activities are either heightened or enhanced.  The additional activities initially included carrying out a census of all categories of pigs on all holdings within the infected area by local veterinary services personnel.  Also included are the following measures:  implementation of enhanced biosecurity measures on farms in the infected area, such as required disinfection of personnel entering and exiting pig holding buildings; the use of appropriate hygienic measures by all persons coming into contact with wild boar; mandatory indoor housing of swine; and enhanced reporting requirements for signs of disease in domestic swine.  All pigs found sick or dead are required to be tested for CSF.  Also, a prohibition on the movement of swine and pork products, including semen and embryos or ova from the infected area for intra-Community trade was instituted as part of Commission Decision 2006/805/EC [38].  
</p>
<p>These activities have been conducted under the guidance of the National Expert Group for CSF, in accordance with Hungary’s contingency plan for CSF (see Section 11 for additional information).  Hungarian officials are not conducting active disease control for CSF in areas outside of the infected zone; however, CSF surveillance is ongoing throughout the country (see Section 9).
</p>
<p><i>Discussion:  
</i></p>
<p>The CSF situation in wild boar in Hungary continues to be monitored closely by Hungarian officials.  Domestic swine farms in the infected region are under increased surveillance and have all been registered and inventoried at the time of this report.  Enhanced inspections and surveillance, as well as movement restrictions, will remain in effect in pig holdings in the infected area until two years after the last virologically confirmed case.  Enhanced monitoring measures in wild boar are required to stay in place for one year after the last detection of confirmed CSF in wild boar per Hungarian Decree 75/2002 [27].  
</p>
<p>Hungary appears to have addressed this disease incursion in a timely and effective manner, and has been able to implement necessary measures to prevent the disease from entering into the domestic swine population.  
</p>
<h2>5.
Vaccination status of the region 
</h2>
<p>Hungary does not currently vaccinate against CSF in its domestic swine or wild boar populations.  Vaccination for CSF has been prohibited since 1974 [27, 34].  The current CSF outbreak in the wild boar population has so far been managed through population control and surveillance.  However, the CSF contingency plan for Hungary, which has been filed with and approved by the EC as specified in the Corrigendum to Commission Decision 2004/431/EC, contains provisions for emergency vaccination in the domestic swine population should such measures become necessary [49].  Outlines of campaigns for both domestic swine and wild boar are contained in Decree No. 75/2002. (VIII.16).   Vaccines for use in domestic swine may only be administered by a vaccination brigade through an emergency Vaccination Center (located within or in close cooperation with the Local Disease Control Centre) [32].  
</p>
<p>Although Hungary does not currently conduct a vaccination program against CSF in domestic or wild swine, some of its neighboring countries do.  Both Slovakia [50] and Romania [46] have applied oral CSF vaccination in their wild boar populations.  Additionally, Romania is also vaccinating its domestic swine populations using the conventional attenuated vaccine in pigs located in smaller pig holdings and a marker vaccine in pigs located large pig holdings [46].    
</p>
<p><i>Discussion:</i>  
</p>
<p>Hungary no longer vaccinates for CSF.  However, since vaccination does occur in wild boar in some neighboring countries (i.e. Slovakia and Romania) it is possible that antibodies to CSF may occur in wild boar found within Hungary near the borders of these countries, making interpretation of serologic results more complicated.  Hungarian officials are aware of the situation and are prepared to take it under consideration if warranted.</p>
<h2>6.
Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk   
</h2>
<p>There are few natural barriers to animal or human movement along the majority of the Hungary’s borders [34].  The most significant natural barrier is the Danube River, which constitutes a portion of the border with Slovakia.  Consequently, there are few natural barriers to disease transmission from neighboring countries.</p>
<p>The risk of pork products smuggled through human movement from these countries is mainly addressed by Customs officials who monitor passenger traffic at non-BIP crossings (see section 7.1.3) and the Frontier Guard, which is charged under Hungarian Act XXXII of 1997 to control the border line of Hungary [32]. 
</p>
<p><i>Discussion:  
</i></p>
<p>The general lack of natural impediments to animal or human movement into Hungary from neighboring regions is a risk factor for the spread of CSF; however this risk is partially alleviated by the presence of BIP and non-BIP crossing points, which are discussed in Section 7.  More specifically, there is the concern of the presence of CSF within wild boar reservoirs in several countries surrounding Hungary (see Section 3) which can move unimpeded into and out of Hungary.  Accordingly, surveillance within the wild boar population of Hungary is conducted more heavily in Counties lining the border with neighboring countries in order to hasten detection should CSF be introduced into the country through migrating wild boar [32].  
</p>
<h2>7.
Movement control and biosecurity from regions of higher risk 
</h2>
<p><i>7.1
Movement of lives swine, pork and pork  products from third countries
</i></p>
<p><i>7.1.1
Legislative and procedural requirements for importation into the EU 
</i></p>
<p>As an EU Member State, Hungary is obligated to comply with EC measures regarding movement of animals and animal products into, between, and across Member States.  The APHIS site visit team evaluated the efficacy with which Hungarian officials have addressed the procedures and legal guidance in this section.
</p>
<p>Only third countries approved by the EU’s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) are permitted to export live animals and animal products to EU Member States.  Approval is based on fulfillment of several factors, including adequacy of the exporting country’s animal health programs, the existence of pertinent animal-related legislation, the presence of a competent veterinary authority, membership in the OIE, and emergency disease response capabilities.  These requirements ensure that the country meets animal health standards that are at least equivalent to those required of EU Member States.  A current list of approved third countries, along with specific animals and products each has approval to export, is contained in EC Council Decision 79/542 [51].  
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2002/613/EC specifies the import conditions for swine semen,
</p>
<p>including a list of authorized third countries, the veterinary requirements, and a list of
</p>
<p>approved semen collection centers.  
</p>
<p>Upon entry into the EU, animals and animal products must be accompanied by the appropriate health certification documents and are also subject to border veterinary check procedures laid down in EU legislation.  (Refer to Council Directives 91/496/EEC [52] and 92/65/EEC [53] for live animals and Council Directive 97/78/EC [54] and Regulation No 1774/2002 [55] for animal products.)  Veterinary checks must include at least a systematic documentation check, an identity check, and, under some circumstances, a physical check.  Veterinary certificates are required to be signed by an official veterinarian (or an official inspector) and must comply with the provisions as defined in Council Directive 96/93/EC [56, 57].
</p>
<p>All consignments of animals or animal products must enter into the EU via an approved Border Inspection Post (BIP) located within a Member State.  The BIP must be inspected and approved by the FVO.  Requirements for certification and approval of BIPs are provided in EU Commission Decision 2001/812/EC [58].  An updated list of approved BIPs is provided in Commission Decision 2001/881/EC [59], as amended.  BIPs are placed under the control of official veterinarians within the Member State in which the BIP is located; in Hungary, the County DFCSAH offices employ official veterinarians who are responsible for carrying out the health checks on incoming consignments [56].
</p>
<p>Information contained in veterinary documents for incoming shipments, including the common veterinary entry document (CVED), is entered into a central database.  The database used to capture incoming shipments (as well as animal movement between Member States) is the Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES).  TRACES is fully implemented in Hungary [27].  </p>
<p>Once the shipment arrives at the BIP, the following activities occur for both live animals and products:  a document check; an identity check or visual confirmation of correct ear tags, tattoos, etc.; and a general physical examination with a percentage of the shipment singled out for a more thorough examination.  If the inspection is satisfactorily completed, an official veterinarian completes and signs the CVED, and the original of the CVED accompanies the shipment to the point of destination.  Consignments which are found not to be compliant with Community legislation will either be destroyed or, under certain conditions, re-dispatched within 60 days if requirements have been met [56].
</p>
<p>According to Hungarian officials, a consignment is refused entry if there is a significant problem.  In some cases, when the infraction is minor (such as an oversight on the paperwork) the consignor is allowed extra time to fix the problem.  In these cases, the problem must be fixed within 8 working days or the consignment will be destroyed [28].  
</p>
<p>Seized goods are refrigerated in the seizure box and a register of collected items is maintained.  Animal Health and Food Control maintains an agreement with the company that incinerates confiscated goods if they must be destroyed (rendering companies must be approved in accordance with Council Regulation 1774/2002 for all category 1 materials including international catering waste and specified risk materials [60]).  Improper veterinary certification was the most common reason for rejecting shipments at the airport BIPs in Hungary [28].
</p>
<p>Commission Regulation 745/2004 [61] dictates that posters to promote public awareness of prohibited meat, milk, and their products must be prominently posted at all border crossings.  
</p>
<p>On occasions where the live animal station is separate from the BIP, a truck is used to transport the animal(s) to the inspection station.  The State Veterinary Service has a contract with Customs to accompany the transport truck to the point where it is met by veterinary officials who accompany the shipment to the inspection station.  All documentation and identification checks are done at the border, but physical checks must be conducted at the inspection station [28].  
</p>
<p><i>7.1.2
Border Inspection Posts
</i></p>
<p>Hungary currently contains seven EC-approved BIPs with veterinary controls.  These are the required entry points for animals and animal products from third countries.  Prior to its accession to the EU, Hungary maintained 27 BIPs [34].  The seven BIPs, which are stationed along the borders with Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia include one airport, three rail crossings, and three road crossings.  A road BIP at Nagylak, between Hungary and Romania, was decommissioned as of January 1, 2007, according to Commission Decision 2006/926/EC [62] (amending Commission Decision 2001/881/EC [59]) due to the accession of Romania to the European Union on that date.  Oversight and administrative responsibilities of the BIP are primarily handled at the central level (by the FCSAPHD), while staffing is handled at the County level [34, 60].  There were between five and fifteen official veterinarians employed at BIPs visited during the APHIS site visit along with additional veterinary technicians and in some cases administrative staff at the busier crossings [28].  
</p>
<p>All proposed BIPs in EU Member States must be inspected by the FVO prior to approval, and once they have been approved they must annually pass an FVO inspection.  If the initial inspections are acceptable, the frequency of inspections may be extended to no less than once every three years [32, 60].  Live animals and their products are permitted to move only through the BIPs staffed with official veterinarians [32].  A list of the seven current BIPs is provided below in Table 3.  All were approved by the FVO.
</p>
<p>Table 3.  Hungarian Border Inspection Posts 
</p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Location</p>
</td>	<td><p>Type of BIP</p>
</td>	<td><p>Bordering country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Animal products permitted into Hungary via the BIP</p>
</td>	<td><p>Live animal species permitted into Hungary</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Budapest</p>
</td>	<td><p>Airport</p>
</td>	<td><p>N/A</p>
</td>	<td><p>All products for human consumption, and not for human consumption (both chilled and those without temperature requriements)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Other Animals (including zoo)</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Eperjeske</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rail</p>
</td>	<td><p>Ukraine</p>
</td>	<td><p>Products for human consumption (chilled and those without temperature requirements), and not for human consumption (chilled and no temperature requirements)</p>
</td>	<td><p>None</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Gyékényes</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rail</p>
</td>	<td><p>Croatia</p>
</td>	<td><p>All products for human consumption and not for human consumption</p>
</td>	<td><p>None</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Kelebia</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rail</p>
</td>	<td><p>Serbia and Montenegro</p>
</td>	<td><p>Products for human consumption (chilled and those without temperature requirements), and not for human consumption (chilled and no temperature requirements)</p>
</td>	<td><p>None</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Záhony </p>
</td>	<td><p>Road</p>
</td>	<td><p>Ukraine</p>
</td>	<td><p>All products for human consumption and products not for human consumption without temperature requirements</p>
</td>	<td><p>Ungulates and Equine</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Röszke </p>
</td>	<td><p>Road</p>
</td>	<td><p>Serbia and Montenegro</p>
</td>	<td><p>All products for human consumption and products not for human consumption without temperature requirements</p>
</td>	<td><p>Equine</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Letenye </p>
</td>	<td><p>Road</p>
</td>	<td><p>Croatia</p>
</td>	<td><p>All products for human consumption and products not for human consumption without temperature requirements</p>
</td>	<td><p>None</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p> ref [59]</p>
<p>All of the approved Hungarian BIPs were built or remodeled to meet EC specifications as described by Annex II of Council Directive 97/78/EC and Commission Decision 2001/812/EC.  Hungary started development of their BIPs in 1998.  Construction was co-financed by the Hungarian government with the EU providing remaining funds with daily operating expenses coming from the Hungarian budget [28].
</p>
<p>BIP staff are technically employed by the County DFCSAH office in which they are located; however, they are under the direct supervisory and administrative responsibility of the MARD office in Budapest.  According to both an FVO report and the APHIS site visit, the overall number of veterinary staff in the BIPs were sufficient in relation to the consignments received [28, 60].  
</p>
<p>Multiple trainings have been organized for BIP employees (with additional training for Customs agents).  Greek officials held a training program for Hungarian officials under the Twinning Project that consisted of a 3-day seminar just prior to the APHIS site visit, with the purpose of ensuring that all BIP employees are trained for product and live animal control [28].  
