J-A13043-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: R.L.J., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.L.J.

No. 798 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order April 15, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at No(s): No. 1849-09

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J. MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2015 R.L.J. (“R.J.”) appeals from the dispositional ord er entered following an adjudication of delinquency for the offenses of pos session of a firearm with an altered manufacturer’s number, carrying a firear m without a license, and possession of a firearm by a minor. 1, 2 On appeal, R.J. raises two issues: (1) “Did law enforcement fail to present objective evidence of reasonable suspicion to perform an investigative detention of R.J. when the police failed to sufficiently prove that R.J. was the person who ran from police in a high crime area,” and (2) “Was the identification eviden ce insufficient beyond a reasonable doubt when police identified R.J. as the suspect because he stood

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6110.2(a), 6106(a)(1), and 6110.1(a) , respectively.

2 On April 15, 2014, R.J. was committed to Mid Atlan tic Youth Services.J-A13043-15

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in the backyard of fifteen row houses, considering that the police never saw the suspect’s face, could not describe the suspect in any detail, and lost sight of the suspect when he or she ran behind the fifteen row houses?”

R.J.’s Brief at 8. 3 Based upon the following, we affirm. Prior to the adjudication hearing, R.J. filed a mo tion to suppress, which was denied by the juvenile court. The facts adduce d at the suppression hearing were set forth in the juvenile court’s find ings of fact:

1. On the date in question, the police officer in the case was on routine patrol in the area of Mon View Heights.

2. This area is known by the police to be a high-crime area for both drugs and violence. While on patrol in this area, t he police officer observed a person wearing dark clothes, with a hood y, cross the roadway in front of his marked vehicle. The individ ual was wearing a hoody with the hood up.

3. This person turned, viewed the patrol car, and bega n to hurry away from the area. Thereafter, he turned and looke d back at the patrol car and began to run around a building i n the area.

4. The officer drove around the building and around th e block. He stopped the car, exited, and walked through the bui lding tunnel, which was a passageway described in the record of b eing able to gain access from the front to the back area of the building, which the police officer described as almost like a yard- type landscape.

5. Upon turning the corner, the officer saw a person w ho matched the clothing and description of the person he saw r unning from the patrol car.

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3 R.J. timely complied with the order of the juvenil e court to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal

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6. The Officer, due to the late hour, the darkness, th e flight and his inability to see the person’s hands, asked him to r aise his hands for the officer’s safety.

7. Upon raising his hands, the Officer saw in plain vi ew a pistol in the waistband of the juvenile.

8. There were no other people seen in the area at this time.

9. Given the high-crime area, the flight of the person that matched the description of the person he saw running earlie r, and the inability to see that person’s hands, the officer w as within his rights to ask for the minimal intrusion for officer ’s safety for the raising of the juvenile’s hands. Thereafter, the we apon was in plain view and properly seized. Juvenile Court Opinion, 12/19/2014, at 1–2. R.J. first challenges the court’s suppression rulin g. Specifically, R.J. contends that the officer lacked reasonable suspici on to stop him because “in the present case, the officer was not justified in his belief that R.J. was the suspect.” R.J.’s Brief at 20. R.J. asserts the Co mmonwealth’s evidence only

showed: R.J. was merely standing in the backyard area of th e fifteen row houses. There was no indication that he had just r un from police or that police could provide any sufficient identif ying information that connected R.J. to the fleeing suspect, other t han R.J. stood outside in the general area where the suspect had r un and he wore nondescript dark clothes. R.J.’s Brief, id.

Our standard of review is as follows: Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression cour t’s factual findings are supported by the record and wh etherJ-A13043-15

- 4 - the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are co rrect. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidenc e of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for th e defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppres sion court’s factual findings are supported by the recor d, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppre ssion court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an app ellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppres sion court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones , 605 Pa. 188, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 832, 131 S. Ct. 110, 178 L. Ed. 2d 32 (U.S. 2010) (citations, quotations and ellipses omitted). Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress. See In the Interest of L.J. , 79 A.3d 1073, 1083-1087 (Pa. 2013).

Commonwealth v. Ranson , 103 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal

denied , ___ Pa. ___ (Pa. May 13, 2015). “ It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibil ity of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Clemens , 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotations and citation omitted). Our law recognizes three levels of police interact ion with civilians. “The first is a mere encounter, which requires no l evel of suspicion at all. The second level is an investigative detention, whi ch must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Finally, the third level is a n arrest or custodial detention, which must be supported by probable caus e.” CommonwealthJ-A13043-15

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v. Walls , 53 A.3d 889, 892–893 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Regarding an investigative detention:

In the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States Supre me Court indicated that police may stop and frisk a person w here they had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is af oot. In order to determine whether the police had a reasonable suspi cion, the totality of the circumstances – the whole picture – must be considered. Based upon that whole picture the detai ning officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.

In the Interest of D.M. , 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). Unprovoked flight in a high-crime area f rom persons identifiable as police officers is sufficient to establish reaso nable suspicion to support an investigative detention. Commonwealth v. Jefferson , 853 A.2d 404 (Pa. Super. 2004). See also Commonwealth v. Brown , 904 A.2d 925 (Pa. Super. 2006). At the suppression hearing, Officer David Haines, o f the Mifflin Police Department, testified that on March 3, 2014, he was by himself, in uniform and in a marked vehicle, patrolling the Mon View He ights housing project. N.T., 3/20/2014, at 6. He further testified: Q. Did anything unusual happen during your shift? A. Yes. As I was driving on the property towards th e 31 row, which is in the back of the complex, I saw a person in dark clothing with a hood over his head cross in front o f me. When that person looked in my direction, he began t o run. As I got closer, the person looked back again and i ncreased his speed, and he ran and continued to run and ran behi nd the 31 row apartment building.J-A13043-15

- 6 - **** THE COURT: Okay. You were driving? THE WITNESS: I was driving.

THE COURT: He came across. Go ahead. Tell me. THE WITNESS: He was probably about 150 feet ahead of me. THE COURT: Okay. THE WITNESS: As I continued to a location, as he l ooked back and looked at my vehicle, he ran. When he got to the rear at the 31 row building, he looked back again, and he ran and turned to the lef t and ran behind the building. [BY COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: Q. Okay. Can you describe this area. A. It’s a residential area. It’s a private proper ty. There’s a front gate that’s monitored by guards. We have a huge amount of crime in this complex, esp ecially in the area that I saw this individual. Anything from homicides to drugs to burglaries, robberies. We have – almost o n a daily basis we are up there at that area a couple of time s. Q. You called it a residential area. Is it homes, row houses, apartment buildings?

A. It’s row houses. Q. Okay. What time was this?

A. This was 12:08 a.m. Q. Was anybody else around in the area that you could observe?J-A13043-15

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A. No. I didn’t see anybody else.

  Q. Okay. He’s at this point about 150 feet away. A. He’s probably about 100-to-150 feet in front of me to my right. Q. Okay. Where was he located exactly? A. To the right. When I initially saw him, he had just crossed the road. He walked across the road and looked in my direction as I was approaching. As soon as he looked in my d irection, he began to run. As I closed the distance, he continued to run. But then he looked back again, and he ran harder and made the l eft behind the complex of buildings. Q. Prior to him running, how fast was that person g oing? A. He was just walking. Q. Okay. Was anything else around? Any other cars on the street? A. Yes. There are cars parked on the street. Q. Any other moving vehicles that you recall?

A. No. Q. At that point did you make eye contact?

A. No. Q. Okay. You said when that person first looked in your direction, he started running?

A. Correct.J-A13043-15

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Q. Where was the person when he first looked in you r direction? What part of the street? A. Immediately to the right side of the street. He had just crossed the street from my left to my right. Once he got to the other side of the street, he looked in my direction . As soon as he looked in my direction, he began to run.

** ** Q. Where was that person when he looked back a seco nd time? A. He was approximately 75 feet to my right near th e rear of the 31 building. Q. Okay. Then you said that the pace was increased ?

A. Yes. Q. How fast was that person going at that time? A. It appeared to be a full sprint. Q. How far did that person sprint? A. I lost sight of him after probably about 15 feet once he turned the corner of the 31 row building. Q. Were there other people around?

A. Not that I recall. Q. What is the lighting in this area?

A. It’s very poor. It’s hard to – THE COURT: Very poor?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

A. I mean there’s some lights, but it depends on which area you’re in. At times it can be poor. At times it c an be okay. Depends on whether you’re right underneath the stre et light.J-A13043-15

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Q. What about the area you were in?

A. When I initially saw him, it was fair. There was s now on the ground, so, it was brighter than what it usu ally is.

**** Q. Okay. You said that the person that you saw – n ow I’m shifting back. I apologize. The person that you s aw was wearing what?

A. Dark clothing. I couldn’t make out a color other th an it was dark. There was a hood. He had a hood on his head. Q. Was the hood up or down? A. It was up. Q. Okay. Once that person went into a sprint you s aid for about 15 feet, what happened?

A. I lost sight of the person behind the building. Q. What building?

A. 31 row

. Q. Okay.

A. I continued to drive to the middle part of the buil ding. The building has probably 15 residences. Q. Okay.

A. Individual residences in there. Halfway in between there’s what we call a tunnel. It’s a passageway that leads to the rear of the building. Q. You ... call it a tunnel?

A. We call it a tunnel. Q. Is it covered?J-A13043-15

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A. Yes. Q. Okay. A. I mean, it’s an open passageway that would lead directly from the front to the back of the building. Q. Okay. I’m sorry. Did the person go through that or did you or both? A. ... I went through. Q. Okay. What happened?

A. As I walked through the tunnel, as soon as I turned the corner, I came face-to-face with the individual proba bly ten feet away. Q. Okay. Now, you said you turned the corner. Di d you turn right or left? A. Turned right. Q. As you turn right out of the tunnel, describe th at area. A. It’s just a backyard. It’s a small backyard are a that runs the length of the building. It was snow covered at the time. Q. Was anybody else around?

A. No. Q. What was that person doing? A. He stopped. I think we were both surprised to see each other so close in proximity at the time. Q. Which direction was the person facing? A. He was facing right directly at me. Q. Did you make eye contact?

A. Yes.J-A13043-15

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Q. What was he doing?

A. He stood there. I couldn’t see his hands. I tol d him to put his hands up to where I could see them. I told him to put his hands up to his head. As soon as he put his hands up, I saw a large silver handgun in his waistband. N.T., 3/20/2014, at 6–12, 15–18 (emphasis added). At the suppression hearing, Officer Haines identified R.J. as the juve nile he had encountered

with the firearm. Id. at 23–24. The juvenile court, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinio n, after discussing the relevant case law, explained its rationale for denying the suppression

motion: In the present case a police officer was on routine patrol in an area that he described as a high crime area. As he was patrolling a residential apartment building he saw a young black male walking through the area. The young black mal e turned and looked directly at the police officer at which point he turned around and began to run. As the police officer turned his vehicle to attempt to apprehend the individual he drove around the building[. He e xited and walked through the building tunnel,] and saw the pe rson he recognized as the same individual that fled upon se eing the police car. The officer [] ordered the juvenile to stop and rai se his hands. Upon raising his hands in plain view was a firearm. The officer’s conduct was much less than a Terry [4] pat-down. He merely instructed the juvenile to stop and raise his hands for the officer’s safety. Upon raising his hands in plain view was a weapon. The case law is clear that not only was he justified in taking the actions that he did, the officer could h ave, based upon

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4 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968).J-A13043-15

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unprovoked flight in a high crime area, conducted a pat-down of the juvenile. Given the minimal intrusion upon the juvenile coupled with the unprovoked flight and high crime a rea, the officer was well within his authority to take the a ction that he did. Therefore, the stop was in fact lawful and th e adjudication that followed pursuant to [the parties’ stipulation to incorporate the testimony from the suppression hearing] was cle arly based on and supported by record evidence. Juvenile Court Opinion, 12/19/14, at 6. R.J. maintains, however, that “[b]ased on the offic er’s testimony, he did not see the person’s face. ” R.J.’s Brief at 17 (emphasis in the original), citing N.T., 3/20/2014, at 26. R.J. states that “[the] e vidence failed to provide sufficient information to allow t he officer to reasonably conclude that R.J. was the person who fled from the officer while he patrolled the area.” R.J.’s Brief at 19. R.J. ass erts he was “merely standing in the backyard of the fifteen row houses,” that th ere was no evidence “that [he] was sweating, panting, shaking, or doubled ove r, or any other evidence indicating [he] had recently sprinted away from pol ice[,]” and there was “no indication how quickly the officer traveled behind the houses and what abutted the backyard of the row houses.” R.J.’s Br ief at 20–21. We find no error in the juvenile court’s ruling. Th e court was free to weigh and credit Officer Haines’s testimony that at the back of the building he encountered the suspect who had run away from hi m initially. See Clemens, supra . Given Officer Haines’s observations of the suspe ct’s clothing, the absence of other persons in the vicin ity, the area and direction in which the suspect fled, and the location where O fficer Haines came uponJ-A13043-15

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R.J., the record supports the court’s determination that Officer Haines had reasonable suspicion to stop R.J. See Jefferson, supra

. R.J.’s argument is essentially a challenge to the j uvenile court’s findings of fact. As stated above, we are bound by the court’s findings of fact if they are supported by the record. Ranson , 103 A.3d at 76. We have determined that the court’s findings of fact are su pported by the evidence, and so we are bound by them. Consequently, R.J.’s argument cannot

succeed. 5 Accordingly, in light of our standard of review, we will not disturb the court’s decision that denied the motion to suppress

. Next, R.J. challenges the sufficiency of the identi fication evidence to sustain the adjudication of delinquency for the off enses of possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer’s number, carr ying a firearm without a license, and possession of a firearm by a minor. 6 R.J. argues:

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5 Even if R.J. was actually the wrong person, the co urt’s conclusion that the officer had reasonable suspicion for suspecting tha t R.J. was the individual who fled from him is supported by the evidence of r ecord, as discussed above.

6 Section 6110.2 of the Crimes Codes provides, in re levant part, that “ No person shall possess a firearm which has had the ma nufacturer’s number integral to the frame or receiver altered, changed, removed or obliterated.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2(a). Under Section 6106(a)(1) of the Crimes Code, “Except as provided in paragraph (2), ... any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his pla ce of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued li cense under this chapter commits a felony of the third degree.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1). Finally, Section 6110.1 provides, in relevant part: “Except as provided in subsection (Footnote Continued Next Page)J-A13043-15

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The identification evidence was insufficient beyond a reasonable doubt when the police identified R.J. as the suspec t because he stood in the backyard of fifteen row houses, even t hough the police never saw the suspect’s face, could not desc ribe the suspect in any detail, and lost sight of the suspec t when he or she ran behind the fifteen row houses. R.J.’s Brief at 23. R.J. maintains “[t]he evidence presented here supports nothing more than a guess.” Id. at 27. See also id. at 24.

Our standard of review is well settled:

In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, we mus t determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, a s well as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict w inner, are sufficient to support all the elements of the o ffense. Additionally, to sustain a conviction, the facts an d circumstances which the Commonwealth must prove[] must be such that every essential element of the cr ime is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Admittedly, guilt must be based on facts and conditions proved, and n ot on suspicion or surmise. Entirely circumstantial evide nce is sufficient so long as the combination of the eviden ce links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolve d by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The fact[-]finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented at trial.

Commonwealth v. K.A.T. , 69 A.3d 691, 696 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “While attacks upon identification testim ony normally go to the

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ (b), a person under 18 years of age shall not posse ss or transport a firearm anywhere in this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110. 1(a).J-A13043-15

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weight of the evidence and not to the sufficiency o f the evidence, it has

further been stated that where the identification evidence is demonstrated to be so inherently unreliable as to make a verdict based upon it one of conjecture or surmise, it will be found insufficien t.” Commonwealth v.

Orr , 38 A.3d 868, 878 (Pa. Super. 2011) (footnote omit ted). We find no merit in R.J.’s argument. As discussed above, we have concluded the juvenile court properly determined th e stop of R.J. was lawful. When R.J. was lawfully stopped, he was found to be in possession of a firearm. At the suppression hearing, Officer Haine s positively identified R.J.

as the individual that he had encountered with a fi rearm, and this testimony was incorporated into the adjudication hearing. See N.T., 3/20/2014, at 23–24; See N.T., 3/25/2014, at 7–8. Therefore, the identifica tion evidence was sufficient to sustain the adjudication of delin quency beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. K.A.T., supra . Therefore, R.J.’s sufficiency challenge regarding identificati on evidence fails. Dispositional order affirmed.J-A13043-15

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 6/30/2015