IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–1942

Filed May 12, 2017

LAURIE FREEMAN, SHARON MOCKMORE, BECCY BOYSEL, GARY D. 

BOYSEL, LINDA L. GOREHAM, GARY R. GOREHAM, KELCEY 

BRACKETT, and BOBBIE LYNN WEATHERMAN,

Appellees,

vs.

GRAIN PROCESSING CORPORATION,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, 

Thomas G. Reidel, Judge. 

Defendant appeals district court ruling certifying case as a class 

action. DISTRICT COURT CLASS CERTIFICATION ORDER 

AFFIRMED.

Michael R. Reck, Mark McCormick, Charles F. Becker, and 

Kelsey J. Knowles of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines; Steven J. 

Havercamp and Eric M. Knoernschild of Stanley, Lande & Hunter, P.C., 

Muscatine; and Joshua B. Frank of Baker Botts L.L.P., 

Washington, D.C., for appellant. 

Sarah E. Siskind and Scott A. Entin of Miner, Barnhill & Galland, 

P.C., Madison, Wisconsin; James C. Larew of Larew Law Office, 

Iowa City; and Claire M. Diallo of Browne, Diallo & Roy, LLP, 

Princeton Junction, New Jersey, for appellees. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

In this appeal, we must decide whether the district court abused 

its discretion by certifying this case as a class action. The plaintiffs are 

residents of Muscatine, Iowa, who live near a corn wet milling plant. The 

plaintiffs allege air pollution from the plant interferes with the use of 

their property. They have filed this lawsuit alleging state common law 

and statutory claims based on nuisance, trespass, and negligence

theories. In a prior appeal, we held their claims were not preempted by 

the Federal Clean Air Act (CAA). Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 

N.W.2d 58, 94 (Iowa 2014). On remand, the district court, over 

defendant’s objections, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class 

certification and divided the class into two subclasses. For the reasons 

explained below, we affirm the class certification order. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Grain Processing Corporation (GPC) has operated its corn wet

milling facility in Muscatine since 1943, converting corn kernels into 

products for commercial and industrial use. On April 23, 2012, eight

Muscatine residents living near GPC filed a putative class action on 

behalf of “themselves and others who have resided within one and onehalf miles from the perimeter” of GPC’s facility within the preceding five 

years, an estimated 4000 residents. Their petition provides this overview 

of their claims:

The plaintiffs allege the corn wet milling operation at GPC’s 

facility creates hazardous by-products and harmful 

chemicals, many of which are released directly into the 

atmosphere. . . . They assert the polluting chemicals and 

particles are blown from the facility onto nearby properties. 

They note particulate matter is visible on properties, yards, 

and grounds and various chemical pollutants are also 

present. Compounding these adverse effects, according to 

the plaintiffs, GPC has used, continues to use, and has failed 

to replace its worn and outdated technology with available 
3

technology that would eliminate or drastically reduce the 

pollution. The plaintiffs assert these emissions have caused 

them to suffer persistent irritations, discomforts, 

annoyances, inconveniences, and put them at risk for 

serious health effects. 

Id. at 63–64. The plaintiffs limited their damage claims to loss of use and 

enjoyment of property, foregoing claims for diminution in value or 

personal injury.

GPC moved for summary judgment, asserting plaintiffs’ common 

law and statutory claims were preempted by the CAA and Iowa Code 

chapter 455B (2011), Iowa’s counterpart to the CAA. GPC’s motion 

alternatively argued the lawsuit raised nonjusticiable political questions. 

The district court granted GPC’s motion for summary judgment based on 

preemption and the political-question doctrine. The district court relied

on a key federal preemption decision that subsequently was reversed on 

appeal. On our review, we concluded the plaintiffs’ claims were not 

preempted or barred by the political-question doctrine. Id. at 83–85, 88–

89, 93–94. We reversed the summary judgment and reinstated the 

lawsuit against GPC, relying in part on the new federal appellate decision

filed after the district court’s ruling. See id. at 65 n.2 & 94. We 

remanded the case to the district court. 

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification. The plaintiffs 

moved for class certification after remand. GPC resisted class 

certification on several grounds. The plaintiffs argued common 

questions of law and fact predominated over individual claims—a 

fundamental requirement for class certification. Common questions 

included “whether GPC violated its duty of care, whether the haze, odor, 

and smoke emitted from GPC [were] the product of negligence, and 

whether such emissions constituted negligence or unlawful trespass.” 

The plaintiffs proposed a plan for adjudicating their claims. The plan
4

focused on three prongs: GPC’s common course of conduct, proof of 

harm, and calculation of damages. 

First, the plaintiffs proposed to show GPC’s common course of 

conduct in knowingly creating a nuisance. They pointed to internal 

emails indicating GPC was aware of the pollution and the need to update 

equipment to improve air quality. For example, in 2008, Derek Biggs, 

GPC’s plant manager, emailed coworkers observing, “At times when I was 

there, the parking lot and south end of Muscatine [were] covered in a 

haze, and if we had that odor, haze, etc. in Washington, we would have 

serious problems with the locals.” Mick Durham, GPC’s environmental 

director, received an email in 2010 from Kurt Levetzow, an employee of 

the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) who stated he was “amazed 

at a bluish colored haze that was leaving GPC’s property and blanketing 

the residential neighborhood across from the plant.” A 2012 email from 

Bill Chrisman, GPC senior process engineer, to Durham disclosed that

over one weekend the facility’s dryers caused “the neighborhood [to be] 

so smoky across the street that it was fairly hard to see, not to mention 

breathe.” GPC engineers described the dryers as “antiquated,” 

“deteriorating,” “run down,” and “older higher polluting.” 

The plaintiffs proposed to prove that GPC delayed fixing the 

problems by choosing to focus its resources elsewhere. Technologies to 

reduce emissions were available but not implemented at GPC’s

Muscatine plant. The plaintiffs characterized this common proof as the 

“most significant portion of the trial,” stating,

Whether it be a class case or an individual trial, there 

is going to be a lot of evidence, a significant amount of 

evidence regarding the culpability of GPC’s conduct. That 

evidence will be the same, over and over again, for every 

single class member. Regardless if this case is tried once or 

tried hundreds or thousands of times, the same witnesses, 
5

the same documents will be testified about, the same issues

[will be presented]. 

The plaintiffs noted, “[T]hese conditions and GPC’s knowledge of them 

are facts and evidence that reside at the heart of every class member’s 

claims.” 

In the second phase, the plaintiffs proposed to focus on proof of 

harm: that every resident within one-and-a-half miles suffered a 

nuisance. The plaintiffs would offer three categories of evidence. The 

first addressed causation; it “revolve[d] around GPC’s public admissions 

that its operation had been causing the smoke, the odor and the haze 

that had concerned the Muscatine community for years.”

The next addressed harms suffered by the residents. The plaintiffs

proposed to offer testimony from twenty to thirty “normal” persons living 

within the class boundaries, describing the common character of the 

harm. The plaintiffs submitted over 100 declarations from residents. 

Most described the smell emitted from the GPC plant as “burned corn” or 

“rotten eggs.” Many mentioned dust-like particles accumulating on their 

lawns and homes. Sometimes the dust was white or gray, and 

sometimes it was darker. Most declarations indicated the smell or ash 

happened daily or nearly every day and mentioned symptoms of burning 

eyes and irritated sinuses. Many said they could not open windows or 

enjoy the outdoors due to the smell and dust. The plaintiffs alleged these 

declarations, together with residents’ testimony, met the objective 

standard for nuisance: that normal persons in the community found the 

conditions offensive, annoying, or intolerable. The plaintiffs stated,

Plaintiffs are prepared to present testimony from 

normal persons from all over the class area who regard 

GPC’s pollution as definitely offensive, seriously annoying or 

intolerable. Whether they are, in fact, normal persons living 

in the community will be a jury question. But if so, and if 

the jury credits their testimony, it will establish that GPC 
6

created a nuisance at their properties, and if in every portion 

of the class area normal persons testify that they 

experienced a nuisance, then it is permissible for a jury to 

infer that a nuisance has been suffered throughout the class 

area. 

GPC could then present conflicting testimony from other residents within 

the class boundaries who did not experience similar harm or were not 

bothered by the emissions.

The final type of evidence plaintiffs intended to offer was air 

modeling data from Dr. Paul Rosenfeld. Dr. Rosenfeld plotted the 

dispersion of three types of emissions: volatile organic compounds 

(VOCs), particulate matter (PM10), and sulfur dioxide. These emissions 

were proxies for odor, smoke, and haze, respectively. Dr. Rosenfeld used 

AERMOD, an EPA-approved modeling algorithm that accounts for wind 

direction, wind speed, temperature, humidity, precipitation, and certain 

obstructions to estimate where the wind blew particles from GPC. 

