FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

THE FIXED INCOME CLEARING CORPORATION – GOVERNMENT 

SECURITIES DIVISION’S OBSERVANCE OF THE CPSS-IOSCO

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 

DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF

OBSERVANCE 

MAY 2010 

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

MONETARY AND CAPITAL MARKETS DEPARTMENT
4101046
 Contents Page

Glossary ..................................................................................................................................... 3

Tables 

1. Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation – 

Government Securities Division (FICC-GSD) of the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations 

for Central Counterparties ...................................................................................................................... 4 

2. Summary of the Detailed Assessment of the Observance of Fixed Income Clearing 

Corporation – Government Securities Division (FICC-GSD) with the CPSS-IOSCO 

Recommendations for Central Counterparties ..................................................................................... 25 

3. Actions to Improve Compliance ................................................................................................. 29
3 

GLOSSARY

BCP Business Continuity Plan 

BITS Banking, Infrastructure and Technology Services 

CCP Central Counterparty 

CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

CME Chicago Mercantile Exchange 

CPSS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 

DTC Depository Trust Company 

DTCC Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 

DVP Delivery-versus-Payment 

FDIA Federal Deposit Insurance Act 

FDICIA Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 

FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

FICC-GSD Fixed Income Clearing Corporation – Government Securities Division 

FICC-MSBD Fixed Income Clearing Corporation – Mortgage Backed Securities Division 

FR Federal Reserve 

FRA Federal Reserve Act 

IMF International Monetary Fund 

IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commission 

ISO International Organisation for Standardisation 

JPMC JP Morgan Chase 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

NSCC National securities Clearing Corporation 

NSS National Settlement Service 

RCCP Recommendation for Central Counterparties 

RSSS Recommendation for securities Settlement Systems 

SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 

SIPA Securities Investor Protection Act 

SIFMA Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 

SROs Self Regulated Organizations 

TRADES Treasury/Reserve Automated Debt Entry System 

UCC Uniform Commercial Code 
4 

Table 1. Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Fixed Income Clearing 

Corporation – Government Securities Division (FICC-GSD) of the CPSSIOSCO Recommendations for Central Counterparties 

FICC is composed of two divisions: the Government Securities Division (GSD) and the Mortgage Backed 

Securities Division (MBSD). This assessment only covers FICC-GSD, i.e. the CCP providing services for 

transactions in U.S. Government Treasury and Agency securities. The MBSD, which is not yet providing CCP 

services, is not covered by this FSAP mission. In this regard, it is noted that a rule filing has been submitted to 

the SEC for setting such a CCP. 

Recommendation 1 A CCP should have a well founded, transparent and enforceable legal framework for each 

aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions. 

Description Accessibility of the regulatory framework (Q1) 

Laws, regulations, rules, procedures and contractual provisions governing the operations 

and activities of the FICC-GSD are public and readily accessible to system participants. 

All changes to FICC-GSD’s Rules are filed with and reviewed by the SEC, and proposed 

rule changes are published for public comment. FICC-GSD’s rule filings and SEC 

approvals are posted on the DTCC website as well as the SEC’s website, www.sec.gov. 

 

All FICC-GSD participants are required to execute membership agreements under which 

they agree to be bound by FICC-GSD’s Rules. 

Legal basis (Q2) 

Securities clearing and settlement activities are governed and regulated by specific laws 

and regulations, and the provisions in other financial legislation and regulations: 

 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

 Securities and Exchange Commission rules and regulations 

 Federal Reserve Act 

 Federal Reserve Banks Operating Circulars (in particular OC12, OC6) 

 Self Regulatory Organisations Rules and Procedures 

 New York State Law 

 FICC-GSD’s rules and procedures 

 Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code 

 Subpart B of regulation J incorporating the provisions of article 4A of the Uniform 

Commercial Code 

 U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement act of 1991 

 New York State Banking Laws 

 Liquidation provisions of applicable federal and state banking laws 

The legal framework demonstrate a high degree of assurance that there is a clear and 

effective legal basis for: 

(a) The CCP acting as counterparty

The legal framework includes statutory provisions and clearing agency rules. The New 

York law of contracts and provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) (see 

e.g., NYUCC §8-111) support the enforceability of FICC-GSD acting as a central CCP. In 

particular, Section 8-111 of the New York UCC which provides: “A rule adopted by a 

clearing corporation governing the rights and obligations among the clearing corporation 

and its participants in the clearing corporation is effective even if the rule conflicts with 

this article [8] and affects another party who does not consent to the rule.” In addition, 

each membership applicant is required to provide an opinion of counsel that provides that 

the membership agreement and the Rules (including those relating to FICC-GSD’s role as 

a CCP) are enforceable against it. 
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(b) The timing of assumption of liability as CCP

The New York law of contracts and provisions of the UCC (See, e.g., New York UCC §8-

111) referred to in the paragraph above supports the enforceability of the timing of 

assumption of liability as CCP by FICC-GSD. 

(c) Netting arrangements 

U.S. law supports netting arrangements relating to securities transactions. In particular, the 

U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, as amended 

(“FDICIA”) supports “netting contracts” providing for the netting of payment obligations 

and payment entitlements between and among members of clearing organizations. Under 

FDICIA, netting under a netting contract is not prevented or subject to being unwound by 

the receiver or trustee in a subsequent insolvency proceeding. The netting provisions of 

FDICIA were designed to reduce systemic risk to the financial markets. In addition, New 

York law recognizes the validity of contractual netting arrangements generally (including 

transaction novation, payment and closeout netting). 

In addition, recent amendments to both FDICIA and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code contained 

in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 include 

provisions that validate master netting agreements in respect of securities, commodities, 

forward, swap and repurchase transactions, and provide that the closeout and netting of 

transactions arising under such agreements may not be stayed or avoided in any 

bankruptcy proceeding brought under the Code, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 

(FDIA), or the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) (subject in the case of SIPA, to 

certain exceptions not relevant for clearing organizations). 

(d) The protection of the CCP's interest in collateral (including margin) 

Legal comfort for the validity of FICC-GSD's membership agreements and its Rules, 

including the validity of FICC-GSD’s lien and collateral protections, is found principally 

in the UCC (Articles 8 and 9) and general New York contract law. Although relevant 

insolvency laws can limit a secured party's rights to access and liquidate its collateral, the 

FDICIA provision referred to above, the Code, FDIA, and SIPA contain specific 

provisions to protect clearing agency closeouts (including access to and retention of 

collateral). 

(e) Default procedures 

FICC-GSD’s Rules provide that if a Member fails to meet its settlement obligations to 

FICC-GSD, and FICC-GSD suspend/terminate the Member, that Member’s positions 

would be closed out. Clearing agency close-out provisions are specifically permitted under 

both FDICIA and the Bankruptcy Code. 

(f) Finality of transfers of funds and financial instruments 

Finality between FICC-GSD and its clearing banks is governed by the applicable account 

agreements (once a settlement instruction from the FICC-GSD is acted upon by the 

clearing bank it may not be reversed except for the correction of an error). 

Enforceability of FICC-GSD rules/procedures/contracts (Q3) 

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (amending both 

the FDICIA and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code) contain provisions validating the 

rules/procedures/contracts of FICC-GSD. Besides, the 2005 Act also provides that the 

close-out and netting of transactions under such agreements may not be stayed or avoided 

in any Amendments include provisions that validate the rules, procedures and contracts of 

FICC-GSD, bankruptcy proceeding brought under the Code, FDIA, or SIPA (subject in the 

case of SIPA, to certain exceptions not relevant for clearing organizations)
6

Cross-border activities (Q4) 

Around 10 percent of the FICC-GSD members are established or incorporated outside the 

US. Historically, FICC-GSD has required legal opinions of outside legal counsels. The 

2005 Act, referred to above, states that should a foreign receiver on behalf of a defaulting 

foreign member seek recognition in the U.S. bankruptcy courts, the same protections 

available to FICC-GSD under the Code with respect to a domestic Member should also be 

available to it in any domestic proceeding brought on behalf of a foreign Member. 

The FICC-GSD has currently no cross-border arrangement with other CCPs. 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments

Recommendation 2. A CCP should require participants to have sufficient financial resources and robust 

operational capacity to meet obligations arising from participation in the CCP. A CCP 

should have procedures in place to monitor that participation requirements are met on an 

ongoing basis. A CCP’s participation requirements should be objective, publicly disclosed, 

and permit fair and open access. 

Description Sufficient financial resources and robust operational reliability (Q1) 

FICC-GSD establishes requirements for participants' financial resources and 

creditworthiness (set in FICC-GSD’s Rule 2A on initial membership requirements and 

Rule 3 on ongoing membership requirements). 

Financial requirements depend on the legal status of the participants (e.g., broker/dealer, 

bank/trust company, etc.), the types of services that the participant will use or provide 

within the system. 

In this regard, the FICC-GSD rules distinguish between four main membership types: (i) 

comparison-only members, (ii) netting members, (iii) sponsoring members and sponsored 

members, and (iv) funds-only settling bank members. For each of these categories, 

distinctions are made per types of entity and service used. The Rule 2A set the conditions 

(including financial resources and operational capability) to become member. 

The FICC-GSD’s rules (see Rule 4 (Clearing Fund)) provide that all guaranteed service 

Members are required to make a deposit to the Clearing Fund, with the amount of each 

Member’s required deposit being fixed by the FICC-GSD in accordance with the Rules. 

FICC-GSD assesses Members’ operational capability to ensure that they are able to 

satisfactorily communicate with the FICC-GSD (i.e., send-in trade input and receive 

output from the FICC-GSD). Members provide FICC-GSD with certain financial and 

operational information reviewed by DTCC risk management to ensure that the applicant: 

1) has sufficient financial ability to make anticipated contributions to the Clearing Fund 

and to meet obligations to FICC-GSD, and 2) has an established business record of a 

minimum of six months or personnel with sufficient operational background and 

experience to ensure the ability of the firm to conduct such a business. In addition, FICCGSD confirms that the applicant will be able to fulfil anticipated commitments to and meet 

the operational requirements of FICC-GSD with necessary promptness and accuracy prior 

to activating membership, FICC-GSD applicants are required to conduct operational 

testing with FICC-GSD (e.g., connectivity testing). 

Monitor compliance with participation requirements (Q2) 

FICC-GSD monitors that participation requirements are met on an ongoing basis (Rule 3 

on ongoing membership requirement). To this end, FICC-GSD members must submit 

annual audited financial statements and well as interim financial statements for certain 

members. Reporting requirements vary depending on the type of entity and services used. 

In addition, the Risk Management function receives monthly or quarterly regulatory 

reports, depending on the reporting frequency of the Members. The rules foresee that 
7

FICC-GSD may impose a fine on Members that fail to timely provide such information. 

As part of the ongoing monitoring of Member firms an internal credit risk rating matrix is 

used to risk rate bank and broker/dealer Members. This matrix is quantitatively driven and 

is produced systemically from data contained in the Members’ regulatory reports. The SEC 

has evaluated this matrix when FICC added it to its risk management, and the matrix is 

subject to periodic regulatory review. The key financial elements focus on a Member’s 

capital, leverage, liquidity and profitability. Once this rating is generated it is then 

reviewed by an analyst for possible downgrade due to qualitative factors such as regulatory 

history or type of audit opinion issued and then a final rating is assigned. The resulting 

rating determines the level of financial review that will be performed on each Member and 

may impact the Member’s Clearing Fund requirement. Additionally, the Risk Management 

department monitors the markets and news intraday, so that action can be taken if 

warranted. 

Suspension and termination of participants' membership 

Termination of participants' membership can result from a participant decision or a FICCGSD’s decision. FICC-GSD’s rules contain provisions in this regard. In case a member 

decides to terminate participation, Rule 3 section 13 on voluntary termination sets that a 

comparison-only member or a netting member can terminate its membership by providing 

a written notice to FICC-GSD. The Rule further specifies that such voluntary termination 

should not affect the member’s obligations to FICC-GSD in case of transactions submitted 

before the termination date. In the case of a sponsoring member and, voluntary termination 

is also done by written request. (rule 3A) 

FICC-GSD can determine termination of a participant’s membership in the following 

cases: 

- if a participant notifies FICC-GSD that, due to external circumstances, it intends to 

wind-down its activities. In this context, rule 21A (on wind down of a netting member) 

allows FICC-GSD to take actions with regard to this participant in view of mitigating 

the risk, including (but not limited to) permitting the wind-down Member to submit 

only transactions that serve to support the wind-down, restricting or modifying the 

wind-down member’s use of any or all of the FICC-GSD’s services, and requiring the 

wind-down Member to increase Clearing Fund deposits; 

- if a participant is no longer in compliance with access requirements. In this case, FICCGSD’s rules allow for restricting a member’s access to services, by limiting or 

excluding the Member’s participation on one or more transactions or services or by 

terminate its membership (rule 21 on restrictions on Access to Services). 

- if a member becomes insolvent, following rule 22 on insolvency of a member. 

In these three cases, FICC-GSD will notify the SEC, and the affected member and other 

members via “important notices”. These procedures are detailed in the rules, which are 

published on DTCC’s website. 

Open and fair access (Q3) 

Participation requirements of FICC-GSD are objective and clearly stated in the system’s 

rules. Access is not limited on grounds other than risk. 

FICC-GSD’s participation requirements address: credit risk, operational capability, 

compliance risk and legal risk. Only certain entities (e.g., broker/dealer, bank, etc.) 

specified by the rules of the system may qualify for membership. The level of reporting 

requirements will vary according to the type of entity and the services it uses or provides 

within the system. 

 

The framework of section 17A of the Exchange Act is designed to result in fair access to 

the clearing agency. Section 17A(b)(3) requires that the rules of a clearing agency provide 
8

that any (i) registered broker or dealer, (ii) other registered clearing agency, (iii) registered 

investment company, (iv) bank, (v) insurance company, or (vi) other person or class of 

persons as the Commission, by rule, may from time to time designate may become a 

participant in such clearing agency (although a clearing agency may deny participation to a 

person subject to a statutory disqualification or a person that does not meet such standards 

of financial responsibility, operational capability, experience, and competence as are 

prescribed by the rules of the clearing agency.) In addition, Section 17A(b)(3) provides 

that the rules of a clearing agency may not be designed to permit unfair discrimination in 

the admission of participants or among participants in the use of the clearing agency and 

may not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of 

the purposes of the Act. 

Before denying a membership application, FICC-GSD must provide the applicant with a 

concise written statement clarifying the specific grounds under which the denial decision 

has been taken, and notify the applicant of its right to request a hearing to determine 

whether the application should be denied. 

Membership requirements, including the arrangements for orderly exit, are clearly stated in 

FICC-GSD’s Rules which are available to the public at FICC’s website, www.dtcc.com. 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments FICC submitted a rule filing to SEC for expanding its membership to include some buyside unregistered investment pools (UIP), such as hedge funds, as a new membership 

category. According to FICC, they will be able to monitor whether these entities comply 

with surveillance requirements on a contractual basis. Moreover, additional access 

requirements are intended to be imposed. In addition, certain buy-side entities, such as 

SEC-registered investment companies, are not permitted to mutualize losses, meaning that 

they may not become subject to a loss allocation that arises due to a default of a member 

with whom the registered investment company did not trade. 

In its filing to the SEC, FICC stated it will impose additional risk management measures 

with respect to UIP members, including calculating their Clearing Fund requirements at a 

higher value at risk confidence level and instituting an additional qualitative assessment 

requirement. 

Recommendation 3. A CCP should measure its credit exposures to its participants at least once a day. Through 

margin requirements, other risk control mechanisms or a combination of both, a CCP 

should limit its exposure to potential losses from defaults of its participants in normal 

market conditions so that the operations of the CCP would not be disrupted and nondefaulting participants would not be exposed to losses that they cannot anticipate or 

control. 

Description Measurement of exposures (Q1) 

 FICC-GSD uses a risk-based margin methodology to limit its credit exposures to 

members. On a daily basis FICC-GSD calculates a "Clearing Fund" requirement for each 

Member based upon their unsettled and pending transactions. This requirement constitutes 

"margin" for purposes of Recommendations 3 and 4 of this Assessment. The margin 

methodology is part of FICC’s rules and, as such, the methodology and any material 

changes thereto are reviewed and approved by the SEC. The aggregate value of all such 

deposits is referred to collectively as the Clearing Fund, which operates as FICC-GSD's 

default fund in the event of a participant default. 

The exposures are measured daily and payments of any Clearing Fund contribution are 

required by 09:30 am on the settlement day. The daily calculation uses the prior day’s 

closing market price. In addition, FICC-GSD has the ability under its Rules to call for 

additional Clearing Fund deposits on an intraday basis, as needed. The price of the asset is 
9

updated on an intraday basis and additional charges may be collected to cover significant 

price movements from those Members with a significant exposure in the identified asset. 

Also, DTCC Risk Management systems include routines that permit Risk Management to 

monitor Members' overall trading activities throughout the trading day to determine 

whether exposures are building up that would require special actions to increase a 

Member's Clearing Fund deposit. 

At multiple times during the day, these routines run and generate reports identifying 

Members' then-current positions. Risk Management reviews these reports on an "as 

needed" basis, and, if they conclude a special action is warranted, may impose an intraday 

Clearing Fund charge against the Member's account. On an "as needed" basis, Risk 

Management may also run various closeout (profit/loss) scenarios on Members' thencurrent positions using then-current prices. 

Risk mitigation tools (Q2) 

The FICC-GSD limits its exposure to potential losses from defaults by its Members as 

follows: 

 By establishing membership standards and performing continuous monitoring of 

Members to those standards. 

 By requiring contributions to FICC-GSD’s Clearing Fund (i.e., margin). (All netting 

Members are required to make deposits to the Clearing Fund. The amount of their 

required deposits is calculated daily and collected accordingly.) 

 Through the existing cross-guaranty and cross-margining arrangements with other 

clearing organizations. These arrangements are designed to provide a mechanism for 

the sharing of excess collateral of a common defaulting participant held at one clearing 

organization to cover losses incurred at another clearing organization. 

 In addition, under the Rules, the FICC-GSD may seek such assurances of financial 

responsibility and operational capability from a Member as it deems necessary or 

advisable to protect itself and its Members. This may include, inter alia, restrictions on 

use of FICC-GSD services and increased Clearing Fund deposits. 

 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments The definition of margins and clearing funds in the public assessment should be made 

more consistent in line with international usage/practice and the definitions provided in the 

glossary of the RCCP. It will be beneficial (especially for non-U.S. CCPs that intend to 

establish links with FICC-GSD) to clarify the terminology. FICC-GSD management stated 

that they would clarify this terminology in the next revision of the self-assessment. 

Recommendation 4. If a CCP relies on margin requirements to limit its credit exposures to participants, those 

requirements should be sufficient to cover potential exposures in normal market 

conditions. The models and parameters used in setting margin requirements should be riskbased and reviewed regularly. 

Description Models and parameters to set margins (Q1) 

FICC-GSD calculates Clearing Fund requirements based upon most recently observed 

market conditions (i.e., using historical data of the most recent 250 days for bonds). The 

components used by FICC-GSD to calculate Clearing Fund requirements consist of: ((a) 

an end-of -day value at risk (VaR); (b) a margin requirement differential; and (c) a 

coverage component. 

The VaR calculations are based on three-day period with confidence level of 99 percent 

and this is evidenced with regular back-testing studies (which assume no positions are 

liquidated until the third day, and over the past two years have, on this basis, reflected 

actual overall coverage exceeding 99 percent). 
10

The margin requirement differential component addresses the risk due to future position 

fluctuations; the risk that the Member will not satisfy a deficiency in its Clearing Fund 

deposit requirement; and the risk that a Member will not satisfy its funds-only settlement 

obligation. 

The coverage component is a back test-like component that is meant to address model 

deficiencies that may arise and serves to bring the member’s confidence level to the 

desired level. 

Validation of the models and parameters used to determine the margin levels 

FICC-GSD’s Rules provide it with the flexibility to conduct a closeout over a longer 

liquidation period, should it deem appropriate. This model is back-tested internally on a 

monthly basis. 

The model and FICC-GSD’s general risk management procedures are periodically 

examined by FICC-GSD’s regulators and by its internal and external auditors. The model 

is also periodically validated by external experts. 

Intraday margin calls (Q2) 

FICC-GSD has the legal authority to demand intraday margins, should it deem necessary 

or appropriate. Intraday margin calls can be collected (operationally), as necessary. Risk 

Management has discretion to make such calls, based upon, for example, market events 

and their effect on internally maintained predetermined thresholds. 

Assets accepted as margins and related haircuts (Q3) 

FICC-GSD accepts cash and certain eligible securities as collateral for the Clearing Fund. 

Securities currently accepted are U.S. Government Treasury securities, U.S. Agency 

securities guaranteed by the U.S. Government and certain U.S. Agency/Government 

Sponsored Enterprise pass-through securities. The lesser of 10 percent or $5 million of a 

Member’s Clearing Fund requirement must be made and maintained in cash. 

Assets (securities), used as collateral, are re-priced every night. Haircuts for all securities 

pledged to the Clearing Fund are set forth in FICC-GSD’s Rules. FICC-GSD applies 

haircuts that reflect the potential of the Clearing Fund assets’ value to decline. Initial 

haircut rates were determined on a ten-year historical return volatility analysis using a 5 

sigma confidence level, as well as the application of additional concentration factors for 

certain security types if the amount deposited exceeds a certain percent of total collateral. 

On an ongoing basis, haircut rates are reviewed quarterly. Moreover, FICC-GSD can 

require a letter of credit to be posted by a member as additional collateral if deemed 

appropriate to ensure its members and its protection. 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments

Recommendation 5. A CCP should maintain sufficient financial resources to withstand, at a minimum, a default 

by the participant to which it has the largest exposure in extreme but plausible market 

conditions. 

Description Stress testing (Q1) 

FICC-GSD now performs stress testing on a monthly basis. Stress tests cover 50 stress 

scenarios selected from the past 10 years of historical data and special events such as the 

1987 stock market crash. There are also 82 scenarios included in the stress testing that 

have at least some hypothetical component and are not based solely on historical 

performance. The results of the stress tests are brought to the attention of executive 

management and the DTCC board's credit and market risk management committee. The 

steps that the FICC-GSD would follow in the event that stress tests indicate a potential 

deficiency (which has not occurred) would be as follows: senior management of the Risk 

Management Department would bring the deficiency results to the attention of executive 
11

management and the Board’s Credit and Market Risk Management Committee for 

consideration of options. The steps taken may not be made explicitly known to Members 

(unless they result in a proposed Rule change, for example by modifying the Clearing 

Fund formula). However, management believes that Members are informed via the Rules 

as to the flexibility that the FICC-GSD has to take risk management-related actions (such 

as increasing a Member’s Clearing Fund requirements if the FICC-GSD is concerned 

about a particular Member and determines a need to seek assurances of the Member’s 

continuing financial responsibility in the form of increased Clearing Fund) in order to 

protect the FICC-GSD and its Members. 

FICC-GSD engaged an external expert to conduct a comprehensive review of 

models/parameters/scenarios/frequency which was completed at the end of 2009. 

The stress testing assumptions are not disclosed to participants. 

Sufficiency of liquidity resources 

FICC-GSD’s financial resources consist of: 

(i) the cash in the Clearing Fund (amounting to US$3.2 billion, end-2008); 

(ii) the cash obtainable by repoing the securities in the Clearing Fund (amounting to 

US$15.4 billion in U.S. Treasury and Agency securities and US$223 million in 

eligible mortgage backed securities); 

(iii) the cash that would be obtained by repoing the securities that would have been 

delivered to the defaulting member, had it not defaulted. 

FICC-GSD began evaluating the sufficiency of its liquidity to cover the failure of the 

largest affiliated family. Affiliated family is defined the group of members that is under the 

control of the same organization, including the organization controlling all the others. A 

back test study of family liquidity requirements covering the period from 2008 through 

April 2009 showed that there was sufficient liquidity to cover the needs of the failure of 

any affiliated family 100 percent of the time assuming that the funding need could be 

fulfilled via the repo arrangement FICC-GSD established. 

So far the member with the largest exposure identified in the FICC-GSD’s stress tests has 

been adequately covered by FICC-GSD’s total required Clearing Fund deposit. Back 

testing results demonstrate that FICC-GSD’s Clearing Fund would be able to cover 

closeout losses of multiple Members. Specifically, the most recent back test showed that 

the sum of all back test losses of FICC-GSD Members is less than the sum of the required 

Clearing Fund deposits of Members.

Ability to draw on financial resources (Q2) 

The legal enforceability of FICC-GSD’s collateral arrangements is supported by the UCC 

and generally New York contract law. Although relevant insolvency laws can limit a 

secured party’s rights to access and liquidate its collateral, the FDICIA provisions, the 

Code, FDIA and SIPA contain specific provisions to protect the clearing agency close-outs 

(including access to and retention of collateral). Additional financial resources to cover 

losses from participant defaults include FICC-GSD’s retained earnings, and funds that may 

be payable to FICC-GSD under the cross-margining and cross-guaranty arrangements 

maintained with other clearing agencies. 

Immediate availability of financial resources (Q3) 

According to FICC, all the resources in the Clearing Fund that the FICC-GSD is relying 

upon to cover losses are held in accounts at the two clearing banks in the name of FICCGSD. 

The Clearing Fund cash is held in a tri-party repo agreement overnight and returned to a 

FICC-GSD bank account during the day for immediate access, if needed.
12

Securities in the Clearing Fund are held at FICC-GSD’s clearing banks and immediate 

access is available for repoing (for liquidity purposes), if needed. The FICC-GSD has not 

obtained committed credit lines to this end. 

Assessment Broadly observed. 

Comments In order to be fully compliant, FICC-GSD should: 

- consider additional liquid financial resources to use in case of extreme situations 

where repo agreements cannot be used; and, in particular; and 

- minimize its exposure and concentration risk vis-à-vis the two clearing banks; 

- consider conducting more frequent stress testing than once a month, in particular, in 

times of unusual market volatility; and 

- disclose stress testing assumptions to participants. 

FICC-GSD’s liquidity can be increased by repoing the securities in the Clearing Fund or 

the unpaid allocations of the defaulting members. However, this arrangement cannot be 

considered as a committed line, since there is no complete assurance that the repo markets 

would be effective in extreme market situations. 

Recommendation 6. A CCP’s default procedures should be clearly stated, and they should ensure that the CCP 

can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and to continue meeting its 

obligations. Key aspects of the default procedures should be publicly available. 

Description Definition of default and clarity of default procedures (Q1) 

The FICC-GSD’s rules state clearly what constitutes a default. Under the FICC-GSD’s 

rules, the FICC’s Board of Directors or a delegated Board Committee may terminate or 

suspend a Member from any service if the Member becomes subject to a formal 

insolvency proceeding, the Member fails to perform its obligations to the FICC-GSD, the 

Board has reasonable grounds to believe that the Member has been responsible for 

fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or the Board has reasonable grounds to believe that the 

Member is in or is approaching significant financial difficulty. 

The FICC-GSD’s rules provide it with the authority to promptly close out and manage the 

positions of a defaulting Member and to apply the defaulting Member’s collateral. FICCGSD Rule 22A, entitled “Procedures for When the Corporation Ceases to Act,” provides 

that the close-out procedure shall be completed as promptly as possible after the FICCGSD has given notice that it has ceased to act for a Member. The Rule provides the FICCGSD with the ability to apply the proceeds of the liquidation, as well as all other funds and 

assets of the defaulting Member, to meet the defaulting Member’s obligations to the FICCGSD. 

