PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 16-3667

_______________

CHARLES WESLEY BLACKLEDGE, 

Appellant

v.

OLGA GRIGORIEVNA BLACKLEDGE

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(W.D. Pa. No. 2-16-cv-01004)

Honorable Nora B. Fischer, District Judge

_______________

Argued: May 19, 2017

Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and NYGAARD, Circuit 

Judges

(Opinion Filed: August 3, 2017)

James C. Martin, Esq.

Reed Smith

225 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1200

Pittsburgh, PA 15222
2

Michael P. Yingling, Esq. (Argued)

Reed Smith

10 South Wacker Drive, 40th Floor

Chicago, IL 60606

Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant1

Barbara B. Ernsberger, Esq. (Argued)

Behrend & Ernsberger

355 Fifth Avenue

Suite 1200, Park Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Attorney for Respondent-Appellee

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner, a German resident, appeals the denial of his 

petition alleging that his wife wrongfully retained their theneight-year-old son in the United States in violation of the 

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 

 

1 We express our gratitude to Appellant’s counsel for 

accepting our appointment of this matter and for their 

excellent briefing and argument in this case. Lawyers who 

act pro bono fulfill the highest service that members of the 

bar can offer to indigent parties and to the legal profession.
3

Abduction. Because we conclude that, to the extent an 

agreement between the parties can be gleaned from the 

record, the parents’ shared intent was that the child would 

move to the United States not for a transient visit, but with a 

settled purpose, and because the child had acclimatized to his 

life in the United States at the time of the retention, the 

United States was then his habitual residence and the 

retention was not wrongful under the Convention. 

Accordingly, we will affirm.

I. Factual Background 

A. J.B.’s Early Years and Initial Two-Year 

Residence in Pittsburgh

J.B., a United States citizen, was born in the Ukraine

in 2008 to Petitioner Charles Blackledge, a United States 

citizen who currently resides in Berlin, Germany, and 

Respondent Olga Blackledge, a Ukrainian citizen and lawful 

permanent resident of the United States who currently resides 

in Pittsburgh, United States. For the first three years of J.B.’s 

life, the family lived in Kharkiv, Ukraine, and Dublin, 

Ireland, while also spending some weeks in Vilnius, 

Lithuania. In the spring of 2011, when the family was staying

in Lithuania and then Ukraine, Petitioner secured a job as a 

patent agent in Germany at about the same time Respondent

was accepted to a Ph.D. program at the University of 

Pittsburgh. The family left Ukraine and, after a seven-week 

summer holiday in Munich, Germany, Respondent and J.B. 

moved to Pittsburgh and lived for the next two years 

separately from Petitioner, who lived and worked in Berlin, 

Germany, while regularly visiting and communicating with 

J.B. According to Petitioner, the plan was for the family to 

eventually reunite—either Respondent would finish her 
4

coursework in Pittsburgh and go to Germany or Petitioner

would use his position in Germany “as a stepping stone to get 

back to the [United States].” J.A. 240.

In the summer of 2013, after Respondent and J.B. had 

lived in Pittsburgh for two years, J.B. underwent cardiac 

surgery at the Children’s Hospital in Pittsburgh. Petitioner

went to Pittsburgh to be with J.B. during his recuperation and 

to seek jobs in the United States. When those efforts proved 

fruitless, Petitioner decided to return to Germany and 

Respondent agreed to join him, both because she had agreed, 

before the initial move to Pittsburgh, to move to Germany for 

two years and because she was financially unable to support 

herself at that point. Respondent then arranged for storage of 

toys, books, furniture, and other belongings with a friend in 

Pittsburgh, and Petitioner, Respondent, and J.B. moved 

together to Berlin, Germany, in August 2013. For J.B., this 

was the first time he had ever been to Berlin or ever resided in 

Germany.

B. J.B.’s Move to Germany

After the move, Respondent continued to pursue her 

Ph.D. studies at the University of Pittsburgh, remotely, and 

J.B. was enrolled in the J.F.K. School, a public school 

“founded in conjunction [with the] American Embassy and 

German Government” with a “bilingual/bicultural” focus, 

intending to provide American students with an “easier time 

to adjust to the[ir] German” residency while still 

“preserv[ing] their language and continu[ing] to work on their 

language skills and all of the subjects in English.” J.A. 430-

31. J.B. also attended an afterschool program at J.F.K., where 

students could play and do their homework, joined a soccer 

team, and played chess at the Russian House. 
5

In August 2015, when J.B. was seven years old,

Respondent sought to return to Pittsburgh to complete the 

final phase of her Ph.D. program. By this point, according to 

both parties, the marriage had become acrimonious, and, 

according to Respondent, they had “agreed that [they would] 

divorce” and that it was only “a matter of time [as to] when.” 

J.A. 421-22. While the nature of the parties’ disagreement 

over J.B.’s continued residence underlies this appeal and will 

be discussed in more detail below, Petitioner initially agreed 

that Respondent and J.B. would return to Pittsburgh, and they 

requested a one-year leave of absence for J.B. from the J.F.K.

School and secured German visas for themselves and J.B. that 

were valid through 2018. Given the belongings they had 

stored in Pittsburgh in August 2013, Respondent and J.B. 

opted to leave in Germany items that were difficult to 

transport, such as toys, Legos, and a bike, when they returned 

to Pittsburgh in August 2015. 

C. J.B.’s Return to Pittsburgh

Back in Pittsburgh, J.B. attended second grade in the 

2015-2016 school year and, according to his teacher,

“performed as a wonderful second grader,” earning, 

cumulatively, at the end of the year As in spelling, 

handwriting, math, and grammar, and a B in reading, and 

finishing the year on “academic high honor roll.” J.A. 328-

30. J.B.’s teacher described him as a “well-behaved” child 

who “followed rules and routines easily,” “made friends 

easily,” J.A. 330, was “[k]ind, happy, loving, eager to learn,” 

and was generally “well-adjusted,” J.A. 334. Despite an 

initial deficiency in reading, J.B. finished the fourth quarter 

with “an excellent grade,” showing what his teacher termed 

“dramatic improvement” in his reading level throughout the 

year. J.A. 333, 451. J.B.’s love of reading extended beyond 
6

the school year, when J.B. joined a summer reading 

challenge, completing the fifteen-book assignment by July 5, 

two months ahead of the August 31 deadline. 

J.B. was also a member of a four-student robotics club, 

organized by a parent of one of his classmates. The team met 

every Saturday or Sunday afternoon when the students would 

design missions and submit the mission to a robotics 

competition, winning first place in Pennsylvania and twentyninth in the United States. J.B. was tentative at first, because 

he didn’t know how to program the robot and thought the 

tasks were “impossible,” but by the end “he was . . . so 

excited” by the project, and he was able to explain his 

favorite mission and how the students accomplished it. J.A. 

