No. 3--04--0271 (Consolidated with Nos. 3--04--0285 and 3--04--0289) Filed December 4, 2009–CORRECTED COPY 1/26/10 IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS THIR D DI STRICT A.D., 2009 COUNTY O F KANKA

KEE, I LLINO IS, ) EDWARD D. SMITH, KANKAKEE ) COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY, ) WASTE MANA GEMENT O F IL LI NOI S, ) INC., and BYRON SANDB ERG, ) Appeal f rom the I llinois ) Pollution Control Board Petitioner s-Appell ants, ) ) Docket N os. PCB 04--33 v. ) PCB 04--34 ) PCB 04--35 THE IL LI NOIS POLLUTI ON CONTROL ) BOARD, THE CITY OF

KANKAKEE, ) IL LI NOI S, TOWN & COUNTRY UT IL ITI ES, ) INC., and KANKAKEE REGI ONAL ) LAND FIL

L, L LC, ) ) Responde nts-Appe llees. )

JUSTICE McDADE d

elivere d the opini on of the c ourt: For convenience and clarity , this opinion uses the following short-form references: Town & Country

Utilities, Inc . (Town &

Country ); Town &

Country and Kank

akee Re gional L

andfill, LL C, collectively (Applica nts); the County of Kankake e, Illinois (County ); Waste Management of Il linois, I

nc. (Wast e Manag ement); B yr

on Sandbe

rg (San dberg ); the Coun

ty, Waste Management, and Sandberg collectively (Obje ctors); the City of Kanka kee, Illinois (City

); the city council of the City

of Kankakee (City

Council or Council); the Illinois Pollution Control2

Board (Board); and the I

llinois Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2004)). Following an unsuccessful request, Applicants filed a second request seeking local siting approva l for a pr oposed la ndfill with

in the City . A leng

thy hearing ensued, whereu

pon the City Council ap

proved the reque st. Objectors petit ioned for review b efore t

he Boar d, which u

pheld the City Council's decision. Objectors then filed the instant appeal challenging the approval of Applican ts' sec ond request on sev eral g rounds. RELEV ANT STATU

TORY PROVI SION S Subsection 39(c)) of the Act declares that " no permit for the development or construction of a new pollution control facility ma y be g ranted by the [Environmental Protection] Agency unless the applicant submits proof to the Agency that the location of the facility has been approved by the

*** governing body

of the municipality *** in which the fa cility is to be located in accor dance w ith Section

39.2 of thi s Act." 4 15 IL CS 5/39(c) ) (West 200 4). I n releva nt part, section 3 9.2 read s:

"(a) The *** governing

body of the municipality *** shall approve or disapprove the requ est for lo cal siting

approva l for ea ch pollution control

facility which is su

bject to such rev iew. An a

pplicant for loca l siting a pproval shall submit

sufficie nt details describing the proposed facility to demonstrate compliance, and local siting approval shall be granted only

if the proposed facility

meets the following criteria:

*** (ii) the facility is so desig ned, located and proposed to be operated that the public health, safety

and welfare will be protected;3 *** (iv) *** (B) for a facility

that is a sanitary landf

ill or waste disposal site, the facility is located outside the bounda ry of the 100-y

ear floodplain ***; * * * (viii) if the facility is to be locate d in a county wher e the county boa

rd has adopted a solid wast

e manag ement pla

n consiste nt with the

planning require ments of the Local Solid Waste Disposal Act or the Solid Waste Planning and Recy cling Act, the facility is consistent with that plan[.] *** * * * (b) No later than 14 day s before the date on which the *** gover ning body of the municipality receive s a request for site approval, the applicant shall cause written notice of such request to be served either in person or by registered mail, return rece ipt requested, on the owners of all property within the subject area not solely owned by the applicant, and on the owners of all property within 250 feet in each direction of the lot line of the subject property , said owners being such persons or entities which appe ar from the authentic tax records of the County in which such facility is to be loca ted ***.

*** Such notice shall state the name and address of the applicant, the loc ation of the proposed site, the nature and size of the development, the nature of the activity proposed, the proba ble life o f the pro

posed activity , the date

when the request for site a pproval w

ill be submitted, and a description of the right of persons to comment on such re quest as hereafter provided.4 (c) An applicant shall file a copy of its request with the *** governing body of the municipality in which the proposed site is located. The request shall include (i) the substance of the applicant's proposal and (ii) a ll documents, if any, submitted as of that date to the [Environmental Protection] Agency pertaining to the proposed facility , except trade secrets as determined under Section 7.1 of this Act. All such documents or other materia ls on file w

ith the *** gover

ning bod y of the munic ipality

shall be ma

de avail able for public inspection at the office of the *** gove rning body of

the municipality and may be copied upon pay

ment of the actual cost of reproduction. Any person may

file written comment with the *** governing body of the municipality concerning

the appropriateness of the proposed site for its intended purpose. The *** governing body

of the municipality shall consider a ny comment rec eived or post marked not l ater t han 30 days after the da te of t he las t pub lic he aring. * * * (m) An ap

plicant ma

y no t file a r

equest f or local siting a pproval w

hich is substantia lly t he same a s a reque st which w as disapproved pu rsuant to a finding agains t the appli cant unde

r any of crite ria (i) t hrough (ix) of subs ection ( a) of this Section within the preceding 2 y

ears." 415 IL

CS 5/39.2(a)(ii), (a)(iv), (a)(viii), (b), (c) , (m) (West 2004). If the gove

rning body of

a municipality gr

ants a request for local siting approval, a third party may petition the Board for a hearing to c ontest the decision, "such hearing to be base d exclusive ly on the rec ord before *** the gover ning bod y of the munic ipality ." 415 I

LCS 5/40.1(b) (West 2004). In making its deter mination, "the Board shall include in its consideration *** the fundamental fairness of the procedure s used by the *** g overning body of the5

municipality." 415 I

LCS 5/40.1(a) (West 2004).

PROCEDURAL FACTS 1. The 200 2 Request On March 13, 2002, Applicants filed a request with the City for local siting approval of a proposed landfill. Objectors opposed the request, but the City Council approved it after conducting a multi-day

hearing. Objectors then petitioned for re view before the Board, which

revers ed the City

Council' s decisio n. Specif ically, the Boa

rd concl uded that the Counc il erred

in finding that the proposed l andfill me t the crit erion in s ubsection 39.2(a

)(ii) of the Act ( 415 I LCS 5/39.2(a)(ii) (West 2002) (protection of public health, safety , and welfare)). Applican ts appea led to this C ourt ( Town & Country Utilities, I nc. v. Pollution Control Board , No. 3-03-0025 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)) ( To wn & C ou nt ry I ), and we reinstated the City Council's decision. The County and Boa rd then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that: (1) the decision to be revie wed was the decision issued by the Boa

rd, not the Council; and (2) the Board's decision wa s not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Town & Country Utilities, I nc. v. Pollution Control Board , 225 Ill. 2d 103, 122 (2007). Accordin

gly , the Boa

rd's de cision wa s reinsta

ted and A pplicant s' 2002 s iting re quest failed. 2. The 200 3 Request On March 7, 2003, before their appeal to this court in To wn & C ou nt ry I , Applicants filed a new request with the City f or siting approval of a proposed landfill at the same loca tion described in their 2002 request. Waste Manageme nt moved to dismiss the new request, arguing that it was barred by

subsection 39.2(m) of the Act. See 415 ILCS 5/39.2(m) (West 2004)6

(prohibi ting a " request

for loca l siting a pproval w

hich is sub stantiall

y th e same a s a reque st which was disapproved *** within the preceding 2 y ears"). The City

