FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIGUEL DIAZ-TORRES,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

Nos. 18-70141

18-72700

Agency No.

A089-247-266

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 2, 2020*

Seattle, Washington

Filed June 29, 2020

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Ryan D. Nelson, and

Danielle J. Hunsaker, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge R. Nelson

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR

SUMMARY**

Immigration

Denying a petition for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum and withholding of 

removal, the panel held that petitioner had not met his 

burden of establishing that his proposed social groups 

comprised of “Mexican professionals who refuse to 

cooperate with drug cartels” and “agronomists who refuse to 

help cultivate drugs” are socially distinct.

The panel explained that nothing in this record addresses 

whether Mexican society views either of petitioner’s 

proposed social groups as distinct. For instance, no laws or 

proposed legislation, nor any country conditions reports or 

news articles, mention such a group. To the contrary, the 

evidence painted a picture of all segments of the Mexican 

population being adversely affected by the brutality of drug 

cartels. In addition, the panel explained that the expert 

testimony in this case did not bridge the gap to establish that 

Mexican society views petitioner’s proposed groups as 

distinct, but rather indicated that almost anybody can be 

targeted by the drug cartels.

The panel also concluded that petitioner’s testimony was 

insufficient to establish social distinction, because although 

some of his testimony indicated that cartel members view 

individuals like petitioner as targets for extortion or 

violence, it did not establish how society in general views 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR 3

his proposed groups. The panel explained that the view of 

an applicant’s persecutors does not inform the social 

distinction inquiry except to the extent it is indicative of 

whether society views the group as distinct. The panel 

further explained that an applicant’s testimony alone is 

insufficient to establish the social distinction of a proposed 

group unless he satisfies the trier of fact that his testimony is 

credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient 

to demonstrate that the proposed group is socially distinct. 

Moreover, the panel stated that the social distinction inquiry 

encompasses principles that will ordinarily demand some 

type of corroborative, objective evidence. Because there 

was no such evidence here, the panel held that substantial 

evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that petitioner 

failed to establish that his purported groups were socially 

distinct.

The panel addressed petitioner’s remaining claims, and 

the denial of his motion to reopen, in a concurrently filed 

memorandum disposition.

COUNSEL

Bernice Funk, Law Office of Bernice Funk, Seattle, 

Washington, for Petitioner.

Mona Maria Yousif, Trial Attorney; Brianne Whelan Cohen, 

Senior Litigation Counsel; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

Attorney General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C.; for Respondent.
4 DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR

OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

Those seeking asylum and withholding of removal based 

on membership in a “particular social group” are required to 

show that the proposed group is recognizable as “socially 

distinct.” This case requires us to decide whether the 

testimony of the applicant—without supporting 

documentary evidence—can satisfy the social distinction 

requirement. We conclude that the applicant’s testimony 

was not sufficient, and therefore deny the petition for 

review.1

I

Miguel Diaz-Torres was born in Mexico and raised in the 

Mexican state of Sinaloa. He graduated from the 

Autonomous University of Sinaloa with a degree in 

Agricultural Sciences and worked for the Mexican 

government as an agricultural engineer throughout Mexico. 

Nearly a decade later, Mr. Diaz-Torres returned to Sinaloa 

to work at a tire store while doing agricultural consulting on 

the side.

As part of his consulting, Mr. Diaz-Torres was asked by 

two men to look at a crop of corn that “wasn’t growing well.” 

Mr. Diaz-Torres agreed to do so and went with the men to 

the corn field. He observed corn growing only on the 

exterior of the field. On the interior, marijuana was growing. 

Mr. Diaz-Torres nonetheless offered and was paid for his 

advice. This same scenario may have played out a second 

1 We reject the remaining arguments raised in Mr. Diaz-Torres’s 

first petition for review, and deny his second petition for review, in a 

concurrently-filed memorandum disposition.
DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR 5

time during this period. Mr. Diaz-Torres testified that the 

individuals who approached him for help were members of 

the Sinaloa cartel.

Several years later, Mr. Diaz-Torres was again 

approached by cartel members, who were specifically 

looking for “Engineer Miguel.” He was again asked for 

advice due to his expertise as an agricultural engineer. But 

this time, the men were more forthcoming, explicitly telling 

him they needed help growing marijuana. Mr. Diaz-Torres 

refused. The men told him if he did not help them, his “life 

was at risk.” They told him to think about their offer and 

that they would return the next day. Mr. Diaz-Torres 

believed their threats to be credible given his knowledge of 

the cartels. So he fled Mexico and entered the United States 

without inspection.

Approximately seven years later, Mr. Diaz-Torres 

returned to Mexico, intending to permanently live with his 

aging mother in Sinaloa. After several months, he visited a 

shopping mall, where, by happenstance, he ran into the same 

two cartel members from the earlier threat. Those men again 

threatened him, telling him his life was not safe because he 

refused to help them. Fearing harm or worse, Mr. DiazTorres fled to his brother’s home in a different region of 

Mexico, and then flew to Canada. From there, Mr. DiazTorres attempted to enter the United States and was detained 

at the border.