Dr. Rosenfeld’s model revealed pollutant concentrations and variations 

over time across the class area. He also developed a “wind rose” 

analysis, based on the sixteen cardinal wind directions, which he used to 

quantify the amount of time each property received “direct hits,” or was 

downwind from, the emissions. Dr. Rosenfeld’s data showed “the 

presence of the same pollutants frequently and repeatedly on every 

property in the class, and . . . the presence of those pollutants at 

properties closely surrounding the properties of the testifying normal 

persons.” At the class certification hearing, the plaintiffs’ counsel 

explained,

And if you look at this, what you don’t see, Your 

Honor, is during the hour of 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., a single 

solitary orange little cloud only covering the red cross that is 

Ms. Mockmore’s property. What you do see is that when 

GPC’s soup of pollutants are blown at Ms. Mockmore’s 

property, all of the other parcels and properties in close 
7

proximity to Ms. Mockmore’s are similarly hit by GPC’s soup 

of pollutants. 

And the Mockmore’s property is not isolated in this 

observation, Your Honor. And this is important because this 

is why it supports the inference that we’re asking the jury to 

make in this case, that when Ms. Mockmore or this normal 

person or that normal person testifies about his or her 

experience with GPC’s pollutants . . . it is a reasonable 

inference for the jury to infer that similar properties in close 

proximity experience a similar nuisance[.] 

“All of this evidence in combination, these three categories of evidence,” 

the plaintiffs argued, “will support a reasonable inference by the jury that 

the nuisance conditions existed on every property in the class area.” 

Finally, for the third phase of the plaintiff’s proposed trial strategy, 

the plaintiffs suggested a formula for calculating damages. Initially, they

proposed using a simple per diem formula, in which the jury would 

assess a per-hour amount ($10 to $15) for the time each resident lived in 

the area. Alternatively, the plaintiffs proposed another, more exacting

formula in which the jury’s assigned baseline per-hour value would be 

multiplied by each property’s “direct hit” hours and prorated based on 

each property’s pollutant concentration. Pollution concentration, 

plaintiffs argued, could be calculated as follows: 

The formula takes the average concentrations of each of 

[VOCs, PM10s, and sulfur dioxide] present on each parcel 

and then sums them up to arrive at a property-specific 

concentration total and to determine how that compares to 

the total concentrations of the hardest hit property. And we 

refer to the hardest hit property as the baseline for all 

others. The formula divides the concentration total for each 

property into the . . . baseline total. 

Plaintiffs acknowledged that because the model measures only the 

amount of time a property is hit by emissions, lower concentration totals 

may measure emissions that residents would not notice. It would be left 

for the court and jury to identify what total concentration level, if any, 

constituted a nuisance. The plaintiffs admitted this formula does not 
8

account for time class members spent asleep or away from their 

property, but asserted the formula was permitted under our caselaw

allowing approximation of damages. 

To the extent issues remained concerning individual damages, the 

plaintiffs contended these issues could be litigated during a “claims 

administration process typical to class actions.” During this process, 

individual factors such as tenure of the residents and proximity to other 

sources of pollution could be addressed. 

B. GPC’s Resistance to Certification. GPC argued the residents’ 

claims were inherently individual, and as such, individual issues 

predominated over those common to the class. GPC pointed to variances 

in testimony submitted by the residents. For example, their descriptions 

of GPC’s emissions differed, such as “yellow dust,” “syrupy, sticky 

residue,” “similar to pencil shavings,” “sticky, brownish tan particulates,” 

“small black pellets like peppercorns,” or “dust that looks like fur.” Some 

residents had moved into the neighborhood with knowledge of the 

emissions, while others were unaware before moving. The neighbors had 

lived in the area for varying periods, some moving to the area after the 

lawsuit was filed and others living there for over fifty years. Some stated 

they may have received reduced pricing on their homes because of the 

pollution. Some lived closer to other emission sources, such as a 

wastewater treatment plant or railroad. GPC identified seven residents 

(out of over 100 declarants) who stated they never had been prevented 

from doing anything outdoors because of the smells or emissions. Even 

these residents, however, acknowledged the prevalent odor in their 

neighborhood from GPC’s facility. The individual issues, GPC argued, 

necessitated a property-by-property, person-by-person analysis to 

determine whether GPC’s conduct created a nuisance.
9

GPC also resisted the residents’ phased trial strategy. Specifically, 

GPC objected to the use of lay testimony to infer classwide harm. GPC 

noted a class action must “rise or fall” with the named plaintiffs. 

Allowing the jury to infer, from representative testimony, conditions on 

surrounding properties, GPC argued, would impermissibly alleviate each

resident’s burden to prove nuisance on his or her property. Moreover, 

using inferences would mask individual issues, hindering individual 

defenses and thereby depriving GPC of due process.

GPC submitted expert testimony criticizing Dr. Rosenfeld’s model 

and corresponding allocation of damages. It alleged the model was 

flawed because it combined disparate substances (VOS, PM10, and 

sulfur dioxide) to reach an aggregate total, even though properties with 

differing concentrations of these substances would experience differing 

harms. The model showed concentration totals on a linear scale, 

although testimony established that emissions would not be experienced

linearly. A property with a concentration total of 200 would not suffer 

double the lost use of enjoyment as one with 100. The model only 

accounted for wind direction and failed to account for hours during 

which the residents were sleeping, on vacation, or otherwise away from

home. Because the model measured emissions hitting the property even 

at levels that would not be perceptible, let alone cause compensable 

harm, GPC argued the model did not establish a nuisance. GPC also 

noted the residents’ model and formula could not measure any alleged 

trespass or negligence by GPC.

C. The District Court’s Decision. The district court granted 

class certification. Noting its authority to modify or decertify the class at 

any time, the district court divided the class into two subclasses, one for 

members in close proximity to GPC, and the other for those in peripheral 
10

proximity. The court reasoned that plaintiffs’ air dispersion analysis 

“yields results one would expect—properties in close proximity have 

comparable ‘Concentration Totals’ and direct-hit hours.” Therefore, 

“named plaintiffs suffer the most comparable harm to absent class 

members who live in close proximity, and the closer the proximity the 

more analogous the harm.” The court sorted six named plaintiffs into 

the close-proximity subclass and two into peripheral proximity.

The district court further determined that common issues of law 

and fact existed and that common issues predominated over individual 

ones. Common issues included GPC’s course of conduct, its knowledge 

of the pollution, and its level and duration of emissions. Addressing 

GPC’s concerns, the district court, citing Miller v. Rohling, 720 N.W.2d 

562 (Iowa 2006), stated,

Because Iowa measures the existence of nuisance-level 

harm objectively, a nuisance claim brought under Iowa law 

is not inherently individual. Indeed, Iowa’s objective 

standard renders many of Defendant’s Due Process 

arguments—idiosyncratic sensitivities, physical infirmities, 

life style choices, preferences for use and enjoyment, 

housekeeping habits—immaterial to proving nuisance. 

Further, Iowa’s objective-nuisance standard supports 

Plaintiffs’ plan for presenting the jury with lay testimony 

from witnesses—whom the jury can find are “normal persons 

living in the community”—to prove the class-wide impact of 

the alleged nuisance throughout each subclass area. 

Miller also supports Plaintiffs’ proposed use of 

formulaic damages. Miller upheld the trial court’s formulaic 

use of an identical per hour dollar value for all of the 

plaintiffs notwithstanding differences in their proximity to 

the sources of the pollution. Miller also approved the trial 

court multiplying an identical per hour dollar value by 

sixteen hours a day—because it assumed that “most normal 

people would be out of their home a period of eight hours a 

day.” . . . Miller approving formulaic damages based on 

reasonable inferences and approximation renders more of 

Defendant’s Due Process arguments—each class member 

living in a different proximity to the source of the pollution,

the varying rate of emission over time, the varying velocity 

and direction of the wind, and the number of hours each 
11

plaintiff was actually or wakefully present at his or her 

property—immaterial to proving nuisance. 

The district court concluded, “Due to the remedial nature of our class 

action rules, the manageability concerns raised by Defendant’s 

arguments are presently insufficient to deny certification.”

GPC appealed as of right. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.264(3) (“An order 

certifying or refusing to certify an action as a class action is 

appealable.”). GPC argues the district court abused its discretion in 

certifying the class and that certification infringed upon its due process 

rights. We retained the appeal. 

