COMMITTEE ON 

FOREIGN INVESTMENT 

IN THE UNITED STATES 

 

ANNUAL REPORT 

TO CONGRESS

Report Period: 2009 (Calendar Year) 

Issued: November 2010 

PUBLIC/UNCLASSIFIED VERSION 

CFIUS ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 

Report Period: 2009 (Calendar Year) 

Issued: November 2010
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i

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Section I: Covered Transactions 

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 

A. Information on 2009 Covered Transactions ............................................................... 2 

B. Specific, Cumulative, and Trend Data on Covered Transactions, 

Withdrawals, and Investigations .......................................................................... 2 

C. Covered Transactions by Business Sector & Country ............................................... 3 

1. Covered Transactions by Business Sector of U.S. Companies: 

 2007-2009 ....................................................................................................... 3 

2. Covered Transactions by Country: 2007-2009 ............................................. 11 

D. Withdrawn Notices................................................................................................... 14 

E. Mitigation Measures................................................................................................. 14 

F. Perceived Adverse Effects of Covered Transactions ............................................... 15 

Section II: Critical Technologies 

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 18 

Definitions & Methodologies......................................................................................... 18 

II-A. Whether There is Credible Evidence of a Coordinated Strategy to 

Acquire Critical Technology Companies............................................................ 18 

1. Key Findings.................................................................................................. 18 

2. Summary of Foreign M&A Activity in the United States................................. 19 

3. Frequency of Activity by Countries and Companies ....................................... 19 

II-B. Whether Foreign Governments Used Espionage Activities to 

Obtain Commercial Secrets Related to Critical Technologies ........................... 22 

Key Finding........................................................................................................ 22 

Section III: Foreign Direct Investment in the United States by Countries that 

Boycott Israel or Do Not Ban Terrorist Organizations 

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 23 

A. Summary of Findings and Conclusions.................................................................... 23 

B. Study Methodology .................................................................................................. 24 

1. Identification of Relevant Countries............................................................... 24 

2. Scope of FDI.................................................................................................. 24 

C. Detailed Findings ..................................................................................................... 25 

1. Quantification of FDI in the United States from the Relevant 

 Countries....................................................................................................... 25 

2. National Security Effects of FDI in the United States from the 

 Relevant Countries........................................................................................ 27 

a. Transactions Notified to CFIUS Under Section 721............................ 27 

b. Transactions Considered Under Non-Notified Transaction 

 Procedures ........................................................................................ 27 
ii 

Appendix

A. Definition of “Critical Technologies” .......................................................................... 28 

B. Methodology and Data Sources Used to Identify U.S. Critical 

Technology Companies Acquired by Foreigners............................................... 28 

C. Analyzing the Acquisitions of U.S. Critical Technology Companies......................... 30 

D. Defining “Coordinated Strategy” for Purposes of this Report................................... 30 

E. Participating Agencies and Entities – Critical Technologies Section........................ 31 
1

SECTION I: COVERED TRANSACTIONS 

Introduction 

This section of the CFIUS Annual Report to Congress has been prepared in accordance 

with section 721(m) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170(m)(2)), 

as amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, or “FINSA” 

(Pub. L. No. 110-49). Section 721(m)(2) requires the annual report on covered 

transactions to provide: 

“(A) A list of all notices filed and all reviews or investigations completed during the 

period, with basic information on each party to the transaction, the nature of the 

business activities or products of all pertinent persons, along with information about any 

withdrawal from the process, and any decision or action by the President under this 

section. 

(B) Specific, cumulative, and, as appropriate, trend information on the numbers of 

filings1

, investigations, withdrawals, and decisions or actions by the President under this 

section. 

(C) Cumulative and, as appropriate, trend information on the business sectors involved 

in the filings which have been made, and the countries from which the investments have 

originated. 

(D) Information on whether companies that withdrew notices to the Committee in 

accordance with subsection (b)(1)(C)(ii) have later re-filed such notices, or, alternatively, 

abandoned the transaction. 

(E) The types of security arrangements and conditions the Committee has used to 

mitigate national security concerns about a transaction, including a discussion of the 

methods that the Committee and any lead agency are using to determine compliance 

with such arrangements or conditions. 

(F) A detailed discussion of all perceived adverse effects of covered transactions on the 

national security or critical infrastructure of the United States that the Committee will 

take into account in its deliberations during the period before delivery of the next report, 

to the extent possible.” 

 

1

 For purposes of this report, “filings” means notices filed under section 721. 
2 

A. Information on 2009 Covered Transactions 

The classified version of this report contains a table listing all 65 notices of transactions 

that were filed with CFIUS in 2009, and that CFIUS determined to be covered 

transactions under section 721. That table sets forth information on the acquirer and 

the U.S. business acquired, including the nature of their business activities or products, 

and details on any withdrawal. While that table is not included here because of the 

disclosure prohibition in section 721, provided below is aggregate information regarding 

those 65 notices: 

• CFIUS conducted both a review and an investigation with respect to 25 of the 65 

notices. 

• Seven of the notices were withdrawn. In three of these cases, the parties filed a 

new notice. In three other cases, the parties abandoned their transaction. In one 

case, the party withdrew its notice with the intention of re-filing in 2010. 

• The President did not take action to block or prohibit any transactions in 2009. 

B. Specific, Cumulative, and Trend Data on Covered Transactions, 

Withdrawals, and Investigations 

In the years 2007 through 2009, companies filed 358 notices of transactions that CFIUS 

determined to be covered transactions under section 721. Roughly nine percent (33 

cases) of such notices were withdrawn during the review stage, three percent (12 

cases) were withdrawn during the investigation stage, and 15 percent (54 cases) 

resulted in an investigation. There were no transactions that resulted in a Presidential 

decision. 

There was a modest upward trend in the number of notices from 2007 to 2008, followed 

by a noted decline in 2009. As shown in Table B-1 on the next page, the number of 

notices of covered transactions increased from 138 in 2007 to 155 in 2008. By 2009, 

the number of notices had dropped to 65. The percentage of notices that were 

withdrawn from review fell in 2009 compared to 2008, but represented a slight increase 

when compared to 2007. The percentage of investigations shows an overall increasing 

trend from 2007-2009, while the percentage of notices withdrawn during the 

investigation stage declined slightly. In 2007, seven percent (10 cases) were withdrawn 

during review, four percent (five cases) were withdrawn during investigation, and four 

percent (six cases) resulted in investigation. In 2008, 12 percent (18 cases) were 

withdrawn during review, three percent (five cases) were withdrawn during investigation, 

and 15 percent (23 cases) resulted in investigation. In 2009, eight percent (five cases) 

were withdrawn during review, three percent (two cases) were withdrawn during 

investigation, and 39 percent (25 cases) resulted in investigation. 
3

Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions 

2007 - 2009 

Year Number of 

Notices 

Notices 

Withdrawn 

During 

Review 

 Number of 

Investigations

Notices 

Withdrawn 

During 

Investigation 

Presidential 

Decisions 

2007 138 10 6 5 0 

2008 155 18 23 5 0 

2009 65 5 25 2 0 

Total 358 33 54 12 0 

Table B-1: Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions 2007-2009 

C. Covered Transactions by Business Sector & Country 

1. Covered Transactions by Business Sector of U.S. Companies: 2007-2009

The notices of covered transactions filed with CFIUS during the 2007-2009 period 

involved several industrial sectors and a wide range of subsectors. Almost half of such 

notices were in the manufacturing sector (153, or 43 percent), while just over one third 

of the notices were in the information sector (122, or 34 percent). 

The tables and charts below provide a breakdown by sector and by year of the 358 

notices of covered transactions cumulatively filed with CFIUS for 2007 through 2009. 

The data below show that the greatest number of filings occurred in the manufacturing 

and information sectors, although there was no clear trend in the number of notices filed 

within each of these sectors as a percentage of total notices filed each year. The 

percent of notices in the manufacturing sector increased slightly from 2007-2008, then 

declined in 2009. Notices in the information sector declined notably as a percentage of 

annual transactions in 2008 and then increased in 2009. Transactions as a percentage 

of yearly totals in the mining, utilities, and construction sectors have shown a steady 

upward trend since 2007. 

Covered Transaction by Sector and Year, 2007-2009 

Year Manufacturing Information 

Mining, 

Utilities and 

Construction 

Wholesale 

and Retail 

Trade 

Total 

2007 60 (43%) 58 (42%) 11 (8%) 9 (7%) 138 

2008 72 (46%) 42 (27%) 25 (16%) 16 (10%) 155 

2009 21 (32%) 22 (34%) 19 (29%) 3 (5%) 65 

Total 153 (43%) 122 (34%) 55 (15%) 28 (8%) 358 

Table C-1: Covered Transactions by Sector and Year, 2007-2009 
4 

Covered Transactions by Sector, 2007-2009

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2007 2008 2009

Year

# of Transactions

Manufacturing

Information

Mining, Utilities,

and Construction

Wholesale and

Retail Trade

Figure C-1: Covered Transactions by Sector 2007-2009 

Manufacturing accounted for 43 percent (153 notices) of all notices filed with CFIUS 

from 2007 through 2009. The computer and electronic products subsector comprised 

41 percent (62 notices) of the 153 manufacturing sector notices during the period. The 

transportation equipment subsector accounted for another 19 percent (29 notices) of the 

notices in the sector. 

Manufacturing, 2007-2009 NAICS Code Number of 

Transactions 

% of Total 

Manufacturing 

Textile Product Mills 314 2 1% 

Petroleum and Coal Products 324 3 2% 

Chemical 325 8 5% 

Plastics and Rubber Products 326 4 3% 

Nonmetallic Mineral Products 327 2 1% 

Primary Metal 331 10 7% 

Fabricated Metal Products 332 6 4% 

Machinery 333 17 11% 

Computer and Electronic Products 334 62 41% 

Electrical Equip., Appl., & Comp. 335 4 3% 

Transportation Equipment 336 29 19% 

Miscellaneous 339 6 4% 

Table C-2: Covered Transactions from the Manufacturing Sector 
5

Figure C-2: Covered Transactions from the Manufacturing Sector 

Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing accounted for 32 percent 

(20 notices) of the 62 notices in the computer and electronic products subsector from 

2007 through 2009. Navigational, measuring, electro-medical, and control instruments 

manufacturing also accounted for 32 percent of the notices in this subsector. 

Computer and Electronic Products, 

2007-2009 NAICS Code Number of Transactions 

% of Total 

Computer and 

Electronic 

Products 

Computer and Peripheral Equipment 

Manufacturing 3341 5 8% 

Communications Equipment 

Manufacturing 3342 17 27% 

Semiconductor and Other Electronic 

Component Manufacturing 3344 20 32% 

Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, 

and Control Instruments Manufacturing 3345 20 32% 

Table C-3: Covered Transactions from the Computer and Electronics Subsector 

Manufacturing

2007-2009

Other 

29%

Miscellaneous

Transportation Equipment

19%

Electrical Equip., Appl., & Comp.

Computer and Electronic

Product

41%

Machinery

11%

Fabricated Metal Products

Primary Metal

Nonmetallic Mineral Products

Plastics and Rubber Products

Chemical

Petroleum and Coal Products

Textile Product Mills
6 

Figure C-3: Covered Transactions from the Computer and Electronics Subsector 

The information sector accounted for 34 percent (122 notices) of all notices of covered 

transactions filed with CFIUS from 2007 through 2009. The professional, scientific, and 

technical services subsector accounted for 64 notices, over half of the information 

sector notices during the period. The publishing industries (except Internet) subsector 

accounted for another 19 percent (23 notices) of information sector notices. 

Information, 2007-2009 NAICS Code Number of 

Transactions 

% of Total 

Information 

Publishing Industries (except Internet) 511 23 19% 

Telecommunications 517 22 18% 

Data Processing, Hosting and Other Related 

Services 518 1 <1% 

Other Information Services 519 3 3% 

Securities and Other Financial Investments 523 3 3% 

Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles 525 1 <1% 

Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 541 64 52% 

Administrative and Support Services 561 4 3% 

Waste Management and Remediation Services 562 1 <1% 

Table C-4: Covered Transactions from the Information Sector 

 Computer and Electronic Products

2007-2009

Navigational, Measuring, 

Electromedical, and 

Control Instruments 

Manufacturing

32%

Semiconductor and Other

Electronic Component 

Manufacturing

32%

Communications 

Equipment Manufacturing

27%

Computer and Peripheral 

Equipment Manufacturing

8%
7

Information

2007-2009

Other

11%

Professional, Scientific, and 

Technical Services

52%

Telecommunications

18%

Publishing Industries (except 

Internet)

19%

Data Processing, Hosting 

and Other Related Services

Securities and Other

Financial Investments

Funds, Trusts, and Other

Financial Vehicles

Administrative and Support

Services

Waste Management and

Remediation Services

Other Information Services

Figure C-4: Covered Transactions from the Information Sector 

Within the professional, scientific, and technical services subsector, computer systems 

design and related services accounted for 36 percent (23 notices) of the subsector’s 64 

notices, while architectural, engineering, and related services accounted for 33 percent 

(21 notices) of the notices. 

