file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

No. 00-203 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2000 MT 257 

301 Mont. 482 

10 P.3d 819

JOHN STILES, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES, STATE OF MONTANA, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, 

Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Judge Presiding

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Lonnie J. Olson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Child Support

Enforcement Division, Helena, Montana

For Respondent:

John Hollow, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (1 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

Submitted on Briefs: August 3, 2000 

Decided: September 26, 2000 

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 The First Judicial District Court of Montana, Lewis and Clark County, reversed the 

Financial Responsibility Decision and Order issued by the Child Support Enforcement 

Division of the State of Montana, Department of Public Health and Human Services, 

against John Stiles, and found that because Stiles' sister, the legal guardian of the child, 

had no right to receive support, no right to support could therefore pass to the State. We 

affirm the District Court's ruling.

¶2 The State raises the following issues on appeal:

¶3 1. Did the District Court err when it held that equitable estoppel and waiver applied 

prospectively to relieve John Stiles of current and future support obligations for his son?

¶4 2. Did the District Court err when it held the statutory right of the State of Montana to 

be reimbursed for the payment of public benefits on behalf of the child was negated by the 

conduct of the child's custodian?

¶5 Neal Stiles was born to John and Renna Stiles on November 10, 1986, the youngest of 

three children. Within weeks after Neal's birth, the Stiles separated. The Stiles were living 

in California, with John serving in the U.S. Navy. John was given responsibility for Neal's 

care, and asked his sister in Montana, Cynthia Huffman, now Cynthia Golding, if she 

would care for Neal for a short time while he fulfilled his duties at sea. She and her thenhusband, Brian Huffman, agreed.

¶6 Cynthia has sought legal custody of Neal since that time, availing herself of courts in 

both Montana and California on numerous occasions. Her efforts met with differing 

results, including an award of physical custody handed down by a California court. 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (2 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

Cynthia often did not comply with court orders resulting from these efforts, including 

orders to allow visitation of Neal by John. John initially offered to pay the Huffmans for 

Neal's care, but the Huffmans refused to accept the money, saying it was not needed. At 

all times John has covered Neal under his health insurance plan.

¶7 Cynthia applied for and was granted public assistance beginning in November 1995 for 

a four-month period, assigning any right to child support she may have had to the State of 

Montana. A Notice of Financial Responsibility issued to John on May 3, 1996, 

establishing John's monthly obligation for Neal at $388. John requested a hearing to 

adjudicate this matter, which was held June 27, 1996. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 

Lori Ballinger of the Child Support Enforcement Division then issued a Financial 

Responsibility Decision and Order to John in November of 1996 establishing his 

obligation to provide financial support for Neal in the amount of $511 per month. Stiles 

asked Cynthia to sign a waiver of this obligation, but she refused.

¶8 John petitioned for judicial review. The District Court remanded the matter back to 

ALJ Susan Schafer to make findings of fact regarding John's claim that Cynthia had 

waived her right to receive child support or that she was equitably estopped from asserting 

or assigning them. The District Court reserved responsibility for determining whether the 

facts found by the ALJ satisfied the elements of waiver and equitable estoppel. The ALJ 

found that the requisite elements of waiver and estoppel were present, and these findings 

were upheld by the District Court. In addition, the court found that because Cynthia had 

no right to receive support, she could not then convey to the State rights greater than those 

to which she was entitled. The State of Montana appeals. 

DISCUSSION

¶9 This Court stands firmly behind the precedents and principles providing for the 

maintenance and welfare of children by those responsible. Along with these 

responsibilities, however, come rights. Here, the sister of John Stiles, Cynthia Huffman, 

now Cynthia Golding, has done everything within her power and under the color of law to 

deny John's parental rights. We have previously stated, "a natural parent's right to care and 

custody of a child is a fundamental liberty interest, which must be protected by 

fundamentally fair procedures." In re R.B., Jr. (1985), 217 Mont. 99, 103, 703 P.2d 846, 

848. It appears from the record that Cynthia has been entirely successful in that endeavor. 

She has stated her intent to make the child her own to her mother and sister, immediately 

after being asked as a favor under difficult circumstances to look after the newborn child 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (3 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

for no more than a few months by her brother. She has on at least one occasion refused 

John's offer of financial support for Neal. She has flaunted court orders to allow John to 

see his child. She has admonished Neal to run and get the nearest police officer if John 

ever approaches him, with no legal or rational basis that appears in the record. We concur 

with the District Court that as long as Neal remains with Cynthia there will be no award of 

child support in this matter, but should that change this issue must be reconsidered. 

