alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 230 (Monday, December 1, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 63537]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-31376]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket Nos. EC96-19-010, and ER96-1663-011]


Pacific Gas and Electric Company, San Diego Gas & Electric 
Company, and Southern California Edison Company; Notice of Filing

November 24, 1997.
    Take notice that on November 21, 1997, the California Independent 
System Operator Corporation filed for Commission approval in this 
docket, pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, an 
application to amend the ISO Tariff and a motion for waiver of the 60 
day notice requirement. The ISO requests that the proposed ISO Tariff 
amendments be made effective as of January 1, 1998. In addition, on 
November 21, the ISO filed for informational purposes its Revised 
Staging Plan No. 1.
    The ISO states that the proposed tariff amendments, involving 
Settlements and billing, Ancillary Services and the ISO's financial 
security, are necessary for the January 1, 1998, operations of the ISO.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20426, 
in accordance with Rules 211 or 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). All such motions 
or protests should be filed on or before December 2, 1997. Filings must 
include a one page executive summary.
    Protests filed with the Commission will be considered by it in 
determining the appropriate action to be taken but will not serve to 
make the protestants parties to the proceeding. Any person wishing to 
become a party must file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing 
are on file with the Commission and are available for public 
inspection.
Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-31376 Filed 11-28-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Venture Lending & Leasing VI, Inc. (the "Fund") on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Martin D. Eng, Chief Financial Officer of the Fund, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Fund.





/S/ Martin D. Eng





Martin D. Eng


Chief Financial Officer


March 15, 2012
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 235 (Monday, December 8, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 64577]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-31990]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. RP98-60-000]


Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation; Notice of Filing

December 2, 1997.
    Take notice that on November 25, 1997, Columbia Gas Transmission 
Corporation (Columbia) tendered for filing Attachment A to the filing, 
which details, by customer, the historical load factors calculated 
using total firm entitlements for the 12-month period ended October 31, 
1997.
    Columbia states that this filing is being submitted pursuant to the 
Commission's November 12, 1997 Order in Docket Nos. RP97-149-002 and 
RP97-391-000, in which the Commission approved GRI's 1998 funding 
formula continuing the 1997 funding formula with allocated RD&D program 
costs to its members. Since the approved charges for 1998 are the same 
as the GRI charges approved for 1997, no revision is required in 
Columbia's presently effective Sheet Nos. 25 through 28, but the 
charges to certain of Columbia's firm customers will change based upon 
the revised historical load factor calculations.
    Columbia states that this filing is to reflect Columbia's changes 
to its firm customers' load factors reflected in the calculations on 
Attachment A. As stated above, any new customer added after January 1, 
1998 will be billed GRI each month based on the actual throughput for 
each prior month of service until a 12-month history is established. 
Nevertheless, Columbia is filing Attachment A to the filing so as to 
insure that the load factors resulting from the calculations are a 
matter of public record.
    Columbia states that copies of its filing have been mailed to all 
parties on the Commission's service list in Docket No. RP96-140 and 
RP96-140-002, and to each of Columbia's firm customers, interruptible 
customers, and affected state commissions. Columbia also agrees to make 
available for this filing the data that it was required to provide in 
its June 13, 1996 compliance filing in Docket No. RP96-140-002 pursuant 
to a protective agreement.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest this filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426, in 
accordance with Sections 385.214 and 385.211 of the Commission's Rules 
and Regulations. All such motions or protests must be filed as provided 
in Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection in the Public Reference Room.
Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-31990 Filed 12-5-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
WiHiams, Renee (OST) ^Otk^i IX^^-dST' ff'lZ'i^'/^ 

Subject: FW: CHISANA ACCESS . 

From: MIKE WARD [mailto:theoutfitter@aptalaska.net] 

Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 10:39 AM 

To: Little, Cynthia M (DOT) 

Cc: 'Michelle Morris' l i 

Subject: CHISANA ACCESS 

TO STATE OF ALASKA DOT: 

Regarding air service to Chisana; it is of vital importance. My family has been traveling to and from Chisana annually 

since the mid 1970's. The scheduled air service and mail plane are of vital importance to all residents and visitors of the 

Chisana community. I hope to buy property in Chisana and possibly live their on a seasonal basis when I retire in a few 

years. 

Since there is no highway access, the air service is essential as it is the only way to get supplies in and to get out for 

medical issues. 

The community will not grow and will likely shrink without air service; is that what you want? 

