NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0342n.06 F iled: Jun e 18, 2008 No. 05-2579 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
LISAP AN EP UC CI , P laintif f-App ellant,
v. HON IG M AN M ILLE R SC HWA RT Z & C OHN L L P, Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On App eal from the United St at e s D ist r ic t C our t fo r th e Eastern Distr ict of Michigan

Be for e : BOG G S, C hie f Judg e ; a nd M AR TIN and SI LER , C ir c uitJudg e s. B O GGS, Chief Ju dge. L i s a P an ep u cc i s u edHo n i gm an M i l l er S ch wa rt z an d

C o h nL LP (“H onigma

n” or “ the Fir

m”), the la

w firm at which she w as an e quity partne r, for

sex di scrimination, preg nancy

discrimination, disabilit y discrimination, and re taliation, in violation of Titl e VI I , the P re gnancy

Discrimination Act, the Ame rica ns with Disabiliti es Ac t, and Michig an’s Disa bled Persons Civil Rights Act a nd Elliott -L arse n Civil Rights Act. The district court g rante d Honig man’s motion to di smiss on the g rounds that Panepucc i ha d to a rbitrate her c laims under the ter ms of the arbitration clause include d in Honigma n’s Partner ship Ag ree ment. The c lause states that partner s
mus t arbi tr ate any

cla im s “ar is in g und er or

rel ate d t o” t he P art ners hi p Agreem ent . P anep ucci a pp e a ls the district court’s de cision to dismi ss her c laim and ar gu es t h at her discrimination claims do notNo. 05-2579

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- 2 - arise unde r or r elate to the Par tnership Ag ree ment. We hold that the arbitration cla use does cover Panepucc i’s claims and a ffirm the district c ourt’s dismissal of the ca se.

I A. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound Panepucc i gr aduate d from the Unive rsity of Michig an L aw Sc h o o l in 1988 and joined Honig man t hat y ear

as an a ssociate in its corpor ate de partment. She be came a nonper centa g e par tner on J anuar y 1, 1993, and a pe rce ntag e partne r on J anuar y 1, 1997. As of January

1, 2003, Panepucc i’s sh are of pa rt ne rs hip un its in t

he F ir m r e pr e se nte d le ss t

ha n 1 % o f t he F ir m’ s tota l pa

rt ne rs hip un its
. Ho n i gm an i s a M i ch i gan -b as edl aw fi rm , wi t h 2 2 0 at t o rn ey s an d o ff i c es i nDe t ro i t , L an s i n g, Bloomfield Hills, and Ann A rbor. Ala n S. Schwartz is currently the CEO of Honig man. I n h e r c omp lain t, P ane pu c c i br oa dly a lle g e d th a t H on ig ma

n tr e a te d h e r a

nd oth e r f e ma le pa rt ne rs dif fe re ntl y be c a us e of the ir se x. I n p art ic ula

r, Pane pu c c i a lle g e d th a t sh e and oth e r f e ma le pa rt ne rs we re de nie d c lie nt b us ine ss d e ve lop me nt o pp or tun iti e s, we re no t g ive n c lie nts on the same basis as male attorney s, and wer e not g iven the opportunity to “ inherit” clients on the same ba sis as
ma le a tto rn e y s. Panepucc i also made spec ific alleg ations of discrimination. Acc ording to Panepucc i, she too k ti me of

f f ro m w or k in 19 99 , 200 0, and

20 01 to p ur su e va

ri ou s in fe rt ili ty

tr e a tme nts . A s a

re su lt of he r t ime of

f, he r b ill a

ble ho ur s d

ro pp e d f ro m in e xce ss o f 2 50 0 h ours in 1 99 9 to a pp ro xima te ly 19 00 bil la ble ho ur s in

20 00 . Sh e wa s to ld t o e xpe c t a sig nif ic ant c ut i n h e r c omp e ns a tio n a s a re su lt of the de cre ase. U ltimately , Panepucc i’s compensation for 2000 was $15,000 lower tha n her 1999No. 05-2579

