NOT RECOMMENDED F OR P UBLICATION F ile Nam e: 07a0796n.06 F iled: Novem ber 14, 2007 No. 05-1925 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT JESS E SPENCER, P etitioner -Appellant,
v. ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE RAYM OND BOOKER, EASTE RN DISTRICT OF M ICHIGAN Respondent-Appellee. ____________________________________/ BEFORE: BATCHEL DER and GILMAN, Cir cuit Judges; and STAFF ORD, Distric t

Judge.* STAFF ORD, Distric t Judge. The pe titioner, J esse Spenc er ( “Spence r”) , appea ls from the district court’s de nial of his petition for a wr it of habea s corpus by a per son in state custody

. We AF F IRM
. I. BACKG ROUND Followinga jury

trial, Spence r wa s convicted of second- deg ree murder f

or the 1997 bruta l
mur de r o f B uf

or d H ug he s, a

fr a il, fi ft y -t hr e e -ye ar- old

man who liv e d w ithSpe nc e r a nd his mot he r, Ev e ly

n Sp e nc e r L ov e . Sp e nc e r w a s se nte nc e d to an in de te rm inate se nte nc e of tw e nty to fo rt y y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt. Spe nc e r a pp e a le d h is c onvic tio n to the Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls. In th at a

pp e a l, Spe nc e r r a ise d n e ith e r a

n in e ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- c ouns e l c la im n or

any se nte nc ingiss ue s.Pag e 2 of 11

* The Honor able William H. St aff ord, Jr., United St ates District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of F lorida, sitting by desig nation. The Michig an Court of Appe als aff irmed Spence r’s c onviction in an unpublished opinion on May 7, 1999. People v . Spence r , No. 207467, 1999 WL33445261 (Mich. Ct. App. May 7, 1999). The Michig an Supreme Court denied Spence r’s de layed application for leave to appea l on November 29 , 1 99 9, statin g : “ [W]e are no t pe rs ua de d th at th e qu e sti on s p re se nte d s ho uld be re vie we d b y

thi s Court.” People v . Spence r , No. 114803, 605 N.W.2d 317 (Mich. 1999). On Novembe r 9, 2000, Spence r filed a motion for relief

from judg ment in which he r aised the same iss ue s th at w e re pr e se nte d to the Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls o n d ir e c t a

pp e a l. H e a lso raised se vera l additional issues, including inef fec tive-assistance -of- counsel a nd sentenc ing issues. Am on goth e r t

hin g s, Spe nc e r a

rgue d ( 1) tha

t hi s tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e be c a

us e he fa ile d to object at se ntencingto the improper sc oringof prior r ecor d varia ble 2 (“ PRV 2”); and (2) that the trial court de nied him a fa ir sentenc ing he aringwhen it base d his sentence on err oneous information. Spence r ar gued that his motion was not subject to dismis sal under the Michig an pr oc e dura l de fa

ult ru le , M CR 6 .5 08 (D )( 3) , b e c a us e (1 ) t he ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of his a pp e llate counsel (who failed to ra ise ineff ective- assistance and sente ncingissues on appea l) established g ood cause for his def

ault, and (2) the cour

t’s improper r eliance on his previous convictions resulted in an inva lid sentence , establishing a ctual pre judice. The state tr ial court de nied Spence r' s motion for relief from judg ment on September 21, 2001. Amongother thing s, the state trial c ourt reje cted—on the me rits—Spencer ’s ineffectiveassistance -of- counsel a

nd sentenc ing c laims. The Michig an Court of Appe als denied Spenc er’ s delayed application for leave to appea l the trial court’ s denial of his motion for re lief fr om judgme nt, stating that Spenc er f ailed “to mee t the burden of establishing e ntitlement to reliefPag e 3 of 11

un de r M CR 6 .5 08 (D ). ” Th e Mic hig an Su pr e me Court

de nie d Sp e nc e r’ s a

pp lic atio n f

or le ave to appea l on October

31, 2003, stating that Spencer had “f ailed to meet the bur den of e stablishing entitlement to relief unde r MCR 6.508(D).” People v . Spence r , 670 N.W.2d 674 (Mich. 2003). P ro ce ed i n g pro s e , Spencer there afte r filed a

petition for writ of ha

beas c orpus in fede ral district court, pursua

nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2254, raisinga number of issues, including(1) whe ther the state trial cour

t erre d when it fa iled to find that Spencer was de nied the ef

fec tive assistance of counsel; and ( 2) whe ther the state trial court e rre d when it fa iled to find that Spencer was de nied a fair se ntencinghear ing a

nd, there by , due proc ess. The district c ourt denied Spenc er’ s petition, fi nd ing —amon goth e r t

hin g s— that Sp e nc e r’ s in e ff

e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- c ouns e l and

du e pr oc e ss
c l a i m s w e r e w i th o u tm e r i t
. T h e d i s tr i c tc o urtth e r e a f t e r g r an t e d a c e rt i f i c at e o f a p p e a l a b i l i ty, limit ed to Spence r’s inef

fec tive-assistance and due pr ocess c laims. This ti mely appea l followed. II. AN AL YSI S A. IN EF F EC TIV E A SSIST AN CE OF CO UN SEL In h is f e de ra l ha be a s p e tit ion , Sp e nc e r c ha lle ng e d th e state a pp e llate c ourt s’ re fu sa l to
re v i ew h i s i n ef

fe ct i v e- as s i s t an ce -o f- co un s el cl ai m . Inre s p o n s e, ci t i n g Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722 (1991), Warde n Ray mond Booke r (“ Booke r”) argued that fe dera l habea s review of Spencer ’s ineff

ective- assistance -of- counsel c laim was bar red be cause , in refusingto reviewthe claim, the state a

ppellate c ourts relied on a n independe nt and ade quate state proce dural ground and Spence r fa iled to establish cause and pre judice to excuse his proce dural de fault. See id. at 729 (holdingthat fede ral c ourts may not review“a que stion of fede ral lawdecide d by a state c ourt if the dec ision of that court re sts on a state law ground that is independe nt of the fe dera l question

and a de qu ate to s up po rt

the jud g me nt” ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt re je c te d B oo ke r’ s p ro c e dura l de fa ultPag e 4 of 11

argument but never

theless denied r elief on the merits. In essenc e, the district cour t determined that Spencer

failed to e stablish prejudice unde r Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 688 (1984), thu s d oo min ghis ine ff

e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- c ouns e l c la im. W e r ev i ew th e d i s tri ctco urt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa ct for c lear

err or and its conc lusions of law de novo

. Hicks v . Straub , 3 77 F .3 d 5 38 , 5 51 (6 th Cir. 2004). Th is c ourt

a pp lie s a fo ur -p art te st t o d e te rm ine wh e the r a c la im h a s b e e n p ro c e dura lly defa ulted: (1 ) t

he c ourt mus t de te rm ine tha

t th e re is a

state pr oc e dura l r

ule wi th whic h th e pe tit ion e r f a ile d to c omp ly ; ( 2) the c ourt mus t de te rm ine wh e the r t

he state c ourt s a c tua lly

e nf or c e d th e state proce dural sanc tion; (3) the state proc edura l rule must have be en an adequate and indepe ndent state proc edura l gr ound upon which the state c ou ld r e ly

to f or e c los e re vie w o f a

fe de ra l c on sti tut ion a l c la im; and (4) if the cour

t has deter

mined that a state pr ocedur al rule w as not complied with and that the rule was a n adequate and independe nt state g round, then the pe titioner must demonstrate that there was c ause f

or his failure to follow the rule a nd that actua l prejudice resulted f

rom the alleg ed constitutional err or. Hartman v. Bagley , 4 9 2 F. 3 d 3 4 7 , 3 5 7 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Monzo v. Edwards , 281 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 2002)). I f the state c ourts do not clear ly and expressly

invoke a state proce dural ba r when r ejec ting a

defe ndant’s inef

fec tive-assistance claim, but instead rule on the merits, then a fede ral c ourt may

rea ch the mer its of the claim. Coleman , 501 U.S. at 735. He re , i ti s cl ea r t h atS p en ce r f ai l edt o co mp l y

wi thM i ch i gan ’s p ro ce d

ura l ru l e r equ i ri n g a defe ndant to raise ine ffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel on direc t appea l. Spencer raised the issue, not on direct a

ppeal, but in a post-c onviction petition for relief from judg ment. I t is also clear that the pr oc e dura l ba

r s e t f or th i n M CR 6 .5 08 (D ) c on sti tut e s “ an a de qu ate and ind e pe nd e nt s tate proce dural ground upon which the state [may ] rely to forec lose revie w of a

fede ral c onstitut ionalPag e 5 of 11

M. C.R . 6 .5 08 (D ) s tate s in re le va nt p art : 1 (D) E ntitlement to R elief. The defe ndant has the bur den of e stablishing entitlement to the re lief reque sted. The c ourt may not gr ant re lief to the def endant if the motion (1 ) s e e ks re lie f f

ro m a jud g me nt o f c onvic tio n a nd se nte nc e tha

t st ill is s ub

je c t to c ha lle ng e on

a pp e a l pu rs ua nt t o s ub c ha

pte r 7 .2 00 or

su bc ha pte r 7 .3 00 ; (2) a lleg es g rounds for r elief which wer e dec ided ag ainst the defe ndant in a prior a pp e a l or pr oc e e din gun de r t

his su bc ha pte r, un le ss t

he de fe nd ant e sta

bli sh e s th at a re tr oa c tiv e c ha

ng e in t he law h a s und e rm ine d th e pr ior de c isi on ; (3) a lleg es g rounds for r elief, othe r than jurisdictional def ects, whic h could have been r aised on a

ppeal f rom the convic tion and sentenc e or in a prior motion under thi s su bc ha pte r, un le ss t

he de fe nd ant d e mon str ate s (a) g ood cause for f

ailure to ra ise such g rounds on appe al or in the prior motion, and (b) a ctual pre

judice fr om the alleg ed irre gularities that support the claim for r elief.... claim.” Hartman , 4 92 F .3 d at 35 7; see als o H owa rd v . B ou c ha rd, 405 F.3d 459, 477 ( 6th Cir. 20 05 ) ( no tin gthat “ [i]t is we ll- e sta bli sh e d in thi s c ir c uit

that th e pr oc e dura l ba

r s e t f or th i n Ru le 6.508(D) c onstitut es an a dequate and indepe ndent g round on which the Michig an Supreme Court
may re ly in f or e c los ingre vie w o f f

e de ra l c la ims ” ); Simpson v. Jone s , 238 F.3d 399, 407 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (notingthat “we have he ld that MCR6.508(D) w as beingregularly followed [by

the Mic hig an c ourt s] a s o f 1 99 0" ). What is le ss c le ar i s whe the r t he state c ourt s in

thi s c a se a c tua lly 1

e nf or c e d th e state ’s pr oc e dura l ba r whe n d e nyingre lie f o n Sp e nc e r’ s in e ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e c la im. Relying on Ab e la v . M

ar tin , 380 F.3d 915 ( 6th Cir. 2004), the district court dete rmined that the Michig an appe llate cour ts’ g ener al incantation of MCR 6.508(D) was inade quate to show that th e state c ourt s d e nie d r e lie f o n th e ba sis of the pr oc e dura l ba

r s e t f or th s pe c if ic a lly in M CR 6.508(D)( 3). F inding no “ clea r and e x press invocation of a proc edura l bar,” the district court
c o n c lu d e d

th at S p e n c e r ’ s in e f

f e c ti v e - a s s is ta

n c e c la im w a s n o t p r o c e d

ur a ll y d e f a u lt e d

. We disag ree with the district court’s c onclusion.Pag e 6 of 11

In Ab e la , the cour

t noted: M.C.R. 6.508(D) states that “[t] he def endant ha s the burden of es t ab l i s h i n g en t i t l em en tt o th e r el i ef re qu es t ed

. ” A l th o u gh 6.508(D)( 1), (2) , and (3) list specific proc edura l gr ounds for denying a defe ndant re lief fr om judgment, these proce dural grounds are not the exclusive gr ounds for whic h a cour t may deny relief pursuant to M.C.R. 6.508(D). A c ourt may deny relief from judgme nt under 6.508(D ) for the non-proc edura l rea son that the defe ndant simply

failed to mee t his burden of “ establishing e nti tle me nt t o th e re lie f r e qu e ste d. ” As su c h th e Mic hig an Su pr e me Court ’s c itatio n to M. C.R . 6 .5 08 (D ) i n it s o rd e r d e nyingAb e la le ave to a pp e a l do e s n ot d e mon str ate tha t th at c ourt

de nie d h im leave to appea l on the basis of a pr ocedur al def ault, much less on the proc edura l gr ound descr ibed in M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3), Ab e la , 380 F.3d at 922. Be cause , in Abela’ s case , the state trial c ourt and the state court of appea ls denied re lief on the mer its of Abela’ s fede ral c laims and the Michig an Supreme Court de nie d r e lie f o n th e ba sis of MCR 6 .5 08 (D ) i n g e ne ra l, a pa ne l of thi s c ourt fo un d th at th e c la ims raised in Abe la’s fe dera l habea s petition were not pr ocedur ally defa ulted. Acc ordingto the Ab e la court, “ g iven that all of the lowe r state c ourts adjudicate d Abela’ s case on the merits, it is not at all clea r that the Michig an Supreme Court’s summary order relies on a

proce dural ba

r, as oppose d to the non-proc edura l rea son that Abela simply failed to mee t his burden of ‘e stablishing entitlement to the relief

reque sted.’ ” Id. at 923. Since Ab e la , a

dif fe re nt p ane l of

thi s c ourt ha s c on sid e re d a

c a se fa c tua lly

sim ila r t o th is
case . Mc Cra

yv . M e tri sh , 232 F. App’ x 469 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished dec ision). As happene d here , the def

endant in McCray

(1) r aised a

n ineffe ctive-a ssistance-of -counse l claim in a motion for relief

from judg ment rathe r than on dire ct appe al; (2) the Mic higa n trial court addre ssed and r ejec ted McCra y ’s claim on the mer its; and (3) the state a ppellate c ourts—both the Michig an Court of Appe als and the Michig an Supreme Court—refuse d to reviewMcCray ’sPag e 7 of 11

ineffe ctive-a ssistance c laim, stating in one- sentenc e orde rs that McCra y had “f ailed to meet the burden of establishing e ntitlement to relief under [Mi chig an Court Rule] 6.508(D).” Id. at 478. Citi ngestablished Six th Circuit prece dent, our c ourt held that the state a ppellate c ourts’ summary invocation of MCR 6.508(D) made clea r that the state c ourts’ dec ision to deny relief rested exclusively

on a state pr ocedur al rule. Id. at 47 8 ( c iti ngsix c a se s: Lub e rd a v . Tr ipe tt , 211 F.3d 1004, 1005 (6th Cir. 2000); Ho war d v . B ou c ha rd, 4 05 F .3 d 4 59 , 4 77 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Munson v. Kap ture , 3 84 F .3 d 3 10 , 3 14 -1 5 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 4) ; Hargrave- Thomas v. Y ukins , 374 F.3d 383, 387 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ; Burroughs v. Mak owski , 282 F.3d 410, 414 ( 6th Cir. 2002); and Simpson v. Jone s , 23 8 F .3 d 3 99 , 4 07 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) ). Re je c tin gMc Cr ay ’s Ab e la

- b a s e d ar gum e n tt o th e c o n tr ar

y,
our c ourt e xpla ine d th at, a

bs e nt en banc consideration to overrule a published opinion of the circ uit, the Ab e la court c ould not have over ruled Luberda and its prog eny . McCray , 232 F. App’ x
at 47 8 n .1 ; see, e .g. , Luberda , 211 F.3d at 1006 (findingthe def endant’ s ineffe ctive-a ssistance-of

trial-counse l claim proce durally defa ulted wher e the state trial court c onsidered the claim on the merits but the Michig an Court of Appe als ruled that L uberda had “f ailed to meet the bur den of
e sta bli sh inge nti tle me nt t o r e lie f u nd e r M .C. R. 6 .5 08 (D )” ); Burroughs v. Mak owski , 282 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2002) (findingthat the Michig an appe llate cour ts’ summary

statement that the petitioner wa s not entitled to relief unde r MCR 6.508(D) “pr esents a suf ficient e x planation that the ir ru lin g s w e re ba se d o n p ro c e dura l de fa ult ” ). Ha vin gfo un d th at th e state a pp e llate c ourt s’ decision re sted on an indepe ndent and a dequate state proc edura l gr ound, this court held that Mc Cr ay ’s ine ff

e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- c ouns e l c la im w a s b arr e d f ro m f e de ra l c ourt

re vie w a bs e nt a sh ow ingof

c a us e fo r t he de fa ult and pr e jud ic e ari sin gthe re fr om. As the c ourt

