Office of Tax Analysis

Working Paper 115

January 2017

Methodology for Analyzing a Carbon Tax

John Horowitz, Julie-Anne Cronin, Hannah Hawkins, 

Laura Konda, and Alex Yuskavage

The OTA Working Papers Series presents original research by the staff of the Office of Tax

Analysis. These papers are intended to generate discussion and critical comment while

informing and improving the quality of the analysis conducted by the Office. The papers are

works in progress and subject to revision. Views and opinions expressed are those of the authors

and do not necessarily represent official Treasury positions or policy. Comments are welcome,

as are suggestions for improvements, and should be directed to the authors. OTA Working

Papers may be quoted without additional permission. 
2

Methodology for Analyzing a Carbon Tax

January 2017

John Horowitz1, Julie-Anne Cronin2, Hannah Hawkins3, Laura Konda4, and Alex Yuskavage5

Keywords: carbon tax, greenhouse gas emissions, 

tax swap, revenue recycling, distributional analysis

JEL Codes: H23, H24

 

1

John Horowitz: Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, John.Horowitz@treasury.gov. 

2

Julie-Anne Cronin: Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Julie-Anne.Cronin@treasury.gov. 

3 Hannah Hawkins: Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Hannah.Hawkins@treasury.gov. 

4 Laura Konda: Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Laura.Konda@treasury.gov. 

5 Alex Yuskavage: Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Alexander.Yuskavage@treasury.gov. 

The authors thank Nathan Born for his research assistance.
3

I. Introduction

Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) is responsible for estimating the revenue, economic, and 

distributional effects of current and alternative tax systems, including individual, business, estate, and 

excise tax systems. The purpose of this technical paper is to document the methodology OTA would use 

to estimate the revenue and distributional effects of a carbon tax. Carbon taxes have been sufficiently

widely discussed that a technical assessment of the issues involved was warranted. In addition to 

describing the office’s methodology, this technical paper lays out several of the tax policy issues that 

would be involved in implementing such a tax.

The majority of the tax issues involved with a carbon tax are straightforward and would be consistent 

with U.S. policy experience with other excise taxes in terms of how the tax could be implemented and 

administered and how OTA would assess its revenue and distributional effects. Other issues involve 

broader changes to the U.S. tax system and are not part of standard excise tax analysis. In particular, 

because a carbon tax would raise substantial revenue, at least in early years, and because this revenue is 

likely to enter general revenue (unlike other excise taxes whose revenues are typically invested in trust 

funds with specific spending mandates), a carbon tax would allow Congress to reduce other taxes if 

desired in a so-called “tax swap.” Such a reduction in other taxes would raise its own set of tax policy 

issues in terms of timing, distributional effects, and tax administration. 

The analytical and methodological issues can be more readily understood in the context of a specific 

example. To examine the effects of a sample carbon tax, OTA estimated the 10-year revenue effects of 

a carbon tax that started at $49 per metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (mt CO2-e) in 2019 and 

increased to $70 in 2028. We estimate that such a tax would generate net revenues of $194 billion in the 

first year of the tax and $2,221 billion over the 10-year window from 2019 through 2028. This revenue 

could finance significant reductions in other taxes. In 2019, this carbon tax revenue would represent 

approximately 50 percent of projected corporate income tax payments or 20 percent of the OASDI 

portion of the payroll tax. If the revenue were rebated to individuals it would amount to $583 per person 

in the U.S. The last section of the paper uses Treasury’s Distribution Model to provide distributional 

analysis of this sample tax and four possible tax swaps. Distributional analysis is particularly valuable 

in this context for guiding the choice of the tax swap to address possible equity considerations.

Proposals for a carbon tax are often accompanied by recommendations for changes in Federal spending 

(e.g., research into energy efficiency or renewable energy generation; geoengineering) or changes in 

environmental regulations. These items are outside the expertise of OTA and are not discussed here.

II. Revenue Estimation and Design Issues 

1. The tax base – What would be taxed?

Any assessment of the revenue and distributional effects of a tax must be predicated on a choice of what 

the base of the tax would be and at which points the tax would be collected. Because the U.S. does not 

currently have a carbon tax or other excise taxes of a similar scope, some basic assumptions regarding 

what the base of the tax could be are necessary. This section provides a discussion of the issues in 

determining the tax base in terms of administrative burden, compliance, and coverage of greenhouse gas 

emissions. 
4

We divide the potential tax base into three categories:6(i) fossil fuel emissions; (ii) non-fuel emissions, 

including industrial process and product use emissions, emissions of fluorinated gases, and other 

emissions not counted as fossil fuel emissions; and (iii) biomass fuels such as ethanol. Non-carbonbased energy sources such as nuclear, wind, solar, and geothermal do not emit greenhouse gases and 

would not be taxed. Although land-use-based and other non-point emissions, such as from soil 

management, livestock, or deforestation, might eventually be covered in some way by a carbon tax 

system, this paper does not address the issues that such coverage would involve. 

a. Fossil Fuel emissions

Fossil fuel combustion represents roughly 76 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.7 Essentially all 

of these could be covered by an excise tax levied on coal, natural gas, and petroleum at distinct points in 

the supply chain. A streamlined set of taxable activities and a straightforward taxable unit would give 

the fossil fuel component of the carbon tax a light administrative burden. 

Fossil fuel emissions could be taxed using either a so-called “upstream” or “midstream” approach. The 

approaches differ on the point in the supply chain at which the fuel’s emissions would be taxed: An

upstream approach taxes raw fuels while a midstream approach taxes fuels at a designated point further 

down the supply chain but before they reach final consumers. A hybrid of the two approaches is also 

possible. 

Under an upstream system, an excise tax would be levied on (i) crude oil as it reaches the refinery, (ii) 

natural gas as it leaves the processor to enter a pipeline system or, for gas that bypasses the processor or 

pipeline system, arrives at the end user, and (iii) coal as it leaves the mine. To be consistent with a 

carbon tax focused solely on domestic use, fuel imports would be taxed and exports would be eligible 

for a refundable tax credit. Aviation fuels used in foreign trade, a designation that includes international 

flights, would be exempt from the tax. Carbon dioxide captured from a fossil fuel plant or through 

industrial processes and permanently stored would be eligible for a refundable tax credit.8 

Fuels or fuel products that are delivered to uses that do not release emissions, such as waxes, lubricants, 

solvents, or chemical feedstocks, would be exempted from the tax or could claim a credit. An upstream 

system would need to promulgate rules to govern such exemptions and credits. This issue does not arise 

to any great degree under a midstream tax, which aims to tax only those fuel products that are destined 

to be combusted. 

Under a midstream system, an excise tax would be levied on (i′) petroleum-based fuels as they leave the 

refinery or are otherwise sold for use, an arrangement referred to as being imposed at the “terminal 

rack,” (ii′) natural gas as it leaves local distribution centers, and (iii′) fuels used by electric generating 

facilities or other industrial users that have not been previously taxed. A hybrid upstream/midstream 

 

6

Tax categories do not necessarily conform to categories in the Greenhouse Gas Inventory (EPA, 2016a), the Greenhouse 

Gas Reporting Program (EPA, 2016b), or the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 

7 OTA estimate based on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Energy Information Administration data.

8 Treatment of imports, exports, aviation fuels, and captured carbon dioxide is the same under both upstream and midstream 

approaches.
5

approach that taxed natural gas and coal upstream and petroleum products midstream is also possible. 

Under either upstream or midstream approach, the tax would be based on the imputed carbon dioxide 

emissions per unit of fuel. Table 1 shows candidate imputed emissions and per-fuel-unit taxes that 

would apply under the upstream and midstream approaches assuming a tax of $49 per metric ton of 

carbon dioxide equivalent (mt CO2-e). A per-unit fuel tax would be cost-effective because each of these

fuels’ carbon dioxide emissions are essentially invariant to how the fuel is burned:9,10 A high mileage 

car emits essentially the same amount of carbon dioxide per gallon of gasoline as a low mileage car, 

although of course, the high mileage car can go much further on that gallon of gasoline. 