Please don't discontinue air service to Chisana 

Thank you for your consideration, sincerely, 

Michael D. Ward
#### BONANZA SIRLOIN PIT CORP. OF FLORIDA, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Sydney KANDEL and Charlotte Kandel, his wife, Appellees.

No. 70-49.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 19, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
**Exhibit 32**

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER ANDCHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

Inconnection with the quarterly report of Continental Materials Corporation (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the period ending July 2, 2005, as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James G. Gidwitz,the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I,Joseph J. Sum, the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,hereby certify, pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, as amended, and Section 1350, of Chapter 63 of Title 18 ofthe United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that to our knowledge:

 

(1)   The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(2)   Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company for the periods presented in the Report.

 

 
| August 16,  2005 |   |                                        |
|-----------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------|
|                  |   |                                        |
|                  |   |                                        |
|                  | By:    | /s/ James G.  Gidwitz                       |   |
|                  |   | James G. Gidwitz                            |
|                  |   | Chairman of the  Board and                  |
|                  |   | Chief Executive  Officer                    |
|                  |   |                                        |
|                  |   |                                        |
|                  | By:    | /s/ Joseph J.  Sum                          |   |
|                  |   | Joseph J. Sum                               |
|                  |   | Vice President  and Chief Financial Officer |
|                       |        |                                             |  |  |

 

----
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT

TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Sara Lee Corporation (the Company) for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Report), I, L.M. (Theo) de Kool, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial and Administrative Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.

Dated: November 9, 2006



|                                                                       
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ L.M. (Theo) de Kool,                                               
|Executive Vice President and Chief Financial and Administrative Officer
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of CEO Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of Carter Validus Mission Critical REIT, Inc. (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), John
Carter, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company hereby certifies, to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The accompanying Report of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|       |  |                        
|------ |  | -----------------------
|       | 
|/s/:   |  | John Carter            
|Name:  |  | John Carter            
|Title: |  | Chief Executive Officer
|Date:  |  | March 31, 2011         

The foregoing certification is being
furnished with the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
and it is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general information language in such filing, except to the extent that the Company specifically
incorporates by reference.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT UNITED STATES OF AM ERIC A, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. PR INC ETON JAM AAL LEE PER R Y, De fe nda

nt - Appe lla

nt. No. 15-30094

D.C . No. 2:13-c r-00008-W FN-32 M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of W a shington Wm . Fre m

m ing Nie lse n, Se n ior Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 5, 2016 ** Se attle , W a s hington B e fore : O’ SC A

NNLAIN a

nd GOULD, C irc uit Judge s and B UR N S, * ** Distric t Judge . 

# FIL ED FEB 12 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honora

ble La rry A. B urns, Distric t

Judge for the U.S. Distric t C ourt for the Southe rn Distric t of C a lifornia , sitting by de signa tion.Princ e ton Pe rry a ppe a ls his sente n c e im

p ose d for c o nspiring to distribute oxy c odone -ba se d pills in viola tion of 21 U.S.C . §§ 846 a nd 841(a )(1). W e have jurisdic tion unde r 18 U.S.C . § 3742 a nd 28 U.S.C . § 1291, a

nd we a ffirm . The distric t c ourt did not err by inc luding drugs a

ttributa ble to Ina lie l Lisbe y in c a lc u lating Pe rry ’ s ba s e offe nse le ve l. “ [I] n the c a se of a jointly unde rta ke n c rim ina l a c tivity . . . a ll re a sona bly fore se e a ble a c ts a nd om issions of othe

rs in furthe ran c e of the jointly

unde rta ke n c rim ina l a c tivity ” sha ll be fa c tore d in whe n c a lc ulat ing a

de fe n da nt’ s offe nse le ve l. U.S.S.G. § 1B 1.3(a )(1)(B ) (2014). The distric t judgere a sona

bly c onc lude d tha

t Pe rry and Lisbe y

we re working toge the r during there le va

nt pe riod of thec onspira c y , a nd tha t the re fore the drugs attributa ble to Lisbe y

we re within the

sc ope of the ir jointly

unde rtake n c rim ina l a c tivity and re a sona

bly fore se e a ble to Pe rry . Se eUnite d State s v . Tre adw e ll , 593 F.3d 990, 1004 (9th C ir. 2010). AFFIRM E D .
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-04-1998
<CASH>                                             765
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   19,930<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     14,223
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                37,570
<PP&E>                                          19,370<F2>
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  59,793
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           18,341
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           663
<OTHER-SE>                                      32,768
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    59,793
<SALES>                                         51,741
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                51,741
<CGS>                                           39,446<F3>
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   48,704
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (133)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 384
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,786
<INCOME-TAX>                                       975
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,811
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,811
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.68
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.65
<FN>
<F1>Net of allowance for doubtful accounts
<F2>Net of accumulated depreciation and depletion
<F3>Exclusive of depreciation, depletion and amortization
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
# FILED
May 7, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON MAY 1998 SESSION

