332 June 14, 2023 No. 295

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RYAN GRANT CLEAVER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Malheur County Circuit Court

20CR65253; A177908

Robert S. Raschio, Judge.

Argued and submitted January 11, 2023.

Laura Graser argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. 

Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, 

Solicitor General.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief 

Judge, and Powers, Judge.

ORTEGA, P. J.

Affirmed.
Cite as 326 Or App 332 (2023) 333

ORTEGA, P. J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him 

of private indecency, ORS 163.467, and assigns error to the 

trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. 

Defendant contends that the state failed to adduce sufficient 

evidence that he exposed himself in a “place where another 

person has a reasonable expectation of privacy” because the 

victim, his 17-year-old daughter, did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the “marital bedroom” that he and 

his wife share. We affirm.

The relevant facts are few, and we recount them in 

the light most favorable to the state, drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the state’s favor. State v. Zamora, 326 Or App 

140, 142, ___ P3d ___ (2023). In November 2020, defendant’s 

17-year-old daughter, A, lived with defendant and his wife in 

their home. A entered defendant’s bedroom, which he shares 

with his wife, to ask defendant about an upcoming shopping 

trip. Defendant was lying on the bed, fully clothed, and A 

was talking to her boyfriend on her cell phone. A few minutes 

later, defendant exposed his penis and began masturbating. 

A ended the call with her boyfriend and began recording a 

video of defendant with her cell phone. The video, which the 

state introduced at trial, shows defendant stroking his erect 

penis for about one minute while A and defendant engage in 

casual conversation. Although A generally understood that 

she was not allowed to enter her parents’ bedroom unless 

she was invited, the door was open, and defendant never 

asked her to leave.

The state charged defendant with private indecency, ORS 163.467.1

 At the close of the state’s evidence, 

1 ORS 163.467 provides: 

“(1) A person commits the crime of private indecency if the person 

exposes the genitals of the person with the intent of arousing the sexual 

desire of the person or another person and:

“(a) The person is in a place where another person has a reasonable 

expectation of privacy;

“(b) The person is in view of the other person;

“(c) The exposure reasonably would be expected to alarm or annoy the 

other person; and

“(d) The person knows that the other person did not consent to the 

exposure.
334 State v. Cleaver

defendant moved for judgment of acquittal. He argued that 

there was insufficient evidence that he was in a “place where 

another person has a reasonable expectation of privacy,” 

ORS 163.647(1)(a), to convict him as a matter of law because, 

in his view, A had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 

defendant’s bedroom; defendant argued that only he and 

his wife have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 

bedroom. Defendant contended that a person’s reasonable 

expectation of privacy varies with the room because “different rooms of [a] house have different purposes.”

The state responded that defendant was misconstruing “place where another person has a reasonable 

expectation of privacy” as a place where that other person 

has a right to exclude others or be free from observation. 

Correctly understood, the state argued, that element focuses 

on whether the defendant is in a place where another person 

has a reasonable expectation to be free from the intrusion of 

someone indecently exposing themselves to the person. The 

state pointed to ORS 163.467(4), which expressly includes 

“residences” as a “place where another person has a reasonable expectation of privacy,” and argued that A had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in her parents’ bedroom 

because she was in a residence, regardless of which particular room she was in within the residence. The trial court 

denied defendant’s motion.

On appeal, the parties reprise the arguments they 

made to the trial court. Thus, the issue before us is whether 

the state adduced sufficient evidence that defendant was in 

a “place where another person has a reasonable expectation 

of privacy” within the meaning of ORS 163.467. We conclude 

that it did and that the trial court therefore correctly denied 

defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

We have previously construed “place where another 

person has a reasonable expectation of privacy” to include, 

“(2) Private indecency is a Class A misdemeanor.

“(3) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to a person who commits 

the act described in subsection (1) of this section if the person cohabits with 

and is involved in a sexually intimate relationship with the other person.

“(4) For purposes of this section, ‘place where another person has a reasonable expectation of privacy’ includes, but is not limited to, residences, 

yards of residences, working areas and offices.”
Cite as 326 Or App 332 (2023) 335

as a matter of law, those places set forth in ORS 163.467(4). 

In State v. Miller, 242 Or App 572, 256 P3d 171 (2011), the 

defendant was charged with private indecency for masturbating in a holding cell in view of the victim, who was seated 

in a hallway across from the defendant’s cell awaiting a 

court proceeding in an unrelated criminal case. The hallway 

was not open to the public, but it was open to judges, court 

staff, maintenance personnel, and occasional escorted tour 

groups. Id. at 574. On appeal, the defendant challenged the 

denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal and argued 

that the victim was not in a place where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The state remonstrated that 

“the victim was in a ‘working area,’ which is a specifically 

protected area under ORS 163.467(4).” Id. at 577.

We agreed with the state. In construing the 

private indecency statute, we first observed that, “[i]n 

ORS.163.467(4), the legislature defined ‘place where another 

person has a reasonable expectation of privacy’ for purposes 

of ORS 163.467.” Id. (emphasis added). We then construed 

one such place, “working area,” and concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude 

that the jail hallway was “a ‘working area’ and thus a ‘place 

where another person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.’” Id. at 578.

The analysis in Miller applies equally to this case. 

There is no dispute that defendant exposed himself to A 

while in defendant’s bedroom, nor is there any dispute that 

the bedroom was inside defendant’s and A’s “residence.” See 

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1931 (unabridged ed 

2002) (defining “residence” as “a building used as a home 

: dwelling”). Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence here 

for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that defendant’s bedroom was part of a “residence,” ORS 163.467(4), and thus a 

“place where another person has a reasonable expectation 

of privacy,” ORS 163.467(1)(a). The trial court therefore correctly denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

In arguing for a different result, defendant makes 

several related arguments, none of which we find persuasive. We understand defendant to argue that a “place where 

another person has a reasonable expectation of privacy” 
336 State v. Cleaver

depends on whether the person has a right to access the 

place, a right to be free from scrutiny while in the place, and 

a right to exclude others from the place that is superior to the 

defendant’s right to exclude others from the place. We disagree. As we recently held in State v. Wimmer, 325 Or App 

372, 379, ___ P3d ___ (2023), the legislature enacted the private indecency statute with the intent “to cover situations 

where the [inappropriate] exposure occurs in a place that a 

person reasonably expects is not public.” That is, for purposes 

of ORS 163.467(1)(a), a person has a reasonable expectation 

of privacy in a place when the person reasonably expects 

that the place is not public—i.e., it is a place to which the 

general public does not have access—regardless of whether 

the person has a right to access the place or to be free from 

scrutiny while in that place. We also concluded that there is 

no indication in the text, context, or legislative history that 

“reasonable expectation of privacy” in ORS 163.467 is meant 

to incorporate the standard under the Fourth Amendment. 

Id. at 376-77. Nor is there any indication that the defendant’s

reasonable expectation of privacy is relevant to the analysis; 

indeed, the statute requires only that the defendant’s exposure occur at a “place where another person has a reasonable 

expectation of privacy.” ORS 163.467(1)(a) (emphasis added).

Finally, defendant argues that construing ORS 

163.467(1)(a) to include those places listed in ORS 163.467(4) 

by definition would lead to “absurd results.” However, “without ambiguity as to the legislative intent after consulting 

the text, context, and legislative history, we do not reach 

canons of construction.” Coos Waterkeeper v. Port of Coos Bay 

Oregon, 363 Or 354, 371-72, 423 P3d 60 (2018) (citing State 

v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009)).

Affirmed.