355-56. J.B. and the classmate whose mother had organized 

the robotics club “stayed friends after the robotic project”

ended, playing Legos and soccer together. J.A. 358.

In addition, J.B. bonded with his teammates on his 

swim team, which ran for three trimesters—from September 

through December, January through April, and May through 

July. The goal for students on the team was to master the 

four competitive strokes so that they would be able to do 

them “correctly if they decide[d] to compete.” J.A. 369-70. 

At the start of the year, J.B. was “able to swim the length of 

the pool free style” and had “a pretty good breast stroke kick, 

but his endurance—swimming the length of the pool was 

difficult.” J.A. 371. By spring, however, he was able to 

compete in four meets, “better[ing] his times pretty much 

every meet” and, by summer, “he was able to swim all four 

strokes,” do “flip turns,” and “dive.” J.A. 371-72. 

J.B. made many friends in Pittsburgh and enjoyed play 

dates, birthday parties, video-gaming, playing soccer, playing 
7

card games, sleepovers, and other outings with various young 

people. J.B.’s own birthday party, when he turned eight in 

June 2016, was attended by many of those friends. 

Respondent’s friends and colleagues also developed a bond 

with J.B., enjoying dinners together, attending university 

events and spending weekends and holidays together, going 

to the park, attending theater festivals and puppet shows 

together, and generally playing with and babysitting J.B. 

Respondent and J.B. also explored the broader 

Pittsburgh environs, including trips to Erie, Pennsylvania,

Frank Lloyd Wright’s Fallingwater in Mill Run, 

Pennsylvania, and Pittsburgh’s four Carnegie Museums. 

They also became members of a local museum called the 

Mattress Factory where J.B. enjoyed “showing off his 

knowledge . . . to his friends,” whom he sometimes invited to 

join him. J.A. 446-47. J.B.’s interests extended as well to 

sports, and he became familiar with the local sports teams and 

was a fan of the Pittsburgh Penguins hockey team and the 

Riverhounds soccer team. 

D. Parents’ Dispute Over J.B.’s Continued 

Residence

Within the first month of J.B.’s stay in the United 

States, Petitioner sent Respondent an email, referencing job 

applications he had sent to the United States and elsewhere, 

and indicating that he might be moving to another country so 

that J.B. would not be returning to Germany at all. 

Respondent assured Petitioner that J.B. “is pretty happy in 

Pittsburgh, so by the end of the year, going back to Berlin 

might not be exactly what he wants.” J.A. 199. Petitioner

replied to this email but did not comment on, or reject, the 

possibility of J.B. remaining in Pittsburgh. 
8

However, five months later, in February 2016, 

Petitioner initiated a series of emails with Respondent that 

form the bulk of the record of the parties’ shared intent as to 

J.B.’s habitual residence. These began with Petitioner’s 

request that Respondent “confirm [her] commitment to our

agreement” that J.B. would return to Germany for the 2016-

17 academic year. J.A. 188-90. For her part, the Respondent

did not deny the existence of an agreement but asked the 

Petitioner to “reconsider it,” J.A. 172, explaining, “I do not 

think . . . it is a good idea for a child [J.B.’s] age to live with 

one parent for a year, and with the other for a year,” J.A. 181. 

That agreement, Respondent stated, “presupposes . . . yearly 

adaptation to living with different parents [which] is 

psychologically disadvantageous” to J.B., and urged 

Petitioner to consider J.B.’s well-being, J.A. 177, suggesting 

that Petitioner move “somewhere close” so that they could 

both “take care of [J.B.] on a permanent basis” and not 

“change [J.B.’s] permanent caregiver every year.” J.A. 181. 

In response, Petitioner observed that Respondent had 

not expressed any concerns about J.B. “spend[ing] alternate 

years with us when the agreement was made.” J.A. 178. And 

while Petitioner acknowledged Respondent’s “concerns about 

stability of dwelling,” he explained that he did not “think 

there [we]re better options than maintaining [their] previous 

agreement,” J.A. 179 (emphasis omitted), which he 

characterized as: “[J.B.] would go with you to Pitt[sburgh]

and return to me for 2016-2017 academic year. Then back to

you . . . .” J.A. 176. In subsequent correspondence, 

Petitioner advised Respondent to “prepare [herself] for 

fulfillment of [the] agreement that [J.B.] returns to 

[Respondent] for 2016-2017,” reassuring her, “You’ll have 

him again in 2017,” J.A. 168. And in May, the parties again 
9

discussed the prospect of J.B. alternating years between his 

parents, with Petitioner documenting in his notes of their call 

that Respondent continued to oppose “any plan for [J.B.] to 

alternate between Germany and [the] USA,” because she

believed that it “put[] too much pressure on [J.B.] to go back 

and forth” and “insist[ed] upon more consistency.” J.A. 156-

58. 

While the dispute between the parties over J.B.’s longterm residency arrangements was ongoing, Respondent filed

petitions for divorce and custody and, at the end of May, the 

Family Court in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania issued an 

interim custody order that, in terms of physical custody, 

allowed J.B. to continue to reside with the Respondent, 

pending a final custody determination, and granted Petitioner 

visitation over the summer and holidays. 

On June 9, Petitioner informed Respondent that he had

found a good rate for J.B. to return to Berlin on June 19 and

that he wanted J.B. to stay in Berlin and go to school there 

“like we planned.” J.A. 144. Respondent objected on the 

grounds that, under the interim custody order, any trip to 

Berlin would only be for a visit, not for the school year, and 

that J.B., in any event, was committed through August 3 to 

attend robotics and other summer camps, which Petitioner 

had not told her to cancel and for which the cancellation 

deadline had then passed.

Declaring that the interim custody order was “not 

valid,” Petitioner “demand[ed] that [J.B.] return on 19 June,”

J.A. 143, and reiterated that he was looking at tickets for both 

Respondent and J.B., even though Respondent objected that 

“. . . it sounds like you are planning to abduct [J.B.],” and that

Petitioner should “contest the court’s decision . . . legal[l]y,” 
10

J.A. 143. After a few additional exchanges in which 

Respondent sought assurance from Petitioner about the length 

of J.B.’s visit before she would consent to his return to 

Germany, Petitioner stated that he was “still waiting to hear 

anything more from the mediators.” J.A. 140. The record 

reflects no additional email communications between the 

parties.

On July 6, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition in the 

United States District Court for the Western District of 

Pennsylvania, seeking J.B.’s return to Germany under the 

Hague Convention. 

II. District Court Proceedings

The District Court held a two-day bench trial in midAugust.2

 In addition to the above-referenced emails and the 

testimony of Petitioner and Respondent, the trial record 

included testimony and documentation offered by J.B.’s 

teacher, swim coach, parents of J.B.’s school friends, and 

Respondent’s friends, related to J.B.’s acclimatization to 

Pittsburgh, as well as written statements from Petitioner’s

brother and friends and acquaintances in Germany, indicating 

they understood that J.B. was to return to Germany for the 

 

2 Prior to the hearing, the parties were referred to 

mediation. Unfortunately, mediation was unsuccessful. 

While mediation enables parents, who are well-positioned to 

know the needs of their child, to forge a resolution that best 

serves the child’s interests, a court reviewing a Hague 

Convention petition has the more limited mandate of 

“restor[ing] the status quo that existed prior to the wrongful . . 

. retention.” Didon v. Dominguez Castillo, 838 F.3d 313, 320

(3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11

2016-2017 school year. With regard to the testimony of 

Petitioner and Respondent, the District Court found 

Respondent generally to be more credible. Of the written

statements offered by Petitioner, only one was based on a 

conversation in which Respondent was present, and the rest 

were based on Petitioner’s representations to the declarants. 

The District Court accorded these statements “diminished 

weight” and “minimal significance,” on the grounds that they 

were “the product of a concerted effort by Petitioner” and that 

“several” of the letters “merely . . . parrot[ed] language 

directly suggested by Petitioner.” Blackledge v. Blackledge, 

No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at *22 (W.D. 

Pa. Aug. 26, 2016). The District Court also conducted an in 

camera interview of J.B. 

On August 19, 2016, the District Court entered an 

order denying the petition, and on August 26, 2016, it issued 

a Memorandum Opinion in support of its order.3 See id. at 

*1. Its first order of business was to determine the retention 

date so that it could then consider which forum was J.B.’s 

habitual residence immediately prior to that date. Reasoning 

 

3 Because the District Court concluded Petitioner did 

not meet his burden to prove he was entitled to relief, it did 

not address any of the affirmative defenses raised by 

Respondent, which included that J.B. had attained the age and 

maturity at which it was appropriate to take account of his 

preferences, that J.B. preferred to remain in Pittsburgh, and 

that returning to Germany would expose J.B. to a grave risk 

of harm. See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 

International Child Abduction art. 13, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 

No. 11,670; Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

114543, at *7-15. 
12

that Petitioner himself testified he originally agreed to permit 

J.B. to live in Pittsburgh for one year, starting in August 

2015, and that Petitioner had acquiesced to J.B. participating 

in camps through the summer, the District Court calculated 

the retention date as August 2016. Id. at *10-11 & n.5. 

Turning to the question of habitual residence, the 

District Court correctly recognized that it was required to 

consider both the parents’ shared intent and the child’s 

acclimatization. Id. at *11-12; see Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 

445 F.3d 280, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2006). As to shared parental 

intent, it concluded there was “no credible evidence” that the 

parties agreed that J.B.’s stay would be for a “specific 

duration.” Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

114543, at *24. And, considering evidence of J.B.’s activities 

and expectations up until the August retention date, the Court 

concluded that J.B. was acclimatized to Pittsburgh. Id. at 

*12-17, *24. In so finding, it accorded “significant weight” 

to J.B.’s in camera interview, including his stated preference 

for Pittsburgh, because it found J.B. “to exhibit an unusual 

degree of maturity and situational awareness.” Id. at *12 n.6, 

*15. As it concluded Pittsburgh was J.B.’s habitual residence 

immediately prior to the August retention date, the District 

Court held that the retention was not wrongful under the 

Hague Convention. Id. at *25. The consequence of this 

holding was that J.B. could continue to reside in Pittsburgh 

pending the resolution of his parents’ custody proceedings

before the Allegheny County Family Court. See generally

Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 287.

Petitioner now appeals, seeking to reverse the District 

Court’s denial of his petition, with the understanding that a

reversal would allow the Allegheny County interim custody 

order to be vacated, custody proceedings to be initiated in 
13

Germany, and J.B. to reside with Petitioner in Germany

pending the resolution of those proceedings.

III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction 

under 22 U.S.C. § 9003(a), which grants district courts 

original jurisdiction over claims arising under the 

Convention. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. 

We review the District Court’s factual findings for 

clear error and review legal conclusions and the application of 

the law to the facts de novo. Didon v. Dominguez Castillo, 

838 F.3d 313, 319-20 & n.13 (3d Cir. 2016). In the context 

of Hague Convention cases, certain determinations involve 

mixed questions of law and fact. We have held, for example, 

that habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact. 

Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 n.9 (3d Cir. 1995). 

And although our past cases have not addressed the issue in 

explicit terms, we recognize today that the two factors 

informing habitual residence, i.e., the parents’ shared 

intentions regarding the child’s move and the child’s 

acclimatization, themselves involve mixed questions, because 

those factors depend both on case-specific fact-findings and 

whether those findings meet the specified legal threshold. 

See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996) 

(explaining that the “issue [of] whether the facts satisfy the 

[relevant legal] standard” is a mixed question of law and 

fact). For mixed questions of law and fact, we must “separate 

the issue into its respective parts, applying the clearly 

erroneous test to the factual component, [and] the plenary 

standard to the legal.” N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA 

Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).
14

IV. Analysis

The purposes of the Hague Convention are “to secure 

the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or 

retained in any Contracting State” and “to ensure the rights of 

custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State 

are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.” 

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 

Abduction art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 

[hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Convention was “not 

designed to resolve international custody disputes.”

Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 287. Rather, in addressing Hague 

Convention petitions, courts are limited “to restor[ing] the 

status quo prior to any wrongful removal or retention, and to 

deter[ring] parents from engaging in international forum 

shopping in custody cases.” Id; see also Didon, 838 F.3d at 

320 (explaining that any return remedy merely “seeks to 

restore the status quo that existed prior to the wrongful . . . 

retention” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

A petitioner who initiates judicial proceedings for the 

return of a child under the Hague Convention has the burden 

to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child 

has been wrongfully removed or retained. 22 U.S.C. § 

9003(b), (e)(1)(A). The removal or retention of a child is 

wrongful if: 

a it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a 

person . . . under the law of the State in which 

the child is habitually resident immediately 

before the removal or retention; and 
15

b at the time of removal or retention those rights 

were actually exercised . . . or would have been 

so exercised but for the removal or retention. 

Hague Convention, supra, art. 3. As we have explained in 

interpreting these provisions, to determine if a petitioner is 

entitled to relief, the court must answer four questions: “(1) 

when the removal or retention took place; (2) the child’s 

habitual residence immediately prior to such removal or 

retention; (3) whether the removal or retention breached the 

petitioner’s custody rights under the law of the child’s 

habitual residence; and (4) whether the petitioner was 

exercising his or her custody rights at the time of removal or 

retention.” Yang v. Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 271 (3d Cir. 2007) 

(citing Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 287). 

