Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 236 / Tuesday, December 9, 1997 / Proposed Rules 64787

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

helicopters that have been modified, altered,

or repaired, so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must use the authority

provided in paragraph (d) to request approval

from the FAA. This approval may address

either no action, if the current configuration

eliminates the unsafe condition, or different

actions necessary to address the unsafe

condition described in this AD. Such a

request should include an assessment of the

effect of the changed configuration on the

unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no

case does the presence of any modification,

alteration, or repair remove any helicopter

from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent failure of the main gearbox

suspension diagonal cross-member (diagonal

cross-member), which could cause the main

gearbox to pivot, resulting in severe

vibrations and a subsequent forced landing,

accomplish the following:

(a) For Model SA–365N and N1

helicopters, prior to the accumulation of

50,000 operating cycles; and for Model AS–

365N2 helicopters, prior to the accumulation

of 30,000 operating cycles:

Note 2: The Master Service

Recommendations and the flight log contain

accepted procedures that are used to

determine the cumulative operating cycles on

the rotorcraft.

(1) Inspect the diagonal cross-member for

cracks in the area of the center bore hole,

using a borescope with a 90° angle drive, or

a video assembly with optical fiber

illumination, or any other appropriate device

that makes it possible to visually inspect the

center area of the part.

(2) Repeat the inspection required by

paragraph (a)(1) of this AD at intervals not to

exceed 500 operating cycles, or 100 hours

time-in-service, whichever occurs first.

(b) If any crack is found as a result of the

inspections required by paragraphs (a)(1) or

(a)(2) of this AD, remove the diagonal crossmember and replace it with an airworthy

diagonal cross-member.

(c) Installation of modification MOD

073880 that installs a diagonal cross-member,

P/N 356A38–3062–20, constitutes a

terminating action for the requirements of

this AD.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft

Standards Staff, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA.

Operators shall submit their requests through

an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector,

who may concur or comment and then send

it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Staff.

Note 3: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Rotorcraft Standards Staff.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the helicopter

to a location where the requirements of this

AD can be accomplished.

Note 4: The subject of this AD is addressed

in Direction Generale De L’Aviation Civile

(France) AD97–093–041(AB)R1, dated July

30, 1997.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December

2, 1997.

Eric Bries,

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 97–32117 Filed 12–8–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 97–NM–228–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Aerospatiale

Model ATR–42 and ATR–72 Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to all

Aerospatiale Model ATR–42 and ATR–

72 series airplanes. This proposal would

require revising the Airplane Flight

Manual (AFM) to modify the limitation

that prohibits positioning the power

levers below the flight idle stop during

flight, and to provide a statement of the

consequences of positioning the power

levers below the flight idle stop during

flight. This proposal is prompted by

incidents and accidents involving

airplanes equipped with turboprop

engines in which the ground propeller

beta range was used improperly during

flight. The actions specified by the

proposed AD are intended to prevent

loss of airplane controllability, or engine

overspeed and consequent loss of

engine power caused by the power

levers being positioned below the flight

idle stop while the airplane is in flight.

DATES: Comments must be received by

January 8, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–103,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 97–NM–

228–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays.

This information may be examined at

the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mark Quam, Aerospace Engineer,

Standardization Branch, ANM–113,

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,

Washington 98055–4056; telephone

(425) 227–2145; fax (425) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 97–NM–228–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No.

97–NM–228–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

In recent years, the FAA has received

reports of 14 incidents and/or accidents

involving intentional or inadvertent

operation of the propellers in the

ground beta range during flight on

airplanes equipped with turboprop

engines. (For the purposes of this

proposal, beta is defined as the range of

propeller operation intended for use

during taxi, ground idle, or reverse

operations as controlled by the power

lever settings aft of the flight idle stop.)
64788 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 236 / Tuesday, December 9, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Five of the fourteen in-flight beta

occurrences were classified as

accidents. In each of these five cases,

operation of the propellers in the beta

range occurred during flight. Operation

of the propellers in the beta range

during flight, if not prevented, could

result in loss of airplane controllability,

or engine overspeed with consequent

loss of engine power.

