Ministry of Economy and Production 

Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food 

National Animal Health and Agrifood Quality Service 

SENASA 

ANNEX 

RISK ASSESSMENT FOR IMPORTATION OF FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE VIRUS 

INTO NORTHERN PATAGONIA B FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE FREE ZONE 

WITHOUT VACCINATION 

NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH DIRECTORATE

EPIDEMIOLOGY DIRECTORATE 

 

REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA 

January 2007
Risk Analysis Office 

Epidemiology Directorate 

 National Animal Health Directorate 

1 

RISK ASSESSMENT FOR IMPORTATION OF FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE VIRUS 

INTO NORTHERN PATAGONIA B FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE FREE ZONE 

WITHOUT VACCINATION 

Introduction 

In January 2005, the OIE Scientific Commission restored the status of Foot and Mouth 

Disease (FMD) free with vaccination to the area north of the Province of Chubut 

(Argentina) after eradication actions were adopted in response to the outbreak that 

occurred in August 2003, in the Province of Salta, 40 Km. from the border with Bolivia. 

The remaining part of the territory of Argentina, known as Southern Patagonia and which 

includes the provinces of Chubut, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego, was recognised as 

FMD free without vaccination by the International Committee of OIE in May 2002. 

The 231,695 sq. Km. zone identified as “Northern Patagonia B” (NPB) is adjacent to 

Southern Patagonia, has a similar epidemiological status, and is subject to the same 

restrictions for FMD. 

Animals in this zone were never vaccinated. The area served as a surveillance zone for 

Southern Patagonia, and is recognised as FMD free with vaccination. 

Recognition of the health status is important for the zone and from the animal health and 

meat trade viewpoints as it would offer the possibility of accessing international sheep 

meat markets with the surplus production of the main activity in the area (sheep farming). 

Beef and pig meat production in the zone is insufficient to meet local demand. 

The purpose of this document is to provide additional information on the risk of FMD in the 

area and facilitate the decision of the ad hoc Group of the Scientific Commission. 

To this end, a qualitative estimate of the probability of FMD spreading (ingress) and of the 

exposure to FMD virus (FMDV) in the Zone (NPB) is presented based on descriptive 

scales that characterize the magnitude of the risk. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Contents 

Step 1: Description of the epidemiological characterisation and probability of presence of 

the virus in the zone (internal risk). 

Step 2: Description of the necessary biological processes for FMDV spreading (ingress) in 

the zone as a result of shipments of animals or products. 

Step 3: Description of the probability of the virus entering the zone and potential risks 

under different conditions resulting from ingress of animals or products that may carry the 

virus (external risk). 

Step 4: Description of the necessary biological processes for FMD susceptible animals in 

NPB to be exposed to possible sources of infection from a specific risk source. 

Step 5: Description of the probability of animals in NPB being exposed to possible sources 

of infection from a specific risk source. 

Step 6: Assessment of the consequences of a specific exposure and estimate of their 

probability of occurring. 

Step 7: List of risk mitigation measures adopted (as provided for in SENASA resolutions) 

to reduce the risk in each stage of the process. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Step 1 

Epidemiological characterisation and probability of presence of the virus in the 

zone 

1. Livestock sector 

The livestock sector plays a key role in the economy of Argentina and farm exports 

represent 52.2% of our trade. 

The main product exported by Argentina is de-boned beef. Cattle Production parameters 

are included below: 

National Stock, in millions 56.5 

Animals slaughtered, in millions 13.2 

Average slaughter weight, in Kg. 360 

Annual extraction rate, as % 23.3 

Production of bone-in meat, in millions of 

tonnes 

2.62 

Meat consumption, in millions of tonnes 2.23 

Exportable volume, in millions of tonnes 387 

FOB price, in USD/tonne 1,420 

Exported value, in millions of USD 550 

The productive aptitude of the each region, which is determined by the agro-ecological 

quality of the soil, favours or restricts the presence of FMD. 

Commercial dairy and fattening operations in the more productive regions have higher 

stocking rates (Pampa Region) and, as they continuously receive shipments of young 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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cattle, favour persistence of FMD. Extensive stocking farms in NEA, NOA and Semiarid 

zones have lower stocking rates, but also have favourable conditions for persistence of 

FMD. Cattle farming in Patagonia - that includes the zones identified as Northern 

Patagonia B and Southern Patagonia - is restricted to small cattle breeding areas (FMD 

free) that have very low stocking rates, therefore the only possibility of presence of the 

disease is through importation of the virus into the region. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

5 

Bovine Population 

Pampa Region 34938756 

NEA Region 12290654 

NOA Region 3807705 

Semiarid Region 4497374 

Patagonia 1026233 

TOTAL 56,560,722 

Distribution of Bovine Population by Region 

35 mill 

12 mill 

4 mill 

5 mill 

1 mill 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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The Northern Patagonia region is divided into two zones. Distribution of holdings, cattle 

population and stocking rate are shown below: 

Family holdings that keep sheep and goats and extensive beef cattle operations 

predominate to the West of Northern Patagonia B, in the Andes and foothills of the 

provinces of Neuquén and Río Negro. 

Sheep production is the main activity to the East, in the area located between the Negro 

River and the province of Chubut. This area is typical of the Patagonian plateau and 

similar to the southernmost part of the country. 

Epidemiological indicators applied by PANAFTOSA (WHO) characterised the zone as an 

FMD free ecosystem and noted that a determining factor for this classification was the low 

contact rate between susceptible animals due to the very limited growth of natural forage 

(and explains why an FMD vaccination programme was never needed in this zone). 

The area principally has integrated commercial sheep farms that seasonally send lambs 

and culled ewes directly to slaughter; movement of animals between holdings is 

infrequent. 

Population of feral susceptible species (some deer, Camelidae, and pigs) is very small and 

their role in the FMD epidemiological chain is irrelevant. 

The structure of the Veterinary Service that supports the National Epidemiological 

Surveillance System is summarised below: 

Zone No. of holdings Bovine population Stocking rate 

Bov/ha 

Northern 

Patagonia A 3557 1.090.100 0.09 

Northern 

Patagonia B 

9211 200571 0.01 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Results of the serological enquiry to detect infection 

2003 2004 2005 

Bovines sampled 0 0 2231 

Holdings sampled 0 0 57 

No. of positive animals 0 0 0 

Ovines sampled 1020 1000 6324 

Holdings sampled 104 100 211 

No. of positive animals 0 1(*) 0 

(*) Complementary epidemiological studies, including enlarged 

complementary sampling of the farm demonstrated absence of infection. 

Historical records of the disease in the zone indicate that presence has been sporadic and 

number of outbreaks is negligible compared to those in the cattle production area. All 

cases were related to: 

1. Ingress of infected bovines for slaughter or bone-in meat; 

2. Active outbreaks in the cattle production area to the north of the FMD free zone; 

3. Feeding of pigs with slaughter or kitchen waste (swill). 

Causes may be attributed to: 

1. National vaccination programmes that did not provide adequate immunity to stop viral 

circulation in the animal population. 

1 Veterinarians 15 

2 Assistant veterinarians 7 

3 Clerks 7 

4 Total No. of holdings 9211 

5 Cattle stock 200571 

6 Sheep stock 2144683 

7 Pig stock 7139 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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2. Insufficient sensitivity of the surveillance system in the field and in slaughterhouses to 

detect diseased animals or animals with FMD-like symptoms. 

3. Inadequate structure for official control and surveillance, and 

4. Lack of official regulations to mitigate the risk of spreading of, and exposure to the 

virus, lack of restrictions for shipment of vaccinated animals for breeding or slaughter and 

of bone-in meat, offals, etc., and feeding of pigs with non-heat treated slaughter waste. 