Mr. Diaz-Torres applied for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against 

Torture (“CAT”), arguing that he was a member of the 

particular social group of Mexican “professionals who 

refuse to cooperate with drug cartels.” Mr. Diaz-Torres 

testified about the threats by members of drug cartels in 

Sinaloa for not cooperating with them. He also testified that 
6 DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR

he knew of other Mexican professionals, including 

agricultural engineers, who had been killed for not 

cooperating with the cartels.

He also submitted documentary evidence, including 

news articles about Mexican professionals who were killed. 

The articles explained these deaths, but they did not identify 

the murderers or why each person was killed. He also 

submitted evidence about violence caused by the cartels in 

Mexico, including evidence that the cartels target and kill 

those who give tips to the police, those who help rival 

cartels, those in rival cartels, those who refuse to be extorted 

for money, and those politicians who try to stop them. There 

was no documentary evidence regarding cartels targeting 

Mexican professionals to seek their services. Nor was there 

documentary evidence showing that Mexican society views 

either of these groups as distinct.

Mr. Diaz-Torres’s application also included an affidavit 

from Sylvia M. Longmire, M.A., an expert in Mexican 

criminal organizations. She testified about the advent of 

such organizations in Mexico, and about their leadership, 

criminal activities, and interaction with the Mexican 

government. She also testified that Mr. Diaz-Torres was 

likely to be targeted by Mexican drug cartels if removed to 

Mexico. She did not, however, opine on how those who 

refuse to provide professional services to cartels are viewed 

in Mexican society.

An immigration judge (“IJ”) denied all relief and the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Mr. DiazTorres’s appeal based in part on its conclusion that the group 

of “Mexican professionals” who refuse to cooperate with 

cartels was “not sufficiently discrete, nor does it have social 

visibility.” But a panel of our Court remanded the case to 

the BIA for further consideration in light of intervening 
DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR 7

cases addressing particular social group determinations, 

including Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 

2014); Cordoba v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014); and 

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014). The 

BIA remanded the matter to the immigration court.

On remand, Mr. Diaz-Torres presented a slightly 

different particular social group—“agronomists” who refuse 

to help cultivate drugs—as well as Mexican professionals 

who refuse to cooperate with cartels. He testified a second 

time, recounting the same story of threats for refusing to 

cooperate with the cartels. During his testimony, he was 

asked about the articles detailing the deaths of Mexican 

professionals. Mr. Diaz-Torres testified that he knew some 

of the men and knew that they were killed for refusing to 

cooperate with the cartels. He also testified that there is a 

particular term in Spanish used in Sinaloa for someone who 

has rejected a cartel’s recruitment efforts—“esta 

comontado.”

New evidence was also submitted. Ms. Longmire 

submitted an updated declaration and testified in court, for 

the first time, about the same general themes discussed in her 

declaration. Mr. Diaz-Torres also submitted a new article 

about an agricultural engineer who was killed in Mexico and 

several new articles about cartel-related violence and crime 

in Mexico.

The IJ denied relief, holding in part that Mr. DiazTorres’s proposed social group of agronomists who refuse to 

cooperate with cartels did not meet the social distinction 

requirement because there was no evidence that the proposed 

group was “perceived as a group by society.” Mr. DiazTorres appealed this ruling, among others, to the BIA. The 

BIA dismissed the appeal, holding that he had “not met his 
8 DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR

burden to produce evidence demonstrating that his purported 

group is socially distinct.” This timely petition for review 

followed.

II

To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must 

show that he is “unable or unwilling” to return to his country 

of origin “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political 

opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Similarly, an applicant is 

eligible for withholding of removal if his “life or freedom 

would be threatened in that country because of [his] race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).

The Immigration and Nationality Act does not define 

“particular social group.” The BIA has interpreted that term 

to include three components: (1) a group “composed of 

members who share a common immutable characteristic”; 

(2) “defined with particularity”; and (3) “socially distinct 

within the society in question.” Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 

1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 736 

(2018) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237). 

This case concerns the third requirement—social 

distinction—which we have held is a proper element, giving 

deference to the BIA. Id. at 1135–36.

Social distinction refers to whether “the people of a 

given society would perceive a proposed group as 

sufficiently separate or distinct.” Pirir-Boc, 750 F.3d 

at 1084 (internal quotation marks omitted). This 

requirement refers to general social perception, which can be 

assessed from the perspective of “the society in question as 

a whole,” “the residents of a particular region,” or “members 
DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR 9

of a different social group,” depending of the facts of the 

case. Cordoba, 726 F.3d at 1115. It is not, however, 

assessed from the perspective of the persecutors. Conde 

Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2020).

To make the social-distinction determination, the agency 

must perform an “evidence-based” inquiry into “whether the 

relevant society recognizes [the petitioner’s] proposed social 

group.” Pirir-Boc, 750 F.3d at 1084. “Evidence such as 

country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and 

press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical 

animosities, and the like may establish that a group exists 

and is perceived as ‘distinct’ or ‘other’ in a particular 

society.” Id. (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 

at 244). Because the inquiry is based on country-specific 

evidence, the inquiry is necessarily conducted case-by-case, 

country-by-country, and, in some cases, region-by-region. 

See Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1242. We review the 

record for “substantial evidence” and “reverse the BIA only 

on a finding that the evidence not only supports a contrary 

conclusion, but compels it.” Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1137 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Our cases show how this case-by-case, evidence-based 

inquiry works in practice. In Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, we 

concluded that the particular social group of “people who 

testified against gang members” in El Salvador was socially 

distinct because a “witness protection law” passed by the 

“Salvadoran legislature” for those types of witnesses showed 

that “Salvadoran society recognizes the unique 

vulnerability” of that group. 707 F.3d 1081, 1090–92 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (en banc). In Conde Quevedo, by contrast, the 

particular social group of people in Guatemala “who report 

the criminal activity of gangs to police” did not meet the 

social distinction test because there was no record evidence, 
10 DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR

including “country reports, background documents, or news 

articles,” showing that those who report gang violence were 

recognized as a distinct group in Guatemala. 947 F.3d 

at 1242–43.

This case fits into the latter scenario. Nothing in the 

record addresses whether Mexican society views either of 

Mr. Diaz-Torres’s proposed social groups as distinct. No 

laws or proposed legislation so indicate. Nor do any country 

conditions reports or news articles mention such a group. To 

the contrary, the evidence paints a picture of all segments of 

the Mexican population being adversely affected by the 

brutality of drug cartels. And the expert testimony does not 

bridge the gap. That testimony also indicates that almost 

anybody can be targeted by the drug cartels and does not 

show that Mexican society views as distinct the groups 

Mr. Diaz-Torres claims to be a member of.

Nor does Mr. Diaz-Torres’s testimony make the required 

showing. Mr. Diaz-Torres testified that it is well understood 

in Mexico that Mexican professionals are targeted by cartels. 

He stated, for example, that agricultural engineers and other 

licensed professionals are regularly killed in his town for 

refusing to work with the cartels. He also testified that one 

of his former colleagues, also an agronomist, was killed by 

the cartels for not helping them. According to Mr. DiazTorres, there is even a phrase in his town for those who are 

recruited or targeted by cartels.

Some of this testimony indicates that cartel members 

view individuals like Mr. Diaz-Torres as targets for extortion 

or violence. But the view of Mr. Diaz-Torres’s persecutors 

does not inform the social distinction inquiry except to the 

extent it is “indicative of whether society views the group as 

distinct.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242. As 

described above, we must focus on how society views the 
DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR 11

proposed group. Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1242; accord 

Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“[R]ecognition of a particular social group is determined by 

the perception of the society in question, rather than by the 

perception of the persecutor.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Otherwise, almost any group would be distinct so 

long as it was on a “persecutor’s enemies list.” HenriquezRivas, 707 F.3d at 1102 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).

Moreover, to the extent some of Mr. Diaz-Torres’s 

testimony does relate to the social distinction requirement, it 

did not satisfy his burden of proof as to that element. After 

all, the social distinction requirement is concerned with how 

others view Mr. Diaz-Torres—not how he believes others 

view him. Objective evidence “such as country conditions 

reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of 

discriminatory laws and policies, historical animosities, and 

the like may establish that a group exists and is perceived as 

‘distinct’ or ‘other’ in a particular society.” Pirir-Boc,

750 F.3d at 1084 (internal quotation marks omitted). By 

contrast, the testimony of the applicant alone is insufficient 

to establish the social distinction of a proposed group unless 

the petitioner “satisfies the trier of fact that the [petitioner’s] 

testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific 

facts sufficient to demonstrate” that the petitioner’s 

proposed group is socially distinct. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Given this standard, when a finder of 

fact concludes that the petitioner’s testimony alone is 

insufficient to establish the social distinction of a proposed 

group, we would not be compelled to conclude otherwise 

(even if we would have reached a different conclusion), 

unless the IJ were objectively unreasonable or failed to act 

as a neutral fact-finder.
12 DIAZ-TORRES V. BARR

We note that this approach comports with our 

assessment, consistent with the requirements of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), of the burden of proof in determining 

refugee status. Because Mr. Diaz-Torres was found to be 

credible, we take his testimony as true. See Singh v. Holder, 

764 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014). But Mr. Diaz-Torres’s 

testimony alone is not necessarily “sufficient to sustain” his 

burden. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). The testimony must 

satisfy “the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is 

credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient 

to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.” Id. 

Moreover, corroboration may be required—even when 

testimony is credible—if the agency so decides, unless “the 

applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably 

obtain” it. Id. And the social distinction inquiry 

encompasses principles that will ordinarily demand some 

type of corroborative, objective evidence. Because there is 

no such evidence here, substantial evidence supports the 

BIA’s conclusion that Mr. Diaz-Torres “has not met his 

burden to produce evidence demonstrating that his purported 

group is socially distinct.”

* * *

Because Mr. Diaz-Torres has not met his burden of 

demonstrating that he is a member of a particular social 

group, the petition for review is DENIED.