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- 3 - compensation. Panepucc i does not state her overa ll compensation in either 1999 or 2000; theref

ore, a per centa g e cha

ng e ca nnot be ca lculated. How ever , it seems unlikely that the cut was as gre at as the 24% de cline in her

billable hours. Acc ording to Panepucc i, Sa m u el S tahl, another partne r for whom she worke d, advised he r not to object to her r educe d compensation, lest she be bra nded a “complaine r and troublemake r.” I n J anuar y 2002, Panepucc i advised more se nior partne rs that she was pl an n in g to a d o p t a nin f an t, w h o w o u ld

b e b o r nin F e b r u ar y 2 0 0 2 , an d

w o u ld b e taking
ma te rn ity le a ve . Pa

ne pu c c i to ld S c hw art z that sh e int e nd e d to take tw e lve we e ks of le a ve , th e fu ll
ma te rn ity le a ve pr ov id ed un der

fi rm po lic y . A c c or din g to P ane pu c c i, S c hw art z state d th a t he did not ag ree with her takingso much time. I n Fe bruar

y 2002, the Firm’s attorney compensation committ ee inf ormed Pane pucci that he r
rec ommended compe nsation for 2001 would be identical to her 2000 compensation, despite t he fa ct that Panepucc i alleg es she worke d 2300 billable hours i n 2001 (compa red to 1900 hours in 2000). Pane pu c c i ma de va

ri ou s obje c tio ns to se nio r part ne rs , an d s he dr a ft e d a

me mo o n th e su

bje c t w hil e she wa s on maternity

leave . Schwar

tz (then the Firm’s vice chair and hea d of the attorney compensation committ ee) , J oel Adelman (then t he Firm’s CEO), and D onald Kunz (then the F irm’s corpor ate d ep ar t m en t head) held a mee ting with Panepuc ci in J une 2002 to discuss her 2001 compensation and her me mo. Accor ding to Pane pucci, Schwa rtz admitt ed that her

compensation
may have be e n o ff

by $1 5, 00 0, bu t di d n ot o ff

e r t o p ay he r t hat amou nt. At this ti me, her

relationship wit h Schwar tz bega n to “d eter iorate.” I n J uly 2003, afte r a d is p u te a b o u t h o w mu c h ti me Pa

n e p u c c i s h o u ld

h a v e b il le d

to a matt e r s h e w o r k e d o nf o r Sc h w a rtz , Schwar tz advised her i n a lengthy memo, which was provided to other partners, that he would notNo. 05-2579

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- 4 - work with her

in the future. F rom then on, ac cordingto Panepucc i, she was una ble to obtain any work a ssignments at the Firm. Pane pucci took a me dical leave of absenc e in November 2003. Since that ti me , s he a lle g e s th a t th e F ir m ha s r e fu se d to g ive he r d a ta pr ov ide d to oth e r p e rc e nta g e pa rt ne rs , ha s d isc on tin

ue d p ay me nts to h e r, and

ha s st op pe d p ay inghe r a ny sh are of the F ir m’ s p ro fi ts. Panepucc i’s relationship with Honig man was g overne d by a Partne rship Ag ree ment and an Attorney Manual. Ar

ticle X of the Partnership Ag ree ment addre sses “Dispute Resolution” and
c on ta ins an a

rb itr a tio n c la

us e , w hic h s ta te s: 10.01 Arbitration In the e vent of a controv ersy or c laim arising under or related to this Agreeme nt or its int erpretation, or, in the eve nt of an alleged breach of this Agreem ent which the Pa rtn e rsh ip o r a ny

Pa rtn e r d isp ute s, thepa rti es sh all

su bm i t s uc h c on tro v e rsy

, c lai m or dispute t o a binding arbit ration conducted by the Ame rican Arbitration Association (“the Associat i o n ”) unde r its Optional Procedure s for L arg e Complex Commercial Disputes. . . . The arbitration shall be hear d and de ci d ed b y three (3) arbitrators, eac h of whom shall be a neutra l c hosen from the Commercial Pane l of the Southfield Regiona l Offic e of the Association in ac corda nce w ith the Association’s pr oc e dure s f

or se le c tin g ne utr a l arb itr a tor s. Th e arb itr a ti on sh all be c on du c te d in Oa kla nd County , M ic hig an[,] at a sit e mut uall y agreeable t o th e pa rt ie s. . . . A ll discovery conducte d in the arbitration shall be conducte d p ursuant to the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, but de positions s hall be li mited to not more than five (5) (exclu s i v e o f expert witnesses) by eac h party

to the arbitration, there shall be no reque sts for admissions, and all matters re lating to the a rbitration shall be de emed str ic tly c on fi de nti a l and sh a ll be the su bje c t of a pro te c tiv e or de r f ro m th e arb itr a tor s. Specifica lly , the books and re cords of the Partner ship, including, but not limit ed to, all matters and materials re lat i n g t o t h e financ ial aff airs of the Partnership a

nd the Partners, sha ll be dee med strictly confide ntial and shall not be produc eable in the arb itr a tio n, inc lud ingdis c ov e ry , e xce pt to the e xten t th e y are dir e c tly

and ma te ri a lly rel ev an t to the matter at issue a s determined by the ar bitrators. In addition, the admissibili ty

of evide nce a

t t h e h ea ri n g shall be g overne d by the Fe dera l Rules of Evidence
. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . In addi ti on , th e Part ne rs hip Ag re e me nt s pe c if ie s in Ar tic le 10 .0 2 th a t,No. 05-2579

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- 5 - “ [r]e g ard le ss of th e outc ome of the arb itr a tio n, e a c h p art y sh a ll b e ar i ts o wn

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, c os ts and all other

expenses it incurs in the arbitration.” Panepucc i signe d the Partner ship Ag ree ment on May 17, 2 0 0 0
. Sh e a ls o s ign e d an a me n d me n t to th e a g r e e me n t o n Se p te mb e r 1 5 , 2003. The Attor ne y Manu a l se ts o ut v ari ou s po lic ie s g ov e rn ing pe rf or manc e e va luatio ns , w or

k a ssi g nme nts , and all other

aspec ts of work at Honigma n.

B. P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound Panepucc i filed a c laim with the EEOC on Marc h 9, 2004, and re cei v ed h er “rig ht to sue” letter on Nove mber 24, 2004. S he filed her complaint in fede ral dist rict court on J anuar y 1, 2005. I n her c omplaint, she alleg ed violation of Title VI I ’s prohibition on disparate tre atment bec ause of sex (Count I ), violation of Title VI Iand the Pre g nancy Discrimination Act (PDA) based on a lleg ed dis c ri min a tio n b e c a

us e of he r p re g na

nc y and ma te rn ity

le a ve re qu e sts (C ount I I ), vio la tio n o f T itl e VI Iand the PDAbe c a

us e the F ir

m r e ta liate d a g a ins t he r ( Count I I I ), vio la tio n o f the Am e ri c ans wi th Disabilities Act and the Michig an Disabled Persons Civil Rights Act ( Count I V), a nd violation of the M ic h ig a n E ll io tt
- L ar s e n Ci v il Ri g h ts A c t’ s p r o h ib it io n s o n s e x d is c r im in a ti o n ( Co u n t V) a nd reta liation (Count VI ). Panepuc ci soug ht economic and non-economic damag es for her phy sical and
e mot ion a l in

jur y and los t w a g e s. Honig man filed a

motion to di smis s u n d er R u l e 12(b)( 1) on January 27, 2005. The F irm argued that Panepuc ci lacke d standing under feder al anti-discrimination laws because she was not
an e mpl oy e e and

tha t Panepuc c i mu st a

rb itr a te he r c la ims in a c c or d w iththe Part ne rs hip Ag ree ment’s ar

bitration clause. Pane pucci r esponded t h at s h e wa s an employ ee a nd that theNo. 05-2579

