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Filed 6/29/15 P. v. Belton CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CASSONDRA LADAWNYA BELTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

C075998

(Super. Ct. No. 10F08376)

A jury found defendant Cassondra Ladawnya Belton guilty of first degree murder, 

robbery, and car theft, and found true a robbery-murder special circumstance. (Pen. 

Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 211; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) The 

trial court sentenced defendant to prison for life without parole. Defendant timely filed 

this appeal.
2

On appeal, defendant contends some of her pretrial statements should not have 

been introduced as evidence because they were involuntary, were obtained in violation of 

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694]), and--to the extent that any of 

her claims were not raised in the trial court--her trial counsel was ineffective because 

there was no rational tactical reason not to move to suppress her statements on all 

possible grounds. Disagreeing, we shall affirm.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was involved in robbing and killing the victim, Baljinder Kumar, on or 

about December 16, 2010. Defendant and two juveniles, Kevin Hjellum (also referred to 

as Nathaniel L. or Nate) and Monica Elizabeth Ortiz, discussed robbing Kumar, a drug 

dealer, in his car. Kumar was strangled and his body was left near Hood-Franklin Road 

in rural Sacramento County.1

Defendant spoke to a California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer when she was 

arrested in Oroville while driving Kumar’s car on December 19, 2010, the day after 

Kumar’s body was found. She told the officer that her father gave her the car to drive. 

Early the next morning she told the same story to Sacramento detectives. In a later 

interrogation that day, she admitted strangling Kumar and helping to dump his body.

At trial, defendant testified she did not kill Kumar. Although she knew Hjellum 

and Ortiz discussed robbing him during a fake drug deal, she did not take them seriously. 

However, she got into Kumar’s car with them, and put a belt around Kumar’s neck, 

because she thought Hjellum was going to hit her with a rock. Then Hjellum jumped in 

the back and began to strangle Kumar. At that point, defendant got out of the car and 

 

1

 Ortiz and Hjellum, originally codefendants, each pled no contest to second degree 

murder before defendant’s suppression motion was heard. It does not appear that Ortiz 

ever appealed, and we previously denied Hjellum’s request to deem his belated notice of 

appeal to be timely. (See People v. Hjellum, 3 Crim. No. C075886.)
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walked away. She looked back and saw Ortiz waving toward her, so she returned, to find 

Kumar dead or in extremis. She obeyed Hjellum’s direction to drive the car away, and 

watched the other two roll his body down a hill. She accepted money they found in 

Kumar’s car, totaling “a couple thousand” dollars. Defendant was scared when 

questioned and lied to the officers. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, defendant claims (1) the detectives undermined her Miranda waiver, 

and (2) her statements were involuntary. Recognizing that neither of these claims was 

directly presented to the trial court, she contends she may raise the voluntariness claim 

absent a trial court objection, and that her trial counsel was ineffective to the extent he 

failed to preserve her claims. Although the Attorney General appears to be correct that 

these new claims are forfeited, “it is within our discretion to address a forfeited claim to 

avoid the inevitable ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” (People v. Guillen (2014) 

227 Cal.App.4th 934, 1028.) We reach defendant’s claims.

I

The Suppression Hearing

The People moved in limine to admit all of defendant’s statements to the police. 

Defense counsel filed a counter motion to exclude only the portion of the last 

interrogation after she mentioned an attorney, which counsel characterized as a request 

for an attorney that had been ignored by the detectives. Defendant’s more inculpatory 

statements were made after she mentioned an attorney. 

The issue was submitted to the trial court based on transcripts of the 

interrogations, not the recordings later played at trial. This means the trial court was not 

asked to make any determination regarding physically intimidating conduct by the 

officers or the effect of any of their conduct on defendant’s demeanor (e.g., whether she 

was crying, recoiling from them, etc.). 
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During the last interrogation, one detective emphasized that they wanted to know 

who had done what and what the intentions had been, given that some of the 

circumstances suggested torture. He added that they had heard what other people had 

said but wanted to know defendant’s side. Defendant replied: “Uh, well I don’t know if 

this is a question for you guys or if I should ask an attorney or something, but, um, how 

do you go about sentencing us if you - if you can’t exactly find out . . . who actually 

killed him?” The detectives then continued with the interrogation, and defendant freely 

answered questions, detailing the planning of the robbery, the killing, and its aftermath. 

