1995 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-6-1995

United States v Koreh

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 94-5408

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Recommended Citation

"United States v Koreh" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 183.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/183
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

No. 94-5408 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

FERENC KOREH, 

 Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Civil No. 89-cv-02544) 

 

Argued: February 28, 1995 

Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, 

 NYGAARD and McKEE, Circuit Judges

(Filed July 6, 1995) 

 

Judd Burstein (Argued) 

New York, New York 10022 

 Attorney for Appellant 

Susan L. Siegal (Argued) 

Michael D. Bergman 

United States Department of Justice 

Office of Special Investigations 

Washington, D.C. 20530 

James B. Clark, III 

Office of United States Attorney 

Trenton, NJ 08608 

 Attorneys for Appellee 

 ___________________ 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________________ 

SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 

 Appellant Ferenc Koreh appeals from the district 

court's order granting summary judgment to the United States on 

three counts of its complaint revoking Koreh's naturalization and 

requiring the return of his certificate of naturalization. The 

United States based its lawsuit on conduct by defendant of a 

different order than the direct involvement in physical 

atrocities that has characterized many other denaturalization 

cases. The legal principles, nonetheless, are equally 

applicable. 

I. 

 Facts and Procedural History

 Koreh was born on September 4, 1909 in Sepsimagyaros, 

Northern Transylvania, an area that moved between Romania and 

Hungary but which was part of Hungary in 1940, when most of the 

events relevant to this case began. As did the district court we 

rely only on facts that the parties do not dispute.1 Because the 

relevant facts are set forth in detail in the district court's 

comprehensive published opinion, see United States v. Koreh, 856 

F. Supp. 891 (D. N.J. 1994), we repeat only those essential to 

our holding. 

 

1. At the summary judgment stage a court must give the benefit 

of all inferences to the non-moving party. See Erie Telecomms., 

Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988). In 

order to determine which material facts are not in dispute, this 

court conducts an independent review of the record. See Bechtel 
 Hungary was the site of virulent anti-Semitism during 

the late 1930s and early 1940s. In 1938, shortly after Nazi 

Germany annexed Austria and established a common border with 

Hungary, the Hungarian Parliament passed its first major piece of 

anti-Semitic legislation. See Act No. XV of 1938 To More 

Effectively Safeguard the Balance of Social and Economic Life, 

Budapesti Közlöny, May 29, 1938, at 132-44; App. at 1620-52. The 

legislation limited the proportion of Jews that could be employed 

in the free professions (e.g. law, journalism, and the arts) and 

in business enterprises with ten or more employees. Id. at §§ 4, 

7-8; App. at 1622-24. This legislation was followed in 1939 by a 

second law that attempted to define "Jewishness" in racial terms 

and implemented further social and economic restrictions upon 

Hungarian Jews. See Act No. IV of 1939 Concerning Limitations on 

the Economic and Political Expansion of Jews; App. at 1653-1706. 

This law prevented Jews from obtaining Hungarian citizenship, 

barred them from serving in public offices or holding significant 

positions in the press, and further reduced the proportion of 

Jews that could be employed in Hungarian businesses. Id. at §§ 

3-21; App. at 1657-69. 

 In September 1940, as a result of an agreement between 

Hungary and Romania, Hungary annexed Northern Transylvania. 

(..continued) 

v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir. 1989). Of course, a 

defendant's attempt to characterize undisputed facts or to put 

another spin on them does not constitute a genuine issue of 

material fact. 
Immediately after the annexation, the anti-Semitic legislation 

that had been previously enacted by the Hungarian Parliament was 

applied to the approximately 164,000 Jews living in Northern 

Transylvania. Under Hungarian law at the time, no newspaper 

could publish without a government license. App. at 435. In the 

fall of 1940, Koreh applied for and received a license from the 

Hungarian Prime Minister's office to publish Szekely Nep, a 

private daily newspaper in Northern Transylvania. 

 After obtaining the license, Koreh became the 

"Responsible Editor" of Szekely Nep. The parties agree that 

Koreh served as Responsible Editor at Szekely Nep from January 

18, 1941 to April 19, 1942; from approximately August 1, 1942 to 

August 29, 1942; and from October 24, 1942 to October 28, 1942.2 

There is no dispute that during these periods, approximately 

fifty-five anti-Semitic and/or anti-Allies articles appeared in 

the pages of Szekely Nep. Fifty-one of those articles were 

unsigned. 

 Koreh has admitted that he was aware that the paper had 

to demonstrate an anti-Semitic profile to please the Germans and 

the Hungarian government. Although Koreh's byline appeared on 

some of the anti-Semitic articles and the government produced 

evidence of his extensive involvement in editorial decisions, 

 

2. Although Koreh held the position until November 1944, he 

contends that his tenure did not include the periods between 

these intervals or extend beyond October 28, 1942, and we will so 

assume for the purposes of this appeal. 
referred to by the district court, Koreh disputes the 

government's contentions that his duties included writing, 

reading, editing and reviewing the paper's contents. At oral 

argument, counsel clarified Koreh's position as asserting that he 

wrote articles but not the anti-Semitic articles. For the 

purposes of summary judgment, the government accepts that Koreh 

did not write or edit any of these articles. There is no 

question, however, that the person holding the position of 

Responsible Editor on the masthead was criminally and civilly 

liable for all unsigned articles and for those for which the 

author was unavailable.3 Moreover, Koreh concedes that he served 

as an emissary between the paper and the government. 

 His testimony at deposition was as follows: 

 Q: Well, besides getting the license, then what did 

you do at Szekely Nep? 

 

3. The government contends Koreh told the staff what political 

direction the paper should take and what they could and could not 

publish. Although in his deposition Koreh made numerous 

statements suggesting that he did have input into the paper's 

editorial content, see App. at 735 (Q: You had to insure the 

political contents of the paper; is that correct? A: Yes, you 

can say so.), 738-39 (Q: How did you communicate; you just said 

you told people what they could and couldn't publish, didn't you? 

You are nodding, yes? . . . . Let the record reflect that Mr. 

Koreh is nodding affirmatively.), at other points in his 

deposition he minimized his involvement in the paper's editorial 

policies. See App. at 713, 722, 726-27. The government's expert 

evidence regarding the typical role of Responsible Editors in 

Hungary may provide a basis to challenge Koreh's credibility on 

this point, but such credibility determinations are inappropriate 

at the summary judgment stage. See Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 

825, 835 (3d Cir. 1994). For purposes of this appeal, we will 

therefore assume that Koreh's input into the editorial process at 

the newspaper was minimal. 
 A: Not too much. 

 Q: My question -- 

 A: I was first man there, you know. 

 Q: What does that mean, you were first man there? 

 A: I was representing here and there. I went up to 

Budapest, I talked with politicians, with 

ministers, you know, about things how to behave, 

what to do, what kinds of articles they thought 

were useful, and so on, so, but I did not stay 

there, you know, to make the paper every day. 

 

 Q: Are you saying that you were the person that the 

government told [what] had to be in the paper? 

 A: No, but anyhow I talked very much with 

politicians, with other newspapermen, and about 

the whole situation. . . . 

 Q: So you discussed political issues with people in 

Budapest? 

 A: Certainly. 

 Q: And you discussed articles that should appear in 

Szekely Nep in Budapest? 

 A: No, we didn't discuss that. 

 See App. at 721-22 (emphasis added). 

 Koreh does not challenge the characterizations of these 

fifty-five articles as either "anti-Semitic" or "anti-Allies," 

nor could he, as made clear by an objective review of the 

unsigned articles appearing in Szekely Nep during the period for 

which Koreh was legally accountable for them to the Hungarian 

government. See, e.g., App. at 1141 (Oct. 2, 1941: emphasizing 

the "alien-character" of the Jews in Hungary); App. at 1140 
(Oct. 2, 1941: discussing "the Jewish question" in Hungary); App. 

at 1143 (Oct. 2, 1941: quoting a German publication which stated 

that "a final solution may be achieved only by deporting Jewish 

elements"); App. at 1190 (Oct. 31, 1941: referring to the works 

of Jewish writers as "highly undesirable 'literature'"); App. at 

1312 (Jan. 29, 1942: stating that "Jews must not be permitted to 

plunder the people"); App. at 1473 (Aug. 12, 1942: referring to 

Jews as "the enemies of our race, who have stampeded over our 

bodies and continue to do so in their merciless plan to destroy 

Hungarians"); App. at 1416 (Apr. 11, 1942: "There are still 

others who say that we should not have harmed the Jews, but thank 

God, today we are beyond these types of sentimentality"); App. at 

1515 (Aug. 29, 1942: attacking the author of a book questioning 

Hungarian anti-Jewish laws, and noting that the author "is 

certainly unaware of that part of the Holy Scriptures in which 

Jesus, the Lord, regarded Jewry not as his own race, but as a 

'brood of vipers'"). 

 Many of the articles published by Szekely Nep combined 

this anti-Semitic sentiment with anti-Allies rhetoric regarding 

World War II. See, e.g., App. at 1085 (July 24, 1941: discussing 

the "New York Jewish plan" to destroy Germany); App. at 1320 

(Jan. 31, 1942: "The Role of Jewish Capital in the Present World 

War"); App. at 1328-30 (Feb. 15, 1942: article entitled "How the 

World's Jews Forced the American People to Go to War," which 

argued that "it was exclusively Jews who, by an irresponsible 
representation of the facts, have incited the American people to 

wage war against Japan"); App. at 1330 (Feb. 15, 1942: referring 

to "President Roosevelt and the Jewish clique behind him," and 

stating that "the Jews believe that they, as 'the chosen people,' 

are destined to rule over all the other peoples of the earth, and 

therefore they are willing to use any means to achieve this 

end"); App. at 1321 (Jan. 31, 1942: discussing an alleged plan 

for "Jewish world hegemony"); App at 1353 (Mar. 18, 1942: 

"Washington, London and Moscow are waging a war in order to 

establish Jewish world domination"). 

 In addition, Szekely Nep frequently coupled its strong 

anti-Semitic tone with statements supporting or encouraging the 

Hungarian government's steps to enact or to enforce various antiJewish measures. See, e.g., App. at 1402 (Apr. 9, 1942: 

demanding that the Hungarian government "send the Jews packing 

from the homes they continue to arrogantly occupy even today"); 

App. at 1115 (Aug. 29, 1941: "[I]n particular in the field of 

commerce, we strive to permit the Jews the smallest possible room 

to act, and to encourage Hungarian commerce to expand"); App. at 

1416-17 (Apr. 11, 1942: calling for stricter rules against Jews 

"in the areas of housing and purchasing"); App. at 1472 (Aug. 12, 

1942: calling for the "purification" of Hungarians through 

stricter enforcement of laws against those who serve as front men 

for Jewish business owners); App. at 1486 (Aug. 14, 1942: 

referring to Jews as "elements harboring alien interests and 
driven by the desire of self-enrichment," and calling for legal 

reform); App. at 1492 (Aug. 20, 1942: blaming Jews for the 

overcrowding on trains and buses and applauding efforts taken by 

the government to limit Jewish use of sleeping cars). 

 In April 1941, the Hungarian Government enacted a 

decree requiring all Jewish males to serve in a Forced Labor 

Service to assist the Hungarian Army. The implementation of that 

decree between 1941 and 1944 led to the deaths of many Hungarian 

Jews who were forced to work behind Hungarian lines on the 

Eastern Front. Also in 1941, Hungary ordered and implemented a 

decree resulting in the deportation of between 17,000 and 18,000 

Jews who were deemed "foreign" by the Hungarian government 

because they could not prove their Hungarian citizenship. These 

"foreign" Jews, many of whom were from Northern Transylvania, 

were deported to German-occupied Ukraine, where they were placed 

in the custody of members of the German Schutzstaffel ("SS") and 

subsequently executed. 

 In August 1941, the Hungarian Government enacted 

legislation copied from the Nazis barring marriages and sexual 

relations between Jews and non-Jews. See Act No. XV of 1941, 

Amending and Protecting the Matrimony Act; App. at 1707-38. The 

law contained provisions attempting to define Jewishness, and 

included criminal penalties to be applied to the participants and 

to any officials who oversaw such marriages. 
 In 1943, Koreh moved to Budapest and began working in 

the Royal Hungarian Ministry of National Defense and Propaganda. 

Koreh has admitted that he served as an officer in the 

Information Section of the Ministry in 1943 and 1944. See App. 

at 189, 345, 358. The Information Section was responsible for 

"monitoring of the country's public opinion and provision of 

accurate and objective information concerning matters of national 

interest to organizations and institutions which have a formative 

influence on public opinion." App. at 1590. 

 In March 1944, Nazi Germany occupied Hungary. Shortly 

thereafter, more than one hundred decrees related to Hungarian 

Jews were issued. These decrees included orders confiscating 

Jewish property, relocating Jews to ghettos, restricting Jewish 

movement and barring Jews from using public services. Finally, 

beginning in May 1944, the government began mass deportation of 

Hungarian Jews to German labor and concentration camps. Between 

May 1944 and July 8, 1944, approximately 435,000 Hungarian Jews 

were deported to Auschwitz death camp and other German labor and 

concentration camps. 

 After the German occupation of Hungary, Koreh assumed 

the role of Responsible Editor of the government-owned periodical 

Világlap. Koreh's responsibilities at Világlap included review 

of photographs and articles selected for publication and 

supervision of the editorial staff. In 1947, several years after 

the war ended, Koreh was convicted of a war crime for his role as 
a Responsible Editor of Világlap by the People's Court of 

Hungary, and served seven months of his one-year sentence for the 

conviction in prison.4 In addition, he also spent additional 

time thereafter in a detention camp. 

 In 1950, Koreh applied for and received a visa to the 

United States under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. 

No. 80-774, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), as amended by Pub. L. 

No. 81-555, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219 (1950) (the "DPA"). In 

connection with his application, Koreh signed an affidavit 

stating that he had never been a member of or participated in any 

movement which is or has been hostile to the United States, and 

that he had never advocated or assisted in the persecution of any 

person because of race, religion or national origin. That 

affidavit was a prerequisite to the issuance of the visa and it 

is those facts that the government has challenged in this 

lawsuit. 

 On March 8, 1956, the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of New York granted Koreh's petition for 

naturalization and issued to him Certificate of Naturalization 

No. 7516480. In the ensuing years, Koreh has lived in the United 

States, where he has worked as a writer, translator and 

broadcaster for Radio Free Europe. Koreh has also served as an 

 

4. Koreh moved to expand the record in this court with material 

allegedly showing that conviction was recently overturned by the 

post-Communist government in Hungary, but because Koreh withdrew 

his motion after government objection we have no evidentiary 

basis for that assertion. 
editor for various United States-based Hungarian publications, 

and has hosted a weekly radio program in New York City on 

Hungarian affairs. 

 In 1982, the government interviewed Koreh regarding his 

activities in Hungary during World War II. At that time, Koreh 

told the government about his position with Szekely Nep during 

1941-42, his subsequent position with Világlap, and his charge 

and conviction for war crimes in the People's Court of Hungary. 

Koreh had not revealed this information at the time he applied 

for his visa. 

 In June 1989, the United States filed a nine-count 

complaint against Koreh, later expanded to ten counts, seeking to 

revoke Koreh's naturalized citizenship pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 

1451(a), inter alia, as "illegally procured" on the basis of an 

invalid DPA visa. The five counts relevant to this appeal allege 

that Koreh's DPA visa was invalid because (Count I) he had 

"assisted in the persecution" of Jews through his position at 

Szekely Nep, a fact which rendered Koreh ineligible for a visa 

under section 2(b) of the DPA; (Count II) he had "advocated 

and/or assisted in the persecution" of Jews through his position 

at Szekely Nep, a fact which rendered him ineligible for a visa 

under section 13 of the DPA; (Count III) he had been a member of 

or participated in "a movement hostile to the United States" 

through his employment as a Press Officer in the Press Department 

of the Hungarian Ministry of Propaganda in 1944, a fact which 
rendered him ineligible for a visa under section 13 of the DPA; 

(Count IV) his employment with the Hungarian Ministry constituted 

"voluntary assistance" to enemy forces in their operations 

against the United Nations and he was therefore not a "concern of 

the International Refugee Organization," a fact which rendered 

Koreh ineligible for a visa under section 2(b) of the DPA; (Count 

X) he was a war criminal and was therefore not a "concern of the 

International Refugee Organization," a fact which rendered Koreh 

ineligible for a visa under section 2(b) of the DPA.5

 The government's motion for summary judgment was based 

on those five counts and argued that the undisputed facts in the 

case supported the conclusion that Koreh illegally procured his 

citizenship. After hearing oral argument on the government's 

motion, the district court entered an order granting summary 

 

5. In the remaining counts of the complaint, the government 

alleged (Count V) that Koreh's DPA visa was invalid under section 

10 of the DPA because Koreh had advocated or acquiesced in 

activities contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf 

of the Axis nations during World War II; (Count VI) that Koreh 

unlawfully entered the United States by making willful 

misrepresentations to the Displaced Persons Commission and the 

United States Army Counter Intelligence Corps for the purpose of 

obtaining admission; (Count VII) that Koreh gave false testimony 

to Naturalization examiners and therefore was not a person of 

good moral character as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), and was 

therefore ineligible for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 

1427(a)(3); (Count VIII) that Koreh's assistance in and advocacy 

of persecution of Jewish civilians in Hungary demonstrated that 

he was a not a person of good moral character and was therefore 

ineligible for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); and 

(Count IX) that Koreh illegally procured his citizenship by 

willfully concealing and misrepresenting material facts in his 

Application to File Petition for Naturalization and in his 

Petition for Naturalization. 
judgment to the government on Counts I, II and III of the 

complaint. The district court concluded that Koreh's activities 

at Szekely Nep constituted "advocacy and assistance in 

persecution" rendering him ineligible for a DPA visa under both 

section 2(b) and section 13 of the DPA. With respect to count 

III, the district court concluded that Koreh's activities at 

Szekely Nep constituted membership and participation in a 

"movement hostile to the United States," rendering him ineligible 

for a visa under section 13 of the DPA. Because it held that 

these three counts were sufficient to support the government's 

denaturalization action, the district court declined to address 

the arguments presented by the government based on counts IV or 

X. Koreh now appeals the district court's grant of summary 

judgment to this court. 

II. 

 Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

 This court has jurisdiction over Koreh's appeal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have plenary review over the 

district court's order granting summary judgment. Erie 

Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 

1988). 

 We have previously noted the "two competing concerns" 

at issue in denaturalization cases, United States v. Breyer, 41 

F.3d 884, 889 (3d Cir. 1994), which have an impact on our review. 

As acknowledged by the Supreme Court, "the right to acquire 
American citizenship is a precious one, and . . . once 

citizenship has been acquired, its loss can have severe and 

unsettling consequences." Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 

490, 505 (1981). Thus, the government "carries a heavy burden of 

proof in a proceeding to divest a naturalized citizen of his 

citizenship." Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 

(1961). At the same time, however, courts require "strict 

compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to 

the acquisition of citizenship." Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506. 

These two factors combine to "reflect our consistent recognition 

of the importance of the issues at stake--for the citizen as well 

as the Government--in a denaturalization proceeding." Id. at 

507. 

III. 

Discussion

 Under Section 340(a) of the Immigration & Nationality 

Act of 1952, as amended, the government may seek the revocation 

of an order admitting a person to citizenship and the 

cancellation of that person's certificate of naturalization if 

such order and certificate "were illegally procured." 8 U.S.C § 

1451(a). In order to legally obtain a naturalization order and 

certificate, an applicant must have resided in the United States 

for at least five years after having been "lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence." See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a)(1), 1429. Lawful 

admission requires entry pursuant to a valid immigrant visa. See
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 515; Breyer, 41 F.3d at 889; United States 

v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1985) (in banc), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986). 

 As noted above, Koreh entered the United States under a 

visa issued pursuant to the DPA. At the time of Koreh's 

application, a DPA visa was available only to persons of concern 

to the International Refugee Organization (IRO). DPA § 2(b), 62 

Stat. at 1009. The IRO Constitution provided that persons "who 

can be shown to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil 

populations of countries" are not persons "of concern" to the 

IRO. See Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, 

opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 3051-52, 

T.I.A.S. No. 1846. 

 In addition, section 13 of the DPA provided, in part: 

 No visas shall be issued under the provisions of this 

Act . . . to any person who is or has been a member of 

or participant in any movement hostile to the United 

States or the form of government of the United States, 

or to any person who advocated or assisted in the 

persecution of any person because of race, religion, or 

natural origin. 

DPA § 13, 64 Stat. at 227 (emphasis added). Thus, Koreh was not 

eligible for his DPA visa if, prior to his obtaining the visa, he 

(1) had "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of 

countries" within the meaning of the IRO Constitution, (2) had 

"advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because 

of race, religion, or natural origin" within the meaning of 

section 13 of the DPA, or (3) was or had been "a member of or 
participant in a movement hostile to the United States or the 

form of government of the United States," within the meaning of 

section 13 of the DPA. 

A. 

 Assistance in Persecution

 We first consider whether the undisputed facts support 

the district court's conclusion that Koreh "assisted in the 

persecution" of Hungarian Jews through his activities at Szekely 

Nep.

6 In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of 

the term "assistance in persecution" with respect to the validity 

of a visa obtained under the DPA. The Court held that an 

individual's service as a concentration camp guard constituted 

"assistance in persecution" even if that service was involuntary. 

Id. at 512-13 n.34. The Court recognized that "[o]ther cases may 

present more difficult line-drawing problems," and suggested that 

the proper focus is "on whether particular conduct can be 

considered assisting in the persecution of civilians." Id.

(emphasis in original). It continued: 

 

6. In this case, the district court saw no significant 

difference between the phrases "to have assisted the enemy in 

persecuting civil populations of countries" under the IRO 

Constitution and "assisted in the persecution of any person 

because of race, religion, or natural origin" under section 13 of 

the DPA. See United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 890 n.8 (3d 

Cir. 1994) (noting similar purpose behind the two provisions). 

We agree that these two standards have the same meaning for the 

purposes of this case. We note, however, that section 13 also 

barred the issuance of a DPA visa to persons who "advocated" 

persecution. As discussed below, this "advocacy" standard 

provides an independent basis for affirming the district court's 

order. 
 Thus, an individual who did no more than cut the 

hair of female inmates before they were executed cannot 

be found to have assisted in the persecution of 

civilians. On the other hand, there can be no question 

that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a 

rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was 

regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to 

visit a nearby village, and who admitted to shooting at 

escaping inmates on orders from the commandant of the 

camp, fits within the statutory language about persons 

who assisted in the persecution of civilians. 

Id. 

 We have read Fedorenko as describing a "continuum of 

conduct to guide the courts in deciding" how to apply the term 

"assistance in persecution." Breyer, 41 F.3d at 890. Thus, the 

term is to be applied on a case-by-case basis with reference to 

the relevant facts presented in each case. 

 In his brief, Koreh suggests that the mere publication 

of anti-Semitic articles in a private newspaper cannot constitute 

"assistance in persecution." In particular, Koreh states that he 

"challenge[s] the premise that propaganda assists persecution 

merely by creating 'a climate of opinion.'" Appellant's Brief at 

47. He contends that the district court's conclusion that the 

publication of such propaganda necessarily assisted persecution 

of Hungarian Jews is based upon a theory of causation 

questionable under both tort and criminal law. 

 In making such a contention, Koreh overlooks that this 

case is not founded on causation theories of either tort or 

criminal law. The only issue is whether Koreh had satisfied the 

congressionally-imposed prerequisites for acquiring citizenship. 
 In any event, we unequivocally reject Koreh's 

contention that the propaganda activities of Szekely Nep did not 

"assist in the persecution" of Hungarian Jews. It runs counter 

to generations of history that attest to the maxim that the pen 

is at least as mighty, if not mightier, than the sword. That the 

Nazi powers, and their cohorts, placed great confidence in the 

power of the word is demonstrated by the emphasis they placed on 

propaganda. Indeed, in the Nuremberg trials in presenting the 

charges against defendant Julius Streicher, publisher of an antiSemitic newspaper, the prosecution stated: 

 It may be that this defendant is less directly 

involved in the physical commission of crimes 

against Jews. The submission of the prosecution 

is that his crime is no less the worse for that 

reason. No government in the world, before the 

Nazis came to power, could have embarked upon and 

put into effect a policy of mass extermination 

without having a people who would back them and 

support them. It was to the task of educating 

people, of producing murderers, educating and 

poisoning them with hate, that Streicher set 

himself. In the early days he was preaching 

persecution. As persecution took place he 

preached extermination and annihilation; and, as 

we have seen in the ghettos of the East, as 

millions of Jews were being exterminated and 

annihilated, he cried out for more and more. 

 That is the crime that he has committed. It is 

the submission of the prosecution that he made 

these things possible--made these crimes possible-

-which could never have happened had it not been 

for him and for those like him. . . . The effect 

of this man's crimes, of the poison that he has 

injected into the minds of millions and millions 

of young boys and girls and young men and women 

lives on. He leaves behind him a legacy of almost 
a whole people poisoned with hate, sadism, and 

murder, and perverted by him. 

Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg 384-85 (1983)(emphasis 

added)(quoting from 5 International Military Tribunals (IMT), 

Trial of the Major War Criminals 118 (1987)). 

 When judgment was pronounced on Streicher, the War 

Crimes Court stated, "[T]his defendant continued to write and 

publish his propaganda of death. Streicher's incitement to 

murder and extermination at the time when the Jews in the East 

were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly 

constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in 

connection with war crimes, and constitutes a Crime Against 

Humanity." Id. at 496 (quoting from 1 IMT 304) (emphasis added). 

Although the underlying legal basis for the prosecution of 

Streicher differed from the basis for this denaturalization case 

against Koreh, the recognition of the nexus between propaganda 

and persecution is no less applicable for that reason. 

 In United States v. Sokolov, 814 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988), a case in which the 

court upheld an order of denaturalization because of the 

defendant's propaganda activities in writing pro-Nazi and antiAllies articles, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 

that such propaganda activities clearly constituted advocating or 

assisting "in the persecution of the Jews within the meaning of 

section 13 of the DPA." Id. at 874. The court noted that 

Webster's Dictionary defines "'persecution'" as "'the infliction 
of sufferings, harm, or death on those who differ . . . in a way 

regarded as offensive or meriting extirpation'" and as "'a 

campaign having for its object the subjugation or extirpation of 

the adherents of a religion.'" Id. The court stated that 

notwithstanding the lack of any showing of actual persecution of 

Jews resulting from Sokolov's articles, "such propaganda does 

assist persecution by creating a climate of opinion in which such 

persecution was acceptable," id., thereby facilitating their 

persecution. Thus it concluded that Sokolov, who had written 

several anti-Semitic articles in German-occupied Russia, 

"assisted persecution" by conditioning the Russian people into 

accepting and carrying out the German anti-Jewish policies. Id.

 The Sokolov court's analysis is apt here. There is 

evidence that Szekely Nep played a prominent role in calling for 

Hungary's adoption of increasingly drastic anti-Jewish 

restrictions. During Koreh's tenure, Szekely Nep frequently 

advocated anti-Semitic legislation and enforcement actions that 

were more severe than those which had already been enacted by the 

Hungarian Parliament. Some of the measures supported by Szekely 

Nep during 1941 and 1942 were eventually enacted when the German 

government occupied Hungary in 1944. 

 There was ample basis in the undisputed facts for the 

district court to conclude that Koreh's involvement in the 

publication of anti-Semitic articles by Szekely Nep assisted in 

the persecution of Hungarian Jews by fostering a climate of anti-
Semitism in Northern Transylvania which conditioned the Hungarian 

public to acquiesce, to encourage, and to carry out the 

abominable anti-Semitic policies of the Hungarian government in 

the early 1940s. 

B. 

Advocacy of Persecution

 Moreover, we note that under section 13 of the DPA 

Koreh was ineligible for a visa if he "advocated or assisted in 

the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or 

natural origin." See 64 Stat. at 227 (emphasis added). Such 

advocacy by Koreh provides an independent basis to affirm the 

district court's order of denaturalization. 

 There can be no dispute that the articles published in 

Szekely Nep during Koreh's tenure advocated the persecution of 

Hungarian Jews. Thus, even if Koreh were able to demonstrate 

that no actual persecution was caused by the articles published 

in Szekely Nep, he would still have been ineligible for a DPA 

visa under section 13 as in Sokolov for having advocated such 

persecution in the pages of Szekely Nep. Koreh does not contest 

that principle of law nor does he deny that Szekely Nep advocated 

such persecution. Instead he seeks to deflect the legal effect 

of the district court's factual and legal conclusions by 

disclaiming personal responsibility. 

 C. 

 The "active and personal participation" argument
 Koreh's effort to avoid the inevitable conclusion to 

which the undisputed facts led the district court is principally 

concentrated in his argument that he "did not actively or 

personally commit any acts of oppression." Appellant's Brief at 

22. The difficulty with Koreh's argument is that it would 

require us to rewrite the statute. 

 Koreh contends that in non-death camp cases courts 

should require a showing that a defendant personally participated 

in the acts of persecution. He notes that while courts have 

frequently found that armed concentration camp guards have 

"assisted in persecution" regardless of whether they personally 

committed any acts of oppression, see, e.g., Breyer, 41 F.3d at 

890; United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253, 1259 (7th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991), they have been reluctant to 

apply a similar standard in non-death camp cases. Thus, Koreh 

reasons, even if the anti-Semitic articles in Szekely Nep

constitute "advocacy or assistance in persecution" of Hungarian 

Jews, the government must still demonstrate that he took an 

active role in the publication of those articles. 

 In support of his argument, Koreh relies heavily on 

United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985). In 

Sprogis, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a 

district court's dismissal of the government's denaturalization 

action on the ground that the government had presented 

insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the 
defendant had assisted in the persecution of Jews while serving 

as a policeman in Nazi-controlled Latvia. The court stated that 

although the defendant had been present at the police station 

during the detention of nine Latvian Jews and had allowed their 

incarceration to continue, "these were not acts of oppression." 

Id. at 122. The Sprogis court continued: 

 There is no clear evidence that he made any decision to 

single out any person for arrest and persecution or 

that he committed any hostile act against any 

persecuted civilian. Sprogis' passive accommodation of 

the Nazis, like that of so many other civil servants 

similarly faced with the Nazis' conquest of their 

homelands and the horrors of World War II, does not, in 

our view, exclude him from citizenship under the DPA. 

To hold otherwise would require the condemnation as 

persecutors of all those who, with virtually no 

alternative, performed routine law enforcement 

functions during Nazi occupation. 

Id. at 122-23. 

 While we might have drawn the line between "passive 

accommodation" and "assistance in persecution" differently than 

did the Sprogis court, we note that in a case shortly thereafter, 

Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 

U.S. 1182 (1986), the same court sustained deportation of a 

former Latvian police chief who, on orders of the German 

authorities, had directed his police to assist the German 

soldiers in mass arrests and the burning of a village. Id. at 

438. The court did not cite its own Sprogis decision decided 

earlier the same year.7

 

7. The government argues, and the district court agreed, that 

Sprogis is not good law because the Second Circuit's decision in 
 The language in other denaturalization cases on which 

Koreh relies for his proposed "personal participation" 

requirement provides little persuasive precedent. In United 

States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 

U.S. 1153 (1986), the court affirmed a district court's order 

revoking the citizenship of a defendant who served as an armed 

guard at a Nazi labor camp in Poland. Thus the statement that 

"in cases not involving armed guards such as defendant, a showing 

of personal involvement in persecutions may be necessary," id. at 

1378 (emphasis added), is not only dictum, but equivocal dictum 

at best. 

 Inexplicably, Koreh continuously refers to language in 

the dissenting opinion in United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 

488, 513 (3d Cir. 1985) (in banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 

(1986). This court, in banc, affirmed the order of 

denaturalization, concluding that the defendant was ineligible 

for a DPA visa because (1) he had voluntarily assisted enemy 

forces during World War II in their operations, and (2) he made 

willful material misrepresentations in his application for a DPA 

(..continued) 

United States v. Sokolov, 814 F.2d 864, 874 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.

denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988) effectively rejected Sprogis. Koreh 

responds that because Sokolov "voluntarily wrote anti-Semitic 

articles," his role was different from Sprogis's role of "passive 

accommodation." We need not decide whether the cases are 

consistent because Koreh's conduct was more analogous to 

Sokolov's and, in any event, we find the analysis in Sokolov more 

persuasive. 
visa. Id. at 498. Had this court been persuaded by the 

dissent's view, patently the outcome would have been different. 

 This is not a case in which the government bases its 

claim of "assistance in or advocacy of" persecution on Koreh's 

mere membership in an organization. Thus again, the language in 

Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985), where the court 

stated that under the Holtzman Amendment8 the government must 

"provide proof of personal active assistance or participation in 

persecutorial acts before deportability may be established" 

rather than "mere acquiescence or membership in an organization," 

id. at 1431-32, was not made in a factually analogous situation. 

The same is true of the dictum in Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 446, 

where the court did uphold deportability, and in its discussion 

merely noted that "an alien's inactive membership in an 

organization bent on politically-based persecution" or "his 

tangential provision of services to such an organization" might

be insufficient to support deportation. 

 Indeed, there is also dictum on Koreh's "personal 

participation" argument that goes in the other direction. For 

example, in Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.

denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987), another Holtzman Amendment case 

 

8. The Holtzman Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act 

permits deportation of any alien who, under the direction of or 

in association with the Nazi regime or any regime allied with it, 

"ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the 

persecution of any person because of race, religion, national 

origin, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i). 
upholding deportability, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected 

the requirement that personal, active involvement in the 

persecution is required to constitute "assistance in 

persecution." The Schellong court noted that insofar as Sprogis

and Laipenieks hold "that personal involvement in atrocities is 

necessary to have assisted in persecution for purposes of the DPA 

or the Holtzman Amendment, they conflict with Fedorenko." Id. at 

661. The Schellong court, as did this court in Breyer, 41 F.3d 

at 890, and the Second Circuit in Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 446-48, 

endorsed a more flexible rule, determining the nature of 

"assistance in persecution" on a case-by-case basis, as suggested 

in Fedorenko. See 449 U.S. at 512-13 n.34. 

 In any event, the only issue before us is whether the 

facts of this case support the conclusion that Koreh assisted in 

or advocated persecution of the Jews, the statutory standard. 

There need be no personal participation by the defendant in the 

commission of physical atrocities. 

 Despite Koreh's contentions to the contrary, the 

undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that Koreh did, in 

fact, personally participate in the activities that are the 

subject of the government's denaturalization claim. While the 

issue of Koreh's involvement in the editorial process at Szekely 

Nep remains in dispute, there is no dispute that Koreh sought and 

obtained from the Hungarian government the license to publish 

Szekely Nep. That license, as Koreh concedes, was necessary 
under Hungarian law to permit the newspaper to publish. Indeed, 

his act of obtaining and maintaining the license for Szekely Nep

enabled the publication of the newspaper to occur and ensured 

that its anti-Semitic message would be carried throughout its 

distribution area in Northern Transylvania. Koreh's actions in 

connection with the newspaper therefore cannot fairly be 

characterized as one of "passive accommodation." Rather, Koreh 

took affirmative acts that were no less influential to the spread 

of Szekely Nep's anti-Semitic message than the actions of those 

who personally edited and wrote the articles that appeared in the 

newspaper. Thus, even if we were to require some degree of 

active personal participation from defendants in non-death camp 

cases, Koreh's undisputed actions in this case would satisfy that 

requirement. It would be ironic indeed were we to hold that some 

mere writer were to have responsibility for the contents of the 

propaganda spewed out month after month by Szekely Nep but that 

someone without whom the paper could not be published can evade 

such responsibility. It is simply unacceptable to equate Koreh's 

responsibility with that of a typesetter, as Koreh's counsel 

sought to do at argument. 

 We conclude that the undisputed facts of this case 

demonstrate that Koreh's activities at Szekely Nep during 1941 

and 1942 constituted both assistance in the persecution of 

civilians under the IRO and the "advoca[cy] or assist[ance] in 

the persecution of any persons because of race, religion, or 
national origin" under section 13 of the DPA. Koreh was 

therefore ineligible for a DPA visa, and his citizenship was thus 

"illegally procured" under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 

D. 

Movement Hostile

 As an alternate basis for its grant of summary 

judgment, the district court determined that Koreh was also 

ineligible for a visa under section 13 of the DPA because his 

activities at Szekely Nep constituted membership and 

participation in a "movement hostile to the United States." As 

precedent, the district court relied on two cases. One was the 

Second Circuit's holding in Sokolov that Sokolov's writing antiSemitic articles "amounted to a participation in a 'movement . . 

. hostile to the United States.'" See 814 F.2d at 874. The 

other was the district court's holding in Marschalko v. 

Shaughnessy, Civ. No. 63-138 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1951), App. at 

1775-86, approving the INS's conclusion that an individual who 

had been a writer for a semi-official publication of the 

Hungarian government during the war, and who wrote anti-American, 

anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi articles, was ineligible for a DPA visa 

because he had "participated in a movement. . . which was 

'hostile to the United States.'" App. at 1786. 

 Although the word "movement" may not ordinarily be 

associated with a newspaper, Koreh's argument does not stand on 

that technical ground, and the application of the word for 
purposes of the relevant statute has been broad. Koreh argues 

instead that unlike the newspapers in Sokolov and Marschalko, 

which were directly affiliated with Axis governments,9 Szekely 

Nep was a "civilian newspaper" and therefore it should not be 

deemed a "movement hostile to the United States" despite its 

anti-Allies political stance.10 

 However, the premise for the government's 

denaturalization claim is that Koreh was not eligible for DPA 

status, which was the basis of his visa. The government has 

produced uncontested evidence that during the early 1950s, when 

Koreh got his visa, the United States Displaced Persons 

Commission (DPC) frequently denied DPA status to persons 

associated with private and semi-private newspapers that had 

published anti-American propaganda in Axis nations during World 

War II because they were deemed members of movements "hostile to 

the United States." See, e.g., App. at 1613 (denying admission 

to editor of newspaper in Hungary during 1942 because "[t]he 

position . . . would necessitate support and compliance with the 

 

9. In Sokolov, the paper was a publication directly controlled 

and operated by the German army. 814 F.2d at 867. In 

Marschalko, the paper was characterized as a "semi-official organ 

of the Hungarian government." App. at 1778. 

10. In light of the articles referred to in the text supra, 

Koreh does not dispute, nor could he, that Szekely Nep espoused 

anti-American views and pro-Nazi philosophy during Koreh's 

tenure. See, e.g., App. at 1195-1204 (article entitled 

"Roosevelt-The Emperor of the World"); App. at 1327-35 (article 

entitled "How the World's Jews Forced the American People to Go 

to War"). 
directives of the Hungarian Government in power in 1942"); App. 

at 1614 (denying admission to person who admitted association 

with newspaper published under Nazi supervision that demonstrated 

"pro-Nazi sentiment"); App. at 1615 (denying admission to woman 

whose husband was editor-in-chief of rightist German newspaper 

and wrote anti-Allies and anti-Jewish articles in Hungarian 

newspaper). 

 This evidence clearly supports the government's 

position, accepted by the district court, that Szekely Nep

constituted a "movement hostile to the United States" for DPA 

purposes.11 The DPC decisions demonstrate that the DPC's focus 

was on the sentiment expressed in the newspapers, not the formal 

institutional association of the newspaper. Insofar as the DPC 

decisions suggest that some connection with an Axis government is 

required, see, e.g., App. at 1614, the record shows both that 

Szekely Nep received some degree of editorial direction from the 

Hungarian government and that Szekely Nep could not have operated 

without a government license. We therefore conclude that Szekely 

Nep constituted a "movement hostile to the United States" for the 

purposes of section 13 of the DPA. 

 We must then consider Koreh's attempt to distinguish 

Sokolov and Marschalko on the ground that those defendants 

 

11. Of course, the DPC decisions are not dispositive of our 

interpretation of the "movement hostile" language. Instead they 

undermine Koreh's suggestion that for DPA status there was a 

clear distinction between private and public newspapers which 

published anti-American, pro-Nazi articles. 
personally advocated Nazism or anti-Semitism by writing articles 

in official or semi-official newspapers. He argues, as he did in 

connection with the "assistance" and "advocacy" grounds for 

denaturalization, that the degree of his personal involvement in 

the publication process is a disputed issue of material fact. 

Koreh contends that "participation or membership" must be 

construed to take into account the degree of a defendant's 

involvement in the organization, in order that those tangentially 

affiliated with a movement deemed hostile to the United States 

(such as a janitor, a sportswriter, etc.) would not be barred by 

section 13. 

