Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-PC-475 | May 13, 2015 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Susan D. Rayl

Michael R. Smith

Smith Rayl Law Offices

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Paul A. Moore,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 13, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1407-PC-475

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Marc T. Rothenberg, 

Judge

The Honorable Amy J. Barbar, 

Magistrate

Cause No. 49G02-0308-PC-128884

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-PC-475 | May 13, 2015 Page 2 of 17

Statement of the Case

[1] Paul A. Moore appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, 

which challenged his convictions for two counts of murder, two counts of 

criminal confinement, as Class B felonies, and one count of arson, as a Class B 

felony,for which he received an aggregate sentence of 120 years. Moore 

presents the following two consolidated and restated issues for our review:

1. Whether he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he 

established that the prosecutor withheld evidence in 

violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and 

then suborned perjury related to the non-disclosure; and

2. Whether he was denied the effective assistance of trial 

counsel for failure to call an exculpatory witness.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] We recited the facts relevant to Moore’s convictions in his direct appeal: 

The facts most favorable to the convictions indicate that Moore’s 

mother purchased a .45-caliber Ruger handgun in 2001 and kept 

it at Moore’s home in the 4300 block of East 39th Street in 

Indianapolis. On the afternoon of January 25, 2002, 

Indianapolis Police Department Sergeant David Wisneski 

responded to a report of a burglary in progress at the home of 

Linda Jordan. Sergeant Wisneski heard the yelling of gang 

names and saw an unidentified person push Linda aside and 

forcibly enter her home. Yonic Jordan then forcibly removed 

someone from the home. After the situation calmed down, 

Sergeant Wisneski learned that Derrick Dempsey had lost a fight 
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with Yonic and had driven to the Jordan residence with Moore 

and a third person “to seek revenge.” Tr. at 593. Sergeant 

Wisneski asked Dempsey if he could “look inside” his car, which 

was parked in the driveway with the engine running. Id. at 579. 

Dempsey consented.

In the trunk, Sergeant Wisneski found an assault rifle and a 

shotgun. A records check indicated that Moore had reported 

these firearms stolen. Under the front passenger seat, Sergeant 

Wisneski found a “chrome and black” .45-caliber Ruger 

handgun, which had not been reported stolen. Id. at 583. Moore 

stated that he owned the handgun and produced a valid handgun 

permit. Sergeant Wisneski made no arrests but confiscated the 

firearms “because things were in a very, very dangerous state at 

that time[.]” Id. at 594. Sergeant Wisneski sent the firearms to 

the police property room. On January 28, 2002, as part of his 

duties in operating the Integrated Ballistic Identification System 

(“IBIS”), firearms technician John Brooks test-fired the 

confiscated handgun and entered the relevant ballistics 

information into the IBIS computer. In April 2002, Moore’s 

mother retrieved the handgun from the property room and gave it 

to Moore.

Late one night in June 2003, Moore telephoned Eric Bettis, the 

uncle of his friend Curtis Ward, and asked for a ride. Eric 

complied, and Moore gave him $30. The next morning, Moore 

informed Eric that he had left his gun in the car. Eric’s wife, 

Theresa, stopped by Moore’s residence to give him the gun, but 

he was not at home. Theresa gave the gun to Eric’s brother,

Herman Bettis, because she did not want to keep it in her car. 

Herman informed Moore that he had the “[b]lack and silver” .45-

caliber handgun, and Moore told him to “hang on to it[.]” Id. at 

705, 706. Herman kept the handgun in his restaurant.

On the evening of Friday, July 18, 2003, Adrian Beverly was 

riding around with Brandie Coleman and Gregory Johnson, who 

was dressed as a female and went by the name of Nireah. The 
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trio saw Moore and Ward riding in Moore’s car and asked them 

to pull into a gas station parking lot. Johnson and Moore exited 

their vehicles, talked briefly, and exchanged phone numbers. 

Johnson hugged Moore and kissed him on the cheek. Id. at 798. 

Moore was attracted to Johnson. Id. at 799. Coleman and Ward 

also exchanged phone numbers.

On July 21, 2003, Herman Bettis delivered the handgun to 

Moore at his home. At 12:51 a.m. on July 23, 2003, Coleman 

called Moore’s home phone to speak with Ward. Coleman and 

Johnson then drove to Moore’s home in Coleman’s mother’s 

Jeep Grand Cherokee. Coleman, Johnson, Ward, and Moore 

chatted briefly outside and entered Moore’s home. Ward and 

Coleman went into Ward’s room, and Moore and Johnson went 

into Moore’s room.

Later, Moore entered Ward’s room with a “[b]lack and gray” 

Ruger .45-caliber handgun and said, “Man, I need to holler at 

you.” Id. at 456, 454. The two men went into the kitchen, and 

Moore asked Ward whether he knew “if Nireah is a man or a 

female.” Id. at 455. Ward told the “[d]isturbed” and “upset” 

Moore that Nireah looked like a woman to him. Id. Moore and 

Ward went into the living room, where Moore “interrogat[ed]” 

Johnson and Coleman regarding whether Johnson was male or 

female. Id. at 456. After approximately forty minutes of 

questioning, Johnson had to use the restroom. Moore followed 

him there and exclaimed in a “stunned, startled” voice, “Man, 

this is a boy.” Id. at 457. Moore became “real irate” and talked 

about feeling “like his manhood’s been violated[.]” Id. Moore 

stated that Johnson “was kissing on him.” Id. at 457. Moore 

stated that he should “[w]hip [their] ass” or “possibly kill 

them[.]” Id. at 458. Moore asked Johnson, “What did you 

think, I was a faggot?” Id.

Moore asked Ward to get some wire, which they used to bind 

Coleman’s and Johnson’s hands behind their backs. Johnson 

sobbed that he “didn’t mean nothing” and would “never do 
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nothing like that again” and “turn straight.” Id. at 459. Moore 

put Coleman and Johnson in the backseat of the Jeep and told 

Ward to follow him in Ward’s car. Moore drove the Jeep from 

East 39th Street to a small park on Fall Creek Parkway North 

Drive, where he drove over a curb, around a locked gate, and 

into a wooded cul-de-sac. Ward drove past the gate, made a Uturn, and returned to see Moore walking up the road. Moore 

entered Ward’s car, took the handgun out of his pocket, 

dismantled it, and threw the pieces out the window. Moore said, 

“Man, I had to do it.” Id. at 463. Moore told Ward that he had 

to “calm [Coleman] down” after he shot Johnson. Id. at 464. 

The pair went back to Moore’s home, returned a roto-rooter to a 

rental store, and went their separate ways.

That afternoon, Moore called Ward and stated that “he might 

have to go back and burn the truck up.” Id. at 467. Ward later 

spoke with Moore’s brother, Clarence McGee, who had seen the 

bodies in the Jeep. McGee asked Ward to pick him up at 

Moore’s home so that “they could go burn the Jeep up.” Id. at 

468. Ward arrived at Moore’s home after dark. Moore told 

Ward that the Jeep had to be burned to “cover his tracks.” Id. at 

469. McGee asked Ward to get a gas can, and the two men 

drove back to the Jeep. Ward let McGee out of the car near the 

Jeep, made a U-turn, and retrieved McGee, who smelled of 

gasoline and said that he had almost burn[ed] himself. Ward saw 

that the Jeep was in flames. Upon their return, Moore described 

how Johnson “flopped back in the seat” when he was shot. Id. at 

472. Moore told Ward that he was like a brother and that “if

anything goes down that [they] wouldn’t have anything to worry 

about.” Id. at 472-73.

Just after 9:00 p.m., firefighters were dispatched to the burning 

Jeep and extinguished the flames. Inside, they discovered the 

charred bodies of Johnson and Coleman, both of whom had been 

fatally shot in the forehead before the fire started. Coleman’s 

larynx and chest had suffered blunt force trauma. The .45-caliber 

bullets recovered from the victims’ skulls matched the January 
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2002 ballistics test of Moore’s handgun. Investigators 

determined that gasoline had been poured in the backseat of the 

Jeep and ignited. On July 29, 2003, Adrian Beverly identified 

Ward as the passenger in the car that she had seen in the gas 

station parking lot on July 18 while riding with Coleman and 

Johnson. Ward initially denied any involvement in the crimes 

but eventually implicated Moore.

On August 5, 2003, the State charged Moore with two counts of 

murder, two counts of class B felony criminal confinement, and 

one count of class B felony arson. Moore and McGee were tried 

together in April 2004. On April 8, 2004, the jury found Moore 

guilty as charged. On May 5, 2004, the trial court imposed an 

aggregate sentence of 120 years. 