Communication between the FAA and

the public during a meeting held on

June 11–12, 1996, in Seattle,

Washington, revealed a lack of

consistency of the information on inflight beta operation contained in the

FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual

(AFM) for airplanes that are not

certificated for in-flight operation with

the power levers below the flight idle

stop. (Airplanes that are certificated for

this type of operation are not affected by

the above-referenced conditions.)

U.S. Type Certification of the Airplane

These airplane models are

manufactured in France and are type

certificated for operation in the United

States under the provisions of Section

21.29 of the Federal Aviation

Regulations and the applicable bilateral

airworthiness agreement. The FAA has

reviewed all available information, and

determined that AD action is necessary

for products of these type designs that

are certificated for operation in the

United States.

FAA’s Determinations

The FAA has examined the

circumstances and reviewed all

available information related to the

incidents and accidents described

previously. The FAA finds that the

Limitations Section of the AFM’s for

certain airplanes must be revised to

prohibit positioning the power levers

below the flight idle stop while the

airplane is in flight, and to provide a

statement of the consequences of

positioning the power levers below the

flight idle stop. The FAA has

determined that the affected airplanes

include those that are equipped with

turboprop engines and that are not

certificated for in-flight operation with

the power levers below the flight idle

stop.

The FAA notes that both Model ATR–

42 and ATR–72 series airplanes are

equipped with an electro-mechanical

gate device that is designed to protect

against the positioning of power levers

below the flight idle stop in flight. The

gate device has an override feature that

allows access to beta during a landing

roll, in the event of certain system

failures. If a certain type of failure

occurs, access to beta is available in

flight. A pilot who is accustomed to

protection that the electro-mechanical

gate device provides may inadvertently

access beta in flight. Further, a pilot

may deliberately access beta in flight

using the override feature.

In light of this, the FAA considers that

the revision of the AFM is necessary to

ensure that pilots are reminded that

positioning of power levers below the

flight idle stop while the airplane is in

flight is prohibited, even though an

electro-mechanical gate device is

installed. The FAA further considers

this to be a minimum action to ensure

that pilots do not carry over certain

flight habits from an airplane design

that mitigates the effects of beta in flight

to an airplane design that does not.

Explanation of the Requirements of the

Proposed AD

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on Model ATR–42 and ATR–72

series airplanes of the same type design,

the proposed AD would require revising

the Limitations Section of the AFM to

modify the limitation that prohibits the

positioning of the power levers below

the flight idle stop while the airplane is

in flight, and to add a statement of the

consequences of positioning the power

levers below the flight idle stop while

the airplane is in flight.

Cost Impact

The FAA estimates that 144

Aerospatiale Model ATR–42 and ATR–

72 series airplanes of U.S. registry

would be affected by this proposed AD,

that it would take approximately 1 work

hour per airplane to accomplish the

proposed actions, and that the average

labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based

on these figures, the cost impact of the

proposed AD on U.S. operators is

estimated to be $8,640, or $60 per

airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed

above is based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the proposed requirements of this AD

action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if

this AD were not adopted.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein

would not have substantial direct effects

on the States, on the relationship

between the national government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore,

in accordance with Executive Order

12612, it is determined that this

proposal would not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this proposed regulation (1)

is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket.

A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

Aerospatiale: Docket 97-NM–228-AD.

Applicability: All Model ATR–42 and

ATR–72 series airplanes, certificated in any

category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent loss of airplane controllability,

or engine overspeed and consequent loss of

engine power caused by the power levers

being positioned below the flight idle stop
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 236 / Tuesday, December 9, 1997 / Proposed Rules 64789

while the airplane is in flight, accomplish the

following:

(a) Within 30 days after the effective date

of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of

the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual

(AFM) to include the following statements.

This action may be accomplished by

inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM.

‘‘Positioning of power levers below the

flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight

is prohibited. Such positioning may lead to

loss of airplane control or may result in an

overspeed condition and consequent loss of

engine power.’’

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager,

Standardization Branch, ANM–113, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators

shall submit their requests through an

appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Standardization

Branch, ANM–113.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Standardization Branch,

ANM–113.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on

December 2, 1997.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 97–32120 Filed 12–8–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Mine Safety and Health Administration

30 CFR Parts 57 and 75

RIN 1219–AA94

Safety Standards for the Use of RoofBolting Machines in Underground

Mines

AGENCY: Mine Safety and Health

Administration, Labor.

