Report to the Congress

on

Joint Liability and Innocent Spouse

Issues

Department of the Treasury

February 1998
2/9/98

The Honorable Bill Archer 

Chairman 

Committee on Ways and Means 

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Section 401 of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1453 (July 30,

1996), requires the Treasury Department to conduct a study of issues relating to joint income tax

returns. Enclosed is our report of that study. As directed by Congress, the issues discussed

include:

1) The effects of changing liability for tax on a joint return from being joint and several to

being proportionate to the tax attributable to each spouse;

2) The effects of providing that, if a divorce decree allocates liability for tax on a joint return

filed before the divorce, the Secretary may collect such liability only in accordance with

the decree;

3) Whether those provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 intended to provide relief

to innocent spouses provide meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is appropriate;

4) The effect of providing that community income (as defined in section 66(d) of the Internal

Revenue Code) which, in accordance with the rules contained in section 879(a) of such

Code, would be treated as the income of one spouse, is exempt from a levy for failure to

pay any tax imposed by subtitle A by the other spouse for a taxable year ending before their

marriage.

The Administration recently proposed, as part of the Fiscal Year 1999 Budget, legislation

that would amend the innocent spouse provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 

Legislation currently pending in Congress (particularly H. R. 2676) also would amend these

provisions. We look forward to working with Congress to adopt meaningful solutions to this

important problem.

I am sending a similar letter to Mr. Rangel. 

Sincerely,

/signed/

Donald C. Lubick

 Acting Assistant Secretary

 (Tax Policy)
2/9/98

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

Chairman 

Committee on Finance

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Section 401 of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1453 (July 30,

1996), requires the Treasury Department to conduct a study of issues relating to joint income tax

returns. Enclosed is our report of that study. As directed by Congress, the issues discussed

include:

1) The effects of changing liability for tax on a joint return from being joint and several to

being proportionate to the tax attributable to each spouse;

2) The effects of providing that, if a divorce decree allocates liability for tax on a joint return

filed before the divorce, the Secretary may collect such liability only in accordance with

the decree;

3) Whether those provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 intended to provide relief

to innocent spouses provide meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is appropriate;

4) The effect of providing that community income (as defined in section 66(d) of the Internal

Revenue Code) which, in accordance with the rules contained in section 879(a) of such

Code, would be treated as the income of one spouse, is exempt from a levy for failure to

pay any tax imposed by subtitle A by the other spouse for a taxable year ending before their

marriage.

The Administration recently proposed, as part of the Fiscal Year 1999 Budget, legislation

that would amend the innocent spouse provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 

Legislation currently pending in Congress (particularly H. R. 2676) also would amend these

provisions. We look forward to working with Congress to adopt meaningful solutions to this

important problem.

I am sending a similar letter to Senator Moynihan. 

Sincerely,

/signed/

Donald C. Lubick

 Acting Assistant Secretary

 (Tax Policy)
- i -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 4

BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LAW CONCERNING JOINT AND 

SEVERAL LIABILITY ...................................................... 6

A. Joint Filing for Married Taxpayers ......................................... 6

1. Origin of Joint Filing .............................................. 6

2. Effect of Community Property Law on Joint Filing ....................... 7

3. Current Joint Filing ............................................... 8

B. Collecting Unpaid Tax ................................................. 10

1. In General .................................................... 10

2. Collecting Unpaid Taxes of Married Taxpayers ......................... 10

C. Relief Provisions ..................................................... 12

1. Background: The Need for Relief .................................. 12

2. Current Requirements for Innocent Spouse Relief for Joint Return Filers ..... 13

a. A Joint Return Has Been Made For The Taxable Year ............. 13

b. There is a Substantial Understatement of Tax Attributable to Grossly

Erroneous Items of the Other Spouse .......................... 14

i. The Return Contained a Substantial Understatement of Tax .... 14

ii. The Understatement Was Grossly Erroneous ............... 15

iii. The Understatement Was Attributable to the Other Spouse .... 16

c. The Taxpayer Did Not Know, and Had No Reason To Know, of the

Substantial Understatement .................................. 16

i. The Taxpayer Did Not Know .......................... 16

ii. The Taxpayer Had No Reason To Know .................. 17

d. It Would Be Inequitable To Hold The Taxpayer Liable For

The Deficiency ........................................... 18

3. Requirements for Relief for Separate Return Filers in Community

Property States ................................................. 19

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT IRS ADMINISTRATION OF JOINT RETURNS ........... 21

PROPOSALS TO REPLACE OR REFORM THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

STANDARD .............................................................. 23

A. Introduction ......................................................... 23

B. Mandatory Separate Returns For All Filers .................................. 24

1. Description of Proposal .......................................... 24

2. Effect on Taxpayers ............................................. 25

3. Effect on IRS Administration ...................................... 27
- ii -

4. Effectiveness of the Proposal ...................................... 29

5. Summary ..................................................... 29

C. Proportionate Liability ................................................. 29

1. Front End Proportionate Liability ................................... 30

a. Description of Proposal ..................................... 30

b. Effect on Taxpayers ....................................... 31

c. Effect on IRS Administration ................................ 31

d. Effectiveness of Proposal ................................... 32

e. Summary ............................................... 34

2. Back End Proportionate Liability - ABA Separate Liability Proposal ........ 34

a. Description of Proposal ..................................... 34

b. Effect on Taxpayers ....................................... 36

c. Effect on IRS Administration ................................ 36

d. Effectiveness of Proposal ................................... 37

e. Summary ............................................... 38

D. AICPA Proposal: Allocated Liability Standard .............................. 38

1. Description of Proposal .......................................... 38

2. Effect on Taxpayers ............................................. 38

3. Effect on IRS Administration ...................................... 40

4. Effectiveness of Proposal ......................................... 40

5. Summary ..................................................... 41

E. Determine Tax Liability in Accordance With Divorce Decree ................... 41

1. Description of Proposal .......................................... 41

2. Effect on Taxpayers ............................................. 42

3. Effect on IRS Administration ...................................... 42

4. Effectiveness of Proposal ......................................... 44

5. Summary ..................................................... 44

COMMUNITY PROPERTY ISSUES ........................................... 45

A. Limiting Community Property That is Subject to Federal Tax Collection ........... 45

B. Effect of Overruling Poe v. Seaborn ....................................... 47

REFORM OF THE INNOCENT SPOUSE PROVISIONS ........................... 49

A. Introduction ......................................................... 49

B. Perceived Problems Under I.R.C. § 6013(e) ................................. 49

1. Substantial Understatement ....................................... 49

2. Grossly Erroneous Items ......................................... 50

3. Actual or Constructive Knowledge .................................. 51

4. Equitable Factors ............................................... 51

C. Improvements to the Innocent Spouse Provisions ............................. 52

1. Administrative Improvements ...................................... 52

2. Potential Legislative and Regulatory Improvements ..................... 53

a. Substantial Understatement .................................. 53

b. Grossly Erroneous Items .................................... 53
- iii -

c. Actual or Constructive Knowledge ............................ 54

d. Equitable Factors ......................................... 54

e. I.R.C. § 66 .............................................. 54

f. Better Access to Tax Court .................................. 55

g. Collection Stay During Litigation ............................. 56

CONCLUSION ............................................................ 57
- 1 -

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The innocent spouse rules currently do not provide relief from joint and several liability in

certain meritorious cases. In section 401 of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110

Stat. 1453 (July 30, 1996), Congress directed the Treasury Department and the IRS to conduct a

study analyzing whether existing law provides meaningful relief in all cases where it is appropriate

and considering the effects of various proposals to change the liability rules for joint filers. This

report discusses the results of that study. Treasury and the IRS are proposing a series of legislative

and administrative changes to address the liability issues affecting innocent spouses.

Background

Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (“Code”), married taxpayers may elect to file their

annual income tax returns either jointly or separately. The filing status that the taxpayers elect

determines not only the computation of their correct tax but also their ultimate liability for the proper

amount of tax due. Under current law, a married taxpayer who files separately is liable only for the

proper amount of tax attributable to his or her own return, and not for the tax attributable to his or

her spouse’s return. By contrast, taxpayers who file joint returns are held jointly and severally liable

for the full, correct amount of tax for both spouses (using joint filing status) for the year at issue.

These rules (permitting married taxpayers to elect their filing status and attaching certain liability

consequences to that decision) have evolved over the course of the development of the income tax

for several reasons, in particular to facilitate treating married couples as a single economic and

taxpaying unit and to accommodate certain differences between community property and noncommunity property states. Further, because of the current structure of the income tax, there

generally is an economic incentive for married couples to file jointly, rather than as married filing

separately. The systems of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for processing tax returns,

collecting unpaid tax liabilities, and resolving tax disputes are also substantially structured to reflect

the joint filing rules. 

Until the enactment of various relief provisions (beginning in 1971), an individual could avoid

the liability consequences of joint return filing only under common law doctrines, for instance by

demonstrating that the individual’s signature was a forgery or that it was obtained as a result of fraud,

duress, misrepresentation, or mistake. Often the most sympathetic cases involve a separated or

divorced individual whose former spouse withholds knowledge of the inaccuracy of the joint return

and who later finds himself or herself facing a joint and several liability significantly larger than

anticipated when the return was filed. 

Therefore, in 1971, 1980, and again in 1984, Congress enacted provisions enabling spouses

to obtain equitable relief from joint and several liability in various circumstances. In most cases under

current law, these “innocent spouse” rules provide relief from joint and several liability only if a joint

return filer can demonstrate four separate statutory requirements: (1) that a joint return was made

for the taxable year; (2) that the joint return contains a substantial understatement of tax attributable

to grossly erroneous items of the other spouse; (3) that the taxpayer did not know, and had no reason
- 2 -

to know, of the substantial understatement when he or she signed the joint return; and (4) that it

would be inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for the deficiency in income tax attributable to the

substantial understatement.

Findings

The report acknowledges that the current joint and several liability and innocent spouse rules

are imperfect in certain respects. It reviews various proposals to change these rules and concludes

that each has certain advantages in comparison to the present system but also suffers from defects of

its own. In particular, proposals to limit one spouse’s liability for items of income, deduction, or

credit that are considered properly attributable (under various formulations) to the other spouse

would impose increased burdens on taxpayers and the IRS yet would still require some kind of

equitable relief provisions in certain egregious situations. 

In an effort to improve the application of the current innocent spouse provisions, the Treasury

Department and the IRS have implemented, and are in the process of implementing, several

administrative actions. These administrative steps include:

! Expediting the issuance of a new form to assist taxpayers in preparing claims for relief under

the innocent spouse provisions. These forms will be processed in one central location to

ensure the technical expertise of the IRS examiner and consistent treatment for taxpayers. 

! Reviewing current training materials to ensure that they stress the responsibility of employees

to identify situations where the innocent spouse provisions might apply, even if the taxpayer

does not know about the provisions. When appropriate, the IRS will provide these taxpayers

with the new form and assist them in preparing it. 

! Making telephone assistors, specially trained in the innocent spouse provisions, available to

answer questions from taxpayers received through IRS’ toll free telephone system.

! Developing special training courses on the innocent spouse provisions to be given to IRS

collection and examination personnel in both basic training as well as annual continuing

professional education training.

! Alerting couples who file joint income tax returns of the legal consequences of joint filing in

the instructions in their tax packages, and revising other publications to make innocent

spouses more aware of the relief provisions available to them. 

! Conducting focused outreach on both the national and local levels to community

organizations that serve abused or battered spouses to identify those who might qualify for

relief under the innocent spouse provisions.
- 3 -

Treasury and the IRS also recommend certain statutory changes that would preserve the advantages

of the current system and yet afford innocent spouse relief in more situations. In particular, we

recommend legislation that would:

! Automatically suspend collection efforts against one spouse when the other is contesting a

proposed joint assessment in Tax Court.

! Make innocent spouse relief easier to obtain by changing statutory standards to help

additional taxpayers, including those with smaller tax bills who are presently ineligible for

relief in many cases.

! Give more taxpayers who are denied innocent spouse relief by the IRS an opportunity to

appeal the IRS decision to Tax Court, and automatically suspending collection while the Tax

Court considers the appeal.

These legislative proposals were proposed previously by President Clinton last October and were

included in the Administration's fiscal year 1999 budget. The Treasury Department and the IRS look

forward to working with the tax-writing committees to implement these recommendations as

promptly as possible. 
For convenience, the Internal Revenue Service will be referred to as either “the IRS” or 1/

“the Service,” the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1453 (July 30,

1996), will be referred to as “TBOR 2,” and the Internal Revenue Code will be referred to as “the

Code” or as “I.R.C.” when referring to a specific section (“§”). 

- 4 -

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, with the support of the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of the

Treasury, Congress enacted the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1453 (July

30, 1996). As part of the TBOR 2 process, Congress heard from taxpayers and their representatives 1/

about how the tax system works for married taxpayers who file joint returns, particularly those joint

filers who later divorce or separate. Many of the comments focused on how the Internal Revenue

Code's current standard of joint and several liability affects married taxpayers who file joint returns.

Therefore, in TBOR 2, Congress directed Treasury and the IRS to conduct a study analyzing the

following four items:

(1) The effects of changing the liability for tax on a joint return from being joint and

several to being proportionate to the tax attributable to each spouse. 

(2) The effects of providing that, if a divorce decree allocates liability for tax on a joint

return filed before the divorce, the Secretary may collect such liability only in

accordance with the decree.

(3) Whether those provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 intended to provide

relief to innocent spouses provide meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is

appropriate.

(4) The effect of providing that community income (as defined in I.R.C. § 66(d)) which,

in accordance with the rules contained in I.R.C. § 879(a), would be treated as the

income of one spouse, is exempt from a levy for failure to pay any tax imposed by

subtitle A by the other spouse for a taxable year ending before their marriage.

See TBOR 2, § 401.

The House Committee on Ways and Means Report concerning TBOR 2 further directed

Treasury and the IRS to "examine the tax policy implications, the equity implications, and operational

changes which would face the IRS if the liability standard were changed.” H.R. Rep. No. 506, 103rd

Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1996). The House Report also directed Treasury and the IRS to examine "the

effects of overturning the application of Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), for income tax

purposes in community property states" in connection with the fourth topic specified in the statutory

provision.
- 5 -

Treasury and the IRS began studying these issues before enactment of TBOR 2 as part of the

"Administrative Initiatives to Enhance Taxpayer's Rights," Announcement 96-4, 1996-4 I.R.B. 99

at 101 (January 22, 1996). Treasury and the IRS requested public comments on the study topics and

reform proposals in Notice 96-19, 1996-1 C.B. 371. The following report sets out the results of the

study.

This report first traces the development of the joint and several liability standard and the

innocent spouse provisions, and it then describes current IRS procedures for administering these

provisions. These discussions provide the context for understanding proposals to reform or replace

the joint and several liability standard, the innocent spouse provisions, and certain community

property laws. The report analyzes several proposals for change and concludes with a discussion of

the Administration’s own administrative and legislative proposals in this area. 
For example, assume each spouse earned $10,000 of income. Also, assume that the rate 2/

structure in effect taxed the first $10,000 of income at 10 percent and all income over $10,000 at

20 percent. If the married couple filed jointly, they would have owed tax of $3,000 ($10,000 x 10

percent + $10,000 x 20 percent). If the couple had filed separately, however, their combined tax

would have been only $2,000 ($10,000 x 10 percent for each return). 

Joint and several liability means that each party is held responsible for 100 percent of a 3/

liability until it is paid. 

- 6 -

BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LAW 

CONCERNING JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

A. Joint Filing for Married Taxpayers

1. Origin of Joint Filing

Early revenue acts based income taxation on the individual rather than on a marital unit. For

example, the 1894 Income Tax Law, assessed tax "upon the gains, profits, and income received . .

. by every citizen. . . ." Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 553. This focus on the

individual, rather than on households or marital units, was retained in 1913 when the first income tax

law based on the Sixteenth Amendment imposed a tax "upon the entire net income arising or accruing

from all sources . . . to every citizen of the United States . . . and to every person residing in the

United States, though not a citizen thereof." Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. 166.