Professional, Scientific, and Technical 

Services, 2007-2009 NAICS Code Number of Transactions 

% of Total P-S-T 

Services 

Architectural, Engineering, and Related 

Services 5413 21 33% 

Computer Systems Design and Related 

Services 5415 23 36% 

Management, Scientific, and Technical 

Consulting Services 5416 12 19% 

Scientific Research and Development 

Services 5417 6 9% 

Other Professional, Scientific, and 

Technical Services 5419 2 3% 

Table C-5: Covered Transactions from the Professional, Scientific & Technical Services Subsector 
8 

Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services

2007-2009

Other Professional, Scientific, 

and Technical Services

3%

Scientific Research and 

Development Services

9%

Management, Scientific, and 

Technical Consulting 

Services

19%

Computer Systems Design 

and Related Services

36%

Architectural, Engineering, 

and Related Services

33%

Figure C-5: Covered Transactions from the Professional, Scientific and 

Technical Services Subsector 

The mining, utilities, and construction sector accounted for 15 percent (55 notices) of 

the notices of covered transactions filed with CFIUS from 2007 through 2009. In this 

sector, the largest percentage of activity involved the utilities subsector, which 

accounted for 47 percent (26 notices) of the notices in this sector. Ninety-two percent of 

the transactions in the utilities subsector related to electric power generation, 

transmission and distribution. 

Mining, Utilities and Construction, 

2007 - 2009 NAICS Code Number of Transactions 

% of Total 

M, U & C 

Oil and Gas Extraction 211 3 6% 

Mining (except Oil and Gas) 212 11 20% 

Support Activities for Mining 213 9 16% 

Utilities 221 26 47% 

Construction of Buildings 236 3 6% 

Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 237 2 4% 

Specialty Trade Contractor 238 1 2% 

Table C-6: Covered Transactions from the Mining, Utilities & Construction Sector 
9

Mining, Utilities, and Construction

2007-2009

Mining (except Oil and Gas)

20%

Other

17%

Utilities

47%

Oil and Gas Extraction

Support Activities for Mining

16%

Construction of Buildings

Specialty Trade Contractor

Heavy and Civil Engineering

Construction

Figure C-6: Covered Transactions from the Mining, Utilities & Construction Sector 

Wholesale trade accounted for eight percent (28 notices) of the notices of covered 

transactions filed with CFIUS from 2007 through 2009. Support activities for 

transportation accounted for 46 percent (13 notices) of the 28 wholesale trade sector 

notices during the period. Merchant wholesalers of durable goods, water transportation, 

and electronics and appliance stores accounted for another 11 percent each (three 

notices each) within the sector. 
10 

Wholesale and Retail Trade, 2007-2009 NAICS Code Number of 

Transactions 

% of Total 

Wholesale Trade 

Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods 423 3 11% 

Merchant Wholesalers, Nondurable Goods 424 2 7% 

Electronics and Appliance Stores 443 3 11% 

Water Transportation 483 3 11% 

Truck Transportation 484 1 4% 

Transit and Ground Passenger 

Transportation 485 2 7% 

Support Activities for Transportation 488 13 46% 

Warehouse and Storage 493 1 4% 

Table C-7: Covered Transactions from the Wholesale Trade Sector 

Figure C-7: Covered Transactions from the Wholesale Trade Sector 

Support Activities for Transportation (SAT), 

2007-2009 NAICS Code Number of Transactions 

% of Total 

SAT 

Support Activities for Air Transportation 4881 3 23% 

Support Activities for Water Transportation 4883 8 62% 

Freight Transportation Arrangement 4885 2 15% 

Table C-8: Covered Transactions from the Support Activities for Transportation Subsector 

Wholesale and Retail Trade, 2007-2009

Merchant Wholesalers, 

Nondurable Goods

7%

Water Transportation

11%

Truck Transportation

4%

Transit and Ground 

Passenger

Transportation

7%

Electronics and 

Appliance Stores

11%

Support Activities for

Transportation

46%

Merchant Wholesalers, 

Durable Goods

11%

Warehouse and 

Storage

4%
11

Support Activities for Transportation, 

2007-2009

Freight 

Transportation 

Arrangement

15%

Support 

Activities for Air 

Transportation

23%

Support 

Activities for 

Water 

Transportation

62%

Figure C-8: Covered Transactions from the Support Activities for Transportation Subsector 

2. Covered Transactions by Country: 2007-2009 

The first table that follows (C-10) breaks down the notices of covered transactions from 

2007 through 2009 by country and year.2 There is no clear trend in the breakdown of 

transactions by year. Acquisitions by investors from the United Kingdom accounted for 

27 percent of notices for the three-year period (97 notices) and represented the largest 

number of notices each year. Canada, France, Israel, and Australia together accounted 

for an additional 30 percent of the total notices over the period (106 notices) and were 

among the leading countries each year (with the exception of Australia, which was a 

leading country from 2007-2008, but had only one transaction in 2009). 

The second table that follows (C-11) shows that there is no clear tendency of 

companies in any one country to prefer transactions in a specific industry sector. 

Acquisitions by investors from countries that accounted for multiple notices typically also 

involved multiple sectors. 

 

2

 The figures in this table reflect the number of notices filed with CFIUS and are not adjusted to account 

for the fact that some transactions were the subject of more than one notice, where the original notice 