Moore v. State, 827 N.E.2d 631, 633-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[4] On direct appeal, Moore challenged the admission of ballistics evidence, the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, and his sentence. Id. at 

633. This court determined that the ballistics evidence was derived from an 

unconstitutional seizure of the handgun and should have been excluded as fruit 

of the poisonous tree. Id. at 639. However, the ballistics evidence was found to 

be cumulative of Ward’s and the Bettises’ testimony that Moore possessed the 

handgun at the time of the murders. Id. at 640. Accordingly, the error in the 

admission of the ballistics evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. Additionally, this Court concluded that the State presented sufficient 

evidence to support Moore’s convictions and that his sentence was not 

inappropriate. Id. at 641, 643. Thus, we affirmed Moore’s convictions and 

sentence.
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[5] On October 4, 2006, Moore filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he

amended on May 3, 2013. Moore’s amended petition for post-conviction relief 

asserted the following grounds for relief: 

The State committed a Brady violation, in direct contravention of 

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 

and Article One, Sections Twelve and Thirteen of the Indiana 

Constitution, where the State failed to disclose the existence of 

an informal agreement/understanding between itself and [a] key 

witness.

The State committed prosecutorial misconduct . . . where the 

State knowingly allowed the presentation of perjured testimony 

of their key witness.

Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

. . . where counsel failed to call the only exculpatory witness who 

would have corroborated the defense’s theory.

Appellant’s App. at 141-42. On August 21, 2013, and on November 6, 2013, 

the post-conviction court conducted evidentiary hearings at which Ward, 

Marcel Pratt (Moore’s trial counsel), Ralph Staples (the prosecuting attorney), 

and Moore’s grandfather (the omitted defense witness) testified. On June 17, 

2014, the post-conviction court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of 

law in which it denied Moore’s petition for post-conviction relief. This appeal 

ensued.
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Discussion and Decision

Post-Conviction Standard of Review

[6] The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing 

the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction 

Rule 1(5); Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004). When appealing 

from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of 

one appealing from a negative judgment. Id. On review, we will not reverse 

the judgment of the post-conviction court unless the evidence as a whole 

unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the 

post-conviction court. Id. A post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will 

be reversed only upon a showing of clear error, that which leaves us with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In this review, 

findings of fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous and no deference 

is accorded to conclusions of law. Id. The post-conviction court is the sole 

judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id.

Alleged Exculpatory Evidence—Brady Claim

[7] Moore first contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the State failed to 

turn over exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963). His petition for post-conviction relief alleged that the State failed to 

disclose the existence of an informal agreement between the State and Ward, 

something he now describes as a “wink and nod” or “unspoken” agreement. 

Appellant’s Br. at 8.
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[8] Specifically, Moore claims Ward received a substantial bond reduction in 

anticipation of his trial testimony. Also, Ward was never charged with murder 

and was permitted to plead guilty to confinement and arson, as Class B felonies, 

and received a nine-year sentence (which included three years due to a 

probation violation).

[9] The State has an affirmative duty to disclose material evidence favorable to the 

defendant. State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 153 (Ind. 2012). “[T]he suppression 

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 

due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. 

at 87. Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable likelihood that it might 

have affected the outcome of the trial.” Samaniego v. State, 679 N.E.2d 944, 948 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.

[10] The establishment of a Brady claim requires that the defendant show: “(1) that 

the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) that the evidence was favorable to the 

defense, and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.” Minnick v. 

State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 755 (Ind. 1998). The suppression of Brady evidence is 

constitutional error warranting a new trial. Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d 274, 298 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[11] “Brady applies to evidence impeaching the credibility of State’s witnesses.” 

Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ind. 1999) (citing United States v. Bagley, 

473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)). However, the State will not be found to have 
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suppressed material evidence if it was available to the defendant through the 

exercise of reasonable diligence. Bunch, 964 N.E.2d at 297.

[12] In Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644 (Ind. 1999), the Court considered a Brady

claim in the context of the State’s non-disclosure of an agreement not to 

prosecute a witness in a murder trial for the witness’ alleged drug-related 

conduct. The Court concluded: “Because the ‘deal’ became known to 

Williams and the jury before the trial concluded, there was no Brady violation.” 

Id. at 648.

[13] At Moore’s post-conviction hearing, Ward confirmed that he had not, at the 

time of his trial testimony, been given something in return for his testimony. As 

for “an understanding,” Ward testified: “[there were] no promises that I could 

grab . . . hold to. There was [sic] no specifics at all. None. No specifics, no 

details, no nothing.” P-C.R. Tr. at 110-11. He acknowledged that he had never 

been charged with murder and that he had been released on bond shortly after 

his arrest. Former prosecutor Ralph Staples testified that the State had 

cooperated with Ward’s bond reduction as a show of “good faith” during 

negotiations with Ward’s attorney. Id. at 23.

