J-A15006-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

RAYMOND QUAGLIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

DAVID HATCHIGIAN AND BANK OF 

AMERICA 

APPEAL OF: DAVID HATCHIGIAN No. 2638 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 8, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 1037 April Term, 2010 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED AUGUST 04, 2014 

 Appellant, David Hatchigian, appeals pro se from the order entered on 

August 8, 2013, by the Honorable William J. Manfredi, Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County. After careful review, we affirm. 

 This appeal arises from a suit instituted by Raymond Quaglia, Esquire, 

asserting breach of contract and defamation claims against his former client, 

Hatchigian.1

 According to the complaint, Hatchigian had retained Quaglia’s 

professional services in three separate matters. In two of the matters, a 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 Quaglia also asserted a defamation claim against Bank of America, 

however, Quaglia voluntarily discontinued this claim on December 3, 2010. 
J-A15006-14

- 2 - 

contingent fee agreement was reached, while in the third, Quaglia would bill 

Hatchigian on an hourly basis. 

 When one of the contigent fee matters settled, Quaglia distributed the 

funds to Hatchigian and himself. Hatchigian subsequently filed an affidavit 

of forgery with Bank of America, Quaglia’s bank, alleging that his signature 

on the settling defendant’s check had been forged and that he had received 

no payment. The affidavit caused Bank of America to stop payment and 

charge back the payment against Quaglia’s account. Ultimately, Hatchigian 

recanted the affidavit. 

 As noted above, Quaglia then sued Hatchigian for unpaid fees and 

defamation. The case proceeded to arbitration, where Hatchigian was 

represented by counsel. The arbitrators found in favor of Quaglia. 

Hatchigian then filed a pro se appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. 

Hatchigian subsequently utilized the services of counsel, and the parties 

picked a jury on November 23, 2011, the day before the Thanksgiving 

holiday. After the jury was picked, the parties settled the case, and the jury 

discharged. However, on Thanksgiving Day, Hatchigian e-mailed his counsel 

the following message: “After careful consideration of the proposed 

settlement offer, I must respectfully decline. For all other previous reasons.” 

 Hatchigian, through counsel, filed a praecipe to discontinue the case 

on December 20, 2011. However, the praecipe was not docketed until 

January 4, 2012. In the meantime, Hatchigian filed a pro se petition to 
J-A15006-14

- 3 - 

strike his own praecipe on January 3, 2012. Because of the chronology, 

Hatchigian’s pro se petition was marked as moot administratively, without 

court review. Hatchigian filed a timely appeal. 

 On appeal, the trial court recommended that the matter be remanded 

to address Hatchigian’s petition to strike. This Court concurred, and 

remanded the case back to the trial court for proceedings on Hatchigian’s 

petition to strike. See Quaglia v. Hatchigian, 617 EDA 2012, unpublished 

memorandum (Pa. Super. September 18, 2012). Upon remand, the trial 

court held a hearing on April 17, 2013. On August 8, 2013, the trial court 

entered an order denying Hatchigian’s petition to strike the praecipe to 

discontinue. This timely appeal followed. 

On appeal, Hatchigian raises a single issue for our review: “Did the 

trial court err by assuming that Leventhal [Hatchigian’s counsel] properly 

exercised Travelers’ [Hatchigian’s insurer] settlement authority in light of the 

insured’s November 24th email?” Appellant’s Brief, at 12. Our standard of 

review of this issue is straightforward: “The authority to strike off a 

discontinuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will 

not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion.” Hopewell v. Hendrie, 562 

A.2d 899, 900 (Pa. Super. 1989). 

Here, the trial court found that Hatchigian understood and agreed to 

the terms of the settlement on November 23, 2011. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 8/8/13, at ¶¶ 36-37. This finding is supported by the testimony of 
J-A15006-14

- 4 - 

Hatchigian’s then-counsel: “I immediately called Mr. Hatchigian on his cell 

phone, and I explained the entire deal and got his express authority to 

settle.” N.T., Hearing on Petition to Strike, 4/17/13, at 84.2

 As the trial 

court was in a superior position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, we 

can find no abuse of discretion in this finding. 

Based upon this finding, the trial court concluded that the settlement 

agreement was binding upon Hatchigian, and that Hatchigian’s subsequent 

change of heart did not act to invalidate the agreement. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 8/8/13, at ¶ 49. This legal conclusion is supported by precedent, 

and does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Thus, we conclude that 

Hatchigian’s sole issue on appeal merits no relief.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/4/2014 

____________________________________________ 

2

 We note that the Certified Record does not contain a copy of this 

transcript, and further, that our review of the record does not reveal that 

Hatchigian requested a transcript in conjunction with his notice of appeal. 

However, a copy of the transcript is included in the reproduced record, and 

Quaglia has not objected to its inclusion. Under these circumstances, we 

decline to find Hatchigian’s claims waived.