The carbon content of coal is more variable than the carbon content of refined fuels or natural gas. 

Under the imputed-emissions approach shown in Table 1 the tax would depend only on the type of coal 

and would not distinguish within coal of a given type. We therefore would expect consumers of each 

coal type to engage in some degree of “arbitrage.” Coal consumers of each coal type would likely seek 

out coal sources that yielded higher amounts of energy per unit of tax, causing average carbon dioxide 

emissions for different coal types to be greater than the parameters shown in Table 1. We have not 

attempted to predict how large an effect this might be. To minimize distortions, the Secretary of the 

Treasury could be provided the authority to update periodically the carbon-content parameters used to 

construct the coal taxes in a way that reflects changes over time in the carbon content of coal coming to 

market. In the upstream tax case, similar concerns may apply to variability in the carbon content of 

crude oil.

Under an upstream system, crude oil would be taxed based on its total carbon content regardless of the 

fuels and products it is used to produce. This approach is necessary to ensure the tax falls fully on those 

fuel products that are later used for energy purposes. Fuels and fuel products whose emissions were 

substantially lower than the Table 1 coefficients would be eligible to claim a credit based on their lower 

emissions. This treatment may be somewhat challenging for taxation of non-fuel petroleum products

that emit greenhouse gases as they breakdown over time. Secretarial discretion would be needed to 

define which products have emissions that are not accurately reflected in Table 1. 

For electric generating facilities and other stationary combustion sources, a midstream approach could 

instead tax actual emissions, as measured by a continuous emissions monitoring system, rather than the 

fuel inputs. A measured emissions tax would not presently be possible for transport fuels or natural gas 

used directly by residences or commercial establishments; for these uses, some form of fuel-based tax 

would still be required.11 Under a measured emissions tax, emissions from renewable fuels at electric 

generating facilities and other point sources would initially be taxed at the same rate as emissions from 

fossil fuels but they could be made eligible to claim full or partial credit based on the renewable fuel 

used, depending on how the system wishes to treat renewable fuels. 

 

9

Fossil fuel combustion also releases small amounts of methane and N2O and these are not invariant to the circumstances of 

combustion. Table 1 taxes are based solely on each fuel’s CO2 emissions. Tax legislation would determine whether the 

Table 1 parameters should be modified to incorporate non-CO2 emissions or whether the non-CO2 emissions would be 

covered separately as a form of industrial emission. 

10 Under an upstream system, imports of refined fuels would be taxed and exports provided a credit at the midstream rates 

shown in Table 1. 

11 A measured emissions tax would require writing new tax guidance for emissions measurement. Fuel-based taxes would be 

able to take advantage of existing guidance on fuels measurement.
6

Comparison of upstream and midstream approaches. Our assessment is that the upstream, midstream, or 

upstream-midstream hybrid approaches would tax essentially the same quantity of fossil-fuel-based 

emissions, with minor differences. One exception is that a midstream system would not readily cover 

emissions from petroleum fuels burned at the refinery. Under a midstream system, those emissions 

would presumably be covered instead as industrial (non-fuel) emissions, described below. 

Our assessment is further that under any of these approaches the carbon tax could be collected through 

modest modifications to existing Form 720, the tax form on which existing federal excise taxes are 

reported. Furthermore, under any of the approaches, the carbon tax could, if desired, readily be imposed 

on top of existing fuel and energy taxes and those Federal tax revenues could continue to flow to the 

Highway Trust Fund, Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund, 

Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, and related entities. 

Differences between the upstream and midstream approaches arise instead primarily from (i) the time 

needed to write necessary tax guidance (a function, in part of the number of taxable activities and the 

availability of existing tax guidance), (ii) the number and sophistication of the taxpayers and the variety 

of taxable activities involved, which together affect longer-term compliance and administration 

concerns, and (iii) the number of products or fuel uses that should be exempted from the tax or, 

conversely, the number of fuel uses that might be missed by the chosen tax point.12 A midstream 

approach would entail fewer exemptions for non-emitting uses compared to the upstream approach but 

would involve a larger number of tax filers. In general, tax administration has historically been able to 

deal effectively with exemptions to taxable activities; this experience is particularly relevant to the 

upstream tax approach. 

 

12 In essence, tax analysis must consider errors of both Type I (fuel uses that would be taxed even though they do not release 

greenhouse gases) and Type II (fuel uses that would not be taxed even though they release greenhouse gases).
7

Table 1. CO2 content and tax rates for fossil fuels @ $49/metric ton of carbon dioxide 

equivalent (mt CO2-e)

Fuel CO2 content1 Tax @ $49/mt CO2-e

Natural gas and coal 

(Upstream or midstream approach)2

Natural gas 53.12 kg/mcf $2.60/mcf

Anthracite 2,578.68 kg/short ton $126.36/short ton

Bituminous 2,236.80 kg/short ton $109.60/short ton

Sub-bituminous 1,685.51 kg/short ton $82.59/short ton

Lignite 1,266.25 kg/short ton $62.05/short ton

Petroleum 

Midstream approach

 (representative fuels):

Gasoline 8.89 kg/gallon $0.44/gallon

Diesel, home heating oil 10.16 kg/gallon $0.50/gallon

Jet fuel 9.57 kg/gallon $0.47/gallon

Upstream approach:

Crude oil 432 kg/bbl3$21.17/barrel

1 Source: http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/co2_vol_mass.cfm. CO2 content parameters 

represent OTA’s assessment of tax-relevant emissions and should not be considered definitive for 

any carbon tax that may be enacted. 

2

For natural gas and coal, upstream and midstream approaches differ in the point in the supply 

chain at which the fuel is taxed but not the form of the fuel or the per-unit fuel tax at the point of 

taxation. 

3

Source: https://www.epa.gov/energy/ghg-equivalencies-calculator-calculations-and-references

Tax guidance. A variety of existing tax rules and (non-tax) regulations provide language and protocols 

that could be used to issue the tax guidance necessary for a carbon tax, including definitions of taxable 

activities. 

For an upstream point of taxation for crude oil, the current tax levied for the Oil Spill Liability Trust 

Fund (OSLTF), described in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 4611, would provide essentially all 

required guidance, although additional guidance would be required for an export tax credit, which is not 

currently provided; our assessment is that this credit would be relatively straightforward. Crude oil 

derived from tar sands is currently exempt from the OSLTF tax but is assumed to be subject to an 

upstream carbon tax.

For a midstream approach for petroleum-based emissions, which would tax refined fuels, the IRC

defines the fuels currently subject to tax as well as establishes the tax rates, relevant taxable events, and 

exemptions, and imposes registration requirements for blenders, producers, enterers, terminal operators 

and others. Applicable regulations and other IRS administrative guidance provide further detail and 

information on taxable fuels.13 The Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) tax covers all carbonemitting motor fuels and further includes home heating oil and other refined products not subject to the 

more prominent taxes that finance the Highway Trust Fund or Airport and Airways Trust Funds, which 

include exemptions for off-road and non-transport fuel uses, among others. In addition, LUST exempts

 

13 IRS Publication 510 (https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p510.pdf ) provides a thorough and comprehensive compilation of 

the rules, definitions and administrative requirements relating to the fuel excise taxes. 
8

fuel destined for export or for use by the purchaser as supplies for vessels employed in foreign trade or 

trade between the United States and any of its possessions. This tax therefore covers essentially all 

petroleum products that lead to Table 1 emissions, and does not cover any products that do not lead to 

Table 1 emissions. Our assessment is that this existing tax language and guidelines could largely be 

adopted for a carbon tax. A tax that used the LUST tax framework would constitute a midstream point 

of taxation. 

For an upstream point of taxation for coal, the tax could rely almost entirely on guidance issued for the 

existing coal excise tax, which is imposed on the first sale of coal mined in the United States. The 

existing tax does not apply to sales of lignite or imported coal; a cost-effective tax would cover both of 

these components and expanded tax rules would need to be written to cover these products. The existing 

coal excise tax also exempts exports but these are presumed to also be exempted under a carbon tax.

For a midstream approach, the tax on coal (and natural gas) would be levied at the electric utility or 

other point-source emitter rather than at the first point of sale. No current Federal excise taxes are 

applied at these points. Large emitters could be readily identified using protocols developed by EPA 

under its Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program. Although regulatory actions, including registration of 

emitters, undertaken for this program are not valid for IRS purposes, they provide language and 

procedures that could presumably be adopted by the IRS. A cost-effective tax would need to expand 

beyond this set of large emitters and be applied to all emitters, regardless of size. 

No Federal taxes are currently levied on natural gas. New tax rules would be needed to define fuel 

measurement protocols and to identify and register the relevant points of taxation in the upstream case. 

Midstream taxation is discussed in the previous paragraph. 

A cost-effective tax system would also provide a credit for carbon dioxide capture and permanent 

sequestration. The current Section 45Q credit for carbon sequestration provides rules needed to 

administer such a credit, although the current credit is not refundable. Tax treatment would be 

essentially the same under upstream or midstream approaches.

b. Non-fuel emissions

A number of greenhouse gas emissions would not be covered by a fuel-based emissions tax. They 

include: (i) emissions that arise during the production of industrial products such as cement, lime, glass, 

ammonia, petrochemicals, and others, (ii) emissions from the mining of coal and the extraction and 

refining or processing of oil and natural gas; these are mostly non-combustion emissions but some 

combustion emissions might be included here if they occur above the point at which the fossil fuel tax is 

imposed and (iii) direct emissions of fluorinated gases. 

Except for fluorinated gases, these non-fuel emissions are generally not directly linked to a readily 

observed output or input (as is true for fossil fuel combustion) and therefore tax rules would have to be 

specific to each process. Because tax rules would be specific to each process, greater rule-making effort 

would be required, and there is the possibility that some cost-effective emissions reductions would not 

immediately be counted as such and might therefore not be undertaken. We expect that in most cases, 

tax rules could borrow from language and experience developed under the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas 

Reporting Program. Additional tax efforts would be required to identify and register those entities that 
9

would be responsible for the tax. Such actions would benefit from previous Greenhouse Gas Reporting 

Program efforts but additional effort would be required.

Fluorinated gases could be taxed at the manufacturer or importer. The U.S. has experience taxing the 

import and manufacture of a number of ozone depleting chemicals. Although the set of fluorinated 

gases that are greenhouse gases is different from the set of ozone depleting chemicals, much of the tax

guidance and tax administration experience for ozone depleting chemicals could be used for fluorinated 

gases that are greenhouse gases.

Advantages and disadvantages of taxing non-fuel emissions. Because non-fuel emissions require greater 

tax administration efforts and because some carbon tax proposals focus exclusively on fossil-fuel 

emissions, it is worth laying out the advantages and disadvantages of applying the tax to non-fuel 

emissions. 

The primary advantage of extending the tax to non-fuel emissions is the potential to lower the overall 

costs of controlling emissions; the more sources that reduce emissions cost-effectively, the lower is the 

cost of any given amount of overall emissions reduction. The cost savings potential from taxing nonfuel emissions is greater the higher is the potential for sources of non-fuel emissions to develop low-cost 

strategies to reduce emissions. 

The disadvantage of extending the tax to non-fuel emissions is that these emissions are not as easy to 

tax. This leads to two drawbacks: (1) Because non-fuel emissions are not directly measured and cannot 

generally be directly linked to a specific input or output, the basis for taxation must be described in 

fairly deep detail. The process would require imputing the emissions that are released by each relevant 

production process. The promulgation of these imputation rules is a potentially lengthy process, 

although some of the necessary work has again been done for the purposes of greenhouse gas reporting. 

(2)This imputation process runs the risk that some emissions-reducing strategies might be missed. For 

example, emitters may be able to find strategies to lower their emissions that would not be recognized 

under the potential regulations. A third, presumably minor, disadvantage is that because not all non-fuel 

emissions can be readily taxed and because tax rules may take a long time to develop, there is the 

possibility of leakage from taxed non-fuel emissions activities into other, not-yet taxed non-fuel 

emissions activities. 

The decision to extend the tax to cover non-fuel emissions could be made on an activity-by-activity

basis. OTA did not attempt to assess the tax administration requirements nor the benefits and costs for 

covering any specific process. A few non-fuel emissions, such as fluorinated gases, could likely be 

readily taxed without incurring the disadvantages described above. 

c. Biomass fuels

Biomass fuels such as ethanol, wood, animal waste, and corn stover, among others, are used for 

transportation, power generation, and heating. OTA did not assess the rationale for taxing these fuels, if 

at all, nor, if they were taxed, what CO2 content parameters would apply.

Because of the wide range of fuel sources, only a midstream-type of approach could be used. Biomass 

fuels used for transportation could be taxed effectively as they leave the processor or at the terminal 
10

rack, as is done for other transportation fuels. Biomass fuels used for power generation and heating may 

be subject to minimal processing and there may be no clear point in the supply chain until those fuels 

reach the electric generator or other stationary emitter. 

Given these assessments, and for purposes of simplicity, the subsequent discussion of revenue 

estimation uses a tax base that includes fuel-and non-fuel emissions but excludes biomass fuels. 

However, the assessments could be modified to take account of alternative choices. 

2. Revenue Estimation

To examine the revenue potential of a sample carbon tax designed as described above, OTA estimated 

the 10-year revenue effects of a carbon tax that started at $49 per metric ton CO2-e on January 1, 2019 

and rose at roughly a 2 percent real rate through 2040, applied to all energy-related carbon dioxide 

emissions and selected other major sources of greenhouse gas emissions.

14 We used 2019 as the first 

year of the tax because our assessment is that it would take two years to prepare to tax the three fossil 

fuels. Analysis assumes that in addition to full coverage of fossil fuel emissions, 33 percent of 

eventually-covered non-energy emissions would be covered by tax rules beginning in 2019, 67 percent 

in 2020, and 100 percent in 2021. Renewable fuels are assumed to not be taxed in this scenario. 

The carbon tax scenario and projected net revenues and emissions are shown in Table 2.15 OTA 

analysis, based on projections from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), estimates that such a 

tax would raise $2,221 billion in net revenue over the 10-year window from 2019 through 2028.16 A tax 

applied only to energy-related carbon dioxide emissions would raise $1,846 billion in net revenue over 

the 2019-2028 window. In both cases, projected revenue is approximately linear in the starting tax rate. 