At the in limine hearing, defense counsel represented that defendant was young, 

lacked sophistication, and had no criminal record, and contended her reference to an 

attorney invoked her right to counsel. Defense counsel also contended that when the 

detectives segued from discussing the car theft to the killing, defendant should have been 

re-Mirandized.

The trial court ruled defendant had been properly Mirandized, did not invoke her 

right to counsel, and “continued talking . . . for a good while openly and, apparently [in] a 

very cordial conversation, said a few things.” Defendant was not “forced to [talk] . . . 

without certain warnings or put in any kind of duress.” 

II

Defendant’s Claims

Defendant contends the detectives undermined her Miranda waiver and through 

their purported misconduct rendered her statements involuntary. We disagree.2

 

2

 Defendant does not challenge the finding that she did not invoke her right to counsel. 

(See Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 458-459 [129 L.Ed.2d 362, 371]; 

People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 376-384 (Nelson).)
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A. Miranda Waiver

A suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, 

but may be expressed or implied. (See Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 374-375; 

People v. Roquemore (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 11, 22-23.) “On appeal, we conduct an 

independent review of the trial court’s legal determination and rely upon the trial court’s 

findings on disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Williams

(2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 (Williams).)

The record shows defendant was Mirandized before the first recorded 

interrogation, and re-Mirandized at the beginning of the second recorded interrogation.3 

After being told her rights at the beginning of the second interrogation, defendant spoke 

freely with the officers at length. She asked the officers questions, and listened to their 

questions. In short, this appears to have been a mundane, routine, interrogation. Indeed, 

the fact defendant was advised of and waived her rights multiple times bolsters the view 

that she knowingly and voluntarily waived them. (Cf. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 

434 [“After a valid Miranda waiver, readvisement prior to continued custodial 

interrogation is unnecessary ‘so long as a proper warning has been given, and “the 

subsequent interrogation is ‘reasonably contemporaneous’ with the prior knowing and 

intelligent waiver” ’ ”].)

Defendant contends the “tactics” of the police vitiated her waiver, specifically, 

that the detectives suggested “her jury would infer guilt from her failure to speak with the 

police,” thereby telling her that her “right to remain silent was meaningless.” She likens 

this to cases where the Miranda rights are not clearly communicated or are negated by 

official conduct. 

 

3

 At trial there was testimony that defendant had also been Mirandized by the CHP 

officer when she was arrested, said she understood her rights, and first told the false story 

about receiving Kumar’s car from her father. 
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For example, defendant emphasizes United States v. Harrison (1994) 34 F.3d 886, 

at page 891 (Harrison) which states in part: “Although the agents thinly veiled their 

implied message behind a rhetorical question, Harrison could only conclude that she 

might suffer for her silence.” Harrison opened the door of her home to find some 15 

federal agents with guns drawn, who searched her house and arrested her and her 

companion. She was advised of her Miranda rights, but after a brief silence, an agent 

described the evidence against her and said that she could face a 20-year sentence. The 

agent then asked whether Harrison thought it would be better if the judge were told that 

she had cooperated or had not cooperated. Harrison said it would be better if she talked 

to the agents and they told the judge she had cooperated, then she made an inculpatory 

statement. (Id. at p. 890.) In reversing her conviction, the Harrison court emphasized the 

impropriety of the implication that the agents would tell the judge or prosecutor that 

Harrison had not cooperated if she exercised her right to silence. (Id. at pp. 891-892 

[“there are no circumstances in which law enforcement officers may suggest that a 

suspect’s exercise of the right to remain silent may result in harsher treatment by a court 

or prosecutor”].) Defendant also points to Doody v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2011) 649 F.3d 986, a 

habeas corpus case holding that a state court had unreasonably found a valid Miranda

waiver. There, the rights were read in a confusing manner, so that “[w]hat began as the 

reading of a single-page Miranda form morphed into a twelve-page exposition that 

negated the intended effect of the Miranda warning.” (Id. at p. 991, italics added; see 

also id. at pp. 1024-1028 (conc. opn. of Kozinski, C.J.) [“unlike voluntariness [which 

may be debatable], ‘a warning is a clearcut fact’ ”; the officer muddled the warnings by 

suggesting Doody was entitled to a lawyer only if he were involved in the crime, not 

merely suspected of involvement, therefore “The warning given in this case was far 

worse than no warning at all”].)
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But Harrison and Doody are inapposite: Here, defendant chose to waive her right 

to silence and speak to the officers long before any of the officers’ challenged remarks 

were made. There was no infirmity at the time the Miranda warnings were given, as in 

