[Cite as White v. Ritchey, 2013-Ohio-4164.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

TERRENCE J. WHITE, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V. 

LAURIE E. RITCHEY, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO. 12 MA 98 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas, Domestic Relations Division of 

Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 10DR19 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

 

For Plaintiff-Appellant Attorney David L. Engler 

100 DeBartolo Place, Suite 315 

Boardman, Ohio 44512 

For Defendant-Appellee Attorney Maurus Malvasi 

11 Overhill Road 

Youngstown, Ohio 44512 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

 

 

 Dated: September 18, 2013 
[Cite as White v. Ritchey, 2013-Ohio-4164.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Terrence White, appeals from a Mahoning County 

Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division decision determining that it was 

an inconvenient forum to determine the issue of child custody. 

{¶2} Appellant and defendant-appellee, Laurie Ritchey, were divorced by 

order of the Mahoning County Domestic Relations Court on April 21, 2010. The 

parties share one son, born April 25, 1997. A shared parenting plan was 

incorporated into the divorce decree whereby appellant was named the residential 

parent and appellee was granted visitation. 

{¶3} In April 2011, the parties modified the shared parenting plan so that 

appellee was named the residential parent and appellant would enjoy visitation. 

{¶4} In February 2012, appellee filed a petition for protection from abuse 

with the Lawrence County Court in Pennsylvania alleging that appellant had 

threatened her. At that time, the Lawrence County Court granted a temporary order 

of protection, pending a further hearing. 

{¶5} On March 7, 2012, appellant filed a motion in the Mahoning County 

Domestic Relations court to terminate the shared parenting plan and name him as 

the residential parent. 

{¶6} The Lawrence County Court judge contacted the Mahoning County 

court advising it that appellee had registered the trial court’s order with it and filed a 

complaint for custody in Lawrence County. 

{¶7} Based on the contact from the Lawrence County Court, the Mahoning 

County court gave the parties the opportunity to brief the issue of whether Ohio was 

an inconvenient forum to hear the case. And on April 26, 2012, the trial court issued 

an order transferring this matter to Lawrence County. It found that Pennsylvania was 

the more appropriate forum. 

{¶8} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 25, 2012. 

{¶9} Appellant now raises a single assignment of error, which states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ABUSING THEIR [sic.] 

DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF INCONVENIENT 
-2-

FORUM. 

{¶10} Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Ohio 

was an inconvenient forum in which to hear this case. He claims that the court 

erroneously relied on an allegation of domestic violence, as there was no proven 

domestic violence. He further contends that the amount of time the child has resided 

outside of Ohio is inapplicable because the child lived in Ohio for a longer amount of 

time and the distance between Mahoning County, Ohio and Lawrence County, 

Pennsylvania is negligible. Appellant next argues that the court erred in finding that 

the parties agreed to Pennsylvania having future jurisdiction when they agreed to the 

April 2011 shared parenting plan. He asserts the court could have just as easily 

concluded the parties agreed to Ohio having future jurisdiction. Finally, appellant 

contends Mahoning County could have handled the matter more expeditiously since 

it had all of the previous evidence and had a detailed knowledge of the case history. 

Instead, appellant asserts, Lawrence County is starting from scratch. He claims that 

because Mahoning County has handled this case from its inception in 2010, it is 

more familiar with it. 

{¶11} The purpose of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) is to avoid conflicts between different states involving 

child custody cases. Ohio codified the UCCJEA in R.C. 3127.01 through R.C. 

3127.53. The UCCJEA's intent was to ensure that a state court would not exercise 

jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding if a court in another state was already 

exercising jurisdiction over the child in a pending custody proceeding. Rosen v. 

Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853, 883 N.E.2d 420, ¶20-21. 

{¶12} On appeal, we will only reverse a trial court's decision to exercise 

jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA if the court committed an abuse of discretion. In 

re N.R., 7th Dist. No. 09-MA-85, 2010-Ohio-753, ¶12. Abuse of discretion connotes 

more than an error of judgment; it implies that the trial court's attitude was arbitrary, 

unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 

450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 
-3-

{¶13} Pursuant to R.C. 3127.21(A): 

A court of this state that has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a 

child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at 

any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the 

circumstances and that a court of another state is a more convenient 

forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon motion of a 

party, the court's own motion, or at the request of another court. 

{¶14} In considering whether it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall 

consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. 

R.C. 3127.21(B). In making this determination, the court shall consider all relevant 

factors, including: 

(1) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in 

the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; 

(2) The length of time the child has resided outside this state; 

(3) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the 

state that would assume jurisdiction; 

(4) The relative financial circumstances of the parties; 

(5) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume 

jurisdiction; 

(6) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the 

pending litigation, including the testimony of the child; 

(7) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue 

expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; 

(8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in 

the pending litigation. 

R.C. 3127.21(B). 

{¶15} In rendering its decision in this case, the trial court analyzed all of the 
-4-

statutory factors in detail. 

{¶16} As to the first factor dealing with domestic violence, the court noted the 

following. Appellee filed a petition for protection from abuse in the Lawrence County 

Court on February 17, 2012. In her petition, appellee alleged that appellant told their 

son he had purchased a gun and to tell his mother and her boyfriend that a “storm 

was coming.” Appellee also alleged that appellant had previously threatened to 

shoot her and previously abused her. The Lawrence County Court issued a 

temporary protection order that day. The matter remained pending in that court. 

Appellant denied these allegations. The court found that because there was a 

current protection order currently in effect in Pennsylvania, that state was the best 

state to protect appellee and the child. 