Council denied the motion to dismiss, f

inding that the two

request s were not substan tially similar a nd that the

2002 req uest had not been disapproved within the meaning of subsection 39.2(m) be cause the local siting authority , the Counc il, had ap

proved it despite the Boar

d's subs equent r

eversa l. On the merits, the City Council gra nted Applicants' 2003 request. Objectors petitioned for review before the B oard, ra ising cl aims simila

r to those made ag ainst the 2 002 request. This time, howe

ver, the Board c onfirmed

the Counc il's dec ision. As to the denia l of Waste Management's motion to dismiss, the Board found that subsection 39.2(m) wa s inapplicable for the same reason articulated by the City Council: Applicants' 2002 reque st had not been disappro ved within

the mean ing of th e statute

because the loca l siting a uthority , the Counc il, approve d it. Since

this findin

g was di spositive on the ques tion, the B oard did n ot addre ss whether Applican ts' 2003 request

was substa

ntially similar to t

heir 2002request

. Objector s filed the instant ap

peal ( Tow n & C oun try II ) which, having been decided, now comes before us on a supervisory order from the supreme court. County of Kankake e, Illinois, et al. v. Pollution Control Board et al. , 231 I ll. 2d 659, 9 02 N.E.2d 1077 (200 9). The s

upreme court has directed us to vacate our order and reconsider the cause as follows: (1) de termine whether Applican ts' 2002 request

was disap

proved f or purpos es of subs ection 39 .2(m) of the Act; (2) if we find such disapproval, determine whether the cause must be remanded to the Board f or a decisi on on whet

her Appl icants'

2003 req uest was s

ubstantia lly s imilar to their 2002 r equest; and (3) i f we find

that rema nd is not ne cessar

y, d ecide th e partie s' rema

ining iss ues on ap peal. ANA LYSIS7

Disposition of the instant appeal has been delay ed by multiple chang es in authorship of the cour t’s judg ment and Jus tice Hold

ridge d eserve s credit f

or the bul k of this op inion. Now , in accord with the supreme court’s supervisory order, we find that (1) Applicants’ 2002 request wa s disapproved for purposes of subsection 39.2(m) of the Act whe n the Board reversed the City ’s Council’s decision on the 2002 application on the grounds the Council erred in finding that the proposed landfill met the criterion in subsection 39.2(a)(ii) if the Act; (2) re mand is not necessary to deter mine whet

her Appl icants'

2003 req uest was s

ubstantia lly s imilar to their 2002 r equest because their 2003 request fails to satisfy all of the criteria in section 39.2(a) (415 I LCS 5/39.2(a) (West 2004)); and (3) our finding that the 2003 application fails to satisfy all of the statutory criteria is dispositive because all of the statutory criteria must be met as a precondition for local siting a pproval. 1. Refiling Subsection 39.2(m) of the Act reads: "An applicant may not file a request for local siting approval which is substantially the same as a request which was disapproved pursuant to a finding against the applicant under any of criteria (i) through (ix) of subsection (a) of this Section within the preceding 2 y

ears." 415 IL

CS 5/39.2(m) (West 2004). Objectors argue that this bar applies because (1) Applicants' 2002 re quest was "disapproved" when the B oard reversed the City Council's gr

ant of approval, and (2) the 2003 request was substantially similar to the 2002 request. Regarding the prior- disapproval requirement, Applicants and the Board a rgue that the 2002 request was not disapproved within the meaning of the statute bec ause the local siting authority, the City

Council, approved it. Applicants also argue that the 2003 reque st was not substantia lly s imilar to the 2002 re quest.8

This part of the issue involves statutory construc tion, a question of law and we review the Board's decision de novo . Shields v. Judges' Retirement System , 204 Ill. 2d 488, 492 (2003). Though we are no t bound by the Boa rd's int erpret ation of s ubsection 39.2(m) , we will g ive it weight in our own construction. Shields , 204 Ill. 2d at 492 ("As a g eneral rule, courts will accord deference to the interpretation of a sta tute by the ag ency c

harged with its administration"); Cojeunaze

Nursing Center v. Lumpk

in , 260 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1029 (1994) ("Althoug h not formally bound by

administrative decisions interpreting the legal ef fect of statutory

language, a court will give an administrative agency 's conclusions great weig

ht in the court's own statutory construction"). A reviewing court's re sponsibility when construing a statute is to asc ertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Madison H. , 215 Ill. 2d 364, 372 (2005). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language use d in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary mea

ning. Paris v. Feder , 179 I ll. 2d 173, 1 77 (1997) . The stat ute must be

evaluat ed as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other section. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Reg ulation , 153 Ill. 2d 76, 91 (1992). "Acc ordingly, wor ds and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other releva nt provisio ns of the st atute." Southern I llinoisan v . Illi

nois Depa

rtment of Public He alth , 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). Applicants’ 2002 request was disapproved for purposes of subse ction 39.2(m) of the Act. Although section 39.2(m) reference s “disapproval” under subsection (a), and subsection (a) contains no mention

of the B oard, we

are not l imited to se ction 39.2 (a) for context in w

hich to determine the meaning of “disapproved” in section 39.2(m). "The statute should be evaluated as9

a whole; each p rovision should be co nstrued in connection with every other secti on." Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Profe ssional Regulation , 153 Ill. 2d 76, 91, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1118 ( 1992) . The

refore, p ursu ant to the r ules o f sta

tutor y c onstr uction, the

prop er co

ntext in which subsection 39.2(m) speaks of a prior request that was " disapproved pursuant to a finding against the applicant" (415 I LCS 5/39.2(m) (West 2004)) is Title X of the Act as a whole, not just subsection 39.2(a) of Title X of the Act. When read in the proper context, a prior request is "disapprove d pursuant to a finding against the applicant" following re solution of any statutorily prescribed "contest [of] the appeal of the county boar

d or the governing body

of the municipality." 415 I LCS 5/40.1 (West 2004). Re so lu ti on of

a c on te st ma y oc cu r b y a w ri tt en de ci si on by t he Bo ar d o r t he pa ss ag e o f " 12 0 d ays after the date on

which [the

Board] r eceive d the peti

tion" to c ontest the

decision of the co unty board or governing body . 415 IL CS 5/40.1 (West 2004). Under section 40.1 of the Act, if a petition to contest "approval" by the local siting authority is filed, but the B oard fails to take action th ereon, i

t is only after the passag e of 120 d ay s that "the petitioner may deem the site location approved." 415 I LCS 5/40.1 (West 2004). The Act s ignals t

he legi slature’ s intent to v est appr oval and d

isapprov al author

ity a t both the loca l level and

at the review level. The legislature r eferred to the "local siting re view process " not the

"local approva l or disap proval pr ocess." 415 I LCS 5/3 9.2(n) ( West 2004) . This use of language re flects the legislature’s intent that the local siting approval is just the first step (where admittedly

only one step may

be necessary

) in the process to approve or disapprove a siting application. The coextensive a

uthority provided to the "lo cal" a

nd "rev iew" sit ing proc edures i s also10

reflected by

legislature’s failure to distinguish between " approval authority" at the local level and at the review level in section 39.2(m). Section 39.2(m) refe rs to "a request which was disapprove d pursuant t o a finding agains t the appli cant under any of criteri a (i) through (i x)." 415 IL CS 5/39.2(m) (West 2004). The Board found that the 2002 application failed to meet the criteri on in subse ction 39.2 (a)(ii) and reve rsed the County ’s decis ion. The B oard’s d ecision is , on its face, "a finding ag ainst the applicant under any of criteria (i) through (ix) of subsection (a)." 415 IL

