An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-106

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 July 2014

IN THE MATTER OF: Gaston County

No. 13 JA 90

 O.O.

_________________________

IN THE MATTER OF: Mecklenburg County

No. 13 JA 123

 O.O.

On writ of certiorari to review adjudication order entered 

5 August 2013 by Judge James A. Jackson in Gaston County 

District Court and disposition order entered 23 December 2013 by 

Judge Rickye McKoy-Mitchell in Mecklenburg County District 

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 June 2014.

Twyla Hollingsworth-Richardson, for petitioner-appellee 

Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services.

Richard Croutharmel, for respondent-appellant father.

Tawanda Foster, for Guardian ad Litem.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Respondent-father appeals by writ of certiorari from an 

order adjudicating O.O. a neglected juvenile and a disposition 
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order based on that adjudication. After careful review, we 

affirm.

O.O. is the oldest of father’s seven children. On 17 

October 2011, a judgment was entered granting legal and primary 

physical custody of all seven children to their mother. The 

trial court found that the greater weight of the evidence 

supported allegations of domestic violence by father against the

children and their mother and therefore determined that it was 

in the best interests of the children to grant legal and primary 

physical custody of the children to their mother. Nevertheless, 

the trial court found that father was “also a fit and proper 

person to have the care, custody[,] and control” of the children 

and granted him secondary physical custody. The trial court 

further found that O.O., twelve years old at the time, was 

placed in New Hope of the Carolinas Treatment Center in June 

2010 after the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services 

(“DSS”) found that she sexually abused some of her siblings.

O.O. was a patient of the inpatient treatment facility until 

April 2011.

In October 2012, a physical altercation occurred between 

O.O. and her mother. As a result, mother would not allow O.O.
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to reside in her home. O.O. resided with father until 27 

February 2013.

On 1 March 2013, DSS filed a petition alleging that O.O.

was a neglected and dependent juvenile. DSS alleged that a 

physical altercation arose on 27 February 2013 between O.O. and 

father “because [O.O.] used an expletive.” DSS claimed that 

O.O. sustained marks on her neck, wrist, and underarm area as a 

result of the altercation. DSS further claimed that O.O. was 

afraid to return to father’s home and could not return to her 

mother’s home. Noting its long history of involvement with the 

family, DSS also indicated that O.O. had been “sexually 

inappropriate with some of her siblings in the past” and that it 

would be “counterproductive” for O.O. to return to her mother’s 

home where her siblings resided. No other placements were 

available for O.O. DSS obtained nonsecure custody of O.O. by 

order entered on 1 March 2013.

On 6 May 2013, an order was entered transferring venue from 

Mecklenburg County to Gaston County. On 5 August 2013, O.O. was 

adjudicated a neglected juvenile. On 16 August 2013, venue was 

transferred back to Mecklenburg County. On 23 December 2013, 

the trial court entered a disposition order in which it ordered 

that O.O. remain in the custody of DSS.
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Father filed pro se written notice of appeal from the trial 

court’s orders twice, first on 4 December 2013, and then again 

on 21 January 2014. Father’s notices of appeal fail to fully 

comply with the requirements of Rule 3.1 of the North Carolina 

Rules of Appellate Procedure because they lack signature by 

father’s trial counsel. Father’s appeal is therefore subject to 

dismissal. McQuillin v. Perez, 189 N.C. App. 394, 397, 

657 S.E.2d 924, 927 (2008) (“Our Appellate Rules are mandatory, 

and failure to comply with them subjects an appeal to 

dismissal.”). Cognizant of the deficiency in his notice of 

appeal, father seeks review by petition for writ of certiorari. 

In our discretion, we allow the petition. See N.C.R. App. P. 

21(a)(1).

_________________________

Father first argues the trial court abused its discretion 

in violation of Rule 607 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence 

when it denied him the opportunity to attack O.O.’s credibility

by playing a video recording of a prior incident during the 

adjudication hearing. Father sought to introduce a video

recording of a prior incident involving O.O. to refute her 

testimony that she had only previously struck father in selfdefense. Father alleges this evidence would have shown that 
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O.O.’s testimony was inconsistent with her prior conduct. We 

are not persuaded.