ROY CLEVELA ND SMITH, JR., ) ) Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. 02C01-9712-CR-00468 ) vs. ) SHELBY COUNTY ) STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) No. P-18667 ) Respondent. )

O R D E R
This case represents an appeal from the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for post-convic

tion relief. On June 17, 1996, the petitioner pled guilty to rape of a child and received a fifteen y ear sentence. No appeal wa s taken. On June 23, 1997, the petitioner’s petition for post-conviction rel ief was filed by the tri al court. Finding that the statute of limitations had ex pired, the trial court di smissed the petition without a hearing.
On appeal, the petitioner clai ms that he timely submitted hi s petition to the appropriate prison authorities for mailing. See Rule 28, §2(G), Rules o f the Supreme Court. In suppo rt of his positi on, the p etition er attac hes as an

appendi x to his

brief a copy of a mail room receipt da ted June 16, 1997. However , there is nothing in the record to substantiate the peti tioner’s claim in this

respect. It is the petiti oner’s duty to prepare an adequate record on appeal. State v. Banes , 874 S.W.2d 73, 82 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). This Cour t cannot consider an issue w hich is not preserved in the record for review. See T.R.A.P. 24(b). Moreov er, allegations of fact contain ed in a brief may not be considered as evidence. State v. Bennett , 798 S.W.2d 783, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Accordingly, the petitioner’s claim must fail.

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-30-202(a), a person in custody under a sente nce of a court of this state must petiti on for post-conviction r elief within one year of the date2

of the final action of the highest state app ellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, withi n one year of the date on whic h judgment became final. The Post-Conviction Proc

edure Act provides sev eral limited exceptions

to the one-year statute of limitations, howev er none of them are applicable to the present case. See § 40-30-202(b). The record r eflects that the petition in thi s case was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitati ons, and is, therefore, untimely . Accordingly, the postconviction court proper ly dismissed the petiti on without an evidentiar y hearing. T.C.A. § 40-30-206(b).

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing the petit ioner’s petition for post-c onviction relief. Accor

dingly, it is her

eby ORDERED that the judgment o f the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20 , Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Enter, this the ___ day of May , 1998.

_____________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUD GE

_____________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, JUDG E

_____________________________ THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
#### Chester T. WELDON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-472.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 21, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 21, 1974.

*134Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Mark King Leban, Asst. Public Defender, and Kurt Marmar, Legal Intern, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Joel D. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY .and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was tried upon an information charging him with the felony of uttering a worthless check. After trial before the court without jury, the court reduced the charge to a misdemeanor and found the appellant guilty. The court withheld the entry of adjudication of guilt and placed the defendant on probation for a period of two and one half years.

On this appeal, the defendant has presented three points for our review. The first urges that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient to prove intent. In light of the record, we find that this point does not establish error. It should be remembered that when a defendant moves for a directed verdict of acquittal, he admits all facts in evidence and every conclusion favorable to the State fairly and reasonably, inferable therefronj. See Holland v. State, 129 Fla. 363, 176 So. 169 (1937); Devlin v. State, Fla.App.1965, 175 So.2d 82. Whether the defendant issued the check involved herein with knowledge that there were insufficient funds and with the requisite intent to defraud may be determined from the circumstances.

Appellant’s second point urges error upon the ground of the alleged unconstitutionality of Fla.Stat. § 832.05(6), F.S. A., which provides that “ . . . the drawing, making, uttering or delivering .of a check, draft or written order, payment of which is refused by the drawee, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds in or credit with such drawee”. We note that this issue was not raised or argued in the trial court. Nevertheless, we have examined appellant’s contention in the light of the argument advanced in his brief and find that the argument is not sufficient as a basis upon which to declare the section invalid. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970).

Appellant’s third point urges that the sentence is excessive because the court found the appellant guilty of a misdemean- or in the second degree for which the maximum sentence is sixty days in prison. Fla.Stat. § 948.04, F.S.A., provides that a trial court may place a defendant on probation for two years beyond the maximum term provided for the offense by statute; therefore, two years plus sixty days is the , maximum period for probation on this offense. Since this argument concerning the excessiveness of the sentence is mérito-*135rious, the sentence shall be amended by reducing the term of probation to two years and sixty days.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed and the sentence is amended as above set out.