Here, as the District Court observed, there was no 

dispute as to the fourth factor, i.e., that Petitioner had custody 

rights under German law and that he was exercising those 

rights. But, having determined that the retention date was 

August 2016 and that J.B.’s habitual residence immediately 

prior to that date was Pittsburgh, the District Court concluded,

on the basis of the first two factors, that Petitioner had not 

met his burden of proving a wrongful retention.

4

 Blackledge, 

No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at *10, *25.

Below we address, first, Petitioner’s argument that the 

District Court erred in fixing the retention date, and, second, 

 

4 As to the third factor, Petitioner made no argument 

that the retention breached his custody rights under United 

States or German law. Instead, his argument focused on 

whether Germany still remained J.B.’s habitual residence at 

the time of the retention. 
16

Petitioner’s contention that it erred in determining J.B.’s 

habitual residence immediately prior to that date. 

A. Retention Date

According to Petitioner, the District Court erred in 

adopting August 2016 as the retention date because Petitioner

had withdrawn his consent to J.B. remaining in the United 

States prior to August, when he had “clearly communicate[d]

[his] desire to regain custody” of J.B. in the June 9 email 

demanding J.B.’s return by June 19. Appellant’s Br. 21-22

(second alteration in original) (quoting Karkkainen, 445 F.3d 

at 290). Respondent, for her part, urges us to adopt the 

District Court’s August date. We conclude neither June nor 

August reflects the proper date under our case law. 

In Karkkainen we confronted a situation where the 

noncustodial parent initially agreed to the child remaining in 

the United States indefinitely, but then, in mid-July, emailed 

the custodial parent demanding that the child return home on 

August 10, the date for which she had purchased a return 

flight for the child, insisting that retention beyond that date

would “constitute kidnapping.” 445 F.3d at 289-90. In 

determining the retention date, we recited, without adopting, 

another court’s definition of “retention date” as the date the

noncustodial parent “clearly communicates her desire to 

regain custody and asserts her parental right to have [her 

child] live with her.” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis 

omitted) (quoting Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 841 F. Supp. 264, 

270 (N.D. Iowa 1993)). Assuming this definition applied, we 

held that by mid-July the noncustodial parent had clearly 

communicated the withdrawal of consent for the child to

remain in the United States beyond August 10 and that 

nothing in the record “suggest[ed] there was confusion about 
17

[the noncustodial parent’s] opposition after mid-July.” Id. at 

290. While we acknowledged that the noncustodial parent 

had originally agreed to let the child remain in the United 

States indefinitely, id. at 289, and had communicated in midJuly her withdrawal of that consent beyond August 10, we did 

not adopt the mid-July notice date as the retention date, id. at 

290. Nor did we accept the notion that the original agreement 

for a longer period vitiated the noncustodial parent’s ability to

clearly communicate her desire to regain custody of the child. 

Id. Instead, we recognized that a party may accelerate a

retention date by “withdraw[ing] her consent to have [the 

child] remain” with the custodial parent, and we then settled 

on August 10—i.e., the date on which consent actually 

expired—as the retention date. Id. at 290-91. 

Building on Karkkainen, we hold that the retention 

date is the date beyond which the noncustodial parent no 

longer consents to the child’s continued habitation with the 

custodial parent and instead seeks to reassert custody rights, 

as clearly and unequivocally communicated through words, 

actions, or some combination thereof. That determination is, 

by necessity, fact-intensive and will vary with the 

circumstances of each case. And while in some cases the 

notice date and actual expiration date will coincide, in other 

cases the notice will indicate a future date as the date consent 

will be withdrawn, in which case that latter date, depending 

on the facts of the case, will constitute the expiration date 

and, hence, the retention date. 

In determining the retention date here, we conclude 

that the District Court erred by looking solely to Petitioner’s 

original consent for J.B. to reside in Pittsburgh through 

August 2016 and failing to assess whether Petitioner’s 

subsequent communications, up to and including the filing of 
18

his Hague Convention petition, effected a withdrawal of that

consent.

5

 But, consistent with Karkkainen, we also reject 

Petitioner’s argument in favor of a June 9, 2016 retention 

date, as that date reflects merely Petitioner’s notice of a 

possible expiration of consent on June 19, 2016. 

While in Karkkainen we rested on the prospective date 

of expiration identified in that petitioner’s notice, id. at 290,

significant differences between the facts of that case and this 

one lead us to conclude that June 19 also does not reflect the 

proper retention date here. In Karkkainen the noncustodial

parent took the affirmative step of purchasing a ticket,

asserted that any retention beyond the scheduled return date 

would constitute “kidnapping,” and did not equivocate as to

that retention date. Id. at 290. Here, in contrast, Petitioner 

only researched the possibility of purchasing a ticket; 

Respondent, not Petitioner, flagged a concern about 

“abduct[ion],” J.A. 143; and Petitioner left open the 

possibility of further negotiations, stating after his demand 

email that he was “still waiting to hear anything more from 

the mediators,” J.A. 140. Under these circumstances, we 

conclude neither June 9 nor June 19 was the retention date, 

and in the absence of any earlier communication in which 

Petitioner clearly and unequivocally withdrew his prior 

consent and sought to reassert his custody rights, we hold that

 

5

Indeed, given that the District Court purported to 

exercise jurisdiction over this case since the filing of the 

petition on July 6, 2016, an August 2016 retention date would 

raise concerns about the ripeness of Petitioner’s claim and the 

jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate it. See 

generally Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 

U.S. 568, 579-80 (1985).
19

consent expired and J.B. was therefore “retained” on the date 

Petitioner filed his Hague Convention petition, i.e., July 6. 

Below we consider the evidence concerning J.B.’s 

habitual residence immediately prior to that retention date and 

whether the District Court erred in its conclusions as to the 

parents’ shared intent or J.B.’s acclimatization. 

B. Habitual Residence

To determine where a child is habitually resident we 

“employ a mixed standard of review, accepting [a] district 

court’s historical or narrative facts unless they are clearly 

erroneous, but exercising plenary review of the court’s choice 

of and interpretation of legal precepts and its application of 

those precepts to the facts.” Didon, 838 F.3d at 320 n.13 

(alteration in original) (quoting Feder, 63 F.3d at 222 n.9). 

The Hague Convention does not define habitual residence,

and we have held that it “is a fact-intensive determination that 

cannot be reduced to a predetermined formula and necessarily 

varies with the circumstances of each case.” Karkkainen, 445 

F.3d at 291. That inquiry becomes all the more difficult 

where “the petitioning parent initially agreed to allow the 

child to stay abroad for an indefinite duration, but 

subsequently had second thoughts about that decision.” Id. 

Although a difficult inquiry, it is not without guideposts and 

our precedent assists us in navigating our path. Below we 

discuss (1) guiding principles from our case law relevant to 

habitual residence; (2) the record in this case concerning 

shared parental intent; and (3) the evidence of J.B.’s 

acclimatization.

