J-A15006- 14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 RAYMOND QUAGLIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. DAVID HATCHIGIAN AND BANK OF AMERICA

APPEAL OF: DAVID HATCHIGIAN No. 2638 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order Entered August 8 , 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 1037 April Term, 2010

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J. * MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED AUGUST 04, 2014 Appellant, David Hatchigian, appeals pro se from the order entered on August 8, 2013, by the Honorable William J. Manfred i, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. After careful review, we affirm. This appeal arises from a suit instituted by Raymond Quaglia, Esquire, asserting breach of contract and defamation claims again st his former client, Hatchigian. 1 According to the complaint, Hatchigian had retained Qu aglia ’s professional services in three separate matters. In two o f the matters, a

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 Quaglia also asserted a defamation claim against Bank of America, however, Quaglia voluntarily discontinued this claim on December 3, 2010.J-A15006- 14

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contingent fee agreement was reached, while in the thi rd, Quaglia would bill Hatchigian on an hourly basis. When one of the contigent fee matters settled, Quagli a distributed th e funds to Hatchigian and himself. Hatchigian subsequen tly filed an affidavit of forgery with Bank of America, Quaglia’s bank, alleging that his signature on the settling defendant’s check had been forged and t hat he had received no payment. The affidavit caused Bank of America to s top payment and charge back the payment against Quaglia’s account. Ulti mately, Hatchigian

recanted the affidavit. As noted above, Quaglia then sued Hatchigian for unpa id fees and defamation. The case proceeded to arbitration, where Hatchigian was represented by counsel. The arbitrators found in favo r of Quaglia. Hatchigian then filed a pro se appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. Hatchigian subsequently utilized the services of counsel, and the parties picked a jury on November 23, 2011, the day before t he Thanksgiving holiday. After the jury was picked, the parties settle d the case, and the jury discharged. However, on Thanksgiving Day, Hatchigian e-mailed his counsel the following message: “After careful consideration o f the proposed settlement offer, I must respectfully decline. For all other previous reasons.” Hatchigian, through counsel, filed a praecipe to discont inue the case on December 20, 2011. However, the praecipe was not d ocketed until January 4, 2012. In the meantime, Hatchigian filed a pro se petition toJ-A15006- 14

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strike his own praecipe on January 3, 2012. Because of the chronology, Hatchigian’s pro se petition was marked as moot administratively, without court review. Hatchigian filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the trial court recommended that the matt er be remanded to address Hatchigian’s petition to s trike. This Court concurred, and remanded the case back to the trial court for proceed ings on Hatchigian’s petition to strike. See Quaglia v. Hatchigian , 617 EDA 2012, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. September 18, 2012). Upon r emand, the trial court held a hearing on April 17, 2013. On August 8, 2013, the trial court entered an order denying Hatchigian’s petition to stri ke the praecipe to discontinue. This timely appeal followed. On appeal, Hatchigian raises a single issue for our re view: “Did the trial court err by assuming that Leventhal [Hatchigian’s counsel] properly exercised Travelers’ [Hatchigian’s insurer] settlement authority in light of the

i nsured’s November 24 th email?” Appellant’s Brief, at 12. Our standard of review of this issue is straightforward: “ The authority to strike off a

discontinuance is vested in the sound discretion of the t rial court, and we will

not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion. ” Hopewell v. Hendrie , 562 A.2d 899, 900 (Pa. Super. 1989). Here, the trial court found that Hatchigian understood and agreed to the terms of the settlement on November 23, 2011. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/13, at ¶¶ 36-37. This finding is support ed by the testimony ofJ-A15006- 14

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Hatchigian’s then

- counsel: “I immediately called Mr. Hatchigian on his cel l phone, and I explained the entire deal and got his e xpress authority to settle.” N.T., He aring on Petition to Strike, 4/17/13, at 84. 2 As the trial court was in a superior position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, we can find no abuse of discretion in this finding. Based upon this finding, the trial court concluded that the settlement agreement was binding upon Hatchigian, and that Hatc higian’s subsequent change of heart did not act to invalidate the agreeme nt. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/13, at ¶ 49. This legal conclusion is sup ported by precedent, and does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Thus, w e conclude that Hatchigian’s sole issue on appeal merits no relief. Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/4/2014

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2 We note that the Certified Record does not contain a copy of this transcript, and further, that our review of the recor d does not reveal that Hatchigian requested a transcript in conjunction with h is notice of appeal. However, a copy of the transcript is included in the re produced record, and Quaglia has not objected to its inclusion. Under these ci rcumstances, we decline to find Hatchigian’s claims waived.