alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Kyle Dean Kuykendall v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-18-00930-CR

Trial court case number: B15-684

Trial court: 198th District Court of Kerr County

Appointed counsel for appellant, Kyle Dean Kuykendall, has filed a motion to set 

aside his “Motion to Withdraw as Counsel” and “Appellant’s Brief” filed pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The State has filed a response and does not 

oppose the request. We grant the motion, and strike counsel’s and Anders brief, filed in 

this appeal on March 6, 2019, and motion to withdraw, filed on March 7, 2019.

Accordingly, appellant’s brief is due to be filed no later than 30 days from the 

date of this order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(d).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Russell Lloyd

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __April 9, 2019____
257 La. 612

#### Joseph Whitney PIERRE, Jr. v. SAINT PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 51142.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 4, 1971.

In re: Insurance Company of North America applying for writ of certiorari.

Writ denied. Applicant can have the issue reviewed on appeal in case of an adverse judgment.
EXHIBIT 13.2

Certification by the Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of AutoNavi Holdings Limited (the
Company) on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Catherine Qin Zhang, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: June 27, 2011



|       |  |                        
|------ |  | -----------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Catherine Qin Zhang
|Name:  |  | Catherine Qin Zhang    
|Title: |  | Chief Financial Officer
#### George DALEO and John Dubois, Petitioners-Cross-Respondents, v. The TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, Respondent-Cross-Petitioner.

No. 43468.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 11, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1973.

Alan R. Schwartz and Horton, Schwartz & Perse and Sams, Anderson, Alper, Spen*170cer & Post, Miami, for petitioners, cross-respondents.

David L. Willing of Adams, George & Wood and Jeanne Heyward, Miami, for respondent, cross-petitioner.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners’ petition for writ of certiora-ri is denied.

Petitioners-Cross Respondents’ petition for attorney’s fees is denied and Respondent’s cross petition for writ of certiorari is granted without oral argument. The filing of briefs is hereby dispensed with, cer-tiorari is granted, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is quashed, and the cause remanded for reconsideration in light of Wilder v. Wright, 278 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973).

CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ„ concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)



In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Horizon Technology Finance Corporation and Subsidiaries (the “Company”)
for the annual period ended December 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Christopher M. Mathieu, as Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant hereby certify, to the best of my
knowledge that:



(1) The Report fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2) The information contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



|/s/ Christopher M. Mathieu |                        
|-------------------------- | -----------------------
|Name:                      | Christopher M. Mathieu 
|Title:                     | Chief Financial Officer



Date: March 11, 2014
#### Rick D. MERCHANT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. George B. MOWAD, M. D., et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 6579.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

May 3, 1978.

Preston N. Aucoin, Ville Platte, for defendants-appellants.

Ernest R. Eldred, Baton Rouge, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before DOMENGEAUX, WATSON and FORET, JJ.

DOMENGEAUX, Judge.

MOTION TO DISMISS

George B. Mowad, M. D., the defendant-appellant, moves for leave of this court to abandon his appeal and obtain its dismissal. The motion is unopposed.

We grant the motion to dismiss.

Rule VII, Section 3 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal provides in pertinent part that:

> “In the absence of a timely answer to the appeal or other formal action to amend or modify the judgment appealed, the appellant alone may, by his formal Motion to Dismiss, on leave of the court, forthwith abandon his appeal and obtain a dismissal.”

Since an answer to the appeal has not been filed, nor has any other formal action to amend or modify the judgment appealed been taken, the appeal is hereby dismissed at defendant-appellant’s costs.

*APPEAL DISMISSED.*
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 8 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

NALINI G. PREMSINGH, M.D. and CHRISMAN-SAWYER BANK, f/k/a FIRST CITY BANK,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee. Case No. 96-3209 (D.C. 95-2275-EEO) (District of Kansas)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.2

Plaintiffs-appellants Nalini G. Premsingh, M.D. (“D r. Premsingh”) and Chrisman-Sawyer Bank, f/k/a First City Bank (“the Bank”) appeal the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (“UNUM”). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we presume familiarity with the underlying, undisputed facts, as stated by the district court. See Premsingh v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 929 F. Supp. 1391, 1393-94 (D. Kan. 1996). On appeal, Dr. Premsingh and the Bank renew the arguments they raised in the district court. The district court rejected these arguments in a thorough, well-written opinion. In sum, the district court’s reasoning was as follows: First, the policy at issue in this case unambiguously conditioned reinstatement upon payment of all premiums due for past periods of lapsed coverage. See id. at 1395-96. Second, UNUM was not estopped from denying coverage during the 1992-93 reinstatement process after having accepted Dr. Premsingh’s overdue premium payment, because the policy’s reasonable requirements for reinstatement had not been satisfied. See id. at 1396-98. Third and finally, no statute, contract, or actions by UNUM gave it a duty to notify the Bank, as the assignee of Dr. Premsingh’s right to receive benefits under the policy, that premium payments were overdue. See id. at 1398-99.3

We AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons. We DENY Dr. Premsingh and the Bank’s Motion for Certification of the first two of the above three issues: there is controlling precedent on these issues in the decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeals; therefore, the questions do not meet the requirements for certification. See 10th Cir. R. 27.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3201 (1994). The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court,

Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A22D0179. DEREK GABRIEL, SR. et al. v. SENTINEL LAKE

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al.

Derek Gabriel, Sr. and Autumn Gabriel (“Plaintiffs”) filed this breach of

contract action against Sentinel Lake Homeowners Association, Inc., and others

(“Defendants”). The court entered its final judgment in favor of Defendants in May

2018. Plaintiffs, who had been represented by counsel but were now proceeding pro

se, filed a motion to set aside, which the court denied. Plaintiffs did not appeal from

that order. Plaintiffs then filed a second motion to set aside and vacate judgment,

under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d), alleging fraud on the part of Defendants. The trial court

denied the motion on September 10, 2021, and Plaintiffsfiled a notice of appeal from

that order. We dismissed the appeal as abandoned after Plaintiffs failed to file a brief

and enumeration of errors within the time allowed. See Case No. A22A0430 (Dec.

16, 2021). On December 10, 2021, Plaintiffs filed this application for discretionary

review of the September 10, 2021 order.1

We lack jurisdiction. To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed

within 30 days of the entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v.

1As an initial matter, to the extent that Plaintiffs intended this application to be

their brief in their direct appeal, we nevertheless lacked jurisdiction over the direct

appeal because “the denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA §

9-11-60 is not directly appealable and instead requiresthe filing of an application for

discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (b).” Jim Ellis Atlanta, Inc. v. Adamson,

283 Ga. App. 116, 116 (640 SE2d 688) (2006). “Compliance with the discretionary

appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga.

App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996).

January 07, 2022
State, 204 Ga. App. 582, 583 (420 SE2d 393) (1992). This statutory deadline is

jurisdictional, and we cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance

with OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). Boyle v. State, 190 Ga. App. 734, 734 (380 SE2d 57)

(1989). Here, Plaintiffs filed their application 91 days after the entry of the order to

be appealed. Thus, we lack jurisdiction and the application is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

01/07/2022
#### Michael James TROISE, Sr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 74-161.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 22, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
Opinion issued September 29, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals
For The 

## First District of Texas

————————————

NO. 01
- 15
- 00390
- CV

——————————— JOHN T. PRESTON AND C CHANGE INVESTMENTS , LLC , Appella nt s V. EMJO INVESTMENTS, LT D. AND H.J. VON DER GOLTZ , Appell e e s

On Appeal from the 215th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 2011
- 44058

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellants John T. Preston and C Change Investments, LLC have filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this appeal. No opinion has issued. Accordingly, we grant the motion , remove the appeal from the Court’s submission docket, and2 dismiss the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP . P. 42.1(a). We dismiss any other pending
motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Hugo Jesus RAMIREZ-ARANGO, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 01-30380.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 12, 2002.*

Decided Aug. 16, 2002.

Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, and TASHIMA and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Hugo Jesus Ramirez-Arango appeals his jury trial conviction of illegal reentry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that the district court erred when it granted the government’s motion *in limine*to suppress evidence that Ramirez-Arango applied for *836a pardon from his underlying conviction before his reentry. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2). We affirm.

The government moved for suppression of the pardon application on several grounds. The district court granted the motion on the ground that it was clear from the face of the application that Ramirez-Arango was ineligible for a pardon until after the date of his reentry. We review rulings suppressing evidence *in li-mine*for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Ravel,*930 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.1991).

Ramirez-Arango’s trial defense consisted of a denial of the government’s charge that he lacked permission to reenter. *Cf. United States v. Corona-Garcia,*210 F.3d 973, 976 n. 1 (9th Cir.2000) (listing elements of illegal reentry offense). To prove its charge, the government introduced evidence that the Attorney General’s records show no such grant of permission and that Ramirez-Arango confessed to having neither requested nor received such permission. Ramirez-Arango argues that his pardon application is relevant to his defense because it casts doubt on the government’s proof. This argument has no merit.

A request for permission to reenter may be relevant to cast doubt on whether that permission was granted. *Corona-Garcia,*210 F.3d at 979 n. 3. As the government correctly noted in its motion *in limine,*however, a pardon alone cannot constitute permission to reenter under § 1326(a). *See United States v. Blanco-Gallegos,*188 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1999). Evidence that Ramirez-Arango requested a pardon, rather than permission to reenter, does nothing to undermine the government’s proof that Ramirez-Arango lacked permission to reenter. *See United States v. Click,*807 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir.1987).

Although the district court granted the motion on a different ground, we may affirm on any ground raised before the district court. *Id.*at 850 n. 5.

Because evidence of Ramirez-Arango’s pardon application is irrelevant to his defense, his alternate argument that its sup-' pression prevented him from presenting a complete defense fails. *See United States v. Dorrell,*758 F.2d 427, 430 (9th Cir.1985).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 32
CERTIFICATION

We, C. Wesley McDonald, President and Chief Executive Officer, and J. L.
Dickinson, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, of Continental Global
Group, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

1.          The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the
            quarterly period ended September 30, 2004 (the "Report")
            fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
            the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2.          The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
            in all material respects, the financial condition and
            results of operations of the Company.

/s/ C. Wesley McDonald                     /s/ J. L. Dickinson
----------------------------------         -----------------------------------
C. Wesley McDonald, President and          J. L. Dickinson, Vice President and
  Chief Executive Officer                    Chief Financial Officer

Dated:  May 16, 2005


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
BRIAN QUINN

Chief Justice

JAMES T. CAMPBELL

Justice

MACKEY K. HANCOCK

Justice

PATRICK A. PIRTLE

Justice

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas

Potter County Courts Building

501 S. Fillmore, Suite 2-A

Amarillo, Texas 79101-2449

www.txcourts.gov/7thcoa.aspx

VIVIAN LONG

Clerk

MAILING ADDRESS:

P. O. Box 9540

79105-9540

(806) 342-2650

April 13, 2016

Eric Coats

Attorney at Law

1716 S. Polk

Amarillo, TX 79102

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Kristy Wright

Asst. Criminal District Attorney

2309 Russell Long Blvd., Suite 120

Canyon, TX 79015

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

RE: Case Numbers: 07-15-00246-CR, 07-15-00286-CR

Trial Court Case Number: 17,917-A

Style: Ricky Dan Allee v. The State of Texas

Dear Counsel:

The Court this day issued an opinion and judgment in the captioned causes. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 48. 

In addition, pursuant to Texas Government Code, Sec. 51.204(b)(2), exhibits on

file with this Court, if any, will be destroyed three years after final disposition of the case

or at an earlier date if ordered by the Court. 

Very truly yours,

Vivian Long

VIVIAN LONG, CLERK

xc: Honorable Dan L. Schaap (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

Jo Carter (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

FILE COPY
Exhibit 15.1














CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM




We consent to the incorporation by reference in Post-Effective Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement No. 333-174483 on Form F-3 and in Registration Statement No. 333-191414 on Form F-3 of our reports dated June 18, 2014, relating to the consolidated financial statements of Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A. (which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes explanatory paragraphs relating to (a) the restatement to correct the presentation of earnings per share information attributable to each separate class of common and preferred shares, (b) the retrospective adjustments as a result of the subsequent Share Bonus and Reverse Share Split transactions, (c) the retrospective adjustments as a result of changes in accounting policies related to the adoption of International Accounting Standard – IAS 19 (R) – Employee Benefits and (d) the supplementary information included in note 41.j under the caption Statements of Value Added), and relating to the effectiveness of Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A.’s internal control over financial reporting, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 20-F/A of Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A. for the year ended December 31, 2013, and to the reference to us under the heading “Experts” in the Prospectus, which is part of this Registration Statement.










/s/ Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu


Auditores Independentes


São Paulo, Brazil


June 18, 2014
256 La. 800

#### ELEPHANT, INC. v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.

No. 50869.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 22, 1970.

In re: Elephant, Inc. applying for certiorari or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Application not considered. It was filed more than 30 days after a rehearing was refused by the Court of Appeal — See Section 11 of Article 7 of the Louisiana Constitution.
Exhibit 32.2 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

In connection with the Annual Report of Atlas Resources Series 28-2010 L.P. (the “Partnership”) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2014 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Sean P. McGrath, Chief Financial Officer of the General Partner, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

| (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership. |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| /s/ SEAN P. MCGRATH                       |
|------------------------------------------------|
| Sean P. McGrath                                |
| Chief Financial Officer of the General Partner |
| September 11, 2015                             |
U.S. Position on World Bank’s Investment in the 

Ouarzazate I Concentrated Solar Power Plant Project in Morocco 

November 17, 2011 

The United States commends the Government of Morocco for this bold initiative to establish a 

renewable energy sector. The world urgently needs to develop renewable energy products, and 

an investment in solar power will play to the Morocco’s comparative geographic advantage in 

producing green energy. 

While there are risks in developing this operation, there is also the opportunity for great reward if 

the project is successful and can be replicated across the region. This project represents a good 

opportunity to take a clean technology to scale, significantly reducing future capital costs and 

risk for renewable energy products. Innovation is inherently risky and thus the controls and 

mitigation measures built into the project design and technical assistance to Morocco’s Agency 

for Solar Energy (MASEN) are especially important. 

The Government of Morocco’s decision to use a public-private partnership for this project is a 

positive step. The need to secure concessional financing to facilitate private sector participation 

in the project requires use of a framework approach to environmental and social safeguards. As 

a result, the sequencing of environmental assessments differs from the norm. In this context, the 

framework Environmental and Social Impact Assessment’s (ESIA) description of the project 

location and of the anticipated impacts of the project is necessary analysis of the potential 

environmental impacts. Taken together with framework ESIA’s posting for public comment and 

assurances that a full project-specific ESIA will be completed and will likewise benefit from 

public comment, this appears to be satisfactory analysis of potential environmental impacts. The 

United States requests that the final analysis be posted to the Bank's website during the comment 

period. In addition, greater attention to water use should be given in the detailed project specific 

ESIAs and in the environmental management plans given the water scarcity issues in the project 

area. 

Although the aims and approach of the proposed project are positive, the United States is 

concerned by the inclusion of a 'voluntary local content' provision. This is an unwelcome 

departure from the Bank's principles of completely open international competition. Thus, while 

the overall aims and approach of the project are commendable, the United States would like to be 

recorded as abstaining on this project.
258 La. 561

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Phillip Anthony HARRIS, David Kellyon, Carol Ann Hollingsworth, and Gloria Dean Williams.

No. 51402.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 10, 1971.

In re: Phillip Anthony Harris et al. applying for writs of mandamus and prohibition.

Writ granted.

On considering the petition of relators in the above numbered and entitled cause:

It is ordered that the Honorable Joseph A. LaHaye, Judge of the Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Landry, furnish a transcript of all prior pleadings in State v. Harris et al, Nos. 27,098, 27,099, 27,100, at least five days prior to the trial, to counsel for defendant Harris.