was withdrawn and then re-filed, as discussed in Section I.D of this report. 
12 

 Covered Transactions by Acquirer Home Country, 2007-2009 

Country 2007 2008 2009 Total 

Australia 9 11 1 21 

Australia & United Kingdom 1 1 

Austria 1 2 3 

Bahrain 1 1 

Belgium 1 1 2 

Brazil 1 2 3 

Canada 21 6 9 36 

Canada & Singapore 1 1 

Channel Islands 1 1 

China 3 6 4 13 

Finland 1 1 

France 7 12 7 26 

Germany 6 3 1 10 

Greece 1 1 

Hong Kong 1 1 1 3 

Hungary 1 1 

Iceland 1 1 

India 5 1 6 

Ireland 1 2 3 

Israel 6 12 5 23 

Italy 3 5 2 10 

Japan 1 8 4 13 

Kuwait 2 2 4 

Lebanon 4 4 

Luxembourg 1 1 

Malaysia 1 1 

Netherlands 7 2 4 13 

Netherlands & France 1 1 

Norway 1 2 3 

Qatar 1 1 2 

Russia 8 8 

Saudi Arabia 1 1 2 

Singapore 1 1 2 

South Africa 1 1 

South Korea 2 2 

Spain 6 1 7 

Sweden 3 3 

Switzerland 6 4 10 

Taiwan 3 1 4 

United Arab Emirates 7 2 2 11 

Ukraine 2 2 

United Kingdom 33 48 16 97 

Grand Total 138 155 65 358 

Table C-9: Covered Transactions by Country 2007-2009 
13

Covered Transactions by Acquirer Home Country and Target Sector, 2007-2009 

Country Manufacturing 

Mining, 

Utilities & 

Construction 

Wholesale 

& Retail 

Trade 

Information Total 

Australia 1 4 7 9 21 

Australia & 

United Kingdom 1 1 

Austria 3 3 

Bahrain 1 1 

Belgium 2 2 

Brazil 2 1 3 

Canada 6 10 1 19 36 

Canada & Singapore 1 1 

Channel Islands 1 1 

China 7 2 1 3 13 

Finland 1 1 

France 14 4 3 5 26 

Germany 2 2 2 4 10 

Greece 1 1 

Hong Kong 3 3 

Hungary 1 1 

Iceland 1 1 

India 6 6 

Ireland 1 1 1 3 

Israel 15 1 7 23 

Italy 9 1 10 

Japan 2 5 1 5 13 

Kuwait 1 2 1 4 

Lebanon 4 4 

Luxembourg 1 1 

Malaysia 1 1 

Netherlands 6 1 2 4 13 

Netherlands & France 1 1 

Norway 2 1 3 

Qatar 2 2 

Russian Federation 6 1 1 8 

Saudi Arabia 2 2 

Singapore 1 1 2 

South Africa 1 1 

South Korea 2 2 

Spain 5 2 7 

Sweden 1 2 3 

Switzerland 5 5 10 

Taiwan 4 4 

UAE 7 2 2 11 

Ukraine 2 2 

United Kingdom 47 7 2 41 97 

Grand Total 153 55 28 122 358 

Table C-10: Covered Transactions by Country 2007-2009
14 

D. Withdrawn Notices 

Parties cannot withdraw an accepted notice of a transaction unless the Committee 

approves a written request for withdrawal from the parties. Parties have requested 

withdrawals for a number of reasons over the years. For example, in some cases, 

parties are unable to address all of the Committee’s outstanding national security 

concerns within the initial 30-day review period or 45-day investigation period. The 

parties might then choose to submit a request for withdrawal, either to provide additional 

time to answer remaining questions or to resolve remaining national security concerns. 

In other cases, the parties may withdraw a notice because they are abandoning the 

transaction or because a material change in the terms of the transaction warrants the 

filing of a new notice. When appropriate, the Committee has established processes to 

track the status of a withdrawn transaction or interim protections to address specific 

national security concerns identified during the review or investigation of the withdrawn 

transaction. 

In 2009, CFIUS approved the withdrawal of seven notices. The parties withdrew five 

notices during the 30-day review period and two during the 45-day investigation period. 

Three of the notices were re-filed after withdrawal, and CFIUS concluded action in those 

cases. In three cases, the parties abandoned the transactions that were the subject of 

the notices. In one case the notice was withdrawn during the investigation period but 

with the intention of re-filing in 2010. 

E. Mitigation Measures 

From 2007 through 2009, 21 cases resulted in the use of mitigation measures. 

Mitigation measures have included a number of different types of legally binding 

undertakings. These range from national security agreements (NSAs), which are 

complex documents that seek to address a number of perceived risks, to letters of 

assurance, which are simpler documents appropriate for less complex cases or where 

the risks posed by the transaction are relatively few and easier to mitigate. 

In 2009, CFIUS agencies negotiated, and parties adopted, mitigation measures for five 

different covered transactions. These measures involved acquisitions of U.S. 

companies in the computer software, telecommunications, and energy sectors. Four 

CFIUS agencies served as the USG signatories to these measures. 

The measures required the businesses involved to take specific and verifiable actions, 

including, for example: 

o establishing a Corporate Security Committee and the position of security officer; 

o complying with guidelines for handling existing USG contracts and USG 

customer information, and with terms of USG access to specific protected 

products; 

o notifying relevant USG parties of any material introduction, modification, or 

discontinuation of a product or service, as well as any awareness of any 

vulnerability or security incidents. 
15

The Committee has adopted procedures to evaluate and ensure that parties to a 

covered transaction remain in compliance with any risk mitigation measure entered into 

with CFIUS agencies under section 721. For all mitigation measures executed since 

FINSA became effective, Treasury, as Chair of CFIUS, has designated each U.S. 

Government (USG) signatory to a mitigation measure as a lead agency for monitoring 

compliance with that measure. Lead agencies carry out their monitoring responsibilities 

on behalf of the Committee and report back to the Committee on at least a quarterly 

basis. In addition, signatories to mitigation measures that were entered into before 

FINSA’s effective date report to CFIUS quarterly on compliance with those measures. 

All lead agencies for monitoring mitigation compliance have implemented processes to 

carry out their responsibilities. 

CFIUS agencies use a variety of means to monitor and enforce compliance by the 

companies that are subject to the measures, including: 

o periodic reporting to USG agencies by the companies; 

o on-site compliance reviews by USG agencies; 

o third-party audits when provided for by the terms of the mitigation measures; 

o investigations and remedial actions if anomalies or breaches are discovered or 

suspected. 

In light of the number and complexity of mitigation measures implemented to date, 

CFIUS agencies have taken a variety of actions to maximize their ability to monitor 

compliance, including: 

o increasing USG staffing levels and assigning staff responsibilities for the 

monitoring of compliance; 

o designing tracking systems to monitor required reports; 

o instituting internal instructions and procedures to ensure that in-house expertise 

is drawn upon to analyze compliance with measures. 

F. Perceived Adverse Effects of Covered Transactions 

Section 721(m) requires that this report include a discussion of all perceived adverse 

effects of covered transactions on the national security or critical infrastructure of the 

United States that the Committee will take into account in its deliberations during the 

period before delivery of the next report, to the extent possible. In reviewing a covered 

transaction, CFIUS evaluates all relevant national security considerations identified by 

its members during the review and does not conclude action on a covered transaction if 

there are unresolved national security concerns. 

As discussed in the Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by 

CFIUS, which CFIUS published in the Federal Register on December 8, 2008, the 

transactions that CFIUS has reviewed present a broad range of national security 

considerations. CFIUS examines the national security considerations to determine 

whether, in light of the specific facts and circumstances related to the transaction, the 

transaction would adversely affect national security and pose a national security risk. 

Such transactions, which have presented a wide range of national security 

considerations, have involved, for example: 
16 

• Foreign control of U.S. businesses that: 

o Provide products and services to an agency or agencies of the U.S. 

Government, or state and local authorities, that have functions that are 

relevant to national security. 

o Provide products or services that could expose national security 

vulnerabilities or create vulnerability to sabotage or espionage. 

o Have operations, or produce or supply products or services, the security of 

which may have implications for U.S. national security, such as 

businesses that involve infrastructure that may constitute critical 

infrastructure, businesses in the energy sector, businesses that affect the 

national transportation system, and businesses that could significantly and 

directly affect the U.S. financial system. 

o Have access to classified information. 

o Are in the defense, security, and national security-related law enforcement 

sectors. 

o Are involved in activities related to weapons and munitions manufacturing, 

aerospace, and radar systems. 

o Produce certain types of advanced technologies that may be useful in 

defending, or in seeking to impair, U.S. national security, which may 

include businesses engaged in the design and production of 

semiconductors and other equipment or components that have both 

commercial and military applications, or the design, production, or 

provision of goods and services involving network and data security. 

o Engage in the research and development, production, or sale of 

technology, goods, software, or services that are subject to U.S. export 

controls. 

