alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 27 (Monday, February 10, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 5949]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-3160]



[[Page 5949]]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Forest Service

36 CFR Part 223

RIN 0596-AB21


Disposal of National Forest Timber; Cancellation of Timber Sale 
Contracts

AGENCY: Forest Service, USDA.

ACTION: Proposed rule; extension of public comment period

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: A proposed rule to change the procedure for calculating 
damages when timber sale contracts are cancelled was published on 
December 30, 1996 (61 FR 68690) with the comment period closing 
February 13, 1997. Timber industry reviewers have asked for additional 
time to complete their review of this proposed rule because a 
substantial amount of this comment period was used for the review of 
two other timber-related rules proposed by Forest Service.

DATES: Comments must be received by close of business March 17, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Send written comments to Director, Timber Management Staff, 
MAIL STOP 1105, Forest Service, USDA, P.O. Box 96090, Washington, DC 
20090-6090.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Rex Baumback, Timber Management Staff, (202) 205-0855.

    Dated: February 3, 1997.
David G. Unger,
Associate Chief.
[FR Doc. 97-3160 Filed 2-7-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-11-M
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Willman E. GUILLORY, Jr.

No. 61943.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 16, 1978.

In re: Willman E. Guillory, Jr. applying for remedial writs. Calcasieu Parish.

Granted.

The petition of the relator in the above entitled and numbered case having been duly considered,

It is ordered that a Writ of Certiorari issue herein, directing the Honorable Arthur J. Planchard, Judge of the 14th Judicial District, Court for the Parish of Calca-sieu, to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, record is in our possession, the record in duplicate, or a certified copy of the record in duplicate, of the proceedings complained of by the relator herein, to the end that the validity of said proceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid Judge of said Court and the respondent through counsel shall show cause, in this court, on a date to be fixed by this Court, why the relief prayed for in the petition of the relator should not be granted.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N
NO. 03-15-00294- CV
Manor Independ ent School District, A ppellan t

v. Deydra Ste ans, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 353 RD JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 3-0 0024 1, H ONO RAB LE TIM SULAK JUDGE P RESIDING
O R D E R
P ER CURIAM

We d e n y th e “ A

p p e ll e e ’ s E me r g e n c y M o ti o n f o r Re consideration of Tempora ry Or d e r on Appellant’s Motion for Eme rg ency Stay .” I t is ordere d on May

18, 2015.

Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton, and B ourland
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<CIK> 0000023426
<NAME> THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES
<MULTIPLIER>1,000
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                  DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                       JUN-30-2000
<BOOK-VALUE>                                          PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                            1,702,548
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                            619,900
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 478,552
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                             1,963,533
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                               0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       4,764,533
<COMMON>                                                75,849
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                              414,955
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                                    192,311
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                         683,531
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                        0
<PREFERRED>                                            116,200
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                                 1,066,669
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                      90,000
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                                    0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                               0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                          160,000
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                                    0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                             50,032
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                        88,381
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                       2,510,136
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                        4,764,533
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                            1,431,561
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                                    50,228
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                           1,246,867
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                           1,312,817
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                                118,744
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                                     (16,083)
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                         118,383
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                49,554
<NET-INCOME>                                            68,829
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                              4,622
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                           64,207
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                                25,000
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                                    0
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                                  98,132
<EPS-BASIC>                                             0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                             0.00

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 12



CONSOLIDATED NATURAL GAS COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
(Thousands of Dollars)



_____________________________________________________________________________
Twelve Months to September 30                                            1998
_____________________________________________________________________________
Earnings:
  Income from continuing operations.........................         $279,557
  Add income taxes..........................................          125,700
                                                                     ________
    Income from continuing operations before income taxes...          405,257
  Distributed income from unconsolidated investees,
    less equity in earnings thereof.........................           (2,186)
                                                                     ________
    Subtotal................................................          403,071
                                                                     ________

  Add fixed charges:
    Interest on long-term debt, including amortization
      of debt discount and expense less premium.............          107,018
    Other interest expense..................................           15,547
    Portion of rentals deemed to be representative
      of the interest factor................................            9,731
    Fixed charges associated with 50% projects with debt....              927
                                                                     ________
TOTAL FIXED CHARGES.........................................          133,223
                                                                     ________
TOTAL EARNINGS..............................................         $536,294
                                                                     ========

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES..........................             4.03
                                                                     ========
_____________________________________________________________________________
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

The undersigned, J. David Brow, Secretary, Treasurer and a director of The Electric Network.com, Inc., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)    the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of The Electric Network.com, Inc. for the six month period ended June 30, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of The Electric Network.com, Inc.