1. Principles of Habitual Residence
20

A child’s habitual residence is “the place where [the 

child] has been physically present for an amount of time 

sufficient for acclimatization and which has a degree of 

settled purpose from the child’s perspective.” Baxter v. 

Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Feder, 63 F.3d at 224). To assess 

whether a child’s habitual residence meets this threshold we 

analyze both the child’s acclimatization and the “shared 

parental intent”—a factor that is relevant because “the child’s 

knowledge of [his parents’] intentions is likely to color [his] 

attitude to the contacts [he] is making” and “affect the length 

of time necessary for a child to become habitually resident or 

otherwise influence a child’s ability to acclimatize,” and, in 

addition, because it bears on the parents’ own intentions 

“regarding their child’s presence in a particular place.”6 

Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292, 296 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

As a general matter “courts will find no change in 

habitual residence” where the evidence of shared parental 

intent reflects that the “child’s initial move from an 

established habitual residence was clearly intended to be for a 

specific, limited duration.” Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 

540, 549 (3d Cir. 2004). However, we have recognized an 

exception to this general rule where a move, though 

temporary, carries “a degree of settled purpose . . . , even if 

 

6 We give some “independent weight to the parents’ 

present, shared intentions” to “ensure that neither parent is 

acting unilaterally to alter a joint understanding reached by 

the parents.” Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 
21

such purpose is only for a limited period.” Id. The concept 

of “settled purpose,” then, does not require an intention “to 

stay . . . indefinitely,” and may in fact be for a “limited 

period,” precipitated by various motivations, including 

“[e]ducation, business or profession, employment, health, 

family or merely love of the place.” Feder, 63 F.3d at 223-

24. Regardless of the motivation for the location selected, or 

whether the stay was meant to be permanent or temporary, 

“[a]ll that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one 

does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly 

described as settled.” Id.

As to the relative weight given the parents’ shared 

intent and the child’s acclimatization, we have held that when 

a child is very young, he “cannot possibly decide the issue of 

residency,” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 548, and the parents’ shared 

intent is, thus, “of paramount importance,” while 

acclimatization is secondary, Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 296. 

However, once a child is old enough “to develop a certain 

routine and acquire a sense of environmental normalcy,” 

acclimatization becomes the central inquiry. Whiting, 391 

F.3d at 550-51. Although we have not fixed the age when 

acclimatization takes on this greater significance, and it 

necessarily will vary depending on the maturity and cognitive 

and social abilities of the child in question, we have 

recognized that a typical four-year-old child “certainly has 

this ability” because he is “able to develop a certain routine

and acquire a sense of environmental normalcy” and is “not 

only aware of those around him, but is able to form 

meaningful connections with the people and places he 

encounters each day.” Id. At that point, because the child has 

“reached an age where [he is] capable of becoming firmly 

rooted in a new country,” we attach greater significance to 
22

acclimatization and give “less weight to shared parental 

intent.” Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 296 (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009,

1119 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
23

2. The Parents’ Shared Intent In This 

Case

Here, the District Court declined to apply the 

presumption that there is, ordinarily, no change in habitual 

residence when the child’s move is for a “specific, limited 

duration” because it found that there was “no credible 

evidence” that the parties had an agreement that J.B.’s stay in 

Pittsburgh would be for a “specific duration.” Blackledge, 

No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at *23-25

(quoting Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291 n.3). We agree with 

Petitioner that this finding was clearly erroneous, given the 

evidence on this record that there was such an agreement.

But because that evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the 

parties intended J.B.’s residence in Pittsburgh, albeit of 

specific, limited duration, to carry “a degree of settled 

purpose,” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549, we nonetheless conclude 

that the “shared parental intent” factor favors the United 

States as J.B.’s habitual residence. 

At the outset, we cannot agree with the District Court 

that there was no credible evidence that the parties had agreed 

J.B.’s stay in Pittsburgh was intended to be for a specific

duration. While the Court acknowledged that the record 

demonstrated the “existence of an agreement,” it nonetheless 

found that it “does not speak to the specific terms of the 

agreement,” Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

114543, at *19, and therefore rejected the notion the stay 

could be categorized as of specific, limited duration. But we 

have not required great precision in the terms of the

agreement, nor even a specific return date, in order to 

conclude a case involved an agreed-upon move of “specific, 

limited duration.” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549. Instead, we 
24

have considered cases to fall in that category where the move 

was bounded by even a general time frame. See Yang, 499 

F.3d at 272-73 (describing the child’s residence with the 

father, intended to be for the length of the mother’s 

recuperation, as “a limited period of time”); Whiting, 391 

F.3d at 542, 549 & n.6 (discussing the child’s stay with her

mother for two years but “no later than October 19, 2003” as 

“intended to be for a specific, limited duration”); see also 

Feder, 63 F.3d at 223-24 (citing with approval In re Bates, 

No. CA 122-89, High Court of Justice, Family Div’l Ct. 

Royal Courts of Justice, U.K. (1989) (framing an 

approximately three-month stay with mother, while father 

was on a concert tour, as “for a limited period”)). 

Here, although the District Court was correct that the 

parties’ emails stop short of identifying a date certain that was 

originally agreed for J.B.’s return, or similarly “specific terms 

of the agreement,” Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 114543, at *19, they make clear that the parties 

intended J.B.’s stay in Pittsburgh to be of a “specific, limited 

duration,” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549. For example, in 

response to Petitioner’s references to the alleged “agreement” 

in his emails in February 2016, and his requests that 

Respondent “keep[] with [their] agreement that [J.B.] will 

return to [Petitioner] for the academic year 2016-2017,” J.A. 

190, Respondent did not reject the notion that there was an 

agreement or that J.B.’s stay with her in Pittsburgh was 

intended to be for a limited duration. Rather, she asked 

Petitioner to “reconsider” the agreement, J.A. 172, so that J.B. 

could stay with her “as a primary caregiver,” J.A. 171, rather 

than requiring him to “yearly adapt[] to living” with a 

different parent in alternating years, which she believed

would be “psychologically disadvantageous” for him, J.A. 
25

177. Indeed, the record is replete with references to the 

parties’ agreement that “[J.B.] would go with [Respondent] to 

Pitt[sburgh] and return to [Petitioner] for [the] 2016-2017 

academic year. Then back to [Respondent].” J.A. 176; see 

also J.A. 168 (warning Respondent to “prepare [herself] for 

fulfillment of [their] agreement that [J.B.] returns to 

[Petitioner] for 2016-2017” and reassuring her, “You’ll have 

him again in 2017”); J.A. 178 (noting that Respondent had 

not previously expressed concerns for J.B. to “spend alternate 

years with us when the agreement was made”). 

