IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON CAMILLE PALMER, an individual, Appellant,

v. RAINBOW FACTORY SHOWROOM, LLC, a Washington Corporation Respondent. DIVISION ONE
No. 72227-1-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: July 27, 2015 Dwyer, J. - Camille Palmer claims that she injured her hand while sliding down a display slide in a play structure showroom. She appeals the dismissal of her negligence claims against the showroom, arguing that summary judgment was improper under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Because she fails to demonstrate that the doctrine applies in this case, we affirm.
I On March 20, 2010, Camille Palmer and her daughter went shopping for playstructures at Rainbow FactoryShowroom (Rainbow). They climbed onto a slide in the showroom and slid down together with Palmer's daughter sitting between Palmer's legs. Palmer's complaint alleges that she injured her left hand during her descent. On March 12, 2013, Palmer sued Rainbow, alleging that her injuries "were caused by a display slide that was negligently designed or assembled." Rainbow filed a third party complaint against the slide's manufacturer, Rainbow PlayNo. 72227-1-1/2 Systems, Inc. (RPS). Rainbow alleged that RPS was liablefor injuries caused by any defect in the slide. Exhibits and deposition testimony establish that the slide was supported by wooden posts that were bolted to the side ofthe slide through a wood runner. The bolts needed to be inspected and tightened annually to ensure that gaps did
not form between the runner and the slide or between the post and the runner. In herdeposition, Palmer testified that herhand was on the top edge of the slide as she slid down it. Near the bottom of the slide, her left hand got 

### "stuck" or "caught." By the time herfeetreached the bottom ofthe slide, herleft hand was behind her. When she "stood up to try to get it out, itcame out." Palmerdid notknow if her hand "impacted the vertical [support] post or whetherit 

### became caught on theother side of [the runner.]" When asked if shethought the 

### injury happened in one ofthose two ways, she said, "I just know it happened somehow offthe side of the slide." When asked ifthe injury could have occurred further up the slide, she said, "I couldn't answer that." Rainbow and RPS both moved for summary judgment. Palmer opposed 

### themotions, arguing thattheevidence supported claims for negligent assembly under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and a design defect under the ordinary consumer test. In its reply to Palmer's response, Rainbow argued that res ipsa loquitur did not apply because the slide and any defects or causes ofthe accident were accessible to Palmer after the accident. Rainbow also argued thatNo. 72227-1-1/3 itwas not a subsidiary of RPS and, therefore, the design defect claim against it
should be dismissed. The court granted both motions for summaryjudgment and dismissed all of Palmer's claims. Palmer appeals onlythe order dismissing her claims against Rainbow. Her briefs on appeal address onlythe dismissal of her negligent assembly claim.1
II The sole issue on appeal is whetherthe superior courterred in granting 

### summaryjudgment. Summaryjudgment is appropriate ifthere is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 

### of law. CR 56(c). We review an order ofsummaryjudgment de novo, engaging in 

### the same inquiry as the trial court. New CinqularWireless PCS. LLC v. City of Clyde Hill, Wn. App. _, 349 P.3d 53, 56 (2015). Palmer contends the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur precluded summary 

### judgment. Underthat doctrine, a plaintiffis spared the normal requirement of proving specific acts ofnegligence and the trier offact is permitted to infer negligence ifthe following criteria are met: 

### (1) the accident oroccurrence thatcaused the plaintiffs injury would notordinarily happen in the absence of [a defendant's] 

### negligence, (2) the instrumentality oragency that caused the 

### plaintiffs injury was in theexclusive control ofthedefendant, and (3) the plaintiffdid notcontribute to the accident or occurrence.

1 Palmer has abandoned her design defect claim against Rainbow.
-3-No. 72227-1-1/4 Curtis v. Lein, 169 Wn.2d 884, 890-91, 239 P.3d 1078 (2010); Pacheco v. Ames, 149 Wn.2d 431, 436, 69 P.3d 324 (2003) (stating that test is whether occurrence "is ofa type thatwould notordinarily result ifthe defendant were not negligent" 

### (emphasis added)). If any ofthe threecriteria are not satisfied, res ipsa loquitur does notapply. Nauven v. City ofSeattle, 179Wn. App. 155, 317 P.3d 518, 527 

### (2014). Thedoctrine isdisfavored and isapplied sparingly "'in peculiar and 

### exceptional cases, and only where thefacts and thedemands of justice make its 

### application essential.'" Tinder v. Nordstrom, Inc., 84 Wn. App. 787, 792, 929 P.2d 1209 (1997) (quoting Mornerv. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 31 Wn.2d 282, 293, 196 

### P.2d 744 (1948)). Whether the doctrine applies in a particular case is a question of law that we review de novo. Pacheco, 149 Wn.2d at 436. Palmerfails to demonstrate that res ipsa loquitur applies in this case. The 

### argument section ofher opening briefconsists primarily of several long case 

### quotations and containsjusttwo paragraphs oflegal analysis. Those paragraphs

state: Here, the Plaintiffs testimony —which must be taken as true 

### in the light most favorable to her—is thatshe was using the slide in a perfectly safe manner, but severely injured herhand. There is no evidence to the contrary, and no other conceivable explanation offered for her injury. Furthermore, Plaintiffhas evidence to concretely support a plausible theory ofinjury —one that Defendants admit must be 

### guarded against! Ifthebolts holding the support posts to the slide were improperly assembled, or had loosened, a "gap" would exist, in which Camille's hand would have been "caught." This argument is insufficient for several reasons.No. 72227-1-1/5 First, it completely fails to address the first and second criteria for application of the doctrine. See Nguyen, 179 Wn. App. at 173 n.17 ("Nguyen inadequately argued this doctrine in his motion to reconsider and on appeal. His argument consists ofconclusory statements thatessentially reiterate the elements of res ipsa loquitur without elaboration."). We need not considerclaims


### on appeal that are inadequately argued. State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 

### P.2d 440 (1990); Statev. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 868-69, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). Second, as Rainbow correctly points out, Palmer ignores the underlying 

### purpose ofthedoctrine. Our courts have repeatedly emphasized that "[t]he 

### doctrine permits the inference ofnegligence on the basis that the evidence ofthe cause ofthe injury ispractically accessible to the defendant butinaccessible to 

### the injuredperson." Pacheco, 149 Wn.2d at436 (emphasis added); Curtis, 169 Wn.2d at 890 (quoting Pacheco). It "allows the plaintiffto establish a prima facie case ofnegligence when hecannot prove a specific act ofnegligence because he is notin a situation where he would have knowledge ofthat specific act." Pacheco, 149Wn.2d at 441; Curtis, 169Wn.2d at 894 (quoting Pacheco); accord Robison v. Cascade Hardwoods. Inc., 117 Wn. App. 552, 563, 72 P.3d 244 

### (2003) (res ipsa loquitur applies where "the plaintiffis not in a position to explain the mechanism ofinjury" and the defendant "is in a superior position to control 

### and toexplain the cause ofthe injury"); Jackass Mt. Ranch. Inc. v. South Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist.. 175 Wn. App. 374, 400, 305 P.3d 1108 (2013) 

### (res ipsa loquitur not applicable where evidence ofcauseofinjury wasnotNo. 72227-1-1/6 inaccessible; injured party had ability to inspect to determine ifparty was negligent). In its response brief, Rainbow points out that Palmer had access to the slide after the accident for expert and other analysis and that she photographed it 

### for purposes ofthis action. Nevertheless, despite Rainbow's arguments and the above-mentioned authorities, Palmer does not address this issue in either of her briefs on appeal. She fails to demonstrate that this is a "'peculiar and exceptional'" case warranting application of res ipsa loquitur. 

### Although we need not address theissue further, we note that several of 

### the prerequisites for the application ofres ipsa loquitur arearguably not satisfied here. Specifically, on this record, it is difficult to sayeitherthat the mechanism 

### producing the injury does not normally happen absent a defendant's negligence, or that Palmer did not contributeto the accident or occurrence. Palmer states in the introduction section of her briefthat "it's seemingly obvious that people using 

### a playground slide in the typical manner don't break their hand on the way down unless there's been negligence in the assembly ormaintenance ofthe slide itself." She also claims it is undisputed that her hands were in a safe position on 

### the top ofthe edge ofthe slide atthe time ofthe accident. But Palmer admitted in her deposition that she does not know whether her hand struck theplainly visible support postbelow the edge ofthe slide. Thus, herown testimony 

### suggests thather hands may have been below the edgeoftheslide in an arguably unsafe position. An injury resulting from using the slide in this manner

-6No. 72227-1-1/7 could easily occur in the absence of "negligence in the assembly or maintenance
of the slide itself." Palmer fails to demonstrate that the court erred in dismissing her negligence claim on summaryjudgment.
Affirmed.

We concur: 

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