COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Benton and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

QUANTI M. EVANS, S/K/A 

 QUANTI MONTERIO EVANS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2557-95-1 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 DECEMBER 10, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY 

James C. Godwin, Judge Designate 

 Kathleen A. Maynard, Assistant Public 

Defender, for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Quanti Evans was convicted of possession of cocaine with the 

intent to distribute. On this appeal from the trial judge's 

refusal to suppress evidence, Evans argues (1) that the police 

found evidence during a detention that violated the Fourth 

Amendment and (2) that the statement he made after his arrest was 

not voluntary. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the 

detention was unlawful and that the trial judge erred in 

admitting the seized evidence. 

 I. 

 The evidence proved that at 9:25 p.m. on September 2, 1994, 

Officer Christopher P. Smith and Officer Clark were on routine 

patrol when they saw an automobile parked on a dead-end street. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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The officers stopped their vehicle facing the automobile and 

illuminated the automobile with their bright headlights. Officer 

Smith testified that this particular street was an area normally 

checked for drug activity. He also testified that he observed a 

pile of clothes on top of the automobile. He recognized the 

automobile as belonging to an individual who rented it to other 

people in exchange for narcotics. 

 The officers, both in uniform, left their vehicle and went 

to the automobile. Officer Smith approached the automobile on 

the driver's side. He saw five people inside and noticed that 

the interior was "extremely smoky." Officer Smith motioned for 

the person in the driver's seat to roll down the window. The 

driver, who was not wearing a shirt, looked away. Officer Smith 

then tapped on the window and again motioned to the driver to 

open the window. After the driver partially rolled down the 

window, Officer Smith detected a strong odor of marijuana. 

 Officer Smith asked the driver to produce his driving permit 

and vehicle registration. The driver gave Officer Smith his 

permit. The passenger in the front seat, Quanti Evans, looked in 

the glove compartment for the registration card without success. 

 While this was occurring, Officer Smith noticed a cellophane 

wrapper for a cigar on the ground outside the automobile. He 

testified that he concluded the occupants were smoking marijuana 

in a hollowed-out cigar. 

 Officer Smith ordered the driver out of the automobile. 
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After a brief conversation with Officer Smith, the driver 

consented to a search of the automobile. The officers then 

removed Evans and the other three occupants and conducted pat 

down searches. The officers found two small baggies of marijuana 

and a cigar stuffed with marijuana on one of the passengers from 

the rear seat. The officer who searched Evans found $271 in his 

front pants pocket. After Officer Clark discovered cocaine in 

the glove compartment, Officer Smith arrested Evans. 

 At the police station, the officers placed Evans in a cell. 

 Because Evans was a minor, Officer Smith contacted Evans' 

mother. When Evans' mother arrived, Officer Smith advised Evans 

of his Miranda rights. Evans and his mother indicated that they 

understood the Miranda rights, and they both signed a waiver 

form. 

 Officer Smith testified that he explained the charges and 

told Evans and his mother that it was "always in [a defendant's] 

best interest to make a statement, get the facts out as he sees 

them, clear the air sort of thing." He also advised Evans that 

he would tell the Commonwealth's Attorney and the judge that 

Evans had been cooperative. He testified that although he told 

Evans that "anything can happen" in court, he also told him "that 

it would, may be more favorable to him" if he gave a statement. 

Officer Smith said he "may have told [Evans] that [he has] seen 

the court . . . go on a different route with people that make 

statements or that type of thing." After Officer Smith made 
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those statements, Evans gave a written statement confessing his 

possession of the cocaine in the glove compartment. 

 Evans testified at the suppression hearing that Officer 

Smith told him that he "need[ed] to be cooperative" so that the 

Commonwealth's Attorney would "take it easy on [him], but if [he 

kept] trying to fight the system they [would] . . . send [him] 

away for a long time." Evans also alleged that Officer Smith 

stated that in "previous cases . . . where people wrote 

statements they didn't get that much time." 

 The trial judge found that the police officers had a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they detained the 

occupants of the automobile and found that Evans' statement was 

voluntary. Thus, the trial judge denied Evans' motion to 

suppress both the cocaine seized from the glove compartment and 

Evans' statement. 

 II. 

 "When the police stop a motor vehicle and detain an 

occupant, this constitutes a 'seizure' of the person for Fourth 

Amendment purposes, even though the function of the stop is 

limited and the detention brief." Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 

Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988) (citations omitted). 

When the officers parked their car blocking the path of the 

suspects' vehicle, shined their bright lights into the vehicle, 

approached the vehicle in uniform, and insisted that the driver 

roll down his window and display his driver's permit, the 
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officers effected a stop of the passengers in the vehicle. 

 "[T]he police can stop and briefly detain a person for 

investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion 

supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be 

afoot.'" United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). The Terry standard 

requires that "[t]he officer . . . be able to articulate 

something more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 

or "hunch."'" Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (citation omitted). The 

record must contain a basis for the trial judge and this Court to 

exclude the hypothesis that the police operated on a hunch. The 

Supreme Court has stated that "[a] court sitting to determine the 

existence of reasonable suspicion [that a crime is occurring] 

must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that 

conclusion." Id. at 10. 

 Although the record contains a myriad of facts, the record 

contains no testimony by the officers asserting that they 

suspected criminal activity or articulating the nature of the 

criminal activity they allegedly suspected. The officers had not 

received a call that required them to respond to that vicinity. 

Officer Smith testified that they were on routine patrol when 

they saw the automobile. Moreover, he responded in the 

affirmative when asked, "Well, is there any responsibility . . . 

when you see a vehicle parked at a location where in your opinion 

it's not supposed to be parked and it is abandoned, do you go up 
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and check it?" However, no evidence established that the 

automobile appeared abandoned. 

 Although the trial judge found "from the evidence presented 

that the officers had every reasonable suspicion," the officers 

did not articulate a basis to support a conclusion other than a 

desire to check the automobile because it was suspicious. In 

short, the officers did not articulate a basis to exclude the 

conclusion that the stop was based on a hunch. For these 

reasons, we hold that the trial judge erred in refusing to 

suppress the evidence seized from the automobile. 

 III. 

 "The burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove that 

extra-judicial inculpatory statements were made voluntarily 

before they can be admitted in evidence against one charged with 

or suspected of the commission of a crime." Gwaltney v. 

Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 468, 472, 452 S.E.2d 687, 690 (1995). 

In assessing the evidence, this Court must examine the totality 

of the circumstances. Id. None of the facts and circumstances 

of the interrogation established that Evans' "will was overcome 

and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired." 

Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 554, 413 S.E.2d 655, 658 

(1992). The statements made by the police officer did not render 

the confession inadmissible. See Starks v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 

48, 52-54, 301 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1983). 

 Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for 
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further proceedings. 

 Reversed and remanded.