Dated: August 19, 2005
| /s/ J. David Brow |
|-------------------|

J. David Brow

Secretary, Treasurer and Director

(Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2051 

To designate methamphetamine as an emerging threat, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 18, 2021 

Mr. PETERS (for himself and Mr. CURTIS) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To designate methamphetamine as an emerging threat, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Methamphetamine Re5 sponse Act of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DECLARATION OF EMERGING THREAT. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Congress declares methamphet8 amine an emerging drug threat, as defined in section 702 

9 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy ReauthorVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 May 18, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2051.IH H2051

pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2051 IH

1 ization Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1701), in the United 

2 States. 

3 (b) REQUIRED EMERGING THREAT RESPONSE

4 PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enact5 ment of this Act, the Director of the Office of National 

6 Drug Control Policy shall establish and implement an 

7 Emerging Threat Response Plan that is specific to meth8 amphetamine in accordance with section 709(d) of the Of9 fice of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act 

10 of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1708(d)). 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 DANIEL R. DUNAGAN,

3 Petitioner-Appellee,

4 v. NO. 29,188 

5 GLORIA CHAVEZ,

6 Respondent-Appellant.

7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRANT COUNTY

8 MIKE MURPHY, District Judge

9 Gloria Chavez

10 Hurley, NM

11 Pro Se Appellant

12 MEMORANDUM OPINION

13 KENNEDY, Judge.

14 Respondent, pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting the petition for

15 dissolution of marriage and dividing the property. We issued a notice of proposed

16 summary disposition, proposing to affirm the district court’s order. In our notice, we

17 stated that the arguments Respondent raises on appeal should have been raised first

18 in district court, including Respondent’s arguments that she was not given notice of

19 the hearing on the petition for dissolution of marriage. [CN 2] We explained that if

20 Respondent wishes to pursue the claims she has raised in the Court, then she may do
2

1 so in district court by seeking relief from the final order. [CN 2-3] We referred

2 Respondent to Rule 1-060-(B) NMRA (permitting parties to seek relief from a

3 judgment on several grounds, including mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect,

4 newly discovered evidence, the judgment is void, etc.) [CN 2-3] Respondent has

5 filed an informal memorandum in opposition to our notice, indicating that she has

6 filed a motion to reconsider the order granting petition for dissolution of marriage in

7 district court. We construe this response as an acceptance of our proposed disposition.

8 Accordingly, we affirm.

9

10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

11 ___________________________________

12 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge

13 WE CONCUR:

14 ___________________________

15 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge

16 ___________________________

17 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A0355. CLARENCE STRICKLAND v. THE STATE.

A jury found Clarence Strickland guilty of aggravated sodomy against his

daughter, and we affirmed his conviction on appeal. See Strickland v. State, 311 Ga.

App. 400 (715 SE2d 798) (2011). Strickland subsequently filed a motion to vacate

a void judgment, which the trial court denied on February 5, 2015. Strickland filed

a notice of appeal from this ruling on April 9, 2015. We lack jurisdiction for two

reasons.

First, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the

appealable order. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice

of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Rowland

v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Because Strickland filed his notice

of appeal 63 days after entry of the trial court’s order, his appeal is untimely.

Second, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an

appropriate remedy in a criminal case.” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) (686

SE2d 786) (2009). Any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion

must be dismissed. See id. at 218 (2); Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 (690 SE2d

150) (2010). A direct appeal may lie from an order denying a motion to vacate or

correct a void sentence, but only if the defendant raises a colorable claim that the

sentence is, in fact, void. See Harper, supra at 217 n.1; Burg v. State, 297 Ga. App.