We review a trial court’s ruling pursuant to Rule 607 for 

an abuse of discretion. State v. Banks, 210 N.C. App. 30, 38, 

706 S.E.2d 807, 814 (2011). Rule 607 provides that “[t]he 

credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party.” N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 607 (2013). Specific instances of the 

conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking the witness’s

credibility may, in the discretion of the trial court, be 

inquired into on cross-examination of the witness if they are 

probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or 

untruthfulness. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (2013). 

However, “[e]ven if the trial judge allows the inquiry on crossexamination, extrinsic evidence of the conduct is not 

admissible.” State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 634, 340 S.E.2d 84, 

90 (1986).

Although the trial court allowed father to cross-examine 

O.O. regarding the prior incident, the video depicting O.O.’s 

conduct during the prior incident was not admissible to attack 

O.O.’s credibility because it was extrinsic evidence. See id. 

We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in 

excluding the video.
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Father next argues the trial court erred when it 

adjudicated O.O. a neglected juvenile. We disagree.

When reviewing an adjudication of neglect, we must

determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact are 

supported by clear and convincing evidence, and whether those 

findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions of law. 

In re Gleisner, 141 N.C. App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 

(2000). If the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by 

competent evidence, they are binding on appeal, even if there 

may be evidence to support contrary findings. In re T.H.T., 

185 N.C. App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007), aff’d as 

modified, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008). We review the 

trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. In re J.S.L.,

177 N.C. App. 151, 154, 628 S.E.2d 387, 389 (2006).

A “neglected juvenile” is defined in part as “[a] juvenile 

who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline 

from the juvenile’s parent . . . or who lives in an environment 

injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 7B-101(15) (2013). An adjudication of neglect requires “there 

be some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the 

juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a 

consequence of the failure to provide proper care, supervision, 
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or discipline.” In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 752, 

436 S.E.2d 898, 901–02 (1993) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Section 7B-101(15) affords the trial court some 

discretion in determining whether children are at risk for a 

particular kind of harm given their age and the environment in 

which they reside.” In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 210, 

644 S.E.2d 588, 592 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the case sub judice, the trial court heard testimony 

from both O.O. and father regarding the events occurring on 27 

February 2013. Based on the evidence, the court found as 

follows:

The Respondent/father awoke in the morning 

as he usually does. He allowed the juvenile 

to practice driving and was waiting in the 

car when the juvenile left the house. There 

was ice/frost on the windshield of the car. 

The Respondent/father allowed the juvenile 

to start the car. The juvenile began to 

back up the car. The Respondent/father felt 

that the juvenile was going to strike a 

telephone pole and needed to scrape the 

ice/frost off the windshield. The 

Respondent/father provided the juvenile with 

a scraper. The juvenile scraped the 

windshield but not enough to where the 

Respondent/father felt it was safe enough 

for her to drive. There was an argument 

wherein the juvenile got out of the motor 

vehicle. The Respondent/father attempted to 

forcefully place the juvenile back into the 

vehicle. The juvenile did strike the 

Respondent/father and fought the 

Respondent/father. The juvenile ran to the 
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front door to get away from the 

confrontation with the Respondent/father. 

Once inside the home the confrontation began 

to escalate. Respondent/father grabbed the 

juvenile forcefully, placed her on the couch 

and told her she was going to listen to him. 

The juvenile attempted to remove herself 

from the couch and at each attempt the 

Respondent/father forcefully kept the 

juvenile from leaving the couch. Both 

Respondent/father and the juvenile continued 

to escalate the confrontation. Both the 

Respondent/father and the juvenile were 

physically assaulting the other. Both the 

Respondent/father and the juvenile were 

yelling and screaming at each other. 

Eventually this led to another room of the 

home at which time the Respondent/father 

attempted to restrain the juvenile by 

bending her hand backwards and at one point 

when Respondent/father was trying to 

restrain the juvenile he put his hands on 

her neck area for a couple of seconds. The 

Respondent/father indicated that the 

juvenile was being disrespectful and told 

the juvenile that she was not going to 

school that day but was going to stay home 

and think about what she had done. The 

confrontation ended when the 

Respondent/father left the home to move the 

car. The juvenile ran outside and called 

her mother on her cell phone. The 

Respondent/father chased her, tackled her 

and took her phone. The Respondent/father 

finally took the juvenile to her school in 

Charlotte, North Carolina. The school 

officials noticed the juvenile was crying 

and had minor scratches on her shoulder, a 

swollen right hand, and bruising. The 

school officials inquired as to what 

happened and the juvenile told them the 

injuries were caused by the 

Respondent/father.
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In his challenge to the trial court’s adjudication of 

neglect, father does not argue the court’s findings of fact are 

lacking evidentiary support. Rather than contest the 

evidentiary basis of the trial court’s findings of fact, father 

“denies the finding that he physically assaulted [O.O.]” and 

“denies choking or intentionally hurting his daughter.” He 

argues “[t]he evidence showed that [father] attempted to 

restrain his daughter to get her unruly behavior under control. 

If [O.O.] got hurt in the process, it was due to her own 

misconduct, and not any intentional or inappropriate action on 

[father’s] part.” Father essentially claims the trial court 

erred by finding O.O.’s testimony to be credible and by failing 

to resolve evidentiary inconsistencies in his favor. The trial 

court, however, was free to reject father’s testimony and give 

credence to O.O.’s testimony, and we decline father’s invitation

to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of 

the trial court. See In re Whisnant, 71 N.C. App. 439, 441, 

322 S.E.2d 434, 435 (1984) (stating that it is the trial court’s 

“duty to weigh and consider all competent evidence, and pass 

upon the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given 

their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom”). Therefore, the trial court’s findings of fact
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based on O.O.’s testimony are binding on appeal. See In re 

T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. at 343, 648 S.E.2d at 523.

In addition to the trial court’s findings of fact regarding 

the altercation between O.O. and father on 27 February 2013, the 

trial court found that O.O. has “anger issues,” has been 

“combatant” with both father and her mother, and has been 

involved in numerous altercations with family members. The 

trial court further found as fact that:

[t]he animosity that has built up in the 

juvenile towards the Respondent/father and 

the Respondent/mother has caused these angry 

outbursts from the juvenile. Based on prior 

outbursts between the juvenile, the 

Respondent/parents, and the siblings; [sic]

to return the juvenile to either parent 

would lead to substantial risk of aggressive 

behavior between the parties, create an 

injurious environment, and place all parties 

at risk of bodily harm.

The court finally found that father was “not capable of getting 

the juvenile the help she needs.” Father does not challenge 

these findings of fact, and they are thus binding on appeal. 

See Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 

(1991) (“Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the 

trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by 

competent evidence and is binding on appeal.”). Based on the 

foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact 
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are sufficient to support its conclusion that O.O. is a 

neglected juvenile. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s 

order adjudicating O.O. a neglected juvenile.

Father next argues the trial court’s disposition order 

erroneously modified the adjudication order by ordering that 

O.O. was adjudicated both neglected and dependent when the 

juvenile had only been adjudicated neglected.

There are “two phases in juvenile hearings——adjudication 

and disposition.” In re Eades, 143 N.C. App. 712, 713, 

547 S.E.2d 146, 147 (2001). An adjudication hearing in a 

juvenile action is “a judicial process designed to adjudicate

the existence or nonexistence of any of the conditions alleged 

in a petition.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-802 (2013). Whereas, the 

purpose of a disposition hearing is to design an appropriate 

plan to meet the juvenile’s needs and protect and promote public 

safety. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2500 (2013).

Here, O.O. was adjudicated neglected during the 

adjudication phase. It is therefore clear that the trial court 

erred by ordering that O.O. was also adjudicated a dependent 

juvenile during the disposition phase. It does appear, however, 

that this was a mere clerical error. Accordingly, we remand the 

disposition order for correction of this clerical error. See 
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State v. Smith, 188 N.C. App. 842, 845, 656 S.E.2d 695, 696 

(2008) (“When, on appeal, a clerical error is discovered in the 

trial court’s judgment or order, it is appropriate to remand the 

case to the trial court for correction because of the importance 

that the record speak the truth.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

Father further argues the trial court erred at disposition

by finding that “inappropriate discipline” was one of the 

“problems” that led to the adjudication of neglect. We 

disagree.

The trial court found as fact at adjudication that “neither 

the Respondent/father nor the juvenile handled the situation 

[which led to the adjudication of neglect] in an appropriate 

manner.” We conclude that the trial court could thus properly 

determine at disposition that “inappropriate discipline” was a 

“problem” that led to the adjudication of neglect. Even 

assuming arguendo that this finding was erroneous, it is 

harmless error given that it appears to have had no impact on 

the dispositional plan for father.

Affirmed; remanded for correction of a clerical error.

Judges ELMORE and HUNTER, JR. concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).