CS 5/39.2(m) (West 2004). Based on the for

egoing , no statut

ory basis exists

to conclu de that th e time limit

ation in section 39.2(m) does not apply e qually to a finding by the Board "disapproving" an application as to a finding by the

local siting authority " approving" an application pursuant to any of the criteria. Accordingly , we hold that Applicants’ 2002 request was “disapproved” by the Board for purposes of subsec tion 39.2( m) of the Act. Althou

gh our holding, s tanding

alone, w ould seem

to require an analysis of the effect of the Board’s fa ilure to determine whether Applicants’ 2003 request was substantially similar to their 2002 re quest, we do not believe that substantial inquiry into the matter is either necessary to comply with the supreme cour t’s supervisory orde

r or prudent in this case. We are all in agreement on the rema ining issues in this case. Our holding on the issue of whether the propo sed fac ility

is consiste

nt with the

County ’s solid wa ste mana gement plan is dispositive because, regardless of whe ther applicants are restricted from filing their request by section 39.2(m), their request fails to satisfy all of the statutory cr

iteria, and all of the statutory criteria must be met as a precondition for local siting appr oval. Stated differently , the Board’s failure to conside

r the subs tantial si

milarity issue is of

no effe ct on the u

ltimate ou

tcome of these11

proceedings, and, consistent with direction from the supreme court, we will not waste judicial resources on further analy sis. In re Alfred H .H. , 233 Ill. 2d 345, 351, 910 N.E.2d 74, 78 (2009) (“As a general rule, c ourts in Illinois do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affecte d regardless of how those issues are de cided”). 2. Notice The County arg

ues that Applicants failed to comply w ith the notice requirement of subsecti on 39.2(b ) of the A ct, which reads: "No later than 14 days before the date on which the *** gover ning body of the municipality receive s a request for site approval, the applicant shall cause written notice of such request to be served either in person or by registered mail, return rece ipt requested, on the owners of all property within the subject area not solely owned by the applicant, and on the owners of all property within 250 feet in each direction of the lot line of the subject property , said owners being such persons or entities which appe ar from the authentic tax records of the County in which such facility is to be loca ted ***." 415 IL CS 5/39.2(b) (West 2004). This requ irement i s jurisdictional and must be followed to vest the

local siti ng authority

with power to hear a landfill request. Waste Management of I llinois, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board , 356 I ll. App. 3d

229, 234 ( 2005). Since the pe rtinent f acts ar e undisput

ed in the i nstant ca se, this issue presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Waste Management , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 231-32. The land within the statutory notice a rea included Parcel 13-16-23-400-001, the Bradshaw farm. Sheila Donahoe, the County 's chief assessment officer, testified that she12

searched the County's authentic tax records to determine who owned the B radshaw farm. Specifically, she r

eviewed a property

record card contained in a computer database shared betwee n the asse ssor's o ffice a

nd the tre asurer

's and ta x collector

's offi ce. The

card ide ntified si x

co-owne rs of the farm: Ga ry Bradsh aw, James B radshaw , Jay Bradsh aw, Ted B radshaw , Denise Fogle, and Judith Skates. For all owners except Skates, the address listed in the databa se was 22802 Prophet Road, Rock Falls, Illinois, 61071. Pursuant to a chang e-of-address card submitted by Skates, her addre ss was listed as 203 South Locust Street, Onarga , Illinois, 60955- 1224. The

card wa s scanne d into the Co unty's data

base on Ma

rch 7, 20 02, meani

ng Skate s must have submitted it sometime before then. The name she used on the car d was "Skates, Judith Ann Bradshaw." The data base als o include d "mailin g flag s" for the Brad shaw fa rm. Pursua

nt to these flags, tax bills and notices were not to be sent to Gary Bradshaw, James Bradshaw, Jay Bradsh aw, Ted B radshaw , and Den ise Fog le. I

nstead, a ll such mai lings we

re to be s ent only

to Judith Skates at her Onarga address. I n this regard, the following colloquy occurred during Do na ho e' s t es ti mo ny:

"Q. Now , how woul d yo u know to se

nd tax bills a

nd notice s for all o f these individuals, to Judith Skates in Onarga rather than to the various Bradshaws in Rock Falls? A. Because that was their reque st to send them to her and we indicated that we would send notices relating to the taxes, namely , the tax bill, change notice, delinquent notice, extension notice, et cetera, to her. * * *13 Q. Ms. Donahoe, ba sed upon Jud ith Skates ' requests or re quest, as indicate d in the name and address change , which she filed, notices and bills are no longer sent to any of the B radshaw s at the Roc k Falls a ddress, i s that cor

rect? A. That' s corre ct. Q. And if you wer

e to send anything

to any of the B radshaws, it will be sent here, to Judith Skate s in Onarga, I llinois? A. If I we re sendi ng any thing on t his parc el as it re lates to these four notices, it would be sent to Judith Skates." Accord ingly , the bill f

or taxes due on the f

arm in 200 2 was sen

t exclusive ly to

Skates. Donahoe testifie d that the

County did not "s end any

other ty pes of doc

uments to property owners besides documents in those four categor ies" (tax bill, change notice, delinquent notice, and extension notice), and that the mailing flags did not mention notices under subsection 39.2(b) o f the Act . When aske d if any one in her office had infor med Applic ants "th at Judith Skates was the agent for service of process of all of the other owners of that prope rty," Dona

hoe answered: "I

n talking with my staff a

nd questioning them about this, the only information they would have that would be on these cards, it would indicate that every owner is listed and every owner has an address." Mark Frechette, the County 's treasurer and ex officio tax collector, submit

ted an af fidavit stating that he reviewed the County 's authentic tax records, which showed five owners (Gary Bradshaw, James Bradshaw, Jay Bradshaw, Ted Bradshaw , and Denise Fogle) with a single Rock Falls ad dress an d one owne

r (Judith Ska

tes) with an Onar ga add ress. Thomas Volini, Town & Country' s president, testified that he was familiar with the14

Bradshaw farm. I

n a discovery

deposition, he stated that Judith Skates was "the taxpayer of record" and "the par

ty to be contacte d in respect of the taxes on that property ." He also explained that in co nnection

with Applic ants' 20 02 reque st ( To wn & C ou nt ry I ), an attempt had already been made to serve notice at 22802 Prophet Road, Rock Falls, I llinois. In addition to the other five own ers, the

County 's tax re cords onc e indica ted that Sk

ates cou ld be ser ved at the Rock Fal ls address as the taxpaye

r of record. However, in 2002 the proc ess server discovered "that none of the part ies listed *** were availab le at that

address ." Spec ifically

, the res ident at the addre ss advised that "none of those parties resided [there] and that the only competent way

of contacting them would be to contact Judith Skates who was acting as their representa tive." The resident then prov ided Skate s' Onar

ga add ress for such con tact. Regarding his efforts to identify property owne

rs in the instant case ( Tow n & C oun try II ), Volini testified that he interviewed the county clerk, the county

treasurer, and staff members at the county assessor' s office. He also consulted maps, copied property record cards, copied tax bills, and prepared affidavits to assure that his mailings of notice we re "up to speed *** with the current records of the county ." When asked if he mailed notice to the Rock Falls address, Volini explained: "In

this case , I don't beli eve I did, beca use I believe we had more up-to -date information indicating that, A, Judith Skates was the representative of the taxpay ers of record, and, B, that she was, indeed, the ta xpayer of rec ord, and, C, that her residence address, according to the curr ent records of the county , was in Onarga and not in Rock Falls, a nd, D, pursuant to a

n intervie w with the

occupa nt of the property

in Rock Fa

lls, which had previously be en indicated to be a location at which Judith Skates or any of the15

other potential assessees of record might have been contacted was, in fact, an incompete nt address because none of them lived there, an d, F, bec ause the

occupa nt of that h

ome directed us to Judith Skates as the representative of those family members and directed us to the same

address in Onarg a, I llinois tha

t the then curren t recor ds of the c ounty indicated was the place to contact her." According to the county

employees intervie

wed by Volini, "only

the tax bill itself" reflected whom the county dee

med "the appropriate party " to its "authentic tax records." The bill provided the most up -to-date

informat ion reg arding

the pers on or persons to who m notices s hould be se

nt. Based on this information, Volini sent one notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Skates at her Onarga address and another notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the remaining owners at Skates' s Onarga address "C/O Judith Skates." The sec ond mailing listed the other owners individually . Skates signed both return receipts on Februa ry 12, 2003. She did not, however, forward the second notice to the other owners (her siblings), each of whom submitted an affidavit stating that he or she did not become awar e of the siting proceedings until after the procee dings were concluded. The County arg

ues that Volini's efforts did not satisfy the notice requirement of subsection 39.2(b) of the Act because "notice s were not sent to the last known address for five owners," and "separa

te notices were never sent to or rec eived by those five property owne

rs at any address." The plain language of subsec tion 39.2(b) does not include the phrase "last known address"; it mentions service by registered mail without specify ing any mode of determining the mailing address. Moreover, if Volini had sent notice of Applica nts' 2003 request to the Rock16