</p>
<p>Additionally, Customs officials at both the BIPs and crossing points are trained at both the Central and Regional levels [32].  For example, on November 9, 2004, veterinary officials conducted a one-day seminar on passenger controls with Customs and veterinary service officials employed at the border crossing points.  Veterinary officials invited 45 Customs Officers and 50 veterinarians [28].  
</p>
<p>Training was also provided as part of TAIEX (the Techincal Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument of the Institution Building Unit of Directorate-General Enlargement of the European Commission) for the BIPs during April/May 2004 [60].  The goal of TAIEX is to provide the new Member States and candidate countries short-term technical assistance, in line with the overall policy objectives of the EC, in the application and enforcement of EU legislation [63].  </p>
<p>During the site visit, the APHIS site visit team observed that biosecurity measures were followed at the BIPs that were visited, including personnel changing clothes prior to entering the live animal section or any other section of the BIP for processing shipments, donning protective clothing and sanitizing their hands.  Additionally, disinfection facilities were observed in the products unit [28].
</p>
<p>Disinfection is required between handling products for non-human and human consumption.  Separate areas are maintained for live animals and products for both human and non-human consumption at all facilities.  Additionally, separate entry facilities for live ungulates and other live animals, products of animal origin for human consumption, and products of animal origin not for human consumption were observed [28].  
</p>
<p><i>7.1.3
Customs and the Hungarian Frontier Guard at BIP and non-BIP crossing points
</i></p>
<p>Passenger and pet control activities are also conducted at crossing points from third countries into Hungary that are not co-located with BIPs.  Both the Frontier Guard and Customs Officers are involved in carrying out checks at these locations.  The number of these Community entry points, as of 2005, was 43 [27].  The Hungarian Frontier Guard Service is a military organization which has the task of controlling the Frontier borders of Hungary according to Hungarian Act XXXII of 1997.  Customs officials at BIPs as well as crossing points are trained at both the Central and Regional levels [32].  Both departments appeared familiar with the EU requirements during the site visit [28].
</p>
<p>The EU has measures in place to prohibit all personal consignments of meat, meat products, milk and milk products from entering the EU, including packages sent to private persons, unless the consignments have been specifically authorized and permitted and subject to declaration of the goods on arrival.  Specific provisions are in place regarding Member State controls at EU entry points not associated with BIPs in order to detect the presence of illegal consignments.  These provisions include the use of detection aids such as scanning equipment and sniffer dogs where necessary, seizure and destruction of personal consignments that are in violation of the rules, and penalties on travelers who are found to be in violation of the rules [56].  Hungary conducts both random and targeted searches and, as required under Commission Regulation 745/2004, and provides an annual report to the EU listing the amounts of seized products and identifying high risk countries [27].  
</p>
<p>Although veterinary officials at the BIPs do not have access to the Customs database, there appeared to be good communication between the two agencies during the APHIS site visit.  Customs officials have historically notified veterinary officials of any incoming shipments that they had not been made aware of or when they find small food consignments or prohibited goods in a passenger’s possession [28].  Cross checks between the two authorities also provide for safe import control measures and traceability [32]. 
</p>
<p>As required under Commission Regulation 745/2004, Hungary provided a copy of their 2005 annual report to the EU listing the amounts of seized products and high risk countries, which includes information from Customs [27] (see table provided in Appendix 1).  Records on third countries where illegal consignments were most frequently found were used in targeting inspections to passengers originating from those countries [27, 28].  Additionally, records of individual importers with a history of problems are also maintained for the purpose of targeting inspections [28]. 
</p>
<p>Posters notifying travelers of prohibited items according to Commission Regulation 745/2004 are required to be displayed both at BIP and non-BIP border crossings [61].  When asked by the APHIS site review team about posters the team was advised that signs advising passengers of prohibited products were issued by the European Commission at the airport.  A sample poster was provided by Hungarian Veterinary Officials; however, none of the review team recalled observing the posters at the Budapest airport upon arrival, although they did notice signs at the airport in Frankfurt, Germany prior to boarding the airplane to Budapest [28].  Additionally, informational posters were reported to have been seen during the FVO inspection, although these were not displayed in the manner required by Commission Regulation 745/2004 [60].
</p>
<p><i>7.1.4
Transit controls
</i></p>
<p>Transit of products across EU member States from one third country to another is allowed under EC legislation, provided that there are no restrictions on the source country (see Council Directive 97/78/EEC [54, 64], Commission Decision 2000/208 [65], and Corrigendum to Council Directive 2004/68/EC [54, 64]).  Seals are applied to the conveyance at the point of origin in the third country (officials at the point of departure from the departure country can break and replace the seal for inspection purposes).  A Customs Officer at the BIP at the point of entry into the EU Member State records the seal number and breaks the seal upon arrival in order to complete document and identity checks, but no further unloading or alteration of the cargo is allowed while in the transited country.  TRACES is used to track movement of the shipment into and out of the Member State [56].  According to Council Directive 97/78 EC, in-transit product shipments must be at the exit point within 30 days from the date of departure of the BIP of entry.</p>
<p><i>7.2
Controls on intra-Community trade
</i></p>
<p>Trade in live animals and animal products within the EU is primarily governed by a series of Council Directives that must be transposed by the individual Member States, including Council Directives 64/432/EC and 89/662 EC, and 97/12/EC [66-68] (checks on products), Council Directives 90/425/EC [69] (checks on live animals), 96/93/EC (health certificates), and 91/628/EC [70] (transport), as well as Commission Decision 98/139/EC [71] (spot checks).  Shipments to EU markets that cross Member State borders must originate from holdings, markets, or assembly centers that are subject to regular veterinary checks, and animals are required to remain on the holding of dispatch for at least 30 days prior to trade. All live animals and animal products, including semen and embryos, must be accompanied by the appropriate certificate as specified in EC legislation.  An official veterinarian certifies the health certificate and supervises the loading and unloading of animals or products.  The shipment is entered into TRACES, which triggers electronic notification of the point of destination as well as any border crossing points.  An official veterinarian at the point of destination confirms the arrival of the approved products along with the appropriate documentation [56].  
</p>
<p>As an EU Member State, Hungary is free to engage in intra-Community trade with any other Member State as governed by EC legislation.  Hungarian officials indicated that appropriate EC legislation governing intra-Community trade has been transposed into Hungarian legislation [32].  
</p>
<p>Since the CSF virus is present in all or part of some EU Member States, there is EC legislation that restricts trade from the affected region in order to prevent introduction of the virus into free areas of the EU.  Commission Decision 2006/805/EC prohibits trade of porcine semen, ova, and embryos from infected areas, and substantially limits trade in live swine from affected regions within the EU.  Restricted regions include all of Bulgaria and parts of Germany, France, Slovakia, and Hungary.  Commission Decision 2006/779/EC recognizes the entire territory of Romania as a restricted region for CSF and institutes the same restrictions throughout this State.  As per Commission Decision 2007/630/EC, the ban is currently set to remain in place until December 31, 2009, at which point it will be reconsidered taking into account the CSF situation in Romania.  
</p>
<p>As a result of Romania’s accession to the EU, there is no longer a BIP between Hungary and Romania (the previously existing road BIP at Nagylak was disbanded).  Romania continues to experience outbreaks of CSF in wild boar and domestic pigs.  In order to enforce the restrictions laid out in Commission Decision 2006/779/EC, Hungary has provided for enhanced checks at and near the border.  These include inspection of passenger baggage of Romanians crossing the border (conducted at the border) and also some joint border control/veterinary services "squadrons" that pull over trucks and buses coming from Romania for random checks to ensure there are no forbidden pork products being brought in from Romania.  The latter checks are conducted within an area of about 50 km from the Romanian border on the Hungarian side [72].</p>
<p>In addition, Title 9 CFR94.24 and 9 CFR 98.38 prohibit importation of breeding swine, pork or pork products, and semen into the United States from restricted zones.  Further, 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 also prohibit importation of swine or pork products that have commingled with swine or pork products derived from swine from a restricted zone prior to the lifting of restrictions.  Import of swine or pork products that have transited a restricted area is only permitted if the means of conveyance was sealed and the seal remained intact upon arrival at the point of destination.
</p>
<p><i>7.3
Volume and type of swine and pork imports 
</i></p>
<p>Live swine and swine products are harmonized commodities under EC legislation, which means that the requirements for importation from third countries are standardized across all of the Member States.  Live swine may only be imported from third countries approved by the EC to export live swine to Member States.  Approved third countries include Switzerland (domestic swine for breeding or slaughter and wild boar), Chile (domestic swine for breeding purposes only and wild boar), Canada (domestic swine for breeding only), and New Zealand and Iceland (domestic swine for breeding or slaughter).  Fresh pork products are only permitted from the following third countries:  Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, New Zealand, and the United States, according to Council Decision 79/542/EEC.  APHIS considers all of these countries except for Switzerland (which has not been evaluated by APHIS) to be free of CSF (with certain restrictions placed on Chile in 9 CFR 94.25).  
</p>
<p>According to data on the Global Trade Atlas Navigator website [73], since its accession to the EU, Hungary has imported live swine and pork almost exclusively from within the EU Community.  There were two exceptions, both from 2006, including the importation of nineteen tons of swine meat from Romania and two live swine from Norway, which is recognized by APHIS as free of CSF in 9 CFR 94.9 (see Appendix 2).  Romania was an approved third country for meat from both wild and domestic swine at the time of the importation; however, since its accession to the EU, import of live swine, swine semen, ova, and embryos, pork and pork products has been prohibited to Member States (Commission Decision 2006/779/EC, as amended [48]).
</p>
<p>Additional products, such as fresh and frozen edible offal have originated entirely from EU Member States according to the Global Trade Atlas website [73].
</p>
<p><i>Discussion</i> 
</p>
<p>Requirements for BIP facilities throughout the EU are standardized, and the facilities are closely monitored by the FVO.  In this regard, Hungary’s BIP facilities were determined to be adequate in terms of infrastructure and biosecurity practices.  Staffing levels appeared to be adequate relative to the workload as of the FVO review and the APHIS site visit in 2004.  The volume of inspection at the BIPs visited by the APHIS team in November 2004 was generally light, and the facilities were operating well within the scope of their resources.  The veterinary inspectors appeared to understand the pertinent EC legislation and were confident in their job skills.  Each BIP is inspected at least annually by headquarters and is audited by the FVO at least once every three years.
</p>
<p>Hungary is a net importer of live swine.  During the past three years, Hungary has imported thousands of live swine from new Member States, some of which are currently under evaluation by APHIS.  For example, Hungary has imported several thousand tons of swine meat from Slovakia, which is currently undergoing evaluation by APHIS and includes restricted areas for CSF, and Romania, which APHIS has not yet evaluated for CSF and considers CSF-affected.
</p>
<p>In order to reduce the risk of introducing CSF from affected Member States, EC legislation[41, 74] prohibits movement of swine and fresh pork from areas known to be infected with CSF, although some movement of live animals is permitted under controlled circumstances.  For instance, due to the ongoing outbreaks of CSF in both domestic pigs and wild boar in Romania, the import of live swine, swine semen, pork and pork products from Romania has been prohibited entry into the EU.  In general, EC control measures appear to be effective once an outbreak is detected; however, outbreaks have occurred outside of established control zones, and commodities could theoretically be sourced from these areas before an outbreak is detected.  Measures currently in place in Hungary that enforce restrictions on importing pork and pork products from other Member States appear effective.  
</p>
<p>Import controls and procedures in Hungary appear to be sufficient to prevent the introduction of CSF into Hungary through live swine and their products.  As an EU Member State, Hungary may only import swine, pork and pork products, and semen from EU-approved third countries, and must follow applicable import procedures, which appear to be in place and adequately enforced.  Illegal movements of animals and products are monitored by a combination of Customs officials, the Frontier Guard, and BIP personnel.  Border control and Customs agents interact with the Veterinary Services in the oversight of border movements.  There is concern, however, regarding live haul trucks not being routinely disinfected when entering Hungary; however, this practice is regularly conducted should an outbreak in a neighboring country be detected and the risk of these vehicles transporting the agent into Hungary is low.  </p>
<p>The overall risk of introducing CSF into Hungary through movement of swine or pork products from other countries, either Member States or third countries, given the protective mechanisms that are in place, is low.
</p>
<h2>8.
Livestock demographics and marketing practices</h2>
<p><i>8.1.
Livestock demographics
</i></p>
<p><i>8.1.1.
Domestic swine population</i></p>
<p>The domestic swine population in Hungary has declined from an all time high of close to 10 million animals in the 1980s to approximately 3.3 million as of 2007 [24, 75, 76].  Pig holdings tend to be concentrated in counties located in the south and east of Hungary, along the border with Romania, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro, but there are some foci of industry in Gy<b>ő</b>r-Moson-Soprom and Komárom-Esztergom counties along the far west border with Slovakia.  This is generally in contrast to the presence of high concentrations of wild boar (> 100 wild boar/200 km2), which tend be located within the northwestern region of Hungary (refer to section 8.2).  There is some overlap of the two populations, especially in Gy<b>ő</b>r-Moson-Soprom and Komárom-Esztergom counties, on the western border with Slovakia and Baranya and Tolna counties, on the eastern border with Croatia (see Figure 5 below for a map displaying counties in Hungary) [28, 34].  </p>
<p>Figure 5.  Map of Hungarian Counties.
</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image7.jpg" alt="image7.jpg"></p>
<p>http://www.jcu.edu/language/hunghemu/map-counties.jpg
</p>
<p>The number of pig holdings has also declined since the 1980s, with the greatest reduction seen in small farms [28, 76].  In the past, many people raised their own pigs for personal consumption, but today swine farms are mostly concentrated into larger scale operations [28].  Hungary has defined large and small scale pig farms as those comprised of more than 100 pigs and those with 100 or fewer pigs, respectively.  Seventy percent of slaughtered pigs, as well as most pigs destined for export, originate from large-scale farms [28, 34].</p>
<p><i>8.1.2.
Biosecurity on swine holdings
</i></p>
<p>The veterinary duties of local veterinary offices include inspecting and licensing large pig holdings.  Inspections take into account waste disposal practices, adequacy of fencing to prohibit contact with humans or other animals, changing/shower room facilities, adequacy of necropsy and cleaning and disinfection facilities, and carcass storage area.  For small holdings, veterinary officials verify that changing and disinfection rooms are available and that buildings where animals are kept are separated from main traffic areas [30].  Compliance with the swill feeding ban is documented every time an official veterinarian enters a pig holding for any purpose [32].</p>
<p>During visits to commercial operations made during the APHIS site visit, many overlapping biosecurity measures were observed, including the use of truck washing facilities (often at multiple sites within the facility); appropriately segregated feed, bedding, and loading sites; dirty and clean showering and changing facilities for employees, as well as visitors in some cases; foot baths and hand-washing areas; and permitting procedures for visitors (under the control of the County DFCSAH).  Additionally, all animals were housed within buildings and fencing was adequate to prevent human and wild animal incursions.  It was mentioned at some of the facilities that employees were prohibited from owning pigs and also from bringing in their own food from outside the facility.  One facility maintained guard dogs within the outer perimeter fencing [28].  
</p>
<p>On the small farms visited, APHIS team members observed that hand-washing areas and the use of foot baths were enforced.  Animals on the farms that were visited were housed primarily indoors.  In Hungary, fences are commonly used, and when pigs were seen outdoors during the site visit they were usually confined by fencing [28].</p>
<p><i>8.2.
Wild boar distribution
</i></p>
<p>Wild boar are present throughout Hungary, and are occasionally seen in cities.  The number of wild boar in Hungary in 2005 was estimated to be 78,000, with the highest densities of animals located in the north and west of the country [27].   This number is down from over 90,000 wild boar reported as of 2002 [28].
</p>
<p>Although most of the domestic swine industry is concentrated in the southeastern region of Hungary, where the wild boar density is at its lowest, there is some overlap as described in section 8.1.1.
</p>
<p>8.3.
<i>Animal identification</i></p>
<p>EC regulations require swine to be identified by holding only; however, in Hungary, individual identification is required for testing purposes and in high value breeding pigs.  Identification tags are required to be applied to swine prior to movement off of the holding of birth [30].  
</p>
<p>EC legislation requires that all Member States maintain a database that includes information about each pig holding, including the address and location of the holding, and sanitary information about the holding (Commission Decision 2000/678/EC [77]) .  Additionally, each owner is required to maintain an on-farm register listing the number of animals in the operation and the number of animals entering and leaving each holding, the location to or from which the animals moved and the date of movement (Council Directive 92/102/EEC as of 1/95 [78]).  
</p>
<p>In Hungary a registration number must be assigned to each holding by an official veterinarian, although approved private veterinarians can update information regarding animal movement and apply identification tags.  Other locations that might handle animal traffic, such as fairgrounds, are also required to have a registration number.  In addition to registering their holdings, each pig owner is responsible for ensuring that identification, in the form of an ear tag listing the holding of birth, is applied to all pigs prior to movement off of the holding of birth [28, 30].  The digits on the ear tag identify not only the farm, but also the responsible veterinarian for the farm (the official veterinarian within the district is the default, but commercial farms may designate a private veterinarian, whose performance is overseen by the official veterinarian for the district).  All movement is reported to the central database for tracking purposes.  Owners cannot sell or move pigs without being in the national database.  If pigs are not identified appropriately the destination will refuse the shipment [28].</p>
<p>At commercial farms visited during the site review, pigs were ear notched at birth for identification, but upon movement from the farm the pig received an ear tag.  During the site visit the farm register of a small farm was reviewed and found to contain all information related to births, samples collected, deaths, etc.  The register in this case also contained official stamps from the official veterinarian verifying the information [28].  
</p>
<p><i>8.4.
Marketing practices
</i></p>
<p>There are no animal auction centers (which have proven to be a significant risk factor in other countries) in Hungary.  Animals are typically sold directly from the premises to the slaughter plant.  Small-scale farms may sell animals at local markets which are controlled by official veterinarians.  Animal movements are approved by the official veterinarian, who also issues the animal health certificate and certifies transport vehicles used to carry animals to and from the market [34]. 
</p>
<p><i>8.5.
Internal Movement controls </i></p>
<p>The registration number assigned to each holding (and other location likely to participate in animal movement, such as fairgrounds) is used to track animal movement.  Pig owners are required to apply an ear tag to all pigs prior to leaving the holding of birth.  The ear tag is marked with a 7 digit code listing the holding ID as well as a code signifying the official veterinarian responsible for that holding [28, 30].  Ear tags may be applied by approved private veterinarians or official veterinarians.  The veterinarian is responsible for entering the movement information into the national database.  Owners must procure a movement certificate prior to moving animals off of their premises and are unable to do so if their holding is not registered in the national database [28].  
</p>
<p>Animal movements must be authorized by an appropriate movement certificate, issued by the official veterinarian of the DVO in advance of the movement, and indicating both the origin and destination locations [28, 30].  Three copies of the movement certificate are issued.  One travels with the shipment, one stays at the district of origin, and one stays with the owner.  When the animal reaches its destination the copy that moved with the shipment is filed with the local veterinary office of destination and the information is entered into the national database.  If pigs are not identified appropriately the destination will refuse the shipment [28].
</p>
<p><i>Discussion</i></p>
<p>Although smaller swine operations are more numerous than larger operations, most domestic pigs in Hungary reside in the larger facilities, including the majority of pigs destined for slaughter and export.  Biosecurity measures at both types of operations, but particularly the larger operations, were observed to be extensive and overlapping.  Physical separation between domestic pigs and wild boar as well as other wild animals was adequate at all operations observed, vehicles entering the premises were subject to cleaning and disinfection, and workers and visitors underwent disinfection procedures.  Prohibitions on workers bringing in food or owning their own pigs were also in place in some of the commercial operations, further reducing the possibility of unintentional introduction of CSF virus.  Biosecurity measures on smaller holdings were less stringent overall; however, these pigs were generally housed indoors (thereby minimizing the potential for contact with wild boar) and had fewer outside workers, visitors, and vehicles entering the premises.   
</p>
<p>Registration of pig holdings and individual identification requirements for pigs upon movement, testing, or breeding are conducted vigorously in Hungary.  Movement controls appeared adequate to track the movement of individual animals when necessary.  Together, these mechanisms appear to be sufficient to allow for rapid tracing and movement control activities in the event that CSF is diagnosed in the domestic population.
</p>
<p>As discussed under Section 2, due to the likelihood of the persistent threat of CSF from the wild boar population of Hungary, biosecurity is a key component in the prevention of movement of the disease into the domestic swine population.  Stringent biosecurity measures in place in pig holdings in Hungary, particularly in the larger operations which are more likely to produce pigs for slaughter and export, have proven to be effective at preventing the introduction of CSF into domestic swine operations.
</p>
<h2>9.
Disease surveillance</h2>
<p>Routine surveillance for CSF is ongoing in both the domestic swine and wild boar populations in Hungary.  As a result of the detection of CSF in the wild boar population near the border with Slovakia (see Section 2) additional surveillance in both populations is currently being conducted in the infected zone.  
</p>
<p><i>9.1
CSF surveillance in domestic swine
</i></p>
<p><i>9.1.1
Active surveillance
</i></p>
<p>In the early 1990’s, active surveillance in Hungary’s domestic swine population was concentrated in four counties in eastern Hungary around the location of the last known case of CSF in the Hungarian domestic swine population.  In 2000, the testing program was extended to all counties in Hungary, with national serologic surveillance samples increasing steadily each year from 22,625 samples tested in 2000 to 269,000 samples (approximately 5% of the population at that time) tested in 2003, all with negative results [32].  During this time, CSF surveillance was tied to serologic testing for pseudorabies disease: approximately 100% of pseudorabies samples submitted from small farms and 10% of pseudorabies samples from large farms were also tested for CSF [30, 32].  
</p>
<p>Beginning in 2004, Hungary implemented the CSF National Monitoring Program.  This program changed the nature of active surveillance for CSF in domestic swine in Hungary.  Under this program, surveillance is based on a statistically valid serological evaluation of swine using individual holdings as a population unit for large holdings and all holdings contained within a settlement as the population unit for small holdings.  Sample sizes were established in accordance with Commission Decision 2002/106/EC in order to detect the presence of disease with 95% confidence at a prevalence of 5% in the case of breeding (or mixed) herds and 95% confidence of detection at a prevalence of 10% for fattening herds.  Using the herd as the sampling unit in this manner is much more sensitive than sampling according to political (i.e. national or county) borders.  Serologic samples are evaluated using a commercially available ELISA kit [32, 79, 80].  </p>
<p>In addition, all boars in AI centers must be tested and found negative to antibodies to CSF virus using an ELISA or serum neutralization test in combination with a 30 day quarantine as required in Commission Decision 1999/608/EC [81].  Additional testing with negative results for CSF is required at the time the animal leaves the collection center (or within 12 months of entry if they do not leave before that time).  Alternatively, 25% of all animals in the center must be sampled at 3 month intervals.  To date, all samples from domestic swine have been found negative for CSF since the conclusion of the 1993 outbreak [80].
</p>
<p>One of the first measures imposed by the National CSF Eradication Group shortly after detection of CSF in the wild boar population in and around Nógrád County was to have official veterinary services personnel visit every pig holding in the infected zone in order to provide the owners with information about CSF.  In addition, a clinical examination of all pigs on the farm was conducted and a census was taken in accordance with Council Directive 2001/89/EC.  As the infected zone increased in size these activities were repeated in the newly encompassed holdings.  As in areas outside of the infected zone, any pigs displaying clinical signs of CSF or found dead were tested to rule out the presence of the disease [39, 82].  
</p>
<p>In addition, enhanced serologic sampling and clinical evaluations of domestic pigs residing within the infected zone has also been conducted.  Small-scale and backyard pig holdings within this area were evaluated to determine their risk status for introduction of CSF.  Holdings that are within 3 km of a case of CSF, or those with owners who engage in or are otherwise associated with hunting, are defined as at risk holdings.  Both serologic testing and clinical inspection of pig holdings in the infected zone are conducted more frequently in at risk holdings compared to those that are not designated at risk.  
</p>
<p>In at risk holdings serologic testing sufficient to detect CSF if present in 5% or more of the pigs with 95% confidence must be conducted every six months, whereas in other holdings in the infected area testing is required on an annual basis.  Serologic evaluation in large scale holdings are required to be conducted every 6 months with a sampling scheme sufficient to detect either 5% disease prevalence in breeding animals or 10% prevalence in fattening stock, both with a confidence of 95%.  All samples collected so far have tested negative for CSF [39, 82].
</p>
<p>Additionally, domestic pigs in small-scale at risk holdings receive a clinical inspection from an approved or official veterinarian every three months.  The inspection includes an examination of the animals for general health and the presence of signs of disease as well as an evaluation of stock records for evidence of unusual mortality rates.  Small holdings in the infected zone that are not determined to be at risk holdings receive the same inspection, but only twice a year.  For large scale holdings an official veterinarian is required to conduct the inspections on a monthly basis.  In addition to the items evaluated in small holdings, these farms also receive an inspection of biosecurity controls, including the movement of people, materials, and equipment onto the farm, disinfection facilities, and impenetrability of the farm [39].  </p>
<p><i>9.1.2
Passive surveillance 
</i></p>
<p>Reporting of CSF upon first suspicion of the disease is required of any animal holder.  The individual must immediately report the suspicion to the District Office and the District Office must immediately dispatch an official veterinarian to the site of the report to begin clinical examinations and testing to confirm or rule out CSF in accordance with Commission Decision 2002/106/EC [34].  A quarantine order is applied to the farm upon first suspicion of disease and is not lifted until the presence of CSF has been conclusively ruled out [27].