Currently, and for the reasons stated above, actions and regulations were adopted, and 

the control structure has been strengthened to ensure that the health status of the zone is 

preserved. 

Conclusion 

The epidemiological characterisation described above, the capacity of the FMD 

surveillance system and the human and material resources assigned to its implementation, 

and the results of clinical and serological surveillance determine that the zone is free of 

FMDV infection. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Step 2 

Description of the necessary biological processes for FMDV spreading (ingress) in 

the zone as a result of shipments of animals or products 

Origin or routes of entry of the virus into the area include: 

A) Virus is present in the country (area subject to vaccination), and 

1. Non-vaccinated, diseased animals fit for slaughter are not detected or reported by the 

surveillance system; or 

2. Infected animals fit for slaughter that are a source of infection but show no clinical 

signs of the disease, are not detected in the annual serological sampling. 

3. These animals are selected for slaughter but no clinical signs or lesions are detected: 

♦ At the time of loading; 

♦ In the ante mortem inspection; or 

♦ During slaughter. 

4. The animals are slaughtered at an officially approved abattoir that is authorized to ship 

de-boned meat or thermo processed offals to the FMD free area not subject to vaccination. 

5. The meat is not maturated (temperature and time), carcass pH does not reach 5.9, and 

pH checks do not detect it. 

6. Infectious materials (ganglia, bones, etc.) are not removed during de-boning. 

7. The animals described in 1) and 2) are not slaughtered under official control, or their 

prohibited products elude sanitary barrier checks at points of entry into Northern Patagonia 

B. 

B) Virus may cross the border and enter from infected areas in neighbouring countries 

via: 

a) Animals that are a source of infection; 

b) Animals that are incubating the disease, show clinical signs, or are asymptomatic 

carriers; 

c) Mechanical transmission: vehicles / people, animal products, etc. 

C) Virus may enter from more remote infected areas by mechanical transmission (people, 

animal products, etc.). 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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D) Virus may enter due to a leak from a vaccine manufacturer’s facility that manipulates 

the virus.
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Step 3 

Description of the probability of the virus entering the zone and potential risks 

under different conditions resulting from ingress of animals or products that may 

carry the virus. 

External Risk: 

A 1) One (1) year after the vaccination programme was suspended (in 1999) the virus 

entered Argentina from FMDV infected regions in neighbouring countries. Between August 

2000 and January 2002, the epidemic affected 2500 holdings. 

Consequences included loss of the FMD free status without vaccination, loss of 

international beef markets for a period of one year, and a deep crisis which led to 

bankruptcies in the productive and industrial farming sectors. 

The bad experience taught many lessons and the sensitivity of farmers - and of the sector 

as a whole - to detect and notify the disease improved the surveillance system. 

The new design of the vaccination programme that began in 1990 was highly effective and 

attained close to 100% vaccine coverage in bovines with a high-efficacy oil base vaccine 

that provided extended immunity and a system that preserved the cold chain. 

Annual serological samplings indicate high levels of immunity in cattle therefore it is highly 

improbable that viral circulation still persists in the provinces, 4 years after the last 

outbreak of the epidemic. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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The following graphs show immunity levels, per zone and category, expressed in percentage 

of animals with Medium and High protection levels. (Compared data 2003, 2004 and 2005) 

Reference: 

1) Category 1: Cattle from 6 to 12 months of age. 

2) Category 2: Cattle from 12 to 24 months of age. 

Population Inmunity Compared

2003, 2004 y 2005. Category 2 

(vaccinated cattle), Virus O1.

0,00%

10,00%

20,00%

30,00%

40,00%

50,00%

60,00%

70,00%

80,00%

90,00%

100,00%

Central –

M esop

Fattenig Border PatagNo rteA

Year 2003

Year 2004

Year 2005

Population Inmunity Compared

2003, 2004 y 2005. Category 2 

(vaccinated cattle), Virus A2001.