Harrison and Doody. Defendant contends the references to her silence vitiated her 

Miranda advisement: “By suggesting . . . that her jury would infer guilt from her failure 

to speak with the police, Detective Tracy effectively told [defendant] that her right to 

remain silent was meaningless.” But Detective Tracy said no such thing. He said the 

jury would speculate about her intentions if she did not explain herself. He also said it 

would look bad for her if the only statement the jury had from her was her statement to 

the CHP and earlier to the detectives, to the effect that her father gave her Kumar’s car to 

drive. That was an accurate and common sense observation; at the time the officer made 

the statement the police had caught one of defendant’s relatives trying to dispose of 

Kumar’s belongings from her house. They knew defendant’s claim that her father gave 

her the car was false. We see nothing about pointing out this circumstance that would 

undermine defendant’s ability to stand on her rights and end the interrogation.

Defendant contends the officers “openly confronted her” with information that in 

between the two recorded interrogations, they had searched her home, caught a relative 

trying to dispose of items belonging to Kumar, and told her that her juvenile companions 

had been talking and said nobody intended to kill Kumar. Further, a detective suggested 

the killing was a mistake and an unfortunate accident. All of this is correct. Also, in 

response to an inquiry from defendant about determining her sentence, the detective 

replied he could not say, and that was for the prosecutor and the judge to determine. His 

job was to gather the facts impartially. Shortly thereafter, he told her the only person 

who could explain defendant’s state of mind was defendant, which is why the detectives 

came to Oroville from Sacramento to talk to her. She replied, “So maybe present that 

question, I’ll be able to tell you what happened.” They asked her what happened and she 

told them about the planning and execution of the robbery and disposal of the corpse.
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Once Miranda rights are clearly communicated, as they were here, and are waived 

by the suspect, officers may continue with a non-coercive custodial interrogation unless 

and until the suspect invokes her or his right to silence or right to counsel, and in this case 

defendant impliedly concedes she did neither. (See fn. 2, ante.) After all, “it is the 

Miranda warnings themselves, which—when given to the suspect and waived prior to 

questioning—are ‘ “sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation 

process.” ’ ” (Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 377.) We fail to see how any or all of 

defendant’s points about the successful interrogation techniques used in this case after 

defendant knowingly and freely waived her Miranda rights undermined her knowledge of 

those rights or implicated her decision to waive them. 

Accordingly, assuming the point is not forfeited, defendant has not demonstrated 

that her Miranda waiver was vitiated by the detectives. 

B. Voluntariness4

“The prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the 

evidence that a defendant’s confession was voluntarily made. [Citations.] In determining 

whether a confession was voluntary, ‘ “[t]he question is whether defendant’s choice to 

confess was not ‘essentially free’ because his [or her] will was overborne.” ’ [Citation.] 

Whether the confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. 

[Citations.] ‘ “On appeal, the trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding 

the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, but the trial court’s 

finding as to the voluntariness of the confession is subject to independent review.” ’ ” 

(People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 169 (Carrington).) 

 

4

 As will become evident, several of the sub-points raised by defendant as to her 

Miranda waiver are also used by her to attempt to show her statements were involuntary. 

We will not duplicate all of our analysis of these common points.
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“Here, there is no dispute as to the historical facts, no claim of physical 

intimidation or deprivation, and no assertion of coercive tactics other than the contents of 

the interrogation itself.” (People v Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 114.) Only the

transcripts were submitted for the trial court’s consideration. Defendant partly contends 

that the actions of the officers “and the surrounding circumstances” rendered her 

statements involuntary. She emphasizes that she had asked about her sentence, 

suggesting that this equated to a request for legal advice, that is, for a lawyer’s advice. 

However, she does not contest the trial court’s ruling that her question was not an 

unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. She faults the officers for wrongly 

suggesting her intent was at issue, although this case was prosecuted as a felony-murder 

case. But “[t]he policeman is not a fiduciary of the suspect. The police are allowed to 

play on a suspect’s ignorance, his anxieties, his fears, and his uncertainties; they just are 

not allowed to magnify those fears, uncertainties, and so forth to the point where rational 

decision becomes impossible.” (United States v. Rutledge (7th Cir. 1990) 900 F.2d 1127, 

1130.) 