</p>
<p>Animals that die or are slaughtered as part of an epidemiologic investigation as well as any materials or instruments that are destroyed during the process are subject to compensation.  Any owner, animal holder, veterinarian, etc. who does not report suspicion of a disease as required, or otherwise violates their requirements as an animal keeper, will be ineligible for compensation.  In addition, any individual who neglects to report a notifiable animal disease to the competent veterinary authority under Article 10 of Act CLXXVI of 2005 may be fined between 20,000 HUF (approximately $125 USD) and 3M HUF (approximately $20,000 USD) (exact amount to be determined by the DFCSAH).  Additionally, the penal code may be used to sentence violators with up to one year imprisonment [23, 25, 34].
</p>
<p>During 2006 and 2007, there were 78 and 43 suspected cases of CSF, respectively, that were reported by private veterinarians or animal holders in Hungary (see Table 4).  All cases were based on presentation of clinical signs and were submitted to virological testing using antigen capture ELISA.  All were eventually determined not to be affected with CSF.
</p>
<p>Table 4.  Suspicious cases of CSF reported by private veterinarians in Hungary during 2006 and 2007, by County.</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image8.emf" alt="image8.emf"></p>
<p>Ref [24]</p>
<p>Routine surveillance in the domestic swine population of Hungary combined with enhance surveillance measures in place in the infected zone for wild boar are in line with EC regulations and appear sufficient to detect the disease within this population should it arise.
</p>
<p><i>9.2
CSF surveillance in wild boar</i></p>
<p><i>9.2.1.
Routine sampling
</i></p>
<p>Sampling of wild boar in Hungary is based on serologic evaluations for screening purposes (antigen ELISA) with follow-up virus isolation using a real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for confirmatory testing of initial seroreactors [27].  Serologic sampling is conducted throughout Hungary in coordination with hunting activities, with the number of tests conducted proportional to the estimated number of wild boar within each County as well as the size of the County.  In addition, testing is concentrated in the areas close to the Hungarian border, especially with countries known to have CSF in their wild boar populations.  The current sampling plan in wild boar is designed to detect CSF with a confidence level of 95% if it is present within the population at a prevalence of at least 5% [28, 32, 79] .  
</p>
<p>The required number of tests for wild boar in each County necessary to meet the sampling criteria is provided in advance to the County AO.  For counties on the Hungarian border, 20 percent of the wild boar samples required for the year must come from animals shot within 30 kilometers of the border.  In addition, 100% of wild boars shot within 30 kilometers from the border must be submitted for diagnostics until the 20 percent goal is reached [28].  
</p>
<p>As part of their routine serologic surveillance, Hungary detected 99 serologically positive wild boar between January 1, 2005 and February 28, 2006 (out of a 12,796 that were tested).  None of the serologically positive animals were found to harbor CSF virus upon confirmatory testing, indicating the possibility of previous infection or vaccination.  These animals appeared to be located primarily in counties in the northern and western parts of Hungary with a high density of wild boar (>200 wild boar/200km2), with few exceptions [27].
</p>
<p><i>9.2.2.
Enhanced surveillance in the infected zone
</i></p>
<p>Due to the designation of Nógrád County, as well as portions of Pest, Heves and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén counties (along the border with Slovakia) as a CSF infected area, surveillance efforts have been intensified in accordance with the CSF Diagnostic Manual (Commission Decision 2002/106/EC).  Enhancements include required sampling of all wild boars shot within 10 km of the infected zone for both serologic and virologic evaluation.  Minimum sample numbers must be met in order to detect disease at a prevalence of 5% with 95% confidence.  Additionally, all wild boar exhibiting abnormal behavior must be shot and sampled for CSF and all wild boar found dead must be reported and examined by an official veterinarian for a period of two years following the last virologically positive case.  Both serologic and virologic tests must be conducted on these animals [38, 39].  
</p>
<p>From March 1, 2007 to May 31, 2008 there were over 17,500 samples submitted for CSF testing from wild boar throughout all of Hungary.  Over 8,000, or approximately half, of the samples came from wild boar within Nógrád and Pest Counties.  As of July 2008, a total of 195 cases of CSF had been identified in 108 wild boar from Nógrád County and 87 from Pest County [40].  </p>
<p><i>Discussion</i></p>
<p>Hungary’s surveillance program in domestic swine appears adequate to detect CSF if it were present in the population.  Enhanced surveillance in accordance with EU provisions is practiced in both domestic pigs and wild boar within the infected area.  This surveillance allows for more rapid detection of disease in domestic pig holdings within the infected zone, which is where it is most likely to occur.
</p>
<p>CSF is a notifiable disease in domestic pigs in Hungary, and Hungarian law provides both incentives for reporting and penalties for not reporting suspicious cases of CSF.  Provisions for payment of indemnity in the case of an outbreak have been made.  It has been demonstrated that suspicious case of CSF have been routinely reported to veterinary officials, with a subsequent investigation conducted in a manner appropriate to rule out the presence of disease.
</p>
<p>The ability to detect CSF in the wild boar population has been demonstrated, and current surveillance activities, both within and outside of the infected zone can be expected to continue to detect disease where it occurs.  Serologically reactive (virus negative) tests dating back to 2005 indicate the possibility that CSF in wild boar did occur within Hungary prior to its detection in 2007.  Other possibilities, such as the incursion of previously vaccinated or previously infected pigs from outside of Hungary may explain these findings.  However, current testing protocols are likely to detect CSF in this population as it occurs.
</p>
<p>Cases of CSF in wild boar continue to be found within the infected area, thus monitoring measures are ongoing; however, no cases have been detected in domestic pigs within the infected area.
</p>
<h2>10.
Diagnostic laboratory capabilities</h2>
<p><i>10.1
Overview</i></p>
<p>The national animal health laboratory for Hungary is located in Budapest.  It operates under the jurisdiction of the Veterinary Diagnostics Directorate (VDV) of the CAO and is the reference laboratory for CSF within Hungary, including departments covering mammalian pathology, poultry pathology, game animal pathology, fish and bee pathology, histopathology, toxicology, immunology, bacteriology, and virology.  In addition to the central animal health laboratory, the VDV also operates two regional laboratories at Debrecen and Kaposvár [23, 79].
</p>
<p>The National VDV Animal Health Laboratory has Biosafety Level 2 laboratory facilities.  All activities with live CSF virus are carried out in biological safety cabinets.  The laboratory has been approved for CSF virus isolation, CSF antigen detection, and CSF antibody detection by both virus neutralization and ELISA tests [34].  It is accredited by the Hungarian national accrediting body, and has participated in the EU Reference Laboratory for CSF, Inter-Laboratory Comparison Testing program since 1995 [30, 79].  
</p>
<p>Whole carcasses or organ samples from CSF suspect pigs are sent to the pathology department of the central laboratory.  Necropsy samples are then transferred to the histopathology and virology departments.  Blood samples from epidemiological contacts or other animals within the herd may be submitted concurrently for serologic and virological investigation if available [79].
</p>
<p>Of the two regional laboratories, Debrecen is located in the northeastern region of Hungary in Hajdú-Bihar County, serving as the CSF laboratory for eastern counties, while Kaposvár, located in Somogy County, serves the western portion of Hungary.  In addition to serving as a reference laboratory, the central VDV laboratory also provides primary laboratory services to Budapest and centrally-located counties [28, 34].
</p>
<p>The regional laboratories conduct serological testing only for CSF.  If there is a clinically suspicious case of CSF (or any OIE List A disease) all samples must be forwarded directly to the central VDV laboratory in Budapest [28, 34]. </p>
<p><i>10.2
CSF diagnostics </i></p>
<p>Hungary currently uses a commercially available ELISA kit for serologic screening for CSF in both wild boar and domestic swine [79].  Confirmation of positive serologic results is done using Real-Time PCR, as well as virus isolation and ELISA antigen detection kits [27].  
</p>
<p>Inconclusive serological results obtained by ELISA testing are submitted to the virology department for comparison testing with virus neutralization using different strains of CSF, bovine viral diarrhea virus, and border disease virus [30].
</p>
<p><i>10.3
Training
</i></p>
<p>The central animal health laboratory takes part in Inter-Laboratory Comparison testing every year at the EU reference laboratory for CSF in Hannover, Germany [30, 34].  Proficiency testing is performed for bovine viral diarrhea and border disease, which can cross-react and cause false positive test results for CSF, as well.  Hungary has reported that all testing has been satisfactory [30].  Every six months all methods used in the diagnosis of CSF within the virology department are verified using controlled samples as required by the EU Regulation of Accreditation [32].
</p>
<p>Training sessions are organized yearly to practice the implementation of control measures specified within the contingency plans [34].  Training is also provided specifically to the laboratory veterinarians every other year through a special course administered by international and local CSF experts which is designed to provide updates on pestivirus infection in pigs, including CSF laboratory diagnosis [30].</p>
<p>New technicians are trained while on the job by experienced veterinarians and technicians on an ongoing basis.  Skills in CSF diagnostic work are evaluated every six months by testing known CSF positive and negative samples by all methods used [30].
</p>
<p>Virology staff training is done according to the accreditation requirement for the Hungarian national accreditation body.  A list of trained staff for each test is kept in an active file.  A proficiency test is administered every 6 months for some diagnostic tests on in-house proficiency panels [79]. 
</p>
<p><i>10.4
Data management</i></p>
<p>All laboratory test results are entered manually onto the test sheets and afterwards are entered into an electronic Laboratory Information Management System.  According to Hungarian officials, this process includes several control points designed to rule out human error [27].
</p>
<p><i>Discussion</i></p>
<p>Staffing, training, and operational procedures at the animal health laboratories in Hungary appeared adequate to detect CSF.  During the site visit, the National VDV laboratory in Budapest was evaluated.  Overall, the facilities, equipment, staffing, training, and validation procedures at the central animal health laboratory for Hungary appeared adequate to support surveillance and diagnostic activities for CSF in Hungary.  During the APHIS site review there were concerns about the lack of sensitivity of the direct fluorescent antibody test with respect to wild boar screening and manual entry of test results.  To address the first issue, APHIS offered to share standard operating procedures and reagents that have been validated and used at USDA’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory at Plum Island (FADDL).  Hungary declined to accept the offer, but did update their practices according to OIE specifications by incorporating more sensitive assays into their screening procedures.  </p>
<p>The laboratory system, including staffing, training, and diagnostic issues, has proven to be adequate in detecting CSF in samples from wild boar and domestic swine in Hungary. 
</p>
<h2>11.
Emergency response capabilities
</h2>
<p>The CSF contingency plan for Hungary complies with EC requirements.  The plan implements measures for the control of CSF according to procedures provided in Council Directive 2001/89/EEC as well as Commission Decision 2002/106/EC [32].  The most recent version of the CSF contingency plan was developed by the MARD and has been filed with and approved by the EC as specified in the Corrigendum to Commission Decision 2004/431/EC [49].  Each County DFCSAH  is required to draft its own version of the contingency plan to reflect local personnel and conditions with roles and responsibilities assigned to specific individuals [28].
</p>
<p>In general, the CSF contingency plan details measures to be taken in case of suspicion or confirmation of CSF at a holding, slaughterhouse, livestock market, or in a means of transport, as well as control measures for contact holdings, epidemiological investigation practices, establishment of protection and surveillance zones, and control measures in these zones.  The contingency plan also details cleaning and disinfection practices, stamping-out procedures, repopulation practices, transportation procedures, diagnostic procedures, biosafety requirements, principles of emergency vaccination of domestic and feral pigs, and reiterates restrictions on feeding of catering waste, as well as outlining procedures to take in the event of suspicion or confirmation of CSF in wild boar [32].</p>
<p>Measures to control CSF when it occurred in wild boar in January of 2007 near the border with Slovakia were implemented in accordance with the contingency plan.  The National Expert Group, which is activated upon confirmation of CSF, met within three days of confirmation of the first case of CSF.  In the interim, temporary measures were applied immediately within 10km of the first three cases [36, 37].
</p>
<p>Since that time, measures laid out in Hungary’s CSF contingency plan, in accordance with both Council Directive 2001/89/EEC and Commission Decision 2002/106/EC have been adhered to in the control of CSF in wild boar and monitoring and prevention in domestic swine within and adjoining the infected area.  Notification and updates have been provided to both the EC and OIE as required [83].   
</p>
<p>The contingency plan for CSF is updated regularly as EC regulations are passed.  Updates reflect changes made by EC regulations, changes in local personnel, and feedback from local offices.  During the site visit the review team found that current plans approved by the EC were on file in the district veterinary offices; the plans were up to date and staff were familiar with the contents of the plans [28].  
</p>
<p>In addition, regular emergency response training is conducted to ensure that all personnel are familiar with and possess the ability to execute the contents of the plan.  These trainings are held at two levels, one aimed at disease experts and members of the National Disease Control Center (NDCC), and one directed at other staff members.  Training of the expert group is organized four times a year within Hungary for those staff members; in addition, two staff members participate in the annual training course organized by the EC.  Training of support staff occurs both centrally and locally and includes alarm drills at least twice a year with simulation exercises at least twice every five years [32].  