 In most cases involving the "movement hostile" prong of 

the DPA, there is little question that the defendant participated 

actively in actions deemed hostile to the United States. See, 

e.g., Breyer, 41 F.3d at 890-91 (defendant's voluntary service in 

Nazi concentration camp guard unit constituted membership in a 

movement hostile to the United States); Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 

497 n.11 (suggesting that defendant's voluntary service in 

Ukrainian militia organized by the Nazis constituted membership 

in a movement hostile to the United States). That does not mean 

that those whose actions were of a different order do not also 

fall within the statutory prescription. 

 We find particularly persuasive the decision of Judge 

Bechtle in United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 

1981) that "membership in a movement hostile to the United 
States" required only willing membership in such an organization 

"without proof of personal participation in acts of persecution." 

Id. at 72. As that court pointed out, the plain language of 

section 13 contains no requirement that a defendant personally 

participate in any hostile acts committed by the movement, and 

the legislative history suggests that Congress sought to exclude 

all "members" of such groups, regardless of the degree of their 

participation. Id. at 73-75. This led it to conclude that 

"[t]he only qualifying restriction as to willing membership does 

not go to the type or personal degree of membership but, rather, 

to the type of movement in which a person is a member." Id. at 

74.12 It is unlikely that Congress, which enacted the DPA in 

part to assist the victims of Nazi persecution, wanted to extend 

the DPA's benefits to persons who were voluntary members of 

movements that assisted in that persecution.13

 There is no dispute that Koreh voluntarily assumed the 

position as Responsible Editor of Szekely Nep. In light of our 

 

12. Relying upon this conclusion, the Osidach court concluded 

that an individual who was a voluntary member of the Ukrainian 

police from 1942-44 was a member of a movement hostile to the 

United States because those police assisted the Germans during 

the war, regardless of whether he personally participated in any 

acts of persecution. 513 F. Supp. at 78-79, 96. 

13. While no courts have directly addressed the issue, at least 

one other court of appeals has implicitly accepted the Osidach

court's interpretation of the provision. See Laipenieks v. INS, 

750 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that in a deportation 

action, unlike a denaturalization action involving the DPA, "more 

than willing membership in a movement is required to establish 

deportability"). 
conclusion that the newspaper constituted a "movement hostile to 

the United States," we will also affirm the district court's 

conclusion that Koreh was ineligible for a visa under the 

"movement hostile" provision of section 13 of the DPA.14

E. 

Laches

 Koreh unsuccessfully argued that the government's claim 

was barred by laches because it was investigating this case in 

1982 but failed to file a complaint until 1989. The elements of 

laches are (1) lack of diligence by party against whom the 

defense is asserted and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the 

defense. Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 74 (3d 

Cir. 1986). Koreh apparently contends that the delay in bringing 

the denaturalization action was inexcusable, and that he suffered 

prejudice due to the delay. 

 The government argues that laches is unavailable in a 

denaturalization proceeding and that its use as a defense in such 

a case is unprecedented. This court has not yet decided that 

issue. In Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961), 

 

14. We note that the district court's conclusion on this issue 

could also be affirmed by relying upon the alternative grounds 

advanced by the government: Koreh's position in the Information 

Section of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of National Defense and 

Propaganda during 1943-44. Koreh does not dispute that he 

voluntarily assumed this governmental position, and there is 

little question that the Ministry, as an organ of the Hungarian 

Axis government during World War II, constituted a "movement 

hostile to the United States" for the purposes of section 13 of 

the DPA. Because there are ample other bases to affirm, we need 

not rely on a ground not reached by the district court. 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that some federal courts have held 

that "laches is not a defense against the sovereign," but because 

the Court concluded that the laches claim in that case would fail 

on its merits, it did not decide whether the defense was 

applicable in a denaturalization proceeding. Id. at 282-84. 

 The government points to Fedorenko, a later case, where 

the Supreme Court noted that "district courts lack equitable 

discretion to refrain from entering a judgment of 

denaturalization against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship 

was procured illegally or by willful misrepresentation of 

material facts." 449 U.S. at 517. Although the Fedorenko Court 

was not discussing the availability of a laches defense, the 

government reasons that this language bars such a defense because 

laches involves the use of a district court's "equitable 

discretion." The government also cites several decisions by 

federal district courts holding that a laches defense is not 

available in a denaturalization proceeding. See, e.g., United 

States v. Schmidt, No. 88 C 9475, 1990 WL 6667, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 

Jan. 3, 1990), aff'd, 923 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 

U.S. 921 (1991); United States v. Schuk, 565 F. Supp. 613, 615 

(E.D. Pa. 1983); see also United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 

1254, 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1374, 1384 (7th 

Cir.) (noting on appeal that the court need not reach the issue 

because the defendant did not meet the burden of proving laches), 

cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986). 
 Under the facts of this case, we need not resolve the 

question of the availability of a laches defense to a 

denaturalization action. We agree with the district court that 

even if such a defense were available, Koreh has failed to 

establish the elements required to maintain the defense. A party 

asserting the defense of laches has the burden of establishing 

the elements of the defense. See EEOC v. Great Atlantic & 

Pacific Tea Co., 735 U.S. 69, 80 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 469 

U.S. 925 (1984). Koreh has not shown that he has suffered any 

specific prejudice from the government's alleged lack of 

diligence in bringing the case. 

 While Koreh makes a blanket assertion that the delay 

has resulted in the loss of potential witnesses due to death, he 

does not identify any individual who might have helped his 

defense. Indeed, as discussed above, because Koreh has admitted 

that he obtained and maintained the license to publish Szekely 

Nep, an action which we find sufficient to support the conclusion 

that he personally participated in the newspaper's anti-Semitic 

advocacy and assistance in persecution, it is difficult to see 

how any additional testimony would aid in his defense. 

 We therefore conclude that the district court did not 

err in refusing to accept Koreh's affirmative defense of laches. 

IV. 

Conclusion
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 

the district court.