fo un d in Mc Cr ay ’s c a se , w e fi nd

in t his c a se that th e Mic hig an a pp e llatePag e 8 of 11

“ A f un dame nta l mi sc arr ia g e of jus tic e re su lts fr om t

he c onvic tio n o f o ne wh o is 2 ‘ac tually innocent.’ ” Lun dg

re n v . M itc he ll , 4 4 0 F. 3 d

7 5 4 , 7 6 4 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Murray v. Carrier , 4 77 U. S. 4 78 , 4 96 (1 98 6) ). Spe nc e r m ake s n o atte mpt to s ho w that he is “ a c tua lly innocent” of

the cr ime with which he wa s char g ed. courts’ summar

y statements invoking MCR 6.508(D) made c lear that the “de cision to deny relief rested e x clusively

on a state pr ocedur al rule.” McCray , 232 F. App’ x at 478. Spence r’s ineffe ctive-a ssistance c laim, theref ore, is bar red f rom revie w in this court unless Spencer can sh owthat “ the re wa s c a

us e fo r t he de fa ult and pr e jud ic e re su lti ngfr om t

he de fa ult , o r t hat a miscarr iag e of justice w ill result from enfor cingthe proc edura l defa ult in the petitioner’s ca se.” Coleman , 501 U. S. at 749. Spencer has made no such showinghere

. 2 Spencer contends that he was pre

judiced by

his counsel’s fa ilure to object to a se ntencing varia ble—PRV 2—that was score d incorre ctly as 25 points. In Michig an, if ten or more year s elapse betwee n the date on which a pr isoner is dischar g ed fr om a prior c onviction and the date of his or her ne x t offense , the prior c onviction may not be used in scor ing PRV 2. Spence r in fac t
re c e ive d a

PRV2 s c or e of

25 po int s b a se d o n a

19 81 pr ior

c onvic tio n. B e c a

us e Spe nc e r w a s f

ull y discharg ed fr om that 1981 conviction on September 21, 1983, more than 10 y ear s befor e his 1997 murder of Buf ord Hughes, his PRV 2 score should have been 0 a nd not 25. Booke r now c oncede s that Spencer ’s PRV 2 score w as er roneously score d. Relying on a

n incorre ct PRV 2 score of 25, the state trial c ourt deter mined that Spencer ’s Guidelines ra

ng e for the minimum s entenc e wa s 15 to 30 y ear s. Had the state trial court instea d used a PRV 2 score of 0, Spence r’s Guide lines rang e for the minimum s entenc e would have been 10 to 25 y ear s. In either c ase, the statutory maxi mum sentence was life in pr ison. That Spence r’s c ounsel failed to objec t to an incorre ct PRV 2 score doe s not mean thatPag e 9 of 11

To establish prejudice arisingfrom a pr ocedur al def ault, “a pe titioner advanc ing a n 3 ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e c la im mus t ma

ke the same sh ow ingtha

t he wo uld

have be e n r e qu ir e d to make to esta

blish that the ineffe ctive assistanc e itself wa s prejudicial.” McCray , 2 3 2 F e d

. Ap p x. at4 7 9 (c i t i n g J

os e ph v . Co y le , 469 F.3d 441, 462- 63 (6th Cir. 2006)). Spe nc e r n e c e ssa

ri ly su ff e re d p re jud ic e . T o s ho w p re

jud ic e , Sp e nc e r m

us t sh ow“ that th e re is a
rea sonable proba

bility that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr ocee ding would have be en diffe rent.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 4. “ A r e a so na ble pr ob a bil ity is a 3 probability

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Id. Where inef fec tive assistance at sentenc ing is a sserted, pr ejudice is e stablished if the movant demonstrates that his sentence was incre ased by

the def icient per formanc e of his attorne y . Glover v . United States , 531 U.S. 198, 200 (2001). Movants must “aff

irmatively

prove pr ejudice.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 3. I f “ on e is l e ft with pure spec ulation on whether the outcome of

