NO. 95-246 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1995 

STOCKADE ENTERPRISES, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

KEVIN AHL, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Flathead, 

The Honorable Ted 0. Lympus, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Randall A. Snyder; Snyder & Noble, Bigfork, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

James C. Bartlett; Hash, O'Brien & Bartlett, 

Kalispell, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: October 12, 1995 

Decided: October 31, 1995 
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Stockade Enterprises, Inc. (Stockade) appeals the Eleventh 

Judicial District Court's denial of its motions to modify or to 

vacate an arbitration award. We affirm. 

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred in refusing to partially vacate or to modify the arbitration 

award. 

Stockade commenced this action against Kevin Ah1 (Ahl) in an 

attempt to collect on a construction lien. Pursuant to a written 

agreement between Stockade and Ahl, the District Court ordered the 

parties to arbitrate the dispute. The parties signed a Stipulation 

to appoint an arbitrator. The Stipulation provided in part: 

Wilmer E. Windham shall serve as the arbitrator in this 

litigation, with his decision to be binding on the 

parties and the Court. . . .[Iln this case his decision 

is final and binding and the District Court must adopt 

his decision as a final judgment. 

The court signed the Order appointing Mr. Windham as the 

arbitrator. The Order reads in part: 

[The arbitrator's] decision shall be final and binding 

and the District Court shall adopt his decision as a 

final judgment. 

After the arbitrator issued the award, Stockade moved the 

District Court to vacate or to modify the award on the grounds that 

the award was beyond the scope of inquiry, in error, and contrary 

to law. The District Court denied Stockade's motion to modify the 

award. In its Order and Rationale, the court declined to perform 

I' an extensive review of the file and the transcript of the 

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arbitration hearing." Instead, the court determined that judicial 

review of the arbitrator's decision was precluded by the parties' 

Stipulation and the court's Order. The court quoted the provision 

of the Order stating the arbitrator's decision was final and 

binding on the parties and the court. Based on the provisions of 

the Stipulation and Order, the District Court concluded that "there 

simply is no authority on which this Court can set aside the 

award." Accordingly, the court did not review the arbitrator's 

decision and made no findings regarding the award. 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to 

vacate or modify the arbitration award? 

Our standard in reviewing a court's refusal to modify or 

vacate an arbitration award is whether the court abused its 

discretion. May v. First National Pawn Brokers (1994), 269 Mont. 

19, 21-22, 887 P.2d 185, 187; Duchscher v. Vaile (1994), 269 Mont. 

1, 5, 887 P.2d 181, 184. We note that the parties and the District 

Court improperly focused their attention on the provisions of the 

Stipulation and Order to the effect that the arbitrator's decision 

is binding and final. The District Court was incorrect in 

concluding that there is "no authority" authorizing the court to 

set aside the award. Regardless of the "binding" nature of the 

arbitration procedure, the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA) 

does provide the court with authority to set aside an award. 

However, judicial review of an arbitration award is strictly 

limited by the statutory provisions governing arbitration found in 

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the MUM. Sections 27-5-312 and -313, MCA; m, 887 P.2d at 187; 

Duchscher, 887 P.2d at 183. 

Montana adopted the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act in 1985. 

Sections 27-5-312 and -313, MCA, establish the grounds to modify, 

to correct, or to vacate an arbitration award, These sections 

generally limit the district court's review to allegations of 

fraud, partiality, misconduct, excess of power, or technical 

problems in the execution of the award. Duchscher, 887 P.2d at 

183. Section 27-5-312, MCA, provides: 

Vacating an award. (1) Upon the application of a party, 

the district court shall vacate an award if: 

(a) the awardwas procured by corruption, fraud, or 

other undue means; 

(b) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator 

appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the 

arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any 

party; 

(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 

(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing 

upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to 

hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so 

conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of 27- 

5-213, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a 

party; or 

(e) there was no arbitration agreement and the 

issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under 

27-5-115 and the party did not participate in the 

arbitration hearing without raising the objection. 

Section 27-5-313(l), MCA, provides: 

Modification or correction of award by court. (1) Upon 

application made within 90 days after delivery of a copy 

of the award to the applicant, the district court shall 

modify or correct the award if: 

(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures 

or an evident mistake in the description of any person, 

thing, or property referred to in the award; 

(b) the arbitrators awarded upon a matter not 

submitted to them and the award may be corrected without 

affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues 

submitted; or 

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Cc) the award is imperfect in a matter of form not 

affecting the merits of the controversy. 

Thus, the MDAA'S authorization of judicial review of 

arbitration awards is very limited in scope. We have held that 

these provisions do not permit a court to review the merits of the 

controversy. May, 887 P.2d at 190; Duchscher, 887 P.2d at 184. 

The party seeking to vacate, to modify, or to correct an 

arbitration award bears the burden of alleging and proving that one 

of the statutorily enumerated grounds exists. Mav, 887 P.2d at 

189; Duchscher, 887 P.2d at 184. Therefore, in order to trigger 

the District Court's authority to review the arbitration award, 

Stockade had to properly raise one of the grounds in §§ 27-5-312 or 

-313, MCA. Stockade failed to do so. 

Stockade presented the District Court with four issues in 

support of its motion to modify/vacate the arbitration award: 

1. Is there substantial evidence to support the findings 

of fact and conclusions of law? 

2. Does the evidence support a finding that Plaintiff 

assaulted Defendant and is there a proper award of 

damages? 

3. Can the District Court modify or correct the award in 

a fashion consistent with the evidence? 

4. Was the award of attorneys fees arbitrary and 

capricious? [Emphasis added.] 

None of the above issues raised by Stockade address the limited 

bases of judicial review set forth in 55 27-5-312 and -313, MCA. 

On the contrary, Stockade's issues all raise questions regarding 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the award. Although 

Stockade's brief referenced § 27-5-313, MCA, Stockade failed to 

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address the statutory criteria that would trigger judicial review. 

Instead, Stockade propounded an extremely broad scope of judicial 

review, as follows: "Here, the Arbitrator abused his discretion, 

transcended or ignored evidence and did substantial injustice to 

Plaintiff. In nearly every respect, this Court can modify and 

correct the award, based solely on the evidence." Clearly, there 

is no basis for such a broad standard of judicial review. Neither 

the District Court nor this Court has any authority to engage in a 

"sufficiency of the evidence" review of an arbitration award. The 

District Court understated its statutory authority to vacate or to 

modify an arbitration award. Nonetheless, under the pleadings in 

this case, the court correctly concluded that it had no obligation 

to engage in an extensive review of the transcript to weigh the 

sufficiency of the evidence. We hold that the District Court did 

not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the award. 

To invoke the courts' power of review, the grounds set forth 

in §§ 27-5-312 and -313, MCA, must be raised by the party 

challenging the arbitration award. Stockade advances no grounds 

that satisfy these criteria. Had either of the parties read our 

two recent decisions in this area, namely Mav and Duchscher, they 

would have known that petitioning the courts to review an 

arbitration award based on the sufficiency of the evidence is 

beyond our scope of judicial review. 

Affirmed. 

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I We concur: