Filed 7/3/23 In re D.W. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re D.W. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B317405

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

21LJJP00070A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.W.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Tara L. Newman, Judge. Affirmed.

Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Davion W. (Father) appeals a juvenile court disposition 

order declining to place his son, D.W., with him after the court 

removed D.W. from the custody of his mother Antaleen S. 

(Mother). Father, who was a non-offending parent in the 

dependency petition but who had just been released from prison 

on a robbery conviction, argues the juvenile court erred by finding 

it would be detrimental to place D.W. with him. We consider 

whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

detriment finding.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Investigation and Initial Proceedings

In January 2021, the Los Angeles Department of Children 

and Family Services (the Department) received a referral 

alleging then 11-year-old D.W. and his four younger siblings1

(who were ten, eight, five, and two at the time) were being 

neglected. The Department began investigating and filed a

dependency petition alleging D.W. and his siblings were at risk of 

harm from, among other things, the unsanitary and hazardous 

home where they lived with Mother and her fiancé Jovan M., 

from Jovan’s abuse of the children, and from Jovan’s substance 

abuse and mental and emotional problems. In a later amended 

petition, the Department added additional dependency 

allegations, including an allegation that Mother failed to protect 

D.W. from sexual abuse by a maternal uncle.

At an initial detention hearing, the juvenile court removed 

the children from Mother’s custody and D.W. was placed with a 

1 D.W. and some of his siblings have different biological 

fathers.
3

non-related extended family member. Father was incarcerated at 

the time of that detention hearing, serving a six-year sentence for 

robbery (including a sentencing enhancement for great bodily 

injury). Father did not make his first appearance in the 

dependency proceedings until later, in June 2021. At that time, 

Father requested, and was granted, presumed father status as to 

D.W.2 The court also granted Father monitored visitation.

A Department social worker interviewed Father in 

November 2021. By then, he had been released on parole and

said he was participating in anger management classes. Father 

told the social worker that “as long as no one triggers [him] or 

upsets [him],” he would be off parole in a year.

Through a parentage statement submitted by counsel, 

Father stated he lived with D.W. from approximately 2009 to 

2015. Father told a social worker that he wanted custody of all of 

his biological children. The social worker informed Father that 

D.W.’s two siblings recognized other men as their fathers and 

expressed concern that revealing their parentage might cause 

them additional trauma. Father said he did not care. When the 

social worker discussed visitation with Father, Father repeatedly 

stated he did not need to be babysat when seeing his children.

Mother and D.W. were questioned by the Department 

about life with Father prior to his incarceration. D.W. told a 

social worker that Father had been “very mean” and would hit 

2 A paternity test later confirmed Father was the biological 

father of D.W. and two of D.W.’s siblings. Father also requested 

presumed father status as the other two siblings, both of whom

believed other men were their respective fathers.
4

him. Mother similarly said Father was physically abusive and 

controlling during the time they were together.

By December 2021, Father was having sporadic phone calls 

with D.W. but the two had not had any in-person visits.

B. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing

The juvenile court held the jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing that same month (December 2021). The court sustained

the dependency petition with amendments by interlineation, 

finding dependency jurisdiction over the children was proper 

because: (1) the home the children had been living in with 

Mother and Jovan was in an unsanitary and hazardous state; (2) 

Jovan took D.W. and one of his siblings with him to commit a 

burglary; (3) Jovan physically abused one of D.W.’s siblings; (4) 

Jovan had a diagnosis of bipolar depression and failed to take his 

medication as prescribed; (5) a maternal uncle sexually abused 

D.W. and one of his siblings; and (6) Mother failed to protect the 

children from these dangers.

In arguing disposition, D.W.’s attorney opposed giving 

Father custody of the child. D.W.’s attorney represented that 

Father’s contact with D.W. had been sporadic at best even after 

being released from custody and D.W. was “not necessarily 

interested in reunifying with . . . Father.” The Department 

likewise opposed placing D.W. with Father. Father’s attorney

objected to any order removing D.W. from his custody and 

requested reunification services. The Department construed the 

objection as a request to place D.W. in Father’s custody and 

asked the court to find placement would be detrimental to D.W.’s 

safety, protection, and well-being. The Department noted it had 
5

not been able to assess where Father was living and expressed 

concerns regarding substance use.