• Acquisition of control by foreign persons that: 

o Are controlled by a foreign government. 

o Are from a country with a record on nonproliferation and other national 

security-related matters that raises concerns. 

o Have historical records of taking or intentions to take actions that could 

impair U.S. national security. 

CFIUS reviews these national security considerations and the particular facts and 

circumstances of transactions to determine whether the transaction will pose national 

security risk. In doing so, CFIUS is concerned with potential adverse effects posed by 

the transaction, with respect to the following factors, listed in section 721(f) of the 

Defense Production Act of 1950: 

(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements; 

(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense 

requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, 

technology, materials, and other supplies and services; 

(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it 

affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements 

of national security; 

(4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of military 

goods, equipment, or technology to any country – 
17

(A) identified by the Secretary of State - 

(i) under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as a 

country that supports terrorism; 

(ii) under section 6(l) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as a 

country of concern regarding missile proliferation; or 

(iii) under section 6(m) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as a 

country of concern regarding the proliferation of chemical and 

biological weapons; 

(B) identified by the Secretary of Defense as posing a potential regional 

military threat to the interests of the United States; or 

(C) listed under section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 on 

the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Special Country List” (15 C.F.R. Part 778, 

Supplement No. 4) or any successor list; 

(5) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on United States 

international technological leadership in areas affecting United States national 

security; 

(6) the potential national security-related effects on United States critical 

infrastructure, including major energy assets; 

(7) the potential national security-related effects on United States critical 

technologies; 

(8) whether the covered transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction, 

as determined under subsection (b)(1)(B) of Section 721; 

(9) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to transactions requiring an 

investigation under subsection (b)(1)(B) of Section 721, a review of the current 

assessment of— 

(A) the adherence of the subject country to nonproliferation control regimes, 

including treaties and multilateral supply guidelines, which shall draw on, 

but not be limited to, the annual report on “Adherence to and Compliance 

with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and 

Commitments” required by section 403 of the Arms Control and 

Disarmament Act; 

(B) the relationship of such country with the United States, specifically on its 

record on cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts, which shall draw on, but 

not be limited to, the report of the President to Congress under section 

7120 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; 

and 

(C) the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military 

applications, including an analysis of national export control laws and 

regulations; 

(10) the long-term projection of United States requirements for sources of energy and 

other critical resources and materials; and 

(11) such other factors as the President or the Committee may determine to be 

appropriate generally or in connection with a specific review or investigation. 

In the transactions that CFIUS will review during the next reporting period, it will 

continue to take into account the national security considerations noted above. CFIUS 

will consider whether the transactions may have the above-listed or any other adverse 

effects in determining whether the transactions pose national security risk. 
18 

SECTION II: CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES 

Introduction 

This section of the Annual Report to Congress has been prepared in accordance with 

section 721(m)(3) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170(m)(3)), 

as amended. Section 721(m)(3) requires the annual report to include: 

“(i) an evaluation of whether there is credible evidence of a coordinated strategy 

by 1 or more countries or companies to acquire United States companies 

involved in research, development, or production of critical technologies for which 

the United States is a leading producer; and 

“(ii) an evaluation of whether there are industrial espionage activities directed or 

directly assisted by foreign governments against private United States 

companies aimed at obtaining commercial secrets related to critical 

technologies.” 

Subsection II-A addresses the requirement laid out in (i), and subsection II-B addresses 

the requirement laid out in (ii). 

Definitions & Methodologies

The definition of “critical technologies,” which includes technologies subject to certain 

U.S. export controls, is set forth in 31 C.F.R. § 800.209, Regulations Pertaining to 

Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons (the “CFIUS regulations”), 

published in the Federal Register on November 21, 2008. See the Appendix for this 

definition. “Critical technology companies” are U.S. companies that CFIUS identified for 

this report involved in research, development or production of critical technologies. The 

Appendix also provides the definition of “coordinated strategy” for purposes of this 

report, describes the methodology and data sources used to identify transactions 

involving critical technology companies (“critical technology transactions”), and the 

approach used to conduct the analyses required by Section 721 related to critical 

technologies. Finally, it lists the agencies and other entities that participated in 

preparing this section of the report. 

II-A. Whether There Is Credible Evidence of a Coordinated Strategy to 

Acquire Critical Technology Companies 

1. Key Findings 

Based on our assessment of 2009 activity, we judge it unlikely that there is a 

coordinated strategy among one or more foreign governments or companies to acquire 

United States companies involved in research, development, or production of critical 

technologies for which the United States is a leading producer. 
 19

Indications of a coordinated strategy may go unobserved due to limitations on 

intelligence collection, or may be hidden or misconstrued because of foreign denial and 

deception activities. 

2. Summary of Foreign M&A Activity in the United States 

Using the methodology described in the Appendix, CFIUS identified 98 completed 

foreign mergers with, or acquisitions of, U.S. critical technology companies involving 

acquirers from 26 countries and territories. CFIUS agencies and the intelligence 

community evaluated all 98 transactions for indications of a coordinated strategy to 

acquire U.S. critical technologies. 

3. Frequency of Activity by Countries and Companies 

Identifying acquirers’ home countries may provide useful initial insights into the analysis 

of foreign acquisitions of U.S. critical technology companies. Table II-1 on the following 

page lists the originating countries for planned and completed acquisitions of U.S. 

critical technology companies in 2009: 
20 

Country Number of 

Transactions 

United Kingdom 29 

Canada 12 

France 8 

Israel 8 

Japan 7 

Germany 4 

Italy 4 

China 3 

Netherlands 3 

Luxembourg 2 

Sweden 2 

Switzerland 2 

Argentina 1 

Australia 1 

Austria 1 

Cayman Islands 1 

Channel Islands 1 

Finland 1 

India 1 

Ireland 1 

Norway 1 

Saudi Arabia 1 

South Korea 1 

Spain 1 

Taiwan 1 

United Arab Emirates 1 

 

TOTAL 98 

Table II-1: Home Country of Foreign Acquirers 

of Critical Technology Companies 

Thirty percent of the 98 critical technology transactions identified by CFIUS for this 

report originated in the United Kingdom (UK), by far the largest single originating 

country. Canada, France, Israel and Japan together accounted for another 36 percent. 

The foreign companies that are considered the most active in acquiring U.S. critical 

technology companies are those that have completed three or more transactions. Of 

the foreign companies that have done so in 2009, one is based in Italy and acquired 

four critical technology companies and the other two are based in France and the 

United Kingdom, each having acquired three critical technology companies. 
 21

As shown in Figure II-1, the largest amount of M&A activity involving foreign acquisitions 

of U.S. critical technology companies involved targets whose primary activities are in 

the information technology sectors. 