[14] Despite his participation in some of the events surrounding the deaths of 

Johnson and Coleman, Ward was never charged with murder. And he was 

given a substantial bond reduction (from $250,000 to $25,000). Undoubtedly, 

Ward hoped that his cooperation would lead to future leniency. However, the 
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transcript of Moore’s trial belies his assertion that information regarding a deal

between the State and Ward was withheld. 

[15] During opening statements to the jury, Moore’s counsel asserted that Ward’s 

credibility was suspect because of an implicit agreement with the State:

[A]fter negotiations with the State of Indiana and striking what 

they call a ‘gentleman’s handshake’ which I call ‘you scratch my 

back, I’ll scratch your back,’ Curtis Ward starts telling a story 

implicating Paul Moore. I’m not going to go into the details of it 

because I’m going to tell you the truth, he’s now denied 

everything on July 30th, now he comes back on August 6th with 

this story. This is after the deal with the State and you’ll hear 

about the benefit that he has received and possibly could still 

receive for this cooperation.

Tr. at 104. When Ward testified, he acknowledged that he was not in jail but 

was “out on bond.” Id. at 493. During cross-examination, defense counsel 

elicited Ward’s acknowledgement that his bond had been reduced from 

$250,000 to $15,000 (plus an additional amount attributable to a probation 

violation). In closing argument, both the prosecution and defense counsel 

pointed out to the jury that Ward had been favorably treated by the State.

[16] The prosecutor advised the jury that Ward was facing charges of criminal 

confinement, arson, and assisting a criminal, and the prosecutor acknowledged 

the bond reduction: 

Curtis Ward hadn’t made any deals with the State, let me make 

that clear. He may have received a benefit in getting a bond 
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reduction that he shouldn’t have gotten, but he has received no 

deals for his testimony in this case.

Id. at 972. Thereafter, defense counsel vigorously argued that Ward had 

received benefits and still stood to gain from his testimony:

[Ward] is truly [trying] to protect himself. Ms. Haley referred to 

how he has received a benefit already about the bond, yes, he 

has. I don’t know if you’re curious but reading of the charges 

he’s facing, oops, Curtis is not charged with murder. And from 

this deal, there’s no writings. It’s a gentleman’s handshake. 

After we finish here today, what’s going to happen? Do you 

know? I don’t. As far as I know Curtis’ charge’s [sic] dismissed. 

Who knows? I don’t. Yes, he has a lot to gain, he is doing a 

wonderful job protecting himself.

Id. at 982. The jury was repeatedly advised of the dealings between the State 

and Ward. In light of the Indiana Supreme Court’s guidance in Williams, we 

likewise conclude that any “deal” was known to Moore and the jury. Moore 

has shown no Brady violation. 

Alleged Subornation of Perjury

[17] We next turn to Moore’s related allegation that the prosecutor suborned perjury

and, thus, committed misconduct. “A conviction obtained by the knowing use 

of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is 

‘any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony reasonably affected the 

judgment of the jury.’” Lyons v. State, 600 N.E.2d 560, 564 (Ind. App. 1992) 

(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). 
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[18] At the conclusion of Ward’s testimony on re-direct, the following exchange 

took place:

Prosecutor: Mr. Ward, have you been promised anything in 

exchange for your testimony here today?

Ward: No, I haven’t.

Tr. at 538-39. Moore contends that the prosecutor thereby elicited perjury. 

According to Moore, Ward’s answer was false because he had already received 

an unusually low bond and had reason to expect favorable treatment in the 

future.

[19] At the post-conviction hearing, Ward acknowledged he had denied the 

existence of a promise in exchange for his testimony. He added that the 

testimony had been “true,” explaining further that there were “no promises that 

I could grab . . . hold to.” P-C.R. Tr. at 108, 111. The former prosecutor 

corroborated that Ward had no plea agreement when he testified at trial. Thus, 

he denied suborning perjury.

[20] To the extent that the allegation of perjury implicates Ward’s subjective belief 

that he testified truthfully, credibility determinations rest with the postconviction court. To the extent that objective proof could be said to exist, the 

bond reduction had already been granted before Ward testified and was thus 

not a promise of future consideration. Also, Moore has produced no evidence 

of a plea agreement or other defined agreement preceding the testimony. 

Moore has not shown that the post-conviction court erred when it concluded 
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that Moore had not “carr[ied] his burden” to prove his claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct, which was based on the alleged subornation of perjury. 