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- 6 - arb itr a tio n c la

us e did no t a pp ly to h e r c la ims
. On Aug ust 9, 2005, the district court held that it lacke d sufficie n t ev idence to determine whether Panepucc i was an employ ee and denied that part of H onigma n’s motion to dis miss without pr e jud ic e . Th e dis tr ic t court a lso he ld that Pane pu c c i’ s all e g a tio ns , “a sse rt ing c la ims of ine qu ita ble
c omp e ns a tio n me te d o ut o n a dis c ri min a tor

y ba sis , ‘ re la

te to’ the Part

ne rs hip Ag re e me nt, wh ic h s e ts forth the method of

compensation for per centa g e part n er s . ” According ly , the cour t held that Panepucc i’s claims could not be resolved wit hout interpre tation of t he P artne rship Ag ree ment and dismiss ed the c ase.

II We reviewde novo a district c ourt’s dec ision reg ardingthe ar bitrability o f a par ticular dispute. Floss v. Ryan’

s Family Steak H

ouses, Inc

. , 211 F.3d 306, 311 ( 6th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has “ interpre ted the F eder al Arbit ra t ion Act as e stablishing that, ‘a s a matter of fede ral law , any

doubts conce rning the scope of ar bitrable issues should be re solved in favo r of arbitration.’” W

ilson Elec. Contr actors, Inc. v. Minnotte Contracting Corp. , 8 78 F .2 d 1 67 , 1 69 (6 th C i r. 1 9 8 9 ) ( q u o t i n g Moses H. Cone M em’ l Hosp. v. Me rcury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1 98 3) ). Ev e n mo re fo rc e fu lly , w e have state d th a t arb itr a tio n is require d “ ‘u nle ss i t ma

y be sa id with positive assura

nce that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of a n interpre tation that cover s the asser ted dispute.’” M

a s c o Co r p . v . Zu r ic h A m . Ins. Co. , 3 8 2 F.3d 624, 627 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (q u o t i n g Highlands W

ellmont Health N

etwork, Inc. v. John Dee re Health Plan, Inc. , 350 F.3d 568, 57 6- 77 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) ); se e als o United Steelworkers v. W arrior &Gulf Navigation Co. , 3 63 U. S.No. 05-2579

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- 7 - 574, 584-85 (1960) (“In the abse nce of any express provision ex cluding a par ticular g rieva

nce f rom arbitration, we think only t h e m ost force ful evidenc e of a purpose to exclude the c laim from arbitration can pre vail . . . .”). That said, as this c ourt has fre quently noted, “the fede ral policy in f avor of arbitration is not an absolute o n e . A r

b it r a ti o nu n d e r

th e F e d e r a l A r

b it r a ti o nA c t i s ‘ a

matt e r o f c o n s e n t, n ot
coer cion.’” Albert M. Higl ey, Co. v. N/S Corp. , 4 4 5 F. 3 d 8 6 1 , 8 6 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v

. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. , 4 8 9 U
. S
. 4 6 8 , 4 7 9 ( 1 9 8 9 ) )
. A c c o r d i n g l y,

“ on e c ann ot b e re qu ir e d to su bmi t to arb itr a tio n a

disp ut e whi c h it

ha s n ot a g re e d to su

bmi t to arbitration.” NCR Cor

p. v. Korala Assocs., Ltd. , 5 1 2 F. 3 d 8 0 7 , 8 1 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Simon v. Pfizer Inc