18

1

3

35

19

2 4 3

12

1

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Aerospace

& Defense

Chemicals

Energy

Information

Technology

Machinery

& Equip.

Metals

&

Mining

Pharma

&

Biotech

R&D

&

Testing Svcs

Electronics

Other

2009 Transactions

Figure II-1: Completed Transactions by Sector of U.S. Target Company 

The data in this report can also be analyzed by the home region of the foreign 

acquirers. Figure II-2 displays the data with the following regional breakdown: Western 

Europe; East Asia; Canada, Australia & New Zealand; and Other. Western Europe 

accounts for over 60 percent of the transactions. 

Western Europe

61%

East Asia

13%

Canada,

Australia & New

Zealand

13%

Other

13%

Figure II-2: Completed transactions in critical technologies by regions 
22 

Figure II-3 shows the regional breakdown of activity by number of transactions in each 

sector. Western European investors were the most active acquirers of U.S. critical 

technology companies in eight of the 10 identified sectors. 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Aerospace

& Defense

Information

Technology

Chemicals

Energy

Machinery

& Equip.

Metals

&

Mining

Pharma

&

Biotech

R&D

&

Testing Svcs

Electronics

Other

% of 2009 Transactions

Other

Canada, Australia

& New Zealand

Western Europe

East Asia

Figure II-3: Completed transactions by region within each sector 

II-B. Whether Foreign Governments Used Espionage Activities to 

Obtain Commercial Secrets Related to Critical Technologies 

Key Finding 

We judge that foreign governments are extremely likely to continue to use a range of 

collection methods to obtain critical U.S. technologies. 
 23

SECTION III: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 

STATES BY COUNTRIES THAT BOYCOTT ISRAEL 

OR DO NOT BAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction 

This section of the CFIUS Annual Report to Congress has been prepared in accordance 

with section 7(c) of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, or 

“FINSA” (Pub. L. No. 110-49). Section 7(c) of FINSA provides: 

“(1) STUDY REQUIRED.—Before the end of the 120-day period beginning on 

the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the 

Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 

Commerce, shall conduct a study on foreign direct investments in the United 

States, especially investments in critical infrastructure and industries affecting 

national security, by— 

(A) foreign governments, entities controlled by or acting on behalf of a 

foreign government, or persons of foreign countries which comply with any 

boycott of Israel; or 

(B) foreign governments, entities controlled by or acting on behalf of a 

foreign government, or persons of foreign countries which do not ban 

organizations designated by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist 

organizations. 

“(2) REPORT.—Before the end of the 30-day period beginning upon the date of 

completion of each study under paragraph (1), and thereafter in each annual 

report under section 721(m) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (as added by 

this section), the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to Congress, for 

transmittal to all appropriate committees of the Senate and the House of 

Representatives, containing the findings and conclusions of the Secretary with 

respect to the study described in paragraph (1), together with an analysis of the 

effects of such investment on the national security of the United States and on 

any efforts to address those effects.” 

A. Summary of Findings and Conclusions 

• Mergers with and acquisitions of U.S. companies (M&A), the main form of foreign 

direct investment (FDI) into the United States, by investors from the countries 

described in section 7(c)(1) of FINSA that were completed between January 1, 

2009 and December 31, 2009 (CY09) (subject M&A transactions) represents a 

small percentage of the total of such FDI flows into the United States. 

• The value of subject M&A transactions with publicly reported values was 

$3.2 billion. (As described in subsection C, not all publicly announced 

transactions are reported with dollar values, so the actual value of subject M&A 

transactions is over $3.2 billion.) The total value of M&A transactions with 
24 

publicly reported values by all foreign investors during CY09 exceeded 

$116 billion. 

• The subject M&A transactions spanned a number of economic sectors. 

• For the transactions covered by this report, CFIUS either reviewed and 

concluded action under section 721 with no unresolved national security 

concerns, or determined that a transaction was not a covered transaction under 

section 721(a)(3), or CFIUS agencies considered the transaction through 

procedures that they have put in place for transactions that are not notified to 

CFIUS.

B. Study Methodology 

1. Identification of Relevant Countries 

To identify relevant countries that comply with any boycott of Israel, as required by the 

statute, CFIUS considered the list published by the Treasury Department pursuant to 

section 999 of the Internal Revenue Code and the countries identified by the State 

Department in reporting to Congress under section 564 of the Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act, FY 1994-95, as well as information about the countries’ observance 

of a primary boycott of Israel. Based on these considerations, CFIUS interprets the 

reporting requirement under section 7(c)(1)(A) of FINSA to apply to the following 

countries: Iraq3

, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, the 

United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 

To identify relevant countries that do not ban foreign terrorist organizations, CFIUS 

interpreted section 7(c)(1)(B) of FINSA to apply to countries that were certified in 2009 

as “not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts,” pursuant to section 

40A of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. Those countries are Cuba, Eritrea, 

Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela. (The same countries received this certification 

last year.) 

2. Scope of FDI 

Mergers with and acquisitions of U.S. companies are the main form of FDI into the 

United States and the form of FDI that CFIUS is authorized under section 721 to review. 

This report considers the following transactions: (i) transactions notified to CFIUS under 

section 721; (ii) M&A transactions that were not notified to CFIUS (non-notified 

transactions) that CFIUS agencies considered through procedures that each agency 

 

3

 In Iraq, the current requirement under Iraqi law remains unclear. Efforts to harmonize a national position 

on the Arab League Boycott (ALB) have been slowed by differing opinions on Iraqi trade laws and 

regulations as they apply to the boycott. While the Government of Iraq’s review of ALB-specific regulation 

continues, the changing business environment and continued implementation of the U.S. Embassy in 

Baghdad’s action plan to address boycott-related concerns contributed to a decline in requests by the 

Iraqi government for firms’ compliance with the ALB. Most Iraqi ministries and state-owned enterprises 

have agreed not to comply with or have discontinued regulations enforcing the ALB. The Ministry of 

Health, however, continues to intermittently request compliance with the ALB and has not removed a 

requirement to follow the boycott from its tender documents. 
 25

has adopted for this purpose; and, (iii) those M&A transactions that resulted in an 

ownership stake in a U.S. company of at least 10 percent4

, as listed in the Thomson 

ONE Banker and Capital IQ databases, two recognized commercial/financial databases. 

• Thomson ONE Banker database: This database is a product of the Thomson 

Financial division of Thomson Corporation. The information on transactions 

provided in the database includes the date of the transaction, the respective 

countries of origin of the acquirer and the target company, and the sector of the 

target company. In most cases, the database provided the transaction value and 

the percentage of ownership rights acquired through the transaction, and, in 

some cases, the acquirer’s total ownership stake after the transaction. The 

transactions considered for this report excluded those that the Thomson ONE 

Banker database shows resulted in an ownership stake in a U.S. company of 

less than 10 percent. 