Mechanisms outside of the CCP (the FICC-GSD treats its Members as principals) permit 

the transfer and liquidation of the positions and margin of customers of a defaulting 

participant. Specifically, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) which has 

been created by the SIPA, protects securities investors from financial harm if their brokerdealer fails. In the event of a failure of a broker-dealer, SIPC’s primary responsibility is to 

organize the distribution of customer cash and securities to investors, and if the cash and 

securities are not available, SIPC provides insurance coverage of up to US$500,000 of the 

customer’s net equity balance. 

The rules and procedures empower the FICC-GSD to draw promptly on the available 

financial resources. The types of financial resources available to FICC-GSD are described 

in Recommendation 5. 

(Legal) enforceability of default procedures (Q2) 

The legal framework supports default procedures with a high degree of assurance. The 

2005 Amendments (see response to key question 2(c) of Recommendation 1 above) 
13

provide that the close-out and netting of transactions arising under the protected 

transactions may not be stayed or avoided in any bankruptcy proceeding brought under the 

Code, FDIA, or the SIPA (subject in the case of the SIPA, to certain exceptions not 

relevant for clearing organizations). In addition, legal comfort for the validity of the FICCGSD’s lien and collateral protections is found principally in the Uniform Commercial 

Code (Articles 8 and 9), and general New York contract law. Although relevant insolvency 

laws can limit a secured party's rights to access and liquidate its collateral, the FDICIA 

provision referred to above, the Code, FDIA, and SIPA contain specific provisions that 

would generally be applicable to FICC-GSD, to protect clearing agency close-outs 

(including access to and retention of collateral). 

U.S. insolvency law permits the identification and separate treatment of customer and 

proprietary assets. For example, the insolvency of a U.S. broker-dealer with customer 

accounts will be handled by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation under the SIPA. 

Internal plans for managing defaults (Q3) 

FICC-GSD maintains a comprehensive closeout management framework to managing the 

insolvency and closeout of a participant. In addition, there are appropriate internal 

procedures in the event that FICC-GSD determines to cease to act on behalf of a 

participant. Periodic tests are conducted both for closing out a test broker’s account, as 

well as testing borrowing under the company’s liquidity arrangements. Each instance 

where FICC-GSD determines to cease to act is unique, and both FICC-GSD’s Rules and 

internal procedures take this into consideration. 

Appropriate co-ordination procedures are in place in cases where more than one CCP, 

authority or a separate market operator are involved. For example, the multilateral crossguaranty agreement among the FICC-GSD, The Options Clearing Corporation, and the 

FICC-GSD’s affiliates, NSCC and DTC, contemplates coordination in the event of the 

default of a common Member. The FICC-GSD’s cross-margining agreement with the 

Chicago Mercantile Exchange provides for coordination between the two clearing 

corporations in the event of a default of a cross-margining participant. The FICC-GSD’s 

Rules and internal procedures address the need to coordinate with applicable regulatory 

authorities. 

The FICC-GSD’s close out procedures are subject to ongoing review and development, 

including incorporating knowledge gained from internal tests, which occur at least once 

per year. 

Transparency / publicity of default procedures (Q4) 

The key aspects of the close out procedures are in the FICC-GSD’s Rules which are 

available to Members and to the public generally at www.dtcc.com. In addition, if the 

FICC-GSD were to make a determination to cease to act on behalf of a Member, the FICCGSD would provide notice of that action to Members via Important Notice and also 

communicate relevant details as to the resolution of open transactions to Members in the 

same manner. Important Notices are posted by FICC on its website, and are available to 

the public. 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments

Recommendation 7. A CCP should hold assets in a manner whereby risk of loss or of delay in its access to 

them is minimized. Assets invested by a CCP should be held in instruments with minimal 

credit, market and liquidity risks. 

Description Monitoring of custody risk for CCP assets (Q1) 

FICC-GSD’s securities and cash held with settlement and the Clearing Fund is held in 

FICC-GSD’s account at the Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan Chase. FICC-GSD 

relies on the strict regulatory framework in which these entities and DTC operate (which 
14

includes oversight and examination by the U.S. Federal banking regulators) to ensure the 

safety and accessibility of its clearing fund deposits. This includes regulation regarding the 

protection of customer securities from theft, loss, or misuse, and in the event of 

insolvency. Moreover, the two clearing banks being participants of the clearing agencies 

within DTCC are monitored from a financial and operational perspective. As to 

enforceability of collateral and/or ownership rights see responses to questions under 

Recommendation 1 above.

Investments of CCP resources (Q2) 

Cash is generally invested in reverse repurchase agreements (repos) in debt obligations of 

the U.S. Government and U.S. Government Agencies guaranteed by the U.S. Government. 

The investments consist of tri-party repo arrangements using the standard legal 

documentation. Investments may also include direct purchase of debt obligations of the 

U.S. Government. When reverse repos are not available, funds may be sold to a clearing 

bank. 

The risk of loss of invested funds is minimized in a number of ways. Repo investments are 

generally placed with financial institutions acting as principal rather than as agent, and 

with maturity limited to the next business day (with return of funds being required well 

before settlement) and are held under tri-party custodial agreements. FICC-GSD invests 

only with those repo counterparties assigned a long term debt rating of A- or better from 

one of the rating agencies. Reverse repo investments are secured; collateral must have a 

market value greater than or equal to 102 percent of the cash invested (an industry 

standard) and investment limits are placed on counterparties. A written confirmation of 

each security underlying the repo is also required to be provided by the custodian bank. A 

thorough financial review is performed on the custodian banks. This review includes the 

analysis of the custodians’ quarterly regulatory reports, the application of certain financial 

parameters on a quarterly basis and the review of the custodians’ annual reports. 

Depending upon the results of these financial reviews, discussions will be held with 

appropriate staff of the custodian firms. 

Concentration limits (Q3) 

The overall exposure to a counterparty is considered when placing an investment. The 

Investment Policy establishes the credit limits by counterparty. The credit limits have been 

established to ensure that investments do not exceed an acceptable level of concentration 

with any single counterparty. The credit limits are monitored daily across all DTCC 

subsidiaries. 

 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments FICC-GSD should continue to monitor and mitigate the potential risks which result from 

holding assets at only two commercial banks. Moreover, FICC-GSD should to the greatest 

extent possible avoid unsecured investments. 

Recommendation 8. A CCP should identify sources of operational risk and minimize them through the 

development of appropriate systems, controls and procedures. Systems should be reliable 

and secure, and have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity plans should allow 

for timely recovery of operations and fulfillment of a CCP’s obligations. 

Description The description for this recommendation is very similar to the one of DTC and NSCC 

given that DTC, NSCC and FICC are run in the same platform with however different 

applications (so that the unavailability of one does not affect the other systems’ 

functioning) and business continuity arrangements are organized at the holding company 

level. 

Identification and management of operational risk (Q1) 

Business continuity requirements, sound practices, and objectives for U.S. infrastructure 
15

are established in the “Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resiliency 

of the U.S. Financial System.” In principle, DTC, NSCC, FICC, Euro CCP, and Trade 

Information Warehouse are different applications in the same mainframe. This does not 

create undue operational risk or interdependences on operational reliability since the 

applications of the various systems are clearly separated. There is a central Corporate 

Business Continuity function, which coordinates Business Continuity Plan (BCP) activities 

and planning for DTCC and all its subsidiaries. 

DTCC identifies sources and mitigation tools for operational risks through a number of 

dedicated permanent groups: the Operational Risk Group (develops and oversees 

operational risk management program), the Internal Risk Management Committee 

(evaluates and coordinates the risk management activities within the company), a high 

level Security Committee (address key areas of security risks associated with information 

services), and the Internal Audit Department (reviews the adequacy of internal controls, 

procedures and records of the company with respect to operational risk), independent 

accountants. 

Contingency plans and back-up facilities (Q2) 

DTCC has a formal BCP aimed at addressing events posing a significant risk of disrupting 

its operations. DTCC operates data centers and staff in multiple locations. The BCP are 

tested several times in a year both from the technological and from the business 

perspective. In particular, DTCC contingency plans and back-up facilities for the failure of 

key systems are regularly tested. The out-of-region data centre is a warm site with 2 hour 

recovery capability. The site is fully staffed requiring no movement of personnel. Out of 

region business operations sites are hot sites. Contingency plans for the failure of the key 

systems are not tested with the participants. DTCC data centers in the New York region act 

as a single data centre vis-à-vis participants and therefore although the failure of one key 

system would be visible to participants, should the failure occur no action would be needed 

by participants to resume. Therefore this test is not considered relevant for the participants. 

It should be noted that while the connectivity test (from FICC-GSD and participants’ first 

and secondary sites) is conducted with all FICC-GSD participants when then join the 

system, this test is then conducted on an annual basis only with participants deemed 

critical by FICC-GSD. However, DTCC does not test its back-up sites to participant 

backup sites for the critical participants. 

DTCC currently uses the Banking, Infrastructure and Technology Services (BITS) Shared 

Assessments Program to both describe DTCC's Business Continuity and Information 

Security control structure in response to DTCC participant inquiries and to evaluate 

DTCC's service providers' Information Security controls. 

 

Each year DTCC update a white paper describing the DTCC BCP program and make it 

available to participants on DTCC’s website. In addition, DTCC has produced an “Out-ofRegion” guide to aid clients in reconciling transactions in the unlikely event that DTCC is 

forced to move to its out-of-region processing site. Data centre failover tests are 

conducted 3-4 times per year. Business Operations tests are conducted throughout the year. 

Adequate management controls and periodic independent audit 

Operational reliability issues are regularly reviewed by DTCC’s senior management, 

including managers not responsible for the relevant operations of FICC. Operational issues 

are also reviewed by internal audit as well as review by certified public accountants. 

Deloitte LLC, issued the most recent report for FICC on October 30, 2009, for the year 

ended June 30, 2009. These reports are available on the DTCC website. 

Availability and scalability of the system

According to DTCC, no FICC-GSD key system has failed (nor any data lost) during the 

last year. FICC-GSD did not provide figures on the availability of the system and the 

capacity utilisation of the system (percent of fully available operating capacity as defined 
16

by an average of volume) to the assessor. 

DTCC has dedicated capacity planning staffing and ensures that FICC-GSD has sufficient 

capacity to meet operational needs in all data centers. In particular, With respect to 

processing capacity, FICC-GSD maintains sufficient capacity to meet processing demands 

in stressful market conditions. For clearance and settlement purposes, FICC-GSD can 

process in excess of 2 times their respective historical peaks in a processing day. 

capacity/utilization reports are generated and reviewed by the Infrastructure Department to 

track growth against projections and a yearly annual Capacity Planning Report is produced 

and presented to the Board of Directors, and to FICC’s regulators. 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments Contingency plans and backup facilities for the failure of key systems are not tested and 

reviewed with participants (only connectivity is tested with the critical participants). FICC 

explained that the data centers in the New York region act as a single data centre and 

provide secondary back-up to both systems and the entire facility. In the event the New 

York region data centers are not available, the out of region recovery site is available to 

cover all critical systems. Failover and recovery of any data centre does not require 

changes by participants. The network automatically reroutes the client traffic from their 

primary or backup sites to the recovered data centre. Therefore, it is not relevant to test the 

failure of one key system with the participants. 

DTCC should test its back-up sites to critical participants’ backup sites. 

Recommendation 9. A CCP should employ money settlement arrangements that eliminate or strictly limit its 

settlement bank risks, that is, its credit and liquidity risks from the use of banks to effect 

money settlements with its participants. Funds transfers to a CCP should be final when 

effected. 

Description Use of central bank money (Q1) 

The FICC-GSD uses the central bank model with a tiered settlement arrangement for its 

funds-only settlement process. For the settlement of DVP transactions, see 

Recommendation 10. 

The key components of a Member’s funds-only settlement obligation at the FICC-GSD, 

which constitutes a minor amount of total FICC transactions, include: a mark-to-market 

amount for every net settlement position, a mark-to-market amount for every forward net 

settlement position, fail marks for obligations that were scheduled to settle and have not 

yet settled, coupon payments and other adjustments. The FICC-GSD funds-only settlement 

process is a cash pass-through process, i.e., those members who are in a debit position 

submit payments which are then used to pay Members in a credit position. 

The settlement for the funds-only settlement process occurs on the Federal Reserve’s 

National Settlement Service (“NSS”). Because FICC-GSD does not have direct access to 

the Federal Reserve accounts and services, FICC relies on DTC to submit a file to the 

Federal Reserve Bank of New York where debits and credits are made to the settling 

banks’ Reserve Bank accounts. This file lists debit or credit entries for particular 

depository institutions (“settlers” under Federal Reserve Operating Circular 12) that are 

acting as settling banks under FICC’s rules. The Federal Reserve then processes the file, 

checking to see that settlement banks with a net debit entry have sufficient funds or credit 

in their Federal Reserve account to settle and if so, transferring the money to a temporary 

(technical) settlement account for the arrangement. Once all debits have been collected, 

funds are then credited to settlement banks in a net credit position. All debits and credits 

are final at the time they are made by the Federal Reserve. FICC-GSD Members are 

required to engage a settling bank that meets FICC-GSD’s settling bank criteria to effect 

funds-only settlement on the central bank’s NSS on behalf of the Members. 
17

Finality of transfers (Q2) 

The funds transfers for FICC-GSD funds-only money settlement occur at the Federal 

Reserve. Funds transfers are immediately final when payment is effected on the Federal 

Reserve’s NSS. 

Criteria for selection of settlement banks (Q3) 

FICC-GSD has established certain settling cash agent eligibility, criteria. Apart from the 

initial and ongoing membership requirements, settling cash agents should be a bank, trust 

company, or another entity with access to Reserve Bank account and services, including 

NSS. 

Monitor distribution of exposures among settlement banks (Q4) 

There is no major settlement bank concentration for funds-only settlement that takes place 

in the Federal Reserve. 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments

Recommendation 10. A CCP should clearly state its obligations with respect to physical deliveries. The risks 

from these obligations should be identified and managed. 

Description CCP obligations for physical delivery (Q1) 

The FICC-GSD’s Rules clearly set forth its obligations with respect to deliveries of the 

securities that it processes. The FICC-GSD processes transactions whose underlying 

securities are in book-entry form only. There are three basic underpinnings of the FICCGSD’s settlement process for netted positions: 

1) every securities delivery, whether to or from the FICC-GSD, is made against full 

payment; 

2) the FICC-GSD does not hold securities during the day; rather, deliveries that come 

into the FICC-GSD ordinarily are instantaneously redelivered to another netting 

member (i.e., all movements are in a pre-matched, “bound” status); and 

3) all DVP settlements are made either over the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire Securities 

Service or on the clearing bank’s books; finality of settlement is obtained at the time 

of the securities movement. 

Since FICC is not a depository institution, it does not have direct access to Fedwire 

Securities and, therefore, employs the services of two clearing banks, the Bank of New 

York Mellon (BNY) and JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMC), for this purpose. FICC-GSD 

Rule 12 (Securities Settlement) provides that the FICC/GSD shall notify each Member 

(prior to the entity activating its membership) of the clearing bank or banks that the FICCGSD will use to deliver eligible securities to Members and to receive eligible securities 

from Members, and by product, the types of securities that each such clearing bank will so 

deliver and receive. In turn, each Member (prior to activating its membership) must notify 

the FICC-GSD of the clearing bank that the Member has designated to act on its behalf in 

the delivery of securities to the FICC-GSD and in the receipt of securities from the FICCGSD. As stated above, obligations may be settled within a clearing bank, i.e., on the books 

of a clearing bank when the deliver and attendant receive obligation are at the same 

clearing bank. Otherwise, obligations are settled using Fedwire. All deliveries are made 

against full payment. Participation in the FICC-GSD’s GCF Repo service requires dealer 

Members to have an account with either or both of BNY or JPMC. The clearing banks 

have an integral role in the GCF Repo service. 

DVP of mitigation of principal risks (Q2) 

The FICC-GSD is obligated to deliver securities to a Member with a net long position in 

order to settle such position. However, the FICC-GSD is not obligated to make such 

deliveries until the day on which it receives from a Member with a net short position 
18

securities with the same CUSIP number that are at least equal in quantity to such net long 

positions and that have not been allocated for delivery to another Member. 

Liquidity, storage and delivery (other than principal) risks (Q3) 

Storage and delivery risks (such as warehousing and transportation of instruments) do not 

arise for the FICC-GSD because the underlying securities of the transactions that it 

processes are in book-entry form. 

 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments As a systemically important CCP, FICC should have direct access to Fedwire Securities 

and Fedwire Funds services. Such an access will allow FICC to settle DVP in central bank 

money and reduce the settlement concentration to the two clearing banks. However, due to 

current legal constraint, this recommendation can only be met by either FICC being 

chartered as a bank or statutory changes that grant that the Federal Reserve legal authority 

to provide accounts and services to FICC. 

Recommendation 11. CCPs that establish links either cross-border or domestically to clear trades should 

evaluate the potential sources of risks that can arise, and ensure that the risks are managed 

prudently on an ongoing basis. There should be a framework for cooperation and 

coordination between the relevant regulators and overseers. 

Description Sources of risks in links and compliance with RCCPs (Q1) 

There is no CCP-link in place but the FICC-GSD has implemented a cross-margining 

arrangement with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and according to the self 

assessment has conducted the analyses from a risk management perspective for this 

arrangement. 

Following the cross-margining agreement, (i) entities that are Clearing Members of both 

FICC-GSD and CME, and (ii) Clearing Members of either FICC-GSD or CME that have 

an Affiliate that is a Clearing Member of the other such Clearing Organization, may elect 

to have their Margin obligations in respect of positions in futures contracts and options on 

futures contracts in Eligible Products in their proprietary accounts at CME offset against 

their Margin obligations in respect of positions in Eligible Products at FICC-GSD to the 

extent permitted under the Agreement. 

 

The FICC-GSD and the participating futures clearing organization independently calculate 

applicable residual margin amounts based on their respective rules. In this regard, it is 

noted that the cross-margining agreement foresees that both clearing organizations should 

give sufficient notice to the other one before implementing any change in its rules if it 

relates to the clearing organization’s clearing fund, contributions to capital, rights of 

assessment against its clearing members. 

Legal support for links (Q2) 

The cross-margining arrangement with the CME is governed by the laws of the State of 

New York. Besides, the cross-margining arrangement has been approved by the SEC. 

Moreover, cross-margining arrangements are also referred to in FICC-GSD Rule 43 

(cross-margining arrangements) that sets the conditions to become a cross-margining 

participant. The cross-margining agreement and the cross-margining participant agreement 

for this specific arrangement with the CME is also available on DTCC’s website. 