 

14 The tax (initial tax rate and real rate of growth) is presumed to be set by Congress. 

15 Emissions projections are shown to facilitate comparison with other projections of carbon tax revenue. 

16 OTA analysis does not traditionally provide an assessment of non-fiscal benefits.
11

Table 2. Tax, Net Revenue, and Emissions under a Carbon Tax (main scenario)

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

Taxa($/mt CO2-e, 

nominal)

$49 $52 $54 $56 $58 $60 $62 $65 $67 $70

Revenue and 

Emissions

Net revenueb,c

($bn, nominal) $194 $210 $218 $214 $214 $219 $225 $235 $240 $250

Net revenue as pct. 

of GDP b,c 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.87 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.79

Emissions 

(covered sources,

c

mmt CO2-e)

6,261 5,951 5,551 5,271 5,091 5,032 5,005 4,970 4,941 4,930 

Emissions (covered 

sources) as pct. of 

baselinec

0.95 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79

a Tax levied on carbon dioxide from energy uses of fossil fuels and on selected other non-fuel emissions. Analysis 

assumes that 33 percent of eventually-covered non-fuel emissions will be covered by tax rules beginning in 2019, 67 

percent in 2020, and 100 percent in 2021. Renewable fuels are assumed not taxed in this analysis.

b

For purposes of making revenue estimates, a degree of non-compliance with the carbon tax is assumed to occur.

c OTA calculations based on EIA and EPA data. Covered source emissions are the sum of carbon dioxide from 

energy uses of fossil fuels and selected other taxable emissions. Baseline emissions are emissions under current law 

from sources that would be covered by the sample carbon tax.

OTA estimates that gross revenue under the tax scenario in Table 2 would be $2,962 billion over the 

ten-year window from 2019 to 2028. The difference between gross revenue raised by the tax and the net 

revenue available for spending or reductions in other taxes (shown in Table 2) arises because the 

imposition of the carbon tax reduces taxpayer income subject to other Federal taxes and thus reduces 

income tax revenues at least to some extent. The wedge between gross and net tax revenue due to this 

effect is referred to as the offset. 

The magnitude of the offset depends on the full range of price changes precipitated by the carbon tax, 

since these affect incomes differentially, and the resulting reductions in income tax revenues depend in 

turn on the taxes and tax rates applied to these affected incomes. Induced price changes also affect 

baseline government spending; the reduction in (relative) prices that leads to reduced incomes also 

reduces what the government must spend on goods and services (e.g., Sheiner 1994), an effect that 

somewhat compensates for the loss in income tax revenues. As with the income effect, the effect on 

government spending depends on the full set of price changes induced by the carbon tax. The 

government budget effect is made more complex by the fact that many categories of spending are 

denominated in nominal terms or otherwise affected by price changes differently from consumer and 

business spending. Overall, the induced income tax effect, adjusted for government spending effects, is 

assumed to reduce the amount of gross carbon tax revenues available for new spending or reductions in 

other taxes by 25 percent.17 

 

17 The 25 percent offset for excise taxes represents long-standing practice for the Joint Committee on Taxation, the 

Congressional Budget Office, and OTA. Because carbon tax revenues are projected to be considerably larger than other 

excise taxes, more detailed analysis of the offset in the carbon tax context may be warranted.
12

Carbon tax revenues in Table 2 decline as a proportion of GDP over the budget window. Thus, a 

revenue neutral reduction in corporate, payroll, or other tax rates (the “tax swap”) would have positive 

net revenue in the early years and negative net revenue in later years if the revised rates remained 

constant over the budget window. Tax rates that varied over time and were aimed at keeping the budget 

in balance each year would fall initially but need to rise beginning in 2021. This is roughly the 

experience that British Columbia had with its business tax rate, which, after the introduction of a 

revenue-neutral carbon tax, fell year by year from 12 percent in 2008 to 10 percent in 2011 and then rose 

to 11 percent in 2013 (British Columbia Ministry of Finance, 2014). Adjusting corporate, payroll, or 

other tax rates annually to match carbon tax revenues would be difficult to do in the U.S. and would 

potentially be disruptive of other tax-based decisions. A rebate could more readily be varied from year 

to year such that the net revenue effect of the combined carbon tax/rebate would be zero in every year. 

Like other tax revenue, carbon tax revenue would be subject to uncertainty. More rapid advances in 

energy efficiency or renewable energy generation than initially projected would lead to unexpected 

reductions in carbon tax revenue. To provide preliminary analysis of the range of possible tax revenue 

scenarios, OTA estimated carbon tax revenues under an assumption of more rapid technological 

progress in which covered emissions fell to 20 percent of their baseline levels within 15 years (by 2033), 

with reductions accelerating over time. Results under this scenario are shown in Table 3. 

Large-scale revenue uncertainty is primarily a long-run phenomenon. Nevertheless, at some point it 

may be necessary to revise the tax swap if future projections of carbon tax net revenues fall below initial 

projections. This revision would be on top of any revision due to projected decreases in tax revenue as a 

percent of GDP, such as in Table 2.

OTA traditionally produces revenue estimates of policy based on economic assumptions produced by 

the Office of Management and Budget. Revenue estimates in Tables 2 and 3 instead reflect EIA 

projections of macroeconomic variables. 
13

Table 3. Tax, Net Revenue, and Emissions under a Carbon Tax (rapid technological progress scenario)

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028

Taxa($/mt CO2-e, 

nominal)

$49 $52 $54 $56 $58 $60 $62 $65 $67 $70

Revenue and 

Emissions

Net revenueb,c

($bn, nominal) $189 $185 $175 $166 $160 $158 $155 $154 $149 $145 

Net revenue as pct. 

of GDP b,c 0.90 0.86 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.62 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.48 

Emissions 

(covered sources,

c

mmt CO2-e)

6,109 5,640 5,083 4,665 4,344 4,124 3,925 3,710 3,488 3,263 

Emissions (covered 

sources) as pct. of 

baselinec

0.93 0.86 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.53

a Tax levied on carbon dioxide from energy uses of fossil fuels and on selected other non-fuel emissions. Analysis 

assumes that 33 percent of eventually-covered non-energy emissions will be covered by tax rules beginning in 2019, 67 

percent in 2020, and 100 percent in 2021. Renewable fuels are not taxed in this analysis.

b

For purposes of making revenue estimates, a degree of non-compliance with the carbon tax is assumed to occur.

c OTA calculations based on EIA and EPA data. Covered source emissions are the sum of carbon dioxide from energy 

uses of fossil fuels and selected other taxable sources of emissions. Baseline emissions are emissions under current law 

from sources that would be covered by the carbon tax.

3. Other carbon tax design decisions

The analysis described above excluded effects from alternative design choices that are sometimes 

discussed in the context of a carbon tax. This section describes several of these design options and 

briefly describes how they could affect the analysis above. In each case, these options are meant to 

provide policymakers a fuller understanding of possible carbon tax design choices. 

a. Safety Valves and Emissions Targets

The carbon tax is an alternative form of market-based environmental policy to a carbon cap-and-trade. 

Cap-and-trade systems in the U.S. and elsewhere have frequently included some form of safety valve 

(Jacoby and Ellerman, 2014), a policy provision for responding to real-world outcomes after the cap is 

in place.18 This section discusses a safety valve in the context of a carbon tax.

 

Under a cap-and-trade policy for greenhouse gas emissions, the overall volume of emissions that the 

covered entities will emit is essentially certain – it is equal to the cap – but the resulting price of 

allowances is uncertain. Therefore a safety valve is tied to the allowance price. If, after the cap was in 

place, allowance prices turned out to be too high, relative to a chosen ceiling, the government would 

 

18 Legislation could also provide discretion to the Secretary to make future tax changes in response to economic or 

environmental consequences. A safety valve typically refers instead to a pre-specified legislative provision for changing the 

tax path that does not rely on or grant discretion to the Administration.
14

issue new allowances or make future allowances available sooner, thus nudging the allowance price 

lower. If allowance prices turned out to be too low, relative to a chosen price floor, the government 

would tighten the cap, either by buying up and retiring allowances or issuing fewer future allowances, 

thus raising the allowance price and achieving greater emissions reduction. When allowance prices fell 

in the middle range between the price ceiling and floor, the policy would operate as a pure cap-and-trade 

system. Thus the safety valve provides a check on actual allowance prices after the policy is put in 

place. The safety valve policy entails specifying the relevant price floor and ceiling and the mechanism 

by which the cap would change. 