II. Standard of Review. 

“Our review of the district court’s ruling granting or denying 

certification of a class is limited because the district court enjoys broad 

discretion in the certification of class action lawsuits.” Legg v. W. Bank, 

873 N.W.2d 756, 758 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Vos v. Farm Bureau Life Ins.

Co., 667 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Iowa 2003)). We review a district court’s class 

certification ruling for abuse of discretion. Id. The district court abuses 

its discretion when its “grounds for certifying a class action are clearly 

unreasonable.” Id. If the district court “ ‘weigh[ed] and consider[ed] the 

factors and [came] to a reasoned conclusion as to whether a class action 

should be permitted for a fair adjudication of the controversy,’ we will 

affirm.” Anderson Contracting, Inc. v. DSM Copolymers, Inc., 776 N.W.2d 

846, 848 (Iowa 2009) (alterations in original) (quoting Luttenegger v. 

Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 671 N.W.2d 425, 437 (Iowa 2003)). To the 

extent GPC argues certification infringes upon its due process right to 

present a defense, our review is de novo. Kragnes v. City of Des Moines, 

810 N.W.2d 492, 498 (Iowa 2012). 
12

III. Analysis. 

We must decide whether the district court abused its discretion by 

certifying this class action. GPC contends that commonality, a question 

of law or fact common to the class, is not present as required under Iowa 

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.261(2). GPC relatedly argues common issues of 

law or fact do not predominate over individual issues, a factor it 

contends the district court failed to sufficiently weigh when concluding a 

class action should be permitted for the fair and efficient adjudication of 

the controversy. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.263(1)(e). We determine that

common issues of law or fact exist and predominate over individual 

issues. Finally, GPC argues the certification order violates due process

by interfering with its right to litigate individual defenses. We disagree 

and conclude GPC will be able to litigate individual issues. We hold the

district court did not abuse its broad discretion in certifying this class

action. 

A. Whether the District Court Abused Its Discretion by 

Certifying the Class Action. Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.261 

through 1.263 govern class actions. Under rule 1.262, the district court 

may certify a class action if it finds all of the following:

a. The requirements of rule 1.261 have been satisfied. 

b. A class action should be permitted for the fair and 

efficient adjudication of the controversy. 

c. The representative parties fairly and adequately will 

protect the interests of the class. 

Id. r. 1.262(2). Rule 1.261 provides parties may sue as a class when

“[t]he class is so numerous . . . that joinder of all members . . . is 

impracticable” and “[t]here is a question of law or fact common to the 

class.” Id. r. 1.261(1)–(2). “A failure of proof on any one of the 

prerequisites is fatal to class certification.” City of Dubuque v. Iowa 
13

Trust, 519 N.W.2d 786, 791 (Iowa 1994). But at the class certification 

stage, “the proponent’s burden is light.” Id. The class action rules 

should be “liberally construed and the policy should favor maintenance 

of class actions.” Lucas v. Pioneer, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 167, 175 (Iowa 

1977). The goal of the rules is the 

efficient resolution of the claims or liabilities of many 

individuals in a single action, the elimination of repetitious 

litigation and possibly inconsistent adjudications involving 

common questions, related events, or requests for similar 

relief, and the establishment of an effective procedure for 

those whose economic position is such that it is unrealistic 

to expect them to seek to vindicate their rights in separate 

lawsuits. 

Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 696 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa 2005) (quoting 7A 

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 1754, at 49 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Wright]). 

Rule 1.263(1) lists thirteen factors the district court may consider 

in determining whether “the class action should be permitted for the fair 

and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”1 Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.263(1). 

 

1Rule 1.263(1) provides,

In determining whether the class action should be permitted for the fair 

and efficient adjudication of the controversy, as appropriately limited 

under rule 1.262(3), the court shall consider and give appropriate weight 

to the following and other relevant factors:

a. Whether a joint or common interest exists among members of 

the class. 

b. Whether the prosecution of separate actions by or against 

individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or 

varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class 

that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for a party 

opposing the class. 

c. Whether adjudications with respect to individual members of 

the class as a practical matter would be dispositive of the interests of 

other members not parties to the adjudication or substantially impair or 

impede their ability to protect their interests. 

d. Whether a party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 

on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making final 
14

These factors “center on two broad considerations: ‘achieving judicial 

economy by encouraging class litigation while preserving, as much as 

possible, the rights of litigants—both those presently in court and those 

who are only potential litigants.’ ” Vos, 667 N.W.2d at 45 (quoting 

Vignaroli v. Blue Cross of Iowa, 360 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Iowa 1985)). 

A key factor is whether “common questions of law or fact 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” 

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.263(1)(e). “[T]he language of rule 1.263 indicates the 

district court has ‘considerable discretion’ in weighing the factors.” 

Anderson Contracting, 776 N.W.2d at 848 (quoting Vignaroli, 360 N.W.2d 

at 744). The district court decides what weight, if any, to give each of the 

factors and may weigh one factor more heavily than another. Id. 

_______________________

injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with 

respect to the class as a whole. 

e. Whether common questions of law or fact predominate over 

any questions affecting only individual members. 

f. Whether other means of adjudicating the claims and defenses 

are impracticable or inefficient. 

g. Whether a class action offers the most appropriate means of 

adjudicating the claims and defenses. 

h. Whether members who are not representative parties have a 

substantial interest in individually controlling the prosecution or defense 

of separate actions. 

i. Whether the class action involve a claim that is or has been the 

subject of a class action, a government action, or other proceeding. 

j. Whether it is desirable to bring the class action in another 

forum. 

k. Whether management of the class action poses unusual 

difficulties. 

l. Whether any conflict of laws issues involved pose unusual 

difficulties. 

m. Whether the claims of individual class members are 

insufficient in the amounts or interests involved, in view of the 

complexities of the issues and the expenses of the litigation, to afford 

significant relief to the members of the class. 
15

“Whether or not we agree with the decision arrived at by the trial court is 

not the issue. The issue is one of abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting 

Martin v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 435 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Iowa 1989)). 

The district court has considerable leeway when deciding whether to 

certify the class. See, e.g., Legg, 873 N.W.2d at 761–62 (affirming class 

certification and noting broad discretion); Kragnes, 810 N.W.2d at 500 

(“We find no abuse of the district court’s broad discretion in certifying 

and refusing to decertify the class.”); Varner v. Schwan’s Sales Enters., 

Inc., 433 N.W.2d 304, 306 (Iowa 1988) (concluding the district court did 

not “abuse[] its discretion in denying certification). 

GPC does not contest numerosity. See Legg, 873 N.W.2d at 759 

(noting numbers alone are dispositive to show numerosity and 

impracticality is presumed if the class has over forty members). Nor does 

GPC contest the adequacy of the named plaintiffs to represent the class. 

Rather, GPC argues that the district court erred in certifying the class 

because the requirement of commonality was not met. GPC also 

contends individual issues predominate over common questions of law or 

fact. We address each argument in turn. 

1. Commonality. GPC relies on federal authority in arguing the 

commonality requirement is lacking here. Iowa’s “rules regarding class 

actions[] closely resemble Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.” Vos, 667 

N.W.2d at 44. We have relied on “federal authorities construing similar 

provisions” of the federal rule to interpret our state counterpart. Id. The 

federal rule requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).2 

 

2Federal Rule 23 provides in relevant part,

(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be 

sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
16

_______________________

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 

typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 

protect the interests of the class. 

(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if 

Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:

(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual 

class members would create a risk of:

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with 

respect to individual class members that would establish 

incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing 

the class; or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual class 

members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive 

of the interests of the other members not parties to the 

individual adjudications or would substantially impair or 

impede their ability to protect their interests;

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 

on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 

injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 

respecting the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact 

common to class members predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 

superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 

adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these 

findings include:

(A) the class members’ interests in individually 

controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; 

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation 

concerning the controversy already begun by or against 

class members; 

(C) the desirability or undesirability of 

concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 

forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class 

action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)–(b). 
17

GPC argues Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, supports its challenge

to the district court’s determination on commonality. 564 U.S. 338, 349, 

131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). In Dukes, the plaintiffs sought to certify a 

class action of all women employed at Wal-Mart stores nationwide since 

1998, alleging Wal-Mart’s promotion policies discriminated on the basis 

of sex in violation of Title VII. Id. at 346, 131 S. Ct. at 2549. The Dukes

Court noted commonality “is easy to misread, since ‘[a]ny competently 

crafted class complaint literally raises common “questions” ’ ” Id. at 349, 

131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in 

the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 131–32 (2009)). But 

“[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class 

members ‘have suffered the same injury.’ ” Id. at 349–50, 131 S. Ct. at 

2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, 102 

S. Ct. 2364, 2370 (1982)). It was not sufficient that class members “have 

all suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Id. at 350, 131 S. 