Notwithstanding such error, “we may affirm on any 

grounds supported by the record,” Maher Terminals, LLC v. 

Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 805 F.3d 98, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 

2015), and “[w]hen the outcome is clear as a matter of law . . 

. remand is not necessary,” Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 

248, 253 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, we conclude such an outcome 

is clear as a matter of law because this case is on all fours 

with our decision in Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540 (3d 

Cir. 2004).

In Whiting, the parents had agreed in writing, after the 

attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on 

September 11, 2001, that the mother and child would leave 

the United States and live in Canada for two years—i.e., for a 

limited duration. 391 F.3d at 542. Two months into the 

move, however, the father changed his mind and removed the 

child to the United States. Id. at 543. As the child there was 

only sixteen months old, see id. at 542-43, we focused on 

shared parental intent, and not acclimatization, and we 

concluded that the child’s habitual residence was Canada, id.

at 551-52. After observing the parties intended for the mother 

and child, albeit for that specified period, to put down roots

and take on the normal pattern of residential life in Canada, 
26

including renting an apartment near the mother’s family 

members, looking into childcare programs, and applying for 

necessary documentation, such as a medical card, id. at 542,

we concluded the move was accompanied by a “degree of 

settled purpose,” id. at 549. Given that purpose, we observed,

the fact that the mother and child’s Canadian residence was 

planned for two years “d[id] not in any way diminish the 

parties’ settled intention that the two were to remain in 

Canada for at least two years” and “in no way hinder[ed] the 

finding of a change in habitual residence.” Id. at 550. In 

reaching our holding, we also rejected the father’s argument 

that Canada could not have become the child’s habitual 

residence because there was no shared intent to abandon the 

United States, and we recognized that “abandonment,” as the 

flipside of “habitual residence,” could also be for “a definite 

and extended period,” i.e., until the child resumed her 

habitual residence in the abandoned country, as scheduled.7

Id.

In Whiting, we also relied heavily upon and cited 

approvingly to a British case that is even more analogous to

J.B.’s case. Id. at 547 (citing In re Bates, No. CA 122-89, 

High Court of Justice, Family Div’l Ct. Royal Courts of 

Justice, U.K. (1989)); see also Feder, 63 F.3d at 222-24 

(quoting In re Bates). There, the father was a musician who 

 

7

In Whiting, we held that Canada had become the 

child’s habitual residence based only on the parties’ shared 

intent. 391 F.3d at 550-51. Here, in contrast, not only the 

shared parental intent, but also acclimatization, favor the 

country of the custodial parent, see infra Part IV.B.3, making 

this an even stronger case for the United States as J.B.’s 

habitual residence. 
27

travelled extensively, and the mother and child “had toured 

with father for the majority of the girl’s life to that point.” 

Whiting, 391 F.3d at 547 n.5. Though London “was the 

family’s home base,” the parents decided that the mother and 

daughter would live in New York while the father toured the 

Far East, but after only two days, the father directed the 

nanny to bring the girl back to London. Id. The court 

reasoned that the accommodations made in New York to 

which father had agreed, “however acrimoniously,” for the 

three months before father “return[ed] to London amounted to

a purpose with a sufficient degree of continuity to enable it 

properly to be described as settled.” Feder, 63 F.3d at 224

(quoting In re Bates). The child’s habitual residence, 

therefore, was New York. Id. at 223-24 (citing In re Bates).

Likewise, here, it is evident that J.B.’s move to the 

United States, although of limited duration, was intended by 

both Petitioner and Respondent to be accompanied by a 

degree of “settled purpose.” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 550. The 

record reflects that J.B. moved to Pittsburgh in August 2015 

for the purpose of assuming a full and normal life of an eightyear-old boy during the intended period of his stay, making 

long-term friends and plans, developing routines and a sense 

of environmental normalcy, exploring his city and other parts 

of the Commonwealth, and putting down roots, not only for 

the 2015-2016 school year, but also, per the parents’ express 

agreement, for future alternating years, interspersed with the 

years he would be living with Petitioner in Germany. Under 

these circumstances, as in Whiting, the fact that the parties 

understood that J.B. would return to Germany “d[id] not in 

any way diminish . . . the parties’ settled intention” that he 

was to remain in the United States for at least a year, settling 

into a normal routine, and the fact that J.B.’s stay was 
28

intended to be of a limited duration “in no way hinder[ed]” a 

finding that the United States was his habitual residence 

during that time. Id. 

Petitioner disputes this interpretation of the record, 

arguing that this case more closely resembles that addressed 

by the Ninth Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2001). There the children, Israeli residents, traveled with 

their mother to the United States for a fifteen-month visit to 

“partake of American culture,” id. at 1069, in what the court 

analogized to a “study[] abroad” program, id. at 1083. A year 

into that visit, however, the mother filed for divorce and 

retained the children in the United States. Id. at 1069. In 

rejecting the mother’s argument that the United States had 

become the children’s then-habitual residence, the Ninth 

Circuit concluded that, when the children moved to the 

United States, the “normal expectation,” shared by both the 

parents and the children, was that the family would reunite in

their home in Israel and that Israel would, therefore, remain 

their habitual residence. Id. at 1083. As the court explained, 

the parents and the children were Israeli citizens; they had 

lived all their lives in Israel and entered the United States on a 

temporary visa; and neither parent had a prior connection to 

the United States. Id. at 1069, 1082. 

The record in J.B.’s case paints a very different 

picture. Petitioner and Respondent did not intend J.B.’s stay 

in Pittsburgh as a “study[] abroad” program or a transient 

“American cultur[al]” visit. Id. at 1069, 1083. On the 

contrary, when Respondent and J.B. moved to the United 

States, J.B. was returning to a country and culture with which 

he was already familiar and a city in which he had previously 

lived for two years—a city that, by the time of the retention 

date, was the longest and most stable residence he had known 
29

in his fairly nomadic early years; in addition to having 

extended family in the United States, J.B. was a United States 

citizen, as was his father, and his mother was a lawful 

permanent resident; Respondent and J.B. had resided in 

Germany for only two years between their two residences in 

Pittsburgh; within the first month of J.B.’s residence in 

Pittsburgh, his father made efforts to secure a job in the 

United States and elsewhere, indicating at one point that he 

felt “dirty” that J.B. might not have a home to return to in 

Germany at the end of that year, J.A. 200; at the time of the 

move, both Petitioner and Respondent recognized their

marriage had become acrimonious, and according to 

Respondent, whom the District Court generally found more 

credible, the parties had agreed to divorce and it was only “a 

matter of time [as to] when,” J.A. 421-22; and the parents’ 

emails are explicit that they intended to continue living 

separately in future years and for J.B. to alternate between 

them, spending the 2015-2016 academic year in Pittsburgh, 

the 2016-2017 academic year in Germany, and the 2017-2018

academic year back in Pittsburgh. Thus, this is not a case, as 

in Mozes, where the noncustodial parent’s country had served 

to that point as their “home countr[y]” or where it can be said 

the “normal expectation” of the parties was that they would 

return to that country to live as a family unit. See Mozes, 239 

F.3d at 1083. 