Similar principles could guide the design of a carbon tax safety valve. Under a carbon tax, the cost of 

controlling emissions would be certain – it would be equal to the tax rate – but the overall volume of 

greenhouse gas emissions that would result is uncertain. The safety valve would therefore be tied to our 

overall emissions. Once the tax is in place, if emissions ended up “too high” (above a chosen upperlevel trigger), future taxes would be increased relative to the initial path. If emissions ended up falling 

more than expected – if they met a specific lower-level target – the tax would pause in its yearly rise or 

be dropped altogether. Thus the safety valve provides some control over the actual emissions reductions 

achieved after the tax policy is put in place. A safety valve policy would entail specifying the emissions 

reduction targets and the way in which the carbon tax would respond if these targets were met. 

Qualitatively, depending on how a safety value was designed and how emissions evolved over time, this 

could increase or reduce the revenues associated with a carbon tax. OTA did not analyze the tax 

implications of a carbon tax safety valve.

b. Treatment of tax preferences 

Clean energy tax preferences. The U.S. tax code currently provides tax provisions that encourage 

renewable energy production and improve energy efficiency. A carbon tax would provide incentives for 

these activities more cost-effectively, and its incentives make other tax incentives unnecessary to 

achieve emissions reductions goals. That is, to the extent that such tax provisions result in investments 

in energy efficiency or in renewable generation that would be undertaken anyway in response to the 

carbon tax then they entail a cost to the Treasury in terms of lower revenues without conferring any 

additional social benefits. To the extent that these provisions result in investments that would not 

otherwise be undertaken then their per-unit costs are necessarily higher than the costs of emissions 

reductions being undertaken elsewhere in the economy.19 Both arguments suggest that a cost-effective

tax system would not include tax preferences for clean energy.

20

 

Fossil fuel tax preferences. The tax code includes a number of tax preferences for fossil fuel 

exploration, extraction, processing, and distribution. These provisions increase fossil fuel use and 

 

19 The tax provision most directly affected by these concerns is the Energy Investment Tax Credit. Several other tax 

provisions that have in the past provided production or investment incentives that would be more cost-effectively provided by 

a carbon tax either have expired or will have expired prior to the date of any carbon tax. These include the nonbusiness 

energy credit, the residential energy efficient property credit, the renewable electricity production tax credit, the advanced 

nuclear power credit, the energy efficient commercial buildings deduction, the alternative vehicle refueling property credit 

and the alternative motor vehicle credit. 

20 Some tax preferences may be separately warranted because they address network or learning-by-doing externalities more 

effectively than the carbon tax (alone) would.
15

greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, a cost-effective tax system would not include tax preferences for fossil 

fuels. 

OTA did not assess the extent to which the carbon tax would affect the revenue cost of clean energy or 

fossil fuel tax preferences. 

c. More rapid tax phase-in 

A cost-effective carbon tax would fall equally on all three fossil fuels. However, the tax could 

potentially be phased-in more rapidly for some emissions sources. More rapid phase-in would be 

possible for those fuels for which a large part of the necessary tax infrastructure exists under current law. 

Such tax infrastructure exists for an upstream coal tax, upstream petroleum tax, or midstream transport 

fuels tax. That is, the tax on oil/transportation fuels could potentially be introduced before the tax on 

natural gas and coal. Likewise, the tax on coal could be introduced before the tax on natural gas. 

The economic benefit of a more rapid phase-in comes from more rapid reduction in greenhouse gas 

emissions from the taxed fuels. The economic costs of differential phase-in arise from inefficiencies in 

how emissions are reduced, since carbon emissions would not face a uniform tax during the phase-in 

period. Analytically, such design choices could be readily incorporated within the methodological 

framework described here. 

d. Border Tax Adjustments

A carbon tax could include a border tax adjustment. A standard border tax adjustment would apply the 

carbon tax to imports based on the greenhouse gas emissions estimated to be released during their 

production.21 This standard adjustment is essentially an estimate of how much higher the imported 

good’s price would be if an identical carbon tax had been applied in the country from which the good 

was being imported.22 The standard adjustment would also provide a credit for exports, with the 

analogous aim of assessing how much lower the exported good’s price would be if the U.S. carbon tax 

had not been applied. A border adjustment for the carbon tax could be applied broadly to all goods or 

applied only to a narrower set of goods whose production is particularly energy intensive. This 

narrower set of goods is typically deemed to include iron and steel, chemicals, paper, aluminum, cement, 

and bulk glass (Aldy and Pizer, 2011; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009). 

A border tax adjustment would effectively broaden the base of the carbon tax to include carbonintensive products consumed in the U.S. but produced elsewhere while excluding the tax on exported 

products (as would be done for imported and exported fossil fuels).23 Border tax adjustments would 

reduce the incentive for producers to shift the location of production of energy-intensive products abroad 

to avoid the tax or, analogously, for consumers to increase purchases of energy-intensive imports. 

 

21 The economics of a border tax adjustment are complex and beyond the scope of this analysis. This section discusses 

border tax adjustment issues that we believe would be broadly relevant.

22 A discussion of how carbon content could be imputed is provided by Perese (2010).

23 It is not unambiguous that a border tax adjustment improves competitiveness or U.S. economic performance conditional on 

a greenhouse gas emissions goal. For example, possible adjustments in the exchange rate as a result of changes in patterns of 

trade mean that gains in more energy-intensive sectors must be weighed against losses in less energy-intensive sectors.
16

Border tax adjustments, however, also have substantial disadvantages in terms of complexity and 

administration. 

OTA has not assessed the administrative burden or revenue effects of potential border adjustments for a 

carbon tax.

24

 Such effects would depend on how broadly or narrowly was the set of goods to which the 

border adjustment was applied, the imputed carbon intensities by industry, product, or country of import 

origin and the methods by which imputations would be constructed, and the extent to which the border 

adjustment differentiated across the countries from which imports derive, including provisions to reduce 

the import tax for explicit or implicit carbon prices imposed in those countries.25 

In lieu of a border adjustment, policymakers may choose to provide assistance to U.S. producers in 

energy-intensive trade-exposed industries, either through the tax code or through domestic spending. 

OTA did not attempt to analyze the administrative burden or revenue effects of any such policy. 

Border tax adjustment for electricity. Although the volume of trade in electricity is currently small, the 

ease of cross-border electricity sales and electricity’s high energy content suggests that a border tax 

adjustment for traded electricity could be desirable even if border tax adjustments for other sectors were 

not enacted.26

In the case of electricity, the standard border tax adjustment (consisting of an import tax and export 

credit based on the carbon intensities of the electricity sector in the country from which the electricity is 

imported and the U.S., respectively) would run the risk of electricity being exported and then reimported as a means of garnering tax credits that are not associated with a reduction in greenhouse gas 

emissions; this pattern could occur since both Canada and Mexico have lower carbon intensities for 

electricity than the U.S.27 To preclude such cycling, the export credit would need to be offered at a rate 

equal to or lower rate than the import tax, adjusted for transmission costs. This arrangement would 

remove the possibility of electricity being exported solely for the purpose of re-importation.

III. Distributional analysis

OTA provides distributional analysis of major tax proposals. In this section, we describe the Treasury 

Distribution Model (TDM) and use it to estimate the vertical equity impacts of a U.S. carbon tax and

alternative illustrative “tax swap” provisions. We then estimate the effect of the proposed changes in tax 

 

24 Border tax adjustments would also have effects on greenhouse gas emissions and domestic profits, wages, and 

employment. Estimates of these effects are typically outside the realm of OTA.

25 To be consistent with general tax principles, the tax on imports should be the difference between the U.S. carbon tax and 

the carbon tax, if any, in the country from which the imports are derived, assuming this tax is not credited on export. This is 

not necessarily a straightforward calculation since many countries will not have the broad-based, uniform carbon tax or 

equivalent emissions trading scheme discussed here.