</p>
<p>The NDCC consists of two veterinarians and four assistants who operate under the direction of the CVO.  Their responsibilities are to maintain the contingency plan and implement it in the event of an outbreak.  The number of staff can be increased as needed in the event of an outbreak.  Duties of the NDCC during an outbreak include directing the CSF control strategy and activities, directing the local disease control center (a local agency created at the County DFCSAH level during an outbreak with similar responsibilities to the NDCC but at the local level), preparing reports to OIE and the EC, organizing training, and media relations.  
</p>
<p>Financial provisions include a specially funded account from the Central State Budget which is authorized to release funds for payment of indemnity for animals that died or were killed due to notifiable animal diseases, as well as any materials, instruments, or objects destroyed during eradication activities [25, 34].  A specified amount is automatically included in the budget each year without requiring authorization, through a special decision of Parliament.  Commission Decision 90/424/EEC [84] allows for the provision of supplemental funds from the EC and describes the conditions under which the EC would support a financial contribution to emergency control and eradication of CSF.</p>
<p><i>Discussion
</i></p>
<p>The contingency plan for CSF in Hungary is comprehensive and reflects control measures developed and promulgated by the EC.  In addition, local contingency plans are in place in County DFCSAH and DVOs, and official veterinarians at these levels appeared to be familiar with the provisions of the contingency plan and the initial actions required of them in the event of suspicion and/or confirmation of an outbreak.  Training and simulation exercises aid in developing and maintaining the ability to quickly detect and contain the disease.
</p>
<p>In addition, the occurrence of CSF in wild boar in Hungary and the rapid response on the part of veterinary officials has demonstrated that Hungarian officials from the local level to the Ministry have the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to the occurrence of disease.
</p>
<h2>12.
Summary of Release Assessment Risks</h2>
<p><i>12.1
Likelihood of disease introduction and transmission from infected wild boar  
</i></p>
<p>Introduction of CSF into the Hungarian domestic swine population is most likely to occur through contact with infected wild boar, which can be found both within Hungary and in neighboring countries.</p>
<p>Of primary risk to Hungarian domestic swine is the recent detection of CSF virus in wild boar within Hungary near the border with Slovakia.  The possibility that the virus will persist in this reservoir poses a potential ongoing risk for transmission to domestic swine.  However, movement from wild to domestic pigs has been prevented through a combination of control activities aimed at affected wild boar populations, routine biosecurity measures in swine operations throughout Hungary and enhanced control measures in the infected area.  
</p>
<p>In addition, wild boar migrating from neighboring affected regions could also introduce CSF virus into Hungary.  As discussed in Section 3, Hungary shares common land borders with several countries that APHIS does not consider free from CSF, several of which are currently experiencing outbreaks of the disease in wild boar, and a few with recent or ongoing outbreaks in domestic swine.  Wild boar are not considered migratory in nature, but individual animals may travel substantial distances in search of food, during mating season, or in response to hunting or other pressures.  There are few natural barriers to movement of wild boar into Hungary from surrounding countries.  Even if CSF is eradicated from Hungarian wild boar, the ongoing risk of infected animals from neighboring countries entering Hungary and reintroducing CSF must be considered.  Continuing surveillance efforts to detect these incursions, combined with the ability of Hungary to implement control and biosecurity measures as necessary have proven sufficient to meet this challenge.
</p>
<p>Although exposure of swine to infected wild boar is more likely to occur on small holdings due to the relatively relaxed biosecurity practices in these facilities compared to larger, commercial holdings, these swine are less likely to be involved in movement or used for commercial slaughter, which makes them less likely to pose an export risk to the United States.  Direct exposure of breeding swine to infected wild boar is considerably less likely considering the strict production practices surrounding these animals and their genetic products.  
</p>
<p>The primary barrier to movement of CSF virus from wild boar to domestic swine are routine biosecurity measures, which exist in farms outside of infected zones and have been found to be adequate by the review team.  Should detection efforts in wild boar fail, biosecurity measures in place, especially enhanced measures within the infected zone, provide a mitigation against the transmission of CSF to domestic pigs.  
</p>
<p>Within and adjacent to known infected areas, biosecurity measures in domestic swine operations are significantly enhanced.  As with routine controls, these measures will continue to remain important as a barrier to movement of CSF into the domestic population.  As strong biosecurity measures remain in place in both small and large-scale operations throughout Hungary, the risk from wild boar is low.
</p>
<p><i>12.2
Likelihood of disease introduction via import of infected live domestic swine
</i></p>
<p>Live swine may enter Hungary legally through importation from third countries or intra-Community trade, or illegally via smuggling from neighboring countries.  Legally imported live animals may be intended for either breeding or production use.  </p>
<p>Risk mitigation measures associated with the importation of live animals from third countries include certification of current health status by the exporting country, veterinary inspection at the port of entry, and isolation procedures with veterinary spot-checks at the point of destination.  Veterinary inspection of imported animals at the ports of entry is comprehensive, but could fail to detect disease during the incubation period or in subclinical animals.  Isolation, owner observation, and periodic veterinary inspection at the point of destination increase the odds of disease detection but depend in large part on the extent of clinical signs and the disease recognition capability of the observers, and would not apply to animals destined for direct slaughter.  Serological testing for CSF is generally not required prior to release of imported animals from isolation. 
</p>
<p>Although illegal movement of live swine into Hungary is possible, it is unlikely.  Customs Officials, the Frontier Guard, and BIP personnel work together to identify and control illegal movement of animals and animal products into Hungary.  
</p>
<p>Hungary has historically imported swine almost exclusively from EU Member States, with the exception of two live swine imported from Norway (which is considered by APHIS to be free of CSF) in 2006.  However, some of these Member States, notably Slovakia and Romania, are currently affected with CSF and under restrictions specified in Commission Decision 2006/805/EC.</p>
<p>As an EU Member State, Hungary is free to engage in intra-Community trade with other Member States in a manner that is different from trade with third countries.  EC legislation and control measures put in place by affected Member States prohibit the sale of live swine from restricted zones known to be affected by CSF (see Commission Decisions 2006/805/EC and 2006/779/EC), which substantially mitigates the risk to the internal market.  However, CSF is endemic in wild boar in some of the Member States, and outbreaks may occur outside of established control zones.  Surveillance in both domestic swine and wild boar within affected Member States aids in the early detection of outbreaks outside of established control zones, and biosecurity measures continue to mitigate the movement of infection into domestic swine. 
</p>
<p>Risk mitigation measures associated with intra-Community trade in live swine include a mandatory observation period and veterinary inspection required prior to shipment, as well as certification of disease status by an official veterinarian.  Animals may also be isolated and observed for a period of time at the point of destination.  These measures greatly increase the likelihood of CSF detection, but depend again on the ability of observers to recognize all forms of the disease. 
</p>
<p>EC legislation permits less restrictive sourcing of imported swine than is allowed under APHIS import regulations, which could potentially result in a greater risk of disease introduction into Hungary than is the case for the United States.  However, Hungarian import practices to date have been protective against disease introduction by this route.  Mitigating factors currently in place substantially reduce the likelihood of introduction of CSF virus via imported infected swine, which APHIS considers to be low.  
</p>
<p><i>12.3
Likelihood of disease introduction via infected animal products
</i></p>
<p>Fresh pork and pork products, as well as swine semen, can enter Hungary legally through import or intra-Community trade.  Infective genetic material would result in direct exposure of susceptible domestic animals.  The primary risk from fresh pork and pork products would be feeding of uncooked, infective trim to domestic swine via waste feeding.  An additional route of exposure could include wild boar access to infective waste with subsequent direct or indirect contact of boar to a susceptible domestic swine population.   
</p>
<p>Although unlikely, the possibility also exists for illegal commingling or diversion of imported or traded commodities.  As with live animals, illegal movement of products is controlled by a combination of Customs officials, the Frontier Guard, and BIP personnel.  
</p>
<p>Risk mitigation measures associated with importation of animal products from third countries include certification by the exporting country, veterinary inspection and sampling procedures at the port of entry, required approval of exporting establishments, including swine semen collection centers, and veterinary spot-checks at the point of destination.  EC certification requirements for importation of pork, pork products, and genetic material from third countries are generally comprehensive relative to OIE guidelines and must be signed by an official veterinarian of the country of origin.  The exporting establishment must also be approved by the EC, which substantially limits exports from approved third countries.
</p>
<p>Veterinary inspection of imported animal products at the port of entry and spot-checks at the point of destination are generally effective, but could still fail to detect infective virus in animal commodities.  Current import policies depend heavily on certification of disease conditions in the exporting country and these alone only partially mitigate the risk of introducing CSF virus via imported animal products.  However, these measures act in combination with additional mitigations employed in domestic swine holdings and have generally been protective against disease introduction.
</p>
<p>Harmonized EC legislation permits the importation of fresh pork and pork products, swine semen, and fresh meat from wild boar, from some third countries that APHIS does not consider to be free from CSF.  Historically, however, Hungary has imported swine and pork products almost exclusively from within the EU.  Although some of the EU countries contain regions that are currently considered to be affected by CSF, EC legislation prohibits intra-Community trade of swine products from within the CSF-affected regions, including those within Hungary.  The control measures in place have so far appeared capable of preventing spread due to commercial trade of pork and pork products between Member States.
</p>
<p>Additional measures include the Hungarian ban on waste feeding, which is verified through routine on-farm inspections to make sure the practice is not occurring, and is primarily protective against direct infection of domestic swine.  Standard biosecurity measures that prevent contact with wild boar that could have been exposed to infected waste products derived from imported or traded commodities are also protective.   
</p>
<p>Although EC legislation permits less restrictive sourcing of imported swine commodities than would be allowed by the United States, EC certification and import requirements, combined with current Hungarian import practices mitigate the likelihood of CSF introduction to a low level. 
</p>
<p><i>12.4
Likelihood of disease introduction via incoming commercial or passenger traffic
</i></p>
<p>CSF could be introduced into Hungary via incoming commercial traffic from affected Member States or third countries if not subjected to proper disinfection processes, particularly in the case of live-haul trucks.  Passenger traffic from affected regions could also transmit live virus on vehicles or clothing, potentially resulting in on-farm exposure of a susceptible domestic swine population. 
</p>
<p>As discussed in Section 7, there are no standard disinfection practices in place for commercial or passenger vehicles, including live-haul trucks, from neighboring regions in the absence of a reported outbreak; however, if an outbreak were reported, measures would be put in place to disinfect the tires and undercarriage of vehicles as directed by the central veterinary authorities.
</p>
<p>In this scenario, protective biosecurity measures at individual holdings are important in minimizing the potential for contact of farm animals with live virus on visitor vehicles or clothing.  Such measures observed in Hungary include required disinfection of all entering trucks, limiting entry of nonessential personnel and visitors, and required hand washing and use of foot baths and/or change of clothing when entering the production areas.  These measures appear to be common on large swine operations in Hungary although they are somewhat less restrictive on smaller holdings (i.e., hand washing and footbaths only).  Smaller farms, however, tend to receive fewer visitors and less traffic overall.  
</p>
<p>Introduction of CSF via incoming commercial or passenger traffic is a potential risk primarily because of the disease status of neighboring regions.  Disinfection of vehicles and other biosecurity measures at the border appear to depend heavily on disease reporting by neighboring countries.  The level of biosecurity on most large and small swine holdings is likely sufficient to protect against disease introduction via this avenue and the likelihood of disease introduction is low. 
</p>
<p><i>12.5
Likelihood of disease introduction via agricultural commodities for personal consumption
</i></p>
<p>Meat or meat products carried into Hungary via passenger traffic, if contaminated with the virus, could potentially introduce CSF into the country.  Such products may be intentionally smuggled into the country or missed during Customs inspections at border crossings.  The primary route of exposure would most likely be waste feeding to a susceptible domestic swine population.  A secondary possibility would be waste feeding to wild boar with subsequent direct or indirect exposure of domestic swine to infected wild boar.  APHIS considers exposure risk for wild or domestic ruminants to be minimal under this scenario.
</p>
<p>EC legislation prohibits the entry of all types of pork and pork products for personal consumption from most third countries.  Exceptions are made for personal consignments of meat and meat products (not including fresh meat) from the Faeroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Andorra, Norway, and San Marino [54, 61, 85, 86].  Several of these countries are not considered by APHIS to be free from CSF; however, no outbreaks have been reported in those countries in recent years.  Although EC legislation generally limits the size of personal consignments to 5kg or less, there are no requirements for certification, veterinary inspection, or sampling of these consignments.
</p>
<p>Infective CSF virus in agricultural commodities for personal consumption brought in by passenger traffic could result in direct exposure of susceptible domestic swine or wild boar populations via waste feeding.  Although a waste-feeding ban is in place in Hungary and farms are frequently evaluated for this practice, the possibility still exists that non-compliance with the waste-feeding ban could occur, more likely in small holdings than commercial facilities.  In addition, contact with wild boar is also more likely to occur in small holdings due to the relatively less stringent biosecurity measures on small farms.  
</p>
<p>The entry of illegal products into Hungary could occur since the intensity of Customs inspections on the border with third countries depends in large part on disease reporting in those countries and the standard level of inspection is likely insufficient to allow detection and confiscation of all illegal commodities that could carry CSF virus.  In addition, EC legislation permits personal consignments of products that could carry live CSF virus from countries not considered by APHIS to be free from this disease.  However, the risk of potentially infective material finding its way into the domestic swine population of Hungary through illegal movement is low due to a combination of inspections, biosecurity, and waste feeding prohibitions within Hungary.  The likelihood of legal introduction of CSF virus on a personal consignment is even lower due to the likelihood of recognition of an outbreak in the exporting country and subsequent import prohibitions that would be instituted by Hungary. 
</p>
<p><i>Release assessment conclusions  
</i></p>
<p>The preceding 11-factor assessment identified several possible avenues for introduction of CSF into the domestic swine population of Hungary.  The first and most significant route is through contact with infected wild boar, either within Hungary or in adjoining countries.  Second is through importation of infected animals or their products, including semen, from other EU Member States or third countries, which could lead either to direct inoculation of domestic pigs, or introduction of the virus into naive wild boar with subsequent movement into the domestic swine population.  And third is through direct or indirect contact with commercial or passenger vehicles, passengers, etc. entering Hungary from other EU Member States or third countries that are experiencing outbreaks of CSF.</p>
<p>Mitigations to the above risks include the following:  a robust surveillance system and emergency response capability sufficient to detect and control CSF within the wild boar population, reducing the potential exposure risk to domestic swine.  Hungary has recently displayed this capacity through its detection of infected wild boar and its implementation of control measures to identify and remove infected animals, while surveying the domestic population in the affected area and enforcing enhanced biosecurity measures.  Current surveillance practices for CSF in wild boar have demonstrated the ability to detect evidence of circulation of the virus within this population.  In case of a recognized disease incursion, the Hungarian veterinary services have proven to be well trained and equipped to contain the outbreak.
</p>
<p>Additionally, effective routine biosecurity measures on domestic swine holdings, such as restricting human and vehicular traffic, required sanitary procedures for people and vehicles, coupled with enhanced measures within wild boar infected areas, including pig movement prohibitions and indoor housing requirements, will continue to provide crucial barriers to movement of CSF into the domestic population.  Prohibitions against waste feeding in Hungarian law combined with frequent inspection of farms for waste feeding should substantially mitigate this possibility.
</p>
<p>APHIS considers that there is an equivalent low level of risk due to CSF across all of the Member States of the EU, even among those with limited outbreaks in wild boar, due to harmonized EC legislation and trading on the internal common market.  Consequently, the export risk from Hungary is considered the same as from the EU provided that Hungary is subjected to import conditions specified in 9 CFR 94.24 and 9 CFR 98.38, which would preclude trade with swine, pork, pork products or swine semen derived from the infected zone or commingled with swine or pork products from the infected zone of Hungary.</p>
<p>The provisions of the above-mentioned CFR section substantially mitigate the risk associated with more permissive trade practices and legal entry via common land borders by restricting the sourcing of swine for export or slaughter in regions where CSF is known to exist or that is restricted due to CSF; prohibiting commingling of live swine, pork, or pork products with such commodities from regions not considered free of these diseases; and  placing certain restrictions on the use of transportation equipment for live swine. Requirements for FSIS inspection and approval of exporting slaughterhouses, as well as approval of semen collection centers by the national government of the exporting country, further ensure equivalence with U.S. standards. 
</p>
<p>APHIS concludes that there is no evidence that CSF virus currently exists in the domestic swine population in Hungary, although it has been detected in wild boar in two counties within Hungary.  APHIS concludes that the combination of overlapping mitigations in place within Hungary, including import controls, biosecurity on swine holdings, waste feeding prohibitions, surveillance in domestic swine and wild boar, and control measures in current infected areas result in a low risk of the disease entering into swine holdings, particularly commercial holdings, which are more likely to export swine to the US.  APHIS also concludes that there is an equivalent low level of risk across all of the EU Member States that are unaffected by CSF, or affected only in their wild boar population; therefore APHIS consider it necessary to establish sourcing restrictions for Hungary that are equivalent to those specified for other EU Member States in 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38.  Given the low risk of the existence of CSF in the domestic swine population of Hungary and the restrictions applied to imported swine, pork products and semen in the CFR, the likelihood of infected breeding swine, pork, pork products or swine semen entering the US is very low. </p>
<h1>Exposure assessment 
</h1>
<p>An exposure assessment describes the biological pathway(s) necessary for exposure of animals and humans in an importing country to the hazards released from a given risk source, and estimates the probability of occurrence of the exposure(s) [22].  Since APHIS' regulatory authority is limited to animal health, the potential risk to animals is the focus of this evaluation. 
</p>
<p>APHIS considers that the most likely pathway of exposure of domestic swine to CSF virus-infected pork and pork products from Hungary is through feeding of contaminated food waste to swine [87].  Other exposure pathways are more direct and include contact with imported infected live animals or contact with infected genetic material. </p>
<p><i>Waste-feeding practices in the United States
</i></p>
<p>The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to virus-infected meat was evaluated by reviewing previous APHIS studies.  In 1995, APHIS conducted a pathway analysis to estimate the likelihood of exposing swine to infected waste [88].  The analysis included two pathways for exposure of swine to contaminated waste; namely, exposure associated with illegal household imports, and exposure associated with legal imports.  The latter is the exposure pathway that would be applicable to importing meat or meat products from Hungary.  With 95% confidence, APHIS estimated that 0.023% or less of plate and manufacturing waste would be inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine [88].  Based on this fraction, less than 1 part in 4,300 of imported meat is likely to be fed to swine as inadequately cooked waste.
</p>
<p>APHIS conducted a survey in 2001 of the U.S. swine waste-feeding sector to update a similar study done in 1994 [89].  Based on this survey, VS estimated that the proportion of plate and manufacturing waste fed to swine diminished by about 50% between 1994 and 2001 due to a decrease in the number of waste-feeding premises.  The study also found that:</p>
<p>1. The number of waste-feeding premises decreased significantly since 1994;
</p>
<p>2. Several more states prohibited feeding food wastes to swine;
</p>
<p>3. The number of waste-feeding premises in the continental United States decreased by 40.5% from 1994-2001, and in Hawaii and Puerto Rico decreased by 37.5% and 52.3%, respectively; and
</p>
<p>4. Institutions and restaurants provide nearly 90% of all plate waste fed to swine.
</p>
<p>APHIS considers that prohibiting the feeding of unprocessed plate waste to swine has further contributed to the reduction of waste-feeding to swine.  In this regard, waste-feeder operations must be licensed and inspected regularly by USDA inspectors (9 CFR 166).  The licensing process requires that producers adequately cook the waste fed to swine according to methods designed to reduce the probability of survival of foreign animal disease agents in the waste.</p>
<p>Based on the 1995 estimate that a very small proportion of food waste is inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine, and the substantial reduction in waste-feeding operations in recent years, APHIS considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to CSF virus through inadequately processed food waste to be low.  Based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS further considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to CSF virus through inadequately cooked infected meat from Hungary to be low. 
</p>
<p><i>Imported live animals 
</i></p>
<p>The likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to infected live animals was evaluated by considering virus persistence and shedding in infected live swine, as well as standard import requirements for swine.  The exposure assessment focuses on breeding animals since APHIS considers transportation costs to be prohibitive for export of other live animals (e.g. feeder pigs) to the United States from EU Member States.  Similarly, APHIS considers exposure of a susceptible U.S. animal population to illegally imported infected live animals from Hungary to be highly unlikely. 
</p>
<p>The survival period of CSF virus within live swine ranges from 1 week to greater than 6 months depending on various host-pathogen factors.  Consequently, APHIS considers this potential pathway for disease introduction to carry a high unmitigated risk.  However, current US regulations require a minimum quarantine of 15 days for all imported swine (9 CFR 93.510).  In addition, mitigations in 9 CFR 94.24 limit swine imports to breeding swine only and prohibit imported swine from originating from or commingling with swine from any region in which CSF is known to exist or any restricted areas within the EU due to the detection of CSF in domestic swine or wild boar.  These requirements strongly mitigate the risk of exposure of US swine to infected swine from Hungary, the first by increasing the likelihood of detecting infection prior to exposure and the second by decreasing the likelihood of infected swine being chosen for import.   
</p>
<p>Based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS considers the likelihood of introducing CSF virus via live animals from Hungary to be low.  Consequently, APHIS considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible US swine to CSF virus via infected swine from Hungary to be very low.</p>
<p><i>Imported genetic material
</i></p>
<p>Genetic materials have been implicated in the introduction of foreign animal disease into susceptible populations, as well as the spread of established disease epidemics over considerable distances.  For example, two semen collection centers became infected during the course of the 1997-1998 CSF epizootic in the Netherlands [90].  Potentially contaminated semen was distributed to 1,680 swine herds over the course of 5 weeks, during which the disease remained undetected in the donor boars.  Although investigators concluded that only 36 farms had been infected through artificial insemination, all suspect farms were subject to quarantine and testing, resulting in a tremendous expenditure of resources. 
</p>
<p>Survival of CSF virus in semen has been estimated in experimental studies to be 12-72 hours are 20oC but ranges from 1 month to several years at 4oC or below [91].  Survival in embryos and ova is unknown [91, 92]. 
</p>
<p>Based on the extended period of survival of CSF virus in frozen semen, APHIS considers the unmitigated likelihood of exposure of susceptible animals to CSF in infected semen to be high.  However, based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS concludes that the likelihood of importation of semen from infected swine in Hungary is low.  Given the mitigations in 9 CFR 98.38, APHIS considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine in the US to CSF virus to be very low. 
</p>
<h1>Consequence assessment
</h1>
<p>A consequence assessment describes the biologic and economic consequences of introducing the hazards under consideration into the United States.  This consequence assessment addresses both direct and indirect consequences as recommended by the OIE [22]. 
</p>
<p>The magnitude of the biologic and economic consequences following an introduction of CSF virus would depend on the location of the introduction, the virus serotype introduced, and the rate of virus spread.  Other conditions at the introduction site that might facilitate this spread include the ability to detect the disease rapidly, livestock demographics and movement patterns, and the ease of employing eradication procedures[93].  In addition, depending on the extent of export of swine, pork, and pork products, trade restrictions imposed by trading partners may result in severe economic consequences.
</p>
<p>Direct consequences include effects of the disease on animal health and subsequent production losses, the total costs of control and eradication, the effect on the environment, and public health consequences.  Indirect consequences include the impact on international trade and subsequent domestic consequences.
</p>
<p><i>Animal health consequences 
</i></p>
<p>Acute and chronic courses of CSF have been described.  The severity of the disease depends largely on the age of the animal and virulence of the viral strain, with young animals usually more severely affected than older animals.  In older breeding pigs the course of infection is often mild or even subclinical, whereas mortality rates may reach 90% in young pigs [94].  Low virulence strains may manifest primarily as poor reproductive performance and birth of piglets with neurologic defects.
</p>
<p><i>Economic consequences
</i></p>
<p>The overall cost of control and eradication depends on the mitigation or policy option chosen to control and eradicate the disease.  Potential costs include disease control measures such as imposing quarantine measures and movement controls, direct costs related to depopulation of affected and other herds, indemnity payments, vaccination costs, surveillance and laboratory testing, etc.  For disease-free countries like the United States that have a substantial export market for livestock and livestock products, the preferred option for control and eradication has traditionally been to depopulate infected herds without the use of vaccine.  
</p>
<p>The U.S. policy for most significant foreign animal disease emergencies is to follow strict quarantine measures and depopulation of infected and contact herds with ongoing assessment of the need for and implementation of strategic vaccination.  Available data do not allow quantification of the number of farms that would be infected if one of these diseases were introduced.  Nevertheless, the cost of control, eradication and compensation is likely to be significant. 
</p>
<p>Since there have been no CSF outbreaks in the United States from which economic estimates can be derived, estimates of economic effects in other countries are provided as illustrations.  Saatkamp et al. reviewed the economic aspects of control of small and large CSF outbreaks in the EU from 1990-1997 [95].  For the largest outbreak, involving 429 herds over 14 months, the cost of removal of affected swine was 426.9 million Euros, slaughter for welfare purposes cost 1.2 billion Euros, and program operational costs were 134.3 million Euros.  Overall, the outbreak cost pig producers 712.4 million Euros, the national government 230.5 million Euros, and the EU 807.8 million Euros.  Approximately 10 million pigs were destroyed during the course of the outbreak, primarily for welfare reasons (overcrowding or overweight) [96].  The total cost of smaller outbreaks ranged from 10.9 million Euros (8 affected herds over 2 months) to 208.7 million Euros (113 affected herds over 10 months) [95].
</p>
<p>Garner et al. estimated the potential economic impact of CSF on the pig industry of Australia using a stochastic modeling process [97].  The model estimated a loss in gross income of 28-37% for the pig industry in the affected region, and a 9-11% loss in gross income for the national pig industry.  
</p>
<p>While these examples estimate a more severe outcome of an outbreak, the consequences could be lessened if the outbreak were detected earlier and appropriate controls implemented to quickly eradicate the disease. 
</p>
<p><i>Environmental consequences 
</i></p>
<p>Environmental effects have been considered under all applicable environmental review laws in force in the United States.  These are considered in a separate, but related, environmental assessment (APHIS proposed rule).  The environmental assessment complies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and implementing regulations [98].
</p>
<p>Environmental consequences resulting from CSF introduction would primarily occur in relation to disposal of carcasses due to death from disease or depopulation of herds, as well as disposal of contaminated bedding and manure.  The method(s) of disposal employed in response to an outbreak would impact the environment differently.  Disposal of contaminated materials could potentially impact air, water and soil quality, as well as potentially releasing live virus into the environment.  
</p>
<p>Disposal options, previously employed in other countries in response to large scale animal disease outbreaks, include rendering, burial, and incineration.  Factors influencing the decision as to which method(s) of disposal to use include the volume of contaminated material (dependent on the number of animals affected), geographic features (e.g., soil and surface water) of the areas where outbreaks occur, other environmental considerations (e.g., weather and ambient temperature), and available emergency resources (e.g., funds, equipment, and personnel).  
</p>
<p>The environmental consequences of a CSF outbreak in the United States could vary from marginal to extreme depending on factors related to disposal of contaminated carcasses and materials.
</p>
<p><i>Public health consequences </i></p>
<p>Direct public health consequences are insubstantial in that the occurrence of CSF virus in humans is not known to occur.  
</p>
<p><i>Indirect consequences 
</i></p>
<p>In addition to the direct costs of CSF introduction, impacts on international trade and related domestic consequences need to be considered.  Export losses due to restrictions imposed by trade partners on animals and products susceptible to these diseases could run into billions of U.S. dollars.  The value of U.S. exports of pork and pork products, which would be immediately lost if an outbreak of one of these diseases occurred, was in excess of USD 5 billion in 2006 [73].  Again, this example estimates a more severe outcome of an outbreak, the consequences could be lessened if the outbreak was detected earlier and appropriate controls implemented to quickly eradicate the disease. 
</p>
<p>The impact of an outbreak of a foreign animal disease on the rural and regional economic viability, including businesses reliant on livestock revenue, could also be substantial.  For example, Paarlberg et al. conducted a study to estimate the potential revenue impact of an FMD outbreak in the United States similar to the one that occurred in the United Kingdom in 2001 [99].  This study estimated the gross revenue losses for the swine sector alone to be 34% for live swine and 24 % for pork.  Equivalent losses would reasonably be expected from a similarly extensive CSF outbreak.  
</p>
<p>Indirect economic losses to U.S. firms that support export markets for live animals and animal products could also be substantial.  For example, such firms would stand to lose at least USD 2.5 billion annually if ruminant export markets were lost[100].  More than 33 thousand full-time U.S. jobs, accounting for almost $1 billion in wages annually, could be jeopardized by loss of these three markets.  In the longer term, if trade restrictions persisted and alternative export markets did not develop, the U.S. ruminant production sector could contract, allowing other supplying countries to establish trade relationships in the absence of U.S. supply.  Losses due to restrictions on live swine, pork, and pork products are likely to be significant as well. 
</p>
<h1>Risk Estimation
</h1>
<p>Risk estimation consists of integrating the results from the release assessment, exposure assessment, and consequence assessment to produce overall measures of risk associated with the hazards identified at the outset.  Thus, risk estimation takes into account the whole risk pathway from hazard identified to the unwanted event.
</p>
<p>APHIS concludes from the release assessment that there is no evidence that CSF virus currently exists in the domestic swine population in Hungary.  However, CSF has been detected in wild boar within four counties in Hungary, and APHIS considers that the potential for introduction of this disease is greater in several regards than the potential for introduction into the United States.  APHIS also concluded that there is an equivalent low level of risk across all of the EU Member States that are unaffected by CSF, or affected only in their wild boar population.  Therefore, applying mitigation measures for Hungary that are equivalent to those specified for other EU Member States in 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 for breeding swine, pork, pork products and semen would reduce the risk to very low. </p>
<p>APHIS concludes from the exposure assessment that the probability of exposure of susceptible U.S. livestock to CSF virus via pork or pork products, live swine, or genetic material from Hungary to be low due to observations during quarantine, US prohibitions on waste feeding, etc.  Conversely, APHIS concludes that the animal health and economic consequences of a CSF outbreak in the United States would be severe.  Although control and eradication measures would be costly, the major economic impact would likely result from export trade losses.
</p>
<p>In summary, although a CSF outbreak in the United States would likely have severe animal health and economic consequences, APHIS considers the likelihood of infected live swine, pork, pork products, or swine semen entering the United States from Hungary and exposing US livestock, given that the mitigations specified in 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 are applied, to be very low.  
</p>
<p> <b><u>Appendices</u></b></p>
<p><b>Appendix 1: 2005 annual report to the EU</b> <b>listing the amounts of seized products and high risk countries <img src="embedded:image9.emf" alt="image9.emf"></b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image10.emf" alt="image10.emf"></p>
<h2>Appendix 2:  Hungary Import Statistics, 2005-2007</h2>
<p><b>Hungary Import Statistics for Live Swine, 2005 – 2007
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Exporting Country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Quantity (No. of animals)</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>2007</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Poland </p>
</td>	<td><p>36,013</p>
</td>	<td><p>390,396</p>
</td>	<td><p>301,350</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Slovakia </p>
</td>	<td><p>33,114</p>
</td>	<td><p>87,857</p>
</td>	<td><p>108,832</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Netherlands </p>
</td>	<td><p>294,774</p>
</td>	<td><p>102,365</p>
</td>	<td><p>35,121</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Germany </p>
</td>	<td><p>26,564</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,792</p>
</td>	<td><p>10,565</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Czech Republic </p>
</td>	<td><p>19,146</p>
</td>	<td><p>6,193</p>
</td>	<td><p>9,139</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Italy </p>
</td>	<td><p>51,437</p>
</td>	<td><p>46,655</p>
</td>	<td><p>6,704</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Slovenia </p>
</td>	<td><p>1,449</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,931</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,379</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Spain </p>
</td>	<td><p>6,886</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,185</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,471</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Greece </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>572</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Denmark </p>
</td>	<td><p>22</p>
</td>	<td><p>29</p>
</td>	<td><p>206</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Austria </p>
</td>	<td><p>1,104</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>152</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Belgium </p>
</td>	<td><p>16,524</p>
</td>	<td><p>965</p>
</td>	<td><p>17</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Finland </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>8</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>United Kingdom </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>6</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Luxembourg </p>
</td>	<td><p>190</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Norway </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>France </p>
</td>	<td><p>1,215</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,232</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>
    From Global Trade Atlas Navigator, accessed 09/09/08
</p>
<p> Hungary Import Statistics for Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork, 2005 – 2007
</p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Exporting Country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Quantity (metric tons)</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>2007</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Germany </p>
</td>	<td><p>33,410</p>
</td>	<td><p>31,811</p>
</td>	<td><p>33,246</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>United Kingdom </p>
</td>	<td><p>1,506</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,120</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,633</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Slovakia </p>
</td>	<td><p>6,034</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,137</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,594</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Austria </p>
</td>	<td><p>2,944</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,351</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,031</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>France </p>
</td>	<td><p>13,465</p>
</td>	<td><p>11,610</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,789</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Denmark </p>
</td>	<td><p>7,216</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,929</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,690</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Netherlands </p>
</td>	<td><p>6,758</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,442</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,295</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Spain </p>
</td>	<td><p>5,123</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,880</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,718</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Poland </p>
</td>	<td><p>2,142</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,682</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,327</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Romania </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>19</p>
</td>	<td><p>814</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Belgium </p>
</td>	<td><p>1,211</p>
</td>	<td><p>202</p>
</td>	<td><p>695</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Ireland </p>
</td>	<td><p>914</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>270</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Italy </p>
</td>	<td><p>1,055</p>
</td>	<td><p>305</p>
</td>	<td><p>133</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Czech Republic </p>
</td>	<td><p>410</p>
</td>	<td><p>104</p>
</td>	<td><p>89</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Greece </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>40</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Slovenia </p>
</td>	<td><p>9</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Sweden </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Cyprus </p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>185</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>Bottom of Form
</p>
<h1>References
</h1>
<p>1.
APHIS (2000). Risk analysis for importation of classical swine fever virus in swine and swine products from the European Union. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services. 
</p>
<p>2.
APHIS (2004). APHIS risk considerations on importation of classical swine fever (CSF) virus in breeding swine, swine semen, and fresh pork from a European Union region of fifteen Member States. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export. September 2004. 
</p>
<p>3.
Wengler, G., D.W. Bradley, and e. al., <i>Flaviviridae. In Virus Taxonomy: Sixth Report of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses.</i>, ed. C.M.F. F. A. Murphy, D. H. L. Bishop et al (Eds). 1995, New York: Springer Verlag. 415-427.
</p>
<p>4.
Depner, K., T. Bauer, and e. al., <i>Thermal and pH stability of pestiviruses.</i> Revue Scientifique et Technique de l'Office International des Epizooties, 1992. <b>11</b>: p. 885-893.
</p>
<p>5.
Harkness, J.W., <i>Classical swine fever and its diagnosis: a current view.</i> Veterinary Record, 1985. <b>116</b>: p. 288-293.
</p>
<p>6.
OIE. <i>Classical Swine Fever disease card</i>.  2002  [cited 2007 August]; Available from: http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_A130.htm.
</p>
<p>7.
Trautwein, G., <i>Pathology and pathogenesis of the disease. In Classical Swine Fever and Related Infections.  </i>, ed. B. Liess. 1988, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing. 24-27.
</p>
<p>8.
Wood, L., S. Brockman, and e. al., <i>Classical swine fever: virulence and tissue distribution of a 1986 isolate in pigs.</i> Veterinary Record, 1988. <b>122</b>(391-394).
</p>
<p>9.
Elbers, A.R., J.A. Stegeman, and e. al., <i>The classical swine fever epidemic 1997-1998 in The Netherlands: descriptive epidemiology.</i> Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 1999. <b>42</b>: p. 157-184.
</p>
<p>10.
Edwards, S., <i>Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus.</i> Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. <b>73</b>: p. 175-181.
</p>
<p>11.
Fritzemeier, J., et al., <i>Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Germany in the 1990s.</i> Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. <b>77</b>(1-2): p. 29-41.
</p>
<p>12.
Dahle, J. and B. Liess, <i>A review of classical swine fever infections in pigs: epizootiology, clinical disease and pathology.</i> Comp Immun Micro, 1992. <b>20</b>: p. 261-274.
</p>
<p>13.
Elbers, A.R., J.A. Stegeman, and e. al., <i>Factors associated with the introduction of classical swine fever virus into pig herds in the central area of the 1997/98 epidemic in The Netherlands.</i> Veterinary Record, 2001. <b>149</b>(13): p. 377-382.
</p>
<p>14.
Biagetti, M., I. Greiser-Wilke, and D. Rutili, <i>Molecular epidemiology of classical swine fever in Italy.</i> Veterinary Microbiology, 2001. <b>83</b>(3): p. 205-215.
</p>
<p>15.
Laddomada, A., et al., <i>Epidemiology of classical swine fever (CSF) in wild boar in a densely populated area indicating CSF virus persistence as a mechanism for virus perpetuation.</i> Veterinary Microbiology, 1994. <b>134</b>(8): p. 183-187.
</p>
<p>16.
Zanardi, G., et al., <i>Classical swine fever in wild boar in the Lombardy region of Italy fro m1997 to 2002.</i> Veterinary Recrod, 2003. <b>152</b>: p. 461-465.
</p>
<p>17.
Laddomada, A., <i>Inicidence and control of CSF in wild boar in Europe.</i> Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. <b>73</b>: p. 121-130.
</p>
<p>18.
Artois, M., et al., <i>Classical swine fever (hog cholera) in wild boar in Europe.</i> Revue Scientifique et Technique de l'Office International des Epizooties, 2002. <b>21</b>(2): p. 287-303.
</p>
<p>19.
Paton, D.J. and I. Greiser-Wilke, <i>Classical swine fever--an update.</i> Research in Veterinary Science, 2003. <b>75</b>(3): p. 169-178.
</p>
<p>20.
DG(SANCO) (1999). Classical swine fever in wild boar. European Commission Directorate-General XXIV, Consumer Policy and Consumer Health Protection, Directorate B - Scientific Health Options, Unit B3 - Management of scientific committees II (XXIV/B3/R90/1999).
</p>
<p>21.
Moennig, V., G. Floegel-Niesmann, and e. al., <i>Clinical signs and epidemiology of classical swine fever: a review of new knowledge.</i> Veterinary Journal, 2003. <b>165</b>: p. 11-20.
</p>
<p>22.
OIE. <i>Terrestrial Animal Health Code - 2006 PART 1, SECTION 1.3, RISK ANALYSIS</i> 2006  [cited 2007 August]; Available from: http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_titre_1.3.htm.
</p>
<p>23.