Ongoing monitoring of operational, liquidity and credit risk (Q3) 

According to FICC, the cross-margining agreement does not introduce new operational 

risks to the FICC-GSD. FICC-GSD and the CME limit their credit risk exposure by 

determining the participants that can use this arrangement and independently determining 

how much margin with regard to a participant’s residual positions is adequate to protect 

them under the cross-margining agreement. Moreover, the agreement leaves the option to 

FICC-GSD (and CME) to terminate the participation of a member to this arrangement if 
19

FICC-GSD (and CME) estimate that this would protect the clearing organization and its 

participants. Moreover, the agreement foresees loss sharing arrangements. 

The ongoing monitoring is conducted via the daily exchange of cross-margining data 

between the FICC-GSD and the CME. Besides it is noted that the activities of the CME are 

overseen by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 

The cross-margining agreement between FICC-GSD and the CME also foresees (in section 

14 on information sharing) that both clearing organizations would provide information to 

the other one regarding their cross-margining participants for instance in case a special 

surveillance procedure is applied to a cross-margining participant; if more frequent 

reporting is required from a cross-margining participant; if the capital requirements for a 

cross-margining participants are increased; if higher margin requirements are imposed on a 

cross-margining participant. Moreover, the agreement also sets that the clearing 

organizations will inform each other of the total size and aggregate amount of required 

contributions to the clearing organization’s clearing/guarantee fund. 

Co-operative (cross-border) oversight on links (Q4) 

There is a framework for cooperation between the CFTC and SEC. In addition, the CME 

and FICC-GSD participate in the Unified Clearing Group bringing together securities and 

futures clearing agencies in common interest topics (with CFTC, SEC and Fed as 

observers). 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments

Recommendation 12. While maintaining safe and secure operations, CCPs should be cost-effective in meeting 

the requirements of participants. 

Description The description for this recommendation is very similar to the one of DTC and NSCC 

given that the procedures for controlling and reviewing risks and pricing are the same 

between the three subsidiaries of the DTCC group. 

Procedures to control risks and pricing (Q1) 

FICC-GSD’s fees are cost based and FICC-GSD returns to its users excess net revenues 

not needed to fund its operations via rebates or refunds. DTCC performs periodic 

benchmarking studies to assess cost effectiveness in the market place. Pricing levels are 

reviewed against the cost of operations during the annual budget process in order to 

provide guidance to the Board of the price impact. 

Both Internal Audit and DTCC's external auditors review and test elements of the cost 

allocation methodology. 

Regular review of service levels and operational reliability (Q2) 

FICC surveys its participants to test and help ensure adherence to service levels on an 

annual basis. As described in RCCP13, some of the Committees of the Board of Directors 

are overseeing different aspects, covering the systems’ operations. Besides, operational 

reliability is the subject of regular monitoring, the result of which is transmitted to IT, 

product and senior management on a monthly basis. An annual Capacity Planning Report 

considering the projected capacity growth for the year to come is submitted to the Board of 

Directors of DTCC and to its regulators. 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments

Recommendation 13. Governance arrangements for a CCP should be clear and transparent to fulfill public 

interest requirements and to support the objectives of owners and participants. In 

particular, they should promote the effectiveness of a CCP’s risk management procedures. 
20

Description The description for this recommendation is very similar to the one of DTC and NSCC 

given that there is a single governance structure organized at the holding company level. 

Clarity and transparency of Governance arrangements (Q1)

DTCC is a holding company of DTC, FICC and NSCC, which are independent legal 

entities. DTCC common shareholders include approximately 362 banks, broker-dealers, 

mutual funds and other companies in the financial services industry participating in one or 

more of DTCC’s clearing agency subsidiaries, including FICC. 

 

Certain governance information is publicly disclosed and other information is not because 

it is confidential and proprietary in nature. At the time of this assessment only limited 

information is available to the public. DTCC is currently reviewing its corporate 

governance structure and anticipates that once any changes have been duly approved and 

publication authorized, certain additional information will be made publicly available. 

Separation between reporting lines for risk management and other operations (Q2) 

There is a clear separation in the reporting lines between risk management and other 

operations of FICC, NSCC and DTC. The Chief Risk Officer reports directly to the 

Chairman and CEO. The board of directors has appointed a number of standing 

committees including a credit and market risk management committee/compliance and 

operational risk management committee/board committee/ core services operations and 

planning committee 

Management incentives skills and accountability (Q3) 

DTCC Management and the Board establish formal corporate goals yearly based on 

consultation with individual participants, members of the Board, Board committees, 

advisory committees, industry associations, regulators, and others. Management’s 

performance is assessed by the Board against these goals through the review of status 

reports from the management and Board Committees. Through evaluation of management 

performance, and by linking compensation to performance (via the Board’s Compensation 

Committee which is composed of non-management directors), the Board seeks to ensure 

that management has the incentives and skills needed to achieve the clearing agency’s 

objectives, and that management is accountable for its performance. 

Auditors have ensured that: 1) each service does not cross subsidizes the operating 

expenses and revenues of the others neither within each of the systems (DTC, NSCC and 

FICC) nor amongst them; and 2) the risk management financial resources (clearing funds, 

collateral, margins, etc.) are separately maintained and not co-mingled. 

Board composition, expertise and relevant interest’ representation 

Currently the Board of DTCC is composed of 18 members including: two DTCC 

Executives (CEO and COO), two members designated by the preferred shareholders 

(NYSE and FINRA) and other members designated by the shareholders. There is currently 

no other non-participant Board members. 

The members of the Board are elected for a one-year term, usually at the April 

shareholders meeting on the basis of the following procedure. Each year, the Board 

appoints members of the Governance Committee, who in turn, recommend nominees for 

directors to the Board after soliciting from participants of each clearing agency suggested 

nominees for election by common shareholders. The Committee standards in 

recommending nominees are designed to satisfy the fair representation requirement of 

Section 17A of the Exchange Act, and reflect other governance best practices. The 

Governance Committee has the responsibility to nominate persons for election as directors 

ensuring they meet the following criterion: ability to represent users of the services of each 

of DTCC’s clearing and depository subsidiaries; ownership of DTCC common stock; 

expertise; with respect to current directors, their length of service, attendance at Board and 
21

Committee meetings, and effectiveness; and adequate diversity on the Board. 

Public interest objectives 

FICC’s public interest objectives are based upon section 17 A of the Securities Exchange 

Act under which the SEC is directed by the Congress, “having due regard for the public 

interest,” to facilitate the establishment of a national system for the prompt and accurate 

clearance and settlement of securities transactions by, among other things, the registration 

of clearing agencies that have been determined by the SEC to meet the statutory standards 

of the Exchange Act. 

The public's interest is taken into account by the SEC in its review of each proposed rule 

change filed with the SEC by FICC-GSD, i.e., the SEC has an obligation to receive and 

consider public comments on each filing. SEC rules provide that the public comment 

period for proposed rule changes is at least 21 days from the date a proposal is published in 

the Federal Register (unless the proposal meets the criteria for accelerated approval or 

immediate effectiveness). All registered clearing agencies (including DTC, NSCC and 

FICC), as self regulatory organizations, are required to publish notices of their proposed 

rule changes on their websites when they are filed with the SEC, with contact information 

for participants should they wish to provide comments to the clearing agencies directly 

(which the affected clearing agency would then forward to the SEC). This effectively 

provides participants with a longer period to review and consider specific proposals. 

Moreover, FICC indicated that in case it is known that a proposal may have significant 

impact, the proposal is discussed with participants or participant groups (such as, for 

example, the relevant divisions of SIFMA), and FICC consults with its regulators before 

filing it formally. In addition to posting important notices on DTCC’s website that advise 

Participants of the submission/approval of proposed rule changes, FICC-GSD staff 

participates in various industry groups where information is shared, both in advance of 

submitting a particular proposed rule change, or after the filing is submitted (for example, 

as the implementation date of an approved change approaches). DTCC also publishes 

various periodicals and newsletters to its clearing agency membership, that are targeted to 

the financial services industry, trade organizations, regulators and Participants, which 

provide news and information on various products, services, corporate 

initiatives and expanding business opportunities. 

Assessment Broadly observed. 

Comments For the observance of this recommendation, the governance arrangements for FICC should 

be more clearly specified and transparent, including criteria for the composition and 

selection of Board members. 

Recommendation 14. A CCP should provide market participants with sufficient information for them to identify 

and evaluate accurately the risks and costs associated with using its services. 

Description Disclosure of risk management information (Q1) 

FICC-GSD’s rules and procedure are publicly available on DTCC’s website. FICC-GSD’s 

rules are explicit as to when FICC-GSD assumes counterparty exposure. The rules also 

provide information on default procedures. 

 

Information, such as explanatory service bulletins and guidelines on risk management 

measures, is communicated via Important Notices posted on DTCC’s website, along with 

any rule filings. Information about key financial and operational risk is also publicly 

disclosed. 

The website also contains general information about products and services as well as 

contact information. 

In addition, SEC standards and FICC-GSD Rule 35 require that, after the end of each 
22

calendar year FICC-GSD provides its participants with annual audited financial statement 

prepared by an independent public accountant. FICC-GSD is also required to provide its 

participants with unaudited financial statements for each of the first three calendar quarters 

of each calendar year. The annual audited financial statements of FICC as well as the 

consolidated financial statements of DTCC are available on the DTCC website, 

www.dtcc.com. 

Accessibility of information (Q2) 

Information is provided in English and made available on FICC’s website. Moreover, the 

system’s management also responds to inquiries from participants and meets with them as 

may be requested to assist them to understand the rules and the risk implications thereof. 