. , 398 F.3d 765, 775 (6th Cir. 2005) ). Thus, we must not “over ride the c lear

intent of the par ties, or re ach a

result inconsistent with the plain text of the c ontrac t, simpl y beca use the policy favor ing a

rbitration is impli cate d.” EEOC v. W affle House, Inc

. , 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002). The a rbitration clause in this ca se g overns a “contr oversy or claim ar ising unde r or r elated to [the Part

ne rs hip ] Ag re e me nt o r i ts i nte rp re ta tio n. ” Suc h langua g e ind ic a te s a br oa d in te nti on to arbitrate. See, e .g. , H

ig h la n d s W ellmont , 3 50 F.3d at 577 (collec ting c ases holding that “ar ising
un de r” langua g e c on sti tut e s a bro a d a rb itr a tio n c la

us e ); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. B enjamin F. Shaw Co. , 706 F.2d 155, 160 ( 6t h C i r. 1 983) (de scribing “ar ising out of” lang uag e as c reating a n

“ e xtre me ly

br oa d” arb itr a tio n c la

us e ). “W here th e arb itr a tio n c la us e is b ro a d, on ly

an e xpre ss provision exclu d in g a

s p e c if ic d is p u te , o r

‘ th e mo s t f

o r c e f u l e v id e n c e o f

a p u r p o s e to e xc lu d e the claim from a

rbitration,’ will remove the dispute from consider ation by the ar bitrators.” Highlands W ellmont , 3 5 0 F. 3 d

at 5 7 6 -7 7 (q u o t i n g AT& T Tec hs., Inc. v. Commc’ns W orkers of Am. , 4 75 U. S.No. 05-2579

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- 8 - 643, 650 (1986))
. R el y i n g o nt h e b re a d t h o f t h e a rb i t ra t i o ncl au s e, t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt h el d t h at “a l t h o u gh [P anepuc ci’s] claims do not alleg e a dispute in the [Partnership Agr ee m en t ’s ] interpre tation or a brea ch ther eof, the alleg ations, asserti n g cl aim s of inequitable c ompensation meted out on a discriminatory

basis, ‘re lat e t o’ the Partne rship Ag ree ment, which sets for th the method of compensation for perce ntag e par tners.” T he district cour

t concluded that, absent languag e evinc ing an intent to exclude employ ment discrimination claims, Panepucc i had fa iled to show that her dispute was outside the a

rbitration clause
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on c lus ion a pp e ars un a ssa ila

ble . “ A p ro pe r me tho d o f a na ly sis he re is to ask if an a ction could be maintaine d without refe renc e t o the contra ct or re lationship at issue.” Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc

. , 340 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2003)
. Panepucc i’s complaint alleg es that she wa s entitled to more compensation than was distributed. That claim clea rly require s ref

ere nce to, and interpre tation of, the P artne rship Ag ree ment. For example, Ex hibit B, as ame nded, explains ho w a pa rt ne r’ s “ dr aw” is t o b e c a lc ulate d, Ar tic le I Ide sc ri be s h owpe rc e nta g e pa rt ne rs ’ o wn e rs hip
un its and c a pit a l a c c ounts are de te rm ine d, and Ar tic le I I I e xpla ins the a llo c a tio n of ne t in c ome or los s and distributions. Moreove r, t he Firm questions whether Panepucc i qualifies as a n employ ee unde r Title VI I . Whatever the arbitrators decide on that question, the answer will surely require interpre tation of the Partner ship Ag ree ment. See, e .g. , Ar t i cl e V (e x p l ai n i n g ro l e o f p er ce n t age partne rs i n g o v e r

n an c e o f th e F ir m)
. T h u s , it

a p p e ar s th a t P an e p u c c i’ s c o mp la in t f a ll s w it h in the arbitration clause. I n her br iefs to this court, P an ep u cci tries her be st to evade the brea dth of the ar bitrationNo. 05-2579

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Wis ely , Panepucc i does not dispute that employ ment discrimination claims may be subjec t 1 to mandatory

arbitration. The Supreme Court has made cle ar that statutory rig hts, including the r ight to sue for e mploy

ment discrimination, m ay be subjec t to mandatory arbitration. See G ilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. , 5 0 0 U. S. 20 (1991) (holding that ag e discrimination claim wa s su bje c t to mand a tor

y arb itr a tio n) ; s e e als o C i r cu i t Cit y Stores, Inc . v. Adams , 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) ( stating that “[t] he Court ha s been quite specific in holding that arbitration a g ree ments can be enf orce d under the FAAwithout contrave ning the policies of cong ressional en actments giving e mpl oy e e s sp e c if

ic pr ote c tio n a g a ins t dis c ri min a tio n pr oh ibi te d by fede ral law”) ; W illis v. De an W itter Reynolds, Inc

. , 9 48 F .2 d 30 5, 30 9 (6 th C ir . 1 99 1) (u ph old ingmand a tor

y arb itr a tio n o f T itl e VI Iclaims). - 9 - clause
. Her

strong est argument is that refe renc e to the P artne rship Ag ree ment will not be require d 1 beca use she c oncede s that the ag ree ment was not b re ache d. Panepucc i further notes that her complaint does not alleg e that any terms of the Par

tnership Ag ree ment wer e violated, that the a lleg ed dis c ri min a tio n vi ol ate d th e Part ne rs hip Ag re e me nt, or

that he r c omp e ns a tio n w a s d e te rm ine d in violation of t he terms of t he P artne rship Ag ree ment. Citi ng this court’s opinion in Alticor, Inc. v

. National Union Fire In s u r a n ce Co. , 411 F.3d 669 ( 6th Cir. 2005), Panepucc i argues that the arbitration clause in the Partne rship Ag ree m en t wo u ld apply to claims relate d to Honigma n’s g overna nce a nd owner ship, such as a c laim f or an acc ounting of profits or a de mand of a cce ss to the partne rship’s books, but does not apply to c laims of employ ment discrimination that don’t alleg e any brea ch of the Partnership Ag ree ment. These c oncessions ar e ultimately unavailing . Panepucc i is corr ect that this court has rejec ted the proposition that a controve rsy is arbitrable if it merely “touche s matters cove red by the ar bitration clause .” See A lticor , 411 F.3d at 673 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Howeve r, her complaint still does not pass the Fa zio test. Despit e h er co n ce ssions, P anepuc ci’s ac tion sim ply cannot be
ma int a ine d w ith ou t re fe re nc e to the Part ne rs hip Ag re e me nt. Ev e n if the a g re e me nt d e a ls o nly wi thNo. 05-2579

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- 10 - the ba re me c ha nic s o f c omp e ns a tio n, the qu e sti on of whe the r t

he oth e r p art

ne rs fo llo we d th os e mecha nics could be a

key fac tor in deciding whether or not the y illega lly discriminated ag ainst her. The ke y issue in Panepucc i’s suit is whether she was paid less and denie d work be cause of illeg al discrimination. To determine whether she was paid l ess wil l require deter mining a baseline of

how much she should be pa id, and that wil l require ref ere nce to the P artne rship Ag ree ment. Finally , as noted above , the terms of the P artne rship Ag ree ment will be key to determining whether

Panepucc i qu a lif ie s a s an e mpl oy e e un de r t he anti -d isc ri min a tio n la

ws . Pan ep u cc i ’s other a

rg uments are even le ss persuasive . Acc ording to Panepucc i, the “g rava men of [her] Complaint is that she was discriminated and r etaliated a g ainst in the terms and conditions of her e mploy

ment on the basis of he r sex, preg nancy , and disability .” Appe llant’s Br
. a t 20 . Sh e no te s th a t “ [t]he P a r t n e r sh ip A g re e me nt c ov e rs ne ith e r e mpl oy me nt d isc ri min a tio n c la ims
nor t h e s ubject matter