26 In 2014, the U.S. imported 67 million MWh and exported 13 million MWh, primarily to and from Canada, on a base of 4.1 

billion MWH (EIA, 2016: http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7_3.pdf.)

27 The imputed carbon intensity of imported electricity, calculated for the border tax adjustment, could, in principle, include 

that country’s imports; if Canada imported U.S. electricity, even if on a “transitory” basis, this action should increase the 

carbon intensity attributed to Canadian electricity and this adjustment would provide some brake on export-import cycling.

Such an adjustment would be complex however and would likely not fully eliminate cycling. Reducing the export credit 

would provide a more robust solution.
17

law on the distribution of after-tax income across families.28 Tax law changes here include both the 

carbon tax and accompanying illustrative tax reductions such as a per person rebate or reduction in 

payroll or corporate income taxes. Estimates below show the effect of a $49 carbon tax on projected 

2017 incomes.

1. The Treasury Distribution Model

The TDM uses families as the unit of analysis since families generally operate as an economic unit, 

making common decisions and sharing resources. The TDM estimates each family’s total annual 

consumption using income from individual income tax and information returns and savings rates 

imputed from the Survey of Consumer Finances.

29 This methodology allows Treasury to preserve the 

accuracy of income information reported on tax returns when estimating consumption. Survey data may 

underreport income and using such data, without correction, can lead to implausibly high consumption 

to income ratios, such as those found in the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). 30 

After total consumption is estimated using tax data, each tax family is matched to a similar family in the 

CEX. That family’s expenditure shares for 33 consumption categories are then applied to Treasury’s 

estimate of total consumption. We are careful to match families with similar characteristics, including 

family size. Larger families have the ability to share resources (benefit from returns to scale) so their 

consumption shares may be quite different from smaller families. Certain commodities like home 

heating are easier to share than others like clothing so a family with two members might have twice the 

expenditures on clothing compared to a single person but they may not have twice the expenditures on 

home heating. To impute the consumption shares from the CEX, we do an unconstrained statistical 

match with 3 years of CEX data. The statistical match is based on dividing the CEX and tax data into 

900 similar cells. Each cell has a unique combination of marital status (2 possibilities), age of the oldest 

filer (5 age ranges), family size (5 sizes) and consumption rank (18 ranks).31

a. Methodology for Distributing a Carbon Tax

In general, a carbon tax would create a wedge between the prices received by producers and the prices 

paid by consumers. The tax might be passed forward, only increasing the prices paid by consumers, or 

it might be passed backward, only decreasing the prices received by producers. Or, it might be passed 

partly forward and partly backward, both increasing the prices paid by consumers and reducing the 

prices received by producers. How much of the tax is passed forward versus backward depends 

primarily on demand and supply price elasticities (how responsive producers and consumers are to 

changes in price). 

 

28 A summary of Treasury’s methodology for distributional analysis, as well as distributions of income, current law and 

Administration policy, is available on the Department of Treasury’s website: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Pages/Tax-Analysis-and-Research.aspx .

29 Savings are additional savings from cash income. Cash income already excludes some types of savings such as 

contributions to certain tax preferred retirement accounts (deductible 401(K) and individual retirement accounts). The 

savings rates for certain groups are negative, indicating that the families in this group are dissaving on average.

30 Toder et. al. (2011) reconciles the CEX to national accounts and finds the “Personal Savings figure from the CEX is simply 

not credible, especially for the lower income units” (p. 61).

31 A more complete description of the TDM, including detail on its income and consumption imputations can be found in 

Cronin (2017, forthcoming).
18

If the tax is passed forward, the prices paid by consumers are the original prices plus the tax. This 

would result in a general price rise which is inconsistent with revenue estimating assumptions. In 

contrast, if the tax is passed backward, the prices paid by consumers are unchanged and the producer 

receives the original price less the tax. To pay the tax, producers lower wages and capital returns. Thus, 

under either method the purchasing power of consumers falls (either because of higher prices or lower 

wages and capital income). The TDM assumes that the tax is passed back, decreasing the prices 

received by producers but leaving the prices paid by consumers unchanged. This assumption makes the 

distributional model consistent with Treasury’s revenue estimation procedures, which assume that the 

general price level is unchanged. 

Given this approach, there are three components to Treasury’s carbon tax distribution estimates. First 

the tax is passed back to factor incomes. Second, because factor incomes fall, we assume that the taxes 

associated with those factor incomes (individual income, payroll and corporate income taxes) also fall. 

Lastly although the general price level does not change, relative prices do change. Carbon intensive 

goods become more expensive relative to goods that are not carbon intensive. Each component is 

discussed below.

Component 1: Factor income effects

Under the assumption that the carbon tax lowers the price producers receive, factors of production 

receive lower returns. Although the tax initially hits producers of carbon intensive goods, under the 

assumption of mobile labor and capital, the returns to all labor and supernormal capital would fall. As a 

result, labor and supernormal capital returns bear the burden of the carbon tax.32 In the TDM, a family’s 

share of the factor income tax is proportional to their share of total labor and supernormal capital 

income. Labor income, which primarily includes wages, earnings from self-employment and certain 

work-related fringe benefits, is estimated to be about $10.6 trillion at 2017 levels. Supernormal capital 

income, which includes a share of dividends, realized gains, and capital income from noncorporate 

businesses, is estimated to be about $1.1 trillion at 2017 levels. Families ranked in the top ten percent of 

the income distribution receive about 39 percent of all labor income and 83 percent of all supernormal 

capital income.33 The factor income effect of the carbon tax is progressive. 

Component 2: Tax offset

Because the carbon tax reduces factor incomes, it reduces the taxes that are paid by factor incomes, 

namely individual income, corporate income and payroll taxes. The reduction in income and payroll 

taxes offsets part of the revenue raised by the carbon tax. OTA uses a standard total offset of 25 percent

of the excise tax revenue. In the TDM, roughly half of the offset is applied to lower individual income 

 

32 As discussed in Cronin et al. (2013) the normal return to capital is exempt from consumption taxes. Under a consumption 

tax, such as a value added tax (a VAT), new investments are expensed (allowed a full deduction). On a present value basis, 

this is equivalent to exempting the normal return from tax. Only returns in excess of the normal return, referred to here as the 

supernormal return, are taxed. In this context, the supernormal return includes all returns in excess of the normal return. 

Supernormal returns could be the result of successful risk taking or rents. For consistency, Treasury applies the same 

methodology to all forms of a consumption tax (including excises and a carbon tax). 

33 A complete distribution of family income by source both across and within decile is available on Treasury’s website. 

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Distribution-of-Income-by-Source-2017.pdf
19

tax liabilities, 15 percent is for lower corporate income tax liabilities and the remaining 34 percent is for 

lower payroll tax liabilities. A family’s share of each tax offset is in proportion to their positive tax 

burdens under each tax. Families ranked in the top ten percent of the income distribution bear 74 

percent of the burden of the positive individual income tax, 73 percent of the corporate income tax 

burden and 33 percent of the payroll tax burden. On net the tax offset component is regressive. 

Component 3: Relative price effects

Under the third component, consumption goods with relatively high carbon intensities are assumed to 

become more expensive relative to consumption goods with relatively low-carbon intensities. This 

occurs even though the general price level is unchanged. To achieve this relative price effect, we first 

estimate the increase in prices that would occur if the tax were passed forward into increases in 

consumer prices. We estimate how the initial increase in the price of carbon (due to the carbon tax) 

would flow through to the 33 consumption goods directly used by families (which, along with goods 

used directly by government and for export, are termed “final goods”). As discussed in Box 1, goods 

with high carbon content experience relatively large price increases and goods with lower carbon 

content experience small price increases. Next, to keep the price level unchanged, we impose a general 

price decrease (roughly a 2.6 percent decline) for all 33 consumption goods. We are left with higher 

prices for carbon intensive goods and lower prices for goods that are not carbon intensive. 