Because she has no right to support, she has no right to assign to the State.

Issue 1

¶10 Did the District Court err when it held that equitable estoppel and waiver applied to 

relieve John Stiles of an obligation to provide financial support for his son? 

¶11 Neither John nor the State has cited legal authority to this Court that is truly reflective 

of the facts and legal and equitable issues present here. Although both have cited authority 

from other jurisdictions to support their positions, we find Montana's statutes and legal 

precedent adequate to address the relevant legal issues. 

¶12 "In matters and proceedings of an equitable nature, this Court shall review all 

questions of fact arising upon the evidence presented in the record, whether the same be 

presented by specifications of particulars in which the evidence is alleged to be 

insufficient or not, and determine the same, as well as questions of law. . . ." Section 3-2-

204(5), MCA; Rase v. Castle Mtn. Ranch, Inc. (1981), 193 Mont. 209, 216, 631 P.2d 680, 

684. We will not reverse the trial court in an equity case on questions of fact unless there 

is a decided preponderance of the evidence against the findings of the trial court. Lumby v. 

Doetch (1979), 183 Mont. 427, 431, 600 P.2d 200, 202 (stating further that we will 

presume the findings and judgment by the district court are correct, and when the evidence 

furnishes reasonable grounds for different conclusions, the findings of the district court 

will not be disturbed); Boz-Lew Builders v. Smith (1977), 174 Mont. 448, 452, 571 P.2d 

389, 391. Findings of fact in matters of an equitable nature as well as at law are to be 

upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. Finally, the Legislature 

contemplated instances where a court would not award child support. In such cases the 

court must state its reasons for not so doing. Section 40-4-204(3)(c), MCA. 

¶13 The State observes in its initial brief that, "[i]n Montana, waiver and estoppel are not 

available to an obligor to use as a sword, to defeat a child's right to current or future 

support." Waiver and estoppel are, however, available as a legal shield, to prevent 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (4 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

inequitable results when the best interests of the child are not in dispute. The case perhaps 

most parallel to the instant case is State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Horton (1986), 222 Mont. 351, 

722 P.2d 1148. There, this Court used equitable estoppel to disallow a mother's claim for 

child support when both the mother and father had explicitly agreed that if the father 

stayed out of the mother and child's lives, they would stay out of his. The agreement was 

mutually observed over fourteen years. We stated then: 

"[S]he can turn the clock backwards on the understanding which was entered into 

and became consummated by mutual observance over the years, and create a 

financial windfall situation-one that can be pursued through County prosecuting 

offices by filling out and signing forms in a local office without any personal 

expense to her. The father and child, on the other hand cannot turn the clock 

backwards to recapture the association which they should have had and could have 

had . . . . Equity cannot allow the mother to participate in nullification of the 

purpose of the law in fact and, at the same time, allow her to claim the benefit of it 

in theory, simply because there is a meter running which can total a dollar loss in 

child support, but nothing to total the loss of a father-son association." 

Blakeslee, 222 Mont. at 354-55, 722 P.2d at 1150-51 (emphasis added).

¶14 No more prescient prose could have been written for the case sub judice, where the 

facts are even more egregious. Here, the record reveals a father who aggressively sought 

to fulfill his legal and moral responsibilities as a parent to his son, only to be thwarted by 

his sister who was entrusted with the child's care as a favor to her brother, ostensibly for a 

brief time. It was Cynthia's stated and uncontroverted intention to keep this child, in spite 

of both his father's and mother's wishes and intentions. 

¶15 Just as in Blakeslee, no extenuating circumstances had been established to justify a 

fourteen-year delay in seeking child support (e.g., an unsatisfied material need of the child 

over the years, or that may have recently arisen), and neither have such circumstances 

been established here. Furthermore, Cynthia has been especially litigious, having initiated 

numerous court proceedings in both Montana and California, including adoption 

proceedings and intervention in John and Renna Stiles' divorce proceedings. Each of these 

court appearances was an opportunity to request child support, but her principal concern 

appeared to be securing custody of the child, which was granted in 1992.