Food and Veterinary Office (2007). Country profile of Hungary on food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health. European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate F – Food and Veterinary Office DG(SANCO)/7593/2007 - CP Final.
</p>
<p>24.
Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2008). Additional Information for Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Requested for the Evaluation of Classical Swine Fever in Hungary. 
</p>
<p>25.
Hungarian Act No. CLXXVI of 2005 on animal health.
</p>
<p>26.
Federal Register Notice, <i>"Notice of Availability of a Document Concerning the Identification of EU Administrative Units"</i>. 2005. p. 43838-9.
</p>
<p>27.
Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2006). Hungarian response to post-site reveiw set of questions from APHIS. October 2006.
</p>
<p>28.
APHIS (2004). Observations made during APHIS' site visit to Hungary and communications with Hungarian officials. November 2004.
</p>
<p>29.
Council Directive 2001/89/EC on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever.
</p>
<p>30.
Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2003). Hungarian answers to the comlementary questions regarding the assessment of classical swine fever status of Hungary. April 2003.
</p>
<p>31.
Commission Decision 2002/106/EC approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory tests for the confirmation of classical swine fever.
</p>
<p>32.
Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2004). Hungarian answers to the second group of complementary questions regarding the assessment of the CSF status of Hungary. September 2004.
</p>
<p>33.
Food and Veterinary Office (2005). Final report of a mission carried out in Hungary from 7 to 18 November 2005 in order to review the up-grading of certain classes of food processing establishments, controls over certain products of animal origin intended for human consumption, certain live animal controls, and contingency plans for epizootic diseases. European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate F – Food and Veterinary Office (DG(SANCO)/7619/2005 – MR Final).
</p>
<p>34.
Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2002). Clarification of information requested for recognition of freedom from classical swine fever. July 2002.
</p>
<p>35.
Commission Decision 98/139/EC of  laying down certain detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field by Commission experts in the Member States 
</p>
<p>36.
DG(SANCO) (2007). Classical Swine Fever in wild boars - Hungary, Fax No. 2. European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate D - Animal Health and Welfare, D1 - Animal Health and Standing Committee.  D1/BVG(07)D/410217. 26 January 2007.
</p>
<p>37.
DG(SANCO) (2007). Classical Swine Fever - Hungary, Fax No. 3. European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate D - Animal Health and Welfare, D1 - Animal Health and Standing Committee.  D1/BVG(07)D/410289. 2 February 2007.
</p>
<p>38.
DG(SANCO) (2007). Classical Swine Fever - Hungary, Fax No. 4. European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate D - Animal Health and Welfare, D1 - Animal Health and Standing Committee.  D1/BVG(07)D/410342. 8 February 2007.
</p>
<p>39.
Hungarian National Classical Swine Fever Expert Team (2007). Nógrád county and the specified part of Pest county eradication programme for classical swine fever in feral pigs. 
</p>
<p>40.
Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2008). Information about Hungarian measures due to CSF infection in feral pigs in  Nógrád county and specified part of Pest county Hungary.  Report to SCoFCAH 01-07-2008. 
</p>
<p>41.
Commission Decision 2006/805/EC concerning animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever in certain Member States 
</p>
<p>42.
OIE. <i>OIE handistatus II</i>.  2007  [cited 2007 March]; Available from: http://www.oie.int/hs2.
</p>
<p>43.
State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak Republic (2008). Epidemiological situation on classical swine fever in wild boar and domestic swine in Slovakia.  Report to SCoFCAH 30-06-2008. 
</p>
<p>44.
OIE. <i>World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID) Interface</i>.  2007  [cited 2007 March]; Available from: http://www.oie.int/wahid.
</p>
<p>45.
CEI. <i>Summary of selected disease events: July - September 2001.  Center for Emerging Issues, APHIS</i>.  2001  [cited 2007 February]; Available from: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/taf/iw_2001_files/summary2001/disease_summary_7_9_2001.htm.
</p>
<p>46.
<i>approving the plans for the eradication of classical swine fever in feral pigs and the emergency vaccination of those pigs and of pigs in holdings against that disease in Romania </i>2006.
</p>
<p>47.
National Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority of Romania (2008). Information by Romania on the amended Classical Swine Fever control programme for 2008 approved by Commission Decision 2007/870/CE.  Report to SCoFCAH 07-05-2008. 
</p>
<p>48.
Commission Decision 2006/779/EC concerning transitional animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever in Romania 
</p>
<p>49.
Commission Decision 2004/431/EC approving certain contingency plans for the control of classical swine fever.
</p>
<p>50.
DG(SANCO) (2007). CSF Slovakia. European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate D - Animal Health and Welfare, D1 - Animal Health and Standing Committee.  D1/BVG(07)D/413505. 21 December 2006.
</p>
<p>51.
Commission Decision 79/542/EEC drawing up a list of third countries or parts of third countries, and laying down animal and public health and veterinary certification conditions, for importation into the Community of certain live animals and their fresh meat.
</p>
<p>52.
Council Directive 91/496/EEC laying down the principles governing the organization of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC.
</p>
<p>53.
Council Directive 92/65/EEC laying down animal health requirements governing trade in and imports into the Community of animals, semen, ova and embryos not subject to animal health requirements laid down in specific Community rules referred to in Annex A (I) to Directive 90/425/EEC.
</p>
<p>54.
Council Directive 97/78/EC laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third countries.
</p>
<p>55.
Regulation 1774/2002 laying down health rules concerning animal by-products not intended for human consumption.
</p>
<p>56.
DG(SANCO). <i>General Guidance on EU Import and Transit Rules for Live Animals and Animal Products from Third Countries 2006</i>.  2006  [cited 2007 February ]; Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/guide_thirdcountries2006_en.pdf.
</p>
<p>57.
Council Directive 96/93/EC on the certification of animals and animal products.
</p>
<p>58.
Commission Decision 2001/812/EC laying down the requirements for the approval of border inspection posts responsible for veterinary checks on products introduced into the community from third countries.
</p>
<p>59.
Commission Decision 2001/881/EC drawing up a list of border inspection posts agreed for veterinary checks on animals and animal products from third countries and updating the detailed rules concerning the checks to be carried out by the experts of the Commission (as amended) 
</p>
<p>60.
Food and Veterinary Office (2004). Final report of a mission to Hungary from 21 to 25 June 2004 concerning border inspection posts. European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate F – Food and Veterinary Office (DG(SANCO)/7239/2004 – MR Final).
</p>
<p>61.
Regulation 745/2004 laying down measures with regard to imports of products of animal origin for personal consumption.
</p>
<p>62.
Commission Decision 2006/926/EC amending Decision 2001/881/EC as regards the list of border inspection posts in view of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania 
</p>
<p>63.
EC. <i>Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument of the Institution Building Unit of Directorate-General Enlargement of the European Commission.</i>  2006  [cited 2007 February]; Available from: http://taiex.cec.eu.int/.
</p>
<p>64.
Council Directive 2004/68/EC laying down animal health rules for the importation into and transit through the Community of certain live ungulate animals, amending Directives 90/426/EEC and 92/65/EEC and repealing Directive 72/462/EEC.
</p>
<p>65.
Commission Decision 2000/208/EC establishing detailed rules for the application of Council Directive 97/78/EC concerning the transit of products of animal origin from one third country to another third country by road only across the European Community 
</p>
<p>66.
Council Directive 64/432/EEC on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine.
</p>
<p>67.
Council Directive 89/662/EEC concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market.
</p>
<p>68.
Council Directive 97/12/EC amending and updating Directive 64/432/EEC on health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine.
</p>
<p>69.
Council Directive 90/425/EEC concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra- Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market
</p>
<p>70.
Council Directive 91/628/EEC on the protection of animals during transport and amending Directives 90/425/EEC and 91/496/EEC.
</p>
<p>71.
Commission Decision 98/139/EC laying down certain detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field by Commission experts in the Member States 
</p>
<p>72.
International Services personnel, <i>personal communication</i>. November 13, 2007.
</p>
<p>73.
GTA. <i>Global Trade Atlas Navigator</i>.  2007  [cited 2007 May]; Available from: http://www.gtis.com/gta/.
</p>
<p>74.
Commission Decision 2007/152/EC amending Decision 2006/805/EC as regards animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever in Hungary 
</p>
<p>75.
<i>Pig Survey, June 2007</i>.  2007  [cited 2007 August]; Available from: http://www.cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/agriculture/current/pigsurvey.pdf.
</p>
<p>76.
HCSO. <i>Agriculture in Hungary, 2003</i>. Department of Agricultural and Environmental Statistics, Hungarian Central Statistical Office.  2004  [cited 2007 August]; Available from: http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/pdf/emomg.pdf.
</p>
<p>77.
Commission Decision 2000/678/EC laying down detailed rules for registration of holdings in national databases for porcine animals as foreseen by Council Directive 64/432/EEC 
</p>
<p>78.
Council Directive 92/102/EEC on the identification and registration of animals.
</p>
<p>79.
APHIS (2004). Samia Shawky's site visit notes and final lab report, long version (not include in site visit report). 
</p>
<p>80.
MARD (2004). Memo 30.703/2004.  Swine CSF monitoring analysis ***replace with commission decision 1999/608??? 
</p>
<p>81.
Commission Decision 1999/608/EC amending Annexes of Council Directive 90/429/EEC laying down the animal health requirements applicable to intra- Community trade in and imports of semen of domestic animals of the porcine species 
</p>
<p>82.
Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2007). Cases of CSF in Nógrád county in feral pigs in Hungary.  . 
</p>
<p>83.
DG(SANCO) (2007). Classical Swine Fever - Hungary, Fax No. 5. European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate D - Animal Health and Welfare, D1 - Animal Health and Standing Committee.  D1/BVG(07)D/410390. 12 February 2007.
</p>
<p>84.
Council Decision 90/424/EEC on expenditure in the veterinary field.
</p>
<p>85.
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 136/2004 laying down procedures for veterinary checks at Community border inspection posts on products imported from third countries.
</p>
<p>86.
Directive 72/462/EEC on health and veterinary inspection problems upon importation of bovine, ovine and caprine animals and swine, fresh meat or meat products from third countries.
</p>
<p>87.
CEAH (2001). Pathway assessment of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) risk to the United States: an evaluation in response to international FMD outbreaks in 2001. USDA, APHIS, VS 
</p>
<p>88.
CEAH (1995). Risk Assessment of the Practice of Feeding Recycled Commodities to Domesticated Swine in the U.S. USDA, APHIS, VS 
</p>
<p>89.
CEAH (2002). 2001 waste-feeder survey, Unpublished data. USDA, APHIS, VS 
</p>
<p>90.
Hennecken, M., J.A. Stegeman, and e. al., <i>Transmission of classical swine fever virus by artificial insemination during the 1997-1998 epidemic in The Netherlands: a descriptive epidemiological study.</i> Vet Q, 2000. <b>22</b>(4): p. 228-233.
</p>
<p>91.
Floegel, G. and A. Wehrend, <i>Detection of classical Swine Fever virus in semen of infected boars.</i> Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. <b>77</b>: p. 109-116.
</p>
<p>92.
Glossup, C.E. and R. Cameron, <i>Transmission of viruses through pigs and products of pig origin</i>. Trends in Emerging Viral Infections of Swine, ed. A. Morilla, K.Y. Yoon, and J. J. Zimmerman. 2002, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State Press. 3-11.
</p>
<p>93.
McCauley, E.H., et al. (1979). Potential economic impact of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States. St. Paul, Minnesota: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
</p>
<p>94.
Moennig, V., <i>Introduction to classical swine fever: virus, disease and control policy.</i> Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. <b>73</b>: p. 93-102.
</p>
<p>95.
Saatkamp, H.W., P.B.M. Berentsen, and e. al., <i>Economic aspects of the control of classical swine fever outbreaks in the European Union.</i> Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. <b>73</b>: p. 221-237.
</p>
<p>96.
Stegeman, J.A., A. Elbers, and e. al., <i>The 1997-1998 epidemic of classical swine fever in the Netherlands.</i> Veterinary Microbiology, 2000. <b>73</b>: p. 183-196.
</p>
<p>97.
Garner, M.G., I.F. Whan, and e. al., <i>The expected economic impact of selected exotic diseases on the pig industry of Australia.</i> Revue Scientifique et Technique de l'Office International des Epizooties, 2001. <b>20</b>(3): p. 671-685.
</p>
<p>98.
NEPA (1969). National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (40 U.S.C.4321 et seq.) AND regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing the procedural provisions of NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508) AND USDA regulations implementing NEPA (7 CFR part 1b) AND APHIS’ NEPA Implementing Procedures (7 CFR part 372). 
</p>
<p>99.
Paarlberg, P.L., L.G. Lee, and e. al., <i>Potential revenue impact of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States.</i> Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, 2002. <b>220</b>(7): p. 988-992.
</p>
<p>100.
CEAH (2003). Economic impact of alternative management strategies for regulating Canadian ruminant/product imports. Unpublished report. CEAH, USDA, APHIS, VS 
</p>
<div class="footer"><p class="footer">
- 1 -
</p>
</div>
</body></html>