COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges McCullough, Decker and Senior Judge Felton 

ANDRE MORMAN, SR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 0545-15-2 PER CURIAM 

 SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 

RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Clarence N. Jenkins, Jr., Judge 

 (James M. Nachman, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Kate O’Leary, Deputy City Attorney; Stephen M. Hall, Deputy City 

Attorney; Paul Kellinger, Guardian ad litem for the minor children, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Andre Morman, Sr. (father) appeals the order terminating his parental rights to his six 

children. Father argues that the circuit court erred by (1) denying his motion to continue and his 

“motion objecting to the admission of statement(s) and/or video-taped statement(s) into evidence 

pursuant to Virginia Code §§ 63.2-1522 and 1523;” (2) overruling his objections and considering 

evidence from the proceedings in Richmond Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the 

JDR court); (3) allowing A.M.’s1

 statements to come into evidence through Amy Beddo Thomas; 

(4) allowing A.M.’s videotaped statement to come into evidence; and (5) concluding that the 

Richmond Department of Social Services (the Department) proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that father’s parental rights should be terminated. Upon reviewing the record and briefs 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

 The Court will refer to the minor children by their initials. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm 

the decision of the circuit court. See Rule 5A:27. 

BACKGROUND 

 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant 

to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of 

Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). 

 Father and Jennifer Morman (mother) have six children who are the subject of this 

appeal. Between 2008 and 2013, child protective services received nine complaints regarding 

the children. On June 6, 2013, the children came into the Department’s custody based on 

allegations of sexual abuse. The JDR court sustained abuse and neglect petitions filed by the 

Department. 

 The goal of the initial foster care plan was for the children to return home. The 

Department started to provide services to the parents. Father refused any treatment offered by 

the Department and never acknowledged any inappropriate behavior with the children. The goal 

of the foster care plan was changed to adoption once the Department learned of the children’s 

statements regarding abuse in the home. 

 On May 2, 2014, the JDR court terminated father’s parental rights to his six children.2 

He appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court heard evidence on December 10, 2014 and 

March 3, 2015. Father objected to the admission of videotaped testimony from one of his 

children, but the circuit court admitted the tape pursuant to Code § 63.2-1523. Father also 

objected to some out-of-court statements made by the child. The circuit court excluded the 

 2

 The JDR court also terminated mother’s parental rights. She appealed to the circuit 

court, and the circuit court denied the Department’s request to terminate mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (E)(iv). 
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child’s statements; however, some of the statements were later admitted on redirect after 

cross-examination of the child’s sexual therapist. 

 On March 5, 2015, the circuit court entered a final order that terminated father’s parental 

rights to his six children pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E)(iv). This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS 

 Where the trial court heard the evidence ore tenus, “its finding is entitled to great weight 

and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” 

Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) 

(citations omitted). When considering termination of parental rights, “the paramount 

consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d 

at 463. 

Assignments of error #1, 2, 3, and 4 

 Father argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to continue and his 

motion objecting to the admission of evidence pursuant to Code §§ 63.2-1522 and -1523. Father 

further contends the circuit court erred in allowing the child’s videotaped statements into 

evidence and the child’s statements to her therapist into evidence. 

 On November 21, 2014, the Department filed a notice pursuant to Code § 63.2-1522 that 

it intended to offer into evidence “statements of one or more of the . . . children” and that the 

“substance of the statements regard allegations of sexual abuse by father, Andre Morman, Sr.” 

On the same date, the Department also filed a notice pursuant to Code § 63.2-1523 that it 

intended to offer into evidence “a videotaped statement of one or more of the . . . children” and 

that the “substance of the statement regards allegations of sexual abuse and neglect.” The 

Department further represented that appellant’s counsel had viewed the videotaped statements. 
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 On December 5, 2014, father filed a “Motion Objecting to the Admission of Statement(s) 

and/or Videotaped Statement(s) into Evidence pursuant to Virginia Code §§ 63.2-1522 and 

1523.” Father argued that the Department failed to provide adequate notice because it did not 

specify which child’s statement(s) were going to be offered and why the child was not available 

to testify. Father asked the circuit court to continue the hearing and order the Department to 

provide “a notice with the proper specificity.” 

 Under Code § 63.2-1522(A), “an out-of-court statement made by a child . . . describing 

any act of a sexual nature performed with or on the child by another . . . may be admissible in 

evidence if the requirements of [Code § 63.2-1522(B)] are met.” Code § 63.2-1522(B) provides 

that the out-of-court statement may be admitted if the child is unavailable to testify, Code 

§ 63.2-1522(B)(1), and the “statement is shown to possess particularized guarantees of 

trustworthiness and reliability,” Code § 63.2-1522(B)(2). 

