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DA 22-0593

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2024 MT 151N

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

JARRID KEITH CANFIELD,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,

In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DC 21-200

Honorable Jennifer B. Lint, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Joseph P. Howard, Joseph P. Howard, P.C., Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Christine Hutchison,

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Bill Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: June 12, 2024

 Decided: July 23, 2024

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

07/23/2024

Case Number: DA 22-0593
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Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports. 

¶2 Jarrid Keith Canfield appeals from his August 26, 2022 Judgment and Commitment 

for the offenses of Vehicular Homicide while Under the Influence pursuant to § 45-5-106, 

MCA, and Criminal Child Endangerment pursuant to § 45-5-628, MCA. We affirm. 

¶3 On September 7, 2021, Canfield was driving his truck with his partner Jordan in the 

passenger seat and their three daughters, ages 7 to 10, in the rear.1

 At the time, he had THC 

in his body at a level higher than 8 ng/ml. Canfield was assaulting Jordan and almost 

crashed several times while their daughters held each other in the back seat. The third time 

he hit Jordan, he took both hands off the steering wheel, veered into the oncoming traffic 

lane, took evasive action, and overcorrected. The truck went off the road and rolled several 

times before coming to a stop. Jordan was partially ejected from the truck and was pinned 

underneath it; she did not survive. One of their daughters was fully ejected from the truck 

but all three survived with injuries. 

1 Canfield pleaded guilty to amended charges. As such, the facts are taken from the affidavit in 

support of the motion for leave to file the information. 
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¶4 The State filed five charges against Canfield: Negligent Homicide pursuant to 

§ 45-5-104, MCA, which was later amended to include an alternative charge of Vehicular 

Homicide while Under the Influence pursuant to § 45-5-106, MCA; three charges of 

Criminal Endangerment pursuant to § 45-5-207, MCA, for each of his daughters; and 

Partner or Family Member Assault pursuant to § 45-5-206, MCA. Canfield and the State 

entered a plea agreement pursuant to § 46-12-211(1)(c), MCA, (which is non-binding on 

the court) in which Canfield pleaded guilty to Vehicular Homicide while Under the 

Influence and Criminal Child Endangerment. In exchange, the State dropped the remaining 

charges. The State agreed to recommend a 20-year commitment to prison, with none 

suspended, for the homicide charge and a 10-year commitment, fully suspended, for the 

child endangerment charge. Canfield was free to argue for any lawful sentence. 

Additionally, Canfield and the State agreed that “[t]he parties are otherwise free to 

recommend and argue for any other lawful term of sentence and/or conditions thereto, 

subject to a final decision by the [c]ourt.” Canfield signed an acknowledgment of rights 

that said he understood the District Court might impose “imprisonment without possibility 

of parole or furlough.” 

¶5 At sentencing, the State argued for 20 years at state prison, but also asked the court 

to restrict Canfield’s eligibility for parole under the “any other lawful term of sentence” 

agreement and pursuant to § 46-18-202(2), MCA. Canfield’s counsel expressed shock at 

the State’s recommendation, saying that a parole restriction had never been contemplated 

between the parties during plea discussions. Nevertheless, Canfield did not object and 

argued for his own recommended sentence. The District Court rejected both parties’ 
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recommendations and imposed a 30-year sentence to Montana State Prison with none 

suspended and a 30-year parole restriction for the homicide charge. Canfield appeals, 

arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) when counsel unknowingly 

left open the possibility that the State could argue for a parole restriction and that he is 

entitled to withdraw his plea agreement because the prosecutor acted in bad faith at 

sentencing by undercutting the agreed recommendations. 

¶6 Canfield acknowledges that, based on the plain language of the plea agreement and 

our holding in State v. Lewis, 2012 MT 157, ¶¶ 17, 19, 365 Mont. 431, 282 P.3d 679, the 

State was free to seek a parole restriction and the court was free to impose one. Canfield 

argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to understand 

that the State might seek such a restriction and counseling Canfield to enter into the plea 

without that understanding. 

¶7 We generally will not review IAC claims on direct appeal if it is not record based—

i.e., if the record does not adequately document why counsel acted in a particular manner. 

State v. Lucero, 2004 MT 248, ¶ 16, 323 Mont. 42, 97 P.3d 1106. Canfield argues that his 

counsel failed to appreciate the import of the condition in his plea agreement that allowed 

the State to argue for a parole restriction because counsel asserted that he was “shocked the 

state is asking for it at this point” since they had never contemplated a parole restriction 

during plea discussions. However, just because counsel was shocked that the State was 

seeking the restriction does not mean that counsel did not understand it was a possibility, 

nor that Canfield did not understand the possibility when he entered into the plea agreement 

understanding that the District Court could impose a punishment “without possibility of 
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parole.” At this point, Canfield’s arguments as to what his attorney knew, or why the 

attorney did what they did, are speculative and are not appropriate on direct appeal. State 

v. Ward, 2020 MT 36, ¶ 22, 399 Mont. 16, 457 P.3d 955. Further, we have held that 

attorneys need not even advise their clients of discretionary parole restrictions that might 

be imposed by the court. State v. Thomas, 285 Mont. 112, 122–23, 946 P.2d 140, 146 

(1997). We cannot say, on this record, that counsel was ineffective. If the record does not 

show why counsel acted in a certain way, the claim is more appropriately raised by petition 

for postconviction relief. Lucero, ¶ 16; Ward, ¶¶ 18–20. 

¶8 Canfield next argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas because the 

prosecutor actively undercut the plea agreement at sentencing. Plea agreements are subject 

to contract principles, and prosecutors must give more than lip service to their promises 

within the plea agreement. State v. Hill, 2009 MT 134, ¶ 29, 350 Mont. 296, 207 P.3d 307. 

At sentencing, the State argued for the agreed upon sentence in the plea agreement. It also 

argued that the court should impose a parole restriction on Canfield based on the plea 

agreement which stated that the “parties are otherwise free to recommend and argue for 

any other lawful term of sentence.” Thus, at sentencing, the State allowed witnesses to 

testify as to the impact that this case has had upon them and Canfield’s daughters. The 

State also highlighted information contained within the PSI and information relating to the 

dismissed charges. This argument was necessary for its recommendation to the District 

Court that it should impose a parole restriction, which was within the confines of the plea 

agreement. The State did not recommend a sentence contrary to its agreement—it argued 

for a parole restriction based on the unique facts of this case. The information and 
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argument the State relied upon in recommending the restriction was all within the bounds 

of the plea agreement and was not conducted in bad faith. See Hill, ¶¶ 27–28, 30–31; 

see also State v. Collins, 2023 MT 78, ¶ 17, 412 Mont. 77, 528 P.3d 1106. 

¶9 Nor was the witness testimony improper at sentencing. It is appropriate for 

prosecutors to elicit testimony from victims and witnesses at a sentencing hearing, and for 

those victims to express their fears and feelings. State v. Rardon, 2005 MT 129, ¶ 17, 

327 Mont. 228, 115 P.3d 182. Here, the State presented witnesses who discussed their 

fears and feelings stemming from Canfield’s conduct. The State did not ask the witnesses 

any questions. Rather, the prosecutor merely stated that the witnesses had statements they 

would like to read and then the witnesses spoke on their own accord of their thoughts and 

feelings regarding sentencing without any prompting from the State. See § 46-18-115(4), 

MCA. This is a far cry from the prosecutor’s conduct that we overturned in Rardon’s 

second appeal, where the prosecutor had repeatedly and aggressively elicited inflammatory 

testimony clearly designed to undermine the plea agreement. Rardon, ¶¶ 11, 21; 

see also State v. McDowell, 2011 MT 75, ¶¶ 17–19, 360 Mont. 83, 253 P.3d 812. Here, 

the State’s evidence and argument at sentencing was designed to seek a parole restriction, 

which was within the terms of the plea agreement, not to undermine the plea agreement. 

¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our 

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the 

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of 

applicable standards of review. 
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¶11 Affirmed.

/S/ Mike McGrath

We Concur:

/S/ Laurie McKinnon

/S/ Beth Baker

/S/ James Jeremiah Shea

/S/ Jim Rice