. . . the pena lty

phase c ould have be en any differ ent,” ther e has be en an insuff icient showingof pre

judice. Baze v. Parker , 371 F.3d 310, 322 (6th Cir. 2004). Reviewingcourts must consider the totality of the e vidence befor e the f inder of fac t in assessing whether

the re sult would li kely

have be en diffe rent a

bsent the alleg ed er

rors of counsel. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695-96. He re , th e tr ia l c ourt

se nte nc e d Sp e nc e r t o a

n in de te rm inate te rm

of imp ri so nme nt o f 2 0 to 40 y e ars . T he 20 -ye ar m ini mum se nte nc e wa s b a se d u

po n a min imum G uid e lin e s r ang e of 15 to 30 y ear s, and that minimum sentence did not exceed two- thirds of the maxim um as requir ed under the Michig an Supreme Court’s decision in People v . Tanner , 199 N.W.2d 202, 204-05 (Mich. 1972) (holdingthat “any

sentenc e which pr ovides for a minimum exceedingtwo-thirds of the

maximumis i mpr op e r a s f a ili ngto c omp ly

wi th t he ind e te rm inate se nte nc e a c t” ). As no te d in itsPag e 10 of 1 1 order denying Spenc er’ s post-conviction motion for relief from judg ment, the state trial c ourt considere d Spencer ’s 20-year minimum sentenc e to be “ proportional to the cr ime, espec ially since this was a ser ious offense .” Whether the trial c ourt would have imposed a lesser sentenc e had the PRV 2 score be en
corr ectly calc ulated is any

thing but cle ar. The sentenc e that Spence r ac tually rec eived—20 to 40 y ear s—fell within the rele vant minimum and max imum sentencingrang es whe ther Spenc er’ s PRV 2 score wa s 25 points or 0 points. Thus, even if the state tria l court had c orre ctly calc ulated Spencer ’s PRV 2 score, it nonethe less could have imposed the very same sente nce w ithout runningafoul of e ither the state se ntencingguidelines rang e or the Tanner two-thirds rule. Be cause there is nothing in this recor d to sugg est that the state tria l court would have been inclined to impose a lesser sentenc e g iven a 0- point PR V 2 score , we f ind no merit to Spencer’ s
argume nt t

hat he wa s p re

jud ic e d b y

his c ouns e l’ s p ur

po rt e d in e ff

e c tiv e ne ss. Ev e n if

we we re to
a ssume , f or the sake of

argume nt, that Sp e nc e r c ou ld e sta bli shc a us e fo r h is p ro c e dura l de fa ult , h is failure to establish prejudice prec ludes us from excusingthat defa ult. Accor dingly , we c onclude that Spencer ’s ineff

ective- assistance -of- counsel c laim is barre d from fe dera l habea s review

.

B. D UE P RO CE SS Spencer contends that he was de nied due pr ocess be cause the state trial c ourt relied on a n incorre ct PRV 2 score when sente ncinghim. L ike his ineffe ctive-a ssistance c laim, his due proce ss claim was not ra ised until S pence r filed his post-convic tion moti on for r elief f rom judgme nt. In denying Spenc er’ s motion for relief from judg ment, the state trial c ourt stated: [S pence r’s] claim that the pre sentenc e re port was inacc urate , has no merit. A de fenda nt cannot contend that this Court’s relianc e on the [inacc urate ] prese ntence repor

t resulted in a wr ong ful sentenc ePag e 11 of 1 1 be c a us e ne ith e r h e no r h is atto rn e y ob je c te d to tho se matters duringthe sentenc ing he aring

. The Michig an Court of Appe als and the Michig an Supreme Court denied Spence r’s a pplications for lea ve to appe al bec ause Spenc er f ailed “to mee t the burden of establishing e ntitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).” Thus, no state cour t addre ssed Spence r’s due proce ss claim on the merits. As it did with S pence r’s inef fec tive-assistance -of- counsel c laim, the district court addre ssed—and de nied—Spence r’s due proce ss claim on the merits. We ag ain conc lude that (1) an ade quate a

nd independe nt state law ground (pr ocedur al def ault) supported the Michig an Supreme Court’s judg ment denying r eview of Spencer ’s due pr ocess c laim, and (2) Spenc er ha s not shown that he wa s prejudice d by the state trial c ourt’s re liance on a n inacc urate PRV 2 score. Fe dera l reviewof Spence r’s due proce ss claim is thus foreclose d. III . C ON CL USI ON Be cause the fe dera l courts ar e bar red f rom revie wingSpencer ’s ineff ective- assistance -ofcounsel a nd due proc ess claims, we AF F IRM—albeit on diffe rent grounds—the district cour t’s de nia l of Spe nc e r’ s p e tit ion

fo r wri t of

ha be a s c or pu s.