### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

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### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

IRONSHORE SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant,

v.

CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP
, and TERRENCE P. COLLINGSWORTH, Individually and as Agent of CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP, Appellees.

No. 4D21

- 784

[ May 18, 2022 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Keathan B. Frink, Judge; L.T. Case No. 17

- 1223 CACE.

Dinah S. Stein and Mark Hicks of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., Miami, and Stephen H unter Johnson and Nathaniel Haim Sari of Lydecker Diaz, Miami, for appellant.

Bruce S. Rogow and Tara A. Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellee Conrad & Scherer, LLP.

Timothy W. Burns, Jeff Bowen and Jesse Bair of Burns Bowen Bair LL P, Madison, Wisconsin, Pro Hac Vice for appellee Conrad & Scherer, LLP.

M AY
, J.

An insurer appeals a final judgment on the insurer’s duty to defend. It argues

the court erred in granting the insured law firm ’s motion and denying the

insurer’s motion for summary judgment because: (1) coverage is excluded under the policy’s “prior lit igation” and “related professional legal services” exclusions; and (2) the court failed to consider the insurer’s other affirmative defenses and

counterclaim for recission of the policy in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. We agree with the insur er on the second issue . We reverse and remand the case for further proceedings

.

• THE BACKGROUND

In 2014, the insurer issued a Lawyer’s Professional Liability Policy to the law

fir m

. The law firm notified the insurer of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“ RICO ”) suit filed against it during the policy period. The2 RICO suit involved allegations that stemmed in part from the law firm’s representation of plaintiffs in earlier filed human rights lawsuits.

• The Underlying Lawsuits

1. The Human Rights Lawsuits

O n March 20, 2009, one of the law firm’s partners (“Collingsworth”) filed three human rights lawsuits against Drummond Co mpany, Inc. (“Drummond”) under

the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 in the

Northern District of Alabama . The complaints alleged Drummond aided and abetted a Colombian paramilitary group in the wrongful death of union activists

and other civilians related to Drummond’s Colombia mining operations.

2. The Defamation Lawsuit

On October 21, 2011, Drummond filed a one

- count defamation complaint against Collingsworth and the law firm alleging that Collingsworth wrote three letters defaming Drummond i n 2011 at the behest of Llanos Oil Exploration Limited, a Drummond rival. Two letters were sent to Dutch government officials and one to the Itochu Corporation , a potential Japanese investor . The letters urged the recipients to take notice of Drummond’s actions in Colombia, including its alleged relations with paramilitary groups and the resulting human rights

violations.

3. The RICO Lawsuit

Nearly four years later, on March 27, 2015, Drummond filed the RICO lawsuit against the law firm and others. The complaint was 106 pages long with 86 pages of appendices. It alleged that since 2007, Collingsworth, the law firm, foreign attorneys, human rights groups, oil executives, and others engaged in a coordinated “enterprise” against Drummond in violation o f RICO. Part of the alleged enterprise were the three human rights lawsuits filed in 2009

. The law firm submitted the RICO case to its insurer and requested a defense. The insurer

refused to defend the law firm.

• THIS CASE

The law firm filed a one

- count complaint against the insurer requesting a declaration that the insurer had a duty to defend it in the RICO case and to

reimburse the law firm for incurred defense fees and cost s . The insurer admitted

the RICO case had been filed during the policy period and involved Professional Legal Services but denied both a duty to defend and c overage based on the prior litigation exclusion and other policy provisions. It asserted multiple affirmative defenses, a counterclaim, and a thi rd

- party complaint against Collingsworth,3 which sought a declaration of no coverage

, no duty to defend

, and recission of the policy.

Both the law firm and insurer moved for summary judgment on the duty to

defend. Their arguments were limited to the application of E xclusion C

— the prior litigation exclusion. The circuit court granted the law firm’s motion and

denied the insurer’s motion in an extensive written orde r. The court specifically found the insurer had a duty to defend the law firm in the RICO case.

The insurer moved for rehearing, arguing the circuit court’s order did not

address all its affirmative defenses and the court had ruled on issues not raised

i n the motions

. The court denied the motion.

The insurer then moved for clarification and/or to set aside the order, arguing

the circuit court : (1) failed to consider its other affirmative defenses ; (2) ruled on issues not raised by the motions; and (3) failed to address the rescission

counterclaim . In denying the motion, a successor judge reviewed the record and

found the summary judgment order “addresse[d] all [the law firm’s] claims against [the insurer] and . . . all of [the insurer’s] affirmative d efenses and counterclaims against [the law firm].” But the successor judge found the order on the summary judgment motions was not final because there had been no determination of the attorney’s fees, costs, and interest owed to the law firm.

Following d iscovery

, briefing , and an evidentiary hearing , the court ordered the insurer to pay $2,553,699.56 in fees and costs, and prejudgment interest. The successor judge reserved jurisdiction to award further fees and expenses, to

e nforce the insurer’s duty to defend and duty to indemnify , and to enter such

furth e r or ders as the cou r t deemed “just, necessary, and proper

. ” From these orders, the insurer now appeals.

• THE ANALYSIS

More than two thirds of the briefs in this appeal focus on the insurer’s duty

to defend

, the application of the prior litigation and related claims exclusions

, and whether the eight corners rule applies

. In its last and shortest issue

, however, the insurer argues the case must be reversed because the circuit court
did not address i ts remaining affirmative defenses and rescission counterclaim before entering its “final” judgment. I t is th is last argument upon which we

focus.

We do not reach the duty to defend issue and express no opinion on the

merits. Rather, we address the err or that occurred when the successor judge

found that the order on the motions for summary judgment addressed “all [the law firm’s] claims against [ the insurer] and it addresse[d] all of [ the insurer’s] affirmative defenses and counterclaims against [the law firm]” and “no4 outstanding issues of liability remain at issue.” See N

. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Seitlin

& Co. , 919 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)

. That simply was not true.

W hen the court r uled in favor of the law firm on the duty to defend, its judicial labor was not at an end. The insurer twice brought the remaining affirmative

defenses and rescission counterclaim to the attention of the court to no avail.

Rather than resolve those remai ning issues, the successor judge declared that all issues had been resolved when in fact they had not. D espite the trappings of finality found in the successor judge’s order, other interrelated issues r emained outstanding

.

Florida adheres to the princi pal that “piecemeal appeals should not be permitted where claims are legally interrelated and in substance involve the

same transaction.” Mendez v. W. Flagler Family Ass ’n

, 303 So. 2 d 1, 5 (Fla. 1974); see also S. L. T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb , 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974).

Th ere can be no doubt that th e declaratory relief and rescission c laims in this

case are interrelated. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrick , 763 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)

. We therefore reverse and remand the case for the cou rt to

vacate the January 11, 2021 order and the order denying the insurer’s motion

for clarification. We remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings

.

G ROSS and C IKLIN , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.