The Revenue Act of 1916 likewise adopted an individual model of taxation, by taxing "the entire net

income received . . . by every individual." Ch. 463, § 1(a), 39 Stat. 756 (1916).

In 1918, married taxpayers were allowed to file joint returns. This earliest form of joint filing

permitted spouses to offset deductions and losses against each other's income. There was only one

tax rate schedule for taxpayers, however, regardless of whether they filed jointly or separately. If

both spouses earned income and did not have offsetting deductions or losses, the result of filing

jointly would have been an increase in total tax because of the single tax rate schedule and that

schedule's progressivity. In addition, it was unclear whether the election to file jointly caused each 2/

spouse to have joint and several liability. The issue was extensively litigated in these early years. 3/

See, e.g., Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'g 29 B.T.A. 601 (1933) and cases

cited therein.

In 1938, Congress enacted the predecessor of I.R.C. § 6013(d), which introduced explicit

statutory joint and several liability for joint returns. As explained in the legislative history, the

provision was enacted to preserve the administrative ease of joint filing for taxpayers and the

Government:

Unless the husband and wife are to be held jointly and severally liable for the tax upon

their aggregate net income, it will be necessary for the [IRS] to require that their
The nine states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, 4/

Washington, and Wisconsin. Twenty seven percent of all married taxpayers, approximately 13

million couples, live in these states. 

For example, the Senate Report explaining the Revenue Act of 1948 states that, given the 5/

tax rates then in effect, a married couple residing in a noncommunity property state with income

of $10,000 would pay a tax that is 19 percent greater than a similarly situated community

property couple. At $25,000, the tax would be 41 percent larger. S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong.,

2d Sess. 22 (1948).

- 7 -

individual incomes and deductions shall be separately stated in the return, in order that

their respective income-tax liability may be separately determined. Such a

requirement would cause considerable hardship upon taxpayers with moderate

incomes and would largely eliminate the advantages of the joint return.

H.R. 1860, 75th Cong. 2d Sess., 1939-1 C.B. 749.

2. Effect of Community Property Law on Joint Filing

Nine states follow a property system for married couples known as "community property."4/

Although details of these systems vary among jurisdictions, their operation is similar in broad outline.

Typically, each spouse is considered as owning one-half of community property as well as his or her

separate property. In general, all property acquired during the marriage is considered community

property. For example, wages earned by one spouse during the marriage are generally considered

community property. By contrast, in general, property owned by one spouse on the date of the

marriage, acquired afterwards by gift or inheritance or designated as separately owned by agreement

between the spouses is considered "separate property." In addition, property acquired with separate

property remains separate property. In some jurisdictions, however, income derived from separate

property is considered community property.

In Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), the Supreme Court held that a husband and wife in

a community property state were entitled to file separate returns, each treating one-half of the

couple's community income as his or her respective income for Federal income tax purposes.

Because of progressive rate structures, the immediate effect of Poe v. Seaborn was that many married

couples with only one income earner who resided in community property states could pay

significantly less tax than their counterparts in common law states by choosing to report their income

on separate returns. The legislative history to the Revenue Act of 1948, which attempted to remedy

this disparity, states: "Since the rates applied under the income tax are steeply progressive, the same

family income divided in two halves by community property law will be taxed far less severely than

in a common-law State where the whole income is apt to be taxed to one spouse." S. Rep. No.

5/

1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1948).
Different rates for single taxpayers and married taxpayers filing separately were instituted 6/

in 1969 because of concern about penalties on single taxpayers. As a result, married taxpayers

who file separately will ordinarily pay more than those (at the same level of income) who file as

single (unmarried) taxpayers, and also will generally pay more than they would pay if they filed

jointly. These differences are exacerbated by special tax rates (with wider tax rate brackets) for

“heads of household,” that is, unmarried taxpayers who maintain a household for another person,

typically a dependent.

- 8 -

To provide the same income-splitting advantages available to married couples in community

property states after Poe v. Seaborn, many common law states adopted or attempted to adopt the

community property system. The legislative history itself commented on the trend to adopt the

community property system in order to achieve an income tax advantage: 

Recently, however, a number of States have shifted from the common-law to the

community-property system. In these cases benefits under the Federal income tax

which residents of the State would obtain under the community-property system were

largely responsible for the abandonment of common law.

S. Rep. No. 1013 at 23-24.

Congress in the Revenue Act of 1948 allowed all spouses, including those in common law

states, to split their income in much the same way as spouses in community property states already

could. The new provision permitted a married couple, regardless of their state of residence, to file

a joint return including the income of both spouses. The tax was effectively computed on one-half

of the combined income under the rates applicable to single taxpayers, and then multiplied by two to

arrive at the couple's tax liability. This effect was actually achieved by applying a new tax rate

schedule with tax brackets twice as wide as in the tax rate schedule for unmarried taxpayers. The

purpose of the new law was to produce the same income-splitting in common law states as in

community property states. This regime resulted in splitting all income, however, and not just the

income that would effectively be split under community property laws.

The joint return provisions of current law evolved from the income-splitting system created

by Congress in 1948. The joint return filing option and the related rate schedule are based on the

effort to give married taxpayers the same tax treatment, regardless of whether they reside in

community property states or common law jurisdictions. The tax savings provided by the joint return

rates (relative to the married filing separate rates) may be a significant factor giving rise to the

preference of most couples for filing joint returns.6/

3. Current Joint Filing

Under present law, married taxpayers may elect whether to file two separate returns or a

single joint return. This election determines not only the manner in which the taxpayers report their
The causes and effects of the “marriage bonus” and “marriage penalty” are beyond the 7/

scope of this study, which focuses on joint and several liability and relief provisions intended to

ameliorate the effect of joint and several liability in certain cases involving innocent spouses.

As noted above, the common law concept of joint and several liability was expressly 8/

adopted by Congress in 1938 and is now incorporated in I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).

- 9 -

income, but also the application of various computational rules such as the appropriate tax rate

schedule and the amount of the standard deduction. 

For the 95 percent of married taxpayers (approximately 49 million couples) who choose to

file jointly, all of the couple's items of income, deductions, credits and exemptions (whether individual

or joint) are combined on the return. The couple then calculates the tax due using the limits for

deductions, credits and other items appropriate for the married filing jointly status and using the

married filing jointly tax rate schedule. There is no need to determine which item belongs to which

spouse.

The tax rate schedule and the standard deduction for married couples filing joint returns are

based on the view that their combined income should be taxed as though it were equally split between

the spouses. For married individuals with substantially disproportionate incomes, such incomesplitting generally lowers their overall taxes (compared to single returns) because some of the higher

earner's income falls into a lower bracket. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as a “marriage

bonus.” On the other hand, for spouses with relatively equal incomes, the joint return rate schedule

may produce a higher overall tax liability than would apply if the spouses were two single taxpayers.

This phenomenon is commonly referred to as a "marriage penalty."7/

Upon filing a joint return, each spouse generally becomes jointly and severally liable for all 8/

taxes, additions to tax, penalties and interest due with respect to the joint return. This joint and

several liability continues indefinitely, regardless of which spouse's tax items gave rise to the liability,

and even if the couple later divorces or separates. This joint and several liability to the Government

is unaffected by the terms of any divorce decree or separation agreement. 

For the 5 percent of couples who choose to file separately (approximately 2.5 million

couples), each spouse must determine his or her own income, deductions, credits and exemptions.

This determination must be made for both separate items and each spouse's share of any joint items.

For example, if the couple has income from jointly held property or pays a deductible expense from

joint funds, the item must be allocated between the spouses and reported separately. Each spouse

then calculates the tax due using the limits for deductions, credits and other items appropriate for the

married filing separately status and using the married filing separately tax rate schedule. 

Couples who select married filing separate filing status do not get the benefits of incomesplitting (except in community property states). The limitations on deductions and the tax rate

structure for married filing separate taxpayers are generally one half of those for married filing jointly;
- 10 -

accordingly, married individuals with disproportionate incomes could pay more tax by choosing this

filing option. On the other hand, despite the less advantageous rate schedule, separate filing could

produce tax savings for some married couples (e.g., if one spouse has deductions that would

otherwise be unusable because of limits based on income).

Regardless of whether separate filing produces a higher or lower total tax liability, it avoids

the joint and several liability associated with a joint return. Upon filing a separate return, each spouse

is solely liable for the taxes required to be reported on his or her separate return and is not responsible

for any liability based on the other spouse's return. 

B. Collecting Unpaid Tax

1. In General

The majority of Federal taxes are collected through payroll tax withholding, estimated tax

deposits, and payments made by taxpayers at the time of filing their returns. In 1996, approximately

83 percent of the total individual income taxes estimated to be due, and over 95 percent of the total

individual income taxes actually collected, were collected through these taxpayer-initiated processes,

without any affirmative action by the IRS to enforce collection.

If, however, a taxpayer does not pay the taxes that are due after the IRS assesses the taxes

and sends the taxpayer a notice and demand for payment, then a Federal tax lien arises by operation

of law and attaches to "all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to"

the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 6321. The courts look to state law to define what constitutes property or a

right to property. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 512 (1960).

Where voluntary, timely payment of tax liabilities is not made, the IRS must initiate steps to

ensure the collection of due and owing tax liabilities. In certain instances, the IRS must take

affirmative steps to enforce collection based on that lien either through an administrative levy or by

litigation.

To enforce collection of a tax liability based on a lien, the IRS may administratively levy on

any property subject to the lien pursuant to I.R.C. § 6331(a). Alternatively, or in addition, the IRS

may also commence litigation under I.R.C. § 7403 to enforce the tax lien or to subject certain

property to the payment of tax. Although administrative levy is the most common and cost-effective

method of enforced tax collection, litigation under I.R.C. § 7403 is the normal method used by the

Service to collect tax liabilities from real property held jointly by married couples.

2. Collecting Unpaid Taxes of Married Taxpayers

As stated above, when a married couple files a joint return, each spouse is jointly and severally

liable for the tax relating to that return. Any tax lien that might result from a joint return will attach

to any property interests of either spouse as defined under relevant state law, regardless of whether
Babb v. Schmidt, 496 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1974); Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097 9/

(5th Cir. 1972). 

Pan American Import Co. v. Buck, 440 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd in part on 10/

other grounds, 452 So. 2d 1167 (La. 1984).

In re Ackerman, 424 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 11/

(9th Cir. 1970). 

- 11 -

the couple is still married at the time the lien arises. As a result, a joint and several tax liability can

be satisfied from any property owned separately by either spouse (or former spouse), as well as from

property owned jointly. This would include property held by the spouses as tenants by the entirety,

joint tenants, and tenants in common, or as community property.

In contrast, when a married taxpayer files a separate return, the Service generally can collect

a tax liability related to that return only from that taxpayer's separately owned property or interest

in property held as joint tenants or tenants in common. The tax lien arising from one spouse's liability

does not attach to the separate property of the other spouse. Likewise, property held by a couple as

tenants by the entirety generally is insulated from tax collection actions based on the separate return

liability of one of the spouses because courts have found the liable spouse to have no separate or

separable interest in the estate by the entirety. United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.

1951).

In community property states, any property acquired during the marriage is generally

presumed to be community property, unless the property is specifically designated as separate

property under state law. In most community property states, income earned during the marriage

from both jointly and separately owned property will also be community property. The interests of

each spouse in community property are subject to tax liens and can be seized by levy for a separate

tax liability incurred during the marriage. Many community property states, however, permit spouses

to shield property from each other's debts through a written or oral agreement that certain property

will be a spouse's separate property. 

The extent to which the Service can satisfy an antenuptial debt from community property

varies greatly among community property states. With respect to Federal tax liabilities, established

case law allows the Service to collect antenuptial debts from income that is community property in

California, Louisiana, and under some circumstances in Texas. Louisiana law allows all creditors 9/

to collect antenuptial debts from community property. In Washington and Arizona, the Service can 10/

collect a taxpayer's tax liability from a spouse's wages where they are community property, but only

to the extent of the taxpayer's one-half interest in that community property. In Idaho, Nevada,

11/

Wisconsin, and New Mexico, the ability to collect antenuptial debts from community property is

unclear. 
For example, the court in Wissing v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1428 (1970), vacated, 441 12/

F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1971), stated that it "would welcome a rule which would grant relief to a

victimized spouse who has no knowledge of or reason to have knowledge of, and does not benefit

from, unreported income, at least where that income is fruit of a crime." However, it saw no way

to do so given the language of section 6013(d)(3) without ameliorating legislation. 

As described by Congressman Boggs when urging its consideration, this legislation was 13/

intended to "provide relief in compelling situations . . . in connection with the imposition upon

innocent spouses of large liabilities for taxes and penalties attributable to income omitted from a

joint return by the other spouse." 116 Cong. Rec. 43350 (1970).

See, e.g., Galliher v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 760 (1974), aff'd in an unpublished opinion,

14/

(continued...)

- 12 -

C. Relief Provisions 

1. Background: The Need for Relief

From the time joint and several liability was enacted in the tax law in 1938 until enactment

of the Innocent Spouse Act of 1971, spouses could avoid the liability consequences of joint return

filing only under common law doctrines where the spouse's signature was shown to be a forgery or

was obtained by duress, misrepresentation, fraud, or mistake. Some courts reacted to their inability

to grant relief from joint and several liability outside of common law doctrines by including pleas for

legislative relief in their opinions. 

12/

Responding to such concerns, Congress passed the Innocent Spouse Act of 1971, adding

I.R.C. §§ 6013(e) and 6653(b)(4) (currently I.R.C. § 6663(c)). Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84 Stat. 2063.13/

These innocent spouse provisions were significantly expanded in 1984 to cover certain cases that did

not qualify for relief under prior law. For example, the statute originally provided relief only for tax

attributable to omissions of income but, in 1984, was amended to apply to the tax attributable to

erroneous deductions as well. 

Community property rules also have been discovered to produce inequitable results in certain

cases where the couple elects to file separate returns. As demonstrated by the decision in United

States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1970), problems may arise because income that is considered

community property under state law is taxed in equal shares to a husband and wife. If a husband and

wife in a community property state file separate returns, each is required to report one-half of the

community property income (as well as 100 percent of their separate income). Unlike their

counterparts in common law states, community property taxpayers cannot necessarily insulate

themselves from liability with respect to their partners' earnings by electing married filing separately

status. Moreover, because applicability of the innocent spouse provisions of I.R.C. § 6013(e)

depends on the filing of a joint return, filing a separate return precludes relief provided under that

section. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1). 14/
(...continued) 14/

512 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir. 1975).

See, e.g., Ramos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-157. 15/

See, e.g., Bagur v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 817 (1976), remanded, 603 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 16/

1979). See also, H.R. Rep. No. 1278, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 7 (1980). 

- 13 -

As with the joint and several liability imposed upon the filing of a joint return under I.R.C. §

6013(d), absent a relief provision, courts concluded that they were unable to prevent the harsh results

that sometimes ensued when one-half of the community income was attributed to an otherwise

"innocent" spouse. Often the most egregious cases involved abandoned spouses who were

15/

separated but not divorced and who neither received nor benefited from the income imputed to

them. As it did in 1971 with the enactment of I.R.C. § 6013(e), Congress again heeded calls for 16/

reform and, in 1980, added I.R.C. § 66(a) to the Internal Revenue Code, which provided relief in

limited circumstances for taxpayers living in community property states.

2. Current Requirements for Innocent Spouse Relief for Joint Return Filers

To qualify for relief from joint and several liability under the current innocent spouse

provisions, a joint return filer must satisfy four separate statutory requirements. Failure to meet any

one of the requirements precludes relief. As discussed in greater detail below, the taxpayer must

show that:

(1) a joint return has been made for the taxable year;

(2) the joint return contains a substantial understatement of tax attributable to grossly

erroneous items of the other spouse;

(3) the taxpayer did not know, and had no reason to know, of the substantial

understatement when he or she signed the joint return; and

(4) it would be inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for the deficiency in income tax

attributable to such substantial understatement.

I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(A)-(D). 

a. A Joint Return Has Been Made For The Taxable Year

In the absence of a joint return, there is no joint liability from which relief need be sought.

Accordingly, the simplest defense to the imposition of joint and several liability is the lack of a joint

return. 
See, e.g., Federbush v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 740 (1960), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 1 17/

(2d Cir. 1963); Estate of Campbell v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1 (1971); Acquaviva v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-54. 

See, e.g., Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 18/

222 (6th Cir. 1968); Stanley v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 634 (1983). 

Farmer v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1986). 19/

- 14 -

Whether a joint return has been filed is a question of fact, and because a joint return requires

the mutual assent of both spouses, the spouses’ intent is determinative. A return is considered joint,

even if a spouse did not sign the return or give express authorization to the other spouse, if the facts

indicate that a spouse tacitly consented to the return. On the other hand, a signature obtained under 17/

conditions of duress, mistake, fraud, or misrepresentation is not considered the signature of that

person, and the resulting return is not a "joint" return because the spouse's consent was not knowing

or voluntary. 

18/

b. There is a Substantial Understatement of Tax Attributable to Grossly

Erroneous Items of the Other Spouse

This statutory requirement has three separate elements. First, the understatement of tax must

be substantial. Second, the understatement must be attributable to a grossly erroneous item. Finally,

the understatement must be attributable to the other spouse.

i. The Return Contained a Substantial Understatement of Tax

The statute limits innocent spouse relief to situations where the liability arises from a

substantial understatement of tax. An understatement of tax must exceed $500 (exclusive of penalties

and interest) if it is to be considered substantial for purposes of this statute. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3).

In addition, to qualify for relief, an understatement of tax attributable to grossly erroneous

items of deduction, credit or basis must also exceed a specified percentage of the taxpayer's adjusted

gross income (AGI) in the most recent tax year ending before the deficiency notice is mailed (referred

to as the “preadjustment year”). I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4). Where AGI in the preadjustment year is

$20,000 or less, the understatement in tax must exceed 10 percent of AGI. Where AGI in the

preadjustment year exceeds $20,000, the understatement of tax must be greater than 25 percent of

AGI. To calculate the specified percentage of income requirement, the "liability" includes penalties

and interest up to, but not after, the date of the notice of deficiency. If the spouse has remarried, 19/

the new spouse's income is included in calculating AGI, whether or not the new couple files a joint

return. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(E). 

These limitations based on the taxpayer's AGI for the preadjustment year were added in 1984

to liberalize an earlier rule which allowed innocent spouse relief only in the case of omissions from
S. Rep. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). 20/

Prior to 1984, innocent spouse relief was available only with respect to omissions from 21/

income. In 1984, Congress added rules regarding items of deduction, credit or basis to allow

innocent spouse relief in more situations. H.R. Rep. No. 432, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1502

(1984).

Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987). 22/

Flynn v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 355 (1989); Douglas v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 758 23/

(1986), aff'd by unpublished opinion (10th Cir. 1989). 

Douglas, supra, citing H.R. Rep. No. 432, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1502 (1984). 24/

- 15 -

gross income that exceeded 25 percent of the gross income shown on the joint return as filed.

Congress sought to alleviate the hardships that could result from the stricter requirements of prior

law. Because Congress retained some standards relating to the magnitude of the adjustment

necessary to qualify for relief, it appears that Congress retained the concern it had in 1970 to limit

relief to situations involving significant financial hardships. 

20/

ii. The Understatement Was Grossly Erroneous

To qualify for innocent spouse relief, the items causing the substantial understatement also

must be grossly erroneous. Under the statute, any omission from gross income is automatically

grossly erroneous. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(A). It is irrelevant whether the omission results from simple

negligence or fraudulent behavior on the part of the other spouse.

Conversely, for items of deduction, credit or basis to be considered grossly erroneous, the 21/

items must be shown to be without basis in fact or law. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(2)(B). Whether an item

is grossly erroneous is evaluated as of the date of filing the return claiming the item. Neither

22/

disallowance of the item alone, nor lack of substantiation is sufficient to prove that the item was

grossly erroneous. Rather, guided by the legislative history, the established judicial interpretation 23/

is that a deduction has no basis in fact when the expense for which the deduction is taken was never

paid, and has no basis in law when the expense does not qualify for deduction under well-established

legal principles, or when no substantial legal argument can be made to support the deduction.

Referring to the committee report, courts frequently describe such a deduction as "frivolous,

fraudulent, or phony." 

24/
Feldman v. Commissioner, 20 F.3d 1128 (11th Cir. 1994), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1993-17; 25/

Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1993); Schultz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1987-459; Hodges v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-67.

Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1973). 26/

McCoy v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732 (1972). 27/

See, e.g., Ratana v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1981). 28/

- 16 -

iii. The Understatement Was Attributable to the Other Spouse

Innocent spouse relief is available only for grossly erroneous items attributable to the other

spouse. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the spouse claiming relief to prove attribution of the item

to the other spouse.25/

 

In determining the spouse to whom items of income are attributable, community property laws are

disregarded except for income from property. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(5). Where omitted income is

generated by the performance of substantial services by one spouse, that income is attributed to that

spouse even if it is income from a business that is community property. However, if the spouse does

not perform substantial services, even if the income is from a trade or business, that income is

"income from property" subject to attribution in accordance with community property laws.26/

c. The Taxpayer Did Not Know, and Had No Reason To Know, of the

Substantial Understatement

Section 6013(e) requires the taxpayer to establish that he or she did not know and had no

reason to know of the understatement of tax. This requirement is rooted in the common law of

restitution. A taxpayer must affirmatively establish that he or she was a "wholly innocent spouse."

S. Rep. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6089 (1970).

I. The Taxpayer Did Not Know

In cases involving income omission, actual knowledge of the transaction constitutes reason

to know, even when the spouse is ignorant of the tax consequences. For example, a taxpayer has 27/

knowledge if he or she knows that money was received. Failure to understand that the money was

gross income does not demonstrate lack of actual knowledge.28/

Because items of deduction, credit or basis are reported on the return, applying the lack of

knowledge requirement to these items has been more problematic. No clear consensus among the

courts has been established on the meaning of the knowledge requirement. The Ninth Circuit in Price

v. Commissioner held that mere knowledge of the transaction that was the basis of an erroneous
887 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'g an unpublished Tax Court bench opinion. 

29/

See Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126 (1990), aff'd on other grounds, 992 F.2d 1132 30/

(11th Cir. 1993); Purcell v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Barnhill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-97; Wolfram v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 31/

1987-422, aff'd by unpublished opinion (9th Cir. December 6, 1989); Liddy v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1985-107, aff'd without discussion of this issue, 808 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1986). 

- 17 -

deduction did not preclude innocent spouse relief. The court found that the wife knew of the

29/

transaction, but that she did not know enough about the circumstances surrounding it to realize that

it would cause an understatement on the return. The Court concluded that the wife neither knew nor

had reason to know of the understatement. By contrast, the knowledge test in Price has been

specifically rejected by the United States Tax Court. Under the legal standard adopted by the Tax 30/

Court, a taxpayer claiming innocent spouse status must establish that he or she was unaware of the

circumstances that gave rise to the error on the tax return, and not merely that he or she was unaware

of the tax consequences. 

ii. The Taxpayer Had No Reason To Know

Despite the lack of consensus regarding the actual knowledge requirement, courts have

uniformly accepted a standard for determining whether a person claiming innocent spouse relief has

"reason to know" of an understatement on a joint return. The proper standard is whether a

reasonably prudent taxpayer under the circumstances of the spouse at the time of signing the return

could be expected to know that the tax liability stated was erroneous or that further investigation was

warranted. Firmly established within this standard is a spouse's duty of inquiry. Although the

application may vary from case to case, courts universally require a taxpayer seeking innocent spouse

relief to demonstrate that the duty of inquiry was satisfied or that attempts to ascertain facts would

have been futile. The following factors are among those the courts consider in analyzing the

31/

constructive knowledge requirement:

(1) The relief-seeking spouse's level of education. Reynolds v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 1991-210.

(2) The presence of expenditures that appear lavish or unusual when compared to the

family's past levels of income, standard of living, and spending patterns. Estate of

Jackson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 356 (1979); Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680

(1972).

(3) Participation in the other spouse's business and family finances. Sonnenborn v.

Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971).
See, e.g., Saunders v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975). 32/

- 18 -

(4) The other spouse's evasiveness or deceit concerning the couple's finances. Pappadio

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-568; Hayes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-

327.

d. It Would Be Inequitable To Hold The Taxpayer Liable For The

Deficiency

In determining whether it would be inequitable to hold a spouse liable, a principal question

is whether the taxpayer seeking relief derived a benefit beyond normal support from the income giving

rise to the understatement. Prior to 1984, the statute specifically stated that the equitable

considerations should include whether or not the spouse "significantly benefited directly or indirectly

from the items omitted from gross income." When the statute was changed to permit innocent spouse

relief relating to items other than omitted income, this language was deleted, but the legislative history

stated that it should continue to be a consideration in determining the equities of each case. H.R.

Rep. No. 432, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1502 (1984).

Moreover, equity precludes granting relief where the claimant has enjoyed a significant

benefit, directly or indirectly, from an understatement of income. Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b). Like

the "reason to know" test (where the presence of lavish or unusual expenditures may provide notice

that income is not being reported), this requirement involves a review of the taxpayer's financial

affairs and the effect the understatement had on the claimant's lifestyle. The presence of unusual or

lavish expenditures traceable to the errors on the return weighs against an equitable claim for relief.

Recognizing that one person's luxury can be another's necessity, courts generally compare actual

expenditures received by or on behalf of the relief-seeking spouse to what is "ordinary" for that

particular household. Likewise, transfers of property, including those received several years later,

such as an inheritance of property or life insurance proceeds traceable to omissions from income may

also preclude relief.

While significant benefit may be the most important factor, it is not the only one. The statute

and regulations direct that all the facts and circumstances be considered. Other factors that are

considered by the Service and the courts include: whether financial hardship would ensue, whether

the spouse was deserted or divorced, and whether the other spouse was also "innocent." Thus, even

in the presence of significant benefit, relief is not always denied.32/
As originally enacted, I.R.C. § 66 included only the relief provision currently found in 33/

I.R.C. § 66(a). Congress, however, found its initial efforts too restrictive, and amended the relief

provision of I.R.C. § 66 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, by adding two additional

provisions, I.R.C. §§ 66(b) and (c). Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. § 424 (1984). 

- 19 -

3. Requirements for Relief for Separate Return Filers in Community Property

States

In certain cases, a spouse who resides in a community property state and files a separate

return may be relieved of tax liability arising from the income-splitting rules of community property.

I.R.C. § 66. Section 66 has three subsections, discussed below, which address different situations.33/

Section 66(a) provides relief from the allocation of earned income under community property

law for couples who remain married although they live apart if:

(1) the spouses are married to each other at any time during the calendar year; 

(2) the couple lived apart at all times during the calendar year and did not file a

joint return with each other;

(3) one or both spouses had earned income which is community income; and

(4) no portion of the earned income was transferred, directly or indirectly,

between the spouses during the calendar year.

If these conditions are satisfied, community income of qualifying spouses is treated in the same

manner as income of United States citizens or residents married to nonresident aliens under I.R.C.

§ 879.

Section 879(a) divides community income into five categories and provides how the income

in each category is to be attributed between the spouses. Generally, earned community income is

attributed to the spouse who rendered the personal services. Community income from separate

property is attributed to the owner; while dividends, interest, and royalties are attributed to the spouse

with a proprietary vested interest in the income under state law. I.R.C. §§ 879(a)(1), (a)(3); Treas.

Reg. § 1.879-1. Trade or business income and deductions are treated as belonging to the husband,

unless the wife exercised substantially all management and control over the trade or business.

Partnership income is attributed to the spouse who has the partnership interest. I.R.C. §§ 879(a)(2),

1402(a)(5).

Section 66(b) is not really a relief provision for taxpayers. Rather, it allows the Service to

disregard community property laws by denying the benefits of income-splitting to the earner or
- 20 -

recipient of community income who fails to inform the other spouse of the amount of the income

received and who treats the income as though it belonged solely to the earner/recipient. The effect

of I.R.C. § 66(b) is thus to require the income-earning spouse to report the entire amount of income.

Section 66(c) provides relief to certain spouses who have failed to include in gross income

an item of community income attributable to the earnings of the other spouse. With language similar

to I.R.C. § 6013(e), the statute provides that to establish that he or she is entitled to relief the

taxpayer must show: 

(1) a joint return was not filed for the taxable year;

(2) an item was omitted from gross income that would have been attributed to the other

spouse under the rules contained in I.R.C. § 879(a);

(3) at the time of filing his or her separate return the spouse did not know and had

no reason to know of the item of community income; and

(4) it would be inequitable to include the unreported income in the gross income

of the relief-seeking spouse.

Pursuant to I.R.C. § 66(c), if separate returns are filed, one spouse will be relieved of liability

for omissions of income attributable to the other spouse, provided that the relief-seeking spouse did

not know and had no reason to know of the omission, and it would be inequitable to hold that spouse

liable for the omission. If these requirements are met, I.R.C. § 66(c), in effect, overrides community

property laws by not treating the relevant items as community income.
The other numbers given in this paragraph are based on earlier years and adjusted to 34/

reflect approximate 1996 totals.

- 21 -

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT IRS ADMINISTRATION OF JOINT RETURNS

In 1996, the IRS processed over 118 million individual income tax returns. About 51

34/

million returns were from married taxpayers and about 67 million were from single taxpayers. Of the

51 million returns from married taxpayers, approximately 49 million were from married couples filing

jointly, while over 2 million separate returns were filed by married taxpayers. 

The IRS processes a joint return as though it were filed by a single taxpaying entity. The

married couple's tax account information is stored in one account on the Master File, the main IRS

database. The only separate items that appear on this tax account are the spouses' names and social

security numbers. All other information is aggregated on the Master File account, just as it is on the

joint return filed by the married couple. For example, the couple's items of income, deduction,

credits, and exemptions are shown in the aggregate.

A Master File account also shows the date the married couple's return was due and the date

the couple filed their return. These dates are relevant for establishing the statute of limitations for the

IRS to make any additional assessment and collection of tax, interest or penalties and for the married

couple to file any claims for refund.

The IRS has other information systems, some of which incorporate data from the Master File,

and others of which store data derived from processing tax returns, examining returns and pursuing

collection actions. Some of these systems maintain records for the couple in the same aggregate

format as the Master File, but others store data separately for each spouse.

The vast majority of taxpayers, including married couples, have no further contact with the

IRS for a given tax year after a return is filed for that year. The IRS does, however, contact some

taxpayers each year with respect to some aspect of their tax returns. For example, the IRS may

contact taxpayers to verify that their returns correctly reflect income, deductions or credits, or to seek

payments when their tax liability is not fully paid through withholding, estimated tax payments, or a

check submitted with a balance due on the joint return. The IRS selects returns for audit if they meet

certain criteria that apply to all taxpayers, including joint filers. In addition, the IRS contacts

taxpayers when there is a discrepancy between the information reported on the income tax return and

that reported on information returns (e.g., Forms W-2 and 1099). Of the 48 million joint returns filed

for tax year 1992, for example, the IRS assessed additional taxes with respect to approximately 1.25

million joint returns as a result of both the matching information return program and the audit

program.

If a taxpayer, including a married taxpayer, does not agree with the additional tax proposed

through the information matching or audit programs, that taxpayer has the right to dispute the

proposed additional tax through an administrative process before IRS Appeals or to immediately
- 22 -

petition the Tax Court for relief. If the taxpayer disagrees with the decision of IRS Appeals, the

taxpayer may then seek judicial relief.

The IRS takes actions to collect a tax liability after it has been assessed but not paid. This

situation can result from the taxpayer not paying the balance due shown on a return filed by the

taxpayer, from an adjustment to the return from the information matching program, from an audit

adjustment, or after a decision by IRS Appeals or a court. The IRS first sends several notices to a

taxpayer requesting payment and, if the taxpayer does not respond, then the IRS will initiate

collection actions, such as the filing of liens and service of levies, or will negotiate an installment

agreement or offer in compromise. Taxpayers also have the right to appeal these collection actions

first to a Collection Group Manager and then to IRS Appeals. 

A married taxpayer who filed a joint return may raise an innocent spouse claim at any time

in the examination, appeals or collection processes. As seen above, IRS procedures for evaluating

innocent spouse claims follow the law established by the courts and applicable regulations interpreting

I.R.C. § 6013(e). In addition, a spouse who has filed a joint return can learn from the IRS if there

are any pending IRS collection actions against the other spouse to collect their joint taxes with

respect to such return. The IRS also has procedures to allow a spouse to inform the IRS of assets

of the other spouse that may not be known to the IRS.
Possible changes in taxpayers’ total tax liability as a result of these proposals could of 35/

course present a significant financial burden or benefit to taxpayers. To the extent such potential

changes are due to the “marriage penalty” or “marriage bonus,” they are mentioned but not

specifically focused on in this study.

- 23 -

PROPOSALS TO REPLACE OR REFORM 

THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY STANDARD

A. Introduction

The reform proposals identified by Congress for study in the TBOR 2 legislation, as well as

other reform proposals that Treasury and the IRS identified as part of their study, all share the

common goal of lessening or eliminating some of the difficulties that joint filers have experienced as

a result of the joint and several liability standard. These difficulties are especially significant for

divorced and separated taxpayers. The reform proposals, however, differ substantially on how they

achieve this goal.

For convenience, this section of the report generally analyzes the reform proposals in

descending order of magnitude of change to current law. The first section discusses the proposal that

would effect the most comprehensive change to current law: the complete elimination of joint filing

in favor of mandated separate return filing for all married taxpayers. 

The next level of reform proposals seeks to preserve joint filing but allow married couples to

separate their joint tax liability in a variety of ways. These proposals range from a separation of

liability at the time a joint return is filed to a separation of liability for the married couple at the time

of a collection action. These proposals are: "front end" proportionate liability; the ABA's separate

liability proposal; the AICPA's allocated liability proposal; and a proposal to separate a formerly

married couple's Federal tax liability based on the terms of a divorce decree.

This study analyzes each reform proposal by asking three basic questions: 

(1) Would the proposal substantially increase or decrease the burden on taxpayers to

comply with the tax law?35/

(2) Would the proposal significantly increase or decrease the burden to the Government

of administering the tax law?

(3) How well would the proposal attain the goal of lessening or eliminating difficulties

that joint filers may have experienced with joint and several liability, particularly those

who are divorced or separated?

Although each proposal has its particular advantages and disadvantages based on the above

criteria, the purpose of this study is not to conclude whether one proposal is clearly superior over the
It is worth noting that the reallocation of IRS resources could adversely affect the 36/

effectiveness of other IRS programs.

For example, for 1998 the standard deduction is $7,100 for a married couple filing jointly, 37/

or $3,550 each for married individuals filing separately, but $4,250 for an unmarried individual

and $6,250 for a head of household. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2).

- 24 -

others. The study, instead, seeks to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal and the

issues that would need to be addressed if the proposal were adopted.

While the analysis of the administrative effects on the IRS necessarily depends upon current

IRS procedures and technological capabilities. Although this report identifies certain adverse

administrative effects on the IRS from particular reform proposals, it does not imply that these

difficulties are insoluble given the appropriate reallocation of current IRS resources or allocation 36/

of additional resources or advances in technology.

B. Mandatory Separate Returns For All Filers

1. Description of Proposal

Congress directed Treasury and the IRS to study reform proposals under which "each spouse

would be liable only for the income tax attributable to the income of each spouse." H. R. Rep. No.

506, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. 30-31 (1996). The most direct way to accomplish this goal (though not

the only way) would be to mandate separate returns for all married individuals. The mandated

separate return approach would require each spouse to file a separate return to report his or her

income, deductions, exemptions and credits. A spouse would be liable only for the tax attributable

to his or her return and would not be liable for the tax arising from omitted or erroneous items on his

or her spouse's return.

This proposal would shift away from a model that taxes married taxpayers as a single

economic unit to a model that taxes each spouse as an individual taxpayer. Assuming that it did not

intend for this shift to produce a significant change in the overall tax revenues, Congress would have

to consider appropriate offsetting changes to the tax rate structure and certain deductions and credits

if it adopted this approach to resolving joint and several liability issues. For instance, Congress would

have to determine whether to eliminate “married filing separately” status (and possibly “head of

household” status) and make all individual taxpayers use single filing status, or to maintain the

differences between the effective tax rates applicable to married taxpayers who file separately,

unmarried individuals, and heads of households. Moreover, while elimination of the income37/

splitting effect of joint filing would tend to increase the tax liability of some married couples, other

factors could tend to reduce overall tax liability. But absent a specific statutory directive to ignore

community property laws for Federal tax purposes, elimination of joint filing would not affect married

taxpayers who reside in community property states and file separately; they would retain incomesplitting by operation of state law. 
Mandated separate filing would therefore arguably be inconsistent with horizontal equity, 38/

one of the economic goals of taxation, because similar families would be taxed differently based

on the division of income between spouses.

For example, married taxpayers generally must file joint returns to claim a credit for 39/

household and dependent care services under I.R.C. § 21 or the earned income tax credit under

I.R.C. § 32.

- 25 -

2. Effect on Taxpayers

Mandated separate filing would cause the total tax liability of many families to depend on the

division of income between spouses. Because of certain differences in the factors that influence

38/

effective tax rates (such as progressive marginal rates, income-splitting, standard deduction amounts,

etc.), most joint-filing couples would not have the exact same total tax liability if they filed separately

under the current law’s married filing separately status. When compared with joint filers at the same

levels of combined income and otherwise in similar circumstances, total taxes would generally be

higher when one spouse had most or all of the income (e.g., “one-earner” couples), while total taxes

would generally remain approximately the same for couples where both spouses have similar incomes

(e.g., “two-earner” couples). Moreover, even if all of the factors influencing effective tax rates were

adjusted to make married filing separately status, unmarried filing status, and head of household filing

status exactly the same, there would continue to be marriage penalties or bonuses affecting some

taxpayers.

Married taxpayers already have the option to file separate returns if they wish by choosing the

"married filing separately" option. Of the more than 51 million tax returns filed by married taxpayers,

however, less than 5 percent are filed this way. Apart from possible increases in their overall tax

liability if they file separately, there may be many other reasons for the overwhelming preference by

married taxpayers for joint returns over separate returns, including convenience and the ability to

claim certain benefits. 

39/

One dramatic effect on taxpayers of a mandatory system of separate returns would be the need

for couples who are currently filing jointly to prepare two tax returns annually instead of the one

currently permitted. Requiring this extra return would effectively double the paperwork burden on

most of the 49 million couples who currently file jointly. As discussed above, joint filing was

originally introduced in part to lessen the administrative burden on married taxpayers and the

Government alike. 

Under a mandated separate return approach, married taxpayers would need to determine

which spouse should report, and in what amount, income that was produced by a jointly-held asset

or deductions and expenses paid from a joint account. On more complex returns, the list of such joint

items could include items such as: income or loss from a joint business or investment; a joint taxable

refund from a prior year; credits for child and dependent care expenses; mortgage interest on a

jointly-owned home; joint charitable contributions; and deductible expenses paid from a joint account.
See United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (the Government has a lien 40/

(continued...)

- 26 -

Comprehensive rules would need to be implemented, most likely through legislation, to instruct

taxpayers and the Service on how to allocate any number of items between the spouses. Because of

the relatively small number of married filing separately taxpayers, most such questions are currently

handled on a case-by-case approach. 

The simplest allocation approach would be to split each item between the spouses either

evenly or on some other formulary basis. Any such formula would inevitably result in the taxation

of some spouses on a basis that did not reflect their actual economic contribution to the item. This

administrably simple but economically imprecise allocation would undercut the rationale for separate

filing, or for any other approach (such as proportionate liability) intended to limit each spouse's

separate liability to his or her separate economic activities.

The allocation method most consistent with the rationale for any of the reform proposals

designed to eliminate joint liability would generally require a married couple to allocate tax items

between the spouses strictly on the basis of their relative economic contributions to the item. In many

cases, determining the proper allocation of items arising from the expenditure of joint funds would

require establishing the amount that each spouse contributed to the joint funds. Comprehensive

tracing rules may be difficult to develop and apply, however. These tracing rules would likely require

a significant increase in the kinds and amounts of financial records kept by many taxpayers. Default

rules for apportioning items would also be necessary for cases where the spouses are not cooperating

with the IRS or with each other or where the information about joint items is difficult to obtain,

inconclusive, or contradictory. 

Additional tax complexity would also arise from such allocations. Taxpayers would try to

predict their expected allocations and plan to minimize their total tax liability, for example by deciding

how payments for certain deductible household expenses should be made and allocated. Only the

most skillful taxpayers would be able to take full advantage of the opportunities for tax reduction.

In addition to creating complexity, such tax-directed planning activities are generally considered to

be economically inefficient and wasteful to the economy as a whole.

A shift to separate returns would reintroduce differences in tax treatment between married

couples in community and noncommunity property states resulting solely from the operation of state

law. Unlike married couples in common law states, taxpayers in community property states would

continue to have the advantage of income-splitting even if separate returns were mandated. In

addition, because married taxpayers filing separately in common law states are only liable for their

own items of income, real estate held as tenants by the entirety would be protected from enforced

collection where only one spouse owed taxes. By contrast, real estate held as community property

would still be subject to enforced collection activity even where only one of the spouses owed a

Federal tax liability, because a creditor can collect the separate debt of one spouse from the

community property.40/
(...continued) 40/

on the husband's undivided one-half interest in the marital community that could be reached to

satisfy his separate tax debt); Babb v. Schmidt, 496 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1974) (community

property in California can be reached to satisfy a husband's separate tax debt).

- 27 -

Mandatory separate returns would eliminate the need for the Internal Revenue Code

provisions relating to joint filing, joint and several liability and innocent spouse relief. Overall it is

unlikely, however, that this simplification would outweigh the increase in burden and complexity

caused by the new Code and regulatory provisions necessary to guide taxpayers on how to allocate

or apportion jointly-held tax items between two returns for tax purposes.

3. Effect on IRS Administration

The mandated separate return proposal would have a number of significant effects on each

stage of the IRS administrative process. Most serious would be the need to process up to 49 million

additional tax returns, or about a 40 percent increase in the total number of individual income tax

returns processed each year. The IRS does not currently have the resources to handle 49 million

potential new tax accounts. Although there is enough capacity on the IRS's Master File system, the

other IRS computer systems that store data from processing returns, or from which information is

entered onto the tax accounts contained in the Master File, would be unable to accommodate the

additional data from these new returns.

Current IRS plans to upgrade its information systems are based on certain assumptions,

including the continuing existence of joint filing and the joint and several liability standard. These

plans would need to be revised to accommodate the additional taxpayer accounts that would result

from legislation mandating separate returns. The revised upgrades could take a number of years to

accomplish, and this time schedule would need to be reflected in the effective date of any legislation.

It is likely that the cost estimates for these plans would need to be similarly revised to reflect the

substantial increase in equipment and resources necessary to store data from processing the increased

number of tax returns, examined returns, and pursued collection actions. 

Even after the IRS had created the infrastructure capable of handling a massive number of

additional returns, it would still need to devote substantial additional resources each year to process

the new returns and to issue refunds in a timely manner. For example, the IRS would need to hire

additional seasonal workers to transcribe data from the returns. 

Mandatory separate returns would also affect the methods the Service uses to establish the

correct tax liability. For current IRS information matching programs to continue to work effectively

under a mandated separate return approach, information reporters would have to report separate

information to the IRS regarding each spouse's share of joint income items, deductions or credits.

This would require the married couple to notify the information reporter of the appropriate allocation

for joint items. Without such separate reporting, the IRS would be required to cross-check between

the couple's two returns to confirm that each spouse had accurately reported the item reflected on
Financial institutions would most likely continue to require that debts incurred by married 41/

couples be incurred as joint and several liabilities. For example, credit card issuers who issue joint

credit cards would require both spouses to be jointly and severally liable even where the debt was

attributable to only one spouse.

- 28 -

the information return. Currently, this kind of cross-checking is done manually for married couples

filing separate returns (or for other taxpayers owning joint assets). A dramatic increase in manual

cross-checking would be much less effective and efficient than automated document matching. It

could also lead to many more IRS contacts with taxpayers to verify information and would likely

reduce the amount of revenue collected from the information reporting program.

With regard to conducting audits, the IRS would first need to revise its current audit selection

system to be able to identify returns that would most likely result in additional tax assessments. The

IRS would probably then conduct audits in a manner similar to those currently conducted for

taxpayers choosing the "married filing separately" option. In auditing the return of a married

individual, the IRS examiner would likely also analyze the return of the other spouse to ensure that

any joint items of income, deductions, exemptions and credits had been properly reported and

allocated on the return under examination. If the examination resulted in an adjustment that would

affect the other spouse's return as well, the IRS would then open an audit on that return to make the

corresponding adjustment.

IRS efforts to ensure the proper allocation of tax items between two separate returns for a

married couple could divert resources from audit activities more likely to result in the assessment of

additional tax because of the underreporting of income or the overstatement of deductions and

credits. In addition, if the IRS were required to trace the proper source of income, deductions and

credits, both the examinations and appeals processes would take longer to conduct. Finally, the

ability to make corresponding adjustments on the other spouse's return would depend on the

applicable statute of limitations; this could prove difficult where, for example, one spouse is willing

to consent to an extension of the statute but the other spouse is not.

Any reform proposal that resulted in separate tax liabilities for married taxpayers could

preclude the Service from collecting outstanding liabilities from property held by married persons as

tenants by the entirety in those common law states with such property rights. A number of such

states allow only creditors with joint and several liabilities of both spouses to collect those liabilities

from property held in tenancy by the entirety.

Under the mandated separate return proposal, married taxpayers would no longer be jointly

and severally liable for their tax liabilities. The proposal would not, however, affect debts to other

creditors. It is reasonable to expect that many debts incurred by married couples will continue to be

joint and several debts regardless of whether they benefit one spouse more than the other. As a

41/

result, creditors who require married couples to be jointly and severally liable for their debts would

be able to collect those debts from the tenancy by the entirety property of married couples even
For example, both the disadvantages of income aggregation and the advantages of 42/

income-splitting built into the current tax rate structure would be eliminated for taxpayers in

(continued...)

- 29 -

though the IRS could not. Thus, a system of separate tax assessments for each spouse could afford

relief to the taxpayers' other creditors, rather than to the taxpayers themselves.

4. Effectiveness of the Proposal

Outside of community property states, mandating separate returns would largely eliminate the

principal concern with the joint and several liability standard that were identified in TBOR 2. With

mandatory separate returns, a spouse would only be responsible for his or her own tax items,

including an apportioned share of any joint items; neither spouse would face potential liability for

taxes based on the income, deductions or credits of the other spouse. Thus, a spouse would not have

to satisfy the current innocent spouse standards to avoid the tax liability associated with such items.

In community property states, however, mandatory separate returns would have only limited

benefits for taxpayers unless Poe v. Seaborn were overruled by legislation. The effect of Poe v.

Seaborn in community property states is that community income is shared between the spouses,

generally 50-50. Mandating separate returns for couples who live in these states would continue to

result in a 50-50 division of liability for the tax associated with the total community income,

regardless of the amounts actually earned by each spouse. To treat taxpayers who live in community

property and common law states equally under mandatory separate returns, the Poe v. Seaborn

holding would have to be legislatively reversed. This subject is discussed later in this report.

5. Summary

By eliminating joint and several liability, the mandated separate return proposal would

eliminate the difficulties that some married taxpayers (especially those residing in non-community

property states) and some divorced or separated taxpayers may experience with current law. 

Eliminating joint filing, however, would be a significant departure from the premise that married

couples form a single economic unit for tax purposes. Moreover, if the adoption of the separate

return proposal were designed to be revenue-neutral, Congress would need to consider potentially

far-reaching adjustments to current law, including tax rate schedules, deductions and credits. Finally,

the proposal would add significant administrative burdens for all married taxpayers and the Service.

C. Proportionate Liability

Congress described proportionate liability as a standard where "each spouse would be liable

only for the income tax attributable to the income of each spouse." H. R. Rep. No. 506, 104th Cong.,

2d Sess. 30-31 (1996). While this goal could be achieved by a system of mandatory separate returns,

adopting this approach could result in significant changes in overall tax revenues and the distribution

of tax liability among taxpayers as described above. Accordingly, this section describes how the 42/
(...continued) 42/

common law states. The impact of this approach in community property states would depend on

whether Poe v. Seaborn was overruled legislatively.

Such rules would presumably be similar to those discussed above in connection with the 43/

analysis of mandatory separate returns. 

- 30 -

goal also could be achieved by maintaining joint filing but allocating the resulting tax liability between

the spouses through a proportionate liability approach. Proportionate liability would continue to

allow a married couple to compute their tax liability as a single economic unit by splitting income and

sharing deductions. In some respects, this approach would view a married couple as similar to a

business partnership rather than a single economic unit.

This section analyzes two methods of achieving proportionate liability, which are referred to

for these purposes as "front end" and "back end" proportionate liability. Both methods preserve the

option of joint filing for married taxpayers while attempting to limit the tax liability of each spouse

to that portion of the total liability attributable to that spouse. The methods differ significantly in how

and when the tax liability is apportioned between the spouses. “Front end” proportionate liability

would require all joint filers to allocate each tax item at the time of filing on the return to one spouse

or the other. By contrast, “back end” proportionate liability would apply only in the case of the

assertion of additional liability or the collection of unpaid tax. If and when that occurred, items of

income and deduction would have to be allocated between the spouses to determine, assess, and

collect the proportionate amount from each spouse. 

As with mandatory separate returns, both variations of proportionate liability would require

the allocation of each item of income, deduction and credit between married taxpayers. New rules

would be needed to provide taxpayers with guidance on how to make these allocations.43/

Proportionate liability proposals also would require additional allocation rules that would not be

necessary for separate returns, such as the proper allocation of the standard deduction and similar

items that are based on joint filing status.

1. Front End Proportionate Liability

a. Description of Proposal

Under front end proportionate liability, married taxpayers choosing to file joint returns would

separately report their items of income, deductions, exemptions and credits on their joint returns.

Although these items would be computed separately for each spouse, a married couple's tax liability

would continue to be calculated using the current joint return tax rate schedule, and associated limits

for deductions, exemptions and credits. For example, the tax forms could contain three columns for

joint filers: two columns for the spouses to report their respective tax items and a column for the

aggregate amount of each item. Each spouse would be liable for their proportionate share of the tax.
- 31 -

After the couple's aggregate tax liability was computed it would be apportioned between the

spouses using a formula intended to reflect each spouse's proper economic share of that liability. A

relatively simple formula would use a ratio based on each spouse's taxable income to the couple's total

taxable income. For example, if the couple's total taxable income were $100,000, with one spouse

responsible for $40,000, and the other $60,000, then the tax liability would be apportioned in a 40

percent to 60 percent split. 

b. Effect on Taxpayers

While this proposal would maintain joint filing, the burden on married couples in preparing

their joint returns could be substantially increased. Married couples would continue to report their

total income, deductions, exemptions, and credits on the joint return to calculate their aggregate

liability. In addition, a married couple would be required to allocate separate and joint items between

themselves on the return itself in order to apportion their aggregate liability, perhaps by a ratio of

their respective gross incomes or taxable incomes or by some similar formula. 

Although married couples would not have to fill out two returns, as contemplated by the

mandated separate return proposal, they would essentially need to perform the same amount of work

to allocate the items on their joint return in accordance with whatever allocation methodology was

adopted. Taxpayers would need to prepare and maintain sufficient documentation to develop and

support their allocations. Tax payments (including estimated tax payments) likewise would probably

need to be allocated between the spouses in order to determine which spouse had paid his or her

respective share of the aggregate tax liability.

c. Effect on IRS Administration

One approach to administering front end proportionate liability would be to treat the couple

as having two separate tax assessments from the time they file their return. This would essentially

present all of the same administrative issues as mandatory separate returns, discussed above. Front

end proportionate liability, however, would present additional difficulties for IRS returns processing

operations and information systems that would not be present under the mandated separate return

approach. 

IRS computer systems would probably need to be set up to process three rather than one

column of numbers (husband's, wife's and combined), then simultaneously compute and cross-check

those numbers. This would need to be done to verify the accuracy of returns adequately and to utilize

existing examination and collection processes. While this can be done, the work entailed would be

the equivalent of combining three tax accounts in one. This would require all Form 1040

programming to be rewritten to allow for the separate computation of any penalty and interest,

issuance of notices, application of credits and offset, and other such items. Moreover, it would triple

data entry and approximately quadruple the programming and computer processing time needed to

process a joint return. 
- 32 -

An alternative approach would essentially require the IRS to process only the aggregate data

reported on the couple's return (as it currently does for joint returns) and then to make a joint tax

assessment for the couple. Under this approach, the spouse's reported proportionate shares of such

aggregate amounts would only be relevant in the event that one or both of the spouses notify the IRS

that they want a separation of the joint liability into their proportionate shares. For example, this

could occur in the event of an audit, collection action or additional tax assessment. A full discussion

of the administrative effects of this system is presented in the next section on back end proportionate

liability. 

Regardless of which administrative approach is chosen to implement front end proportionate

liability, there would need to be a method of determining which spouse was the source of a payment

of tax, since each spouse would be solely liable for his or her allocated share of a tax liability. Either

the IRS Master File would need to have the capability to maintain separate accounts for each spouse,

or these determinations would need to be made manually when they become relevant. Many, perhaps

most, payments could be traced to one spouse or the other, such as withholding payments attributable

to one spouse's wages. For other payments, the attribution might not be obvious, e.g., a check drawn

on a joint account. A possible solution would be to allocate all unattributable tax payments in

accordance with the taxpayers' allocation formula for tax liabilities. 

Proportionate liability would also complicate the issuance of refunds by the IRS. Under

current law, if a refund is due with respect to a joint return, the Service issues a refund check in the

names of the joint filers. Under a proportionate liability approach, however, the spouses may wish

separate refund checks reflecting their proportionate shares of the total overpayment. Moreover,

there may be situations where one spouse has overpaid and the other has fully paid or underpaid. A

legal rule would be needed to determine whether the IRS should credit the overpayment against the

underpayment or else to allow a refund to one spouse even though the other spouse (and perhaps the

couple together) has underpaid the amount of tax due.

Examinations of front end proportionate liability returns would present many of the same

issues as with mandatory separate returns. For example, under either approach, audits could involve

verifying the proper allocation of joint items and adjusting each spouse’s tax assessment accordingly.

Because adjustments to one spouse’s items would often change the couple’s allocations, such

adjustments in a front end proportionate liability scheme return would probably change the other

spouse's tax liability more frequently than under a mandatory separate return system.

d. Effectiveness of Proposal

Front end proportionate liability would allow each spouse to be liable only for the income tax

attributable to his/her own economic situation and thus would address one of the fundamental aspects

of perceived inequity in current law. It would also preserve the benefits of the income-splitting

associated with current joint returns. These benefits include offsetting the income, deductions,

exemptions and credits of the two spouses and possibly lowering the marginal tax rate that would

otherwise apply to the higher earning spouse.
- 33 -

From an examination perspective, a front end proportionate liability system has one advantage

over the other proportionate liability systems, because the spouses' respective shares of the combined

liability would be reflected on the return as filed. By contemporaneously and jointly determining the

allocation of tax items on the joint return at the time of filing, taxpayers would presumably have used

and would retain a major part of the information necessary to establish their correct allocable share

of the total tax due (provided the spouses correctly allocated joint items between themselves).

Front end proportionate liability would also preserve some of the disadvantages of current

joint filings, although potentially to a lesser degree. Under current law, both spouses who have

signed a joint return are liable for 100 percent of the tax associated with the tax items of either spouse

(unless the innocent spouse provisions apply). Under front end proportionate liability, subsequently

discovered items could often change the couple's total tax liability and thus both spouses'

proportionate shares of that liability, unless the items were solely attributable to the earning spouse

in a single earner couple. This could lead to an increase in the amount of tax due even by the spouse

to whom the additional items are not allocable. 

While this type of adjustment may seem appropriate in some cases, there could also be

situations in which it would seem to raise the same questions of equity that are addressed by the

innocent spouse provisions of current law. Two examples illustrate this point: 

Example 1: Assume H has a deduction from a tax shelter investment solely in his own

name and no income with which to offset the deduction. W has income of $100 from

her medical practice. On audit it is determined that the tax shelter was a sham

transaction lacking in economic substance and H's claimed loss of $100 is disallowed.

Under front end proportionate liability, W will be liable for the entire amount of the

deficiency, because her husband's taxable income is zero. That W is held liable for tax

stemming from a disallowed deduction attributable to her husband may appear unfair,

but in fact her liability is attributable to her true economic situation: $100 of taxable

income and no deductions.

Example 2: Assume H and W's combined reported taxable income is $40,000 with

each reporting $20,000 in taxable income (or a 50-50 split) resulting in a reported

joint tax liability of $6,004 on their return (using 1996 rates). Under a proportionate

liability standard allocation, each would pay $3,002. If it is later discovered, however,

that H has omitted taxable income of $100,000, the couple's joint taxable income rises

to $140,000. The tax due on $140,000 is $37,435. When allocated in proportion to

taxable income, the new ratio is 85.7 percent to 14.3 percent and H's share of the tax

liability increases to $32,087, but W's share of the tax liability also increases to $5,348

(a 78 percent increase). 

Finally, as with mandatory separate returns, front end proportionate liability would be less

effective in resolving current difficulties that taxpayers may be facing with the joint and several

liability standard in community property states, unless Poe v. Seaborn were overruled by legislation.
The ABA's proposal was submitted to the IRS by the American Bar Association's Tax 44/

Section Committee on Domestic Relations in response to Notice 96-19. The proposal is referred

to as the ABA proposal solely for convenience; the submission specifically noted that the

positions taken represented the individual views of the members who prepared it and did not

represent the position of the ABA or its Tax Section Committee.

- 34 -

In community property states, community income is legally deemed to be shared between the spouses.

Thus, in most instances, proportionate liability would result in roughly a 50-50 allocation of tax

between the spouses, regardless of what portion of the income each spouse actually earned, since

such income is likely to be community income.

e. Summary

The principal effect of front end proportionate liability would be to limit a spouse's liability

to a portion of the total liability based on an allocation formula. The simplest allocation approach

would be to split the item evenly between the spouses or to use some other formulary basis. Such

approaches could result in the taxation of one spouse in disproportion to his or her actual economic

contribution to the item. The allocation method most consistent with the rationale for limiting joint

and several liability would generally require a married couple to allocate tax items between the

spouses strictly on the basis of their relative economic contributions to the item. The complex rules

required to reach this result would cause substantial additional compliance burdens for taxpayers and

administrative burdens on the IRS.

It is also likely that some form of innocent spouse or equitable relief comparable to that

provided by current law would continue to be required, because later discovered items of income or

improper deductions, credits, or exemptions, could result in additional tax to the nonearning spouse

due to the allocation formula. Finally, front end proportionate liability would not fully address the

problems with joint and several liability of taxpayers in community property states.

2. Back End Proportionate Liability - ABA Separate Liability Proposal

a. Description of Proposal

The ABA's separate liability proposal is a variation of back end proportionate liability.44/

Under the ABA proposal, married couples would determine their tax liability by filing joint returns

in generally the same manner as under present law. In contrast to the front end proportionate liability

proposal, the spouses would not be required to allocate the tax items shown on the return at the time

of filing. The ABA proposes that the allocation of tax items and the separation of a tax liability or

assessment would occur only in two situations: (1) upon an election by one spouse following an

assessment for unpaid tax; or (2) upon the assertion of a deficiency of tax.

In the first situation, if the IRS were to make an assessment against the joint filers because

they had not fully paid the taxes shown as due on the joint return, either spouse could elect to
- 35 -

separate the tax liability. The spouse seeking to separate the liability would be required to provide

the information needed to allocate each item of income, deduction, exemption and credit between the

spouses. Once the correct allocation of tax items was established, each spouse's liability would be

computed by a formula apportioning the total tax between the spouses, as under front end

proportionate liability. If partial payment had been made with respect to the joint return, the payment

would also need to be allocated between the spouses.

In the second situation (assertion of a deficiency), the ABA proposes that recomputation of

separate tax liability would occur only with regard to items that were adjusted on examination. As

stated in the Appendix to the ABA's legislative proposal, the IRS would determine which taxpayer

is responsible for a particular tax item at the time that an auditor determined an item was improperly

reported, as follows:

Failure to report [earned] income: Deficiencies based upon failure to report income would

be assessed solely against the party that earned the income.

Disallowed individual deductions: Deficiencies based upon improper individual deductions

would be assessed solely against the party on whose behalf the deduction was taken, up to

the amount of income of that party. If the deduction exceeded the income of that party, the

deficiency for the remainder of the deduction would be assessed against the nonresponsible

spouse whose income was sheltered in whole or in part by the deduction. 

Disallowed joint deductions: Disallowed joint deductions would be allocated to each spouse

in proportion to his or her income.

Credit for tax payments: Credit for taxes paid by withholding, estimated payments or

payments with the return would not be given to one spouse, individually, but would be

credited to taxes previously assessed.

Appendix to ABA Legislative Proposal, Annual Meeting, August 1994, at 19.

An issue not explicitly covered by the ABA's proposal is how to apportion tax attributable to

the income generated by a joint asset, such as a joint bank account or a jointly held business or a

separate item purchased with joint assets. A logical extension of the ABA proposal would be to

require that the tax attributable to a joint asset be allocated between the spouses in direct proportion

to their ownership of the property (i.e., generally half to each spouse). 

Under the ABA proposal, neither spouse would be entitled to a refund when there was an

underpayment with respect to the couple's aggregate tax liability. That is, if after separation of

liability, one spouse were overpaid and the other underpaid, no refund would be issued to the

overpaid spouse.
- 36 -

Under the ABA's proposal, additional assessments would be made against each spouse based

on the spouse's responsibility for the individual items giving rise to the assessment. The application

of this rule would be straightforward when only one spouse was affected and the adjustments did not

result in crossing a threshold amount for a rate increase or limitation on deductions. More

complicated rules would be needed to allocate the additional tax liability between spouses when there

were multiple adjustments affecting both spouses (possibly arising at different times) or where the

adjustments would result in a change in tax bracket for the spouses.

b. Effect on Taxpayers

The ABA proposal would allow married couples to file joint returns in essentially the same

manner as under current law. Taxpayers would not be affected by the proposal unless they elected

to separate any unpaid liability (for example, in the case of divorce or separation), or until the IRS

proposed an adjustment to the couple's tax liability (in which case separation might be automatic or

elective). 

Taxpayers who seek to separate their liabilities would need sufficient records to establish the

appropriate allocation or they would be denied relief from joint and several liability. Presumably, the

ABA proposal assumes that all well-advised married taxpayers would take on the additional burden

of maintaining such records, because they would not know at the time their joint return was filed

whether or not the records would be necessary at a later time. In general, the records would have

to be maintained until the statute of limitations for the tax year had closed.

As was true of the front end proportionate liability proposal, unless there was also a legislative

reversal of the rule of Poe v. Seaborn, married taxpayers living in community property states would

not be helped by this proposal to nearly the same extent as married taxpayers in common law states.

