Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

SUZY ST. JOHN GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Marion Co. Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

ERIC P. BABBS

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DEJUAN PARKER, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1106-CR-557

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Jose D. Salinas, Judge

Cause No. 49G14-1006-FD-46934

March 29, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAKER, Judge 
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Appellant-defendant Dejuan Parker appeals his conviction for Possession of 

Marijuana,1a class D felony. Specifically, Parker argues that the evidence is insufficient 

to prove that he possessed a baggie of marijuana. Finding that the trial court, as the fact 

finder, could reasonably conclude that Parker was in possession of the marijuana, we 

affirm.

FACTS

On June 13, 2010, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) Officer 

Jerome Harrison was in an unmarked car engaged in the surveillance of a gas station at 

30th Street and Keystone Avenue. Officer Harrison noticed as three men—Parker, 

Shawn Campbell, and Julius Doulas—jaywalked across Keystone toward the gasoline 

station.

At some point, a blue Cadillac pulled into the gas station parking lot. Campbell 

got into the back seat but exited it in less than one minute. Suspecting narcotics activity, 

Officer Harrison followed the Cadillac as it drove west on 30th Street. Other undercover 

officers detained Parker, Campbell, and Doulas at the scene for jaywalking.

Officer Derek Jackson detained the three men and informed them of their Miranda

rights. Officer Jackson and another officer separated the three men, patted them down for 

weapons, and questioned them. The three men were placed at different locations around 

one of the police cars. Parker was “at the tire,” while Campbell and Doulas were “at the 

bumper” and “on the other side of the bumper.” Tr. p. 35. 

 

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Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11.
3

Although Parker was in handcuffs, Officer Jackson noticed a small bag of 

marijuana on the ground “at the feet of [Mr.] Parker . . . right next to [him].” Tr. p. 19. 

No marijuana had been noticed prior to that time. The substance subsequently tested 

positive for 2.70 grams of marijuana. 

Parker was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana as a class D felony 

because he had a prior conviction for that offense. Following a bench trial on March 24, 

2011, Parker was found guilty as charged. Thereafter, he was sentenced to 365 days in 

jail, with credit for time served and the remainder suspended to probation. Parker now 

appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

 Our standard of review regarding sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled. 

We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bond v. State, 

925 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We consider only the evidence 

most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and affirm if 

the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to 

support the verdict. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when a reasonable trier of fact 

would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.

The trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from facts established either by 

direct or circumstantial evidence and a guilty verdict may be based solely on 

circumstantial evidence. Turpin v. State, 435 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 1982). As an appellate 
4

court, we are not required to find that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence has been 

overcome but need only conclude that an inference reasonably tending to support the 

finding of the defendant’s guilt can be drawn from the evidence presented. Armstrong v. 

State, 429 N.E.2d 647, 654 (Ind. 1982).

II. Parker’s Contentions

In addressing Parker’s argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence 

to support his conviction, Indiana Code section 35-48-4-11(1)(ii) requires the State to 

prove that Parker knowingly or intentionally possessed marijuana. We have long 

recognized that a conviction for possession of contraband may be founded upon actual or 

constructive possession. Holmes v. State, 785 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 

Constructive possession is established by showing that the defendant has the intent and 

capability to maintain dominion and control over the contraband. Id. More specifically, 

it has been held that 

In cases where the accused has exclusive possession of the premises on 

which the contraband is found, an inference is permitted that he or she 

knew of the presence of contraband and was capable of controlling it. 

However, when possession of the premises is non-exclusive, the inference 

is not permitted absent some additional circumstances indicating 

knowledge of the presence of the contraband and the ability to control it. 

Among the recognized “additional circumstances” are: (1) incriminating 

statements by the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) a 

drug manufacturing setting; (4) proximity of the defendant to the 

contraband; (5) contraband is in plain view; and (6) location of the 

contraband is in close proximity to items owned by the defendant. 

Id. at 661 (emphasis added)(internal citations omitted). 
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In Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ind. 2011), our Supreme Court reaffirmed 

the principle that proximity of contraband to a defendant, combined with the contraband 

being in plain view, is sufficient evidence to support a conviction based on constructive 

possession. Moreover, a defendant’s proximity to contraband in plain view will support 

an inference of intent to maintain dominion or control. Id. 

In this case, the evidence established that the clear baggie containing the 

marijuana first appeared on the ground, immediately next to Parker’s feet. In light of 

these facts, the trial court could reasonably infer Parker’s ability and intent to maintain 

dominion and control over the marijuana. Contrary to Parker’s contention that either 

Doulas or Campbell could have tossed the marijuana at his feet, Parker’s testimony about 

the locations of the men when separated around the police car makes such a scenario 

implausible. 

As mentioned above, Parker was “at the tire” while Campbell and Doulas were “at 

the bumper” and “on the other side of the bumper.” Tr. p. 35. And because the men 

were separated on different sides of the police car, there was no straight-line path 

between them except what was blocked by the car. Although Parker also claimed that he 

was only two or three feet from either Doulas or Campbell, that apparent conflict in the 

evidence demonstrates that it was the trial court’s prerogative as to which evidence and 

inferences to credit. 

Additionally, we find the circumstances in Gray instructive here. In Gray, police 

officers observed marijuana in plain view approximately eight to ten feet away from 
6

where they were speaking with the defendant. Id. at 172-73. The marijuana was 

underneath a living room coffee table, and two juveniles were sitting on the couch next to 

the table. Id. Although the defendant’s son testified that he tossed the marijuana 

underneath the table, the officers testified that the son was not present during the 

encounter. Id. at 176. Our Supreme Court held that the officers’ testimony that the 

marijuana was in plain view in proximity to the defendant was substantial evidence of 

probative value from which the defendant’s guilt could be inferred. Id. at 175-76. 

As a result of the holding in Gray and contrary to Parker’s argument, no direct 

evidence was required as to “how [the marijuana] appeared.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. 

Gray also demonstrates that, for a defendant’s possession conviction to be affirmed, the 

evidence does not need to positively exclude every other person at the scene of the crime. 

Thus, as in Gray, while we recognize that there may have been other inferences as to how 

the baggie of marijuana landed next to Parker, the trial court could draw the reasonable 

inference of Parker’s guilt based on the evidence that was presented at trial. Thus, we 

decline to set aside Parker’s conviction. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

DARDEN, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.