Completion and disclosure of the answers to the key questions of RCCPs (Q3) 

FICC-GSD completed and disclosed the answers to the key questions from this assessment 

methodology. FICC-GSD self assessment based on the RCCP assessment methodology is 

published on DTCC’s website after being reviewed by its senior management and 

approved by its Board of Directors prior to the publication. The review is conducted at 

least every two years, unless necessary before as a result of any material change to FICCGSD’s system or environment. 

Assessment Observed.

Comments

Recommendation 15 A CCP should be subject to transparent and effective regulation and oversight. In both a 

domestic and an international context, central banks and securities regulators should 

cooperate with each other and with other relevant authorities. 

Description The description for this recommendation is very similar to the one of NSCC as both CCPs 

have similar legal status and are subsidiaries of the DTCC group. 

Effective regulation and oversight (Q1)

FICC is a clearing agency as defined by the Exchange Act and, as with all clearing 

agencies, is required to register with the SEC under section 17A of the Exchange Act 

unless granted an exemption from registration by the SEC. As a result, FICC as an entity is 

subject to full regulation under the Exchange Act (including but not limited to Section 

17A) and is a self-regulatory organization that must meet all requirements with respect to 

SROs under the Exchange Act. 

In addition, the Federal Reserve is interested in FICC-GSD and its observance of the 

RCCPs given its important role in the government securities market and its importance for 

the stability of the overall financial system. 

Sufficient legal capacity and resources 

As a clearing agency, FICC is subject to comprehensive regulation and supervision by the 

SEC pursuant to the Exchange Act. The Federal Reserve coordinates with the SEC to 

conduct oversight, but the United States currently does not have a statute providing formal 

oversight authority to the central bank for non-bank payment, clearing, and settlement 

systems such as FICC. 

At the SEC, an estimated 51 staff are involved in whole or in part in clearing oversight 

(approximately 23 full-time equivalent staff positions). The SEC’s oversight program 

encompasses staff from 7 different offices, including offices involved in legal and policy, 

examination and compliance, and automation review. 

Between FRBNY and the Board, about 20 budgeted officers and staff work full time on 

policy and oversight with respect to payment, clearing and settlement. Additionally, about 

15 supervisory staff are dedicated full time to specific private sector systems; 9 examiners 
23

broadly dedicated to payment and settlement infrastructure and 12 more focused on 

systemically important clearing activities by banks and affiliates. 

Definition and disclosure of objectives of central banks and securities regulators (Q2) 

The SEC’s regulatory objectives, responsibilities, and main policies are defined and 

publicly disclosed. For example, the scope of the SEC’s regulation of clearing agencies is 

defined by the Exchange Act, including Sections 17A and 19. The SEC has adopted rules 

to carry out these statutory responsibilities, such as the review of proposed rule changes. In 

order to assist registrants in meeting their statutory responsibilities, the SEC’s Division of 

Trading and Markets has published standards regarding the objectives and requirements of 

clearing agency registration under Section 17A. In addition to publishing proposing and 

adopting releases for its own rules, the SEC also publishes concept releases and policy 

statements to educate industry participants as to the Commission’s positions on different 

issues, such as straight-through processing, confirmation of trades, operational outages, 

and business continuity. These materials are publicly available from several sources, 

including the SEC’s website (www.sec.gov). 

The Federal Reserve also publishes policy statements which are readily available to the 

public. For example, the Federal Reserve’s Policy on Payments System Risk is available at 

www.federalreserve.gov. Operating Circulars governing Reserve Bank services are 

available online at the Federal Reserve’s Financial Services website at 

http://www.frbservices.org/. Other service related information, such as services offered, 

forms, agreements, schedules, and fees, can be obtained on this site. 

As noted above, FICC-GSD is required to file with the SEC and make public all proposed 

rule changes. The information in each filing is required to be presented by FICC in a clear 

and comprehensible manner in order to enable the public to provide meaningful comment 

on the proposal and for the SEC to determine whether the proposal is consistent with the 

Act and applicable rules and regulations under the Act.. SEC staff also maintains an active 

dialogue with FICC-GSD management. 

Timely provision of oversight information to relevant authorities (Q3) 

FICC-GSD must submit proposed changes to rules and a description of the purpose of the 

proposed rule change to SEC. The term rule is defined broadly under the Exchange Act to 

include the constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and rules, or instruments 

corresponding to the foregoing, of a clearing agency. 

FICC-GSD is statutorily required to comply with several recordkeeping requirements set 

forth in the Exchange Act (Section 17) and SEC rules (Rule 17a-1 et seq.). For example, 

FICC-GSD must make and keep for prescribed periods such records, furnish such copies 

thereof, and make and disseminate such reports as the SEC, by rule, prescribes as 

necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise 

in furtherance of the purposes of this Exchange Act. Under SEC rules, FICC-GSD must 

maintain business records related to its self-regulatory activities. These records must be 

held for a period of not less than five years, with the first two years in an “easily accessible 

place”. SEC Rule 17a-6 sets forth the manner by which FICC-GSD may destroy/dispose of 

such documentation. All of these records are subject to periodic, special, or other 

examinations by representatives of the SEC. In certain instances, FICC-GSD also may be 

asked to furnish copies of materials upon request from its participants, other selfregulatory organizations, or other regulators. FICC is also required to notify the SEC of 

disciplinary actions it takes with respect to its participants, including but not limited to 

ceasing to act for a participant or denying access to services to a participant. 

SEC staff conducts onsite examinations of registered clearing agencies, including FICC. 

Examination reviews may include such areas as internal audit, membership, member 

financial surveillance, clearing fund and collateral risk, risk assessment and risk 
24

management systems, clearance and settlement processes, and liquidity. During 

examinations, FICC is required to provide examiners with documentation requested as part 

of the examination. The SEC conducts examinations on a regular basis and for cause 

where necessary. FICC-GSD is required to notify the SEC if it imposes a final disciplinary 

sanction on a participant, denies participation, limits access to services, or ceases to act for 

a participant and indicate the actions taken to resolve outstanding obligations. 

In addition, FICC-GSD is required to submit all proposed rule changes to the SEC for 

review, notice, comment, and, with some limited exceptions, approval. Section 19 of the 

Exchange Act and the rules thereunder define the procedures by which self-regulatory 

organizations (SROs) must file proposed rule changes with the SEC and by which the SEC 

may approve or disapprove proposed rule changes. Certain proposed rule changes that (i) 

constitute a stated policy, practice, or interpretation with respect to the meaning, 

administration, or enforcement of an existing rule, (ii) establish or change a due, fee, or 

other charge, or (iii) are concerned solely with the administration of the self-regulatory 

organization may be effective upon filing, but all other proposed rule changes are 

approved by the SEC. In most cases, the proposed rule changes are approved by the SEC’s 

Division Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority. For example, the SEC 

reviewed and approved the cross-margining arrangement and amendments thereto FICCGSD put in place with the CME. A MOU with the CFTC is in place for issues of common 

interest. 

In addition, the SEC has established an Automation Review Policy (ARP) applicable to 

SROs, including FICC-GSD. Under the policy, SROs voluntarily establish comprehensive 

planning and assessment programs to determine systems capacity and vulnerability. ARP 

also requests that SROs provide SEC staff with real-time notifications of significant 

system outages. ARP staff at the SEC also conducts IT-specific onsite examinations of 

FICC-GSD. 

Domestic and cross-border cooperation (Q4) 

The legal framework supports cooperation and coordination among the authorities. 

At the domestic level, the SEC and the Federal Reserve have signed exam-specific 

information-sharing arrangements regarding the oversight of FICC-GSD. The main 

principle underlying this framework is to provide for consolidated supervision and to stem 

systemic risk. 

At the cross-border level, the SEC has entered into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) 

with regulators from non domestic institutions in particular for the exchange of 

information. The MOUs can be found on the SEC website. 

Assessment Observed. 

Comments The SEC has not formally required FICC-GSD to perform a self-assessment with respect 

to the CPSS-IOSCO recommendations. However, the SEC reviews the self-assessments 

currently prepared by the clearing agencies. Furthermore, compliance with SEC rules 

ensures compliance with most of the recommendations. SEC staff stated that it would 

consider recommending to the Commission that clearing agencies be required to perform 

self-assessments against the CPSS-IOSCO recommendations by rule or by policy 

statement. SEC is encouraged to do so, also with a view to encouraging consistency in the 

assessment of globally relevant systems and to facilitate co-operation with other 

authorities. 

The Federal Reserve should be provided a legal mandate to oversee FICC, which is 

systemically important system as a complementary function to the existing SEC regulation 

and supervision. 
25

Table 2. Summary of the Detailed Assessment of the Observance of Fixed 

Income Clearing Corporation – Government Securities Division (FICC-GSD) 

with the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Central Counterparties 

Responsibility Grading Comments 

Legal risk 

1. A CCP should have a well founded, 

transparent and enforceable legal 

framework for each aspect of its activities 

in all relevant jurisdictions. 

O 

Participation requirement 

2. A CCP should require participants to 

have sufficient financial resources and 

robust operational capacity to meet 

obligations arising from participation in the 

CCP. A CCP should have procedures in 

place to monitor that participation 

requirements are met on an ongoing basis. 

A CCP’s participation requirements should 

be objective, publicly disclosed, and permit 

fair and open access. 