Falls address, such notice would have been objectionable on due process grounds because he knew from previous efforts that the address was inva lid. See, e.g. , Robinson v. Hanrahan , 409 U.S. 38, 34 L. Ed. 2d 47, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1972) (where State knew that a utomobile owner was not resid ing at a ddres s to wh ich fo rfeit ure no tice w as mai led, a nd th at he co uld n ot get t here, S tate's manner of service violated due process)

. Since we must construe subsection 39.2(b) in a manner that upholds its constitutionality where reasonably possible (see Cook County Republica

n Party v. Illinois State Board of Elections , 232 Ill. 2d 231, 239 (2009)), we will avoid a construc tion that offends due process. Applicants were not re quired to mail notice to Gary Bradshaw, James Bradsh aw, Jay

Bradsh aw, Ted B radshaw , and Den ise Fog le at the R

ock Fal ls addre ss becau se Applicants knew that (1) said owners did not reside there, and ( 2) the actual resident had declined

to acce pt servic e for the

m. This obser vatio n does not l ikewi se app ly to Ska tes's O narga ad dress . Alt hough Applicants ostensibly knew that none of the other owners lived there, the element of dec lination by the actua

l resident (Skates) is missing, and Applicants had reasonable ca use to believe that Skates was a proper recipient of notice for the other owners. Volini testified that during the unsuccessful attempt to serve notice at the Rock Falls addre ss in 2002, the resident said "none of those par ties resi ded [ther

e] and tha t the only compete nt way of conta cting th em would b e to contact Judith Skates who was acting as their representative." The resident then provided Skat es's On arga add ress f or suc h cont act. W hen Vo lini subs equen tly revie wed th e Coun ty's authentic tax records, he discovered that Skates had indeed c hanged her address of re cord to 203 South Locust Street in Onarga. Mor eover, each of the other owners had designated Skates as the recipie nt of their mailings from the C ounty

regar ding taxe s and tax-r

elated notices on

the far m.17

The significance of this designation is highlig hted by the conseque

nces of tax delinquency. If Skates had failed to pay the tax bill on the farm without notifying the other owners, the property

could have been sold at a tax sale, resulting in a transfer of fee title. Since the other owners voluntarily made Skates the sole recipient of mailings with such potential consequences, Applicants could reasonably conclude that Skates was an appropriate rec ipient of mailings with lesser potential consequences. At worst, the proposed landf ill could only affect the value of the Bradshaw farm without forc ing a transfer of ownership. It be ars rep eating

that subse ction 39.2 (b) mere ly me ntions ser vice by regist ered ma il without spe cify

ing any mode of de

termining the mailin

g addr ess. More over, ev en when n otice is

not rece ived, it c omports wi th due pro cess if r

easonab ly c alculate d, under the circ umstance s, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and their opportunity to present objections. People ex rel. Devine v. $30,700.00 United States Currency , 199 Ill. 2d 142, 156 (2002) ( noting that "the

practic alities a

nd peculi arities o f the ca se" ar e relev ant fac tors in determining the sufficiency of notice). We conclude that Applicants met this standard and, in the process, complied with subsection 39.2(b). The par ties cite two instru

ctive ca ses: Waste Management , 356 Ill. App. 3d 229 and Wabash & Lawre

nce Counties Taxpayers & Water Drinkers Ass'n v. Pollution Control Board , 198 Ill. App. 3d 388 (1990)

. In Waste Management , the property ow ners in question were a husband and wife (Robert and Brenda) , living at the same address. The applicant serve d Robert with notic e by

certifi ed mail, r

eturn re ceipt re quested, but only served B renda by

regula r mail, in conjunction with several unsuccessful attempts at personal service . The Board concluded that Brenda had not been served with notice a s required by subse ction 39.2(b). This court affirmed18

the Board's decision, observing that the statute requires either personal service or service by registered mail (certified mail being a functional equivalent), return receipt re quested--neither of which occurred in respect to Bre nda. In Wabash & Lawre

nce , the applicant's request for siting approva l was approved by

the local siting authority, but the a pproval was vacated by

the Board for lack of proper notice . The applicant then filed a second request for loca l siting approval which was again appr oved at the local lev el. This time the Bo ard aff irmed the approva l. On appe al, the Ap

pellate C ourt, Fif

th District, affirme d the Boa rd's de cision. The appell ant arg ued that n otice ha d not been

given to certai n prop erty owner s as req uired by subsec tion 39.2( b). Th e court disagr eed, s tati ng: "The [appellant's] first claim of error involves proper ty that was listed on the tax records as owned by the he irs of a certain individual. It is true only one heir received notice, but only that heir was listed by name and address in the tax records to receive the ta x statemen t on behal f of all th e heirs. As [the app licant] not ified the owner of the prope rty appearing from the authentic tax records, the [Board] properly found the notice complied with section 39.2(b) of the Act even though all of the heirs did not receive personal notice." Wabash & Lawre nce , 198 Ill. App. 3d at 390-91. This Court's decision in Waste Management rested on the fact that the a pplicant , despite knowing both the na

me and va

lid addre ss of a pr

operty owner, f ailed to se

rve that owner wi th notice either in person or by registered or certified mail, re turn receipt requested. The instant facts are different beca

use, inter alia , (1) App licants di d not know t he addre sses of th e proper ty owners in question, and (2) notice was served on those owner s by certified ma

il, return receipt requested, at Skates's address. The instant ca se is thus closer to Wabash & Lawre nce , where the19

County's authentic ta

x records identified only one prope rty owner by

name and address. Just as the applicant in Wabash & Lawre nce was not re quired to

track down other

owners d espite knowing their existence from authentic tax records, nothing in the plain lang uage of subsection 39.2(b) required Applicants to track down the owners in que stion. Knowing a person's existence with no nam e and ad dress is no t mean ingful ly differe nt, fo r prese nt pu rpose s, th an kno wing a person's name with an invalid address (espec ially when that person ha s designated someone else, with a known valid address, as the recipient of his or her mailing s). Having carefully

considered the County' s arguments, we conclude that they read unwritten requirements into the Act. The plain languag e of subsection 39.2(b) does not require separate mailings to co-owners of prope rty, does not specify

any mode of de

termining the address to be used when serving notice by registered mail, and does not require a ctual receipt of mailed notice. We are convinced that Applicants' e fforts complied with subsection 39.2(b). Accordingly , we affirm the Board's de cision that proper notice was afforded the co- owners of the Bradsh aw farm

. 3. Funda mental F airness Subsection 40.1(a) of the Act requires the Boa rd to consider, inter alia , "the fundamental fairne ss of the procedur

es used by

the *** g overning

body of the mun

icipality in reaching its decision." 415 ILCS 5/40.1(a) (West 2004). A nonapplicant who participates in the siting process thus has a statutory right to fundamental fairness in proceeding s before the local siting authority. Land & L akes Co. v. Pollution Control Board , 319 Ill. App. 3d 41, 48 (2000), rev'd on other grounds , Peoria Disposal Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board , 385 Ill. App. 3d 781, 796-97 (2008). However, fundamental fairne ss in this context incorporates only the minimal20

standards of procedural due process, suc h as the right to be heard, the right to cr oss-examine adverse witnesses, and the right to have impartial r ulings on the evidence. Peoria Disposal Co. , 385 Ill. App. 3d at 797. The members of a local siting authority are considered to have acted without bia s ( E & E Hauling, I nc. v. Pollution Control Board , 107 Ill. 2d 33, 42 (1985)), and the fact that a member of the authority has taken a public position or expressed strong views on the issue does not overcome this presumption ( Concerned Adjoining Owners v. Pollution Control Board , 288 Ill. App. 3d 565, 573 (1997)). To establish bias, the complaining party must show that a disi ntereste d observe

r might c onclude t

hat the lo cal siting

authority adjudg ed both the

facts and law before hearing the case. Concerned Adjoining Owners , 288 Ill. App. 3d at 573. In the instant case, the B oard found that the City Council' s siting proceedings were fundamentally fa

ir. We will not reverse this finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Peoria Disposal Co. , 385 Ill. App. 3d at 797 (noting that reve rsal is not warranted unless, after examining

the entir e recor d, the re viewing court is le ft with a d

efinite a nd firm conviction that a mistake has occurred). The County

argue s that the B oard com mitted re versible error f or sever al reas ons. Firs t, the County claims that the City Council's proceedings were f undamentally unfair

because the Council pr

ejudge d the mer

its of Appl icants'

request for siting approva l. As evide

nce for this claim, the County cites lawsuits filed by the City in November of 2002 and June of 2003. The 2002 s

uit conce rned the County 's expenditure of

funds g enerat

ed throug h fees, t axes, or surcharges on solid waste disposal. Accor ding to the complaint, the County had violated the Act by using suc

h funds to: "(a) Re imburse the gene

ral fund of Kanka kee Count

y f or expendi

tures inv olved in21

the litigation against the City of Kankakee in the amount currently in excess of One Hundred Twenty

Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($120,000.00); (b) Reimburse the general fund of K ankakee County f

or expenditures made to pay for salaries of the Planning Department of the County of Kankake e and for which no allocati on of time has justifi ed the re imburseme nt of said expenditur

es; (c) Pay f or solid waste planning for which no planning has oc curred; (d) L oan said f

unds to the

defenda nt's g eneral

fund witho

ut repay ment of sa

id funds from the general fund and without the g eneration of interest as a result of said loan; and (e) I

n other w ay s has misuse d and misa ppropria ted the f unds obtai

ned as a r esult of said fees." The City sought an injunction prohibiting the County from making suc h expenditures of the funds in qu

estion. As

a conseq uence o f the una

uthorized expenditur

es, the Cit y' s reques t "to use said funds for purposes of recy cling and other projects related to solid waste disposal" had allegedly "been limited in amount or denied totally ." The 2003 l awsuit fo cused on certain amendme

nts to the Co

unty's solid w aste managem ent pl an. Acc ordin g to th e comp laint , the a mende d plan (1) in terfer ed wit h the C ity's home-rule power by

"attempt[ing] to eliminate the siting of a solid waste facility within the boundaries of the City of Ka nkakee," and (2) constituted unenforc eable special legislation by "confer[ring] a special benefit of pr ivilege on Waste Management of I llinois, Inc., to the exclusion of all others." The latest amendment to the plan, written to clarify the meaning of prior amendments, declared:22

"It is the intent of Kankake e County that no landfills or landfill operations be sited, located , develop ed or ope rated wi thin Kank akee Cou nty other tha n the existin

g landf ill located southeas t of the int

ersect ion of U.S. Route 45/5 2 and 6000 South Road i

n Otto Township, Kankakee County , Illinois. The only exception to this restriction on landfilli ng is tha t an expans ion of the

existing la

ndfill on the real property that is contiguous to the existing landfill would be allowed under this Plan." Waste Management operated the existing landfill at the location spec ified. The City sought a n order (1) enjoining the County "from attempting to interfere with the siting by the City," and (2) declaring the amended plan void and unenf orceable as special legislation. We disagree with the County's claim that these actions demonstrate fundamental unfairness in the siting proceedings, which oc curred thereafter. As noted a bove, it is presumed that members of the City Council acted w ithout bias. This presumption is not overcome by evidence merely

showing that the City took a public position; the dispositive inquiry turns on what a disinterested observer might conclude a bout members of the City Council. I n our view, such a person would not conclude that Council members had prejudg ed Applicants' siting request. Rather, to a disinterested observer, the 2002 lawsuit would sig nal concern about the availability of rec

ycling a nd solid-waste disposal funds, and the 2003 suit would signal concern about safeguarding the City 's home-rule power. These conc erns involve matters separate from Applicants' siting request, even though the y arose in c onnection with controversies about the request. Accordingly, we find no reversible error. The County

makes ad

ditional a rgumen ts on the f undament al-fair ness issue . At this poi

nt, however , we inter

ject the f ollowing issue bec ause it a

lso involve s the County

's amen ded solid23

waste management plan. 4. Subsection 39.2(a)(viii) Criterion If a proposed pollution c ontrol fa

cility "is to be located in a count

y w here the county board has adopted a solid waste manage ment plan consistent with the planning requirements of the Local Solid Waste Disposal Act or the Solid Waste Planning and Recy cling Act," local siting approva l shall not b e gran

ted unles s "the f

acility is consiste

nt with tha

t plan." 415 I LCS 5/39.2(a)(viii) (West 2004). The County

adopted a

solid wast

e manag ement pla

n in 1993 a

nd amende d the plan

in 1995, 2001 , 2002, an

d 2003. The

resolution contain

ing the 2 001 amend

ment state d that: Wast

e Manag ement' s existing l andfill ha d served the County

and its re sidents we ll for 27 y ears; expansion of that landfill would have "positive impacts," whereas " a second landfill would have negative impacts" on nearby residents; and it was in the best interests of county residents "that one landfill be maintained in its current location." The actual lang uage of the amendment declared: "An ex pansi on of t he [W aste M anageme nt] l andfi ll, i f appro ved, w ill s atisf y the Coun ty's waste disposal needs for an additional 20 y ears. No new disposal facilities will be necessary , or desired, in Kankakee County for purposes of implementing the Plan. Kankake e County

will not sup

port and w

ill contes t the deve lopment of any other la ndfill in the County, unless the expansion of the existing landfill is not approved." This resolution was adopted in October of 2001. In Februar

y of 2002, Applicants announc ed their intention to request local siting approval1 This request gave rise to To wn & C ou nt ry I

. 24 fo r a ne w l an df

il l t o b e l oc at ed wi th in th e b ou nd ar ie s o f t he Ci ty. 1 Approximat ely one month later, the County

adopted t he resol ution cont

aining t he 2002 a mendment

to its solid w aste management plan. I

n the resolution, the County announced its desire "to clarify

the intent and purpose" of the 2001 amendment. The new ame ndment explicitly stated that if approval were granted for expansion of Waste Manage ment's existing landfill, "no new facilities would be necessary ." The actual languag e of the amendment did not elaborate using terms of g eographical proximity, although the preamble lang uage declared that " a second, non-contiguous landfill would have i mpacts upo n County resident s located near any such proposed new f acility." (Emphasis added.) In August of 2002, the City Council granted siting approval in To wn & C ou nt ry I , and in January of 2003, the B oard reversed the Council's decision. Approximately one month later, the County adopted the resolution containing the 2003 amendment to its solid waste management plan. The resolution stated:

"WHEREAS, the County presently wishes to clarify the

intent and purpose of [the 2001 and 2002] amendments to the Solid Waste Management Plan, as well as make further amendments and updates to its Solid Waste Management Plan; and * * * WHEREAS, the present landfill and its owner [Waste Management] have provided reliable and conv enient di sposal ca pacity for the p ast twent

y- seven (2 7) years, and that existing landfill's capacity will be exhausted at present disposal rates within three (3) yea rs; and,25 WHEREAS, the

County hereby seeks to a

void a sec ond non-c ontiguou s landfill being developed; WHEREAS, the County wishes to limit the impacts of landfilling within the County , while at

the same time provi ding the

benefit of additional landf

ill capac ity w

ithin the County, the County

hereby a mends its Solid Waste Management Plan such that no other landfills should be developed in the County with the limited exception that the existing landfill may be expanded. WHEREAS, the expansion of the existing landfill would have positive impacts on the County, including, but not limited to enhancement of the current tipping fee and provision for a hos t fee, a s well as t he contin ued ava ilability of relia ble, conv enient, c osteffective disposal capacity, all to the benefit of the County and its re sidents; and WHEREAS, the County Board has re viewed the decision of the Illinois Pollution Control Board in [ To wn & C ou nt ry I ] dated January 9, 2003 and the County Board se eks to dispel any question or ambig uity, and further a

ffirm that it is its intention to limit the landfilling within the County only to the existing landfill, and any expansion of that landfill in an area contiguous to the existing landfill, as well as also affirm that no other landfills are planned for or desired within the County , and the siting or development of any other non- contiguous landfill within the County is inconsistent with this plan. NOW, THERE

