UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

Q. ILI-YAAS FARRAKHANMUHAMMAD, a/k/a Christopher 

Mitchell, a/k/a Q lli-Yaas Haakeem 

Farrakhan-Muhammad, a/k/a C. Eli-Jah 

Hakeem Muhammad, a/k/a Elijah Hakeem 

Muhammad, a/k/a Caliph lli-Yas AzHakeem Muhammad, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN OLIVER, ADX-Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 16-1445 

(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-02222-PAB) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before McHUGH and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.**

_________________________________ 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

** The Honorable Neil Gorsuch was assigned to this matter originally but did not 

participate in this Order & Judgment. The practice of this Court permits the remaining 

two panel judges, if in agreement, to act as a quorum in resolving the appeal. See 28 

U.S.C. § 46(d); see also United States v. Wiles, 106 F.3d 1516, 1516 n.* (10th Cir. 1997) 

(noting that this court allows remaining panel judges to act as a quorum to resolve an 

appeal). The remaining panel members have acted as a quorum with respect to this order 

and judgment. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, the remaining panel members 

have determined that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination 

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

February 3, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Petitioner Q. Ili-Yaas Farrakhan-Muhammad, a federal inmate proceeding pro 

se, brought this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging 

violations of his constitutional due process rights in connection with prison 

disciplinary proceedings. During those proceedings, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer 

(DHO) found him guilty of assaulting another inmate by throwing an unknown clear 

liquid at that inmate. The DHO sanctioned Petitioner with 27 days’ loss of good 

conduct time, 30 days’ disciplinary segregation, and 60 days’ loss of commissary and 

telephone privileges. Petitioner alleges that prison officials violated his due process 

rights because (1) the notice of the disciplinary charge was inadequate and untimely; 

(2) the Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) hearing was untimely; (3) his staff 

representation was ineffective; (4) the DHO was biased; and (5) the evidence against him 

was insufficient. He requested that the district court expunge his disciplinary conviction 

and restore his good time credits. Petitioner also seeks to proceed on appeal in forma 

pauperis (IFP). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district 

court’s order denying Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 application and further deny 

Petitioner’s IFP motion. 

 “When reviewing the denial of a habeas petition under § 2241, we review the 

district court’s legal conclusions de novo and accept its factual findings unless clearly 

erroneous.” al-Marri v. Davis, 714 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2013). Before a prison 

disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time credits, an inmate must receive 

“(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when 

consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present 
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documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the 

evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Superintendent, Mass. 

Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

563–567 (1974)). Additionally, to comport with due process, some evidence must 

support the decision and the decisionmaker must be impartial. Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 

F.3d 1211, 1219 (10th Cir. 2004). 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court correctly held that 

Petitioner received all the process to which he was entitled. The district court ably 

explained the basis for rejecting each of Petitioner’s arguments, and we need not go into 

great detail here. In short, prison regulations are meant to guide correctional officials, 

not to confer rights on inmates. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995). 

The minor deviations from Bureau of Prison regulations regarding when Petitioner 

received the incident report and when the UDC hearing occurred did not violate the 

Constitution. See Brennan v. United States, 646 F. App’x 662, 667 (10th Cir. 2016) 

(unpublished) (rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the BOP’s failure to provide 

an inmate with an incident report within 24 hours of the incident violated due 

process), cert. denied sub nom. Brannan v. United States (2017); Brown v. Rios, 196 

F. App’x 681, 683 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (noting that the Due Process 

Clause does not require a UDC hearing, and thus the petitioner received more process 

than the Due Process Clause guaranteed when he received the “constitutionally 

unnecessary UDC hearing,” even if that hearing occurred later than regulations 

required). Next, inmates do not have “a right to either retained or appointed counsel 
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in disciplinary hearings,” Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976) (quoting 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570), and we see nothing to support Petitioner’s argument that his 

assistance was ineffective. As to Petitioner’s fourth argument, Petitioner certainly 

has a due process right to an impartial decisionmaker, but “because honesty and 

integrity are presumed on the part of a tribunal, there must be some substantial 

countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to 

factual issues being adjudicated.” Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 518 

(10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner claims the record shows 

the DHO’s bias but does not otherwise point to any specifics supporting his argument. 

We reviewed the record and can find no such evidence. And finally, we agree with the 

district court that there is some evidence supporting the DHO’s finding that Petitioner 

attempted to assault another prisoner. The DHO relied on a staff report that included 

witness interviews as well as a video of the incident. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56 

(“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support 

the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”); Ruelas v. Zuercher, 240 F. App’x 

796, 797 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (explaining that the incident “report alone 

constitutes ‘some evidence’ of Petitioner’s guilt”). 

Because Petitioner has received all the process he was due, we AFFIRM for 

substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s order denying the application for a 

writ of habeas corpus. In addition, we DENY Petitioner’s request to proceed on appeal in 
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 forma pauperis.

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge