[Cite as State v. J.B. , 2021-Ohio-187.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. J. B. Appellant C.A. No. 29699

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE STOW MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nos. 1997CRB2031 1998CRB2837 2006CRA2418 2006CRB3868
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: January 27, 2021

SCHAFER, Judge. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant, J.B., appeal s from the judgment of the Sto w Municipal Court, denying his application t o seal his records. This Court affirms.
I. {¶2} J.B. moved to seal his criminal records in five separate cases. Three of those cases resulted in convictions on the following charges: (1) drug para phernalia offenses, a fourth-degree misdemeanor; (2) disorderly conduc t, a minor misdemeanor; and ( 3) passing bad checks, a firstdegree misdemeanor by virtue of a plea agreement. The two othe r cases resulted in dismissals and involved a charge for failing t o file income taxe s and a charge for passing bad checks. {¶3} J.B. also had a sixth criminal case that he did not move to sea l. That case resulted in (1) a conviction for assault, a first-degree misdemeanor; (2 ) a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, a fourth-degree felony; and (3) the dismissal of a charge for aggravated2 menacing. Although he did not move to seal his sixth case, the probation depar tment advised the trial court that he was not eligible to have his other cases se aled because he had been convicted of an offense of violence (i.e., a ssault) and had more than two mi sdemeanor convictions. The trial court agreed with that assessment and denied J.B.’s application for sealing without holding a hearing. {¶4} J.B. appealed from the trial court’s denial of his application to seal his records. On appeal, this Court determined that the trial court had erred wh en it denied the application for sealing without first holding a mandatory hearing. State v. J.B. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 29286, 2019-Ohio-4659, ¶ 15. We, therefore , remanded the matter for t he requisite hearing. Id. In doing so, we took no position on J.B.’s eligibility for sealing. Id. {¶5} On remand, the trial court held a hearing on J.B.’s application for sealing. The court then denied his applica tion, finding that he was not elig ible to have his records sealed. {¶6} J.B. now appeals from the trial c ourt’s judgment, denying his a pplication for sealing. He raises one assignm ent of error for our review.
II. Assignment of Error The trial court erred in ruling that J.B. is not an eligible of fender to have his criminal records sealed. {¶7} In his sole assignment of error, J.B. argues that the trial cou rt erred when it found that he was not an eligible offender for purposes of having his criminal records sealed. We do not agree that the trial court erred. {¶8} When a case hinges upon the interp retation of the sealing statu tes and an applicant’s eligibility under the same, this Court employs a de novo standa rd of review. Stow v. S.B. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27429, 2015-Ohio-4473, ¶ 6. “A de novo review requi res an independent review of3 the trial court’s decision without any deference to the trial c ourt’s determination.” State v.
Consilio , 9th Dist. Summit No. 22761, 2006-Ohio-649, ¶ 4. {¶9} “The sealing of a criminal record * * * is an ‘act of grace cre ated by the state.’” State v. Boykin , 138 Ohio St.3d 97, 2013-Ohio-4582, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Hamilton , 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639 (1996). “It should be granted only when all req uirements for eligibility are met, because it is a ‘privilege, not a right.’” Boykin at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Futrall , 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-5590, ¶ 6. The sealing statute permits any “eli gible offender” to apply for sealing once enough time has passed. R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). There are tw o eligibility categories, separated by the number and type of offenses of which an offender has bee n convicted. See R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a)-(b). Relevant to this appeal, the first categ ory excludes offenders who have been convicted of “an offense of violence.” See R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a). Offenses of violence are statutorily defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(9). See J.B. , 2019-Ohio-4659, at ¶ 14. {¶10} If an offender previously has been convicted of an offense of v iolence and wishes to have his criminal record(s) sealed, he must meet the eligibi lity requirements set forth in R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b). Relevant to this appeal, that subsection def ines an “eligible offender” as “[a]nyone who has been convicted of an offense * * * and who ha s not more than one felony conviction, not more than two mis demeanor convictions, or not m ore than one felony conviction and one misdemeanor conviction in t his state or any other juris diction.” R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b). {¶11} J.B. concedes that he has a prior conviction for assault, which is an offense of violence. See R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a) (including as an offense of violence any violation of R.C. 2903.13). He nonetheless argues that the trial court should ha ve applied R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a) when determining whether he was an “eligible offender.” Accord ing to J.B., the legislature has made clear that a conviction fo r misdemeanor assault is eligibl e for sealing, even though it is4 generally considered an offense of violence. See R.C. 2953.36(A)(3). Because a conviction for misdemeanor assault is eligib le for sealing under R.C. 2953.36( A)(3), J.B. argues, it should not be considered an “offense of vi olence” for purposes of R.C. 2953.3 1(A)(1)(a). {¶12} “R.C. 2953.36 precludes the sealing of records of certain convi ctions * * *.” State
v. V.M.D. , 148 Ohio St.3d 450, 2016-Ohio-8090, ¶ 14. In other words, if an offender has been convicted of one of the offenses enumerated in that statute, he “is an ineligible offender” as a matter of law. Id. The statute generally prohibits the sealing of offenses of vi olence, but does specifically allow for the sealin g of a conviction for first-de gree misdemeanor assault under R.C. 2903.13. R.C. 2953.36(A)(3). Accordingly, an offender who has been convicted of first-degree misdemeanor assault under R.C. 2903.13 is not per se ineligible to have his record(s) sealed. See
V.M.D. at ¶ 14; R.C. 2953.36(A)(3). {¶13} “While this Court agrees that R.C. 2953.36(A)(3) * * * does not outright preclude the offense [of misdemeanor assau lt] from being sealed, we do n ot agree with J.B.’s contention that this statute likewise strips misdemeanor assault of its ge neral classification as an ‘offense of violence’ under R.C. 2901.01(A)(9) for sealing purposes.” J.B. , 2019-Ohio-4659, at ¶ 14. An applicant for sealing whose offenses are not statutorily exempt from sealing still must otherwise demonstrate that he is an “eligible offender.” See id. at ¶ 14-15; R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). Because J.B.’s misdemeanor assault convi ction was an offense of violenc e, see R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a), the trial court correctly determined that he was subject to the “el igible offender” definition contained in R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b). {¶14} Under R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b), an elig ible offender is someone wh o has “not more than one felony conviction, not m ore than two misdemeanor convi ctions, or not more than one felony conviction and one misdemeanor conviction in this state or any other jurisdiction.” The5
trial court concluded that, becau se J.B. had more than two misd emeanor convictions, he was not eligible to have his records seal ed. The trial court further c oncluded that J.B. was not eligible because he had been convicted of more than one felony and one m isdemeanor. J.B. has not challenged the court’s conclusi on that he is not eligible for s ealing under R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b). His argument is limited to the court’s interpretation and appli cation of R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(a). Because J.B. has not addressed th e court’s application of R.C. 2953.31(A)(1)(b), we will not develop an argume nt on his behalf. See App.R. 16(A)(7); Cardone v. Cardone , 9th Dist. Summit No. 18349, 1998 WL 224934, *8 (May 6, 1998) (“If an argument ex ists that can support this assignment of error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out .”). J.B. has not shown that the trial court erred when it denied his application for sealing. As suc h, J.B.’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
III. {¶15} J.B.’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Stow Municipal Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Stow Municipal Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into ex ecution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to6 mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to m ake a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

JULIE A. SCHAFER FOR THE COURT

CALLAHAN, P. J. HENSAL, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: GREGORY B. MATHEWS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. RUSSELL BALTHIS, Law Director, a nd GREGORY WARD, Attorney at La w, for Appellee.