Appellant’s App. at 88.

Effectiveness of Trial Counsel

[21] Moore claims he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because 

counsel did not call Moore’s grandfather, Charles Moore (“Charles”), as a 

witness. Although Charles was listed as a defense witness, ultimately he was 

not called to testify. According to Moore, his grandfather was in a unique 

position to challenge Ward’s testimony that he was with Moore the morning 

after the murders. 

[22] Effectiveness of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). We evaluate Sixth Amendment claims 

of ineffective assistance under the two-part test announced in Strickland. Id. To 

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 

demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Dobbins. v. 

State, 721 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. 1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

Deficient performance is that which falls below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see Douglas v. State, 663 N.E.2d 

1153, 1154 (Ind. 1996). Prejudice exists when a claimant demonstrates that 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see Cook v. State, 675 N.E.2d 687, 692 (Ind. 1996). 
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The two prongs of the Strickland test are separate and independent inquiries. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Thus, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that 

course should be followed.” Id.

[23] We “strongly presume” that counsel provided adequate assistance and 

exercised reasonable professional judgment in all significant decisions. McCary 

v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002). Counsel is to be afforded 

considerable discretion in the choice of strategy and tactics. Timberlake v. State, 

753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001). Counsel’s conduct is assessed based upon the 

facts known at the time and not through hindsight. State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 

1258, 1261 (Ind. 1997). We do not “second-guess” strategic decisions requiring 

reasonable professional judgment even if the strategy in hindsight did not serve 

the defendant’s interests. Id. In sum, trial strategy is not subject to attack 

through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, unless the strategy is so 

deficient or unreasonable as to fall outside the objective standard of 

reasonableness. Autrey v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind. 1998).

[24] At the post-conviction hearing, Charles testified that, around 8:30 a.m. on July 

23, 2003, he was called to assist Moore with returning a rented Roto-Rooter. 

According to Charles, when he arrived at Moore’s house, Moore was alone and 

Ward arrived “a couple minutes” later. P-C.R. Tr. at 68. In Moore’s view, this 

testimony—had it been presented at trial—would have contradicted Ward’s 

claim “that he was with Mr. Moore continually from the time he claimed Mr. 
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Moore killed Coleman and Johnson until after the two of them returned the 

Roto-Rooter the next morning.” Appellant’s Br. at 42.

[25] In support of his claim, Moore directs our attention to Ward’s trial testimony 

appearing at pages 465 through 466 of the trial transcript. Our review of this 

testimony leads us to disagree with Moore’s contention that Ward described 

completely uninterrupted companionship with Moore after the murders. 

[26] In his trial testimony, Ward described the events leading up to and surrounding 

the murders and stated that he and Moore thereafter went “straight home.”1 Tr.

at 465. According to Ward, at that time “it’s light out, early morning.” Id. 

The prosecutor then elicited testimony of subsequent activities:

Prosecutor: When you two got back to 4302 East 39th Street 

what happened?

Ward: I started heading for the house and he’s going through his 

back yard, he asked me did I know where the shovel was and my 

reply was, where we left it last night. He still had a piece of the 

gun.

Prosecutor: So he asked you about a shovel that morning?

Ward: Right.

Prosecutor: Did you see the Defendant, Paul Moore, do 

anything with that shovel?

 

1 Ward claimed that he had been living at Moore’s house. Moore testified that he lived alone but had given 

Ward a key. 
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Ward: I went in the house, I didn’t go in the back yard with him.

Prosecutor: Did the two of you do anything else together that 

morning?

Ward: Got the Roto-Rooter together, put it in the car and took it 

back to wherever it had came [sic] from.

Id. at 465-66. Ward was not asked if he had parted company with Moore for 

any period of time that morning. As Ward did not testify that his time with 

Moore was uninterrupted, Charles’s testimony that Moore was alone when 

Charles first arrived at Moore’s house would have been tangential at best. Even 

had the jury credited testimony of Ward’s arrival a “couple minutes” later, such

would not directly contradict Ward’s testimonial account of material events. PC.R. Tr. at 68. We discern no prejudice from trial counsel’s decision not to call 

Charles as a trial witness.

Conclusion

[27] In sum, Moore has not shown a Brady violation or that the prosecutor suborned 

perjury, and Moore has not established that he was denied the effective 

assistance of trial counsel. Accordingly, we cannot say that the post-conviction 

court’s denial of Moore’s petition for post-conviction relief is clearly erroneous. 

We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

[28] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.