Petitioner, argues, however, that we should disregard 

those portions of the parents’ communications reflecting that 

they had agreed that J.B. would “spend alternate years with 

[them] when the agreement was made,” J.A. 178, or that J.B. 

would be returning to Pittsburgh for the 2017-2018 school 

year, and that we should limit our consideration of the 

parents’ agreement to those excerpts in which they discuss 
30

J.B.’s return to Germany for the 2016-2017 school year. This

we decline to do. For as we have repeatedly recognized, the 

parents’ agreement as to the allocation of custody between 

them is highly relevant to the determination of “shared 

parental intent.” See, e.g., Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292-93, 

296-97; Whiting, 391 F.3d at 548-51. After all, the main 

reason we look to “shared parental intent” as part of our 

inquiry is its likelihood “to color [the child’s] attitude to the 

contacts [he] is making” and to “affect the length of time 

necessary for a child to become habitually resident or 

otherwise influence a child’s ability to acclimatize”—factors 

relevant to the determination whether the move carried a 

“settled purpose ‘from the child’s perspective.’” Karkkainen, 

445 F.3d at 292, 296. For those reasons, where the parents 

have agreed, in connection with a child’s move to a given 

residence, that the child will henceforth split time between 

them, and, thus, is expected to return to that residence at 

regular intervals going forward, that shared parental intent 

will undoubtedly affect the child’s attitude, expectations, 

plans, and sense of purpose in undertaking the move to that 

residence.8

 

8 The significance of the parents’ forward-looking 

intent in this circumstance is different than in those cases 

where courts have observed that the formation of an intention

to move does not convert the intended future residence into a 

“habitual residence.” See, e.g., Feder, 63 F.3d at 222 (citing 

Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993) 

(holding that a mother’s intention to move the child to the 

United States did not make the United States the child’s

habitual residence prior to the move)). Where a child is 

actually living in a given residence, and we are tasked with 
31

Indeed, Mozes, by its terms, distinguished the “rare 

situation[s] where someone consistently splits time more or 

less evenly between two locations, so as to retain alternating 

habitual residences in each.” 239 F.3d at 1075 n.17 (citing 

Johnson v. Johnson, 493 S.E.2d 668 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)); see 

also id. at 1084 n.50 (explaining that where a child “spent

regularly alternating periods with each parent . . . , [he] might 

thus have acquired dual habitual residence”). And more 

recently the Ninth Circuit again observed in dictum that, 

where the child splits time between his parents’ countries of 

residence, he may be deemed to have “consecutive, 

alternative habitual residences” where supported by the facts. 

Valenzuela v. Michel, 736 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(noting that the father also could have prevailed by showing 

that the father and the mother “shared a settled intention to 

abandon Mexico as the [children’s] sole habitual residence”). 

Likewise, the courts of other Hague Convention 

member states have consistently recognized that the existence 

of a so-called “shuttle custody” arrangement, in which a child 

splits time between his parents’ countries of residence, bears 

on the determination of habitual residence. See, e.g., Wilson 

v. Huntley, 2005 Carswell Ont. 1606, at ¶¶ 8, 32, 50 (Can. 

Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL) (holding that, where the child split her 

time in three-to-six month intervals between the mother and

the father’s homes, developing “similar social and family 

bonds in each State,” and where the “parents clearly intended 

 

determining whether the move to it was accompanied by a 

settled purpose, the parents’ and child’s expectations that the 

child will return to that residence on a regular basis in the 

future is necessarily relevant to the child’s attitude regarding 

the move itself.
32

to share custody of [the child], in the legal sense and in the 

sense of physical, residential custody,” the child “could have 

consecutive alternative habitual residences in two different 

States at separate times”); J. v. J. [HFD] [Supreme 

Administrative Decision] 1995 case no. 7505-1995 (Swed.), 

translated at https://assets.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0080.htm

(holding that, where the parents agreed to be responsible for 

the child “on an alternate basis” and to “share [the child’s] de 

facto care,” the child was habitually resident in her mother’s 

home country, where she was residing immediately prior to 

the retention, because the child had spent the last two years 

there and “ha[d] adjusted to circumstances in the place where 

she [wa]s living”). 

While we have observed in dictum that the concept of 

“alternating habitual residence” would appear to comport 

with the Hague Convention so long as “a child has only one 

habitual residence country at any given time,” Didon, 838 

F.3d at 322 n.20, we have not had prior occasion to address 

the relevance or weight of an agreement that a child split time 

between two parents. In doing so now, we emphasize that the 

parents’ shared intent as to the custody arrangement between 

them is probative—but not dispositive—in the determination 

of habitual residence. That is, we agree with the observation 

that “where residence with two parents is divided equally,

it . . . [is] unreal, in the absence of other differentiating 

factors, to see the residence with one parent as primary and 

stays with the other parent as interruptions.” Watson v. 

Jamieson, 1997 Fam. L.R. 11, 14 (Scot.). At the same time, 

we eschew any suggestion that an agreement to alternate 

habitation between parents automatically equates to 

“alternating habitual residences.” Indeed, any such 

categorical approach to shared custody or one-size-fits-all 
33

framework for habitual residence would be inconsistent with 

our case law, which rejects the application of a 

“predetermined formula” to Hague Convention cases, 

Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291, and with the Convention, which 

contemplates a fact-specific approach and encourages a 

“flexible interpretation” of its terms, Eliza Perez-Vera, 

Explanatory Report, in 3 Hague Conference on Private 

International Law, Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth 

Session, Child Abduction 426, 446 (1982).

9

 

Instead, we view a parental agreement that a child will 

split time between the parents’ countries of residence as a 

significant consideration, but as one among others, informing 

the “necessarily fact-intensive and circumstantially based” 

inquiry a court must undertake to determine whether a child’s 

move was accompanied by a “degree of settled purpose.” 

Whiting, 391 F.3d at 547-48. Approaching the inquiry in this 

way, we respect both our precedent and Congress’s 

instruction that we pay heed to “the need for uniform 

international interpretation of the Convention.” 22 U.S.C. § 

9001(b)(3)(B). 

Undertaking that inquiry here, we consider, in addition 

to the other record evidence discussed above concerning the 

parents’ shared expectations for J.B.’s move to Pittsburgh in 

2015, the parents’ agreement that J.B. would “alternate 

between Germany and [the] USA” going forward, J.A. 157,

 

9 As we previously recognized, “Elisa Perez-Vera was 

the official Hague Conference Reporter, and her report is 

generally recognized as the official history and commentary 

on the Convention.” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 546 n.3 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).
34

and, hence, that J.B. would be returning to Germany for only 

a single academic year before resuming his residence in 

Pittsburgh for the 2017-2018 year. In view of that agreement 

and the totality of the record in this case, it is apparent that 

J.B.’s 2015 move to Pittsburgh was accompanied, through at 

least the July 6, 2016 retention date, by the requisite “degree 

of settled purpose” and that the element of shared parental 

intent thus supports the United States as J.B.’s then-habitual 

residence.10 Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549.

3. The Record Concerning J.B.’s 

Acclimatization

Petitioner asserts two points of error on 

acclimatization, arguing that the District Court applied the 

wrong retention date and, therefore, improperly considered 

irrelevant evidence of acclimatization, and that, when the 

record is limited to the proper time frame, it does not support 

a finding of acclimatization. While we agree that the District 

Court mistakenly considered post-retention-date evidence, we 

 

10 Petitioner’s argument that J.B. was expected to 

return to Germany after the year in Pittsburgh is thus beside 

the point. Although Petitioner accurately catalogues the 

evidence supporting that expectation—e.g., the letter to J.B.’s 

school requesting a one-year leave of absence and stating that 

J.B. would return for the 2016-2017 academic year; the threeyear German visas the parties and J.B. obtained before the 

Respondent and J.B. left the country; and that J.B. left some 

of his belongings behind in Germany—that evidence is 

entirely consistent with the parties’ agreement that J.B. was to 

spend alternating years with each parent and that, during his 

year in Pittsburgh, the United States was J.B.’s habitual 

residence. 
35

have no trouble concluding that error was harmless given the 

substantial record concerning acclimatization as of the correct 

retention date. See generally Winston ex rel. Winston v. 

Children & Youth Servs. of Del. Cty., 948 F.2d 1380, 1391 

n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the court’s consideration of 

inadmissible hearsay was harmless error where there was 

“sufficient evidence without [the improperly admitted 

evidence] to support the district court’s conclusion”). 

The evidence of J.B.’s acclimatization to Pittsburgh as 

of July 6, 2016 is overwhelming. He had a tremendously 

successful academic year, earning nearly all As and 

overcoming an initial reading deficiency while demonstrating 

“dramatic improvement” over the year. J.A. 329, 333, 451. 

In addition, J.B. made friends “easily” and was, according to 

his teacher, “well-adjusted” overall. J.A. 330, 334. J.B. also 

enjoyed numerous activities outside of school, including 

soccer, swim team, and a robotics club, which he was 

handpicked to join by a fellow classmate. Over the course of 

the year, J.B. learned how to successfully program a robot to 

complete missions, despite feeling as though the task was 

impossible when he first started. And on his swim team J.B. 

mastered each of the competitive strokes, and was competing 

by the end of the year, looking forward to stepping up into the 

next group the following year. 

The record, likewise, reflects that J.B. was sufficiently 

mature to form “meaningful connections with the people and 

places he encounter[ed]” in Pittsburgh. Whiting, 391 F.3d at 

550-51. In a credibility determination, to which we defer 

absent clear error, Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468 

(2017), the District Court found that J.B. “exhibit[ed] an 

unusual degree of maturity and situational awareness,” and 

therefore accorded “significant weight” to J.B.’s statements 
36

that he was looking forward long-term to moving into a house 

and getting a dog in Pittsburgh, that he understood “his place 

in Pittsburgh,” that he preferred living in Pittsburgh over 

Berlin because of his quality of life in the United States and 

because he had “more and better friends in Pittsburgh.”11 

Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at 

*12 n.6, 14-15. The in camera interview thus further 

supports the District Court’s conclusion, based on the record 

as a whole, that J.B. had “formed meaningful connections 

with the people and places he encountered,” id. at *16 

(quoting Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 294 (brackets omitted)), and

“ha[d] attained a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly 

described as settled,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Yang, 499 F.3d at 273).

While Petitioner argues the District Court relied 

heavily on evidence of activities post-dating the July 6 

retention date, that evidence, on inspection, reduces to three 

minor points of testimony: J.B.’s swim team that ran from 

September 2015 through the end of July 2016, a summer 

reading challenge that ran from May 24 through August 31, 

and J.B.’s summer camps. Petitioner argues that any 

consideration of these activities constituted reversible error,

 

11 We consider J.B.’s preference for Pittsburgh here 

because a child’s expressed preference for a country may, 

considering his age and maturity, be a further indication that 

the child has acclimatized to that country, see Karkkainen, 

445 F.3d at 294-95, regardless of whether that preference as 

stated would satisfy the “wishes of the child” defense or 

exception outlined in the Hague Convention, see Yang, 499 

F.3d at 278 (citing Hague Convention, supra, art. 13).
37

but we are not persuaded that the District Court erred, much 

less that such error was prejudicial.12 For example, while the 

reading challenge extended through August 31, J.B. 

completed it on July 5, prior to the retention date. And while 

J.B.’s participation on the swim team carried over through the 

end of July, the testimony related to J.B.’s involvement dating 

back to September 2015, with no mention of specific events 

between July 6 and July 31. Even the evidence regarding

summer camps is relevant to the extent it informed J.B.’s 

expectations and aspirations before July 6. Moreover, any 

error in the District Court’s consideration of this evidence

was harmless because the post-retention-date activities were 

merely duplicative and cumulative of other evidence in the 

record concerning those same activities. See Howmet 

Aluminum Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 665 

F.2d 476, 478 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 61) 

(holding that consideration of inadmissible evidence that is 

merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence is not 

grounds for remand or reversal).

In sum, given the extensive record evidence of J.B.’s 

success in school, his participation in various activities and 

sports, his many friendships, his experiences at cultural, 

entertainment, and sporting events, and his own stated 

preference for the United States, to which the District Court 

afforded “significant weight” because of “the degree of 

 

12 Because we conclude that any error in considering

evidence beyond July 6 was harmless, we need not address 

the Respondent’s argument that the Petitioner waived his 

objections to the District Court’s consideration of it because 

he failed to preserve such objections at various points in the 

proceedings. 
38

maturity and situational awareness” J.B. exhibited, 

Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at 

*12 n.6, the District Court did not clearly err in its factfinding related to J.B.’s acclimatization, nor did it commit 

legal error in its determination that J.B. was acclimatized to 

the United States at the time of retention.

V. Conclusion

Because the parents’ shared intent was for J.B. to 

move to the United States with a “degree of settled purpose,” 

Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549, and because J.B. had acclimatized 

to the United States by the date of retention, we agree with 

the District Court’s holding that the United States was J.B.’s 

habitual residence immediately prior to the retention date and 

that the retention therefore was not wrongful under the Hague 

Convention. Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the 

District Court.