Ct. at 2551. Rather, “claims must depend on a common contention” of 

“such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means 

that the determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is 

central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. To 

satisfy the commonality requirement, “ ‘[e]ven a single [common]

question’ will do.” Id. at 359, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (alteration in original)

(quoting Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the 

Structure of the Class Action, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 149, 176 n.10 (2003)). 

The Dukes Court concluded that no common question of law or 

fact was present. Id. at 359, 131 S. Ct. at 2556–57. Unlike an “assertion 

of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor,” the class 

members
18

held a multitude of different jobs, at different levels of 

Wal-Mart hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400 

stores, sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of 

supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of regional 

policies that all differed . . . . 

Id. at 350, 359–60, 131 S. Ct. at 2551, 2557 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th Cir. 

2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)). The employees failed to identify a 

specific employment practice tying together their nationwide claims. Id. 

at 357, 131 S. Ct. at 2555. 

By contrast, the district court here found several common 

questions of both law and fact. The class includes only “members who 

live in the vicinity of Defendant’s Muscatine facility and allegedly suffered 

damages from Defendant’s course of conduct.” GPC engaged in a 

common course of conduct regarding all class members.

Specifically, Defendant operated outdated, highpolluting dryers and coal-boilers, with virtually no controls 

to reduce emissions, [which] purportedly released noxious 

smoke and odor and haze into the surrounding 

neighborhoods for years, which caused a class-wide 

nuisance. Almost identical evidence will be required to 

establish the level and duration of Defendant’s emissions, 

the reasonableness of Defendant’s operations, and the 

causal connection, if any, between the injuries allegedly 

suffered and Defendant’s liability. 

Although the “nature and amount of damages” may differ for each class 

member, the district court concluded, “The central factual basis for all of 

Plaintiff’s claims . . . is GPC’s course of conduct and knowledge of its 

potential hazards. Thus, Plaintiffs’ theory presents a common nucleus of 

operative fact.” We agree. All class members allegedly suffered a 

common injury—air pollution emanating from GPC that interfered with 

the use and enjoyment of their property. 

GPC argues the named plaintiffs did not suffer the same injury as 

other class members. “[A] class representative must be part of the class 
19

and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as class 

members.” Hammer v. Branstad, 463 N.W.2d 86, 90 (Iowa 1990) 

(alteration in original) (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. 

Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S. Ct. 1891, 1896 (1977)). Initially, the 

district court was “not persuaded class representatives ha[d] suffered the 

same injury shared by all members of the class.” The court observed 

that Sharon Mockmore, the class member located closest to GPC, 

experienced a “concentration total” of 317.21, while Bobbie Lynn 

Weatherman, the class member located furthest from GPC, experienced a 

“concentration total” of only 71.50. Thus, “the effects of Defendant’s 

emissions at the edge of the class boundary [could not] be inferred from 

the testimony of class members living in close proximity to Defendant.” 

But the district court resolved that disparity by creating two subclasses, 

entitled “close proximity” and “peripheral proximity,” and grouping the 

named plaintiffs accordingly. Within these subclasses, the district court 

found the named plaintiffs were “ideal representatives for absent class 

members who live nearby.” Our rules allow the district court to define 

subclasses. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.262(3)(c) (“If appropriate, the court may do 

any of the following: . . . Divide a class into subclasses and treat each 

subclass as a class.”). 

Other courts applying equivalent class action rules have 

determined the commonality requirement was met when neighboring 

property owners sued a polluter under nuisance or negligence theories. 

See Ebert v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472, 478 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Here, the 

district court recognized that the issues of General Mills’ standardized 

conduct of alleged contamination and the remedies sought by the class 

are common to all plaintiffs . . . .”); Rowe v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & 

Co., 262 F.R.D. 451, 457 (D.N.J. 2009) (commonality present for
20

nuisance claim alleging groundwater contamination); Collins v. Olin

Corp., 248 F.R.D. 95, 101 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding common questions 

existed as to polluter’s course of conduct for contaminated soil and 

water); Mejdreck v. Lockformer Co., No. 01 C 6107, 2002 WL 1838141, at 

*3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2002) (“Plaintiffs allege this contamination 

constitutes standardized conduct towards all proposed class members 

and there are therefore common questions of law and fact.”); Boggs v. 

Divested Atomic Corp., 141 F.R.D. 58, 64 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (stating 

plaintiffs had identified common questions of extensiveness of emissions, 

what caused them, what precautions were taken, and economic impact 

of emissions); Berdysz v. Boyas Excavating, Inc., ___ N.E.3d ___, ___, 

2017 WL 632445, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2017) (finding common 

issues and affirming certification in air pollution case).

We reach the same conclusion under this record and hold the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the commonality 

requirement was satisfied within the two subclasses. 

2. Predominance. The question of whether common or individual 

issues predominate has been characterized as “fairly complex.” 

Vignaroli, 360 N.W.2d at 744. “Inherent in our inquiry into the 

predomination issue is the recognition [that] the class action device is 

appropriate only where class members have common complaints that 

can be presented by designated representatives in the unified 

proceeding.” Id. Predominance “necessitates a ‘close look’ at ‘the 

difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class 

action.’ ” Vos, 667 N.W.2d at 46 (quoting Rothwell v. Chubb Life Ins. Co. 

of Am., 191 F.R.D. 25, 28–29 (D.N.H. 1998)). The predominance inquiry 

is “qualitative rather than quantitative”; merely “a common question does 

not end the inquiry.” Ebert, 823 F.3d at 478; see also William B. 
21

Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:50 (5th ed.), Westlaw 

(database updated Dec. 2016) [hereinafter Newberg]. 

Individual claims need not “be carbon copies of each other” to 

determine common issues predominate. Vignaroli, 360 N.W.2d at 745. 

The test for predominance “is a pragmatic one.” Luttenegger, 671 N.W.2d 

at 437. 

When common questions represent a significant aspect of the 

case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in 

a single adjudication, there is a clear justification for handling 

the dispute on a representative rather than an individual 

basis. . . . [C]ourts have held that a [class action] can be 

brought . . . even though there is not a complete identity of 

facts relating to all class members, as long as a “common 

nucleus of operative facts” is present. . . .

The common questions need not be dispositive of the 

entire action. In other words, “predominate” should not be 

automatically equated with “determinative” or “significant.” 

Therefore, when one or more of the central issues in the action 

are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the 

[class] action will be considered proper. 

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Wright § 1778, at 528–33). “A claim 

will meet the predominance requirement when there exists generalized 

evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, classwide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class 

member’s individual position.” Vos, 667 N.W.2d at 45 (quoting Cope v. 

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 696 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 (Ohio 1998)). 

The district court issued a forty-seven-page ruling, with eleven 

pages addressing predominance. See Anderson Contracting, 776 N.W.2d 

at 849 (noting the thoroughness of the district court’s ruling). 

Ultimately, the district court determined, 

While variations in the individual damage claims are likely to 

occur and other sources of emissions may pose unusual 

difficulties, common questions of law or fact regarding 

Defendant’s liability predominate over questions affecting 

only individual class members such that the subclasses 
22

should be permitted for the fair and efficient adjudication of 

this controversy. 

The district court also addressed the other factors considered under rule 

1.263(1). 

One of the purposes of class action procedures “is to 

provide small claimants an economically viable vehicle for 

redress in court.” [Martin], 435 N.W.2d at 366. . . . Given 

the complexities of the liability issue and the expenses of this 

litigation, the claims of individual class members are 

insufficient in the amounts or interests involved to afford 

significant relief to the proposed subclass members without 

certification of the subclasses. Finally, class action will 

establish Defendant’s liability in a single proceeding for 

thousands of Muscatine residents. This will avoid 

unacceptable costs and repetition for both parties. 

In Comes, we emphasized the district court’s broad discretion to weigh 

the thirteen factors in deciding class certification. 

In most cases some of the thirteen factors [regarding the fairand-efficient-administration-of-justice test] will weigh 

against certification and some will weigh in favor. It is for 

the trial court, employing its broad discretion, to weigh the

competing factors and determine whether a class action will 

provide a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 

Thus, even if [defendant] is correct in its assertion four of the 

factors weigh against certification, that does not preclude the 

court from certifying the class action if, in its opinion, those 

factors are outweighed by other factors supporting 

certification. 

Comes, 696 N.W.2d at 322 (quoting Howe v. Microsoft Corp., 656 N.W.2d 

285, 289 (N.D. 2003)). 

“Further, a safety net is provided for cases in which certification is 

improvidently granted: the court may decertify the class at a later time.” 

Id. at 324; see also Vos, 667 N.W.2d at 54–55 (affirming district court’s 

decision to decertify class because individual issues predominated). Or 

the district court may bifurcate the trial into separate phases for liability 

and damages. See Hammer, 463 N.W.2d at 88; see also Newberg § 10:6 
23

(“[A] common use of bifurcation . . . is to try liability issues to a jury 

before damages . . . .”). When 

defendant’s activities present a “common course of conduct”

so that the issue of statutory liability is common to the class, 

the fact that damages . . . may vary for each party does not 

require that the class action be terminated. 

Legg, 873 N.W.2d at 759–60 (alterations in original) (quoting Luttenegger, 

671 N.W.2d at 437). 

“Certification of a class action does not depend on a determination 

of whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail on the merits.” Vos, 667 

N.W.2d at 45. However, determining whether the requirements for class 

certification are met “will entail some overlap with the merits of the

plaintiff’s underlying claim. That cannot be helped.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 

351, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Nonetheless, we decline to “engage in freeranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn.

Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013). 

The merits should be analyzed only to the extent relevant in determining 

whether the rules have been satisfied. Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1196. 

We begin, as the district court did, with the plaintiffs’ first cause of 

action, nuisance. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 

Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2001) (“To determine whether the claims 

alleged by the putative class meet the requirements for class certification, 

we must first examine the underlying cause of action . . . .”). The

legislature has defined nuisance as “[w]hatever is injurious to health, 

indecent, or unreasonably offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to 

the free use of property, so as essentially to interfere unreasonably with 

the comfortable enjoyment of life or property.” Iowa Code § 657.1(1)

(2015). Under section 657.2(1), “occasioning noxious exhalations, 

unreasonably offensive smells, or other annoyances, [which] becomes 
24

injurious and dangerous to the health, comfort, or property of individuals 

or the public” constitute a nuisance. Id. § 657.2(1). 

The nuisance statute does not supersede common law nuisance. 

See Freeman, 848 N.W.2d at 67. Rather, statutory nuisance claims are

“supplemented by common law principles governing private nuisances.” 

Perkins v. Madison Cty. Livestock & Fair Ass’n, 613 N.W.2d 264, 271 

(Iowa 2000). We have defined a common law nuisance as “an actionable 

interference with a person’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of 

the person’s land.” Id. (quoting Weinhold v. Wolff, 555 N.W.2d 454, 459

(Iowa 1996)). 

Whether a lawful business is a nuisance depends on 

the reasonableness of conducting the business in the 

manner, at the place, and under the circumstances in 

question. Thus the existence of a nuisance does not depend 

on the intention of the party who created it. Rather, it 

depends on the following three factors: priority of location, 

the nature of the neighborhood, and the wrong complained 

of. 

Id. (quoting Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 459). Alleged nuisances are 

assessed under an “objective, normal-person” standard. Id. “Thus, if 

‘normal persons living in the community would regard the invasion in 

question as definitely offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable’ then 

the invasion is significant enough to constitute a nuisance.” Id. (quoting 

Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 459). 

Whether a nuisance exists is a factual inquiry. Patz v. Farmegg

Prods., Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Iowa 1972). To recover against GPC, 

the plaintiffs must establish common facts as to “priority of location, the 

nature of the neighborhood [involving common proof assessing the 

locale], and the wrong complained of.” Perkins, 613 N.W.2d at 271. 

At oral argument and in their appellate brief the plaintiffs 

conceded priority of location favored GPC as to all class members. GPC’s 
25

operations commenced in 1943, and in the words of plaintiffs’ counsel, a 

resident would have had to be “living under a rock” not to know of GPC’s 

activities in the neighborhood. The plaintiffs have also eliminated many 

individual issues by confining their claims to property damages without 

claiming diminution in value or alleging personal injury claims. Any 

class member may opt out.3 See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.267(1) (allowing 

putative class member to “elect to be excluded” unless he or she is a 

class representative, there has been an affirmative finding under rule 

1.263(a), (b), or (c), or a counterclaim has been asserted against the 

member). 

Because the “normal person” standard is an objective one, any 

idiosyncratic sensitivity, physical infirmities, lifestyle choices, preferences 

for use and enjoyment, or housekeeping habits are immaterial to proving 

whether defendant’s conduct created a nuisance. See, e.g., Miller, 720 

N.W.2d at 569 (awarding damages despite witness testimony emissions 

were “not that bothersome”). Objective standards more readily present 

common questions than subjective standards. See Amgen, 568 U.S. at 

___, 133 S. Ct. at 1191. In Amgen, the United States Supreme Court 

evaluated whether the objective element of “materiality” was a common 

or individual question when deciding whether to certify a class action 

alleging securities fraud.

 

3Indeed, at least seventeen individual class-member plaintiffs have filed 

expedited civil actions. See Pl.’s Appl. for Interlocutory Appeal, Wittenberg v. Grain 

Processing Corp., No. 17–0058 (filed Jan. 12, 2017) (six individuals); Pl.’s Appl. for 

Interlocutory Appeal, Tate v. Grain Processing Corp., No. 17–0062 (filed Jan. 12, 2017) 

(eleven individuals). These expedited civil actions allege property and medical damages, 

while the Freeman class members have limited damages to lost use and enjoyment. The 

individual plaintiffs stated they chose the expedited civil action forum because of the 

opportunity to have cases resolved more expeditiously than a class claim. See Iowa R. 

Civ. P. 1.281(4)(b) (“Unless that court otherwise orders for good cause shown, expedited 

civil actions must be tried within one year of filing.”). 
26

Because materiality is judged according to an objective 

standard, the materiality of Amgen’s alleged 

misrepresentations and omissions is a question common to 

all members of the class. . . . The alleged misrepresentations 

and omissions, whether material or immaterial, would be so 

equally for all investors composing the class. As vital, the 

plaintiff class’s inability to prove materiality would not result 

in individual questions predominating. Instead, a failure of 

proof on the issue of materiality would end the case, given 

that materiality is an essential element of the class members’ 

securities-fraud claims. As to materiality, therefore, the 

class is entirely cohesive: It will prevail or fail in unison. 

Id. Similarly, if the residents fail to demonstrate that a normal person in 

the locality would find the conditions existing throughout the subclass 

area “definitely offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable,” then the 

residents will fail to meet their burden, and the claim will fail. Weinhold, 

555 N.W.2d at 459 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F cmt. d, 

at 106 (1979)). 

Given the plaintiffs’ showing that the three factors—priority of 

location, the nature of the neighborhood, and the wrong complained of—

are objective, common factors, it appears the factual determination of 

whether a nuisance exists is capable of being made on a classwide basis. 

GPC argues Perkins is fatal to class certification because it applied

a property-by-property determination to resolve nuisance claims, 

showing that individual issues will predominate over common questions. 

613 N.W.2d at 273 (“We examine each plaintiff’s claim independently of 

the other plaintiffs’ claims so that a plaintiff’s claim will succeed or fail 

on the basis of that plaintiff’s particular circumstances.”). We disagree 

that Perkins requires reversal. In Perkins, neighboring property owners 

brought a nuisance action in equity against operators of a figure-eight 

auto racetrack built on the county fairgrounds. Id. at 268. The plaintiffs 

all lived in their homes nearby before the racetrack was built and thus 

had priority of location. Id. at 271–72. Races occurred seven nights a 
27

year. Id. at 272. The district court denied recovery, finding “ ‘the seven 

time invasion’ did not rise to the level of a nuisance.” Id. at 272–73. We 

applied de novo review and affirmed as to three of the property owners 

located between 975 and 1150 feet from the track. Id. at 273–74. But 

we reversed as to one plaintiff who lived adjacent to the fairgrounds and 

whose yard was seventy-seven feet from the racetrack. Id. at 274. She 

testified the pit area, located on her property line, was “extremely noisy” 

and that “[l]ights, noise, dust, smoke and exhaust fumes emanate from 

the track and pit area directly onto [her] property, including the house.” 

Id. We found she proved her nuisance claim while the other property 

owners (who lived the length of three to four football fields away) did not. 

Id. 

Perkins is distinguishable. It was not a class action. We reviewed 

the evidence de novo to decide the merits of the nuisance claims. Id. at 

267. By contrast, we are reviewing here the district court’s procedural 

ruling on class certification for abuse of discretion. The merits of the 

nuisance claims will be decided at trial. The district court appropriately 

divided the case into two subclasses, based on the distance from the 

source of the alleged nuisance. Moreover, Perkins did not involve

negligence claims in which the reasonableness of the defendant’s 

conduct is an issue common to all the neighboring property-owner 

plaintiffs. 

Negligence and nuisance are distinct theories. Dalarna Farms v. 