So long as Poe v. Seaborn continues to be law, community income would continue to be allocated

and taxed to each spouse in a 50-50 ratio, by operation of state law.

c. Effect on IRS Administration

The back end proportionate liability proposal would have no significant effect on IRS returns

processing operations. Returns for married couples would be processed in essentially the same way

as joint returns are processed under current law. 

It is less certain how extensively IRS information systems would need to be modified to

accommodate the separation of a couple's tax assessment that could be required under the conditions

of the proposal (i.e., if taxes shown on the return are not paid, or if additional taxes are assessed

through the IRS audit process). If separation of liability were required in a large number of cases,

the most efficient and cost-effective method would be to incorporate the separation of liabilities into

Master File programming. Such changes would require significant alterations to existing Master File

programming (to allow a couple's tax account to be divided into two subaccounts, one for each

spouse) and to the IRS's ongoing modernization efforts. 
For example, if a spouse could make an election after the Service had begun a seizure of 45/

property that would require the Service to return the property, the Service would be seriously

hampered in its ability to collect taxes.

- 37 -

Alternatively, the IRS could handle separation of liability cases under this proposal as it

currently does for joint tax assessments that are separated in the event that innocent spouse relief is

granted. This is currently accomplished on a separate computer system that is used primarily for

collection actions on a former joint account. This separate system has more limited capability than

the Master File; for example, it does not automatically generate notices or make interest and penalty

calculations. 

In the case of an examination, there would be two approaches to administering a separation

of tax liabilities. The IRS might be required in all cases to determine the spouse to whom a specific

adjustment is attributable and automatically assess the additional liability only against that spouse.

Alternatively, an additional tax assessment against a married couple could be presumptively treated

as a joint liability, and the liability would be separated only if one of the spouses makes an election.

While the effect of this proposal on other IRS operations could be reduced by an elective

regime (for example, by reducing the need for comprehensive changes to computer systems), the

examination of returns and collection of taxes could be subject to delays, increased costs, and greater

risk of noncollection. To mitigate these results, it might be appropriate to restrict the time when 45/

a spouse may make an election to separate liabilities. On the other hand, an unrestricted election

approach might be considered necessary to avoid inequitable results. 

d. Effectiveness of Proposal

The back end proportionate liability proposal would preserve the benefits of income-splitting

associated with joint filing under current law. At the same time, it would allow a spouse in some

circumstances to avoid liability associated with the tax items of the other spouse. By providing a

spouse the ability to avoid a portion of a joint liability, the proposal would lessen the difficulties that

some taxpayers experience under current law. 

However, if the goal of the proposal is to ensure that no spouse is required to pay more than

his or her proportionate share of a couple's tax liability, then some form of innocent spouse or similar

equitable relief would be needed in addition to the basic proposal. The ABA proposal would not

protect a spouse where the spouse had overpaid relative to his or her own liability but not relative to

the joint liability, for example through withholding. In addition, back end proportionate liability

would not eliminate the questions of equity that are discussed above with respect to front end

proportionate liability (see examples 1 and 2 in the discussion of front end proportionate liability).

Finally, the proposal would not offer relief if the IRS collected the full joint tax liability before the

election to treat the spouses' liabilities separately had been made, although the frequency of this

problem would depend on the rules governing the timing of the election.
For convenience, “Comments on Notice 96-19, Study on Joint Return and Community 46/

Property Issues for Divorced and Separated Taxpayers,” prepared by the Individual Taxation

Committee-Domestic Relations Working Group of the American Institute of Certified Public

Accountants (AICPA), which was provided to the IRS on July 2, 1996, is referred to as the

AICPA proposal. The AICPA proposal was approved by both the Individual Taxation and Tax

Executive Committees of the AICPA.

- 38 -

In addition, many of the problems that individuals experience with the current innocent spouse

provisions relate to the individuals' inability to prove that they qualify for the relief. Similar problems

might arise under the ABA proposal where the proper allocation of a challenged item is unclear, since

the ABA proposal would place the evidentiary burden on the spouse wishing to separate a liability.

Finally, as with the other reform proposals discussed above, this proposal would be less

effective in resolving current difficulties taxpayers may be facing in community property states, unless

Poe v. Seaborn were overruled legislatively, as advocated by the ABA. See the discussion of

community property issues, below. In community property states, community income is shared

between the spouses. Thus, without a special rule, an understatement of income earned by one

spouse will result in an increased tax liability for both spouses.

e. Summary

The principal effect of back end proportionate liability would be to allow a spouse to avoid

additional tax liability attributable to the tax items of the other spouse resulting from an examination

or from tax not paid upon the filing of a return. Under this proposal, taxpayers would be required

to maintain and produce the records needed to establish the appropriate allocation of tax liability.

Under back end proportionate liability, some form of innocent spouse or similar equitable relief would

also still be needed to ensure that no individual is required to pay more than his or her proportionate

share of a couple's tax liability.

Married taxpayers living in community property states would not be helped as much by this

proposal, because community income would continue to be allocated and taxed to each spouse 50-50

by operation of state law.

D. AICPA Proposal: Allocated Liability Standard

1. Description of Proposal

Under the AICPA proposal, joint filers would determine their aggregate income tax liability,

as they presently do, on a single tax form. No new calculations, columns or rules would be required 46/

to determine the couple's tax liability. Once the joint tax liability was determined, joint filers would

provide an allocation of that aggregate liability on their tax return. The AICPA proposal has two

basic rules for allocating aggregate income tax liabilities between spouses in the event of an IRS
- 39 -

collection action -- one for known liabilities (i.e. , liabilities reported on the return) and one for

unknown liabilities (i.e., liabilities other than those reported on the return).

For known liabilities, a couple could state on the face of their return how their aggregate

liability would be allocated between them in the event of an IRS collection action. Taxpayers would

have complete discretion on how to determine their allocation. They could base their respective

percentages on a detailed income/deduction analysis, or simply choose a particular allocation. If the

taxpayers did not choose an allocation, the default allocation would be a 50-50 split. The AICPA

proposal presumably would permit taxpayers to file amended returns to change their allocations of

known liabilities. Taxpayers could also change such allocations through a divorce decree or

separation agreement.

Unknown liabilities would also be governed by the allocation on either the original return or

any amended return. In the event of a divorce or separation, however, unknown liabilities could also

be allocated by the couples' divorce decree or separate maintenance agreement. If those documents

contained no allocation of the specific liability at issue or of tax liabilities in general, the percentage

allocation would be the same as the allocation on the taxpayers' tax return for the tax year in question.

If that tax return had no allocation, the final default allocation would be a 50-50 split. The issues

involved in binding the Service by divorce decrees are discussed below in this report. 

The AICPA proposes that the IRS generally would have to respect allocations for known and

unknown liabilities unless there was a clearly abusive situation. The IRS, for example, could ignore

an allocation that resulted from the use of force, coercion or intimidation by one spouse against the

other. The IRS would also not have to respect allocations undertaken for purposes of fraud or the

undue manipulation of tax rules, perhaps determined under standards similar to those for transferee

liability. Taxpayers would also be bound by their allocations.

2. Effect on Taxpayers

Married couples would be required to consider carefully the allocation of liabilities on their

joint return, or at least to determine that the default 50-50 split was appropriate for their situation.

If the couple filed an amended return reflecting a change in their overall tax liability, they might need

to reexamine their original allocation in order to obtain the division of tax liability they want. 

Because the AICPA proposal would give spouses the opportunity to choose an allocation

formula unrelated to the economic situation of the two taxpayers, the proposal could create an

additional difficulty for taxpayers who retain professionals to prepare their income tax returns or to

represent them in disputes with the IRS. Such professionals could face a conflict of interest to the

extent they are advising the two spouses with regard to negotiation of an allocation formula on either

the original return or on a subsequent amended return. By contrast, under current law, such
Even under the present joint return and innocent spouse rules, conflicts of interest arise 47/

and the courts occasionally have vacated a decision where one spouse was inadequately

represented. See, e.g., Devore v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1992). The allocated

liability standard could increase these conflicts.

- 40 -

professionals generally have no conflict because the spouses' interests are joint, although conflicts may

arise later when an innocent spouse defense becomes available.47/

3. Effect on IRS Administration

The AICPA's proposal presents many of the same administrative issues as the front end and

back end proportionate liability proposals. Significant administrative effects would first arise

whenever there was a need to determine the spouses' separate liabilities. This could occur at the time

the return was filed (if the model used was similar to front end proportionate liability) or when either

spouse chose to separate their liabilities (if the model selected was similar to back end proportionate

liability). Consequently, the effects on IRS administration would be similar to those described above

for front end and back end proportionate liability, depending on which model was selected. These

effects are discussed in connection with the analysis of the front end and back end proportionate

liability proposals above.

An additional potential complication under the allocated liability standard could arise in

connection with modifications to the allocation (e.g., on amended returns). Changes to the allocation

could require abatements to one spouse's tax account and additional assessments to the other. It

could also be administratively difficult to reallocate payments and refunds.

The allocated liability proposal is subject to the possibility of collusive abuse between the

spouses, for example by assigning most of the joint tax liability to the spouse without assets from

which the liability can be collected. Although the AICPA suggests that the IRS could change

allocations "in situations where there is undue manipulation of the rules . . . or fraud," it does not set

forth standards for such reallocations. It is difficult to foresee what standards would be appropriate

or administrable. Standards based on the spouses' economic contributions would effectively result

in a proportionate liability system. In contrast, a standard based on fraud would effectively preclude

the IRS from changing an allocation, since the proposal does not impose any substantive limits on the

spouses' ability to choose a particular allocation formula.

4. Effectiveness of Proposal

While the AICPA proposal does not necessarily limit a spouse's liability to that spouse's

economic situation, it does limit the ultimate amount collectible from a spouse to either the

percentage that the spouse has agreed to or the 50 percent default allocation. The AICPA believes

that this result better comports with how joint filers view themselves -- namely, as an economic unit

to which each spouse contributes. The allocated liability standard would allow married taxpayers to
- 41 -

choose an allocation percentage based on their own view of their economic arrangement and would

provide a 50-50 default rule for couples who do not make a different choice.

The AICPA believes that there would be less need for the innocent spouse rules, because each

spouse would be liable only for his or her allocated percentage of the total tax liability, rather than

for 100 percent of the total liability as under current law. It is questionable, however, whether this

degree of relief would be considered adequate by a taxpayer who believes that he or she should not

be responsible for any liability attributable to the unreported income or improper deductions of the

other spouse. Considering the equities that support claims for innocent spouse relief under current

law, it would be reasonable to expect many taxpayers to disagree with the AICPA's belief that merely

reducing a joint filer's proportionate liability below 100 percent is an adequate response to the

perceived unfairness of joint and several liability. To address these concerns, some form of equitable

relief presumably would still be necessary to ensure that the nonresponsible spouse is not assessed

tax equitably attributable to the other spouse. 

To the extent that equitable relief was made available to one spouse in order to eliminate an

obligation to pay an amount of tax allocated under the initial formula, an issue would then arise as

to whether the other spouse would be required to pay the difference. While such a shifting of liability

might be inconsistent with the basic premise of the allocated liability standard, it would be supported

by the rationale for providing equitable relief to the innocent spouse. It would also be consistent with

the rules of present law and might be appropriate to minimize any overall revenue loss from the

proposal.

5. Summary

The principal effect of the AICPA proposal would be to limit the spouse's maximum potential

liability by the chosen allocation percentage, in most cases to less than 100 percent of the deficiency.

Because a spouse could remain liable for tax not attributable to his or her actions, the AICPA

proposal would not eliminate the need for equitable relief in many circumstances. Taxpayers who

might now claim innocent spouse relief could continue to need equitable relief even though their

liability was less than 100 percent. At the same time, the proposal might provide taxpayers with less

incentive to challenge inequitable results simply because of the lower tax liability amounts at issue.

E. Determine Tax Liability in Accordance With Divorce Decree 

1. Description of Proposal

Section 401(2) of TBOR 2 directed Treasury and the IRS to examine "[t]he effects of

requiring the IRS to be bound by the terms of a divorce decree which addresses the responsibility for

the tax liability on prior joint returns." This direction was accompanied by the following legislative

history:
The notification to the IRS could be made routinely as part of divorce court proceedings 48/

or else might be required only in cases where the IRS begins collection actions against one of the

former spouses.

Approximately 1,191,000 divorces were granted in the United States in 1994. National 49/

(continued...)

- 42 -

In some cases, a couple addresses the responsibility for tax liability as part of their

divorce decree. However, these agreements are not binding on the IRS because the

IRS was not a party to the divorce proceeding. Thus, if a former spouse violates the

tax responsibilities assigned to him or her in a divorce decree, the other spouse may

not rely on the decree in dealing with the IRS.

H.R. Rep. No. 56, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1996).

The divorce decree proposal would limit each spouse's individual liability with respect to

previously filed joint returns to the amount specified in a divorce decree. Any joint liabilities affected

by the divorce decree would become two separate liabilities once the IRS was notified of the divorce

decree. This proposal would have substantially the same effect on taxpayers in both common law 48/

and community property states.

2. Effect on Taxpayers

As noted in the ABA's comments, divorce decrees and property settlements often fail to

address the division of tax liabilities, and in many other cases use ambiguous wording that leads to

disputes between former spouses as to which spouse is liable for a prior joint liability. The ABA

comments suggest that this problem is unlikely to be eliminated unless many more taxpayers spend

additional resources to be represented by tax attorneys during their divorce proceedings. 

Moreover, even if divorcing taxpayers routinely seek expert tax advice to deal with these

issues, it could be difficult for them to allocate fairly, in the midst of dealing with all the other aspects

of a divorce, a tax liability that might not become an issue until after the divorce is concluded. This

difficulty could also present an opportunity for one spouse to gain an advantage over the other in

allocating a joint liability. In some circumstances, an additional form of equitable relief might be

considered appropriate.

3. Effect on IRS Administration

The divorce decree proposal would have no significant effect on how the IRS currently

processes tax returns. When the IRS received a divorce decree, any joint liabilities affected by the

divorce decree would become two separate liabilities. The extent to which IRS information systems

would need to be modified to accommodate this proposal would depend largely on the number of

divorce allocations the IRS would be required to track. 

49/
(...continued) 49/

Center of Health Statistics of the Department of Health and Human Services, Monthly Vital

Statistics Report (October, 1995).

- 43 -

Assuming that the IRS would not be made a party to every divorce proceeding in which tax

liability was allocated, it is not clear how the Government's interest in collecting the proper amount

of tax revenue would be protected. It is reasonable to expect that the non-tax considerations of

divorce proceedings would overshadow the parties' concern about the ability of the Federal

Government to collect the proper amount of tax. At the same time, this proposal presents the

potential for abuses such as allocating liabilities to asset-poor spouses.

While the IRS could theoretically be granted a right of intervention in divorce proceedings

to protect the Federal Government’s interests, creation of such a right would require an overhaul of

Federal law and the laws of the 50 states, and would require consideration of social, family and

economic policy issues far beyond the scope of this study. Even apart from these larger concerns,

the IRS does not have the resources to participate in the approximately 1.2 million divorces that

occur annually. While many of these divorcing couples would not have unpaid tax liabilities relating

to their jointly filed returns, it would be difficult for the IRS to identify those cases in which

intervention might be necessary to protect the Federal Government’s interests. 

One administrative issue that would have to be resolved is how and when the IRS would be

advised that a divorce decree might effect the separation of the couple's tax assessment. Procedures

preferably would specify that spouses must present divorce decrees at the beginning of an

examination or collection action. This would be necessary to prevent the delay and additional

expense associated with initiating an administrative action on a joint liability only to learn later that

a divorce decree had effectively created two separate liabilities for the former couple, requiring

separate assessment and collection. It is unclear how this concern would be addressed in cases where

the divorce proceedings are not completed by the specified time.

Because the divorce decree proposal would require the Service to substitute two new separate

tax liabilities in place of a joint liability, the effect on the IRS' ability to collect would largely be the

same as those noted for the proportionate liability and AICPA proposals. See the discussions of

those proposals above for more detailed explanations of these issues.

A significant additional complication, however, arises because a divorce decree could alter

a preexisting IRS collection action on a joint liability. For example, a divorce decree could assign a

joint liability to one of the spouses, and the assets subject to a preexisting lien to the other spouse.

In such situations, the IRS would have to incur the costs and complications of first removing its prior

lien because the assets would no longer be subject to satisfying the liability, and then asserting a new

lien against other assets of the liable spouse, to the extent the spouse has such assets.
- 44 -

4. Effectiveness of Proposal

Many taxpayers are apparently surprised to learn that under current law their divorce decree's

allocation of liabilities is not binding on creditors (including the IRS) who do not participate in the

divorce proceedings. The divorce decree proposal would allow divorced taxpayers to limit the

amount of tax they owe on jointly filed returns through the operation of their divorce decree.

Proponents of this proposal believe that limiting the Service’s ability to collect taxes to the taxpayers'

expectations as shown in their divorce decree would be fairer to taxpayers.

While the proposal would permit a couple to separate their joint and several tax liabilities, it

would have no effect on other joint and several liabilities, such as those owed on mortgages or credit

cards. As a result, other creditors could collect from either spouse even if inconsistent with a divorce

decree, while the IRS would be limited in its ability to collect outstanding tax liabilities. The proposal

might thus shift collections from the Government to private creditors.

In addition, the divorce decree proposal fails to address a significant criticism of the joint and

several liability standard -- that one spouse can be held liable for amounts attributable to the tax items

of the other spouse. This could continue to occur if a state court were to apportion Federal tax

liabilities during the divorce based on non-tax considerations. Furthermore, a spouse might not

disclose the existence of unreported income or questionable deductions and credits in the course of

negotiating the divorce decree. Without such information, the other spouse could agree to an

allocation of liability that would not be considered fair had he or she known the full extent of the

potential liabilities of the other spouse. Because of these situations, some form of innocent spouse

or equitable relief would still be necessary. In such cases, either the state court would have to modify

the prior agreement or the Federal tax law would have to override the terms of the state divorce

decree.

5. Summary

As stated above, the divorce decree proposal would limit the effects of joint and several

liability on divorced taxpayers. While this might alleviate some of the difficulties currently faced by

divorcing taxpayers, the proposal would not eliminate the need for equitable relief in some cases.

Finally, through the approval of divorce decrees, states (and not the Federal Government) would be

responsible for the apportionment of Federal tax liabilities between formerly married taxpayers. As

a result, the proposal could produce uneven treatment of taxpayers across the nation. Because of the

many factors a divorce court must take into account in dividing assets and liabilities of a divorcing

couple, and because the IRS would not be a party to divorce proceedings, the proposal likely would

affect tax collections adversely.
Babb v. Schmidt, 496 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1974) (California law); Broday v. United States,

50/

455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972) (Texas law). Louisiana law allows all creditors to collect

antenuptial debts from community property. Pan American Import Co. v. Buck, 440 So. 2d 182

(La. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, 452 So. 2d 1167 (La. 1984).

In re Ackerman, 424 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1970) (Arizona law); United States v. Overman,

51/

424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970) (Washington law).

That is, under the community property laws of Idaho, Nevada, Wisconsin, and New 52/

Mexico, it is unclear to what extent the IRS may collect pre-nuptial tax debts of one spouse from

(continued...)

- 45 -

COMMUNITY PROPERTY ISSUES 

As part of TBOR 2, Congress asked Treasury and the IRS to consider two issues directly

related to community property laws and their effect on married couples. In the statute, Congress

expressly focused on:

The effect of providing that community income (as defined in section 66(d) of such

Code) which, in accordance with the rules contained in section 879(a) of such Code,

would be treated as the income of one spouse is exempt from a levy for failure to pay

any tax imposed by subtitle A by the other spouse for a taxable year ending before

their marriage.

TBOR 2, § 401(4). 

In addition, Congress indicated in the legislative history of TBOR 2 that it was interested in

the effect on taxpayers of a statutory repeal of the Poe v. Seaborn doctrine. See H.R. Rep. No. 506,

103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1996). 

A. Limiting Community Property That is Subject to Federal Tax Collection

Under present law, the Service can collect tax liabilities from "all property and rights to

property, whether real or personal belonging to" the person liable for the tax. For this purpose, a

taxpayer's property rights are determined under state law. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 512

(1960).

Some of the nine community property states allow the IRS to collect tax debts of one spouse

arising prior to a marriage from all of the income (including wages of the other spouse) that is defined

as community property. Other community property states allow the Service to collect one spouse's 50/

tax liability from the other spouse's income (where it is community property) but only to the extent

of the debtor spouse's one-half interest in that community property. In the remaining community 51/

property states, resolution of the issue is unclear. By comparison, in common law states, it is clear 52/
(...continued) 52/

community property income. 

The exemption incorporating I.R.C. § 879(a) by reference would operate slightly 53/

differently where a husband was entitled to the exemption than where a wife was entitled to the

exemption. Any trade or business income of the husband's would be protected, regardless of his

degree of management and control over the business, if he were entitled to the exemption from

levy. A wife's income from a trade or business would only be exempt from levy to the extent that

she exercised substantially all of the management and control over the business. This difference is

the result of the language of I.R.C. § 1402(a)(5) which creates a presumption that trade or

business income is that of the husband. 

Many community property states already provide a mechanism for spouses to shield 54/

property from the debts of their spouse. Married couples can agree, typically in writing, that

certain property should be the spouse's separate property which is not subject to the payment of

the debts of the other spouse.

- 46 -

that the Service has no right to collect an antenuptial tax liability of one spouse from the income

(including wages) of the other spouse.

As suggested in § 401(4) of TBOR 2, Congress could limit the types of community property

on which the IRS could place a levy. For example, if Congress concluded that antenuptial tax debts

of one spouse should not be collected from the income of the other spouse in community property

states, an exemption from levy could be added to the other exemptions already contained in I.R.C.

§ 6334. Such an exemption would provide taxpayers in community property states the same

treatment with respect to this issue as now applies to taxpayers in common law states. 

The exemption suggested by the legislative history of TBOR 2 would look to I.R.C. § 879(a)

to define which community income would be treated as the separate income of one spouse. Such an

exemption would protect the nonliable spouse's earned income, trade or business income,53/

distributive share of partnership income, and income derived from property treated as separate

property under community property law.54/

It should be noted, however, that an exemption in the Internal Revenue Code would not

change the extent to which property is protected from other creditors under state law. Thus, other

creditors of the debtor spouse would still be able to attach community property attributable to the

nondebtor spouse to satisfy nontax debts. As a result, a Federal exemption from levy that is broader

than state exemption laws governing creditors' rights generally might not ultimately benefit the

nondebtor spouse. Community property states could address this issue by revising their exemption

laws to match the Federal tax exemption. 

Another alternative approach to this issue would be an amendment to the Internal Revenue

Code providing that community property law should simply be disregarded for purposes of
See generally Treas. Reg. § 301. 6334-2(b)(example). 55/

No commentator has questioned Congress' authority to enact legislation that would 56/

overturn Poe v. Seaborn.

- 47 -

determining whether a spouse's property is subject to levy for the debt of the liable spouse. Under

such an approach, however, it would be difficult to know what law should be applied to determine

taxpayers' property rights. For example, what law would govern questions such as "Are the wages

earned by one spouse treated as that spouse's property (and therefore exempt from levy to satisfy the

other spouse's tax debts) even after they are commingled in a joint bank account?" Presumably,

55/

much more detailed and extensive Federal rules would need to be developed to define property rights

if this approach were adopted.

Finally, it has been suggested that a legislative repeal of Poe v. Seaborn would have the effect

of limiting the community property that is subject to Federal tax collection. Poe v. Seaborn, however,

addresses only the issue of how married couples in community property states must report their

taxable income when filing separate returns. A legislative repeal of Poe v. Seaborn would change

only this result. It would not, by itself, prevent the collection of a pre-existing tax liability from

community property associated with a new marriage, such as from the earnings of a new spouse,

where otherwise permitted under state law.

B. Effect of Overruling Poe v. Seaborn

As noted by the Supreme Court in Poe v. Seaborn, the incidence of Federal income taxation

is based on the rights of a taxpayer to income under state law. Thus, if Poe v. Seaborn was

legislatively repealed, the Internal Revenue Code would need to provide new Federal rules addressing

the allocation of income for married couples in community property states who file separate returns.56/

This would constitute a marked departure for the Federal Government, which has long followed state

law to determine what constitutes property or a right to property.

A more limited approach, which would be more consistent with the Federal Government's

traditional deference to state laws in defining property rights, would be to suggest that the states

determine whether their community property laws produce inequitable results that should be

eliminated and how to resolve those inequities appropriately. To achieve a result equivalent to a

legislative overruling of Poe v. Seaborn, however, the states would likely have to opt out of the

community property system, or at least provide that each spouse has only an expectancy, but not a

present vested interest, in the income of the other spouse.

Another option would be to adopt the already existing rules of I.R.C. § 879(a), which

supersede community property laws with regard to certain income. Under these rules, salary and
It might also be appropriate to amend I.R.C. § 1402(a)(5) (which is incorporated by 57/

reference in I.R.C. § 879) to remove the presumption that income earned through a sole

proprietorship or a partnership is attributable to a husband rather than his wife.

- 48 -

other earned income are attributable only to the earning spouse. Section 879 continues to follow 57/

the community property laws relating to income from other sources (generally, investment income)

in allocating items between the spouses. Additional rules would be required to deal with investment

income under the control of only one spouse if the goal of repealing Poe v. Seaborn was to ensure

that a spouse is never liable for tax on income over which he or she has no control.

For most taxpayers a repeal of Poe v. Seaborn would, by itself, have little effect, because the

vast majority of married taxpayers file joint returns. Further, I.R.C. § 66 is intended to address those

cases in which Poe v. Seaborn produces particularly inequitable results for married taxpayers in

community property states who choose to file separate returns. See the discussion of section 66,

above.

As noted earlier, however, repeal of Poe v. Seaborn would have a significant impact on joint

filers if it were coupled with the adoption of a proportionate liability standard in place of joint and

several liability. Under any proportionate liability standard, one spouse's share of a couple's aggregate

tax liability will depend upon the allocation of income between the spouses.
- 49 -

 REFORM OF THE INNOCENT SPOUSE PROVISIONS

A. Introduction

Congress expressed concern that the innocent spouse provisions do not provide "meaningful

relief in all cases where such relief is appropriate." TBOR 2, § 401. Indeed, the criteria of I.R.C. §

6013(e) were significantly modified in 1984 when Congress recognized certain “compelling” cases

which did not qualify for relief under prior law. The statute originally provided relief only for tax

attributable to omissions of income but, in 1984, was amended to apply to the tax attributable to

items of deduction, credit or basis as well. As an alternative to the broader reform proposals

discussed above, further amendments to the innocent spouse provisions may help eliminate or lessen

inequities which have been experienced by some married taxpayers, particularly in the case of divorce

or separation.

B. Perceived Problems Under I.R.C. § 6013(e)

1. Substantial Understatement

To qualify for relief under I.R.C. § 6013(e), there must be a "substantial understatement" of

tax. The amount of an understatement of tax equals the excess of the correct tax for the year over

the amount of tax reported on the return as filed. To qualify as "substantial," the understatement of

tax must exceed the tax reported on the return by more than $500. In addition, if the understatement

of tax is attributable to an item of deduction, credit or basis, it must also exceed a specified

percentage of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income in the preadjustment year, i.e., the year before the

adjustment is proposed (10 percent if the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income is $20,000 or less in the

preadjustment year; 25 percent if the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income is more than $20,000 in the

preadjustment year). If the taxpayer seeking relief has remarried, the income of the new spouse must

be included in this calculation. Given how the Code defines "substantial understatement of tax,"

taxpayers may find it difficult to obtain innocent spouse relief.

First, even if the return as filed shows the correct amount of tax, it is possible that a spouse

would be held liable for an amount that he or she believed had already been paid by the other spouse.

Innocent spouse relief, however, currently does not apply to underpayments of tax. Because some

of these spouses might be able to satisfy the other equitable factors of I.R.C. § 6013(e), it is

questionable whether it is fair to exclude them from attempting to obtain innocent spouse relief in this

situation.

Second, as noted above, there are separate limitations for understatements of gross income

reported on the return as opposed to understatements attributable to items of deduction, credit or

basis. There is no apparent reason why different limitations should apply in these two different

situations. In addition, while the limitations introduce a measure of progressivity for taxpayers to

qualify for relief, a mere one dollar addition to income over $20,000 can raise the understatement
At $20,000 of income, the threshold is $2,000. At $20,001, the threshold is $5,000. 58/

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threshold by $3,000. Moreover, the income thresholds for determining eligibility for innocent

58/

spouse relief with respect to a joint return filed with a former spouse are determined by including

income of a new spouse to determine the proper amount of the income thresholds. Taxpayers may

find this rule particularly inequitable.

Third, some taxpayers could find it inequitable to be denied relief if their liability is $500 or

less. For some taxpayers, amounts of $500 or less could result in a substantial hardship.

2. Grossly Erroneous Items

For an item to qualify for innocent spouse relief, the item must be grossly erroneous. Any

omission from income is by definition grossly erroneous. A deduction, on the other hand, must be

"without basis in fact or law" in order to be grossly erroneous. The requirement that an item of

deduction, credit or basis be without “basis in fact or law” before it is considered to be grossly

erroneous may prevent some taxpayers from qualifying for innocent spouse relief even though they

might be able to satisfy the other equitable factors of I.R.C. § 6013(e). It is questionable whether the

distinction between gross income and deductions is an appropriate criterion on which to deny relief

to taxpayers who would otherwise qualify for innocent spouse relief.

In certain circumstances, an adjustment to a return may produce an understatement that is not

attributable to an omission of income, or an erroneous claim of deduction, credit or basis. For

example, a taxpayer might incorrectly characterize income as capital gain. In these cases, no innocent

spouse relief is currently available.

The ABA proposes to eliminate the grossly erroneous requirement, noting that the nature of

the claimed item could be a factor in measuring the equities. This would eliminate some of the

complexity currently contained in I.R.C. § 6013(e), and would instead focus the inquiry on equitable

factors. There is no logical rationale for limiting innocent spouse relief to specific types of items on

a return, when relief arguably is equally equitable and appropriate with respect to any item which may

cause an understatement.

In addition, this proposal would eliminate the problem of requiring one spouse, generally after

divorce or separation, to prove the degree of error in the tax treatment of an item arising from a

transaction into which the other spouse entered. Further, eliminating the "grossly erroneous"

requirement would eliminate disputes about whether a deduction or credit claimed was merely

"wrong" or was "very wrong." It also avoids conflicts of interest of representatives who wish to

argue alternatively that the particular item is allowable, but if not, that one spouse is innocent as to

it.

On the other hand, any expansion of the innocent spouse relief available may reduce the

incentive for each spouse to scrutinize the joint return. The proposed amendment also may allow
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relief for "run of the mill" errors rather than errors that are caused by the wrongdoing of the "guilty"

spouse. Finally, the change would likely cause some loss of revenue.

3. Actual or Constructive Knowledge

To obtain innocent spouse relief with respect to an erroneous item on a joint return, a spouse

must demonstrate that "he or she did not know, and had no reason to know" of the error. Because

this criterion is fact-intensive, it has resulted in considerable litigation, and there is a division among

the courts as to how this requirement should be applied. 

Dissatisfaction with the knowledge standard stems from its fact-intensive nature and the

perception that it is applied inconsistently. Thus, commentators such as the ABA and AICPA have

suggested that the knowledge standard be clarified, changed or even eliminated.

The ABA, for example, proposes that the knowledge standard could be modified so that the

question of liability turns on the ability of the spouse, from his or her own knowledge of the parties’

business affairs, to understand that a potential tax liability exists. Under this proposal, it appears that

a taxpayer’s duty to inquire about and understand the consequences of a transaction reported on his

or her tax return would vary depending on the complexity of the transaction. Thus, the incidence of

tax liability might turn on the parties’ knowledge and understanding of the tax law. If this proposal

were adopted, ignorance of the law could become a defense to the imposition of tax. Under such an

approach, there is no apparent reason why the tax liability of both spouses should not be excused if

they both did not understand the tax consequences of their transaction.

The AICPA takes a more limited approach and proposes that the Service should, in

regulations, list factors to be considered in determining whether a spouse knew or had reason to

know of a substantial understatement of tax. As discussed below, adding such factors could improve

consistency in the application of the knowledge requirement.

4. Equitable Factors

In addition to meeting the other requirements of I.R.C. § 6013(e), a taxpayer seeking innocent

spouse relief must demonstrate that "taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is

inequitable" to hold him or her liable for the deficiency. A taxpayer might meet all of the other tests

of I.R.C. § 6013(e) and still remain liable for an underpayment of tax if the equities indicate that it

is inappropriate to grant relief.

One of the most important factors to be considered is whether the spouse significantly

benefited directly or indirectly from the items which gave rise to the understatement. H.R. Rep. No.

432 (part 2), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1502 (1984); Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b). Other factors taken into

account by courts and the Service in determining the equities applicable to the taxpayer include

whether financial hardship will ensue, whether a spouse was deserted or divorced, and whether the

other spouse also was unaware of the tax consequences of the transaction. The similarity of some
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of these factors to other tests in I.R.C. § 6013(e), in particular the knowledge test, has led the ABA

to propose that the equitable test could be eliminated.

Other commentators, however, have suggested that equitable factors should be the sole and

determinative tests for deciding whether innocent spouse relief should be allowed. Moreover,

eliminating the equitable test would provide innocent spouse relief in certain circumstances where it

might be considered inappropriate. For example, while a spouse might not have actual or

constructive knowledge of omitted income when the return is filed, he or she might later benefit from

the income. This could occur in the case of a subsequent gift or bequest by the earning spouse.

Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b). Without a separate equities test, the non-earning spouse could qualify

for relief in such a circumstance. As a result, income could escape tax altogether, even though the

non-earning spouse has received the benefit of such income, e.g., where spouse A is responsible for

the understatement, then dies, and spouse B inherits the income. 

C. Improvements to the Innocent Spouse Provisions

1. Administrative Improvements

As stated above, some taxpayers have encountered difficulties with the existing innocent

spouse provisions. Treasury and the IRS have already taken several administrative steps to improve

the operation of the statute. Pursuant to an administrative initiative that was subsequently codified

by TBOR 2, the IRS is making information available to divorced or separated spouses with respect

to collection of joint liabilities from the other spouse. In addition, to ensure that taxpayers do not lose

their right to innocent spouse relief, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel is informing practitioners that

may intend to represent both spouses simultaneously to determine whether a conflict exists. Counsel

is also requiring enhanced management supervision in cases where innocent spouse claims are

asserted. CCDM (35)515; Chief Counsel Notice N(35)000-138 Innocent Spouse Cases.

In connection with this study and in response to certain suggestions made by the GAO in their

parallel TBOR 2 study of joint return issues, the IRS also intends to make several other

improvements. The IRS will revise its publications to inform taxpayers more fully of their potential

right to innocent spouse relief. As a legislative matter, Congress could codify this requirement, by

providing that the IRS must establish procedures to alert married taxpayers clearly of their joint and

several liability on appropriate tax publications and instructions, within a certain time frame such as

180 days. Further, the IRS will develop a special form and related procedures for taxpayers to claim

such relief and will use the form to educate its employees about innocent spouse claims to achieve

greater consistency in processing those claims. Congress again could require the IRS to develop such

a separate form with instructions for taxpayers to use in applying for innocent spouse relief.

The IRS is making additional administrative changes designed to improve the treatment of

innocent spouses, including: 1) reviewing current training materials to ensure that they stress the

responsibility of employees to identify situations where the innocent spouse provisions might apply,

even if the taxpayer does not know about the provisions. When appropriate, the IRS will provide
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these taxpayers with the new form and assist them in preparing it; 2) making telephone assistors,

specially trained in the innocent spouse provisions, available to answer questions from taxpayers

received through IRS’ toll free telephone system; 3) developing special training courses on the

innocent spouse provisions to be given to IRS collection and examination personnel in both basic

training as well as annual continuing professional education training; and 4) conducting focused

outreach on both the national and local levels to community organizations that serve abused or

battered spouses to identify those who might qualify for relief under the innocent spouse provisions.

2. Potential Legislative and Regulatory Improvements

Treasury and the IRS have identified a number of possible improvements to the innocent

spouse provisions. These improvements would require changes to either the statute or the

regulations. 

a. Substantial Understatement

In order to permit relief in cases where there is no “understatement of tax” on the joint return

as filed, the statute could be amended to apply to any “underpayment of tax” as well. For example,

if the joint return correctly stated the amount of tax due, but full payment did not accompany the

return, relief would be available if one spouse could establish that he or she did not know of the

underpayment and met the other innocent spouse criteria.

Also, as described above, an understatement of tax attributable to an item of deduction, credit,

or basis, may be the subject of innocent spouse relief only if it exceeds a specified percentage of the

taxpayer’s adjusted gross income in the year before the adjustment is proposed (10 percent if the

taxpayer’s adjusted gross income is $20,000 or less, 25 percent if adjusted gross income is more than

$20,000 in the preadjustment year). No similar rule applies to an omission from gross income.

These special thresholds relating to items of deduction, credit or basis could be deleted.

Alternatively, the 10 percent threshold could be adopted for all income levels. In either case, this

would equalize the treatment of taxpayers whose liabilities result from different forms of inaccuracy,

and would eliminate the arbitrary results which occur at the $20,000 threshold under current law.

These proposed changes would require legislation.

b. Grossly Erroneous Items

Under I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2), any omission from gross income is automatically considered a

grossly erroneous item. In contrast, an erroneously claimed item of deduction, credit or basis must

have “no basis in fact or law” in order to be grossly erroneous. This “no basis in fact or law”

requirement could be eliminated in order to equalize the treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.

Alternatively, the requirement that the understatement be attributable to a grossly erroneous

item could be eliminated. This change would extend relief to situations where the understatement
- 54 -

is not attributable to an omission of income, or an erroneous claim of deduction, credit or basis.

Again, this proposal would require statutory amendment of section 6013(e).

c. Actual or Constructive Knowledge

There currently is no discussion in the regulations relating to the requirement in section

6013(e)(1)(C) that the taxpayer "did not know, and had no reason to know" of the understatement.

As noted previously, the AICPA suggests that the knowledge requirement might be applied more

consistently if courts and the IRS were provided with additional guidance, in the form of a list of

factors that could be taken into account in making this determination. In general, knowledge of an

understatement will always be a factual question that relates to the taxpayer's state of mind, financial

expertise, and similar considerations.

A list of factors would be helpful in providing guidance on either the issue of "constructive"

or "actual" knowledge. This list need not be enacted legislatively, however. In conjunction with the

other proposals described in this section, Treasury and the IRS are considering whether to issue

regulations or other guidance that would provide additional uniformity in the application of the

knowledge test.

d. Equitable Factors

The existing regulations relating to the application of the equitable requirement of I.R.C. §

6013(e)(1)(D) have not been updated since 1974, and several commentators have suggested changes

that could be made to clarify the application of the equity test under current law. For example, the

regulations fail to reflect the 1984 changes that permit innocent spouse relief in the case of erroneous

deductions, credits or basis.

Commentators have suggested a specific list of factors that should be taken into account in

determining whether relief is equitable. Treasury and the IRS intend to issue updated regulatory

guidance on this issue. 

e. I.R.C. § 66

As discussed above, I.R.C. § 66(c) is roughly analogous to I.R.C. § 6013(e) and is intended

to provide a form of innocent spouse relief to spouses who reside in community property states and

file separate returns, each reporting half the community income. Although several of the

considerations taken into account in determining whether relief is appropriate are similar in the two

provisions (for example, a knowledge requirement in both I.R.C. §§ 66(c)(3) and 6013(e)(1)(C) and

an equities requirement in both I.R.C. §§ 66(c)(4) and 6013(e)(1)(D)), I.R.C. § 66(c) is limited to

omissions from gross income while I.R.C. § 6013(e) may apply to erroneously claimed items of

deduction, credit, or basis as well. There also are no minimum understatement amounts in I.R.C. §

66(c), as there are in I.R.C. § 6013(e). To the extent the terms of I.R.C. § 66(c) differ from the terms

of I.R.C. § 6013(e), however, similarly situated taxpayers can be treated very differently. By
If this alternative is adopted, it is also recommended that I.R.C. § 1402(a)(5) (which is 59/

incorporated in I.R.C. § 879) be amended to eliminate the presumption that income earned

through a sole proprietorship or partnership is attributable to the husband rather than to the wife.

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eliminating disparities and conforming the terms of the two provisions, greater uniformity and

consistent treatment of taxpayers could be achieved. 

In addition to the innocent spouse relief provided under I.R.C. § 66(c), community property

laws may also be disregarded under I.R.C. § 66(a) if spouses who live apart during the taxable year

file separate returns. Under current law, this relief is available only if the spouses live apart at all

times during the calendar year. This rule could be relaxed to permit brief periods of reconciliation;

however, we question whether such a relaxed rule would be administrable. Alternatively, Congress

could provide that community property laws would be disregarded whenever taxpayers are legally

separated. 

Another requirement of I.R.C. § 66(a) is that no earned income be transferred between the

spouses. This requirement also could be relaxed. For example, transfers of a de minimis amount

could be permitted. Another possibility would be to amend I.R.C. § 66(a) to remove the prohibition

on transfers of earned income between the spouses. If amended to permit transfers between spouses,

I.R.C. § 66(a) should be further amended to address the treatment of those transferred amounts. One

option would be to treat the transferred amounts in a manner similar to the treatment in common law

states. Thus, if the alimony rules of I.R.C. § 71 are satisfied, the transferred amounts would be

income to the transferee and deductible by the transferor. A second option would be to treat any

transferred amount as earned income of the transferee spouse, taxable to the transferee spouse under

I.R.C. § 879(a).59/

f. Better Access to Tax Court

The forum provided for contesting a denial by the Secretary of innocent spouse relief is

determined by whether an underpayment is asserted or the taxpayer is seeking a refund of overpaid

taxes. Accordingly, the Tax Court may not have jurisdiction to review all denials of innocent spouse

relief. 

It would be appropriate for Congress to expand the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to allow it to

review any denial (or failure to rule) by the IRS regarding an application for innocent spouse relief.

Under this proposal, the taxpayer would have to file a petition for review with the Tax Court during

a stated period after the denial of relief by the IRS. Except for termination and jeopardy assessments,

the IRS would not be allowed to levy or proceed in court to collect from a taxpayer claiming innocent

spouse status with regard to such tax until the expiration of the stated statutory period or, if the

taxpayer petitions the Tax Court, before the decision of the Tax Court has become final. The running

of the statute of limitations would need to be suspended in such situations with respect to the spouse

claiming innocent spouse status. 
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g. Collection Stay During Litigation

Where one spouse files a petition in the Tax Court concerning a joint return, there are no

provisions in the Code or regulations addressing administrative collection action against a

nonpetitioning spouse during the pendency of the Tax Court proceeding. (Collection of the tax is not

an issue in a refund suit, because a prerequisite to jurisdiction in the refund courts is full payment of

the tax.) The IRS’s policy is generally to forebear from administrative collection of a liability from

a nonpetitioning spouse during pendency of a Tax Court proceeding by the other spouse where there

is reasonable doubt that the assessment is correct, provided that adjustment of the claim is within the

control of the Service and the interests of the Government will not be jeopardized. There are some

circumstances where collection action may be appropriate, however, such as when the petitioning

spouse is seeking relief solely as an innocent spouse, or it is anticipated that the nonpetitioning spouse

may file a bankruptcy petition, or when the majority of the assets are held in the name of the

nonpetitioning spouse, or there is reason to believe that jeopardy exists with respect to collection

from the nonpetitioning spouse. 

In many other circumstances, a nonpetitioning spouse should receive the same protection

against IRS collection action as the spouse who has filed a petition in Tax Court contesting a

proposed deficiency. Therefore, Congress could enact legislation providing that, when a married

couple's joint return is the subject of a Tax Court proceeding, the Service must withhold collection

by levy against a nonpetitioning spouse for that liability during the pendency of the Tax Court

proceeding. This would treat the nonpetitioning spouse the same as the petitioning spouse in most

situations. Exceptions would be appropriate in certain situations, such as jeopardy, or when the

taxpayer waives this protection (i.e., agrees to the collection action), or for some other, limited but

automatic kinds of collection activity, such as automatic refund offset, filing of protective notices of

Federal tax lien, etc. The statute of limitations on assessment and collection would need to be stayed

for the period during which collection is barred. If there is a final decision that reduces the proposed

assessment against the petitioning spouse, the assessment against the nonpetitioning spouse would

likewise be reduced. 
- 57 -

CONCLUSION

The Department of the Treasury and the IRS agree with the concern expressed by Congress

in TBOR 2 that the innocent spouse provisions may not provide "meaningful relief in all cases where

such relief is appropriate." TBOR 2, § 401. Proposals to rectify this problem have focused mostly

on fundamental changes to the joint and several liability standard itself, rather than on amending the

relief provisions in sections 6013(e) and 66. As illustrated in the analysis set forth above, each of

these reform proposals presents some advantages when compared to current law, but also suffers

from potential defects, which need to be considered.

This analysis has led Treasury and the IRS to several conclusions. First, there are sound

policy reasons for permitting married couples to file joint income tax returns, such as treating them

as a single economic unit for tax purposes, permitting them to offset each other’s income and losses,

providing that couples in similar economic situations pay the same amount of tax, and permitting

married taxpayers in common law property jurisdictions the same income-splitting effect that is

available to taxpayers in community property jurisdictions. There are also practical reasons for joint

filing, in particular to simplify filing obligations for married couples and to reduce by up to half the

resources that the IRS must devote to processing individual returns.

Second, the basic principle that taxpayers who file joint income tax returns are jointly and

severally liable for the correct amount of tax due for the period covered by the return is appropriate

in the vast majority of cases. By signing and filing a joint return, and thus obtaining the advantages

of joint filing, each spouse voluntarily undertakes the responsibility for the correct joint liability.

Taxpayers who wish to avoid this rule, and in effect obtain proportional liability, already may elect

to file separate returns using married filing separate status, although there is usually an economic

penalty for doing so. Undeniably, however, additional effort should be made to ensure that taxpayers

are fully aware of their filing status options and the consequences of each filing status.

Third, the proposals for completely eliminating joint and several liability have significant

drawbacks. Shifting to a mandatory separate return system or a front-end proportionate liability

system would impose large burdens on taxpayers and the IRS, yet provide very little compensating

benefits to the operation of the tax system. The back-end proportionate liability and allocated liability

approaches would be less disruptive to the processing of income tax returns than the two front-end

approaches. Each proposal, however, would still require the application of equitable or other relief

factors in situations where the liability-limiting rule may still be considered unfair, and would create

difficulties in tax administration and collection for the IRS. 

Finally, the proposals to limit the community property that may be subject to collection for

joint tax liabilities or to overrule Poe v. Seaborn legislatively would be inconsistent with the

longstanding Federal tax policy of generally following state law in determining what constitutes

property or rights to property. They would also unilaterally disadvantage the Federal Government,

in its status as a tax creditor, vis-a-vis other creditors who would continue to follow and be bound

by state property law. 
- 58 -

To improve the tax liability rules affecting innocent spouses, Treasury and the IRS instead

recommend that the relief provisions in the Internal Revenue Code be modified to accommodate more

cases. The immediately preceding section of this report discusses such proposals, and the President’s

FY 1999 budget proposal incorporated several of these proposals. Treasury and the IRS are prepared

to work with the tax-writing committees of Congress to enact this legislation.