J-E01013-20

2020 PA Super 200

IN THE INT. OF: K.M.W., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.W.R., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1537 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 23, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 13-AD-2019 and CP-22-DP-98-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., 

NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and 

McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2020

Appellant, K.W.R. (“Mother”), appeals from the August 23, 2019 Decree 

that both involuntarily terminated her parental rights to K.M.W. (“Child”) and 

changed Child’s permanency goal to Adoption. This Court certified this case 

for en banc review to determine whether this Court should quash this appeal 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), and 

Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976 (Pa. Super. 2019), because Mother filed a 

single Notice of Appeal from a Decree listing more than one lower court docket

number. Because the trial court misinformed Mother to file a single notice of 

appeal from multiple lower court dockets, we decline to quash this appeal. 

Upon review of the merits, we affirm. 

I. MOTHER’S NOTICE OF APPEAL
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On October 9, 2019, Mother filed a timely single Notice of Appeal from 

a Decree that both terminated her parental rights on the adoption docket and 

changed Child’s permanency goal to Adoption on the dependency docket. 

Mother listed both lower court docket numbers on the single Notice of Appeal 

(Docket Nos. 13 AD 2019 and CP-22-DP-98-2016). We granted en banc

review to determine whether this Court should quash this appeal pursuant to 

Walker, supra, and M.P., supra.

1

 Per Curium Order, 4/6/20.

In June 2018, our Supreme Court disapproved of the common practice 

of filing a single notice of appeal from an order or judgment involving more 

than one docket number. See generally Walker, supra. The Court 

observed that “the proper practice under [Pa.R.A.P.] 341(a) is to file separate 

appeals from an order that resolves issues arising on more than one docket.” 

Walker, 185 A.3d at 977. Accordingly, the Court determined, “[t]he failure 

to do so requires the appellate court to quash the appeal.” Similarly, in M.P.,

in an appeal from a termination of parental rights, this Court held that Walker

compels quashal when an appellant files a single notice of appeal from both a 

dependency and an adoption lower court docket. 204 A.3d at 981. 

During the pendency of the instant appeal, an en banc panel of this 

Court clarified the holding in Walker and concluded, “the bright-line rule set 

____________________________________________

1 This Court issued a Rule to Show Cause why Mother’s appeal should not be 

quashed pursuant to Walker. Mother filed a Response, and this Court 

discharged the Rule and referred the Walker issue to the merits panel, which 

subsequently quashed the appeal. Mother filed an Application for 

Reargument, which this Court granted, thus certifying this case for en banc 

review. 
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forth in Walker only required an appellant to file a ‘separate’ notice of appeal 

for each lower court docket the appellant was challenging” and this court 

“should not invalidate an otherwise timely appeal based on the inclusion of 

multiple docket numbers” because neither Walker nor Rule 341 expressly 

forbid this practice. Commonwealth v. Johnson, ___ A.3d ___, 2020 WL 

3869723, at * 4 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc).

However, there are exceptions to the bright-line rule set forth in 

Walker. This Court has declined to quash a defective notice of appeal when 

the defect resulted from an appellant’s acting in accordance with 

misinformation from the trial court, deeming the situation a breakdown in 

court operations. See Commonwealth v. Larkin, ___ A.3d___, 2020 WL 

3869710 at *3 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 

219 A.3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019). In Larkin, an appellant filed a pro se notice 

of appeal seeking relief relating to more than one docket after the order 

informing appellant of his appellate rights provided “Petitioner has thirty (30) 

days from the date of this order to file an appeal.” ___ A.3d at __, __, 2020 

WL 3869710 at *3 (emphasis in original). An en banc panel of this Court held 

that this Court may “overlook the requirements of Walker where . . . a 

breakdown occurs in the court system, and a defendant is misinformed or 

misled regarding his appellate rights.” Larkin, supra at *3. Similarly, in 

Stansbury, the lower court advised the appellant that he could pursue 

appellate review by filing “a written notice of appeal[,]” despite the fact that 

Walker compelled the filing of separate notices of appeal at each docket 
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number. 219 A.3d at 159 (emphasis in original). This Court declined to quash 

the appeal, concluding that a breakdown in court operations occurred. Id. at 

160.

In her Brief, Mother avers that her appeal should not be quashed for a 

defect in the Notice of Appeal, asserting that (1) her sole intent was to appeal 

the Decree on the adoption docket; (2) she included both docket numbers on 

the Notice of Appeal in order to mirror the trial court’s caption; and (3) no 

party suffered prejudice. Mother’s Br. at 41-42. Mother further argues that 

this Court should grant her Application to Strike Trial Court Docket Number in 

which she requested this Court to strike the dependency docket number to 

cure her defective Notice of Appeal. Id. at 44.

Although Mother avers that she had the sole intent to appeal the Decree 

on the adoption docket, that contention is not supported by the issues raised 

in her Brief. In her Brief, Mother raises an issue that pertains to Child’s goal 

change on the dependency docket: “Were adequate reunification services 

provided by the Agency prior to filing the petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights?” Id. at 4. In addition, Mother argues that the Agency did not 

offer adequate services to promote the Reunification goal and cites sections 

of, inter alia, the Juvenile Act, which governs dependency proceedings. See 

id. at 27-34 (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301, et seq.). 

Thus, we reject Mother’s contention that she solely intended to challenge the 

adoption docket. 
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Nevertheless, we are persuaded by Mother’s argument that she included 

both docket numbers on the Notice of Appeal to mirror the trial court’s caption

in the Decree terminating Mother’s parental rights. Our review of the record 

reveals that the Decree included both the adoption docket number and the 

dependency docket number and, most notably, informed Mother, “[t]his order 

shall become absolute as of course if no appeal is taken, within thirty (30) 

days, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341.” Decree, 8/21/19 (emphasis added). The 

trial court’s indication that Mother could seek relief from this Court by filing a 

singular appeal from multiple lower court docket numbers constitutes a 

breakdown in court operations. Accordingly, we decline to quash this appeal.

Mother also avers that this Court should decline to quash because no 

party suffered prejudice because of her defective Notice of Appeal. We 

acknowledge that this is a children’s fast track case, often subject to unique 

rules and procedures. Indeed, as Mother argues, in a children’s fast track 

case this Court has declined to quash a defective notice of appeal resulting 

from noncompliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure when no party has 

suffered prejudice. Mother’s Br. at 45 (citing In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745

(Pa. Super. 2009)). However, in K.T.E.L., the appellant failed to comply with 

Rules 905(a)(2) and 1925(a)(2), which require an appellant to file a concise 

statement contemporaneously with the notice of appeal. 983 A.2d at 747; 

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(2), 1925(a)(2). As discussed above, Walker compels 

quashal for failure to comply with Rule 341, which requires an appellant to file 

separate notices of appeal from an order that resolves issues arising on more 
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than one docket. Walker, supra at 977. Walker declined to provide an 

exception for children’s fast track cases, and we are constrained by this 

holding.2 See generally id.

Finally, in light of our disposition, we deny Mother’s Application to Strike 

as moot. Because we decline to quash this appeal due to a breakdown in 

court operations, there is no reason to strike the dependency docket number 

to cure the defect in the Notice of Appeal. Moreover, because Mother raises 

an issue that arguably challenges Child’s goal change to Adoption on the 

dependency docket, simply removing the docket number from the Notice of 

Appeal would not, in fact, cure the defect. On the contrary, this Court has 

recently concluded that the bright-line rule set forth in Walker does not forbid 

the inclusion of multiple docket numbers on a notice of appeal, but rather 

requires an appellant to file a separate notice of appeal for each lower court 

docket the appellant is challenging. Johnson, ___ A.3d at ___, 2020 WL 

3869723, at *4. 

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2

If Mother files a petition for allowance of appeal following our disposition in 

this case, we request that the Supreme Court grant allocatur in order to 

determine whether Walker should apply in a children’s fast track case. As 

discussed, the Superior Court has already held that in a children’s fast track

case, we should overlook a technical defect in a Notice of Appeal and avoid 

the “extreme action of dismissal” when the defect does not prejudice any 

party. K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d at 747 (citation omitted). We believe that this 

principle should also apply to a Notice of Appeal that violates the technical 

requirements set forth in Walker and Rule 341 when the technical violation

does not prejudice parties, and does not hamper our ability to review the 

appeal. We, however, lack the authority to create this children’s fast track 

exception to Walker and request that the Supreme Court consider doing so.
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For the reasons stated above, we decline to quash Mother’s appeal.

II. TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS AND 

PERMANENCY GOAL CHANGE TO ADOPTION 

Having declined to quash Mother’s appeal for a defective Notice of 

Appeal, we now address the merits of Mother’s challenge to the termination 

of her parental rights and her contention that Dauphin County Social Services 

for Children and Youth (“Agency”) failed to provide adequate reunification 

services.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The trial court provided a through and accurate factual and procedural 

history, which we adopt for purposes of this appeal. See Trial Ct. Op., filed 

11/19/19, at 1-13. In sum, Mother and V.W., Jr. (“Father”) are parents to 

Child, who was born in August 2015.3 Mother and Father have a history of 

substance abuse, domestic violence, and incarceration. In March 2016, the 

Agency placed Child with family members after receiving a report that 

marijuana was found in or around then-seven-month-old Child’s crib. Mother 

entered a detox facility, and Father remained incarcerated for assaulting 

Mother. Mother’s three older children were not living with her at the time. 

On April 13, 2016, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent and 

ordered Mother to complete the following objectives: complete three drug 

screens per week as well as random drug screens; complete parenting classes;

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3 The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights and he is not a party to 

this appeal. 
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and obtain mental health evaluations and complete any recommended 

treatment. The Agency also created objectives for Mother, which mirrored the 

trial court’s objectives and added the following objectives: obtain a drug and 

alcohol evaluation and complete recommended treatment; obtain suitable 

housing; participate in visitation with Child; and cooperate with Agency, 

including attending meetings and signing releases.

On August 9, 2016, Dr. Howard S. Rosen conducted a psychological 

evaluation of Mother and diagnosed her as having a substance use disorder, 

alcohol use disorder, depressive disorder, and traits of narcissism. He made 

specific treatment recommendations. 

Over the next two years, Mother was incarcerated multiple times 

because of her continued substance abuse and parole violations, and the trial 

court made multiple findings that Mother was minimally compliant with her 

objectives. Mother continued to test positive for heroin and/or cocaine and

refused to submit to drug screens. Mother spent a total of 415 days 

incarcerated.

On April 26, 2018, the trial court changed Child’s permanency goal to 

Subsidized Permanent Legal Custody (“SPLC”).

On June 13, 2018, Mother was released from her latest period of 

incarceration, and she attended an August 28, 2018 dependency hearing. The 

trial court found Mother minimally compliant and once again ordered her to 

provide urine screens three times per week, as well as complete the remainder 
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of her objectives. After the hearing, the Agency requested that Mother provide 

a drug screen, and she refused. 

While on parole, Mother began and completed intensive outpatient 

therapy, domestic violence counseling, couples counseling, and enrolled in 

school. 

Mother submitted to monthly drug screens at the request of her parole 

officer but continued to refuse to submit to the court-ordered tri-weekly drug 

screens at the request of the Agency. Mother refused Agency-requested drug 

screens despite the Agency and the trial court both informing her that a refusal 

to submit to a drug screen is presumed to be a positive drug screen. The last 

date that Mother submitted to an Agency-requested drug screen was October 

7, 2016. Moreover, in August 2019, during an Agency-supervised visit with 

Child, parents went into their home to retrieve a forgotten item and returned 

to the visit smelling like marijuana. 

Mother continuously failed to cooperate with the Agency and accused 

the Agency of falsifying information. Mother also posted statements on a 

nationwide social media website that identified caseworkers by name, called 

the caseworkers liars, and claimed the Agency illegally kidnapped Child.

On February 5, 2019, the Agency filed a Petition to Involuntarily 

Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights (“TPR Petition”). After a two day hearing, 

on August 21, 2019, the trial court changed Child’s permanency goal to 
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Adoption and terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).4

Mother timely appealed. Mother and the trial court both complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

A. Did petitioner prove statutory grounds for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights by clear and convincing 

evidence?

B. Did petitioner prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

Mother had relinquished her parental claim, or failed/refused 

to perform parental duties?

C. Did petitioner prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

Mother failed to remedy any conditions which led to [Child] 

being placed in care within a reasonable time?

D. Did the Agency prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

[Child]’s best interests, needs and welfare are served by the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights?

E. Did the [c]ourt give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs, the age and 

welfare of [Child], the parental bond and the preservation of a 

sibling relationship for [Child]?

F. Were adequate reunification services provided by the Agency 

prior to filing the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights?

Mother’s Br. at 4 (reordered for ease of disposition). 