In any event, under current standards, “telling a suspect falsehoods regarding the 

status of the case against him is widely accepted.” (3 Ringel, Searches & Seizures, 

Arrests and Confessions (2d ed. 2011) Voluntariness of Confessions and Admissions, 

§ 25:8, pp. 25–38; see 2 LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure (3d ed. 2007) Interrogation 

and Confessions, § 6.2(c), pp. 629-633.) “Where the deception is not of a type 

reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement, a finding of involuntariness is 

unwarranted.” (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 182; see 1 Witkin, Cal. 

Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Hearsay, § 69, p. 760.) Here, the conduct was not likely to 

induce a false confession. (Cf. People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 550.) 

Defendant’s reliance on People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478 is unpersuasive. In 

that case, our Supreme Court accepted for purposes of argument a lower court’s 

determination that various police statements, including a misstatement about felony 
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murder, amounted to an implied promise of lenity, rendering a confession involuntary (id. 

at pp. 483-485). The high court did not hold that misstating the law about felony murder 

was coercive in all cases. Instead, the statements by the officers must be assessed to 

determine whether they would be likely to cause a false confession. (People v. Farnam, 

supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 182.) The transcript herein contains no such statements.

Similarly, defendant’s claims that the officers improperly suggested the jurors 

would infer guilt if defendant did not talk and minimized the crime by suggesting it might 

have been an accident are unpersuasive, because such conduct would not tend to coerce 

an innocent person to admit to murder. Further, suggesting the killing was an accident 

does not compel a finding that defendant’s will was overborne. As held in an analogous 

case, “suggestions that the . . . homicide might have been an accident, a self-defensive 

reaction, or the product of fear, were not coercive; they merely suggested possible 

explanations of the events and offered defendant an opportunity to provide the details of 

the crime. This tactic is permissible.” (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 171; see 

Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 444 [“suggestions made by the interrogating officers 

that defendant may not have been the actual killer, or may not have intended that the 

victim die, were not coercive”]; People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 116 

[“suggestions that the killings might have been accidental or resulted from an 

uncontrollable fit of rage during a drunken blackout, and that such circumstances could 

‘make[] a lot of difference,’ fall far short of being promises of lenient treatment in 

exchange for cooperation”].) “ ‘ “Once a suspect has been properly advised of his [or 

her] rights, he [or she] may be questioned freely so long as the questioner does not 

threaten harm or falsely promise benefits. Questioning may include exchanges of 

information, summaries of evidence, outline of theories of events, confrontation with 

contradictory facts, even debate between police and suspect.” ’ ” (Carrington, supra, 47 

Cal.4th at p. 170.)
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Nor did the detectives improperly suggest defendant did not have a realistic right 

to silence, because of the jury’s eventual view of her false statements about how she got 

the car. “[T]here is nothing improper in pointing out that a jury probably will be more 

favorably impressed by a confession and a show of remorse than by demonstrably false 

denials. ‘No constitutional principle forbids the suggestion by authorities that it is worse 

for a defendant to lie in light of overwhelming incriminating evidence.’ [Citation.] 

Absent improper threats or promises, law enforcement officers are permitted to urge that 

it would be better to tell the truth.” (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 444.)

Nor, contrary to defendant’s claim were there any improper promises of lenity. 

While promises of lenity in exchange for a confession may render a particular statement 

involuntary (see, e.g., In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200, 214), mere 

exhortations to tell the truth are permissible. (See Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 174 

[“The interviewing officers did not suggest they could influence the decisions of the 

district attorney, but simply informed defendant that full cooperation might be beneficial 

in an unspecified way. Indeed, defendant understood that punishment decisions were not 

within the control of the police officers”]; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 398 

[“ ‘ “[w]hen the benefit pointed out by the police . . . is merely that which flows naturally 

from a truthful and honest course of conduct,” the subsequent statement will not be 

considered involuntarily made’ ”].) Here, the detectives suggested the prosecutor, judge, 

or jury would speculate about defendant’s silence, given her prior lies. The detectives 

never mentioned particular outcomes, and disavowed any control over the punishment 

defendant might receive. Their statements are more properly characterized as urging 

defendant to tell the truth rather than making improper promises of lenity, or threats of 

penal harm if defendant did not keep talking.

Although not directly asked to rule on voluntariness, the trial court found that 

defendant was not “put in any kind of duress.” That finding, which equates to a finding 

of voluntariness, is amply supported by the record.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

 DUARTE , J.

We concur:

 RAYE , P. J.

 HOCH , J.