Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

CRYSTAL RUERUP, 

Appellant, 

v. 

CHARLES F. RUERUP III, 

Appellee. 

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) Supreme Court No. S-16278 

Superior Court No. 4FA-15-01659 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7216 – January 12, 2018 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, 

Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Paul R. Lyle, Judge. 

Appearances: TerynBird,IACNVLLegalServicesProgram, 

Fairbanks, for Appellant. Notice of nonparticipation filed by 

Charles F. Ruerup, III, pro se, Fairbanks, Appellee. 

Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. [Carney, Justice, not participating.] 

MAASSEN, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A mother appeals the superior court’s decision to modify a long-term 

domestic violence protective order against her now ex-husband. The protective order 

was issued by a magistrate judge, based on his findings that the father had committed 

acts of domestic violence. But the superior court, during the parties’ subsequent and 

separatedivorce and custody case, concludedthatfindings ofdomesticviolencewerenot 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

supported by the evidence. When modifying the protective order to accommodate a 

change in the parties’ living arrangements, the superior court also modified the order’s 

factual findings about domestic violence, noting its own conclusion that such findings 

were not justified. 

The mother argues that the superior court erred by modifying the factual 

findings of domestic violence underlying an unappealed final order. We agree that the 

court lacked the authority to modify the factual findings on which the order was based. 

We therefore vacate that aspect of the protective order. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

A. Facts 

Crystal and Charles Ruerup met in Alaska in 2005, had their first child, G., 

in 2006, and separated in 2008.1 They agreed on sharing G.’s custody in January 2009 

but soon reconciled and never followed their agreement. By early 2010 they had moved 

to Kentucky, where in 2012 they married without legal formalities. In February 2013 

they had their second child. They then returned to Alaska, and in April 2014 they 

officially married. In December they again separated when Crystal moved to a domestic 

violence shelter with the children. Charles filed for divorce in April 2015. 

B. Proceedings 

1. 2008 custody and protective order 

When the parties first separated in 2008, they sought the court’s assistance 

in setting up a custody arrangement for G. They reached settlement at mediation before 

there was any substantive litigation, and in early 2009 the court approved their parenting 

agreement. Around this time Crystal also raised allegations of domestic violence; a 

1 We identify the child by an initial for reasons of privacy. 

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magistrate judge heard evidence on the allegations in July 2008 and denied a long-term 

protective order. 

2. 2015 protective order 

Crystal sought another protective order in January 2015, soon after the 

parties separated for good; her complaint was given a new case number. Crystal alleged 

that there had been numerous incidents of domestic violence between 2007 and 2015. 

A different magistrate judge held a hearing in March 2015 and considered only the post2008 allegations. A number of witnesses testified, including Crystal and Charles, a 

friend of Crystal’s, Crystal’s sister-in-law, and Charles’s mother, brother, and nephew. 

The magistrate judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Charles had 

committed three acts of domestic violence against Crystal, two in 2009 and one in 2011. 

Based on these findings, the magistrate judge issued a long-term protective order. 

Among other things, the order limited the parties to certain modes of communication and 

barred Charles from coming within 500 feet of Crystal’s home. The order did not 

purport to decide any custody issues. Neither party appealed it. 

3. 2015 divorce and custody modification 

Charles’s complaint for divorce, filed in April 2015, was consolidated with 

the 2008 case involving the custody of G. On motions for interim custody, Crystal 

sought to use against Charles the statutory presumption disfavoring a parent with a 

history of committing acts of domestic violence, relying on the findings underlying the 

March 2015 protective order as well as other allegations.2 The superior court determined 

2 See AS 25.24.150(g) (“There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who 

has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, or a 

domestic living partner may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, 

joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child.”). 

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that it was not bound by the magistrate’s findings on domestic violence and should 

independently hear and consider the evidence before reaching a decision on custody. 

The court accordingly heard testimony from Charles, Crystal, a friend of 

Crystal’s, and Charles’s mother. The court found — contrary to the magistrate judge’s 

findings underlying the March 2015 protective order —that the evidence did not support 

findings of domestic violence. It expressly rejected all of Crystal’s allegations, noting 

its concerns with delays in her reporting, the timing of her allegations in relation to the 

parties’ disputes over custody, and her overall credibility. The court ordered that the 

parties continue to share custody of G. on a week on, week off schedule. 

The court nonetheless reissued the March 2015 protective order, but in 

amended form. First, the court uncontroversially narrowed the 500-foot restriction on 

Charles’s proximity to Crystal’s home in order to allow Charles to take G. to school. 

Second, although the court checked the box on the form order stating that it found crimes 

of domestic violence, specifically “assault or reckless endangerment,” the court added 

the following note under “Other findings”: 

The Court finds that no incident of Domestic Violence has 

been established through 7/24/2015. However, the Court 

leaves this Domestic Violence Restraining Order in place 

because the Master made a finding and the court finds it in 

the best interest of both parties and their children that the 

DVRO remain in place for the time being. 

Crystal objected to this amendment and asked that the order be reissued in its original 

form except for the amendment to the 500-foot proximity restriction; the superior court 

denied this request. 

In March 2016, following a partially contested trial, the court granted the 

parties’ divorce and decided issues of custody and property. For purposes of the custody 

determination, Crystal accepted the court’s finding that there was no domestic violence; 

this allowed the parties to continue their interimarrangement of shared physical custody. 

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As for legal custody, the court determined that the evidence supported a finding that 

Crystal was better positioned to meet the children’s educational and emotional needs and 

awarded final decision-making authority to her. 

The court’s post-trial decision also gave a fuller explanation of its rationale 

for modifying the domestic violence findings in the long-term protective order. The 

court rejected, as unsupported by any evidence, Crystal’s argument that the police would 

refuse to enforce a protective order that disclaimed any findings of domestic violence. 

The court concluded that the parties’ request to modify the order’s proximity restriction 

gave it jurisdiction to modify other aspects of the order. The court noted that Crystal had 

accepted its findings on domestic violence for purposes of the award of shared custody, 

and if the protective order were not amended there would be inconsistent orders on the 

same issue. The court also concluded that the magistrate judge’s factual findings were 

not binding, because res judicata does not apply to custody modifications and there were 

compelling reasons not to apply collateral estoppel based on the differences in the nature 

and stakes of domestic violence and custody proceedings. 

Crystal appeals the superior court’s modification of the factual findings in 

the long-term protective order. Charles did not participate on appeal. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The extent of a superior court’s statutory authority presents a question of 

law that we review de novo.3 We review a court’s interpretation of statutes de novo4 and 

3 Dodge v. Sturdevant, 335 P.3d 510, 511 (Alaska 2014). 

4 Anderson v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 320, 321 (Alaska 1987). 

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“apply our independent judgment, adopting the rule of law that is most persuasive in 

light of precedent, reason, and policy.”5 

IV. DISCUSSION

The Superior Court Lacked Authority To Modify The Factual Findings On

Which The Long-Term Protective Order Was Based.

Crystal’s challenge in this appeal is limited to the superior court’s 

modification of the protective order to note its own contrary finding that “no incident of 

DomesticViolencehas beenestablished through 7/24/2015.”6 Crystalexplicitlydeclined 

to challenge the superior court’s authority to rely on its own independent findings on 

domestic violence in the separate context of the divorce and custody case, where they 

were relevant to whether the statutory presumption should apply against Charles.7 

Crystal agreed to share custody with Charles, an outcome that could be precluded if the 

superior court followed the magistrate’s lead in finding a history of domestic violence. 

Recognizing the inconsistency in Crystal’s position, we nonetheless agree with her that 

it was error to modify the factual findings that provided the basis for the protective order. 

5 Stephanie F. v. George C., 270 P.3d 737, 746 (Alaska 2012). 

6 The court’s added language could be read not as a modification but rather 

as an explanation of why the court was signing a protective order that appeared to 

contradict its own findings in the custody case. But when it placed its oral decision of 

the custody issues on the record in March 2016, the court explained that its intent was 

to modify and not “reinstate” the protective order’s domestic violence findings. We 

therefore review it as a substantive modification rather than an explanatory comment. 

7 Crystal writes in her brief that she “does not challenge th[e] trial court’s 

jurisdiction and ability to independently decide whether she established by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Charles committed two or more crimes of domestic 

violence against her for custody purposes.” See Morris v. Horn, 219 P.3d 198, 208 

(Alaska 2009) (holding that previous domestic violence finding did not have res judicata 

effect in proceeding to modify visitation because “domestic violence and visitation 

modification proceedings are different causes of action”). 

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The March 2015 protective order was a final, appealable order.8 Neither 

party appealed it,9 and the domestic violence proceeding was not consolidated with the 

later-filed divorce.10 Neither party sought relief from the order under Alaska Civil Rule 

60(b).11 

This is not to say that the order could not be modified. Alaska Statute 

18.66.120(a) allows the court to modify a protective order upon either party’s request.12 

Crystal argues that “neither party moved the court for modification” and that she did not 

agree to it. But the superior court concluded that the parties sought to modify the 

protective order to allow Charles to take G. to school notwithstanding the school’s 

proximity to Crystal’s new apartment, and this conclusion has support in the record. 

Addressing this issue at the interim motions hearing, Crystal said, “I believe [the school] 

probably is over 500 feet [from the apartment;] if not I’m willing to make an exception 

8 See AS 22.15.100(9)(A) (giving magistrates power “to issue a protective 

order in cases involving” domestic violence); 28 C.J.S. Domestic Abuse and Violence 

§ 34 (“Although an appeal from the initial ex parte domestic violence order generally is

interlocutory, a domestic violence restraining order is an appealable final judgment.” 

(citations omitted)). 

9 See AS 22.15.240(a) (“Either party may appeal a judgment of the district 

court in a civil action to the superior court.”). 

10 Crystal did move to consolidate the 2008 custody case involving G. with 

the divorce case; this motion was granted in April 2015. 

11 Rule 60(b) allows a court to revisit a prior judgment under certain 

circumstances, including when “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 

prospective application” among others. Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). See also Jackson v. 

Sey, 315 P.3d 674, 678 (Alaska 2013) (discussing appeal and Rule 60(b) challenge as 

alternate ways to attack a “final and appealable order”). 

12 AS 18.66.120(a) (“Either the petitioner or the respondent may request 

modification of a protective order.”). 

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so that [Charles] can pick up and drop off [G.] from school.” The court responded that 

“the protective order will be modified” to allow that accommodation. Based on this 

exchange, the court could reasonably conclude that the parties had requested 

modification. 

The legislative history of AS 18.66.120, though sparse, supports an intent 

to make modifications and dissolutions of protective orders relatively easy to obtain. 

The Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee raised a concern about criminal 

prosecutions based on violations of protective orders after the victim of domestic 

violence and the subject of a protective order have reconciled.13 The parties here did not 

reconcile, but they both wanted Charles to have access to G.’s new school without 

running afoul of the protective order’s 500-foot proximity limitation. For the same 

reason that the parties should be able to dissolve a protective order following 

reconciliation, they should have a straightforward process for modifying an order to 

reflect their changed circumstances. But requests to modify the provisions regarding the 

order’s implementation (changing addresses or expanding or contracting the proximity 

restrictions, for example) should not carry with them the risk that the underlying factual 

findings of domestic violence — the entire justification for the order — will be again 

placed at issue. 

By statute, the court may issue a long-term protective order only if it “finds 

by a preponderance of evidence that the respondent has committed a crime involving 

domestic violence against the petitioner.”14 An order without such a finding is invalid. 

In its amended long-term order in this case, the superior court checked the box indicating 

13 Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on H.B. 314, 19th Leg., 2d Sess. 

(Apr. 15, 1996) (comments of Senator Robin Taylor, Chair). 

14 AS 18.66.100(b). 

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that it had found “by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent committed, or 

attempted to commit,” the domestic violence crime of “assault or reckless 

endangerment,” but it thennegated thisfinding bystating moreexplicitly its finding “that 

no incident of Domestic Violence has been established through 7/24/2015,” the date of 

the amended order. The disclaimer of any finding of domestic violence eliminated the 

factual basis for the order. 

We recognize that AS 18.66.120(a) sets no explicit limits on the court’s 

authority to modify protective orders; it states only that either party “may request 

modification of a protective order.” But we read modification and dissolution as means 

to accommodate the parties’ evolving circumstances, not an invitation “to relitigate ‘in 

the hope of gaining a more favorable position.’ ”15 This conclusion is reinforced by 

AS 18.66.100, which sets out the provisions a long-term protective order may contain. 

One provision — “prohibit[ing] the respondent from threatening to commit or 

committing domestic violence, stalking, or harassment” — is “effective until further 

order of the court.”16 The remaining provisions — covering such things as limitations 

on contact, proximity restrictions, surrender of firearms, temporary custody, drug use, 

and rehabilitation programs — “are effective for one year unless earlier dissolved by 

court order.”17 All these provisions — relevant to the protective order’s implementation 

— are thus specifically made subject to modification by later court order. But 

modification of these implementation provisions will not undercut the order’s factual 

15 See McAlpine v. Pacarro, 262 P.3d 622, 626 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Bunn 

v. House, 934 P.2d 753, 757 n.12 (Alaska 1997)). 

16 AS 18.66.100(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

17 AS 18.66.100(b)(2) (emphasis added). 

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basis, as did the modification at issue here. Claims of factual error in a final order are 

subject to appeal; they are not ordinarily subject to relitigation. 

In sum, a court’s authority to modify or dissolve a final and unappealed 

long-termprotectiveorder to reflect changesin circumstance doesnotauthorizethecourt 

to change or eliminate the factual findings on which the order was predicated. We 

therefore vacate the superior court’s added language in this case explaining its different 

view of the evidence of domestic violence on which the magistrate judge based the order. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We VACATE the court’s addition to paragraph C.6 of the long-term 

protective order. 

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