DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

IRONSHORE SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant,

v.

CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP, and TERRENCE P. COLLINGSWORTH, 

Individually and as Agent of CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP,

Appellees.

No. 4D21-784

[May 18, 2022]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward 

County; Keathan B. Frink, Judge; L.T. Case No. 17-1223 CACE.

Dinah S. Stein and Mark Hicks of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., 

Miami, and Stephen Hunter Johnson and Nathaniel Haim Sari of Lydecker Diaz, 

Miami, for appellant.

Bruce S. Rogow and Tara A. Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Boca Raton, 

for appellee Conrad & Scherer, LLP. 

Timothy W. Burns, Jeff Bowen and Jesse Bair of Burns Bowen Bair LLP, 

Madison, Wisconsin, Pro Hac Vice for appellee Conrad & Scherer, LLP.

MAY, J.

An insurer appeals a final judgment on the insurer’s duty to defend. It argues 

the court erred in granting the insured law firm’s motion and denying the 

insurer’s motion for summary judgment because: (1) coverage is excluded under 

the policy’s “prior litigation” and “related professional legal services” exclusions; 

and (2) the court failed to consider the insurer’s other affirmative defenses and 

counterclaim for recission of the policy in ruling on the motion for summary 

judgment. We agree with the insurer on the second issue. We reverse and 

remand the case for further proceedings.

• THE BACKGROUND

In 2014, the insurer issued a Lawyer’s Professional Liability Policy to the law 

firm. The law firm notified the insurer of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (“RICO”) suit filed against it during the policy period. The 
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RICO suit involved allegations that stemmed in part from the law firm’s 

representation of plaintiffs in earlier filed human rights lawsuits.

• The Underlying Lawsuits

1. The Human Rights Lawsuits 

On March 20, 2009, one of the law firm’s partners (“Collingsworth”) filed three 

human rights lawsuits against Drummond Company, Inc. (“Drummond”) under 

the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 in the 

Northern District of Alabama. The complaints alleged Drummond aided and 

abetted a Colombian paramilitary group in the wrongful death of union activists 

and other civilians related to Drummond’s Colombia mining operations.

2. The Defamation Lawsuit 

On October 21, 2011, Drummond filed a one-count defamation complaint 

against Collingsworth and the law firm alleging that Collingsworth wrote three 

letters defaming Drummond in 2011 at the behest of Llanos Oil Exploration 

Limited, a Drummond rival. Two letters were sent to Dutch government officials 

and one to the Itochu Corporation, a potential Japanese investor. The letters 

urged the recipients to take notice of Drummond’s actions in Colombia, including 

its alleged relations with paramilitary groups and the resulting human rights 

violations.

3. The RICO Lawsuit 

Nearly four years later, on March 27, 2015, Drummond filed the RICO lawsuit 

against the law firm and others. The complaint was 106 pages long with 86

pages of appendices. It alleged that since 2007, Collingsworth, the law firm, 

foreign attorneys, human rights groups, oil executives, and others engaged in a 

coordinated “enterprise” against Drummond in violation of RICO. Part of the 

alleged enterprise were the three human rights lawsuits filed in 2009. The law 

firm submitted the RICO case to its insurer and requested a defense. The insurer 

refused to defend the law firm.

• THIS CASE 

The law firm filed a one-count complaint against the insurer requesting a 

declaration that the insurer had a duty to defend it in the RICO case and to 

reimburse the law firm for incurred defense fees and costs. The insurer admitted 

the RICO case had been filed during the policy period and involved Professional 

Legal Services but denied both a duty to defend and coverage based on the prior

litigation exclusion and other policy provisions. It asserted multiple affirmative 

defenses, a counterclaim, and a third-party complaint against Collingsworth, 
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which sought a declaration of no coverage, no duty to defend, and recission of 

the policy. 

Both the law firm and insurer moved for summary judgment on the duty to 

defend. Their arguments were limited to the application of Exclusion C—the 

prior litigation exclusion. The circuit court granted the law firm’s motion and 

denied the insurer’s motion in an extensive written order. The court specifically 

found the insurer had a duty to defend the law firm in the RICO case.

The insurer moved for rehearing, arguing the circuit court’s order did not 

address all its affirmative defenses and the court had ruled on issues not raised 

in the motions. The court denied the motion. 

The insurer then moved for clarification and/or to set aside the order, arguing 

the circuit court: (1) failed to consider its other affirmative defenses; (2) ruled on 

issues not raised by the motions; and (3) failed to address the rescission 

counterclaim. In denying the motion, a successor judge reviewed the record and 

found the summary judgment order “addresse[d] all [the law firm’s] claims 

against [the insurer] and . . . all of [the insurer’s] affirmative defenses and 

counterclaims against [the law firm].” But the successor judge found the order 

on the summary judgment motions was not final because there had been no 

determination of the attorney’s fees, costs, and interest owed to the law firm.

Following discovery, briefing, and an evidentiary hearing, the court ordered 

the insurer to pay $2,553,699.56 in fees and costs, and prejudgment interest. 

The successor judge reserved jurisdiction to award further fees and expenses, to 

enforce the insurer’s duty to defend and duty to indemnify, and to enter such 

further orders as the court deemed “just, necessary, and proper.” From these 

orders, the insurer now appeals.

• THE ANALYSIS 

More than two thirds of the briefs in this appeal focus on the insurer’s duty 

to defend, the application of the prior litigation and related claims exclusions, 

and whether the eight corners rule applies. In its last and shortest issue,

however, the insurer argues the case must be reversed because the circuit court 

did not address its remaining affirmative defenses and rescission counterclaim 

before entering its “final” judgment. It is this last argument upon which we 

focus. 

We do not reach the duty to defend issue and express no opinion on the 

merits. Rather, we address the error that occurred when the successor judge 

found that the order on the motions for summary judgment addressed “all [the 

law firm’s] claims against [the insurer] and it addresse[d] all of [the insurer’s] 

affirmative defenses and counterclaims against [the law firm]” and “no 
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outstanding issues of liability remain at issue.” See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Seitlin 

& Co., 919 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). That simply was not true. 

When the court ruled in favor of the law firm on the duty to defend, its judicial 

labor was not at an end. The insurer twice brought the remaining affirmative 

defenses and rescission counterclaim to the attention of the court to no avail. 

Rather than resolve those remaining issues, the successor judge declared that 

all issues had been resolved when in fact they had not. Despite the trappings of 

finality found in the successor judge’s order, other interrelated issues remained 

outstanding. 

Florida adheres to the principal that “piecemeal appeals should not be 

permitted where claims are legally interrelated and in substance involve the 

same transaction.” Mendez v. W. Flagler Family Ass’n, 303 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 

1974); see also S. L. T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974).

There can be no doubt that the declaratory relief and rescission claims in this 

case are interrelated. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrick, 763 So. 2d 1133 

(Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We therefore reverse and remand the case for the court to 

vacate the January 11, 2021 order and the order denying the insurer’s motion 

for clarification. We remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

GROSS and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.