Access Energy Coop., 792 N.W.2d 656, 659 (Iowa 2010). We explained 

the distinction between the two in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 

stating,

Negligence is a type of liability-forming conduct, for example, 

a failure to act reasonably to prevent harm. In contrast, 

nuisance is a liability-producing condition. Negligence may 
28

or may not accompany a nuisance; negligence, however, is 

not an essential element of nuisance. If the condition 

constituting the nuisance exists, the person responsible for 

it is liable for resulting damages to others even though the 

person acted reasonably to prevent or minimize the 

deleterious effect of the nuisance. 

584 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa 1998) (citations omitted). In other words, 

nuisance is a condition, not an act or failure to act by the party 

responsible. See id. 

[T]he true distinction between negligence and nuisance is 

that “to constitute a nuisance ‘there must a degree of danger 

(likely to result in damage) inherent in the thing itself, 

beyond that arising from a mere failure to exercise ordinary 

care.’ ” 

Dalarna Farms, 792 N.W.2d at 659 (quoting Martins v. Interstate Power 

Co., 652 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Iowa 2002)). 

Under both nuisance and negligence theories, the harm caused by 

the defendant’s conduct is relevant. In Martins, the plaintiffs claimed 

electrical transmission lines emitted stray voltage, harming dairy cows on 

an adjoining farm and reducing milk production. 652 N.W.2d at 659. 

Stray voltage was an “inherent part of supplying electricity,” but problems 

in electrical systems could increase its frequency. Id. at 662 (quoting 

Peter G. Yelkovac, Homogenizing the Law of Stray Voltage: An Electrifying 

Attempt to Corral the Controversy, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 1111, 1112–13 

(1994)). To constitute a nuisance, we pointed out the “degree of danger 

likely to result in damages must be inherent in the thing itself.” Id. at 

664. We concluded “[e]xcessive stray voltage from an electric utility 

resulting in damage to a dairy herd [met] that test.” Id. Assessing 

whether GPC’s conduct created an inherent risk of danger will be a 

common legal question affecting both the plaintiffs’ nuisance (the 

resulting condition) and negligence (the reasonableness of the conduct) 

claims. 
29

In addition, the plaintiffs’ negligence claims will require evidence of

GPC’s course of conduct, its duty of care and corresponding breach, and 

its knowledge of the harms caused. Raas v. State, 729 N.W.2d 444, 447 

(Iowa 2007) (noting to establish claim of negligence plaintiffs must show 

“a duty of care,” a breach of duty, that the breach “was a proximate 

cause of their injuries,” and damages). The plaintiffs’ plan to offer 

evidence GPC could have upgraded its coal-burning equipment with

cleaner burning, natural gas-fired equipment earlier, and had it done so, 

much of the air pollution would have been avoided. Whether GPC acted 

unreasonably by delaying that equipment upgrade appears to be a 

common issue. 

Proving trespass will involve similar common evidence, such as 

whether harms can be attributed to GPC and whether emissions

interfered with the residents’ exclusive land possession. See Freeman, 

848 N.W.2d at 67 (addressing cases deciding whether air pollution 

constituted a trespass). GPC’s arguments against certifying these claims 

go to the merits.4 

Class action treatment appears to be the most efficient way to 

resolve these issues. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.263(1)(g) (instructing court to 

consider whether class action “offers the most appropriate means of 

adjudicating the claims and defenses”). Moreover, the complexity of 

these questions may hinder the ability of some class members to get 

relief due to the expense of expert testimony. Id. r. 1.263(1)(m) (directing 

consideration of “[w]hether the claims of the individual class members 

are insufficient in the amounts or interests involved, in view of the 

 

4For example, GPC asserts that no physical invasion is shown by Dr. Rosenfeld’s 

model, that GPC did not cause the physical invasion because testing of residue revealed 

it was from another source, and that even nonnegligently run mills produce emissions. 
30

complexities of the issues and the expenses of litigation, to afford 

significant relief to the members of the class”). The district court acted 

within its discretion in concluding that individual differences among 

class members were not fatal to class certification. 

GPC contends individual issues of causation and injury 

predominate over common questions. We disagree. Contesting 

causation, GPC notes some class members live closer to other industrial 

sources of pollution, specifically the active railroad tracks or the sewage 

treatment plant. But the industrial character of the surrounding 

neighborhood does not preclude a finding of nuisance. See Gacke v. Pork 

Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 180 (Iowa 2004) (affirming finding of

nuisance from hog confinement facility, even though it was a “customary 

enterprise in the neighborhood”); Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 261 

Iowa 696, 704, 154 N.W.2d 852, 858 (1967) (affirming nuisance finding 

even though in commercial area). We also observe there was testimony 

indicating residents could distinguish between odors attributed to GPC 

and the sewage plant. See Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 508

(6th Cir. 2004) (affirming certification when plaintiffs could show injury 

from contaminants directly attributable to defendant, despite other 

industrial sources in area). 

We also do not see an issue in the plaintiffs’ use of representative 

testimony to show classwide harm. In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 

the Supreme Court addressed whether representative evidence could be 

used in proving harm to employees. 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 1036,

1046 (2016). Employees alleged a violation of the Fair Labor Standards 

Act (FLSA) when an employer refused to compensate them for time 

donning and doffing protective clothing. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1042. 

Because there were no records of time actually spent donning and doffing 
31

and time varied among employees, plaintiffs relied on a representative 

sample to allow an expert to compute the average time spent. Id. at ___, 

136 S. Ct. at 1043. The employer moved to set aside the jury verdict, 

arguing that the variation in donning and doffing time required 

individual inquiries preventing certification. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 

1044. Under the FLSA, an employee bringing an individual claim was 

permitted to establish hours worked by producing sufficient evidence to 

permit a “just and reasonable inference.” Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1047

(quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, 66 

S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (1946), superseded by statute as recognized in Integrity 

Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014)). As such, 

the Court concluded class action plaintiffs could use a representative 

sample to provide a reasonable inference of classwide harm. Id.

Similarly, the typical method of proving the objective “normal 

person in the community” standard for nuisance is to present 

representative, lay testimony from members of the community that they 

were disturbed by the condition. See Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 180 (“The 

testimony of the plaintiffs and of the witnesses they presented convinced 

the court that normal persons would be and were substantially annoyed 

. . . .”); Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 460 (stating that lay witnesses 

presented from surrounding farms established offensiveness to persons 

of “ordinary sensibilities”); Bates, 261 Iowa at 702, 154 N.W.2d at 857 

(“Other witnesses living in the vicinity testified to the noises and being 

disturbed by operation of the plant.”). This is the method of proof 

proposed by the plaintiffs. 

Moreover, we have previously approved the use of a formula 

employing reasonable inferences to calculate nuisance damages. Miller,

720 N.W.2d at 569. In Miller, neighbors claimed the defendants’ grain-
32

harvesting activities constituted a nuisance. Id. at 566. Testimony 

confirmed that the defendants’ “emissions during harvest season were so 

pervasive that they blanketed not only the plaintiffs’ vehicles and 

personal property located outside their residences, but also filtered into 

the interior of the plaintiffs’ homes.” Id. at 569. Awarding damages for 

loss of enjoyment during harvest season, the district court used a 

per diem formula, compensating the plaintiffs at the rate of “$6 per hour 

for 16 hours a day for 90 days a year.” Id. at 570. The defendants 

argued this calculation was in error, as “each plaintiff lived in different 

proximity to the defendants’ property and was impacted differently by the 

defendants’ grain storage activities.” Id. at 571. In addition, the 

per diem formula did not account for hours each individual plaintiff may 

not have been present at the property. Id. We upheld the per diem 

calculation. Id. We noted,

If the record is uncertain and speculative whether a party 

has sustained damages, the fact finder must deny recovery. 

But if the uncertainty is only in the amount of damages, a 

fact finder may allow recovery provided there is a reasonable 

basis in the evidence from which the fact finder can infer or 

approximate the damages. 

Id. at 572 (emphasis added) (quoting Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass’n v. 

Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 641 (Iowa 1996)). On this basis, we affirmed 

the district court’s calculation, but reduced the damages of two plaintiffs: 

one because she did not primarily reside on the property and the other 

because she had negotiated for a lesser rent price because of the 

nuisance. Id. at 571–72. So long as the residents establish the 

emissions constituted a nuisance on each property (fact of harm), 

reasonable inferences may be used to approximate damages. See id.

GPC argues that class certification will deny it the fair opportunity 

to contest whether individual homeowners have suffered injury or 
33

damage. We disagree. The plaintiffs have proposed a formula for 

damages. GPC can contest the appropriateness of that formula before 

the jury. If a special jury verdict is entered approving this formula and 

that verdict is supported by substantial evidence, then potentially this 

formula can be used in subsequent claims administration by the court 

while preserving GPC’s due process and jury trial rights. If no damage 

formula is approved, then there would have to be subsequent individual 

trials on damages. Either way, GPC’s rights would be protected. 

A possibility that the class includes some uninjured residents will 

not bar certification at this time. Requiring plaintiffs to show every

member of the class was exposed to contaminants at a high enough level 

to be considered a nuisance would “ask[] the court to make a classcertification ruling based on the merits of the case, something we have 

uniformly rejected.” Comes, 696 N.W.2d at 325 (declining to require 

plaintiffs prove “each class member actually paid some portion of a 

passed-on overcharge” in an antitrust claim). Evidence plaintiffs suffered 

contamination at sufficient levels to recover for nuisance “goes to proof of 

damages, rather than to common liability issues.” Luttenegger, 671 

N.W.2d at 440 (holding that court did not have to make case-by-case 

determination of whether fee charged was improper at certification 

stage). “[T]he fact that a potential class action involves individual 

damage claims does not preclude certification when liability issues are 

common to the class.” Id. (quoting Iowa Trust, 519 N.W.2d at 792). 

GPC’s objections at this stage to Dr. Rosenfeld’s model are likewise 

unavailing. Assertions that “methods are flawed and incapable of 

calculating injury and damages to the class as a whole constitute[] a 

challenge going directly to the merits of the case and should not be 

resolved at this preliminary stage.” Anderson Contracting, 776 N.W.2d at 
34

855. At the certification stage, “[c]alculations need not be exact”; they 

must simply “be consistent” with liability, making just and reasonable 

inferences that are not speculative. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 

___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013). Moreover, GPC’s defense that 

Dr. Rosenfeld’s study is “unrepresentative or inaccurate” is “itself 

common to the claims made by all class members.” Bouaphakeo, 577

U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. 

Class certification is supported by many cases applying equivalent 

rules. In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the propriety of a class 

action in a mass tort case alleging strict liability, common law negligence, 

trespass, and nuisance theories. 855 F.2d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir. 1988). 

The defendant allegedly deposited ultrahazardous material into a landfill, 

polluting groundwater used by neighboring residents. Id. at 1193. In 

affirming class certification, the Sixth Circuit stated, 

In complex, mass, toxic tort accidents, where no one set of 

operative facts establishes liability, no single proximate 

cause equally applies to each potential class member and 

each defendant, and individual issues outnumber common 

issues, the district court should properly question the 

appropriateness of a class action for resolving the 

controversy. However, where the defendant’s liability can be 

determined on a class-wide basis because the cause of the 

disaster is a single course of conduct which is identical for 

each of the plaintiffs, a class action may be the best suited 

vehicle to resolve such a controversy. 

In the instant case, each class member lived in the 

vicinity of the landfill and allegedly suffered damages as a 

result of ingesting or otherwise using the contaminated 

water. Almost identical evidence would be required to 

establish the level and duration of chemical contamination, 

the causal connection, if any, between the plaintiffs’ 

consumption of the contaminated water and type of injuries 

allegedly suffered, and the defendant’s liability. 

Id. at 1197. 
35

Other federal courts have affirmed class certification in tort actions 

brought by neighboring property owners over pollution to avoid the

“duplicative litigation” of individual lawsuits. Gintis v. Bouchard Transp. 

Co., 596 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2010); see Olden, 383 F.3d at 508

(affirming certification based in part on “common argument that the 

class’s properties are regularly covered in cement dust, causing minor 

property damage”); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 

(7th Cir. 2003) (affirming certification because “[t]he questions whether 

Met-Coil leaked TCE in violation of law and whether the TCE reached the 

soil and groundwater beneath the homes of the class members are 

common to all the class members”); Navelski v. Int’l Paper Co., ___ 

F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, 2017 WL 1132569, at *18 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2017) 

(affirming certification of nuisance and negligence claims from dam 

collapsing “[b]ecause in this case, every aspect of liability can be resolved 

on a classwide basis, it would be neither efficient nor fair to anyone, 

including Defendant, to hold over 300 trials to hear the same evidence 

and decide the same liability issues”); Mejdreck, 2002 WL 1838141, at *7 

(stating “it would be wholly inefficient to try thousands of separate cases 

that would allege the same misconduct and provide the same proof of 

such” in negligence and nuisance pollution claims); LeClercq v. 

Lockformer Co., No. 00 C 7164, 2001 WL 199840, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 

2001) (noting proof “would be identical” as to “history of operations, the 

spillage, the impact on the land, soil, and water, [and] possible remedies” 

and “[r]epetitive discovery for individual cases on the same core issues 

would be wasteful”); Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 181 F.R.D. 473, 480 (D. 

Colo. 1998) (“Significant elements of Plaintiffs’ case in chief . . . will be 

presented through the testimony of five experts. This testimony will 

apply to the classes as a whole.”); Boggs, 141 F.R.D. at 67 (“If these 
36

claims were tried separately, the amount of repetition would be 

manifestly unjustified. To the extent that each claim of each plaintiff 

depends upon proof concerning the history of operations at the plant, the 

nature, timing, extent and cause of emissions, . . . that proof would be 

virtually identical in each case.”); Bates v. Tenco Servs., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 

160, 164 (D.S.C. 1990) (“The common questions in this suit will be the 

cause of the ground water contamination, the defendants’ liability, and 

the alleged effects of jet fuel contamination on the neighborhood and the 

people who have lived there.”); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 117 F.R.D. 641, 

645 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“Significant judicial economies are served by trying 

the common issues [of contamination].”); cf. Jackson v. Unocal Corp., 262 

P.3d 874, 890 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (concluding, in a state court case,

common issues of asbestos contamination predominated despite 

individual damages issues); 7-Eleven Inc. v. Bowens, 857 N.E.2d 382, 

395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Although these concerns [of individual issues] 

may be legitimate, we cannot conclude that they outweigh the economies 

of time, effort, and expense that will be achieved by allowing the class 

action to proceed on the issues defined by the trial court.”); Claborne v. 

Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 165 So. 3d 268, 284 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (“We 

also recognize that the risk in trying some 2900 individual cases could 

result in non-uniformity and inconsistent adjudications on the common 

issues.”); Doyle v. Fluor Corp., 199 S.W.3d 784, 789–90 (Mo. Ct. App. 

2006) (“Although individual questions of damages or individual defenses 

may remain after the common issues here are resolved, the need for 

individualized proof . . . does not defeat the predominance of the common 

issues.”); Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 229 S.W.3d 694, 706

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding class action is superior because of 

single course of conduct). 
37

Still other courts have declined to certify a class action for 

nuisance claims because of the individualized nature of determining 

contamination on each property. See Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 

F.3d 255, 272 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[G]iven the potential difference in 

contamination on the properties, common issues do not predominate.”); 

Powell v. Tosh, No. 5:09-CV-00121, 2013 WL 4418531, at *8 (W.D. Ky. 

Aug. 2, 2013) (“[E]ach Plaintiff’s experience as to the intensity and 

duration (or lack thereof) of the hog odor is susceptible to marked 

variation. Further, each named Plaintiff’s . . . property is situated 

uniquely with respect to the barns in question.”); Fisher v. Ciba Specialty 

Chems. Corp., 238 F.R.D. 273, 307 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (“[B]oth the existence 

of contamination and the risk of future contamination will have to be 

proven on a property-by-property basis.”); see also Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. 

Carter, 265 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Ark. 2007) (“[I]t is evident, from the 

property owners’ claims and from the sheer nature of a claim for private 

nuisance, that individual issues exist in the instant case as to whether 

and to what extent Georgia–Pacific’s operation of its waste water 

treatment system caused consequences to, and constituted an 

unreasonable interference with, the property owners’ use and enjoyment 

of their property.”).5 

 

5Courts have also declined to certify nuisance pollution cases when the plaintiffs

failed to show a method of proving classwide harm. See, e.g., Burkhead v. Louisville Gas 

& Elec. Co., 250 F.R.D. 287, 299 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (“Plaintiffs have alleged that 

Defendant’s operations result in extensive emissions, but what remains missing is any 

evidence that the cause of the entire class’s damages could be determined in a single 

proceeding.”); St. Joe Co. v. Leslie, 912 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 

(“Appellees failed to prove how the class representatives could prove their own . . . 

nuisance claims, thereby proving the claims of the unnamed members.”); Ga.-Pac. 