¶16 Collectively, these facts and circumstances satisfy the elements of equitable estoppel 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (5 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

as found by the ALJ and upheld by the District Court. We have previously ruled that there 

need not be an actual agreement between the parties for equitable estoppel to apply when 

the requisite elements have been met, and the obligee has impliedly consented to an 

arrangement other than the payment of the judgment. In re Marriage of Shorten, 1998 MT 

267, ¶ 17, 291 Mont. 317, ¶ 17, 967 P.2d 797, ¶ 17. The elements of equitable estoppel 

are: 

(1) [C]onduct, acts, language, or silence amounting to a representation or 

concealment of material facts; (2) these facts must be known to the party estopped at 

the time of his conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of 

them is necessarily imputed to him; (3) the truth concerning these facts must be 

unknown to the party claiming the benefit of estoppel at the time it was acted upon; 

(4) the conduct must be done with the intent, or at least with the expectation, that it 

will be acted upon by the other party or under circumstances that it is both natural 

and probable that it will be so acted upon; (5) the conduct must be relied upon by 

the other party and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it; and (6) he must in 

fact act upon it so as to change his position for the worse.

Marriage of Shorten, ¶ 18.

¶17 The findings of the ALJ and the District Court support a conclusion that the elements 

of equitable estoppel have been satisfied. With regard to the first two elements of 

equitable estoppel, the Findings of Fact set forth in the Order Granting CSED's Motion 

note the following: 

(5) Betty Stiles is the mother of Ms. Golding (Cynthia) and Mr. Stiles. She was 

present when Neal first went to live with Ms. Golding and Brian Huffman. Ms. 

Golding told Ms. Stiles that it was fate that Neal had come to live with them and 

that he was meant to be her child because Brian's deceased father's name was Neal. 

Ms. Golding told Ms. Stiles that she had gone to the County Attorney to find out 

what she had to do to keep Neal. Ms. Golding told her that she planned to keep Neal 

for one year and then file the appropriate adoption papers.

(6) Beth McDonough is the sister of Ms. Golding and Mr. Stiles. She was present 

when Neal first arrived in Helena. Ms. Golding stayed with Ms. McDonough while 

waiting for John Stiles' and Neal's arrival. Ms. Golding told Ms. McDonough that 

Neal was destined to be in her life because there have been so many coincidences. 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (6 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

One example given by Ms. Golding was that Neal's name is the same as Brian 

Huffman's deceased father. Ms. Golding and Mr. Huffman could not have children. 

They tried to adopt but failed. Ms. Golding believed that this was supposed to be, 

that God had sent this child to her, and that she was supposed to raise him. Ms. 

McDonough testified that Ms. Golding was adamant about not returning Neal 

because she felt John and Renna were inadequate parents. Immediately after Ms. 

Golding obtained custody of Neal she began saying that she would do anything to 

keep him. . . . 

(11) . . . Ms. Golding told Betty Stiles that she had the resources to keep fighting for 

Neal and that she would do so until John Stiles could not afford to fight her 

anymore. 

In addition, in the Order on Remand the ALJ found:

(30) The mother, Betty Stiles, testified that Cynthia Huffman gave her the 

impression she was going to keep Neal and that she had no intention of returning 

Neal to the parents at any time. 

(31) Betty Stiles further testified that Cynthia Huffman informed her that her brother 

Johnny could not afford to continue the fight for the custody of Neal and that they 

were going to continue in litigation until he was broke.

¶18 Here, Cynthia has given more than implied consent to the terms of this agreement. In 

contrast to the mutuality of agreement in Blakeslee, Cynthia has had nearly unilateral 

control over the terms of the entire arrangement. It is disingenuous of her to now claim 

that she is somehow aggrieved when she has herself orchestrated the circumstances she 

now faces. Her conduct and acts in denying John the ability to see his son, coupled with 

her silence to him regarding her intent to keep Neal when the record supports the 

conclusion that she had many opportunities within and without the courts to assert her 

intentions, and which were clearly known to her at the time given her overt statements to 

others, satisfy the first two elements of equitable estoppel. 

¶19 There is no indication in the record that John had any way of knowing that Cynthia 

would make every effort within the court system and without to sever his parental rights, 

and then more than twelve years hence expect him to pay child support either retroactively 

or prospectively. John's belief was that at the time when Cynthia's plan to exhaust his 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (7 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

financial and emotional reserves was successfully implemented, she and her then-husband 

would provide for and raise the child. The ALJ found that, "[h]er actions would not have 

lead a reasonable person to believe she would have wanted Mr. Stiles to participate in the 

raising of Neal even in the limited capacity of providing financial support." Therefore we 

rule the third element of equitable estoppel is satisfied. 

¶20 The record clearly establishes Cynthia's intent to exhaust John's resources so that he 

would cease his efforts to become reunited with his son, and she and her husbands would 

then supplant him as parents. These actions embody the fourth element, i.e., the conduct 

must be done with the intent that it will be acted upon by the other party. John did cease 

his efforts to regain custody of his son for this very reason. We conclude the fourth 

element of equitable estoppel is thus met.

¶21 Elements five and six are intertwined. Cynthia's conduct must have been relied upon 

by John, he must have acted upon her conduct, and acted in a way that changed his 

position for the worse. Here, the record establishes that John relied in innumerable ways 

on Cynthia's conduct, beginning with her assertions that Neal was unavailable to his father 

because of Cynthia's vacation plans, forcing him to leave Montana without seeing his son 

and return to California; he further relied on Cynthia's conduct as manifested in her 

litigiousness, finally leading to exhaustion of his resources and abandonment of his efforts 

to regain his son. These resources could have been better directed to the well-being of the 

child. Cynthia's protestations and denials ring hollow in the face of her actions. Few acts 

constitute a worsening of one's position than losing a child, no matter how lost. The fifth 

and sixth elements of equitable estoppel have thus been met. 

¶22 We conclude that all six elements of equitable estoppel have been met in this case, 

and that therefore Cynthia Golding has no right to receive child support from John Stiles 

either retroactively or prospectively. Cynthia has in effect reaped the rewards of her 

bargain. 

¶23 Because the elements of equitable estoppel have been satisfied, no protracted analysis 

of the issue of waiver is necessary. However, we concur with the District Court's analysis 

in this regard, finding that Cynthia has in fact waived her right to support from John 

through her language and conduct, elements of waiver to which the parties have stipulated. 

As the District Court found:

Cynthia actively attempted to sever the right and ability of the Obligor to adequately 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (8 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

parent the Child. She did this making her intentions to keep and raise Neal as her 

own known to her mother and sister, by repeatedly denying Mr. Stiles access to the 

Child, by filing court actions to terminate Mr. Stiles' parental rights to gain 

permanent custody of Neal, thereby wearing down Mr. Stiles' financial resources, 

and by intervening in Mr. Stiles' divorce proceedings so she could participate in the 

custody portion of the proceedings.

¶24 The District Court poignantly noted: 

The record reflects that John fought for years to establish a relationship with his son 

Neal and to be able to provide for Neal in his home. Cynthia defied a Montana court 

order demanding the child be returned to his parents, defied a California court order 

regarding John's visitation rights, and accepted a California court order that declined 

to award her any child support for Neal's care.

¶25 The State, perhaps acknowledging the unsavory facts leading to the case at bar, argues 

eloquently that the doctrine of equitable estoppel has historically been applied 

retrospectively, and should not apply prospectively, concluding that applying equitable 

estoppel to future support is tantamount to punishment of Cynthia. However, that is not 

our view, nor our purpose. Cynthia sought legal custody before the California court 

system, with some success. She has somehow evaded consequences for her refusals to 

obey court orders and over the years has effectively become the only true and constant 

parent Neal has known. Neal's own biological mother has misspelled his name in court 

documents in the record before us. John Stiles has accepted, as perhaps only a true parent 

can, that to take Neal from Cynthia at this time would be detrimental to his child under the 

totality of the circumstances. We find that the best interests of the child are likely best 

served by the present arrangement, and that based on the record, Cynthia is adequately 

providing for Neal's needs while reaping the benefits of his companionship and the 

elements of relationship, all of which have been denied John. 

¶26 This is consistent with statutory language regarding the obligation of a parent for 

support and education of their children. "The parent or parents of a child shall give the 

child support and education suitable to the child's circumstances." Section 40-6-211, 

MCA. Here, because there has been no showing in the record that the child's needs are not 

being met, an order of additional support will not be forthcoming. The State raises the 

point that even in the case of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights and 

responsibilities, a parent will still be liable for support. Section 42-4-402, MCA. Here, 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (9 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

however, we have an involuntary relinquishment of parental rights, and we will not visit 

upon John the normal responsibilities under these unique circumstances when the needs of 

the child are being met and where he has at all times provided health insurance for the 

child. 

¶27 The State cites a series of cases that have dealt generally with the issues of the instant 

case. The principal cases include In re the Support of Krug (1988), 231 Mont. 78, 751 

P.2d 171; In re Marriage of Neiss (1987), 228 Mont. 479, 743 P.2d 1022; and Fitzgerald 

v. Fitzgerald (1980), 190 Mont. 66, 618 P.2d 867. These cases are distinguished from the 

case at bar primarily on their facts. In all these cases there was court-ordered support 

adjudicated at the time of a dissolution of marriage, and an explicit or implicit finding of 

need on behalf of the children, none of which is found here. In Support of Krug, the parties 

entered into a court-sanctioned modification that was found unconscionable ab initio

because it abrogated child support forever, regardless of circumstances, and no insurance 

was provided for the children, which is not the case here. In none of these cases did the 

Court analyze the individual elements of either equitable estoppel, or laches, which was 

raised in Fitzgerald. 

¶28 Central to Fitzgerald was the plain language of the 1971 divorce decree reading that 

"the defendant shall have no right to visit said child, unless and until, he pays to the 

plaintiff the sum of fifty dollars per month through the clerk of this court for the support 

and maintenance of the minor child of the parties hereto." Fitzgerald, 190 Mont. at 67, 618 

P.2d at 867. Because the father actively avoided seeing the child for the next eight years, 

he then reasoned that he did not have to pay the support. This Court did not concur with 

his reasoning. Here, we have a father who has spent the better part of thirteen years 

actively attempting to establish relations with his son, as opposed to a pattern of 

avoidance. Neither do we concur with the State's assertion that this is a custody dispute 

like that in Fitzgerald. The record indicates that John has stated his belief that under the 

circumstances his son should remain with Cynthia. Nowhere in the record does it now 

appear that he is actively seeking custody of Neal.

¶29 It appears to this Court from the record that in each of the cases cited by the State, the 

absent father was attempting to exploit narrow legal technicalities to avoid undisputed 

court-ordered support obligations awarded at the time of dissolution, whereas here the 

father aggressively sought within and without the courts to provide a home for and 

generally maintain and establish a parent-child relationship with his son, only to be 

thwarted by his sister. In none of these cases was the ex-spouse or other custodian 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (10 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

explicitly seeking to exhaust the father's will and pecuniary resources to destroy the parentchild relationship. In this case, however, we conclude that the individual elements of 

equitable estoppel have been met, and we uphold the ruling of the District Court.

Issue 2

¶30 Did the District Court err when it held the statutory rights of the State of Montana to 

be reimbursed for the payment of public benefits on behalf of a child were negated by the 

conduct of the child's legal guardian?

¶31 We review a district court's interpretation of the law to determine whether the court's 

interpretation of the law is correct. Eddleman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1998 MT 52, ¶ 8, 288 

Mont. 50, ¶ 8, 955 P.2d 646, ¶ 8. We conclude here that the District Court did not err in its 

interpretation of the law. We agree with the District Court's conclusion that the statutory 

rights of the State to be reimbursed for the payment of public benefits are predicated upon 

the beneficiary actually having rights capable of being assigned to the State. The State's 

arguments concerning this statute are incomplete with regard to the other jurisdictions that 

have reviewed similar issues, as the State has not provided the actual statutory language of 

the other jurisdictions that were interpreted by the cases cited. 

¶32 In Comer v. Comer (Cal. 1996), 927 P.2d 265, the father was subject to an existent 

court-ordered child support obligation established at the time of dissolution. The father 

made minimal, irregular payments over the years under his obligation. California's Family 

Code, § 4821, states that, "if a state or a political subdivision furnishes support to an 

individual obligee, it has the same right to initiate an action . . . as the individual obligee 

for the purpose of securing reimbursement for support furnished and of obtaining 

continuing support." Comer, 927 P.2d at 273. There, the right to support was established 

years earlier by the court in divorce proceedings and the State of California simply stepped 

into the shoes of the original obligee. We do not agree with the State of Montana's 

assertion that the State of California inherited rights greater than those set forth in either 

the divorce decree or California's statutes.

¶33 County of San Diego v. Green (Ariz. App. 1991), 810 P.2d 622, also cited by the 

State, is in the end much more supportive of the District Court's analysis of the instant 

case. While the Arizona appellate court did indeed make the statement set forth by the 

State, it did so in remanding the case for further proceedings on the Respondent's 

contention that no duty of support was owing under Arizona law. The case was cited by 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (11 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

the same court in Arizona v. Perez (Ariz. App. 1996), 931 P.2d 427, to support a laches 

defense against the State of Arizona when the State failed to timely seek support from the 

non-custodial parent under an assignment like we have here. The Arizona court noted, 

"application of laches under this, it is hoped, exceptional scenario does not unduly 

interfere with the State's ability to pursue support arrearages in other cases, nor does it 

detract from the strong public policy of promoting the welfare of children." Perez, 931 

P.2d at 430. In referring to Green, the court stated, "[t]hat the State has a remedy 

unavailable to the custodial parent does not preclude a parent obligated to pay child 

support from asserting a viable laches defense against the State. Accordingly the trial court 

did not err in finding appellants' claim for child support arrearages barred." Perez, 931 

P.2d at 430. We concur, noting that laches is also an equitable doctrine with similar factors 

to estoppel.

¶34 If the Montana Legislature had intended that the State would inherit an unequivocal 

right to collect from all parties at the time public assistance was granted, regardless of 

whether a court had approved an order of support, the language would differ greatly from 

the obviously discretionary language actually passed by the Legislature. Section 53-2-613, 

MCA, states in pertinent part:

(2) A person who signs an application for FAIM financial assistance, as defined in 

53-2-902, or related medical assistance assigns to the state, to the department, and to 

the county welfare department all rights that the applicant may have to monetary and 

medical support from any other person in the applicant's own behalf . . . . [Emphasis 

added.] 

The District Court stated, 

John did not have an existing child support obligation that Cynthia assigned to 

CSED under subsection (5), instead CSED is trying to establish a new child support 

obligation. Subsection (2) assigns to the State all rights that an applicant may have 

to monetary support from any other person. [Emphasis added.]

Certainly not all recipients of public benefits have such assignable rights, and there were 

none here. The word "may" appears to reflect an awareness by the Legislature of this very 

principle. "If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute speaks for itself 

and there is nothing left for the Court to construe." Montana Contractors' Assoc. v. 

Department of Hwys. (1986), 220 Mont. 392, 394, 715 P.2d 1056, 1058. We will not use 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (12 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

this case to expand upon unambiguous statutory language. We conclude that the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion in interpreting the statutory language and that Cynthia 

had no rights to support capable of being conveyed to the State.

CONCLUSION

¶35 As we said in Rase, where the issues are not close, the standard of review is to uphold 

the district court on questions of fact unless there is a decided preponderance of the 

evidence against its findings. Here, the ALJ's Findings of Fact as adopted by the District 

Court were not controverted by the State. As a result, there is little to no evidence against 

the Court's findings. Because the District Court's Findings of Fact are not clearly 

erroneous and there is no preponderance of evidence against them, we uphold them.

¶36 We have ruled that the elements of equitable estoppel and waiver have been met, 

based upon sound Findings of Fact by the ALJ and adopted by the lower court. As a result, 

we affirm the District Court's ruling and will not award child support in this matter under 

the current circumstances of custody. Should these circumstances change, this matter must 

be revisited.

¶37 With regard to the issue of whether the current guardian of the child could assign 

rights to the State that she did not have, we will not under these circumstances expand the 

regular meaning of the statutory language "may" and confer greater rights to the State than 

the guardian possessed.

¶38 Finally, we will not countenance subterfuge and failure to communicate among adults 

responsible for the upbringing of children. Those who act extrajudicially or unilaterally to 

their benefit in the short term will find rare solace in the long term. The individual and 

societal costs for such behavior are immeasurable. 

¶39 We hold that the District Court was correct in ruling that John Stiles has no obligation 

to provide additional support to his natural son Neal while Neal remains in Cynthia's 

physical custody.

¶40 Affirmed. 

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

We concur:

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (13 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-203%20Opinion.htm (14 of 14)3/30/2007 10:39:22 AM