A statement may not be admitted under [Code § 63.2-1522] unless 

the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of his 

intention to offer the statement and the substance of the statement 

sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse 

party with a reasonable opportunity to prepare to meet the 

statement, including the opportunity to subpoena witnesses. 

Code § 63.2-1522(C). 

 Similarly, Code § 63.2-1523 applies to videotaped statements made by a child alleging 

abuse or neglect. As with Code § 63.2-1522, Code § 63.2-1523(C) provides: 

A recorded statement may not be admitted under this section 

unless the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of 

his intention to offer the statement and the substance of the 

statement sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the 

adverse party with a reasonable opportunity to prepare to meet the 

statement, including the opportunity to subpoena witnesses. 

 At the hearing on December 10, 2014, the circuit court denied father’s motion for a 

continuance. It held that the Department gave adequate notice under subsection C of Code 
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§ 63.2-1523, but did not give adequate notice under subsection C of Code § 63.2-1522. For the 

videotaped statement, the circuit court held that the notice was adequate because it stated that it 

was a videotape statement and that counsel had previously viewed it. However, for the child’s 

statements, the circuit court held that the notice did not specify which child made the statements 

and to whom the statements were made, and it did not indicate whether counsel had previously 

heard the statements. 

 First, father argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. 

The decision to grant a motion for a continuance is within the 

sound discretion of the circuit court and must be considered in 

view of the circumstances unique to each case. The circuit court’s 

ruling on a motion for a continuance will be rejected on appeal 

only upon a showing of abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice 

to the movant. 

Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34, 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007). 

 When father first requested a continuance, the circuit court denied his request. However, 

once the circuit court ruled that the child’s statements were not admissible under Code 

§ 63.2-1522, the Department requested a continuance and father objected to the continuance. As 

a result, he waived his argument that the circuit court erred in denying a continuance. 

Furthermore, a continuance was eventually necessary due to time constraints, and the circuit 

court heard evidence on a second day several months later. Father had the opportunity to 

question witnesses and present evidence and argument. The circuit court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying father’s initial request for a continuance, and he was not prejudiced at trial. 

 Next, father argues that the circuit court should have treated the videotaped statement and 

the child’s statements the same and excluded all of them. However, the circuit court did not err 

in allowing the videotaped statements because the notice was sufficient. Father’s counsel 

previously had seen the videotape and was able to prepare for its introduction at trial. Code 

§ 63.2-1523(C). Father’s counsel knew the contents of the videotaped statements. It was 
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irrelevant that father’s counsel viewed the videotaped statements during the proceedings in the 

JDR court because once counsel saw the videotape, the Department complied with the statute. 

 During the Department’s direct examination of the child’s therapist, the circuit court did 

not allow the Department to ask about the child’s statements made to the therapist because the 

Department’s notice under Code § 63.2-1522 was inadequate. On cross-examination, mother’s 

counsel asked the therapist whether she was in favor of returning the children to mother, and the 

therapist responded negatively. Counsel followed up with additional questions regarding the 

therapist’s opinion. On redirect examination, the Department asked the therapist whether the 

therapist’s concerns were based on the child’s statements, and the therapist confirmed that they 

were. Then, over father’s objections, the circuit court allowed the therapist to testify about the 

child’s statements, since the door was opened during cross-examination. 

 Assuming without deciding that the circuit court erred in allowing the child’s statements, 

the error was harmless. The standard for non-constitutional error is established in Code 

§ 8.01-678, which provides, in pertinent part: 

When it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at 

the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and 

substantial justice has been reached, no judgment shall be arrested 

or reversed . . . [f]or any . . . defect, imperfection, or omission in 

the record, or for any error committed on the trial. 

In this case, any error in allowing the therapist to testify about the child’s statements was 

harmless because the circuit court heard the same evidence through the videotaped statements of 

the child. 

 Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in its rulings regarding the videotaped 

statements and the child’s statements to the therapist. 
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Assignment of error #5 

 Father argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Department proved by 

clear and convincing evidence that his parental rights should be terminated. In his opening brief, 

father reiterates his previous arguments that the circuit court erred in admitting the videotape and 

the child’s statements. Father also contends that the videotape shows the child was coerced and 

that her statements were not trustworthy. “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight 

accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and 

hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 

S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995) (citations omitted). In light of all the evidence presented, the trial court’s 

judgment was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.