FORE, B E IT R

ESOLV ED that: The first two paragraphs of Ch apt er F iv e, S ect io n VI: Ava il abl e Lan dfi ll Cap aci ty In Kankake e County

of the Kankakee County

Solid Waste Management Plan, on page 339, are her eby delet ed and replac ed wit h the f ollo wing:26 It is the intent of Kankakee County that no landfills or landfill operations be sited, located, developed or operated within Kankake e County other than the e xisting landfill l ocated s outheast

of the inte

rsection of U.S. Rou

te 45/52 a nd 6000 Sout

h Road in Ott

o Township , Kankak

ee County

, Illi nois. The only exception

to this restriction on landfilling is that an expansion of the existing landfill on the real propert y th at is conti guous to

the existing

landfill would be al lowed und er this Plan. The expansion or development of a landfill on the real property contiguous to the existing landfill would limit the impacts of landfilling activity in the County. Accordingly, the development of a ny other landfills in the County on land that is not cont

iguous to the existing

landfill i s inconsis tent with th is County's Solid Waste Manag ement Plan. A noncontiguous landfill is inconsistent with this Plan regardless of whether it is, or to be, situated upon, unincorporate d County land, incorporated municipa l land, village land, township land, or any other land, within the County borders that is not contig uous and adjacent to the existing landfill." This resolution was adopted 24 day s before the filing of Applicants' 2003 re quest for local siting approva l. During the siting procee dings, Mi chael D onahue, a land pla nning a nd zoning consulta nt, testified that he was retained by Town & Country to per

form a land use compatibility ana lysis. He opined that Applicants' proposed landfill was compatible with the surrounding area. As to the contigu ity r equirem ent in the

County 's solid w aste manageme

nt plan, he

expresse d his understanding that the word "contiguous" had "more than one definition," and that the propose d27

landfill was "in very

near proximity" to Waste Manag ement's existing landfill, which he "underst[ood] to be one of the definitions of the word contiguous." Another de finition he understo od was " adjace

ncy ," which meant " abutting ." When a sked if th e propose d landfill abutted Waste Management's existing landfill, he said, " They don' t physically abut one another, no." Devin Moose, the head of Envirogen' s office in St. Charles, Illinois, testified for Town & Country on the que stion of whether th e propose d landfill was cons istent with

the County

's solid waste management plan. He said the a mendments to the plan created ambiguity , leaving room for inter pretation. In

his view, a

fter co nsulting

severa l dictiona ries, the word "c ontiguou s" could mean either "touching" or "in close proximity without touching." H e thus opined that the proposed landfill w as contig

uous to the

existing Wa ste Mana

gement landfill b ecause

it was in "close proximity" to that landfill. The two sites we re located "probably

about a mile and three quarters" from each other. In its written d ecision, the City

Council fo

und that be cause of

certain procedu ral def ects ( failure to provide

notice a nd public hearing s), the Cou nty had not ad

opted a so lid waste manage ment plan consiste nt with the

Loca l Solid Waste

Disposal Act or the

Solid Waste Planning and Recy cling A ct. None

theless, as if the p lan were valid, the Council pr

oceede d to address the consi stency

require ment of su

bsection 39.2(a) (viii) an

d declar ed: "[App licants' request] is consistent with the Kankakee County Plan a s adopted due to the patent and latent ambiguity of the pla

n and the failure to define and describe ter ms of the plan including 'contiguous' and ' existing.' Because the curre nt site is located so as to be near, and in an area which is contiguous, the site is consistent with the plan." Also, the Council expressed its opinion28

that the plan violated the City's " statutory authority to site a solid waste disposal facility and *** constitutional authority as a Home Rule Unit of g overnment," though the Council acknowledg ed that it lacked authority " to make such a finding within the confines of this hearing ." On appeal, the Board declare d that the City Council lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of the County

's solid waste management plan, and that " allegations concerning the adoption of the County's [plan] are not prope r for the Board's consider ation in a Section 40.1 pollution control facility siting appea l." Accordingly , the Board refused to consider " whether the City erroneously

concluded the County' s [plan] was invalid." The Board did, however, consider and reject a procedural cha llenge to the 2001, 2002, and 2003 amendments to the plan. On the question of consistency be tween Applicants' proposed facility and the plan, the Board explained its decisi on as foll ows:

"The Board finds that the recor d contains evidence in support of the City's finding that the proposed application is contiguous to the existing Waste Management fa cility. The February

11, 2003 County Plan amendment states 'the development of any

other landfills in the Coun

ty on land tha

t is not con

tiguous t o the existin

g landf ill is inconsistent with this County's Solid Waste Management Plan.' The Board finds that under the possible d

efinition present ed by Mr. Moose

at the City

hearing s, a landf

ill development within

two miles c ould be ' in close proximity without tou

ching' the Waste Management facility . The February 11, 2003 amendment does not require any expansion or development of a landfill to touch or border the real pr operty of the e

xisting landfill. Therefore, the Board finds the City 's conclusion that [Applicants'] proposal is contiguous to the existing landfill is not against the manifest weight of the evidence."29

For thes e and othe

r reasons, the B oard af

firmed th e City

Council' s finding

that Appli cants' proposed facility met the cr

iterion in subsecti on 39.2(a

)(viii) o f the Act

. In its brief before this Court, and consistent with its written decision, the B oard makes no argument that the County's solid waste management plan is invalid. According ly, the County

and Board a gree tha t Appl icant s' prop osed l andfi ll mu st be c onti guous t o Was te Man agement 's existing la

ndfill but d

isagre e on whet

her that require ment is met . The ess ential fa cts are not in dispute; the only

question i

nvolves their leg al effe ct under the lang uage o f the solid

waste manage ment plan . Accor

dingly , our rev iew is de novo . Cojeunaze Nursing Center , 260 Ill. App. 3d at 1 029. T his s tanda rd doe s not preven t us fr om def errin g to an a dmin istr ative agency's experience and expertise (see Rockwood Holding Co. v. Department of Revenue , 312 Ill. App. 3d 1120, 11 23 (2000) ), but the agenc y' s interpr etation is not binding

and "wi ll be reje cted whe n it is erroneous " ( Shields , 204 Ill. 2d at 492)). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effe ct to the intent of the legislature (here, the County Board). Wade v. City of North Chicag o Police Pension Board , 226 Ill. 2d 485, 509-10 (2007). The best indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board , 228 Ill. 2d 200, 216 (2008). When the st atutory langua ge is clear, other tools of construction are not necessa ry. Cinkus , 228 Ill. 2d at 216. "Where the meaning of a statute is unclea r from a reading of its langua ge, courts may look beyond the lang

uage of the statute and consider the purpose of the law, the evils it was intended t o remedy, and the legisl ative hist ory behind it." Stroger v. Regional Transportation Authority , 201 Ill. 2d 508, 524 (2002); see Midkiff v. Gingrich , 355 Ill. App. 3d 857, 862 (2005)30

(noting that statu tory langua ge is am biguous when it is s

ubject to more tha n one rea sonable interpretation). Although a policy section, such as a preamble, cannot be used to cr eate an ambiguity in a statute or

ordinance, it may be

used to clarify a

mbiguous portions of an act. Triple A Services, Inc. v. Rice , 131 I ll. 2d 217, 2 27 (1989) . Ind eed, whe n statutor y la nguag e is ambiguous, its preamble ranks among the quintessential source s of legislative intent. Atkins v. Deere & Co. , 177 Ill. 2d 222, 232 (1997). In the instant case, the disputed statutory language appea

rs in the paragraph added to the County's solid waste mana gement plan via the 2003 amendment. By the terms of that paragraph,

as an ess ential el ement of consiste ncy with the pl an, any

landfill e xpansion or

development must be locat ed "on the real property

contigu ous to the e

xisting lan

dfill" op erated

by Wa ste Management at the specified addr ess. Such use of the word "contiguous" oc curs four times throughout the paragraph. The fourth usage precludes any landfill "that is not contiguous and adjacent to the existing landfill." Thus, the word "adjace nt" must also be construed. Town & Country' s witnesses, Michael Donahue and Devin Moose, corre ctly testified that the word "contiguous" can ha ve different meanings. Standard def initions are: "1. Sharing an edge or b ounda ry; touch ing. 2 . Nearb y; neighbo ring; a djacen t." Th e Ameri can Her itage Dictionary of the