of [her] Com plaint,” matters whic h are left to the more de tailed Attorney Manual. Id . at 20-21. F irst, we note that the At t o rn ey M anual is not a contr act. Se e ge ne ra lly He u rtebise v. Re liable Bus. Computers, Inc. , 5 5 0 N
. W. 2 d 2 4 3 , 2 4 7 ( M ic h
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( h o ld in g th a t a n arbitration clause in a ha

ndbook was not enfor cea

ble since handbook did not constitute a contra ct). Se c o n d , e v e n if th e ma

n u a l w e r e a

c o n tr a c t, it

w o u ld s ti ll b e g o v e r

n e d b y th e ar b it r a ti o nc la u s e . We have he ld that an ar

bitration cl au s e in a master or “umbre lla” ag ree ment that cre ates a n ong oing relationship encompasses a dispute over the terms of a later contra ct t hat was enter ed int o as par t of the re lationship, even if the late r contra ct itself lacks a n arbitration clause. See Nestl e W ate rs N or th Am., Inc . v. Bollman , 505 F.3d 498, 505 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Finally , Panepucc i makes much of the fac t that the ar bitration clause states that the ar bitratorsNo. 05-2579

P an e p u c c i v . H o n i g m anM i l l e r S c h w art z & C o h nLLP

We n ote that c ouns e l f

or Ho nig man c on c e de d at ora l argume nt t hat th e arb itr a tor s c ou ld 2 awa rd attorne y ’s fe es to Panepuc ci if they find that she is an employ ee unde r Title VI Iand that the p art n e r s h i p ’ s c o n d

u c tv i o l a t e d

T i t l e V II. - 11 - wi ll b e dr awn

fr om t he AA A’ s c omm e rc ia l pan e l. She argue s tha t the fa c t tha t the arb itr a tor s w ill be experts in commerc ial law, rather than e mploy ment law, suff

ices to show that the pa

rties did not intend to arbitrate employ ment discrimination claims. This argument is without m erit. I t is not t rue that only arbitrators with specific expertise in employ ment discrimination may

decide employ

ment discrimination claims. After all, “[w]e decline to indulge the pre sumption t hat the par ties and arbitra l body

conducting a proce eding will be unable or unwilling to re tain competent, c onscientious and impartial a

rbitrators.” Gilmer , 5 00 U. S. at 30 . Ind e e d, e ve n ma nif e st defect s in

arb itr a tor s’ subject matter expertise are irrele vant to our revie w of a

n arbitration decision. Se e Mi c hig an Fa mi ly Res., Inc . v. Serv ice Em

ployee s Int’l Union , 4 75 F .3 d 7 46 , 7 53 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) (e n b anc ) ( statin g that, so long a s the arbitrator was c onstruing or applying the contra ct in que stion, “ it made no diffe renc e wh e the r the arb itr a tor

ha d c omm itt e d s e ri ou s, imp ro vid e nt o r e ve n s ill y e rr or s in re so lvi ngthe me ri ts of the dispute”) (interna l quotation marks omitted). I n conclusion, Panepuc ci’s cla ims sim ply cannot be maintained without ref ere n ce t o the Partnership Ag ree ment. Acc ording ly , the di spute falls within the ag ree ment’s ver y broad a rbitration clause . Panepucc i is now fre e to fra me her arguments for the arbitrators, and she may frame such alternative arguments as she thinks will persua de the arbitrators to g rant her r elief. Since we have decide d that her c laims are arbitrable , we ne ed not addr ess her arguments that the arbitration clause’s lim itatio n o n att or

ne y ’s fe e s is inv a lid
. Suc h matte rs are le ft to the arb itr a tor s and the n p os sib ly to 2No. 05-2579

P an e p u c c i v . H o n i g m anM i l l e r S c h w art z & C o h nLLP

- 12 - a re vie wi ngc ourt
.

III Th e re fo re , fo r the re a so ns se t ou t a bo ve , we AF F I RM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to d ism iss Pane pu c c i’ s su it.