AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed October 13, 2016 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00523-CV 

IN THE INTEREST OF D.L.D., A CHILD 

On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 199-30045-2015 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Lang-Miers, and Justice Stoddart 

Opinion by Chief Justice Wright 

Vickie Davis, maternal grandmother of D.L.D., appeals from the trial court’s judgment 

naming the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services as the managing conservator of 

D.L.D. pending adoption of the child by Connie Stewart, the paternal grandmother and her 

husband, Jeff Stewart. (collectively “paternal grandparents”). In two issues, Vickie contends the 

trial court erred in (1) denying her motion for genetic testing of potential fathers of D.L.D. and 

(2) failing to offer a plan for rehabilitation to her and Maxey Davis, her husband and maternal 

grandfather. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Background 

D.L.D. was removed after her 40-day old brother died while in the possession of Mother. 

At the time, Mother was living with Vickie and Maxey, and D.L.D. slept with her grandparents. 

Drug testing for all except D.L.D. came back positive. D.L.D. was placed with her paternal 
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grandparents. Although Mother and D.L.D.’s Father were not married, Father acknowledged 

paternity. 

Seeking custody of D.L.D., Vickie intervened in the lawsuit filed by the Department of 

Family and Protective Services and also filed a motion for genetic testing. The motion was 

denied for lack of standing. Mother and Father relinquished their parental rights. Vickie entered 

into a partial mediated settlement agreement (MSA) providing that the Department is to be 

named managing conservator pending adoption of D.L.D. by the paternal grandparents. If for 

some reason the adoption is not finalized, the paternal grandparents are to be named permanent 

managing conservators. Also under the MSA, the maternal grandparents are to have continued 

visitation with D.L.D. and the visitation is to be incorporated into the adoption decree. The trial 

court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father and entered judgment in accordance 

with the MSA. Vickie timely appealed. 

Genetic Testing 

In her first issue, Vickie contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for genetic 

testing of potential fathers of D.L.D. The trial court stated on the record that she denied the 

motion because Vickie lacked standing. 

A party’s standing to pursue and maintain a cause of action is a question of law. See 

Coons–Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). We 

review the question of standing de novo. See id. When standing has been statutorily conferred, 

the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis. See Everett v. TK–Taito, 

L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). The party seeking relief 

must allege and establish standing within the parameters of the language used in the statute. See 

id. 
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The Texas Family Code provides for mandatory genetic testing and contains a list of the 

individuals and entities who have standing to pursue such an action. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 

§§ 160.502(a); 160.602(a) (West 2014). A party must be entitled to maintain a proceeding to 

adjudicate parentage as set out in the family code before a trial court can order genetic testing. 

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.502(a); In re Rodriguez, 248 S.W.3d 444, 450-51 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding). Section 160.602 enumerates the following persons who may 

adjudicate parentage: (1) the child; (2) the mother of the child; (3) a man whose paternity is to be 

adjudicated; (4) a support enforcement agency or other government agency authorized by other 

law; (5) an authorized adoption or child-placement agency; (6) an authorized representative of an 

incapacitated or deceased person or minor who would otherwise be entitled to maintain a 

proceeding; (7) a person closely related to a deceased mother; and (8) an intended parent. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.602(a)(1)-(8). 

 Vickie contends that she had standing under section 102.004 of the family code. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004 (West 2014). Vickie’s reliance on section 102.004 is 

misplaced. Section 102.004 concerns standing of a grandparent to seek conservatorship of a 

grandchild. This section does not provide Vickie with standing to seek an order for genetic 

testing. 

As set forth above, standing to adjudicate parentage is governed by section 160.602(a). 

Vickie does not fall within any of the enumerated categories of persons who may adjudicate 

parentage. For this reason, we conclude Vickie lacked standing to request an order for genetic 

testing and, therefore, the trial court did not err in denying her motion for genetic testing of 

potential fathers. We overrule Vickie’s first issue. 
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Custody 

 In her second issue, Vickie contends the trial court erred in “failing to offer a roadmap for 

the maternal grandparents of D.L.D. to rehabilitate themselves.” We construe this issue as a 

complaint that the trial court erred in not awarding custody of D.L.D. to her. As noted above, 

Vickie entered into the MSA as to the conservatorship of D.L.D. and visitation. 

Texas has a policy of encouraging “the peaceable resolution of disputes” particularly in 

disputes involving the parent-child relationship. In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 448 (Tex. 2013) 

(quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.002). In furtherance of that policy, a trial 

court may refer a suit affecting the parent-child relationship to mediation and, if a mediated 

settlement agreement is reached, must enter a judgment on the agreement without inquiry into 

whether it is in the best interest of a child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(c) (West 

2014); Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 447. Pursuant to section 153.0071 of the Texas Family Code, a 

mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if the agreement: 

(1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced type or 

capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation; 

(2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and 

(3) is signed by the party’s attorney, if any, who is present at the time the 

agreement is signed. 

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(d), (e) (West 2014). A party is entitled to judgment on a 

mediated settlement agreement if it meets subsection (d)’s requirements without regard to 

whether it is in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(e); Lee, 411 

S.W.3d at 447. A trial court may only decline to enter judgment on a mediated settlement 

agreement if it finds that a party to the agreement was a victim of domestic violence, the violence 

impaired the party’s ability to make decisions, and the agreement is not in the child’s best 
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interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(e–1); In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 451–52 (Tex. 

2013). 

The Court signed an agreed order of referral to mediation. Counsel for all parties signed 

the order. Vickie and her attorney signed the MSA that prominently stated: “THIS 

AGREEMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVOCATION.” Pursuant to the MSA, Vickie agreed 

that she and Maxey would not be appointed conservators of D.L.D., the paternal grandparents 

would adopt D.L.D. and, if for some reason adoption could not be finalized, the paternal 

grandparents would become the permanent managing conservators of D.L.D., and that she and 

Maxey would have continued visitation with D.L.D. as set forth in the MSA. At the hearing in 

the trial court, Vickie testified that the MSA was in D.L.D.’s best interest. Vickie has not alleged 

that she was a victim of domestic violence and that the violence impaired her ability to make 

decisions, the sole basis on which a trial court may decline to enter judgment on a mediated 

settlement agreement. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(e–1); In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 

452. 

Because the MSA met the requirements for entry of judgment thereon and Vickie did not 

allege facts within the exception of entering judgment pursuant to the MSA, we conclude the 

trial court did not err in entering judgment in accordance with the MSA. We overrule Vickie’s 

second issue. 

 We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

160523F.P05 

 

/Carolyn Wright/ 

CAROLYN WRIGHT 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

IN THE INTEREST OF D.L.D., A CHILD 

No. 05-16-00523-CV 

 On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 199-30045-2015. 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright. 

Justices Lang-Miers and Stoddart 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services 

recover its costs of this appeal from appellant Vickie Davis. 

Judgment entered October 13, 2016.