COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judge Overton, Senior Judges Hodges and Baker 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

MELISSA HOFFLER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0587-98-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 NOVEMBER 17, 1998 

DANIEL HOFFLER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY 

Robert B. Cromwell, Jr., Judge Designate 

 James A. Evans (Dinsmore, Evans & Bryant, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Moody E. Stallings, Jr. (Kevin E. 

Martingayle; Stallings & Richardson, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Melissa Hoffler (wife) appeals her final decree of divorce 

from Daniel Hoffler (husband). She contends the trial court 

erroneously interpreted their pre-nuptial and separation 

agreements to remove husband's obligation to pay wife a $100,000 

property settlement. Because we agree with wife, the trial 

court's decree denying her that payment is reversed and remanded. 

 Husband and wife signed a pre-nuptial agreement on April 21, 

1992. The agreement provided that in the event of divorce, 

husband would pay wife a lump sum property settlement of 

$100,000. The parties were married on June 26, 1992 and had two 

children during the marriage. Husband filed for divorce alleging 

adultery and separation on December 9, 1997. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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 After the separation, when both parties were represented by 

counsel, they began negotiating a separation agreement. That 

agreement was finally signed on December 30, 1997. It is the 

confluence of the pre-nuptial and the separation agreements that 

forms the basis of this appeal. 

 The separation agreement states: 

 [T]he Pre-nuptial agreement dated April 21, 

1992 is a valid binding agreement of both 

parties and that the terms of said agreement 

are to remain in effect except as otherwise 

modified herein, said modifications being 

necessary due to additional circumstances of 

the children born of the parties and modified 

for no other reason . . . . 

Many areas addressed by the pre-nuptial agreement were altered. 

One such alteration provided for wife's post-divorce residence. 

Under the separation agreement, "Husband will pay the costs of 

purchasing the Wife a new residence, up to $300,000 and he is to 

receive a copy of the sales contract and closing statement." 

 On January 23, 1998, the trial court conducted an ore tenus

hearing to determine the intent of the parties regarding the two 

agreements. Wife and her former attorney, Mona Flax, argued that 

the $100,000 property settlement was separate from the $300,000 

owed for a residence. However, Ms. Flax also testified that she 

and husband's attorneys had agreed the $300,000 was inclusive of 

the $100,000. Upon questioning from the trial judge, Ms. Flax 

admitted that she understood the $100,000 was part of, not in 

addition to, the $300,000. This intent is embodied nowhere in 

the terms of the contract. 
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 Husband and his attorneys testified they intended the 

$300,000 to "bump up" the $100,000 from the pre-nuptial. The 

trial court ruled the agreements were unambiguous and that the 

settlement agreement's $300,000 "supplanted" the $100,000 

provided for in the pre-nuptial agreement. The trial court 

issued its decree of divorce on February 13, 1998. 

 "In Virginia property settlement agreements are contracts 

subject to the same rules of formation, validity, and 

construction as other contracts." Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App. 

510, 513, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986). Because our examination of 

the agreements is a matter of law, we are not bound by the trial 

court's interpretation. See Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va. App. 11, 

15, 332 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1985) (citing Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 

Va. 184, 187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)). "Where the agreement 

is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the rights of the parties 

are to be determined from the terms of the agreement and the 

court may not impose an obligation not found in the agreement 

itself." Jones v. Jones, 19 Va. App. 265, 268-69, 450 S.E.2d 

762, 764 (1994). We may look only to the plain meaning of the 

agreements; disregarding any beliefs the parties or their lawyers 

may hold regarding their interpretation. An examination of the 

two contracts reveals they are unambiguous and, when read 

together, do not support the trial court's decree. 

 The pre-nuptial agreement unambiguously entitled wife to 

$100,000 as a lump sum property settlement. The settlement 
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agreement, which modified but did not replace the pre-nuptial 

agreement, failed to exterminate this property settlement 

provision. In a new paragraph, under the heading "Marital 

Residence," husband agreed to pay wife "up to $300,000" for a new 

home for herself and the children. These two, separate 

provisions were not connected to each other in any manner. There 

is no indication that the former was waived as the latter was 

created. Therefore, the only rational interpretation to be made 

is that husband has agreed to make both payments. 

 "No matter how inartfully the terms of the agreement may 

have been originally drawn, we cannot now make a new contract for 

the parties. We can only construe the terms as written." Smith 

v. Smith, 15 Va. App. 371, 376, 423 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1992) 

(citing Smith, 3 Va. App. at 516, 351 S.E.2d at 597). We 

construe the terms of these agreements to entitle wife to a lump 

sum property settlement payment of $100,000 and an additional 

amount up to $300,000 for the purchase of a home in accordance 

with the terms of the settlement agreement. The trial court's 

interpretation, to the extent it conflicts with ours, was error. 

 That portion of the parties' decree of divorce which 

addresses wife's lump sum property settlement is reversed and 

remanded to the trial court with instructions for modification 

not inconsistent with this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.