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed

rulemaking.

SUMMARY: Recent accidents in

underground coal mines involving roofbolting machines indicate the need to

modify the design of such machines and

require additional safety features. The

accident history involving use of these

machines prompted the Mine Safety and

Health Administration (MSHA) to

evaluate roof-bolting machines currently

in use, primarily focusing on potential

hazards to the machine operators during

the drilling and roof-bolt installation

procedures. As a result of the evaluation

of accidents, MSHA is in the early

stages of establishing design criteria and

operating procedures for roof-bolting

machines in underground mines. This

notice seeks to obtain additional

information and data on machine

design, operating procedures, and

miners’ experiences with roof-bolting

machines.

DATES: Submit comments on or before

February 9, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Send comments to the

Office of Standards, Regulations, and

Variances, MSHA, Room 631, 4015

Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia

22203. Commenters are encouraged to

submit comments on a computer disk or

via e-mail to psilvey@msha.gov along

with an original hard copy or via telefax

to: 703–235–5551.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Patricia W. Silvey, Director, Office of

Standards, Regulations, and Variances,

703–235–1910.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

An estimated 2,500 roof-bolting

machines are currently in use at

underground coal, potash, trona, and

salt mines in the United States. The

machines are used to install many types

of roof bolts and other support materials

into the mine roof.

Between January 1984 and April

1994, 16 fatal accidents occurred

involving the operation and

maintenance of roof-bolting machines.

In a six-week period in early 1994, three

operators of roof-bolting machines were

killed while operating the machines in

coal mines. Two were crushed between

the drill head and machine frame while

bolting the rib, and the other was

crushed between the drill head boom

and canopy when the fast-feed boom lift

lever was inadvertently activated.

Responding to these accidents, on April

4, 1994, MSHA formed and chaired the

Roof-Bolting-Machine Committee

(committee) with representatives from

the U.S. Bureau of Mines and the West

Virginia Office of Miners’ Health,

Safety, and Training, to review accident

data, to visit mines to observe roofbolting practices, and to interview

miners. Additionally, the committee

met with four major roof-bolting

machine manufacturers, who provided

data and technical information on

machine design and function.

The study focused on boom and masttype roof-bolting machines and did not

include continuous mining machines

with integral bolters. Primarily, the

committee examined the potential

hazards to the roof-bolter operators

during the drilling and roof-bolt

installation procedures.

Following this study, the committee

issued a Report of Findings (Report) on

roof bolter safety on July 8, 1994

outlining problems and potential

solutions for reducing roof-bolting

accidents. These findings are

summarized below. Copies of the Report

are available to the public at all MSHA

district offices; from MSHA’s Office of

Standards, Regulations, and Variances,

by calling 703–235–1910; and through

MSHA’s Home Page on the Internet, at

http://www.msha.gov.

The committee was reconvened on

October 21, 1996. The purpose of this

meeting was to determine whether any

new technology or design changes had

occurred beyond those included in the

committee’s 1994 Report. The

committee identified one design change,

a new valve developed by a

manufacturer to prevent its two-handed,

fast-feed valve from being bypassed.

The committee also reviewed MSHA

accident data for the period from April

1994 through December 1996. (The

report covered January 1984 through

March 25, 1994.) Although there have

been numerous accidents and injuries,

there have been no fatalities related to

the operation of roof-bolting machines

in either coal or metal and nonmetal

mines since the issuance of the roofbolter safety report. An analysis of the

data confirmed that accidents directly

related to the operation and

maintenance of roof-bolting machines

continue to occur.

II. Findings

The committee identified several roofbolting-related problem areas which

may have contributed to or caused the

accidents. These included: (1)

inadvertent actuation of controls,

particularly the drill-head, fast-feed

control lever, which contributed to

approximately 50 percent of the fatal

accidents; (2) work position location; (3)

retrieval of drill steel; (4) resin insertion;

(5) location of controls; and (6) control

malfunction. In addition, the committee

identified various other areas for

improvement in future roof-bolting

machine design.

III. General Issues

The committee developed ten

possible solutions to address problems

with existing roof-bolting machines. The

solutions are as follows:

1. Installing two-handed, fast-feed

controls that prevent actuation of drillhead feed controls while the machine

operators are positioned in pinch-point

areas.