alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22

- 2235

FREDRICK W. HEROLD, JR. , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC.; BRADFORD E. BUGHER; KRISTINA HEROLD; JESSE B. HAMMOCK; PETER R. COTTER; PARKER GOODMAN GORDON & HAMMOCK, LLC , Defendants

- Appellees

.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. ( 1:21

- cv - 00610

- GLR )

Submitted : May 23, 2023 Decided: May 25, 2023

Before AGEE, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Fredrick W. Herold, Jr. , Appellant Pro Se. John Mark Murdock , POTTER & MURDOCK, PC , Falls Church, Virginia; Mary Hirth Tolbert , STEPTOE & JOHNSON, PLLC , Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Peter Russell Cotter , Jesse Bela Hammock , PARKER GOODMAN GORDON & HAMMOCK, LLC , Easton, Maryland; Shirlie Norris Lake , ECCLESTON & WOLF, PC , Hanover, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2235 Doc: 31 Filed: 05/25/2023 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Fredrick W. Herold, Jr. , appeals the district court’s order s dismissing his complaint, denying reconsideration, and enjoining Herold from filing any more action s related to his
inheritance. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court ’s order s
. Herold v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc

. , No. 1:21

- cv - 00610

- GLR (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2022 ; Oct. 31, 2022 ). We grant Herold’s
motion to amend his informal brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid th e decisional process.
AFFIRMED USCA4 Appeal: 22-2235 Doc: 31 Filed: 05/25/2023 Pg: 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 12.1




CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO


EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13A-14(A)/15D-14(A)


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I, Wei Hua, certify that:




1.      I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Ossen Innovation Co., Ltd.;




2.      Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;




3.      Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;




4.      The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and have:




(a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;




(b)[Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238/34-47986 and 33-8392/34-49313];




(c)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and




(d)Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and




5.      The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):




(a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and




(b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.






Date:  June 23, 2011

/S/    WEI HUAWei HuaChief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-50525

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAGOBERTO TERRAZAS-CHAVEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-96-CR-191

- - - - - - - - - -

June 2, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Dagoberto Terrazas-Chavez appeals his guilty-plea conviction

for illegal reentry of the United States after deportation in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Terrazas-Chavez argues that his

prior burglary conviction was an element of the offense and

should have been alleged in the indictment. The Supreme Court

has rejected this argument. Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

118 S. Ct. 1219, 1226 (1998).

Terrazas-Chavez argues that the district court abused its
No. 97-50525 

-2-

discretion in failing to order sua sponte a hearing to determine

whether he was mentally competent at the time he entered his

guilty plea. We have reviewed the record and have determined

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing

to order sua sponte a hearing to retroactively determine

Terrazas-Chavez’s mental competence at the time he entered his

guilty plea. See United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 303-04

(5th Cir. 1995). 

AFFIRMED.
#### ORANGE MOTORS OF MIAMI, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellants, v. DREW NATIONAL LEASING CORP., Appellee.

No. 70-1238.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 31, 1971.

Rehearing Denied April 30, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
256 La. 897

#### Terry FUSILIER v. DIXIE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 50886.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 23, 1970.

In re: Dixie Auto Insurance Company applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Evangeline. 238 So.2d 223.

Writ refused: On the facts found by the Court of Appeal there appears no error of law in its judgment.
#### In re: ESTATE of Earl Tom PRIDGEON, Jr., Deceased.

No. DD-43.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Aug. 25, 1977.

*742Robert C. Parker, Jr., Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Mick, Henry, Buchanan, Mick & English, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court correctly construed the term “independent action” appearing in § 733.705(3), Florida Statutes, 1975, to require the filing of a separate action upon a claim against an estate to which an objection has been filed rather than the filing of a petition for payment of the claim in the probate action. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in extending the claimant’s time for filing such independent action.

Affirmed.

McCORD, C. J., and BOYER, J., concur.

RAWLS, J., dissents.

RAWLS, Judge

(dissenting).

This court’s majority opinion in *In Re Kemp’s Estate,*177 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), mandates a reversal of the case at bar.

Here, the trial court’s basis for finding “good cause” is:

> “ . . . the Court being of the opinion that considerable confusion has been generated by transition to the new Florida Probate Code effective January 1, 1976, and that additional confusion has resulted from the adoption of Article V of the Florida Constitution effective January 1, 1973, conveying to the Circuit Court jurisdiction over administration of decedents’ estates . . . .”

and upon these grounds granted to appellee a period of 15 days to file an action.1

Judge Sturgis, speaking for this court in the *Kemp*case, quoted at length from the landmark case of *In Re Goldman’s Estate,*79 So.2d 846 (Fla.1955). The facts in *Goldman*are quite analogous to those in the instant case in that the attorneys for claimant alleged that confusion had resulted in their not receiving a copy of the new statute reducing the time for filing suit from one year to 60 days. The probate judge agreed with claimant and entered an order extending the time to file suit. In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court, in quoting from *In Re Jeffries’ Estate,*136 Fla. 410, 181 So. 833 (1938), held:

> “. . . [A] cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a ‘good cause’, by which it is meant that the ‘adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action’ . . . and not mere ‘ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another’s] advice’. . . . ”

See also *Ellard v. Godwin,*77 So.2d 617 (Fla.1955); and *Exchange Nat. Bank of Winter Haven v. Field,*338 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976).

1

. Since the enactment of the Probate Code in 1933, the rule of law has required the filing of a separate action to enforce a claim to which an objection has been filed. No opinion upon this question remotely suggests that a petition for payment of claim would suffice. Every case reviewed reflects that a separate action from the probate proceeding must be filed. The subject statute, Sec. 733.705(3), Fla.Stat., is even more explicit than in the former in that it states “an independent action”.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

C: \ Users \ Robert.Finamore \ AppData \ Local \ Microsoft \ Windows \ Temporary Internet Files \ Content.Outlook \ JL0K7VWC \ 111220reciprocity letter.doc

2 0 December 2012

Mr Paul Gretch

Director

Office of International Aviation

US Department of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE

Washington DC 20590

Dear Paul,

CHARTER OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA

This letter is to confirm that the UK Government, on the basis of reciprocity,

will approve requests from US

- designated airlines to perform fifth, sixth and

seventh freedom cha rter operations on the understanding that the US Government

will approve similar requests from UK

- designated airlines.

The UK Government also confirms that approval for similar charter operations by US

airlines to the UK's Overseas Territories will also be granted, where reciprocity

applies.

Yours sincerely,

Judith

Judith Ritchie

First Secretary (Transport Policy)

cc: Mary Street, DoT

James Gilderoy, DfT London Tel: (202) 588

- 6696

Fax: (202) 588

- 7901

E

- mail: Judith.Ritchie @ fco.gov.uk
#### EDP TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Delaware corporation, Petitioner, v. Kyran MURPHY, Respondent.

No. 71-231.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 15, 1971.

Certiorari dismissed.
#### William Terry BROWN, Petitioner, v. Monroe BRANNEN, Sheriff, Polk County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 74-77.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Jan. 25, 1974.

_ Habeas corpus denied.
No. 72-5632.

#### Worton *v.*Oklahoma.

C. A. 10th Cir. Motion to amend petition granted. Certiorari denied.
November 16, 2015 

Dear Mr. Collins: 

This letter is to inform you that the following information is missing from your petition (Docket 

No. FAA−2015−3742). This information is necessary for the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) to process your petition. 

 Provide a copy of the Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM) 

which is required by Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 1. If you wish for us to 

proceed without this manual and remove closed-set filming from your proposed operation 

please inform of us of your intention by the requested response date listed below. 

Please submit the additional information (non-proprietary) to your docket at 

www.regulations.gov. Once your information has been submitted, please also send a copy of the 

requested information (and any proprietary information), as well as your comment tracking 

number from regulations.gov via e-mail to 333exemptions@faa.gov. If you want us to process 

your request any further, we must receive the information described above by 11/30/15. If we do 

not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further. 

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 267-2999. 

Sincerely, 

/S/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst
#### MEISELMAN v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH.

No. 38253.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 1969.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 216 So.2d 774.
#### Joseph H. COUCH, Sr., and Harriet D. Couch, his wife, Petitioners, v. Richard L. BOOTH and Marion L. Booth, his wife, Respondents.

No. 40592.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 4, 1971.

Certiorari denied. 240 So.2d 532.

ERVIN, Acting C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 13.1

Certification by the Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Concord Medical Services Holdings Limited (the Company) for the year ended December 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Jianyu Yang, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

Date: April 25, 2012



|    |  |                                                 
|--- |  | ------------------------------------------------
|By: |  | /s/ Jianyu Yang                                 
|    |  | Name: Jianyu Yang Title:
Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.2.2

CERTIFICATION REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,
Joan S. Freilich, the Chief Financial Officer of Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (the "Company") certify that the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003, which this statement accompanies, (the "Form 10-Q") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

|                       |  | /s/JOAN S. FREILICHJoan S. Freilich
|---------------------- |  | -----------------------------------
|Dated: August 12, 2003 |  |                                    

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---

QuickLinks
#### Claude CARSWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-1166.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

March 15, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### T. J. SIMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 77-1833 and 77-1834 Consolidated.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 12, 1978.

