UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4689

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JEREMY PERNELL MOSLEY, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:07-cr-00302-LMB-1) 

Submitted: June 22, 2009 Decided: July 9, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Frank Salvato, LAW OFFICES OF FRANK SALVATO, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United States 

Attorney, Daniel J. Grooms, Marla B. Tusk, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Jeremy Pernell Mosley pled guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine, 

and one count of possession with intent to distribute fifty 

grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006). The district court sentenced Mosley 

to 168 months of imprisonment, and he timely appealed. On 

appeal, Mosley argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, his motion to dismiss 

the indictment for lack of jurisdiction, and his motion to 

transfer the case. We affirm. 

 A district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). The 

defendant has the burden of demonstrating “a fair and just 

reason” for withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e); Ubakanma, 215 

F.3d at 424. A “fair and just reason” is one that challenges 

the fairness of the guilty plea colloquy conducted pursuant to 

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United 

States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). 

 In determining whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, six 

factors are considered: 

2 
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible 

evidence that his plea was not knowing or not 

voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly 

asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has 

been a delay between the entering of the plea and the 

filing of the motion, (4) whether defendant has had 

close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether 

withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government, and 

(6) whether it will inconvenience the court and waste 

judicial resources. 

United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). 

Although all the factors in Moore must be given appropriate 

weight, the key to determining whether to grant a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea is whether the Rule 11 hearing was 

properly conducted. United States v. Faris, 388 F.3d 452, 456 

(4th Cir. 2004). This court closely scrutinizes the Rule 11 

colloquy. An adequate Rule 11 proceeding creates a strong 

presumption that the guilty plea is binding. United States v. 

Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992). Our review of the 

record leads us to conclude that the district court properly 

applied the Moore factors and did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Mosley’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

 Mosley also argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of 

jurisdiction. Mosley’s argument is squarely foreclosed by 

Circuit precedent. United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-

12 (4th Cir. 1995). 

3 
 Mosley next argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to transfer his case to the Western District 

of Virginia because venue was improper in the Eastern District. 

He asserts that the conspiracy charged in Count One of the 

indictment occurred in the Western District. The venue statute 

generally applicable to criminal cases provides that “[e]xcept 

as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any 

offense against the United States begun in one district and 

completed in another, or committed in more than one district, 

may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such 

offense was begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3237(a) (2006). A conspiracy may be prosecuted in any 

district in which an act in furtherance of the conspiracy was 

committed. United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 928-29 (4th 

Cir. 1995). 

 In this case, the AUSA stated in the factual basis, 

without contradiction by Mosley, that several acts in 

furtherance of the conspiracy occurred in the Eastern District 

of Virginia. The district court did not err in concluding that 

venue was proper in the Eastern District. To the extent 

Mosley’s argument can be construed as asserting that the 

district court should have transferred the case for the 

convenience of the parties under Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b), we find 

4 
5 

the district court did not abuse its discretion. See United 

States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 336 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 Finally, Mosley asserts a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, stating that “this factual issue is 

probative as to the withdrawal of the guilty plea factors.” 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not 

cognizable on direct appeal. See United States v. King, 119 

F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). Rather, to allow for adequate 

development of the record, a defendant must bring his claim in a 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009) motion. See id.; United 

States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1994). An exception 

exists when the record conclusively establishes ineffective 

assistance. United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th 

Cir. 1999); King, 119 F.3d at 295. Our review reveals that the 

record does not demonstrate that counsel performed in a 

deficient manner. We therefore decline to consider this claim. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Mosley’s convictions. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED