UNITED STATES NAVY-MARINE CORPS 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

F.D. MITCHELL, J.R. MCFARLANE, G.G. GERDING

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DARREN J. EVANS

LANCE CORPORAL (E-3), U.S. MARINE CORPS

NMCCA 201300248

GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL

Sentence Adjudged: 14 February 2013.

Military Judge: CAPT Kevin R. O'Neil, JAGC, USN.

Convening Authority: Commanding General, 3d MAW, MCAS 

Miramar, San Diego, CA.

Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: LtCol K.C Harris, 

USMC.

For Appellant: Capt Jason R. Wareham, USMC.

For Appellee: Maj David N. Roberts, USMC; LT Ian D. 

MacLean, JAGC, USN.

29 July 2014

---------------------------------------------------

OPINION OF THE COURT 

---------------------------------------------------

THIS OPINION DOES NOT SERVE AS BINDING PRECEDENT, BUT MAY BE CITED AS 

PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY UNDER NMCCA RULE OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18.2.

PER CURIAM:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial 

convicted the appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of one 

specification each of violating a general order, murder, and 

assault consummated by a battery, in violation of Articles 92, 

118, and 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§

892, 918, and 928. The military judge sentenced the appellant 
2

to confinement for life with the possibility of parole, 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to pay grade E1, and a dishonorable discharge. The convening authority (CA) 

approved the adjudged sentence and, in accordance with a 

pretrial agreement, suspended confinement in excess of sixty 

years. 

The appellant asserts two assignments of error: (1) that 

the sentence which includes life imprisonment with the possibly 

of parole is too severe because the Marine Corps failed on 

multiple occasions to provide adequate mental health and 

substance abuse resources that he needed; and, (2) that it was 

cruel and unusual punishment and pretrial punishment in 

violation of Article 13, UCMJ, to confine the appellant in 

maximum security conditions throughout the pendency of his 

trial.1

After careful consideration of the parties’ pleadings and 

the record of trial, we conclude that no error materially 

prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant occurred. 

Arts. 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ. 

Background 

The appellant began drinking heavily in the summer of 2011. 

During the same period, the appellant began mutilating himself 

by burning his knuckles with cigarettes. The appellant 

eventually reached out to the flight surgeon of his unit and 

explained that he had been depressed for some time. Over Labor 

Day Weekend of 2011, the appellant expressed suicidal ideations 

and was sent to the Camp Pendleton Mental Health Center, where 

he was ultimately diagnosed with depressive neurosis and alcohol 

dependence. He was then referred to the Consolidated Substance 

Abuse Counseling Center for treatment of his alcohol dependence. 

The appellant’s diagnosis of alcohol dependence was later 

reduced to a diagnosis of alcohol abuse and he was referred to 

treatment in an outpatient program. Shortly thereafter, three 

of the appellant’s peers reached out to Marine Corps leadership 

to request that the appellant be treated in an inpatient program 

because his drinking had not stopped during the outpatient 

treatment. 

On 5 November 2011, about four weeks after his initial 

evaluation, appellant began drinking early in the evening and 

 

1 This summary assignment of error was submitted pursuant to United States v. 

Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).
3

continued drinking and socializing throughout the evening. 

Sometime later that night, the appellant returned to his 

barracks room to find his roommate, Lance Corporal (LCpl) MA, in 

bed with headphones in his ears lying on his stomach in the 

prone position. The appellant removed a crowbar from his locker 

and struck LCpl MA with the hooked end of the crowbar in the 

back of the head multiple times, leaving him dead where he lay. 

Sentence Severity

In his initial assignment of error the appellant avers that 

the sentence awarded by the military judge to include 

confinement for life with the possibility of parole is 

inappropriately severe given his preexisting and undertreated 

mental health issues.2 “Sentence appropriateness involves the 

judicial function of assuring that justice is done and that the 

accused gets the punishment he deserves.” United State v. 

Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A 1988). This requires 

“‘individualized consideration’ of the particular accused ‘on 

the basis of the nature and seriousness of the offense and 

character of the offender.’” United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 

267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982) (quoting United States v. Mamaluy, 27 

C.M.R. 176, 180-81 (C.M.A. 1959)). The appellant asks this 

court approve no more than 30 years’ confinement. Appellant’s 

Brief of 20 Nov 2013 at 18-19. 

After closely considering the record, the evidence offered 

in aggravation, as well as the evidence offered by the defense 

in extenuation and mitigation, we find that the punishment 

awarded was appropriate for this offender and these offenses. 

Granting this appellant the requested relief would amount to an 

act of clemency, which is left to “command prerogative.” See 

Healy, 26 M.J. at 396. Accordingly, we decline to grant relief. 

Pretrial Confinement 

In his other assignment of error, the appellant contends 

that his confinement under maximum security conditions prior to 

 

2 The appellant does not allege and we do not find that his “severe mental 

issues” were such that he lacked mental responsibility for his misconduct. 

To the contrary, on 22 and 26 December 2011, the appellant underwent a mental 

capacity and responsibility examination in accordance with RULE FOR COURTSMARTIAL 706, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2008 ed.), and it was 

determined that his psychiatric disorder was not in such a severe state to 

negate his mental responsibility. The attending psychiatrists additionally 

found that the appellant was able to participate in his own defense and 

understood the nature of the proceedings against him. See AE XVII at 5-6. 
4

his trial was cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of 

the Article 13 ban on pretrial punishment. 

We first note that the record reflects the appellant pled 

guilty unconditionally which has the effect of “waiv[ing] all 

nonjurisdictional defects at earlier stages of the proceedings.” 

United States v. Bradley, 68 M.J. 279, 281 (C.A.A.F. 2010)

(citations omitted); see also United States v. Lee, 73 M.J. 166,

170 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 

30 (1974)). 

In addition to his guilty plea, the appellant expressly 

waived the issue on the record as evidenced by the following 

colloquy: 

MJ: [detailed defense counsel], in your opinion, has 

the accused been subjected to any form of unlawful 

pretrial punishment or restraint? 

DC: No, sir.

MJ: Other than the confinement credit motion already 

conceded by the government, any other issues?

DC: No, sir. 

Record at 354. 

Finally, assuming arguendo that we chose not to apply 

waiver, the summary assignment of error does not establish that 

the appellant was subjected to unlawful pretrial punishment, in 

violation or Article 13, UCMJ, merely because he was placed in 

maximum security. The facts show that the appellant brutally 

murdered LCpl MA while he lay on his bunk by repeatedly striking 

him in the head with a crowbar. Given the violent nature of the 

crime and the fact that the appellant once had suicidal 

ideations, we, like the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 

are reluctant to second guess the security determinations of 

confinement officials. See United States v. King, 61 M.J. 225 

(C.A.A.F. 2005). There is nothing in the record or the 

pleadings to suggest that the appellant’s maximum security 

classification was so excessive as to amount to punishment. 

Accordingly, we find this assignment of error to be without 

merit. 
5

Conclusion 

The findings and the sentence as approved by the CA are 

affirmed.

For the Court

 

 

 

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court