O FICC submitted a rule filing to SEC for expanding its 

membership to include some buy-side unregistered 

investment pools (UIP), such as hedge funds, as a 

new membership category. According to FICC, they 

will be able to monitor whether these entities comply 

with surveillance requirements on a contractual basis. 

Moreover, additional access requirements are 

intended to be imposed. In addition, certain buy-side 

entities, such as SEC-registered investment 

companies, are not permitted to mutualize losses, 

meaning that they may not become subject to a loss 

allocation that arises due to a default of a member 

with whom the registered investment company did 

not trade. 

In its filing to the SEC, FICC stated it will impose 

additional risk management measures with respect to 

UIP members, including calculating their Clearing 

Fund requirements at a higher value at risk confidence 

level and instituting an additional qualitative 

assessment requirement. 

Measurement and management of credit 

exposures 

3. A CCP should measure its credit 

exposures to its participants at least once a 

day. Through margin requirements, other 

risk control mechanisms or a combination 

of both, a CCP should limit its exposure to 

potential losses from defaults of its 

participants in normal market conditions so 

that the operations of the CCP would not be 

disrupted and non-defaulting participants 

would not be exposed to losses that they 

cannot anticipate or control. 

O The definition of margins and clearing funds in the 

public assessment should be made more consistent in 

line with international usage/practice and the 

definitions provided in the glossary of the RCCP. It 

will be beneficial (especially for non-U.S. CCPs that 

intend to establish links with FICC-GSD) to clarify 

the terminology. FICC-GSD management stated that 

they would clarify this terminology in the next 

revision of the self-assessment. 

Margin requirements 
26

Responsibility Grading Comments 

4. If a CCP relies on margin requirements to 

limit its credit exposures to participants, 

those requirements should be sufficient to 

cover potential exposures in normal market 

conditions. The models and parameters used 

in setting margin requirements should be 

risk-based and reviewed regularly. 

O 

Financial resources 

5. A CCP should maintain sufficient 

financial resources to withstand, at a 

minimum, a default by the participant to 

which it has the largest exposure in extreme 

but plausible market conditions. 

BO In order to be fully compliant, FICC-GSD should: 

- consider additional liquid financial resources to 

use in case of extreme situations where repo 

agreements cannot be used; and, in particular; 

and 

- minimize its exposure and concentration risk 

vis-à-vis the two clearing banks; 

- consider conducting more frequent stress testing 

than once a month, in particular, in times of 

unusual market volatility; and 

- disclose stress testing assumptions to 

participants. 

FICC-GSD’s liquidity can be increased by repoing 

the securities in the Clearing Fund or the unpaid 

allocations of the defaulting members. However, this 

arrangement cannot be considered as a committed 

line, since there is no complete assurance that the repo 

markets would be effective in extreme market 

situations. 

Default procedures 

6. A CCP’s default procedures should be 

clearly stated, and they should ensure that 

the CCP can take timely action to contain 

losses and liquidity pressures and to 

continue meeting its obligations. Key 

aspects of the default procedures should be 

publicly available. 

O 

Custody and investment risk 

7 A CCP should hold assets in a manner 

whereby risk of loss or of delay in its access 

to them is minimized. Assets invested by a 

CCP should be held in instruments with 

minimal credit, market and liquidity risks.. 

O FICC-GSD should continue to monitor and mitigate 

the potential risks that result from holding assets at 

only two commercial banks. Moreover, FICC-GSD 

should to the greatest extent possible avoid unsecured 

investments. 

Operational risk 
27

Responsibility Grading Comments 

8. A CCP should identify sources of 

operational risk and minimize them through 

the development of appropriate systems, 

controls and procedures. Systems should be 

reliable and secure, and have adequate, 

scalable capacity. Business continuity plans 

should allow for timely recovery of 

operations and fulfillment of a CCP’s 

obligations. 

O Contingency plans and backup facilities for the failure 

of key systems are not tested and reviewed with 

participants (only connectivity is tested with the 

critical participants). FICC explained that the data 

centers in the New York region act as a single data 

centre and provide secondary back-up to both systems 

and the entire facility. In the event the New York 

region data centers are not available, the out of region 

recovery site is available to cover all critical systems. 

Failover and recovery of any data centre does not 

require changes by participants. The network 

automatically reroutes the client traffic from their 

primary or backup sites to the recovered data centre. 

Therefore, it is not relevant to test the failure of one 

key system with the participants. 

DTCC should test its back-up sites to critical 

participants’ backup sites. 

Money settlements 

9. A CCP should employ money settlement 

arrangements that eliminate or strictly limit 

its settlement bank risks, that is, its credit 

and liquidity risks from the use of banks to 

effect money settlements with its 

participants. Funds transfers to a CCP 

should be final when effected. 

O 

Physical deliveries 

10. A CCP should clearly state its 

obligations with respect to physical 

deliveries. The risks from these obligations 

should be identified and managed. 

O As a systemically important CCP, FICC should have 

direct access to Fedwire Securities and Fedwire Funds 

services. Such an access will allow FICC to settle 

DVP in central bank money and reduce the settlement 

concentration to the two clearing banks. However, 

due to current legal constraint, this recommendation 

can only be met by either FICC being chartered as a 

bank or statutory changes that grant that the Federal 

Reserve legal authority to provide accounts and 

services to FICC. 

Risks in links between CCPs 

11. CCPs that establish links either crossborder or domestically to clear trades should 

evaluate the potential sources of risks that 

can arise, and ensure that the risks are 

managed prudently on an ongoing basis. 

There should be a framework for 

cooperation and coordination between the 

relevant regulators and overseers. 

O 

Efficiency 
28

Responsibility Grading Comments 

12. While maintaining safe and secure 

operations, CCPs should be cost-effective in 

meeting the requirements of participants. 

O 

Governance 

13. Governance arrangements for a CCP 

should be clear and transparent to fulfill 

public interest requirements and to support 

the objectives of owners and participants. In 

particular, they should promote the 

effectiveness of a CCP’s risk management 

procedures. 

BO For the observance of this recommendation, the 

governance arrangements for FICC should be more 

clearly specified and transparent, including criteria for 

the composition and selection of Board members. 

Transparency 

14. A CCP should provide market 

participants with sufficient information for 

them to identify and evaluate accurately the 

risks and costs associated with using its 

services. 

O 

Regulation and oversight 

15. A CCP should be subject to transparent 

and effective regulation and oversight. In 

both a domestic and an international 

context, central banks and securities 

regulators should cooperate with each other 

and with other relevant authorities. 

O The SEC has not formally required FICC-GSD to 

perform a self-assessment with respect to the CPSSIOSCO recommendations. However, the SEC reviews 

the self-assessments currently prepared by the 

clearing agencies. Furthermore, compliance with SEC 

rules ensures compliance with most of the 

recommendations. SEC staff stated that it would 

consider recommending to the Commission that 

clearing agencies be required to perform selfassessments against the CPSS-IOSCO 

recommendations by rule or by policy statement. SEC 

is encouraged to do so, also with a view to 

encouraging consistency in the assessment of globally 

relevant systems and to facilitate co-operation with 

other authorities. 

The Federal Reserve should be provided a legal 

mandate to oversee FICC, which is a systemically 

important system, as a complementary function to the 

existing SEC regulation and supervision. 

 
29

Table 3. Actions to Improve Compliance

Reference 

Recommendation Recommended Action 

Recommendation 3: 

credit exposures management 

Align the definitions of margins and clearing funds with international ones.

Recommendation 5: 

Financial resources 

Consider additional liquid financial resources to use in case of extreme situations 

where repo agreements cannot be used. 

Minimize FICC’s exposure and concentration risk vis-à-vis the two clearing banks. 

Consider conducting more frequent stress testing than once a month, in particular, in 

times of unusual market volatility. 

Disclose stress testing assumptions to participants. 

Recommendation 7: 

Custody and investment risk 

Continue to monitor and mitigate the potential risks, which result from holding 

assets at only two commercial banks. 

Avoid to the largest extent possible unsecured investments. 

Recommendation 8: 

Operational risk 

Test and review FICC backup sites to critical participants’ backup sites. 

Recommendations 10: 

Physical deliveries 

Provide FICC direct access to Fedwire Securities and Fedwire Funds services to settle 

DVP transactions in central bank money. 

Recommendation 13: 

Governance 

FICC’s governance arrangements should be more clearly specified and transparent, 

including criteria for the composition and selection of Board members. 

Recommendation 15: 

Regulation and oversight 

SEC should formally require FICC to perform a self-assessment with respect to 

the CPSS-IOSCO recommendations. 

Ensure the compliance of the SEC rules with the CPSS/IOSCO 

Recommendations. 

Provide legal mandate to the Federal Reserve to oversee FICC, which is systemically 

important system, as a complementary function to the existing SEC regulation and 

supervision. 

Authorities’ response to the assessment 

1. The U.S. authorities welcome the IMF’s assessment of the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation 

(FICC) against the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Central Counterparties (RCCP). We 

appreciate the significant undertaking associated with an FSAP review of the biggest financial sector 

in the world, as well as the challenges that accompany the first assessment of a large advanced country 

in the wake of the crisis. 

2. The authorities are pleased to note that the IMF’s assessment reflects the high degree of 

compliance of FICC with the RCCPs, and will work with FICC in considering the assessment’s 

specific comments and recommendations. 

3. Again, the authorities appreciate the significant undertaking associated with the assessment of 

FICC and the contribution that the assessment process makes to the stability and effective regulation 

and oversight of systemically important payment, clearing and settlement systems.