118, 119 (676 SE2d 465) (2009). “Motions to vacate a void sentence generally are

limited to claimsthat – even assuming the existence and validity of the conviction for

which the sentence was imposed – the law does not authorize that sentence, most

typically because it exceeds the most severe punishment for which the applicable

November 16, 2015
penal statute provides.” von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 572 (2) (748 SE2d 446)

(2013). Thus, when a sentence is within the statutory range of punishment, it is not

void. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004). Here, Strickland does

not argue that his sentence fell outside the permissible statutory range and thus has

notraised a colorable void sentence claim. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this

appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

11/16/2015
#### Harold GOLDMAN and Hattie Goldman, Appellants, v. Herman BODNER, d/b/a Saxon Manor Apartments, Appellees.

No. 72-555.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 15, 1973.

Albert L. Weintraub, Miami, for appellants.

Burnett Roth, Miami Beach, for appel-lees.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and CHARLES CARROLL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs seeking review of a final judgment after a trial without jury before the court. They urge that the trial court erred in making the following findings of fact:

“The testimony is undisputed that sometime in August, 1970, defendant returned from vacation up north and that upon his return received many complaints from the tenants about the condition of the pool, that the pool had not been cleaned for about six (6) weeks. There had been much previous conflict between employer and employees before this incident, according to the plaintiffs. Defendant confronted plaintiffs with these complaints and thereupon MRS. GOLDMAN threw the management keys at defendant and indicated that she and her husband were through with the management of the building; that defendant could manage the building himself, and that they were then quitting, but would remain on the site and complete the books and records until August 31, 1970. On that day they surrendered the records, and rendered no further services.

“The Court finds that plaintiffs voluntarily terminated their employment with defendant, and were not discharged by him. The defendant had no obligation to continue paying the plaintiffs’ salary, and no contractual obligation ever existed to pay any *14car allowance or to provide housing accommodations or their value after August 31, 1970.”

Our review of the record shows that the findings of fact were fully supported by the evidence. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed upon the authority of the rule stated in Read v. Frizzell, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 172.

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Conolog Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert S. Benou Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| | (1) | The Report complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and                         
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Conolog Corporation and will be retained by Conolog Corporation and furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.

|Dated: June 19, 2009 | /s/ Robert S. Benou                                | 
|-------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | 
|                     | Robert S. Benou                                    | 
|                     | Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial | 
|                     | Officer and Treasurer                              | 

The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350. It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.

---
appellant provided no reason why he could not raise his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel in a timely manner. See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252-53, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003). In addition, appellant was informed of his limited right to file a direct appeal in the guilty plea agreement.

Second, appellant claimed he had cause to excuse the delay because he cannot read or write well, he has mental health issues, and it took him a long time to find someone he could trust to help him with legal matters. These were insufficient reasons to demonstrate cause for the delay. See generally Phelps v. Dir., Nev. Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660, 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that petitioner's claim of organic brain damage, borderline mental retardation, and reliance on assistance of inmate law clerk unschooled in the law did not constitute good cause for the filing of a successive post-conviction petition). We also note that appellant was determined to be competent prior to entry of his guilty plea.

Finally, appellant claimed it would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice to impose the procedural bars on his petition. In order to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must make a colorable showing of actual innocence—factual innocence, not legal innocence. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998). Appellant did not demonstrate actual innocence as his claims involved legal innocence, and therefore, he failed to show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of. . . new evidence." Calderon, 523 U.S. at 559 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)); see also Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537; Mazzan v. Warden, 112 Nev. 838, 842, 921 P.2d 920, 922 (1996).

2

# /

Parraguirre

C119 -4 J.

Cherry Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the petition as procedurally barred. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

cc: Hon. Kimberly A. Wanker, District Judge John Koval Nye County District Attorney Attorney General/Carson City Fifth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA
(0) 1947A 

### 3
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<ARTICLE>         5
<MULTIPLIER>      1000
       
<S>                                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                          6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                 JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                      DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                                74
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       6443
<ALLOWANCES>                                         677
<INVENTORY>                                        10568
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   16681
<PP&E>                                             52812
<DEPRECIATION>                                     12611
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     59762
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              17632
<BONDS>                                                0
<COMMON>                                              76
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                        (11747)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       59762
<SALES>                                            51005
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   51005
<CGS>                                              44261
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      47826
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      43
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  3727
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (591)
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (591)
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (591)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (.39)
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</TABLE>