Results are shown in Table 4. The table shows the price increases that would occur if the carbon tax 

were passed forward (column 2) without allowing consumers to switch to less expensive goods. 

Allowing consumers to choose less expensive alternatives would result in smaller price changes but such 

changes are a burden to the consumer so the distribution tables measure burden on the original market 

basket. The general price decrease which is the same for all goods (column 3) and the net price change 

(column 4) is the sum of the two price changes. By design, the net price change is zero for all goods, 

but as can be seen in the table, prices of carbon-intensive goods rise relative to other goods. Net prices 

fall between 0.6 percent and 2.6 percent for the majority of consumer purchase categories. The 

exceptions are energy goods, which necessarily rely heavily on the taxed commodities; price increases 

for electricity, natural gas, home heating oil, and gasoline are projected to rise by between 9.2 (gasoline) 

percent and 24.4 percent (natural gas). A few expenditure categories (water, mass transit, and air 

transportation) exhibit small net price increases from 1.0 to 4.9 percent. 
20

Table 4. Relative Price Increases (percent) 

Consumer expenditure 

category

Price Increase from 

Carbon Taxa

General Price 

Decrease

Net Change in 

Price

Natural gas 27.0 -2.6 24.4

Electricity 16.9 -2.6 14.3

Home heating oil 12.4 -2.6 9.8

Gasoline 11.8 -2.6 9.2

Air transportation 7.5 -2.6 4.9

Mass transit 6.4 -2.6 3.8

Water 3.6 -2.6 1.0

Other < 2.0 -2.6 -0.6 to -2.6

All categories 2.6 -2.6 0.0

a Source: OTA calculations based on BEA and EIA data. 

The relative price has little effect on vertical equity except at the very top of the distribution where the 

relative price effect reduces burdens slightly.
21

Box 1: Increase in prices for carbon-intensive goods

Although the fuel-based carbon tax would fall directly only on oil, natural gas, and coal (or in 

the case of a midstream approach, on their immediate products), its effects would reach 

throughout the economy. Firms that have to pay higher prices for energy inputs can be 

expected to raise prices to account for increased production costs. To the extent that these 

goods are in turn used in the production of still other goods, we should expect the carbon tax 

to potentially affect the price of any good in the economy. The approach used here assumes 

that business-to-business transactions would not be affected by these price effects because 

businesses would pass on any such price changes. Families consuming final goods are not 

able to offset the price effects in this manner, however, and therefore the new prices will 

affect family utility. 

We use Input-Output (I-O) tables produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to convert 

raw energy price increases to price increases for 389 industries/commodities. The analysis 

uses the 2007 Benchmark tables, which are the most recent tables for which detailed 

information is available. We calculate implied energy price changes by applying the $49 

carbon tax to projected 2019 commodity prices for oil, natural gas, and coal. We assume that 

there is 100 percent pass-through of the tax and then apply the calculated percentage price 

increases to the I-O table commodities of “Oil and Gas Extraction” (which we subdivide into 

separate components for oil and gas extraction) and “Coal Mining.” Our results contain only 

the effects of the fuel-based component of the carbon tax; we do not attempt to estimate the 

economic effects of the non-fuel carbon tax.

Finally, the purchaser price of these goods is calculated by adding in transportation and trade 

margins. Using a crosswalk supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we use these 

purchaser prices to determine the change in price of 33 consumer price categories used in the 

CEX. 

There are many ways in which the economy has changed since 2007, the most recent year for 

which the I-O tables are available. Both the energy intensity of the economy (measured in 

terms of BTU’s per dollar of real GDP) and the carbon intensity (measured in terms of tons of 

greenhouse gas emissions per dollar of real GDP) have fallen substantially. To address the 

change in energy intensity we reduced the size of the coal, oil, and gas extraction industries by 

17 percent relative to all other sectors. Value-added and import amounts were adjusted as 

necessary to retain the essential characteristics of the I-O table. To address changes in the 

carbon content of electricity and other energy market changes, we used EIA projections to 

assess the effect of the carbon tax on energy consumed directly by households (first four 

entries in Table 4.) 
22

b. Pass-back versus Pass-forward

As discussed above, Treasury assumes all consumption taxes, including carbon taxes, are passed back to 

sources of income, namely labor and supernormal capital income; thus the pass-back approach is also 

referred to as the sources method. An alternative methodology would be to assume that carbon taxes are 

passed forward to the uses of income, through price increases on goods produced with carbon; this is 

also referred to as the uses method.34 On a present value basis, the two methods result in the same tax 

lifetime burden for a family if the family consumes all of its income (leaves no bequests). Thus, when 

families are ranked by permanent income, the two methods typically give very similar results. 

The timing of tax burdens under the two methodologies, however, is not the same. Relative to the 

sources method, the uses method will show a higher burden in years where a family consumes more than 

their income (borrows or dis-saves) and a lower burden in the years that a family consumes less than 

their income (saves). To the extent that low-income families are more likely to borrow against future 

income, the uses method will appear more regressive than the sources method when families are ranked 

by annual income. Likewise to the extent that elderly families are consuming out of past income 

(dissaving), the uses method will show a higher burden on the elderly than the sources method when 

families are ranked by annual income.

Bequests also affect the equivalence of the sources (income) and uses (consumption) method. If a 

family consumes more over its lifetime than it earns because it receives a bequest then the uses method 

will assign a higher lifetime burden to the family than the sources method. In contrast, if a family 

consumes less over its lifetime than it earns because it leaves a bequest then the uses method will assign 

the family a lower lifetime burden than the sources method. To the extent that high income families are 

more likely to leave bequests, the uses method will appear more regressive than the sources method 

because it will assign a lower burden to high income families who leave bequests.

Under either the sources or uses method, transfer income is left unchanged (“held harmless.”) Under the 

sources method, transfer income does not bear the burden of the carbon tax, only factor incomes do, so 

the tax does not burden families that have only transfer income except to the extent that they consume a 

larger share of carbon intensive goods than the average family. As discussed above the carbon tax under 

the sources method has three components: factor income tax burden, factor income tax burden offset and 

the relative price change burden. The average family will not have a burden from the relative price 

change because it nets to zero. Families with only transfer income will not bear the factor income tax or 

accompanying tax offsets so they can only be affected by the burden of the relative price change. 

Families that consume more than the average level of the taxed good will pay more for their pre-tax 

level of consumption and families that consume a below average level of carbon will pay less for their 

pre-tax level of consumption. 

Similarly, under the uses method, transfer income is indexed to the general price level so again only 

families who consume more than their income or who consume a relatively high share of carbon 

intensive goods (so the price change in their market basket is greater than the general price change) have 

a burden from the carbon tax. For example, if a family had only social security income and the price 

 

34 The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (TPC) follows the sources method and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 

follows the uses method.
23

level rose by 3 percent, under the uses (pass-forward) method, their income would also go up by 3

percent because social security income is indexed to the general price level. If they consumed all of 

their income and consumed an average market basket then the price of their market basket would also 

rise by 3 percent. They would be held harmless. If instead, they had a carbon-intensive market basket, 

then cost of their market basket would rise by more than 3 percent and they would be worse off. On the 

other hand, families with only transfer income who consume a less carbon intensive market basket may 

actually win from a carbon tax as the prices of the goods that they consume fall relative to the average 

family (sources method) or as their indexed income increases by more than the prices of the goods that 

they consume (uses method).