Jack 0. Johnson, ■ Public Defender, Bar-tow, and Wayne Chalu, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant’s probation supervisor filed affidavits charging appellant, who was on probation in two separate cases, with violating conditions (2), (4), (7), (10), and (14) of his probation. At the hearing on the affidavits, the trial court heard evidence of violations of conditions (2), (7), (10), and (14) and then revoked probation. We affirm that revocation, but we agree with appellant that there is an imperfection in the orders revoking probation.

The orders state that appellant was guilty of violating conditions (2), (4), and (7). However, since the court did not hear evidence concerning a violation of condition (4) it should now remove any reference to that condition. *See Brewster v. State,*352 So.2d 1267 (Fla.2d DCA 1977).

Accordingly, we remand the case for correction of the revocation orders as expressed in this opinion. Appellant need not be present for that purpose.

HOBSON, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN and OTT, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 27 (Monday, February 10, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6012-6013]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-3134]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[DEA #153C]


Controlled Substances: Established Initial 1997 Aggregate 
Production Quotas: Corrections

AGENCY: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Justice.


[[Page 6013]]


ACTION: Notice of corrections.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice corrects the notice establishing initial 1997 
aggregate production quotas which was published Tuesday, December 17, 
1996 (61 FR 66311).

EFFECTIVE DATE: This order is effective upon December 17, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Frank L. Sapienza, Chief, Drug & Chemical Evaluation Section, Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Washington, D.C. 20537, Telephone: (202) 
307-7183.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In notice document 96-31889 beginning on 
page 66311, three lines were inadvertently omitted, therefore the 
following corrections are being made. In the table on page 66312, the 
following three lines should be inserted immediately before 2,5-
Dimethoxy-4-ethylamphetamine (DOET).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Established
                        Basic class                            initial  
                                                             1997 quotas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Schedule I:                                                             
  2,5-Dimethoxyamphetamine.................................   15,200,100
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    Dated: January 31, 1997.
James S. Milford,
Acting Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 97-3134 Filed 2-7-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-M
#### Thomas Niza WILLIAMS, alias v. STATE.

1 Div. 759.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 1, 1977.

Rehearing Denied March 29, 1977.

Ian F. Gaston, Mobile, for appellant.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and David W. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BOWEN W. SIMMONS, Retired Circuit Judge.

Appellant-defendant, an indigent at nisi prius and here was convicted of robbery and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. He entered a plea of not guilty and did not take the witness stand except on a voir dire outside the presence of the jury on a motion to suppress evidence. The motion was denied.

His plea of not guilty cast a burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the material allegations of the indictment charging the offense. Such proof embraced the identity of defendant as the one who committed the crime.

Defendant here asserts only one contention of error. He contends that the court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony of the victim that defendant came back a week later, robbed her again and incidentally made some comment about the prior robbery. [See *Williams v. State,*Ala. Cr.App., 338 So.2d 522.]

As a general rule other offenses, prior or subsequent, are not admissible in evidence to establish crime, however, there are exceptions. One exception is to establish identity of defendant. *Murphy v. State,*52 Ala.App. 490, 294 So.2d 457(2)(3); *Weatherspoon v. State,*36 Ala.App. 392, 56 So.2d 793(1).

*708But defendant contends that identity was not an issue in this case, we cannot agree with this contention. When defendant entered his plea of not guilty, his identity became a very important issue which was not mitigated or softened due to defendant’s failure to take the stand before the jury and deny his guilt or identity; nor because he failed to offer any evidence before the jury denying his confession as related by a police officer.

The State had a lawful right to establish the identity of defendant as the robbery culprit by competent evidence, even though redundant. The fact that she saw him a week later, when he again robbed her, was admissible even though she was positive of the first identification. This second observation of defendant tended to strengthen the first identification and tended to impress the jury that she was not mistaken. The fact that the second observation of defendant was under circumstances involving a second offense of robbery against the same victim did not preclude the State from offering it to establish identity, which burden the State carried.

The foregoing opinion was prepared by the Honorable BOWEN W. SIMMONS, Retired Circuit Judge, serving as a judge of this Court under § 2 of Act No. 288, July 7, 1945, as amended; his opinion is hereby adopted as that of the Court.

AFFIRMED.

All the Judges concur.
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