Interim Decision #2833 

MATTER OF SQUIRES 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-22712143 

Decided by Board October 23, 1980 

(1) Unlawfully obtaining by a false pretence $450.00 in Canadian currency with intent to 

defraud in violation of section 304(1a) of the Criminal Code of Canada is a crime 

involving moral turpitude. 

(2) False pretence under section 319(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada is a representation of-a matter of fact either present or past, made by words or otherwise, that is 

known by the person who maim; it to be false and that is made with a fraudulent 

intent to induce the person to whom it is made to act upon it. 

(3) A crime committed under section 304 of the Criminal Code of Canada cannot be 

considered a petty offense where the value of what is obtained exceeds $50.00 and 

punishment can be a term of imprinonmont for ton years. 

(4) A conviction for intent to defraud has, as a general rule, been held to involve moral 

turpitude. 

CHARGE: 

Order Act of 1952—Sec. 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Excludable—convicted of a 

crime involving moral turpitude; false pretences 

ON BEHALF or RESPONDENT Harry Kobel, Esquire 

Rosin & Kobel 

2156 City National Bank Building 

Detroit, Michigan 48226 

By: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Appleman, and Maguire, Hoard Members 

In a decision dated October 30, 1979, an immigration judge found the 

respondent deportable under section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1), as an alien excludable at the time 

of entry for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude 

under section 212(a)(9) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9) and denied 

voluntary departure. The respondent has appealed. The appeal will be 

dismissed as to the issue of deportability and granted as to voluntary 

departure. 

The respondent is a 50-year-old divorced male alien, a native and 

citizen of Canada who, according to the allegations contained in the 

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Order to Show Cause, entered the United States on June 14, 1979, as a 

nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure authorized to remain until June 17, 

1979.1He had been employed in the business of public relations in 

Canada but conceded that presently he is not employed in Canada. The 

respondent further testified that he is presently engaged in making a 

business known as "Emily Across the Street" a success and without 

him the business would have failed. The respondent contends that he 

fell in love with the owner of the business that was not doing well and 

decided to give up his business in Canada and concentrate on making 

"Emily Across the Street" successful. He concedes that he was engaging in his usual business of public relations for the past year without 

any monetary return, but did so out of love. 2 

The Order to Show Cause issued the respondent on July 10, 1979, 

charges that he is excludable under the provisions of section 212(a)(9) 

of the Act for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude 

prior to entry which was not a petty offense. 

The respondent admitted and evidence was submitted to show that 

he was convicted on August 11, 1970 in the Provincial Court of Canada 

(Criminal Division) of the crime of unlawfully obtaining by a false 

pretence $450.00 in Canadian currency from Victoria and Grey Trust 

Co. Ltd. with intent to defraud in violation of section 304(la) of the 

Criminal Code of Canada. The sentence was suspended and the respondent was given probation for six months. 

On appeal, the respondent through counsel contends that because of 

the sentence imposed, his conviction is a petty offense and that he 

should be granted voluntary departure as a matter of discretion. 

The questions presented is whether the respondent's conviction for 

unlawfully obtaining $450.00 by a false pretence is a crime involving 

moral turpitude and whether this crime is classifiable as a petty 

offense. False pretence under section 319(1) of the Criminal Code of 

Canada is defined as follows: A false pretence is a representation of a 

matter of fact either present or past, made by words or otherwise, that 

is known by the person who makes it to be false and that is made with a 

fraudulent intent to induce the person to whom it is made to act upon 

it. 

The immigration judge found that the respondent's conviction was 

for a crime involving moral turpitude. Section 304 of the Canadian 

statute provides: 

(1) Everyone commits an offense who (a) by a false pretence, whether directly or 

The respondent testified that he could not remember the exact date of his entry and 

how long he was authorized to stay but it was between June 14 and July 10, 1979. 

2 The respondent testified that he had an agreement with the owner of "Emily Across 

the Street" but he did not give the details of the agreement. 

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through the medium of a contract obtained by a false pretence, obtains anything in 

respect of which the offense of theft may be committed or causes it to be delivered to 

another person; ... 

(2) Everyone who commits an offense under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) is guilty of 

an indictable offense and is liable, to imprisonment for ten years ... where the value of 

what is obtained exceeds $50.00 . 

When this crime is measured by United States standards, it cannot be 

considered a misdemeanor and therefore cannot be considered a petty 

offense. Section 1 of Title 18, United States Code provides: (1) Any 

offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year is a felony. Further, a conviction for intent to defraud has, as a 

general rule, been held to involve moral turpitude. See ETA ex. ret. 

Portada v. Day, 16 F.2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); Matter of P—, 3 I&N Dee. 

56 (C.0. 1947; BIA 1948); Matter of C-0—, 8 I&N Dec. 488 (BIA 1959). 

The immigration judge concluded that the respondent had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude not classifiable as a petty 

offense and that his deportability had been established by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence. 

The respondent's application for voluntary departure was denied as 

a matter of administrative discretion by the immigration judge. The 

immigration judge found that a nonimmigrant visitor has no 

authorization to wurk in the United States even if no money is paid. 

The immigration judge further found that the immigration laws themselves are undermined when aliens without permission engage in their 

professional occupation for an extended period of time and thereafter 

defeat the intent of section 212(a)(14) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(14) 

by claiming that they have refrained from competing with United 

States labor_ The immigration judge concluded that the respondent's 

engagement in his public relations business by preventing the business 

of his "girl friend" from failing and by assisting in all aspects of the 

running of the store was engaging in employment without complying 

with the normal visa requirements. 

We agree with the finding of the immigration judge that the respondent's convictions under section 304(a) of the Criminal Code of 

Canada is a crime involving moral turpitude and is not classified as a 

petty offense. We conclude that the respondent's deportability under 

sections 241(a)(1) of the Act as an alien who at the time of entry was 

excludable as one who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude under section 212(a)(9) of the Act has been established by clear, 

convincing, and unequivocal evidence. 

In our review of the record, we do not find that the respondent's 

conviction or his unauthorized employment is so unfavorable as to 

preclude him from the benefit of voluntary departure. Therefore, the 

decision of the immigration judge denying the respondent the privilege 

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of voluntary departure is reversed. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed as to the finding of deportability 

and sustained as to voluntary departure. 

FURTHER ORDER: The outstanding order of deportation is 

withdrawn, and in lieu of an order of deportation the respondent is 

allowed to depart voluntarily, without expense to the Government, 

within 30 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that 

time as may be granted by the District Director and under such 

conditions as he may direct. In the event of the respondent's failure to 

so depart, the order of deportation will be reinstated and executed. 

564