0,00%

10,00%

20,00%

30,00%

40,00%

50,00%

60,00%

70,00%

80,00%

90,00%

100,00%

Central –

M esop

Fattenig Border PatagNorteA

Year 2003

Year 2004

Year 2005

Population Inmunity Compared

2003, 2004 y 2005. Category 1 

(vaccinated cattle), Virus O1.

0,00%

10,00%

20,00%

30,00%

40,00%

50,00%

60,00%

70,00%

80,00%

90,00%

100,00%

Central –

M esop

Fattenig Border PatagNo rteA

Year 2003

Year 2004

Year 2005

Population Inmunity Compared

2003, 2004 y 2005. Category 1 

(vaccinated cattle), Virus A2001.

0,00%

10,00%

20,00%

30,00%

40,00%

50,00%

60,00%

70,00%

80,00%

90,00%

100,00%

Central –

M esop

Fattenig Border PatagNorteA

Year 2003

Year 2004

Year 2005
Risk Analysis Office 

Epidemiology Directorate 

 National Animal Health Directorate 

13 

Table: Administered Dosis per FMD Vaccination Campaigne 

Campaigne Administered Dosis

1° 2001 53.717.002

2° 2001 55.502.111

1° 2002 56.113.232

2° 2002 57.909.134

1° 2003 57.282.541

2° 2003 59.201.786

1° 2004 58.241.824

2° 2004 59.038.012

1° 2005 58.440.760

2° 2005 Data in process

FMD Vaccination

See Annex III and Annex III bis – Serological Sampling 2003 – 2004. 

A 2) Design of annual serological enquiries performed since 2001 to detect absence of 

viral activity conforms to the Guidelines of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 

See Section II.2. FMD Surveillance, Item A.2. Serological Surveillance. 

See Annex III and Annex III bis – Serological Sampling 2003 – 2004. 

Epidemiological studies including complementary sampling of holdings with at least one 

positive animal demonstrated absence of viral activity. Therefore we may conclude that it 

is highly improbable that animals with infection exist after the epidemic of 2000 – 2001. 

A (3 - 6). Bovines slaughtered in the area subject to vaccination whose meat is shipped for 

consumption in Northern Patagonia B represent 0.48% of all cattle slaughtered in 

Argentina. 

A total of 5,798,537 Kg. of de-boned beef is shipped into the zone every year. Therefore, 

as the average slaughter weight in Argentina is 360 Kg. per animal and the carcass yield is 

25% de-boned meat, 64,428 bovines of the total annual slaughter of 13,200,000, were 

slaughtered. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Twenty per cent (20%) of bovines slaughtered are clinically inspected on the holding prior 

to shipment for FMD compatible lesions (bovines to slaughter for export to EU). 

Slaughterhouses that supply beef to the FMD free area without vaccination must have a 

special approval and apply risk mitigation measures such as ante mortem clinical 

inspection, checking of mouth, lips and feet for FMD-like lesions, and obligatory recording 

of the maturation process, temperature, time and pH of carcasses sent to de-boning. 
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Epidemiology Directorate 

 National Animal Health Directorate 

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B. Virus may cross the border and enter from infected areas in neighbouring 

countries: 

 Current situation: 

Brazil 

Brazil 

Paraguay 

FMD free country with 

vaccination Brazil 

Outbreaks in the State of Mato 

Grosso do Sul 

and the State of Paraná 

Bolivia 

Border Protection Zone 

Central Region of the 

Country 

FMD free with vaccination 

OIE 2005 

Uruguay 

FMD free country with 

vaccination 

OIE 2003 

Northern Patagonia A 

FMD free with vaccination 

OIE 2005 

Buffer Zone 

Northern Patagonia B 

FMD free without vaccination 

CHILE 

FMD free country without 

vaccination 

OIE 

A 

N 

D 

E 

A 

N 

R 

A 

N 

G 

E 

Southern Patagonia 

FMD free without vaccination 

OIE (2002)

Atlantic Ocean 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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The States of Mato Grosso do Sul and Paraná in Brazil that were affected by FMD 

outbreaks in the last semester, currently represent the highest risk for Argentina. These 

areas of Brazil are 250 Km. from the nearest border with Argentina and 1,800 Km. from 

Northern Patagonia B. 