LEGAL ANALYSIS

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4 The trial court appointed Mindy Goodman, Esq., as Child’s legal counsel in 

the TPR proceedings.
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When we review a decision of trial court to terminate parental rights, 

we must accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial

court if the record supports them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

“If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if 

the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation 

omitted). We, likewise, review an order regarding a placement goal of a 

dependent child under an abuse of discretion standard. In re B.S., 861 A.2d

974, 976 (Pa. Super. 2004). “Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree 

must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation 

omitted). We may not reverse merely because the record could support a 

different result. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We give great deference to the trial 

courts “that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he trial court is free to believe all, part, 

or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 

68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

In addressing petitions to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the 

Adoption Act requires the court to conduct a bifurcated analysis. See 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). The court must first focus on the conduct of the 

parent, and, if the party seeking termination presents clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct meets one of the grounds for termination 

set forth in Section 2511(a), then the court will analyze whether termination 
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of parental rights will meet the needs and welfare of the child, i.e., the best 

interests of the child, as provided in Section 2511(b). The court must examine 

the existence of the child’s bond with the parent, if any, and the potential 

effect on the child of severing such bond. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. 

Super. 2007). A parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing 

of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his parental duties, to the 

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of the child’s potential in 

a permanent, healthy, safe environment. In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 

Instantly, Mother avers that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

terminated Mother’s parental rights under multiple subsections of 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a) and subsection (b). Mother’s Br. at 4-5. We need only agree with 

its decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) and subsection (b) in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 

A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). For the following reasons,

we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the Agency met its 

burden of proof under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Termination Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)

Section 2511(a)(2) provides for termination of parental rights where the 

petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated 

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes 
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of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by 

the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 

827 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). The grounds for termination of parental 

rights under Section 2511(a)(2) due to parental incapacity are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of 

refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 797 

A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).

This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent 

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. Id. At a termination hearing, the orphans’ court may 

properly reject as untimely or disingenuous a parent’s vow to follow through 

on necessary services when the parent failed to co-operate with the agency 

or take advantage of available services during dependency proceedings. Id.

at 340.

With respect to incarcerated parents, our Supreme Court has held that 

“incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be determinative of 

the question of whether a parent is incapable of providing essential parental 

care, control, or subsistence.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa.

2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Incarceration alone is 

not sufficient to support termination under any subsection, but “incarceration

will certainly impact a parent’s capability of performing parental duties, and

may render a parent incapable of performing parental duties under subsection 
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(a)(2).” In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82–83 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis in 

original). 

“Each case of an incarcerated parent facing termination must be analyzed 

on its own facts, keeping in mind . . . that the child’s need for consistent 

parental care and stability cannot be put aside or put on hold[.]” Id. at 84.

“Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient 

time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child 

with his or her physical and emotional needs.” B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 855

(citation omitted). Rather, “[a] parent must utilize all available resources to 

preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child 

relationship.” Id. (citations omitted). Importantly, a parent’s “recent efforts 

to straighten out [her] life” upon release from incarceration does not require 

that a court “indefinitely postpone adoption.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1125 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

Applying these principles, the trial court concluded that Mother’s repeated 

incarceration and continued substance abuse rendered her incapable of 

parenting Child and caused Child to be without essential parental care, control 

or subsistence for over three years. The trial court opined:

Since September 2016, Mother has complied minimally with 

service objectives critical to her ability to properly parent [Child]. 

Most of Mother’s efforts began only after the Agency sought 

termination. . . Mother’s incarceration and re-incarceration 

prevented her from completing essential objectives and 

performing her parental duties to [Child]. . . Mother violated 

parole conditions by absconding or continuing drug use, thwarting 
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opportunities to progress toward reunification. Her incarceration, 

as a result of her own choices, created long absences from 

[Child]’s life. We recognize that Mother has, in the recent past, 

worked toward recovery and sought mental health and domestic 

violence counseling as well as an education. For an unreasonable 

period of time, Mother failed to comply with objectives which 

would evidence sustained progress toward achieving mental 

health and recovery. . . Mother made those efforts years after the 

recommendations in 2016. For the ensuing years, a time critical 

to [Child]’s development, others provided all of her needs.

Trial Ct. Op. at 17-18. 

The trial court also highlighted that Mother remained non-compliant with 

court-ordered tri-weekly drug screens, non-cooperative with the Agency, and 

had not progressed past supervised visitation with Child while Child remained 

in placement for over 40 months. Id. at 6, 8, 13. Our review of the record 

supports the trial court’s findings. We decline to usurp the trial court’s 

credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

Termination Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)

Mother also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

determined that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). Mother’s Br. at 4-5. We conclude, 

however, that the evidence supports this finding of the trial court. 

With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that 

terminating the parental bond will have on the child. In particular, we review 

whether “termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, 
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physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of 

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 

1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). 

One major aspect of the “needs and welfare” analysis concerns the 

nature and status of the emotional bond that the child has with the parent, 

“with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing 

any such bond.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super. 

2018) (citation omitted). The fact that a child has a bond with a parent does 

not preclude the termination of parental rights. In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Rather, the trial court must examine the 

depth of the bond to determine whether the bond is so meaningful to the child 

that its termination would destroy an existing, necessary, and beneficial 

relationship. Id. at 898. Notably, where there is no evidence of a bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In 

re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-3 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

It is sufficient for the trial court to rely on the opinions of social workers 

and caseworkers when evaluating the impact that termination of parental 

rights will have on a child. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. The trial court may consider 

intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 
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2011). Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of the child. Z.P.,

994 A.2d at 1121. 

Mother avers that a bond exists between Mother and Child and that 

severing that bond would prove detrimental to Child. Mother’s Br. at 37, 40. 

Mother argues that her own testimony about how she feels about Child, as 

well as the testimony of case aide Uniqua Lewis, who described the “emotional 

ties” between Mother and Child, both demonstrate that Mother and Child are 

bonded. Id. at 40. 

However, the trial court credited Dr. Rosen’s testimony that the timing 

and duration of Child’s separation from Mother occurred during a period critical 

to the development of a strong bond and weekly supervised visitation upon 

Mother’s release from prison was “hugely insufficient” to form a parent-child 

bond. Trial Ct. Op. at 10-11 (citing N.T., 8/21/19, at 41, 47-48, 62). The 

trial court also highlighted the testimony of caseworker Betsy Jo Harr, who 

observed that Child views Mother as more of a “fun aunt” than a mother figure. 

Id. at 13. Moreover, the trial court was unpersuaded that Child’s “hugs and 

kisses at visits with [p]arents, or her crying at the end of visits, demonstrate 

the existence of a bond which, if broken, will cause detriment to [Child].” Id.

at 20. The trial court opined: 

We found compelling in Dr. Rosen’s testimony that [Mother]’s 

absence from [Child]’s day to day life during a critical 

developmental period rendered formation of a bond with parents 

essentially impossible. Rather, the evidence demonstrates the 

existence of a healthy bond between [Child] and her long-term 

foster parents. [Child] views her foster parents as Mom and Dad 
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and looks to them to provide all of her essential physical and 

emotional care. We see potential harm to [Child] if she were 

removed from her stable and loving foster family, with whom she 

has formed her primary attachment, only to be placed with 

[Mother] who [has] failed to demonstrate the ability to provide 

stability for [Child]. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 21. 

Based on these factors, the trial court concluded that terminating 

Mother’s parental rights would best serve Child’s “developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare.” Id. at 19.

Our review of the record supports the factual findings of the trial court 

and, once again, we decline to reweigh the evidence. The evidence supports 

the trial court’s conclusion that terminating Mother’s parental rights is in

Child’s best interest. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. 

Reunification Services

Finally, Mother contends that the Agency did not provide adequate 

reunification services to promote Child’s goal of Reunification prior to filing a 

TPR Petition. Mother’s Br. at 27, 30. Mother argues that at both the February 

25, 2019 permanency review hearing and the goal change/termination

hearing, the Agency failed to present evidence “as to any additional services 

or assistance provided beyond making referrals or observing visits.” Id. at 

30. This argument is devoid of merit.

An agency is not required to provide reunification services when a child’s

permanency goal is changed from Reunification. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 261 n.22. 

“As a practical and legal matter, an order by the juvenile court changing the 
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child's placement goal from reunification [] ends any dispute that may exist 

between [the Agency] and the parent as to the adequacy of the [Agency’s]

services aimed at reuniting.” In re Interest of M.B., 388 565 A.2d 804, 807–

08 (Pa. Super. 1989).

The trial court changed Child’s permanency goal from Reunification to 

SPLC at the April 26, 2018 permanency review hearing. Accordingly, from 

that date on, the Agency was not required to provide reunification services to 

Mother and Child. Thus, Mother’s argument lacks merit. 

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, for the reasons stated above, because the trial court 

misinformed Mother to file a single notice of appeal from multiple lower court 

dockets, which constitutes a breakdown in court operations, we decline to 

quash this appeal. In addition, our review of the record reveals that the trial

court properly found that the Agency provided clear and convincing evidence 

to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 2511(a)(2) and (b) and to change Child’s permanency goal to Adoption.

Decree affirmed. Application to Strike denied.

President Judge Panella, and Judges Stabile, Kunselman, Nichols, 

McLaughlin, King, and McCaffrey join the Opinion.

Judge Murray files a concurring statement.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/18/2020