alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Carl MORTON, Appellant, v. J. Paul MILLS, Appellee.

No. 77-68.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 10, 1978.

Carl V. Morton in pro. per.

J. Paul Mills in pro. per.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and BARKDULL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals a summary final judgment in favor of the appellee in an action on a foreign judgment.

The record on appeal discloses that there are genuine issues of material fact which have not been eliminated by the movant for summary judgment. *Ratner v. Hensley,*303 So.2d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

**____________** No. 22
- 10380 Summary Calendar

**____________ United States of America,**  Plaintiff

— Appellee **,** versus **Adriana Colunga,** Defendant

— Appellant **.**

**______________________________** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:20
- CR
- 398 - 1

**______________________________** Before **Wiener, Elrod,** and **Engelhardt,** Circuit Judges **. Per Curiam**  **:** ***** Counsel for Defendant
- Appellant Adriana Colunga has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011).

**_____________________** * This opinion is not designated for publication. See **5th Cir . R.**  47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 27, 2022 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 22-10380 Document: 00516590017 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/27/2022No. 22
- 10380

2 Colunga has not filed a response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that t he appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. C ounsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is **GRANTED** , counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the appeal is **DISMISSED** . See **5th Cir. R.** 42.2 . Case: 22-10380 Document: 00516590017 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/27/2022
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Countrywide Financial Corporation (the "Company") for the quarter ended
March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Eric P. Sieracki, Executive Managing Director and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|/s/ ERIC P. SIERACKIEric P. Sieracki
Executive Managing Director
and Chief Financial Officer
May 12, 2008 |  | 
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the
electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Countrywide Financial Corporation and will be retained by Countrywide Financial Corporation and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---



QuickLinks
<PAGE>   1



                                                                      Exhibit 12


                             COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC.
               COMPUTATION OF RATIOS OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                          (Dollar Amounts in Thousands)
                                   (Unaudited)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                             SIX MONTHS ENDED
                                                  JUNE 30,                         YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
                                            --------------------  -----------------------------------------------------
                                              1999       1998       1998       1997       1996       1995       1994
                                            ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------

<S>                                         <C>        <C>        <C>        <C>        <C>        <C>        <C>
Interest Expense                            $  25,400  $  52,700  $ 101,900  $  90,400  $ 142,100  $ 151,000  $  73,300

Estimated Interest Portion of
    Rent Expense                                7,092      5,810     12,352     10,864     10,035     10,064     10,321
                                            ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------

Fixed Charges                               $  32,492  $  58,510  $ 114,252  $ 101,264  $ 152,135  $ 161,064  $  83,621
                                            =========  =========  =========  =========  =========  =========  =========

Income From Continuing
    Operations Before Income Taxes          $ 255,600  $ 218,200  $ 523,600  $ 483,200  $ 470,700  $ 297,300  $ 314,600

Add:     Fixed Charges                         32,492     58,510    114,252    101,264    152,135    161,064     83,621

         Dividends From Less Than
         50% Owned Companies                       --         --         --         --        287        968        549

Less:    Equity in (Earnings) / Losses
         of Less Than 50% Owned
         Companies                                (46)       332        595       (320)    (1,609)      (996)    (1,776)
                                            ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------

Earnings Before Fixed Charges               $ 288,046  $ 277,042  $ 638,447  $ 584,144  $ 621,513  $ 458,336  $ 396,994
                                            =========  =========  =========  =========  =========  =========  =========

Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges            8.9x        4.7x       5.6x       5.8x       4.1x       2.8x       4.7x
</TABLE>
#### TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Frank W. MANDRILLO et al., Appellees.

Nos. 72-637, 72-638.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 6, 1973.

Adams, George & Wood and Jack E. Thompson, Jeanne Heyward, Miami, for appellant.

Alfred Gustinger, Jr., Bolles, Goodwin, Ryskamp & Ware, Stephens, Magill, Thornton & Sevier, Abner Solomon, Schwartz & Acosta, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, CHARLES CARROLL and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

These appeals are from the same partial final judgment. Appellant contends that the trial court has misinterpreted a “modification of an insurance policy” as an attempted cancellation of the policy. The “modification” was an attempted removal of coverage from a part of a fleet of taxicabs. The trial court correctly held that this was an attempted cancellation within the meaning of the city ordinance and the Florida Public Service Commission regulation. Cf. Midstate Hauling Co. v. Reliable Insurance Co., 437 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1971).

Affirmed.
#### Kim Phuong Yu BUI, Plaintiff-Counter-defendant— Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America; et al., Defendants-Counter-claimants—Appellees.

No. 01-36171.

D.C. No. CV-00-00939-BJR.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 12, 2002.*

Decided Aug. 19, 2002.

Before SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, TASHIMA, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Kim Phuong Vu Bui appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in her action seeking a refund of penalties assessed against her as an income tax preparer pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 6694 and 6695. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Barnett v. Centoni,*31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994), and we affirm.