English Langua

ge 288 (1969). The word can sig nify either a

ctual contact or mere close proximity, and no clar ity is gained by

referring to "adjac ent," which can mean either "adjoining" (defined as, inter alia , "contiguous") or merely "[c]lose to; *** lying near ." The American Heritage Dictionar y of the English Languag e 16 (1969). These possibilities render the language of the County's solid waste ma nagement plan ambiguous, as stated by

Devin Moose and found by the City Council. See, e.g. , People v.31

Robinson , 217 Ill. 2d 43, 56 (2005) (where dictionary entry supported two meanings of the statutory phrase " pursuant to," one favoring eac h party' s interpretation, ambiguity existed

warran ting con siderati on of othe r eviden ce to asc ertain le gislativ e intent) ; Midkiff , 355 Ill. App. 3d at 861-62 (2005) (same for the word "a mount"). In addition to the City Council, the Board recognized ambiguity

when it cited "the possible definition presented by Mr. Moose" to support its finding of contiguity . Immediately after doing so, the Board conc luded that "[t]he February 11, 2003 amendment does not require any expansion or development of a landfill to touch or border t he real propert y of the existing

landfill. " This int

erpret ation is er roneous. As noted a

bove, the cardina l rule of s tatutory

construction is to as certain and eff ectuate the inten t of the le gislative body . This rule applies throughout

the process of statutory

construc tion. An a

mbiguity in statutor

y la nguag e does no t create

interpre tive lice nse to simpl

y choose one or the other of possible meanings; rathe r, it simply widens the rang e of evidence that may be used to discove

r what the drafters intended. As our supreme court has explained: "I f the langua ge of a statute is suscepti ble to two c onstruct

ions, one o f which w

ill carr y ou t its purpos e and another wh ich will d efeat it, th e statute wi ll receive th e former const ruction." Harvel v . City of Johnston Ci

ty , 146 I ll. 2d 277, 2 84 (1992) . If t he Boar d had pro perly applied t hese pri nciples, it would have reached a differe nt conclusion about the meaning of the 2003 amendment to the County's solid waste mana gement plan. In its resolution contain

ing the 2 001 amend

ment, the County explained

that Waste Manag ement' s existing l andfill ha d served county residen ts well an d that a se cond land

fill would negati vely impact ne arby

residen ts. Acco rdingly

, the Count

y de clared

that the in

terests o f all residents would be best served by "one landfill *** maintained in its current location." When32

Appli cants propo sed a n ew lan dfill to be l ocated 13⁄4 mi les aw ay from Wa ste Ma nagemen t's existing facility, the County responded with its 2002 amendment "to clarify the intent and purpose" of the 2001 amendment. The resolution containing the 2002 amendment indicated that the County was acting

in response to the prospect of "a second, non-c ontiguous landfill." Likewise, the resolution containing the 2003 amendment, passed for additional clarification of legislative intent, expressed the County's desire "to avoid a second noncontiguous landfill being developed." The amendment meant "that no other landfills should be developed i n the Count y with the limit ed excepti on that th e existi ng landfill m ay be expanded." Accord ingly , the Count

y de clared

its "intention to limit the landfilling within the County only to the existing landfill, and any expansion o f that lan

dfill in an area c ontiguou s to the exist ing land fill, as w ell as als o affirm that no other landfills are planned for or de sired within the County, and the siting or development of any

other non-contiguous landfill within the County is inconsistent with this plan." These facts show that Applicants' proposed landfill was the immediate object of the County 's dec ision to pre clude " non-con tiguous" landfilli

ng. As su

ch, the Co

unty intended its use of the word "contiguous" to preve nt what Applicants were proposing--a ne w landfill located 13⁄4 miles awa

y f rom Waste M anage

ment's e xisting lan

dfill. This

intent co rrespon

ds only to the fir st de fi ni ti on li st ed ab ov e ( "S ha ri ng an ed ge or bo un da ry; to uc hi ng ") , n ot th e s ec on d ( "N ea rb y; neighboring; adjacent") . Accordingly , the Board erred in finding that the pr oposed landfill was contiguous to the existing landfill for purposes of the County's solid waste management plan. As we have observed, the cardinal rule of statutory construction applies throug hout the33

interpretive process. When a statute is rendered ambig uous by two possible definitions of a single term, a construing tribunal is not at liberty to simply choose one of those def initions. The decision must be controlled by asc ertainment of legislative intent. The County clearly did not intend its 2 003 amend

ment to all ow for Ap

plicants' proposed landfill, and the w ord "contiguous " must be construed i

n light of this fact

. Applican ts, in addi tion to ado

pting the Board' s statutor

y- construction arg

ument in toto , argue that "the Kankake e County Solid Waste Manageme nt Plan as adopted and amended violates the Environmental Protection Act and the Illinois Constitution as an improper infringement and limitation upon the home rule powers of an independe nt local government jurisdiction." Although the Board refused to c onsider these arguments below (on jurisdictional grounds), Applicants urge us to adopt them as base s for reversal. I n support of their position, Applicants cite the general proposition that we may affirm a decision for any reason warranted by the rec ord, reg ardless

of the pa rticular reasons given by th e lower t

ribunal. While this proposition is gene

rally true, it has no applic ation to c laims that could not have bee

n proper ly adjudicated by the

lower tribunal in the first place, or to claims that cannot be properly raised on appeal. Such is the case here. In Residents Against a Polluted Environment v. Pollution Control Board , 293 Ill. App. 3d 219 (1997), the Board refused to hear evidence that a landfill siting applicant had influenced the process of amending a county solid waste management plan. On appeal, this court stated: "We ag ree tha t section 4 0.1 does n

ot author ize the Bo ard to re

view the p

rocess involved in the county' s amendment of its Plan. The appellants do not cite, nor do we find, any statutory

or judicial authority which would a llow evidence to be presented34

concerning the county

's amendment of its Plan. Indee d the express language of the Act indicates that the purpose of the siting process is to determine whethe r the proposed fa ci li ty complies with the county' s Plan. 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a) (viii) (West 1994). The Act does not authorize an inquiry into the county 's prior amendment

of the Plan. Rather, the adoption and amendment of a solid waste management plan a re governed by

the Local Solid Waste Disposal Act (415 IL CS 10/1 et seq . (West 199 4)) and t he Solid Was te Planning and Recy

cling Act (415 IL

CS 15/1 et seq . (West 199 4)). Ne ither of t hese acts

au th or iz es th e B oa rd in a s it in g a pp ro va l a pp ea l t o r ev ie w t he pr oc ed ur es us ed by a county in adoptin g its solid waste management plan." Residents Against a Polluted Environment , 293 Ill. App. 3d at 223. Appellan ts acknow

ledge t his passa ge but d ismiss it on the grou

nds that Residents

Agains t a Polluted Environmentis factually distinguishable from the instant case. However, any factual distinction is immate

rial for present purposes because the passa ge con tains an a pplicabl e statemen t of law. I

n these a dministra tive proc eeding s, there

is no statut

ory authority to adjudicate claims about the legitimacy of plan adoption or amendment. We cannot expand our review bey

ond the scope of our statutory authorization. C.f. Town & Country Utilities, I nc. v. Pollution Control Board , 225 Ill. 2d 103, 122 (2007) (noting that " [t]he jurisdiction of the court in this administrative review action *** is limited by the statutes confe rring special statutory jurisdiction"). As for Applicants' home-rule arg ument, it cannot be properly raised for the additional reason that they

lack standing. See, e.g. , People v. Campa , 217 Ill. 2d 243, 268 (2005) (noting that a pe rson who w

ishes to a ttack leg islation a s unconsti

tutional mu st be a me

mber of the class2 Applican ts also mak

e a passi ng ref erence to specia l legisla tion. Thus c

ursory claim yie lds the sa

me concl usion bec ause it is u sed in def ense of t he City 's alle ged rig

hts. 35 to whom the

legisla tion is alle gedly

unconstit utional); In re

Marriag e of Nien

house , 355 Ill. App. 3d 146, 153 (2004) ( "a par ty h as standi

ng to bri ng a constitutiona

l challen ge only if the pa rty is able to show himself to be within the class aggrieve d by the alleg ed unconstitutionality"). Applicants have no constitutional home-rule rights, and the City , the party whose rights are at issue, ha s not filed

a brief raising this claim

. 2 In lig ht of the f orego ing obse

rvations , we conc lude that the Boa rd committ

ed reve rsible

error w hen it fou nd that Ap

plicants' proposed facility met the cr

iterion in subsecti on 39.2(a

)(viii) of the Act (consist

ency with the Co

unty's solid w aste manageme nt plan). This findi

ng is dispositive because all of the statutory criteria must be met as a precondition for local siting approva l. Accor dingly , there i s no reas on to addr ess the r emaining issues ra ised in the

briefs. CONCLUSIO

N For the f orego ing rea sons, we r

everse the deci sion of the

Board, which confirmed t he City Council' s decisio n gran

ting App licants'

request for loca l siting a pproval. Reversed. SCHMI DT, J., conc

urs. JUSTICE HOLD RIDG

E, dissent ing in pa rt and concurrin

g in par t: I dissent from the majority 's conclusion that Applicants' 2002 request was disappr oved for purposes of subsection 39.2(m) of the Act, which reads: " An applicant may not file a request for local siti ng appr oval whic h is substa

ntially the same as a request which was disapproved pursuant to a finding against the applicant under any of cr iteria (i) through (ix) of subsection (a)36

of this Section within the preceding 2 y ears ." (Emphasis adde d.) 415 I LCS 5/3 9.2(m) (

West 2004). Objectors argue that the 2002 reque st was "disapproved" when the Boa rd reversed the City Council's gr

ant of approval. Applicants and the Board, on the other hand, argue that the 2002 request was not disapproved within the meaning of the statute bec ause the local siting authority , the City Council, a

pproved it. The mandate for local siting review appe ars in subsection 39(c), which prohibits the Environme

ntal Prote ction Ag ency

from gr anting a permit for a new p ollution control fac ility "unless the applicant submits proof *** that the location of the facility has been approved by the *** governing body

of the municipality *** in which the fa cility is to be located

in accordance with Secti on 39.2 of

this Act." (Emphasi s added. ) 415 I LCS 5/3 9(c) (We st 2004). T his langua ge indic ates tha

t local sit ing approval is the provinc e of the l ocal sitin g authority ; there is no mention

of the B oard. Se ction 39.2indicate s likewise , stating that " the governing body of the municipa lity , as determined by

paragraph (c) of Sec

tion 39 of this Act, shall approve or disapprove the request for local siting approva l for each pollution control facility which is subject to such review." (Emphasis added.) 415 I LCS 5/39.2(a) (West 2004) (listing nine criteria tha t govern the decision). This provision reflects the conte xt in which subsection 39.2(m) speaks of a prior re quest "d

isapprov ed pursua

nt to a find

ing ag ainst the a

pplicant under an y of criteri a (i) through (ix) of subsection (a)." 415 I LCS 5/39.2(m) (West 2004). As before, there is no

me nt io n o f t he Bo ar d; fi nd in gs on th e n in e c ri te ri a a re ma de by t he lo ca l s it in g a ut ho ri ty. The abse nce of a ny r efere nce to the Board i n this proc ess is rev ealing , since ot her par ts of section 39.2 show that the legislature was awar e of the Board and mentioned its role when relevant. For instance, subsection 39.2(d) states that " [t]he public hearing [conducted by the37

local siting authority] shall develop a r ecord sufficient to form the basis of appeal of the decision" (415 ILCS 5/39.2(d) (West 2004)), and subsection 39.2(n) states that "[i]n any r eview proceeding of a decision of the *** g overning body of a municipality made pursuant to the local siting re view pro cess, the

petitione r in the re view pro ceeding

shall pay to the *** m

unicipal ity the cost of preparing and cer tifying the r

ecord of proceedings" (415 IL CS 5/39.2(n) (West 2004)). These provisions clearly

reflect a distinction between proceeding s in which the decision (approval or disapproval) is made and proce edings in which the decision is reviewed on appea l. See also 415 IL CS 5/39.2(g) (West 2004) (mentioning "siting approval proc edures" and "appea l procedures" separately

). The Board plays no part in the former--only the latter. This fact is apparent from section 40.1 of the Act (titled, "A ppeal of siting approval"), which re ads: "(a) If the *** g overning body of the mun

icipality , as determined by

paragraph (c) of Section 39 of this Act, refuses to grant or gra nts with conditions approval under Section 39.2 of this Act, the applicant may , within 35 days after the date on which the local siting authority disappr oved or conditionally appr oved siting , petition for a hearing be fo re th e B oa rd to co nt es t t he de ci si on of th e * ** go ve rn in g b od y of th e m un ic ip al it y.

*** (b) If the *** g overning body of the mun

icipality as determined by

paragraph (c) of Section 39 of this Act, grants approval under Se ction 39.2of this Ac t, a third p arty other than the applicant who participated in the public hearing conducted by the

*** governing body

of the municipality may

, within 35 days after the

date on which the local siting authority g

ranted siting approval , petition the Board for a hearing to c ontest the38

approva l of the ** * gover

ning bod y of the munic ipality ." (Emphasis adde d.) 415 I LCS 5/40.1(a), (b) (West 2004). By this plain lang

uage, and the other provisions cited above, the de cision of whether to approve or disapprove a local siting request is made by the local siting authority. The Board does not become involved until afterward. Parties can only petition the Board to contest an existing decision of the local siting authority , not to have the Board make its own decision as to approval or disapproval. This explains why "no ne w or additional evidence *** shall be heard by the Board," and why

the Board must base its hearing "e xclusively on the record bef ore the *** governing body of the mu nicipalit y." 415 IL CS 5/40.1(a), (b) (West 2004). The leg islature

repeat edly used the words "a

pprove" and "dis approve " (and t heir derivatives) when discussing the role of the loca l siting authority. On the other ha nd, the legislature never used such words whe n discussing the role of the Board. The County

argue s otherwi se, citing

a partia l sentenc e from su

bsection 40.1(a)of the Act, which reads: "I f there is no final action by the Board [on a petition to contest a disapproval or conditional approval] within 120 days after the date on which it received the petition, the petitioner may dee

m the site location approved ***." 415 ILCS 5/40.1(a) (West 2004). The County interprets this provision as if the words " by the Boa rd" appeared after

the word "approved." This interpretation is problematic bec ause it adds language (" by the Boa rd") that the legislature did not place in the statute. We "must construe the statute as written and may not, under the guise of construction, supply omissions, remedy defects, annex new provisions, add exceptions, limitations, or condi tion s, or o therw ise ch ange th e law s o as to depart from t he pla in mea ning o f the l anguage39

employed in the st atute." In re County Treasur er and E x-Officio Collector of Cook Cou

nty , 323 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049 (2001). Since the legislature used the word "approved" in subsec tion 40.1(a) without explanation, I construe the word in c ontext with its usage elsewhere in the Act. By such c onstruction, the disputed passage means that when an applica nt's statutory rig

ht to a timely decision on appeal is denie d, the applicant may pr oceed as if local siting approval had been granted and no appea l were necessary

in the first place. Rather than signaling appr oval authority at the appe al level, the passage simply provides a remedy

for untimeliness by the Boa rd. For thes e reasons, I

disagr ee with th e majorit

y' s conclus ion that Ap

plicants' 2002 req uest was disap proved f or purpos es of subs ection 39 .2(m) of the Act ( 415 I LCS 5/3 9.2(m) (

West 2004)). Under my

analysis, theref

ore, there would be no reason to address whe ther the 2002 and 2003 req uests wer e substan tially similar. U

nder the majority 's ana lys is, howev er, the s

ubstantialsimilarity question should be a

ddresse d per the

Supreme C ourt's s

upervisory

order. T he Supre me Court specifically stated tha t if this court found a prior disapproval of the 2002 request, we "should nex t consider t he effect of the Bo ard's failure to consider th e substant ial simi larity issue." The majority has not done so. I nstead, the majority has pr oceeded to subsequent issues in the case: notice, fundamental fairness, and consistenc y with the county

solid waste management plan. While I agree

with, and thus concur in, the majority' s conclusions on those issues, I believe it was re quired to

address the substa

ntial-simi larity

issue bef ore rea ching them.