! The Rapid Alert System, for the whole National Territory, triggered the following 

preventive actions: 

" Prohibition to import animals, products and other elements that may carry FMDV from 

the States of Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraná, San Pablo, Santa Catarina, and Río Grande do 

Sul, and prohibition to import products that were not subject to risk mitigation measures 

from the entire territory of Brazil. Initially, restrictions only applied to the State of Mato 

Grosso do Sul but, as the epidemiological situation developed, were extended to include 

other areas. 

" Strengthening of co-ordination for control, surveillance and prevention actions with 

provincial and municipal governments, Animal Health NGOs, and other border control 

bodies such as the Border Patrol Authority, Coast Guard, and the Customs Office. 

" Earlier and intensified progress of the FMD vaccination campaign in all regions of the 

country, especially in border areas of the provinces in northern Argentina, particularly 

those that share a dry border with Brazil. 

" Strengthening of controls at border crossings and dry borders in northern Argentina, 

especially in areas that share a border with Brazil. 

" Strengthening of human resources assigned to control posts and border areas and of 

physical, documentary and identity checks to commercial cargo of animal products 

approved for importation into Argentina. 

" Approval and follow-up of shipments of animal products originating from Brazil in 

transit through the National Territory, en route to third countries. 

" Strengthening of checks to products subject to the Cross-border Trade Regime. 

" Strengthening of checks to passengers, their luggage and means of transportation. 

" Disinfection of vehicles entering Argentina through border posts in the provinces of 

Misiones and Corrientes that share a border with Brazil. 

" Establishment of check-points on strategic routes for prevention purposes. 

" Assignment of mobile patrols to border areas. 
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" Communication to, and active participation of other authorities involved in prevention at 

the borders (Border Patrol Authority, Coast Guard, Customs Office). 

" Communication and operational instructions from SENASA Headquarters to border 

areas. 

! Strengthening of epidemiosurveillance actions: 

Checks to livestock movements. 

Checks at livestock concentration markets. 

Clinical inspection of animals. 

Immediate response to cases showing signs compatible with vesicular disease. 

Communication and awareness: Local media broadcasting of warnings in border areas 

explaining the risk posed by the existing epidemiological situation, and urging the 

population to notify suspect cases of vesicular disease. 

! Strengthening of biosafety measures: 

Checks to verify compliance with ban on feeding pigs with raw slaughter and/or kitchen 

waste (swill). 

! Probability of the virus spreading from the infected area, considering the distance and 

preventive measures adopted by Argentina: 

Existence of 3 control barriers: 

a) Barrier on the border between Brazil and Argentina; 

b) Barrier between the Central Zone and the Buffer Zone, on the Barrancas – Colorado 

Rivers; and 

c) Barrier between the Buffer Zone and Northern Patagonia B, on the Negro River, and 

check points to the south of this barrier. 

The virus could only spread in the area subject to vaccination if illegal movements of 

animals had circumvented border controls and exposed non-vaccinated susceptible 

animals as the Regional Reference Laboratory of OIE (PANAFTOSA) reported that the 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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actuating virus at the time was type O, sub-type O1, that is included in the vaccine used in 

Argentina. 

C) Virus may enter from more remote infected areas by mechanical transmission (people, 

animal products, etc). 

The risk of an exotic virus spreading is difficult to assess and may be considered equal to 

the risk in any zone of a country that has only one international airport with few flights and 

a port where the main activity is loading of fishery products. 

D) Virus may enter due to a leak from a vaccine manufacturer’s facility or a diagnostic 

laboratory that manipulate the virus 

Vaccine manufacturing facilities and the diagnostic laboratory that manipulate the virus 

conform to international biosafety standards, are inspected by the Veterinary Service, and 

are located in the City of Buenos Aires which is 1,200 Km. from the zone. 

The possibility of virus spreading to Northern Patagonia B as a result of a leak from these 

facilities is considered highly improbable. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the absence of viral activity, the level of immunity of the 

population, the distance between the Zone and the area in Brazil that was affected by 

outbreaks, the prohibition to import animals and risk products, and the protection provided 

by the three control posts, viral circulation is not viable. 

Therefore spreading of FMDV from infected areas in neighbouring countries is highly 

improbable. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Step 4 

Description of the necessary biological processes for FMD susceptible animals in 

NPB to be exposed to possible sources of infection from a specific risk source 

Sources of risk in order of importance (vis à vis possibility of importation): 

Source of risk 1: Products contaminated with FMDV. 

Historically, the main cause of FMD outbreaks in the Patagonia region of Argentina (FMD 

free area that was never subject to an eradication programme) was viral exposure of pigs 

due to feeding contaminated slaughter waste or swill. 

Source of risk 2: Infected feral susceptible species. 

There is a small population of FMD feral susceptible Cervidae, Camelidae and pigs. These 

animals would have to be in contact with animals that are sources of infection in the area 

subject to vaccination and then, as a result of transhumance practices, enter NPB and be 

in contact with susceptible farmed species. 

Source of risk 3: Domestic animals that are sources of infection are in contact with 

susceptible animals in the free zone. 
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Step 5 

Probability of animals in NPB being exposed to possible sources of infection 

Source of risk 1: Importation into the Zone of animals and products that may carry FMDV 

is prohibited. Contaminated products would therefore have to be illegally brought into the 

area for family or commercial consumption, or by tourists not informed of the restrictions 

and who bring them in for own consumption. 

The probability of these products not being detected at the entry control posts is low. 

The probability of waste from contaminated prohibited products brought into the Zone for 

family consumption being used as pig feed, is low. 

Attempts of illegal importation of products into the Zone occur if the market offers a very 

significant price premium. Evidence indicates that in the holiday season, when many 

tourists travel to the area, prices of bone-in beef cuts (short ribs) increase and there may 

be attempts to bring these cuts into the area. 

However, as the typical Argentine style of cooking ribs is over a wood or charcoal fire, the 

cooking method mitigates the risk. 

The last FMD outbreak in the Zone demonstrated that the most probable source of risk 

was pigs on non-approved farms therefore, given that the highest risk has been 

characterised, main preventive actions seek to eradicate this factor (SENASA Resolution 

No. 225/95 and legislation on depopulation of pigs in areas adjacent to slaughterhouses). 

Source of risk 2: Feral susceptible animals from other zones that are sources of infection 

are in contact with farmed species. This probability is very low because animals would 

have to travel long distances in poor health conditions, their population is small and have 

gregarious habits, and they would be unable to cross the rivers because of the high flow 

rates (Barrancas-Colorado, and Negro Rivers) that, therefore, constitute natural barriers. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Source of risk 3: Shipments of FMD susceptible animals into the Zone are prohibited 

therefore probability is linked to illegal movement of livestock or the vulnerability of barrier 

control posts. 

The control structure is considered very effective therefore it is highly improbable that 

shipments of animals may avoid controls and enter the Zone. 

 Conclusion 

The qualitative measure of probability of occurrence (assessment of spreading and 

assessment of exposure) is categorized as Negligible and judged to be sufficiently 

small to consider that the occurrence of an FMD outbreak is not probable. 

Presence of FMD in Northern Patagonia B may occur only under exceptional 

circumstances. 

