PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: DONNIE RAY ENNIS; THELMA 

MARIE ENNIS,

Debtors.

DONNIE RAY ENNIS; THELMA MARIE  No. 07-2134 ENNIS,

Debtors-Appellants,

v.

GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC,

Creditor-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Lynchburg.

William E. Anderson, Bankruptcy Judge.

(BK 07-60738)

Argued: October 28, 2008

Decided: February 25, 2009

Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges,

and Richard D. BENNETT, United States District Judge for

the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

Reversed by published opinion. Judge Michael wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Bennett joined.
COUNSEL

Stephen E. Dunn, STEPHEN E. DUNN, P.L.L.C., Forest,

Virginia, for Appellants. W. Calvin Smith, SPILMAN,

THOMAS & BATTLE, P.L.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for

Appellee.

OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:

The anti-modification clause in § 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code prevents a Chapter 13 debtor from bifurcating a

secured claim into secured and unsecured portions if the claim

is "secured only by a security interest in real property that is

the debtor’s principal residence." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). The

issue in this appeal is whether the definition (added in 2005)

of "debtor’s principal residence," which includes a mobile

home that is not "attached to real property," id. § 101(13A),

alters the real property requirement of the anti-modification

clause. We hold that the definition leaves the real property

requirement untouched. The bankruptcy court’s determination

to the contrary is reversed.

I.

In May 2002 Donnie Ennis entered into a Manufactured

Home Promissory Note, Security Agreement and Disclosure

Statement (the Security Agreement) with Green Tree Servicing, LLC (Green Tree) to finance the purchase of a 1997

Fleetwood mobile home. The Security Agreement gave Green

Tree a lien on the mobile home, which secured a debt in the

original amount of $24,747. Green Tree perfected its security

interest by having its lien noted on the Certificate of Title for

a Vehicle (the title for the mobile home) issued to Mr. Ennis

by the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles. The mobile

2 In Re: ENNIS
home is the principal residence of Mr. Ennis and his wife,

Thelma Ennis, and it sits on a lot rented by the Ennises in a

mobile home park. The mobile home is taxed as personal

property by Campbell County, Virginia.

In April 2007 the Ennises (the debtors) filed a petition for

relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtors

also filed a Chapter 13 plan (the plan) that called for the bifurcation of Green Tree’s claim into two parts: a secured claim

in the amount of $12,000, and an unsecured claim covering

the remainder of the debt ($11,923). The plan provided for the

payment of the secured portion of the claim over fifty-five

months at nine percent interest. Green Tree objected to the

plan, arguing that it impermissibly bifurcated (or modified) its

claim. The bankruptcy court entered an order sustaining the

objection on the grounds that Green Tree’s claim was protected from modification under § 1322(b)(2) because the

mobile home was real property that was the debtors’ principal

residence. In re Ennis, No. 07-60738-LYN (Bankr. W.D. Va.

Oct. 17, 2007). At the debtors’ request the bankruptcy court

certified that there is no controlling decision by this court with

respect to § 101(13A)’s effect on claim modification under

§ 1322(b)(2). We therefore authorized this direct appeal by

the debtors. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). The appeal presents a

question of law that we consider de novo. In re Bunker, 312

F.3d 145, 150 (4th Cir. 2002).

II.

Today’s dispute requires us to interpret the antimodification clause in Bankruptcy Code § 1322(b)(2), which

was included in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. A debtor’s Chapter 13 plan may "modify the rights of holders of

secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security

interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). According to the antimodification clause, when an undersecured claim is evidenced

by "a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s prinIn Re: ENNIS 3
cipal residence," the claim cannot be bifurcated into secured

and unsecured components. Green Tree argues that the definition of "debtor’s principal residence," added by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of

2005, prevents the modification of a claim secured by a lien

on a mobile home. According to the definition,

The term "debtor’s principal residence" —

(A) means a residential structure, including incidental property, without regard to whether that structure is attached to real property; and

(B) includes an individual condominium or cooperative unit, a mobile or manufactured home, or

trailer.

11 U.S.C. § 101(13A). Green Tree contends that the definition "evidences a . . . federal interest to define real property

in Chapter 13 not under varying state law, but under a broader

and uniform definition." Appellee’s Br. 3. Green Tree is mistaken about the effect of the definition.

The prohibition against modification in § 1322(b)(2) has

two distinct requirements: first, the security interest must be

in real property, and second, the real property must be the

debtor’s principal residence. The definition of "debtor’s principal residence" addresses only the second requirement, "leaving the explicit ‘real property’ [requirement] untouched." In

re Herrin, 376 B.R. 316, 320 (S.D. Ala. 2007). Not only does

the "debtor’s principal residence" definition avoid defining

"real property," but the definition also makes clear that

whether a structure is a principal residence is independent of

whether it might be real property. Specifically, the definition

states that a "debtor’s principal residence . . . means a residential structure . . . without regard to whether that structure is

attached to real property." 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A). Finally,

Green Tree ignores a basic canon of statutory construction in

4 In Re: ENNIS
attempting to use the definition of "debtor’s principal residence" to eliminate the real property requirement in the antimodification clause. A statute "must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect." Walters v.

Metro Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997). Here, the definition of "debtor’s principal residence" and the real property

requirement in the anti-modification clause may each be given

effect according to their plain language: "property can be a

debtor’s principal residence even if it is personalty, but it cannot be subject to the [anti-]modification provision unless it is

realty." In re Herrin, 376 B.R. at 320. In sum, the real property requirement of § 1322(b)(2)’s anti-modification clause

survives the definition of "debtor’s principal residence." 

It is undisputed that the anti-modification clause’s second

requirement is met in this case: the mobile home is the debtors’ principal residence. The remaining issue is whether the

mobile home meets the clause’s first, or real property,

requirement. We look to state law (here, Virginia law) to

determine whether the mobile home is personal or real property. Id. at 318; see also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48,

54-55 (1979) ("Congress has generally left the determination

of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state

law."). Mr. Ennis obtained a vehicle title to the mobile home

from the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles. See Va.

Code Ann. § 46.2-653. The mobile home was thus classified

under Virginia law as "tangible personal property" for tax

purposes, see id. § 58.1-3503.A.6, and the bankruptcy court

found that the home was taxed as personal property by Campbell County, Virginia. In the Security Agreement Mr. Ennis

agreed that the mobile home would "remain personal property" and that it would "not become a fixture or part of the

real property" without Green Tree’s written consent. J.A. 69.

The record reveals that the vehicle certificate of title to the

mobile home remains a valid document, which means that

Mr. Ennis honored the Security Agreement and did not return

the title to the Department of Motor Vehicles for cancellation

or otherwise attempt to convert the mobile home to real

In Re: ENNIS 5
estate. See Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-653 (outlining steps for converting a mobile home to real estate).

In re Witt, 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997), relied upon by the

bankruptcy court, does not support the argument that the

Ennis mobile home is real property. Witt involved an attempt

by debtors, invoking a different provision, § 1322(c), to bifurcate a claim secured by a deed of trust on a mobile home and

lot. The district court had determined that the mobile home

was real property under Virginia law, and that determination

was not challenged on appeal. 113 F.3d at 510 n.1. Because

the mobile home’s property classification was not at issue in

Witt, that case does not affect our analysis here.

We conclude that the mobile home in this case is personal

property. Accordingly, the real property requirement of

§ 1322(b)(2)’s anti-modification clause is not satisfied, and

the debtors are not prevented from modifying Green Tree’s

secured claim in their Chapter 13 plan.

The order of the bankruptcy court is

REVERSED.

6 In Re: ENNIS