Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1240 | October 28, 2019 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Rory Gallagher

Marion County Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tiffany A. McCoy

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

D’andrae Robinson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 28, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1240

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Lisa F. Borges, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G04-1710-MR-42006

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1240 | October 28, 2019 Page 2 of 6

Statement of the Case

[1] D’andrae Robinson appeals his sentence following his convictions for murder, a 

felony; burglary, as a Level 4 felony; and robbery, as a Level 5 felony. 

Robinson presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court 

abused its discretion when it sentenced him. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 16, 2017, Robinson was hanging out with his friend Christopher 

Taliefer and Taliefer’s half-sisters, S.T. and P.W. At some point, S.T. called 

her mother’s boyfriend, Dallis Coleman, and asked him whether he would take

her and P.W. to get something to eat. Coleman agreed to pick up the girls, who 

met him at a gas station. In the meantime, Tariona Brown picked up Robinson 

and Taliefer in her car, and they drove to the gas station where S.T. and P.W. 

were waiting to meet Coleman.

[3] After S.T. and P.W. got into Coleman’s car, he drove them to his house to eat. 

Without Coleman’s knowledge, Brown, Robinson, and Taliefer followed them

to Coleman’s house, and they parked in a neighbors’ driveway. After some 

time had passed, Robinson and Taliefer exited Brown’s car wearing gloves and 

carrying handguns. The two men entered Coleman’s house, unannounced, and 

Coleman yelled at S.T. and P.W. to run, which they did. Coleman then 

struggled with Robinson, who punched and hit Coleman with a gun, knocking 

him to the ground. Robinson also kicked Coleman, and Taliefer soon joined 

the fight and hit Coleman in the head with a gun.
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[4] Ultimately, Robinson shot Coleman in the head. Coleman died as a result of 

the gunshot wound and multiple blunt force injuries to his head. Before leaving 

Coleman’s house, Robinson and Taliefer stole several items, including two 

televisions and Coleman’s wallet. The next day, Coleman’s son found 

Coleman’s corpse lying in a pool of blood, and he observed a towel wrapped 

around Coleman’s neck. An ensuing investigation led law enforcement to 

identify Robinson and Taliefer as the assailants.

[5] The State charged Robinson with murder; felony murder; burglary, as a Level 1 

felony; robbery, as a Level 2 felony; and carrying a handgun without a license. 

The State dismissed the carrying a handgun without a license charge before 

trial. A jury found Robinson guilty as charged. However, the trial court 

entered judgment of conviction on the counts of murder, burglary, and robbery, 

and the court reduced the level of the burglary and robbery convictions to a 

Level 4 felony and a Level 5 felony, respectively. At sentencing, the trial court 

identified six aggravators and two mitigators, and the court imposed the 

following consecutive sentences: sixty years for murder; six years for burglary; 

and three years for robbery. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Robinson contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced 

him for murder and asks that we either remand for resentencing or revise his 

sentence from sixty years to fifty-five years. Sentencing decisions lie within the 

sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 

(Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1240 | October 28, 2019 Page 4 of 6

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the 

reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. 

State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

[7] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a 

sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a 

sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating 

factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) 

enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly 

supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) 

considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh’g 

other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). 

[8] The sentencing range for a murder conviction is forty-five to sixty-five years, 

with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2019). 

Here, at sentencing, the trial court identified the following aggravating factors: 

“[t]he harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victim . . . was: (A) 

significant; and (B) greater than the elements necessary to prove” murder; 

Robinson’s criminal history; and Robinson’s violation of the terms of his 

pretrial release. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 122. The trial court also noted that 

the “nature [and] circumstances of the crime were egregious [and] the victim 

was beaten [and] tortured prior to the gunshot wound to the head that ended his 

life.” Id. The trial court noted that Robinson “is youthful[,] however he has 

had multiple opportunities for rehabilitation[,]” and he “has a history of illegal 
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substance abuse, despite his youth.” Id. Finally, in its oral sentencing 

statement, the trial court identified as mitigating Robinson’s young age and his 

lack of a stable home life growing up.

[9] Robinson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it identified as 

aggravating circumstances his “torture” of Coleman and that Coleman suffered 

harm beyond what was required to prove the elements of murder. We address 

each contention in turn.

[10] Robinson first contends that the trial court’s identification of “torture” as an 

aggravator is unsupported by the evidence. Robinson correctly states that, in 

support of the death penalty or a sentence of life without parole under Indiana 

Code Section 35-50-2-9(11)(1), the State must present evidence that the victim 

suffered “an appreciable period of pain or punishment” that was “designed 

either to coerce the victim or for the torturer’s sadistic indulgence.” Nicholson v. 

State, 768 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind. 2002). But that statutory aggravator is 

inapplicable here. Rather, in identifying the nature and circumstances of the 

offenses as aggravating, the trial court emphasized that Coleman was “beaten 

[and] tortured” before he was shot. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 122. In this 

context, the court’s reference to “torture” was not made in the context of the 

death penalty statute. Merriam-Webster defines the verb “torture” as “to cause 

intense suffering to,” which aptly describes what Robinson did to Coleman 

before he shot him. Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/torture (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). In addition to

having been hit with a gun and kicked multiple times, the evidence suggested 
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that Coleman might have been strangled with a towel. We cannot say that the 

trial court abused its discretion when it used the word “torture” to describe 

Robinson’s actions.

[11] Robinson next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

identified as an aggravator the fact that Coleman suffered harm beyond what 

was required to prove the elements of murder. In support, Robinson avers that, 

“[a]side from the gunshot wound, which killed Coleman instantly, his injuries 

were mostly superficial.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. However, again, the State 

presented evidence that Robinson struck Coleman with a gun and kicked him 

multiple times, and there was evidence of possible strangulation. Because 

Robinson inflicted multiple serious injuries to Coleman prior to shooting him in 

the head, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it found that 

Coleman suffered harm beyond what was required to prove the elements of 

murder. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced 

Robinson for murder. Thus, we decline either to remand for resentencing or to 

revise Robinson’s sentence.

[12] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.