Consumer Prods., LP v. Ratner, 762 S.E.2d 419, 423 (Ga. 2014) (reversing order to 

certify air pollution class because members had not presented “evidence by which the 

plaintiffs might be able to prove [harm] on a classwide basis” such as scientific evidence 

about how much pollution moved through the air). By contrast, the plaintiffs here have 

offered expert testimony and a common method for proving their claims against GPC. 
38

GPC relies on a decision by the Eighth Circuit filed after the class 

certification order here. See Ebert, 823 F.3d at 475, 481. In Ebert, the 

district court certified a class action against General Mills brought by 

neighboring property owners arising from groundwater contamination. 

Id. at 476. The defendant had disposed of hazardous chemicals by 

burying perforated drums of trichloroethylene (TCE) on its land. Id. at 

475. “[T]he plaintiffs claim[ed] . . . TCE vapors migrated into the 

surrounding residential area, threatening the health of the residents and 

diminishing the value of their property.” Id. The Eighth Circuit panel

agreed the “standardized conduct of alleged contamination and the 

remedies sought by the class are common to all plaintiffs.” Id. at 478. 

Yet the appellate court reversed the certification order after concluding 

that individual issues predominated:

To resolve liability there must be a determination as to 

whether vapor contamination, if any, threatens or exists on 

each individual property as a result of General Mills’ actions, 

and, if so, whether that contamination is wholly, or actually, 

attributable to General Mills in each instance. Accordingly, 

accompanying a determination regarding General Mills’

actions, there likely will be a property-by-property 

assessment of additional upgradient (or other) sources of 

contamination, whether unique conditions and features of 

the property create the potential for vapor intrusion, whether 

(and to what extent) the groundwater beneath a property is 

contaminated, whether mitigation has occurred at the 

property, or whether each individual plaintiff acquired the 

property prior to or after the alleged diminution in value. 

Id. at 479.

Ebert is distinguishable. Tracking the migration of contaminated 

groundwater in that case involved more complex variables than GPC’s 

smokestack pollution blanketing its Muscatine neighborhood with 

airborne particulates. And the Ebert plaintiffs sought recovery for 

diminution in property values, raising valuation issues unique to each 
39

property. Id. at 479; see also Mel Foster Co. Props., Inc. v. Am. Oil Co., 

427 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Iowa 1988) (noting measure of damages in 

nuisance case for diminution of value is “the market value of [the] 

property immediately before contamination and the market value of that 

property after the contamination”). By contrast, the class members here 

are not seeking recovery for any reduction in their property values, but 

rather for their shared experiences with GPC’s smoke, odor, and dust. 

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

rejecting GPC’s predominance objection to class certification. Our class 

action rules do not require that the residents present “common proof on 

each element of the claim. Rather, we have repeatedly noted that the 

existence of individual issues is not necessarily fatal to class 

certification.” Comes, 696 N.W.2d at 322 (quoting Howe, 656 N.W.2d at

289). Individual issues concerning contamination from other sources or 

the amount of chemicals present on a particular property may affect 

damage calculations, but such concerns do not overwhelm common

issues of liability. GPC’s priority of location is conceded, and common 

proof will be required on GPC’s course of conduct, its emissions during 

the relevant time period, its knowledge of emissions, and at what level 

emissions interfere with a normal person in the community’s enjoyment 

of his or her property. These common questions of liability are at the 

heart of the residents’ claims. 

B. Whether Certifying the Class Offends Due Process. We next 

address GPC’s contention that the class certification violates its due 

process rights. “Civil litigation deprives the litigants of property—the 

plaintiff of her chose in action, the defendant of money damages if it 

loses—and thus must accord the litigants due process of law.” Newberg

§ 11:21 (footnote omitted). “A defendant in a class action has a due 
40

process right to raise individual challenges and defenses to claims, and a 

class action cannot be certified in a way that eviscerates this right or 

masks individual issues.” Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d 

Cir. 2013). 

Extrapolation raises due process concerns because it 

provides a full trial, and opportunity to be heard, for some 

plaintiffs but not for others and, correlatively, because it 

enables the defendant to contest damages through 

individualized affirmative defenses against some plaintiffs 

but not all. 

Newberg § 11:21. 

GPC asserts the residents’ plan to extrapolate harm to surrounding 

properties from testimony of twenty to thirty representative class 

members violates due process by masking individual issues. GPC argues 

it must be allowed to pursue individual factors that might reduce certain 

class members’ damages, such as the members’ knowledge of the air 

pollution upon moving to the community. GPC relies on In re Fibreboard

Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990). In Fibreboard, the district court 

certified a class of over 3000 asbestos claims. Id. at 707. To assess 

damages, it proposed to try a small, limited segment of claims in full, 

then extrapolate from those individualized awards to an omnibus award 

for the class. Id. at 708–09. From those witnesses, the jury would 

extrapolate damages to the class as a whole. Id. at 709. The Fifth 

Circuit, in granting mandamus to prevent trial, recognized that such

extrapolation violated the defendant’s rights by masking differences in 

causation, types of injury, fact of injury, and exposure. Id. at 711. 

Fibreboard is inapposite. In Fibreboard, the claims presented were 

more diverse than here. Plaintiffs suffered different personal injuries, 

from different causes, over different periods of time. Here, the residents 

are not claiming personal injuries. Rather, they seek recovery for the 
41

loss of use and enjoyment of their property caused by GPC’s emissions.

The district court has not limited the number of witnesses GPC can 

present, nor its exploration of individual defenses. 

Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated inferences from 

representative proof are permissible in certain circumstances. In Dukes, 

the Court rejected the use of testimony from a sample of 120 Wal-Mart 

employees because it found all members of the class were not similarly 

situated and the plaintiffs lacked evidence the sample was 

representative. 564 U.S. at 367, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. But five years later, 

in Bouaphakeo, the Court allowed representative evidence compiled by 

an expert to establish employee’s average donning and doffing time. 577 

U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1044–45. Explaining this difference, the Court 

stated,

The underlying question in Wal-Mart, as here, was whether 

the sample at issue could have been used to establish 

liability in an individual action. Since the Court held that 

the employees were not similarly situated, none of them 

could have prevailed in an individual suit by relying of 

depositions detailing the ways in which other employees 

were discriminated against by their particular store 

managers. . . . 

In contrast, the study here could have been sufficient 

to sustain a jury finding as to hours worked if it were 

introduced in each employee’s individual action. While the 

experiences of the employees in Wal-Mart bore little 

relationship to one another, in this case each employee 

worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was paid 

under the same policy. . . . [U]nder these circumstances the 

experiences of a subset of employees can be probative as to 

the experiences of all of them. 

Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. We have allowed testimony from 

community residents in nuisance actions to prove the “normal person” 

standard. The plaintiffs plan to call witnesses from throughout the 

neighborhood. GPC is free to call additional witnesses. As we have 
42

already discussed, this class action can proceed in a manner that 

preserves GPC’s due process rights to contest harm and damages 

suffered by individual class members. 

If proof of individual defenses becomes unmanageable, the district 

court has discretion to bifurcate the trial, create additional subclasses, 

or decertify the class. 

[B]ifurcation enables the common issue of liability to be 

resolved in an aggregate proceeding but reserves the 

assessment of individual damages for some subsequent, 

more individualized processing. Courts have therefore held 

that bifurcation assists certification by responding to due 

process concerns. 

Newberg § 11:10 (footnote omitted). At this stage of the case, GPC has 

not shown the class certification order violates its due process rights. 

IV. Disposition. 

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order certifying 

this class action. 

DISTRICT COURT CLASS CERTIFICATION ORDER AFFIRMED. 

All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially. 
43

#15–1942, Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp.

APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur in the generally thorough majority opinion in this case. I 

write separately, however, to emphasize the difference between Iowa law 

and federal law on the question of class certification.

Iowa is one of two states that have adopted a version of the 

Uniform Class Actions Act. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., State and Foreign 

Class-Actions Rules and Statutes: Differences from—and Lessons for?—

Federal Rule 23, 35 W. St. U. L. Rev. 147, 150 (2007). One of the 

purposes of the Uniform Class Actions Act was to create a more generous 

standard for class certification because “federal courts have severely 

restricted the availability of class actions in their forum.” Irving Scher, 

Opening State Courts to Class Actions: The Uniform Class Actions Act, 32 

Business Lawyer 75, 86 (1976). Consistent with the Uniform Class 

Actions Act upon which they are based, Iowa courts have consistently

stated “[o]ur class-action rules are remedial in nature and should be 

liberally construed to favor the maintenance of class actions.” Comes v.

Microsoft Corp., 696 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa 2005); accord Anderson 

Contracting, Inc. v. DSM Copolymers, Inc., 776 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Iowa 

2009); Lucas v. Pioneer, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 167, 175 (Iowa 1977). In light 

of this legislative history and our caselaw, federal class action precedent 

is of limited value in determining class certification under Iowa law.