Bui contends summary judgment was improper because she did not prepare the income tax returns at issue, notwith*848standing that her name and social security number appears on each return as the paid preparer. This contention lacks merit. Bui admitted that she either voluntarily signed returns she did not personally examine and/or was aware that her name was being signed by someone else. The district court properly held that Bui’s signature and social security number constituted a declaration under penalty of perjury that she personally verified that the information on the return was correct and therefore subjected her to the penalty for preparers who understate a taxpayer’s liability. *See*IRS Form 1040, Declaration of Paid Preparer; *see also*I.R.C. §§ 6065 and 6694.

Bui also contends that because she did not receive any compensation for preparing the tax returns, she cannot be considered a preparer under I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36). This contention also lacks merit. The district court properly found that Bui did receive compensation for the preparation of tax returns because she was licensed by the City of Seattle as the sole proprietor of the tax preparation business which received compensation. Under Washington state community property law, she had an undivided one-half interest in the business and its revenues. *See Dean v. Lehman,*148 Wash.2d 12, 19, 18 P.3d 523 (2001) (en banc); *see also*Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.030.

Bui’s remaining contentions lack merit.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: In re Nazmudin Keshwani, M.D., Elite Doc Family Medicine, P.L.L.C., and Elite Doc Health & Beauty P.L.L.C.

Appellate case number: 01

- 16

- 00286

- CV

Trial court case number: 2016

- 21963

Trial court: 334th District Court of Harris County

Relators

, Nazmudin Keshwani, M.D., Elite Doc Family Medicine, P.L.L.C., and E lite Doc Health & Beauty P.L.L.C., have filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial

court’s April 7, 2016 Temporary Restraining Order and Order Setting Hearing for Temporary Injunction. Relators have also filed a motion for emergency stay , seeking a stay of the April 7,

2016 order

. We order real parties in interest, Med

- Cure A nti

- Aging & Skin Care, P.A. and Med

- Cure Primary Care Physicians, P.A., to file a response to the relator’s motion for emergency stay before 5 p.m. Monday, April 11, 2016

.
It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Rebeca Huddle

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: A p ril 8, 2016
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-1724

___________________________

Jeffrey Charles Rodd

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Warden Leann LaRiva et al.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

 ____________

 Submitted: September 15, 2020

Filed: September 20, 2021

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, BENTON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Federal inmate Jeffrey Rodd brought this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act against various

prison staff, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs

when they left him outside in sub zero weather in December 2014, causing serious
injury to his eyes, and then delayed effective treatment until successful surgeries on

each eye in 2017. 

The district court1 granted summary judgment dismissing Rodd’s Bivens claims

for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, as he did not attempt to file

formal grievances. See Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003). His

alleged blindness did not excuse failure to exhaust because Bureau of Prisons

regulations provide for assistance in obtaining administrative remedies, and Rodd did

not allege that prison officials prevented him from seeking assistance. See 28 C.F.R.

§ 542.16(a). The court dismissed Rodd’s Federal Tort Claims Act claims because

they were not adequately presented in any of the five prior administrative tort claims

Rodd filed; this action was not filed within six months after the Bureau of Prisons

denied the only arguably related claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); and Rodd was not

entitled to equitable tolling because he failed to establish that anything prevented him

from timely filing suit, see Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

After careful review of the record, we agree with the district court’s analysis

and further conclude the court did not abuse it discretion in denying Rodd’s motion

for appointment of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court

but modify dismissal of the Bivens claims to be without prejudice. We deny Rodd’s

request that we appoint appellate counsel.

______________________________

1The Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

-2-
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT

TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Sara Lee Corporation (the Company) for the fiscal quarter ended October 2, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, C. Steven McMillan, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------
|                                                 
|/s/    C. STEVEN
MCMILLAN                        
|Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer



November 5, 2004



67
**Final Listing of Questionnaire Files for Steam Electric Rulemaking Record**

**Plant ID 08046**  **Removed from Public**  **(Non-CBI) Docket**  **1 Copyright** 

**Flag 2**  **File Name Description**  

### 08046\08046_Completeness_Checklist.xls EPA Completeness Review Checklist 

### 08046\08046_HardcopyLog.doc EPA log of hardcopy documents submitted 

### x 08046\08046_PartA.xls Plant submitted survey file 

### x 08046\08046_PartE.xls Plant submitted survey file 

### x 08046\08046_PartH.xls Plant submitted survey file 

### x 08046\8046_Checklist.XLS EPA Technical Review Checklist Workbook



### 08046\Certification Statement_08046.pdf Plant certification statement 

### 08046\Supporting Documentation\08046_MAP-1.jpg Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey 

### x 08046\Supporting Documentation\08046_WB-1.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

1Final reviewed survey responses are located in the Steam Electric Technical Questionnaire Database
. 2Copyright documents are available from the docket.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Ruben HERNANDEZ, aka Ruben Guadalupe Franco, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 00-50133.

D.C. No. CR-98-05149-2-OWW.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 12, 2002.*

Decided Aug. 15, 2002.

Before HALL, KOZINSKI, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Hernandez first argues that the district court erred when it concluded that it did not have discretion to grant a 1-level departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. This provision does not contemplate or authorize such a departure. Because Hernandez was not qualified for a departure under § 3B1.2, the district court was also without discretion to consider his request for a departure pursuant to § 2D1.1. *See*U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n. 14.

Hernandez also claims that he is entitled to a departure under § 3E1.1, which requires a defendant to “clearly demonstrate[ ] acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” Only in “rare situations [will] a defendant ... clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 2. Hernandez’s inculpato-ry statements evince no contrition or remorse for his actions. *See United States v. Connelly,*156 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that “a failure to demonstrate contrition and remorse weighs against a finding of acceptance of responsibility”). Considering that “the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review,” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 5, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in denying a departure.

Finally, Hernandez claims that he should be resentenced pursuant to *Ap-prendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). In *United States v. Nordby,*225 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.2000) (overruled on other grounds), we held that, pursuant to *Ap-prendi,*an individual cannot be sentenced above the “prescribed statutory maximum,” which is the maximum punishmént to which the defendant could be exposed “solely under the facts found by the jury.” *81421 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) provides a maximum sentence of 20 years’ incarceration and indefinite supervised release without regard to a finding of any particular drug amount. Because Hernandez’s sentence of 235 months does not exceed the prescribed statutory maximum, we affirm his sentence.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Exhibit 32(a)


                       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


        In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Con-way Inc.
        (the "Company") for the period ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the
        Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
        I, Douglas W. Stotlar, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
        certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
        Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best
        of my knowledge:

           (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m
               or 78o(d)); and

           (2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company.


        Dated:  May 8, 2006




        /s/  Douglas W. Stotlar
        -------------------------
        Name: Douglas W. Stotlar
        Title:Chief Executive Officer






                                                                 Exhibit 32(b)

                       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


        In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Con-way Inc.
        (the "Company") for the period ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the
        Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
        I, Kevin C. Schick, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
        pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sectio 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
        of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

           (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m
               or 78o(d)); and

           (2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company.


        Dated:  May 8, 2006



        /s/  Kevin C. Schick
        -------------------------
        Name: Kevin C. Schick
        Title:Chief Financial Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

JOSEPH RHONE,

Petitioner

v.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 355 EAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 20th day of December, 2017

, the Petition for Allowance of

Appeal is DENIED

.
#### FIRST COMMERCE OF AMERICA INC., an Oregon corporation, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. GENESIS FIRE PROTECTION, INC., an Arizona corporation, et al., Defendants—Appellees. First Commerce Of America Inc., an Oregon corporation, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Genesis Fire Protection, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Defendant—Appellant. First Commerce Of America Inc., an Oregon corporation, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Grantham Fire Protection, Inc., a defunct Arizona corporation, et al., Defendants—Appellants.

No. 00-17060, 00-17169.

D.C. No. CV-96-02006-VAM.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Aug. 14, 2002.

Before WALLACE, KOZINSKI and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Paragraph 2 beginning on page 3 of our memorandum disposition filed on June 7, 2002, is amended to read as follows:

> “The second issue is whether the district court erred in holding that Genesis should not be held liable as a Grantham successor because Grantham’s “principal assets” were not transferred to Genesis. *A.R. Teeters &*Assocs., *Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,*172 Ariz. 324, 836 P.2d 1034, 1039 (1992). Under *A.R. Teeters,*the transfer of a corporation’s “principal assets” is a prerequisite to successor liability. *Id.*First Commerce argues that the district court erred in not finding that Grantham transferred its goodwill to Genesis. Because First Commerce failed to ask the district court to make such a finding, the argument is waived. *Hollinger v. United States,*651 F.2d 636, 640-41 (9th Cir.1981) (citation omitted). Even if First Commerce had not waived this argument, we would conclude that the district court’s finding on this issue was not clearly erroneous because Genesis did not purchase the Grantham receivables which had an esti*782mated value of $338,000. Nor did it purchase Grantham’s trade name or the tools that ultimately sold at auction for over $27,000. *Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,*523 F.2d 1327, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1975) (interpreting a nearly identical provision in California law to require the purchase of “all or substantially all of a corporation’s assets”). Since First Commerce’s other successor liability arguments hinge on the “principal assets” issue, the same result obtains.”

With this amendment, the panel as constituted above has unanimously voted to deny Appellant/Cross-Appellants’ petition for rehearing.

The petition for rehearing is DENIED.
Document

Exhibit 10.1
SUMMARY OF DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION 
Effective July 12, 2021, compensation paid to non-employee directors of A. O. Smith Corporation is as follows: Directors will receive an annual cash retainer of $103,500, paid quarterly. Each director receives Common Stock with the market value of $140,000 on the date of the award. The Lead Director receives an additional annual retainer of $30,000, paid quarterly.  The Chairperson of the Audit Committee receives an additional annual retainer of $20,000, paid quarterly.  The Chairperson of the Nominating and Governance Committee and the Personal and Compensation Committee receives an additional annual retainer of $15,000, paid quarterly.  The committee member retainers have been eliminated.