{¶17} As to the second factor regarding the length of time the child has 

resided outside of Ohio, the court noted that the child is 15 years old. He began 

residing in Pennsylvania in June 2011, a ten-month period up to that time. He is 

enrolled in the Mohawk School District. The Court noted that a child’s home state is 

defined as the state in which a child lived with a parent for at least six consecutive 

months immediately preceding the commencement of child custody proceedings. 

Thus, the court concluded that Pennsylvania is the child’s home state. 

{¶18} As to the third factor concerning the distance between the two courts 

involved, the trial court stated that neither party claimed that the distance between 

Mahoning County and Lawrence County posed any obstacles. It pointed out that 

appellee stated the distance between the two courthouses was 20 miles. 

{¶19} As to the fourth factor addressing the relative financial circumstances of 

the parties, the court noted that neither party offered evidence as to their income. 

But from the past court records, the trial court found appellant earned $38,115.00 per 

year as an elevator inspector and appellee was currently unemployed with her last 

yearly salary being $17,000.00. Thus, the court found a disparity in the parties’ 

incomes. 

{¶20} As to the fifth factor regarding any agreement the parties may have 
-5-

made as to which state should assume jurisdiction, the court stated there did not 

appear to be any agreement. But the court found persuasive appellee’s argument 

that one could infer that when the parties negotiated their modified shared parenting 

plan in April 2011, they agreed the child would become a Pennsylvania resident in 

June 2011, and as a resident the child would be subject to Pennsylvania jurisdiction. 

{¶21} As to the sixth factor dealing with the nature and location of the 

evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, the court noted the child has lived 

in Pennsylvania since June 2011 and attends school in Pennsylvania. It further 

noted that when considering a motion to reallocate parental rights and 

responsibilities, two of the factors a court must consider are the child’s interaction 

with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect 

the child’s best interest and the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community. 

The court concluded that since the child resides in Pennsylvania, a majority of the 

evidence would stem from that state. 

{¶22} As to the seventh factor addressing the ability of the court of each state 

to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the 

evidence, the court noted that appellant alleged the Lawrence County Court has 

shown it does not act expeditiously because it did not hold a hearing within 60 days 

of appellee’s motion. But the court noted that no evidence was presented to support 

this allegation and appellant did not give a reason as to why continuances were 

granted. 

{¶23} As to the eighth factor concerning the familiarity of the court of each 

state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation, the court pointed out the 

parties were divorced in Mahoning County in 2010. They reached an agreement and 

the matter did not proceed to trial. In 2011, the parties appeared before the court 

regarding parental rights and responsibilities. Once again, they reached an 

agreement and the matter did not proceed to trial. Therefore, the court concluded, 

other than the provisions set forth in the parties’ agreed judgment entries, it did not 

have any greater familiarity with the parties’ past history of parenting the child. 
-6-

{¶24} The court concluded by noting that after the parties modified their 

shared parenting plan in April 2011, to provide for the child to live with appellee, the 

child now lives in Pennsylvania, attends school in Pennsylvania, and other than 

having parenting time with appellant in Ohio, the majority of his life is in 

Pennsylvania. Thus, the court found Ohio was an inconvenient forum and 

Pennsylvania was the more appropriate forum. 

{¶25} Appellant makes several attacks on the trial court’s judgment. 

{¶26} He asserts the court relied upon an allegation of domestic violence. But 

it does not appear that the court did so. In fact, the court specifically noted that 

appellee made “allegations” against appellant and that appellant “vehemently denies” 

the allegations. 

{¶27} Appellant further asserts the court failed to consider that the child lived 

in Ohio longer than he lived in Pennsylvania. The court found, however, that the 

child has spent from June 2011 to the present living in and attending school in 

Pennsylvania. Consequently, evidence of the child’s current home life, school, and 

community involvement would all focus on Pennsylvania. 

{¶28} Appellant next claims the court erred in finding that the parties agreed 

to Pennsylvania having future jurisdiction when they agreed to the most recent 

shared parenting plan. The court did not make this exact finding. In fact, the court 

stated: “There does not appear to be any agreement as to which state should 

assume jurisdiction.” But it did go on to find appellee’s argument “persuasive” that it 

could be inferred that when the parties negotiated their modified shared parenting 

plan, they agreed that the child would become a Pennsylvania resident, and as a 

resident he would be subject to Pennsylvania jurisdiction. 

{¶29} Lastly, appellant contends Mahoning County could have handled the 

matter more expeditiously since it had a detailed knowledge of the case history. On 

the contrary, the court found that the Mahoning County Court was no more familiar 

with this case than the Lawrence County Court. It noted that no trials were ever held 

here because the parties reached settlement agreements on the only two occasions 
-7-

they had matters pending in the court. Thus, the court was never given the 

opportunity to hear any evidence in this case and the case was only before it for two 

years. 

{¶30} In sum, the court spent a great deal of time going into a detailed 

analysis of each of the eight statutory factors. It found several factors weighed in 

favor of Pennsylvania being the more convenient forum including the facts that 

Pennsylvania has already issued a temporary protection order (R.C. 3127.21(B)(1)), 

Pennsylvania is considered the child’s home state (R.C. 3127.21(B)(2)), and the child 

resides in and attends school in Pennsylvania, thus most of the evidence in this case 

is in Pennsylvania (R.C. 3127.21(B)(6)). The court did not find that any factors 

weighed in favor of Ohio being the more convenient forum. We cannot find that the 

court misapplied the factors as appellant suggests. Based on the above, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in finding Ohio to be an inconvenient forum in this 

case. 

{¶31} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶32} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

affirmed. 

Vukovich, J., concurs. 

Waite, J., concurs.