Additionally, the capacity of the structure of the Veterinary Service, the 

effectiveness of control posts on the boundaries of the Zone, the preventive 

measures in place, the structure of the disease surveillance system, and the 

historical isolation of the Zone, ensure stability in time and consistency of the 

existing health status. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Step 6 

The magnitude of the consequences resulting from the entry of the disease is 

determined by the following factors: 

1. Potential of the primary outbreak spreading. Although FMD spreads easily, stocking 

rates of susceptible animals, geographic features and movements of animals in the Zone, 

among other factors, condition spreading of the virus. For purposes of exposure 

probability, pigs on holdings in suburban areas are considered to be the highest risk 

population. 

Historical cases of the disease indicate that spreading in suburban areas occurs by 

contact between animals and by mechanical transmission (people). Animals on holdings in 

the countryside were not exposed except when the virus was carried from focal or 

perifocal areas. 

The economic impact (losses in production) caused by the last outbreaks that occurred in 

December 1993 and January 1994 affected 6 holdings, 4 in suburban areas and 2 in the 

countryside. 

A total of 570 bovines, 8856 sheep and 296 pigs were exposed. 

2. Time between exposure and adoption of disease containment and eradication 

measures. 

3. Economic impact to the Zone due to losses in production, marketing, prices of animals 

and animal products, and potential trade. 

These three factors are considered negligible or low therefore the impact of the disease 

may be currently categorized as low. However, in the future, potential losses in 

international trade as a result of the Zone being recognized as FMD free without 

vaccination will be significantly different because of the adjacency of the Southern 

Patagonia Region that has higher production and exporting potential. 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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Mitigation measures adopted (SENASA regulations) with regard to actions that 

reduce the risk at each stage of the process 

HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS TO REGIONS IN WHICH RESTRICTIONS 

FOR FMD SUSCEPTIBLE ANIMALS APPLY 

LEGISLATION: 

- SENASA Resolution No. 58/01, Joint Disposition DNFA - DNSA No. 5-18/01; 

 DNSA Collective Letter No. 84 of 10/08/01 

- SENASA Resolution No. 139/02, Joint Disposition DNFA - DNSA No. 02-19/2002 

- SENASA Resolution No. 1051/02 

- Joint Disposition DNFA - DNSA No. 34-08/05 

- SENASA Resolution No. 725/05 

Shipments of live bovines and other FMD susceptible species 

Importation from other zones is prohibited with 

the following EXCEPTIONS: 

INTRA-ZONE MOVEMENTS 

1. Breeding animals registered in the Herd Book 

originating from Southern Patagonia, provided animals 

conform to requirements established by DNSA (See 

Annex IV- Resol.725/05) 

Health Certificate: DTA and General Health 

Certificate 

2. FMD susceptible animals shipped directly from 

FMD free countries or regions not subject to 

vaccination and recognised by OIE 

Health Certificate: 

Import and entry permit issued by SENASA, and 

certificate of country of origin 

3. In both cases animals may not transit through areas 

subject to FMD vaccination unless expressly 

authorized by SENASA and as determined by DNSA 

1. NO HEALTH RESTRICTIONS.

2. Health Certificate: Animal Transit Document 

(DTA) 

3. Animals may not transit through areas subject 

to FMD vaccination unless expressly authorized 

by SENASA and as determined by DNSA. If 

movement is authorised, a Sworn Statement 

and Shipping Route, as specified in Appendix C 

of Resol. 725/05 is required 
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 National Animal Health Directorate 

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HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS TO REGIONS IN WHICH RESTRICTIONS 

FOR FARM PRODUCTS THAT MAY SPREAD FMDV APPLY 

PRODUCTS NORTHERN PATAGONIA 

“B” 

FRESH BEEF AND SHEEP MEAT 

(Chilled or frozen) 