The juvenile court removed D.W. from both Mother and 

Father and ordered him suitably placed. The court found there 

was a substantial risk of detriment to D.W. in being placed with 

Father (though, without objection, it did not specify its reasons 

for so finding). The court ordered family reunification services for 

Father—as to D.W. only.

II. DISCUSSION

Under the governing substantial evidence standard of 

review, there is adequate support for the juvenile court’s 

detriment finding. As we will explain, Father’s recent release 

from custody, the statements by D.W. and Mother concerning 

Father’s prior physical abuse, Father’s statements concerning his 

ability to successfully complete parole, D.W.’s reluctance to 

reunify with Father, and the lack of information regarding the 

suitability of Father’s home, justify the juvenile court’s decision 

to decline to award custody of D.W. to Father.

When the juvenile court removes a child from a custodial 

parent at disposition, it must determine “whether there is a 

parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the 

time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child 

within the provisions of [Welfare and Institutions Code] Section 

300, who desires to assume custody of the child.” (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 361.2, subd. (a).) If the noncustodial parent requests 

custody, the court must place the child with that parent “unless it 

finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to 

the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the 

child.” (Ibid.)
6

“A detriment evaluation requires that the court weigh all 

relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer net harm.”

(In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425 (Luke M.).) 

These factors may include the dependent child’s own wishes and

the child’s relationship (or lack thereof) with the non-custodial 

parent seeking custody—though those considerations alone 

cannot be determinative. (See, e.g., id. at 1426; see also In re 

A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38, 43; In re C.M. (2014) 232 

Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402.)

On appeal, “[w]e review the record in the light most 

favorable to the court’s order to determine whether there is 

substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could 

find clear and convincing evidence that the children would suffer 

such detriment. [Citations.]” (Luke M., supra, at 1426; see also 

Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.) 

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s detriment 

finding here.

At the time of the juvenile court’s determination, Father 

had only recently been released on parole after serving a sentence 

for a violent criminal conviction. Father was attending an anger 

management class, but the record does not reflect his progress in

the course and he rather ominously told a social worker that he 

would complete parole only if “no one triggers [him] or upsets 

[him].” Such a statement is cause for concern when Father would 

be subject to the stresses of parenthood if given custody of D.W.—

who he had physically abused and been mean to in the past

(statements that we credit under the governing standard of 

review).

Additionally, Father’s communication with the Department 

following his release from custody had been minimal. During the 
7

sole interview he had with a Department social worker following 

his release, he expressed that he wanted unmonitored visitation 

(contrary to the court’s order for monitored visitation) and did not 

care about potentially adding to the trauma experienced by his

younger two children. Further, by the time of the disposition 

hearing, the Department had not been able to assess Father’s 

living situation to ensure it was safe for D.W.

The record also reflects Father did not have a significant 

relationship with D.W. predating the dependency case and only 

sporadically spoke to D.W. on the phone after his release from 

custody. So far as the record indicates, Father did not attend any 

in-person visits with D.W. prior to the disposition hearing, nor do 

we see any evidence that he attempted to have any such visits. 

Additionally, D.W., through counsel, expressed some resistance to 

reunifying with Father.

Considering the record as a whole, there is adequate 

evidence for the juvenile court’s finding of detriment that 

precluded awarding custody of D.W. to Father.3

3 Father argues the lack of an established relationship with a 

noncustodial parent, a child’s desire to reside elsewhere, and 

sibling bonds are each insufficient to support a detriment finding. 

While precedent supports a view that any one of those factors 

would not automatically suffice to support a detriment finding, 

we do not rely on one factor alone in reaching our decision. 

Relying on In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1828 

(Marquis D.), Father also argues the evidence was insufficient to 

support a detriment finding under section 361.2 because he had 

not committed any act “incompatible with parenthood.” Marquis 

D., however, does not establish that such an act is required for a 

court to find placement with a noncustodial parent would be 

detrimental under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2.
8

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

KIM, J.