2. Distributional analysis: Results 

A carbon tax would potentially allow a reduction in other tax rates, the so-called tax swap or “revenue 

recycling”. Distributional analysis is particularly valuable for showing how possible tax swaps could be 

designed to address distributional considerations (e.g., Marron and Morris, 2016). To provide 

information relevant to this assessment, we first show the distributional effects of the carbon tax without 

revenue recycling. We then show the further distributional effects of revenue recycling using four tax 

swap scenarios. 

a. Baseline: Distribution of the carbon tax before revenue recycling

Table 5 shows the distribution of a $49 per metric ton carbon tax without revenue recycling and 

assuming the tax is passed back to factor income (sources method). Table 5 is a standard Treasury 

distribution table. The first two columns show the distribution of families and the distribution of cash 

income by decile. The third and fourth columns show the share of the total tax burden borne by each 

decile under current law and under the proposed law. In this case proposed law is current law plus the 

carbon tax. The fifth and six columns show the average federal tax rate by income decile under current 

and proposed law. Columns 7 thru 10 show the change in tax burden by decile in various forms: as a 

total dollar amount, as an average dollar amount, as a share of the total change in tax burden, and as a 

percent of the total federal tax burden under current law. Each statistic may be of interest to various 

users of the table. 

The last column shows the change in after-tax income by decile. This is the preferred statistic to judge 

the regressivity (or progressivity) of a proposal. The percent change in after-tax income shows how the 

tax change affects each income deciles’ consumption possibilities. If a proposal results in the same 

percentage change in after-tax income for all deciles then the proposal is considered distributionally 

neutral with regard to vertical equity.35 In contrast, if a proposal results in smaller decreases in after-tax 

income for low-income families than for high income families then it is progressive and if a proposal 

results in larger decreases in after-tax income for low-income families than for high income families 

then it is regressive. 

 

35 Treasury’s standard distributional analysis only addresses questions of vertical equity. In general, vertical equity requires 

that families with a greater ability to pay (as measured by income) pay a higher fraction of their income in taxes. Treasury’s 

standard tables do not address questions of horizontal equity, which is the notion that families with an equal ability to pay 

should have equal tax burdens. 
24

As can be seen in Table 5, the carbon tax is progressive for much of the income distribution. The lowest 

income decile is estimated to have a 0.8 percent decrease in after-tax income because of the carbon tax

and the magnitude of this percentage change in after-tax income rises with income through the 9th decile. 

In the 9th decile, after-tax income is estimated to fall by 1.8 percent because of the carbon tax. 

The progressive trend reverses itself, however, at the top of the income distribution. The top 5 percent is 

estimated to have a smaller decrease in after-tax income than all but the bottom 3 deciles. Looking at 

the detail within the top ten percent, the decline in the carbon tax burden continues as income rises. The 

top 0.1 percent of the income distribution is estimated to have a smaller decline in after-tax income than 

the poorest income decile.

Compared to TPC (Marron and Toder 2013) and CBO (Dinan 2012), Treasury’s distribution of a carbon 

tax is less regressive. Although Treasury and TPC both pass the carbon tax back to sources of income, 

Treasury passes the tax back only to labor and supernormal capital income whereas TPC also passes the 

tax back to transfer income. TPC includes transfer income in their standard analysis because Social 

Security benefits are indexed to the wage at retirement so new retirees will receive lower benefits. This 

is a very long run view. In contrast the Treasury tables represent the distributional results in the shorter 

run. CBO follows the uses method to distribute a carbon tax which, as discussed above, will result in a 

less progressive distribution to the extent that low-income households consume more than they earn and 

to the extent that higher income households are more likely to leave bequests. 

Even if Treasury were to follow the uses method to distribute the carbon tax, Treasury would likely not 

find the same degree of regressivity as shown in the CBO analysis because Treasury’s consumption to 

income ratios at the bottom of the income distribution are not as extreme as those found in the CEX 
25

(which is used by CBO).36 The CEX is the only data set with detailed consumption information and it is 

the common source of data for carbon tax distributions. However, as mentioned above, the CEX has 

weaknesses as a source of information on total income, especially for families at the lower end of the 

income distribution. To better measure total consumption, the TDM uses tax data to measure income 

and taxes and the Survey of Consumer Finances to measure savings. The TDM uses the CEX only to 

partition the TDM’s estimate of total consumption into commodity shares. 

Treasury’s imputation from the CEX also accounts for family size. The CEX, in its published tables by 

income decile, does not adjust for family size.37 Its lowest income quintile has an average family size of 

1.7 and its highest income decile has an average family size of 3.2. Family size affects returns to scale 

in consumption and it affects a family’s relative well-being so it needs to be considered both when 

ranking families and when imputing consumption to families.38 Without taking family size into account, 

it is not possible to tell if the larger share of total consumption spent by low-income families on certain 

carbon intensive goods is because the families are low income or because they have few members and 

are therefore unable to benefit from returns to scale. In the TDM, we rank families with the same 

income but more members lower and impute consumption based on both family size and consumption 

rank so we can better measure consumption shares for low and high income families. 

b. Results: Distribution under four tax swaps

Table 6 shows the distributional effects of recycling all of the net revenue from the $49 per metric ton 

carbon tax. We considered four illustrative options for revenue recycling: (1) providing a fully 

refundable per person tax credit, (2) lowering the OASDI payroll tax rate, (3) lowering the corporate tax 

rate and (4) a combination of a per person credit, payroll tax cut and corporate tax cut. Each recycling 

option is static (assumes no change in family income) and revenue neutral (when combined with the 

carbon tax) in the first year of the tax. Lowering the payroll tax rate or corporate tax rate may result in 

shifting income between taxable and nontaxable compensation or shifting income between the corporate 

and non-corporate sector; these effects are not considered in these tables. The tax swap policies are 

chosen solely for illustrative purposes. 

The first three columns of the table are for reference and show the distribution of families, income and 

average federal tax rates by income decile. Column 4 shows the carbon tax without revenue recycling, 

the same result as found in Table 5 and also included for reference. Columns 5 thru 8 show each 

recycling option. (i) Combining the per person rebate with the carbon tax results in a very progressive 

change in tax burdens. The TDM estimates that the poorest decile would experience almost a 9 percent 

increase in average after-tax income compared to a 1 percent decrease in average after-tax income for 

the top income decile. (ii) Combining a reduction in the OASDI payroll tax rate with the carbon tax 

would be distributionally neutral with only the very top of the income distribution (the top 1 percent) 

experiencing an average net decrease in after-tax income greater than 0.5 percent.39 (iii) Combining a 

 

36 When ranking by consumption and following the uses method, Cronin, Fullerton and Sexton (2016) find similar results. 

37 See “Table 1. Quintiles of income before taxes: Average annual expenditures and characteristics, Consumer Expenditure 

Survey, 2014” available on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website: http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/consumerexpenditures/2014/home.htm#tableC

38 See Cronin et. al. (2012) for a discussion of family size adjustments in distributional analysis.

39 These results are for vertical equity only. As a class each decile is estimated to have only small changes in after-tax 

income from the combination of a payroll tax cut and carbon tax. Some families within each class, however, may be winners 
26

reduction in the corporate tax rate with the carbon tax would be a regressive change in tax burdens. The 

bottom 90 percent of families in the income distribution would experience an average decrease in aftertax income but the top 10 percent would experience an average increase in after-tax income. The top 0.1 

percent would be expected to increase income by about 6 percent on average under the carbon tax plus 

corporate rate cut. (iv) Combining the carbon tax with a revenue neutral mix of a per person rebate, 

payroll tax cut and corporate rate cut gives mixed results. The bottom and top of the income distribution 

would experience average net increases in after-tax income whereas the middle of the distribution would 

experience only small average changes in after-tax income.

 

(experience tax cuts) and others may be losers (experience tax increases).
27

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