1. Maturated de-boned meat, free of cartilage, ganglia 

and visible clots, in primary packaging, with required 

labelling. 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

FRESH PIG MEAT 

(Chilled or Frozen) Ingress prohibited 

FRESH SAUSAGE PRODUCTS 

CONTAINING PIG MEAT AND BACON Ingress Prohibited 

GROUND MEAT, MEAT PATTIES, 

HAMBURGERS 

1. Ready-prepared for marketing to consumers 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

FRESH OFFALS Ingress Prohibited 

MATURATED TRIMMINGS with fat content 

1. Maturated beef trimmings 

2. Acceptable fat content: Maximum 30% 

3.- Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

UNPROCESSED ANIMAL FAT Ingress Prohibited 

MELTED ANIMAL FAT 

1. Originating from officially approved establishments 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

SMALL MEATS 

1. Thermo-processed at 70°C for 30minutes in the 

centre of the product 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit. 

DRY SAUSAGES 

1. Moisture/protein ratio < 2.25:1 or pH < 5.9 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

RAW SALTED MEAT 

1. De-boned. 

2. Moisture/protein ratio: 2.25:1 

3. Salt-cured for at least 30 days. 

4. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

SALTED GUTS 

1. Salt-cured for at least 30 days 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

1. Moisture content < 16% 
Risk Analysis Office 

Epidemiology Directorate 

 National Animal Health Directorate 

25 

DRY HIDES 2. Health Certificate: DTA and Restricted Transit 

Permit or DTA and Municipal Health Certificate. See 

Circular Letter No. 24/02 

SALTED HIDES AND UNPROCESSED 

SKINS 

1. Salt-cured for at least 28 days 

2. Health Certificate: DTA and Restricted Transit 

Permit or DTA and Municipal Health Certificate. See 

Circular Letter No. 24/02 

GREASY HAIR AND WOOL 

1. Stored at point of origin for at least 60 days 

2. Shipped packaged and wrapped, no stops en route 

permitted 

3. General Health Certificate 

GAME TROPHIES AND SKINS OF FMD 

SUSCEPTIBLE ANIMALS 

1. Subject to physical or chemical treatment 

2. General Health Certificate 

BALES. HAY, STRAW, ROLLS, 

COMPOUND FEED 

1. Minimum storage: Three (3) months 

2. General Health Certificate 

3. Truck wash and disinfection certificate 

SEMEN AND EMBRYOS 

1. Originating from SENASA approved establishments 

2. Health requirements: See Circular Letter No. 32/02 

3. Health Certificate: General Health Certificate 

THERMO-PROCESSED 

ANIMAL PRODUCTS 

1. Thermo-processed at 70°C for 30minutes in the 

centre of the product 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

MEAT, BONE AND BLOOD MEALS 

1. Ingress permitted 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

FEED 

1. Originating from SENASA approved mills 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

FORRAGE, GRAINS, COMPOUND FEED 

AND MILL BY-PRODUCTS FOR FEED 1. Shipped in bulk or individually packaged 

DAIRY PRODUCTS FOR FEED 

1. Pasteurised milk products (two pasteurisations or 

UHT) 

2. Originating from establishments approved by 

SENASA 

3. Commercial documents 

4. Health Certificate stating required heat treatment 

General Health Certificate 

DAIRY PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN 

1. Products made from pasteurised milk 

2. Originating from establishments approved by 
Risk Analysis Office 

Epidemiology Directorate 

 National Animal Health Directorate 

26 

CONSUMPTION SENASA 

3. Commercial documents 

4. No Health Certificate is required 

IMPORTED PRODUCTS 

1. Prior authorisation of the Imports Office to enter the 

region is required 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

(including certification of country or region of origin) 

PRODUCTS CONTAINING IMPORTED 

RAW MATERIAL 

1. Prior authorisation of the Imports Office to enter the 

region is required 

2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit 

(including certification of country or region of origin) 

POULTRY TANKAGE 1. General Health Certificate stating origin of the birds 

MANURE OF SUSCEPTIBLE SPECIES INGRESS PROHIBITED 

SOIL 

(originating from cattle holdings located 

to the north of the Barrancas / Colorado 

Rivers) 

INGRESS PROHIBITED