• Capital IQ database5

: This database is a Standard and Poor’s business that 

provides detailed profiles of M&A, private equity, venture capital, spin-offs, initial 

public offerings, bankruptcies, share buyback programs, and equity/debt public 

offering transactions. The information on transactions provided in the database 

includes the date of the transaction, the respective countries of origin of the 

acquirer and the target company, and the sector of the target company. The 

database provides, in most cases, the transaction value and the percentage of 

ownership rights acquired through the transaction, and, in some cases, the 

acquirer’s total ownership stake after the transaction. The transactions 

considered for this report excluded those that the Capital IQ database shows 

resulted in an ownership stake in a U.S. company of less than 10 percent, where 

data on the interest acquired was available. 

C. Detailed Findings 

1. Quantification of FDI into the United States from the Relevant Countries 

The study identified 15 completed M&A transactions in CY09 by investors from 

countries that comply with any boycott of Israel. These transactions involved investors 

from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 

The study did not find any subject M&A transactions by investors from Cuba, Iran, and 

Syria, which are countries that do not cooperate fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts and 

which were subject to stringent economic sanctions during the relevant period. There 

 

4

 FDI is generally understood to imply ownership of at least 10 percent, and is used by many statistical 

agencies around the world including the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, the 

Council of Economic Advisors (Economic Report of the President), the IMF, and the OECD. As noted in 

the descriptions of the Thomson ONE Banker and Capital IQ databases, these information sources did 

not always provide information regarding the acquirer’s total ownership stake in the U.S. company after 

the transaction. Therefore, some of the transactions covered by this review may be portfolio investments 

rather than FDI. 

5

 Although it was not cited, Capital IQ was also used in last year’s report as a secondary source of M&A 

transactions. 
26 

also were no subject M&A transactions by investors from Eritrea, North Korea, or 

Venezuela -- three countries that were also designated as not cooperating fully with 

U.S. antiterrorism efforts. 

The combined value of the 15 identified transactions with reported values is $3.2 billion. 

Thomson and Capital IQ report M&A transaction value only in those cases in which the 

companies announce the value publicly. Thomson and Capital IQ did not report, and 

Treasury staff was unable to determine independently, values for 10 of the 15 

transactions from the Thomson database analyzed in this report. The value of the 15 

total transactions, therefore, is necessarily greater than $3.2 billion. Figure C-1 shows 

the number and aggregate value of the transactions for each of the relevant countries: 

Total Transactions by Country

Kuw ait

Saudi

Arabia

United Arab

Emirates

Figure C-1: Total Transactions by Country of Acquirer 

FDI into the United States from the relevant countries during CY09 spans numerous 

major sectors of the economy. Figure C-2 shows each of the sectors represented by 

the 15 transactions presented in Figure C-1, noting both the number and value of 

transactions for each sector. Transactions in the manufacturing sector -- the largest 

category represented – include transactions in the aircraft, automobile, biotechnology, 

pharmaceutical, and semiconductor industries. 

 

Total Transactions by Target Sector

Accommodation

& Food Services

Construction

Information

Manufacturing

Mining

Retail

Transportation

Figure C-2: Economic Sectors of U.S. Companies Acquired 

Country Number of 

Transactions 

Known 

Transaction 

Value ($mn) 

Kuwait 1 n/a

Saudi Arabia 3 n/a

United Arab 

Emirates 11 $3,198

Total 15 $3,198

Sector Number of 

Transactions 

Known 

Transaction Value 

($mn) 

Accommodation 

& Food Services 1 $137

Construction 2 n/a

Information 1 n/a

Manufacturing 6 $3,025

Mining 3 $36

Retail 1 n/a

Transportation 1 n/a 

Total 15 $3,198
 27

2. National Security Effects of FDI in the United States from the Relevant 

Countries 

Each of the 15 identified transactions was either formally reviewed by CFIUS under 

section 721, determined to be not a covered transaction under section 721(a)(3), or 

considered as part of the non-notified transaction procedures of CFIUS and CFIUS 

agencies. 

a. Transactions Notified to CFIUS Under Section 721 

Three of the 15 completed transactions identified in Table C-1 were notified to CFIUS, 

with a total value of approximately $3 billion. All three transactions originated in the 

United Arab Emirates. 

CFIUS concluded action on the covered transactions after reviewing the national 

security considerations posed by the transaction and determining that there were no 

unresolved national security concerns. 

b. Transactions Considered Under Non-Notified Transaction Procedures 

CFIUS agencies considered the remaining transactions under their respective “nonnotified transaction” procedures. Pursuant to these procedures, CFIUS member 

agencies monitor M&A activity, identify transactions that have not been voluntarily 

notified to CFIUS but may present national security considerations, and assess whether 

additional information regarding the transaction or the authority of section 721 is 

required to identify or address any national security concerns. 

When a CFIUS agency believes that a non-notified transaction may be a covered 

transaction and may raise national security considerations, the agency may self-initiate 

a review of the transaction under section 721. Alternatively, if CFIUS believes that the 

transaction may raise national security considerations and may be a covered 

transaction, CFIUS may request the parties to provide the information necessary to 

determine whether the transaction is a covered transaction. In cases where such 

information was requested in the past, the parties to the transaction have responded by 

filing a voluntary notice. If CFIUS determines that the transaction is covered, it may 

request that the parties file a notice. When appropriate, CFIUS exercises this authority 

to request information and has in the past done so with respect to acquisitions that have 

not been notified to CFIUS by investors that are the subject of section 7(c) of FINSA. 

Consideration by CFIUS agencies of non-notified transactions from the relevant 

countries have so far not resulted in requests that CFIUS seek further information from 

or filings by the parties to the transaction.
28 

APPENDIX

A. Definition of “Critical Technologies” 

The Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign 

Persons (the “CFIUS regulations”), published in the Federal Register on November 21, 

2008, and codified at 31 C.F.R. part 800, defines “critical technologies” with reference to 

U.S. export control regulations, which were determined to be the most reliable and 

accurate means of identifying critical technologies: 

“§800.209 Critical technologies.

The term critical technologies means: 

(a) Defense articles or defense services covered by the United States Munitions List 

(USML), which is set forth in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 

(22 C.F.R. parts 120-130); 

(b) Those items specified on the Commerce Control List (CCL) set forth in 

Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 

C.F.R. parts 730-774) that are controlled pursuant to multilateral regimes (i.e., for 

reasons of national security, chemical and biological weapons proliferation, 

nuclear nonproliferation, or missile technology), as well as those that are 

controlled for reasons of regional stability or surreptitious listening; 

(c) Specially designed and prepared nuclear equipment, parts and components, 

materials, software, and technology specified in the Assistance to Foreign Atomic 

Energy Activities regulations (10 C.F.R. part 810), and nuclear facilities, 

equipment, and material specified in the Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment 

and Materials regulations (10 C.F.R. part 110); and 

(d) Select agents and toxins specified in the Select Agents and Toxins regulations (7 

C.F.R. part 331, 9 C.F.R. part 121, and 42 C.F.R. part 73).” 

B. Methodology and Data Sources Used to Identify U.S. Critical Technology 

Companies Acquired by Foreigners 

Because the definition of critical technologies used in the CFIUS regulations is specific 

to those regulations, there is no single source that lists all U.S. critical technology 

companies acquired by foreign persons. Therefore, for purposes of this report, CFIUS 

agencies responsible for administering U.S. export control regulations used a 

combination of publicly available information, non-public data on M&A transactions that 

CFIUS reviewed, and their own internal records to identify 98 U.S. critical technology 

companies that were acquired by or received significant investments from foreign 

investors in 2009. The specific data sources and methodology used varied, depending 

on the records maintained pursuant to the particular export control regulations that 

pertain to the different critical technology categories. The dataset used for this report is 

therefore limited. The various methodologies are described below. 

31 C.F.R. § 800.209(a): This paragraph pertains to defense articles or defense 

services covered by the United States Munitions List (USML), which is set forth in 

the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 C.F.R. parts 120-130). 
 29

Under the provisions of the ITAR, the Department of State maintains a robust 

registration, licensing, and compliance process for any person, whether U.S. or foreign, 

involved in the export or temporary import of a defense article or defense service 

controlled by the ITAR. This approach assists in the identification of foreign acquisitions 

of U.S. critical technology companies that produce defense articles or services covered 

under the ITAR. 

31 C.F.R. § 800.209(b): This paragraph pertains to those items specified on the 

Department of Commerce’s Control List (CCL), which is set forth in Supplement 

No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 C.F.R. parts 

730-774). The items on the CCL are controlled pursuant to multilateral regimes 

(i.e., for reasons of national security, chemical and biological weapons 

proliferation, nuclear nonproliferation, or missile technology), as well as for 

reasons of regional stability or surreptitious listening.

Firms producing items under the regulations specified in this paragraph of 31 C.F.R. § 

800.209 are not required to register with the Department of Commerce (Commerce), 

but, in many cases, must obtain a license from Commerce in order to export those items 

(including “deemed exports” to foreign nationals in the United States). To identify 

acquisitions of companies producing items that fall under this part of the definition, 

Commerce used a combination of publicly available information on M&A transactions,6

information on non-publicly announced M&A transactions notified to CFIUS, and its 

internal records of export license applications. 

31 CFR § 800.209(c): This paragraph pertains to specially designed and 

prepared nuclear equipment, parts and components, materials, software, and 

technology specified in the Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities 

regulations (10 C.F.R. part 810), and nuclear facilities, equipment, and material 

specified in the Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Materials 

regulations (10 C.F.R. part 110); 

The Department of Energy used a similar approach to that adopted by Commerce, 

which entailed checking a list of publicly announced M&A transactions7

 against its 

records of export authorizations under 10 C.F.R. part 810 and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s records of export license requests under 10 C.F.R. part 110. 

31 C.F.R. § 800.209(d): This paragraph pertains to select agents and toxins 

specified in the Select Agents and Toxins regulations (7 C.F.R. part 331, 9 CFR 

part 121, and 42 C.F.R. part 73). 

The agents and toxins specified under these regulations are generally subject to export 

controls administered by Commerce. To this extent, the discussion above regarding 

Commerce’s methodology applies to transactions involving these critical technologies, 

as well. 

 

6

 The M&A transactions were identified using the ThomsonONE database and Capital IQ’s database of 

M&A transactions. 

7

 The list of M&A transactions was drawn from the Capital IQ database. 
30 

C. Analyzing the Acquisitions of U.S. Critical Technology Companies 

CFIUS agencies addressed parts (i) and (ii) of section 721(m)(3) of the Defense 

Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170(m)(3)), as amended, by doing the 

following: 

• Analyzing the pattern of M&A of U.S. critical technology companies during 2009, 

while also considering transactions in prior years, as appropriate. 

o CFIUS agencies concentrated on foreign direct investment through M&A 

of companies involved in all critical technologies, regardless of industry. 

o CFIUS agencies did not attempt to evaluate issues relating to other 

avenues of foreign access to U.S. critical technologies, such as licensing, 

contracting, or other arrangements that are not mergers or acquisitions. 

• Assessing illicit attempts by government intelligence services of major economic 

competitors to obtain military and dual-use critical technologies. 

o CFIUS agencies did not attempt to evaluate foreign espionage in areas 

other than dual-use, military, or other U.S. critical technologies, or against 

companies not headquartered in the United States. 

o In addition, CFIUS agencies reviewed available information about other 

countries that have historically sought information on critical technologies 

through the use of those countries’ intelligence services. 

D. Defining “Coordinated Strategy” for Purposes of this Report 

CFIUS agencies continue to use the following definition of “coordinated strategy”: 

• A plan of action reflected in directed efforts developed and implemented by a 

foreign government, in association with one or more foreign companies, to 

acquire U.S. companies with critical technologies. The efforts of a single 

company in pursuit of business goals, absent indications of specific government 

direction, were not considered to be a coordinated strategy. Individual company 

strategies encompass such business goals as: entry into the U.S. market; 

increased market share; increased sales; access to new technologies; and 

diversification out of mature industries. 

o Examples of suspect behaviors that could be evidence of a coordinated 

strategy include: 

- A pattern of actual or attempted acquisitions of U.S. firms by foreign 

entities; 

- Evidence that specific completed or attempted acquisitions of 

companies with critical technologies had been ordered by foreign 

governments or foreign government-controlled firms; or 

- The provision of narrowly targeted incentives by foreign 

governments or foreign-controlled firms (e.g., grants, concessionary 

loans, or tax breaks), especially those that appear to market 

observers to be disproportionately generous, to acquire U.S. firms 

with critical technologies. 
 31

E. Participating Agencies & Entities -- Critical Technologies Section 

• Department of Commerce 

o Bureau of Industry and Security 

o International Trade Administration 

o National Telecommunications and Information Administration 

• Department of Defense – Defense Technology Security Administration 

• Department of Justice 

• Department of State 

o Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs 

o Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 

o Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation 

• Department of the Treasury 

• Intelligence Community Elements 

o Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council 

o Air Force Office of Special Investigations 

o Army Counterintelligence Center 

o Central Intelligence Agency 

o Defense Intelligence Agency 

o Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Branch 

o Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 

o Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

o Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

o Department of the Treasury, Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

o Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 

o Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Community 

Acquisition Risk Section 

o National Counterterrorism Center 

o National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

o National Security Agency 

o Naval Intelligence (Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval Criminal 

Investigative Service) 

• Executive Office of the President 

o Council of Economic Advisors 

o National Security Council 

o Office of Science and Technology Policy 
32 

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 33