### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 12, 200 5

KEN NET H GA INES v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -24763 Car olyn Wad e Blackett , Judge

No. W2004-01940-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Septem ber 6, 2005

Th e pe tit ion e r, Ke nn e th G a ine s, app e a ls fr om the She lby Cou nty Cr imi na l Court’ s d e nia l of po stconviction re lief. B eca

use we discern no e rror

in the post-conviction court ’s p ro ce eding s and be c a us e the re c or d s up po rt s th a t c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns , w e a ff ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S M I TH and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Robert Wils on J ones, District Public Defe nder; a nd J ohn H. Parke r, I I
, Assistant Public Defe nder, fo r the Ap pe lla nt, Ke nn e th G a ine s.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt At torne y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Stephanie J ohnson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I n this appeal, the pe titioner claims that the post-c o n v ic ti on court e rre d in holding that trial counsel r ender ed ef

fec tive assistance and that his g uiltypleas we re know ing and voluntary

. Pursuant to the petitioner’s g uilty pleas, the Shelby County Criminal Court entered judgme nts on Fe bruary 29, 2000, convicting the petit ioner of, and sentencing him for, se cond deg ree murder a nd two counts of espe cially ag g ravated kidnapping . He r ece ived a 2 5 -y ear sentenc e for

se c on d d e g re e murde r t o r un c on se c uti ve ly

to an a g g re g a te 20 -y e ar s e nte nc e fo r e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping

. The defe ndant filed the petition f or post-conviction re lief now unde r re view on Marc h 5, 2001. I n t he petition, he cla imed that his convictions resulted fr om ineffe ctive assistance of trial counse l. The post-c onviction court appointed c ounsel, who ame nded the pe tition to add a c laim that the defe ndant’s plea was involuntary

or unknow i n g. T h e court conducte d an-2-

evidentiary

hearing and afterwar d enter ed in writing its findings of f act, c onclusions of law, a nd adjudication of de nial of re lief.

I n the evidentiary

hearing, the petitioner testified that he was charg ed along with 14 co-de fenda nts in a g ang -ty pe abduc tion and homicide. Severa l of t he co-defe ndants wer e put on trial and convic ted bef

ore the parties disposed of the petitioner’s case . The pe titioner testified that the
state ’s ple a

of fe r w a s for a n ag g re g a te se nte nc e of 45 y e ars a nd that he b e lie ve d h is r e le a se e lig ibi lit y date would oc cur a fter the service of 70 per cent of the sentenc e. He testified that he was dismay ed to learn tha t his sentence c arried no re lease elig ibilit y date.

Th e pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t he be lie ve d th a t he c ou ld n ot r e c e ive a fair tr ia l be c a us e he wa s “ [y ]oun g , b la c k, [an d] a ff ili a te d [w ith a

g a ng ].” He te sti fi e d that hi s tria l c ou ns e l to ld h im that if he we nt t o tria l, h e wo uld lik e ly re c e ive tw o c on c ur re nt l if e se nte nc e s w ith ou t th e po ssi bil ity of par ole to be ser ved conse cutively to a term of 50 y ear s. The petiti oner thought t hat the state’ s plea offe r of 45 y ear s serve d at 70 per cent would be his best option.

The pe titioner testified that trial counse l failed t o o b tain an expert to cha lleng e the state’s e vidence , particula rly the gun us ed to kill one of the vi ctims. He c omplained that counse l failed to intervie w witnesses. He testified that at the time of the plea, he thought, “I ’m signing for eig hty -five pe rce nt so I ’ll g et g oo d t i m e i n t h e p enit entiary by working . . . .” He testified that he believed the net ef

fec t of reduc tions to his sentenc e would avail him r elea se afte r serving 70 perc ent of his sentenc e. He testified that trial counse l told him he would be elig ible for r elea se upon ser ving 85 perc ent of the s entenc e. He testified that he believed hi s plea ag ree ment “wa s the best dea l at the time” but t h at h e later le arne d that he “shouldn’t [have g iven up his] rights beca use [he] was . . .
y oung and didn’t know no be tter then, didn’t know nothing about no law.”

Th e pe tit ion e r a dmi tte d th a t his tr ia l c ou ns e l c on fe rr e d w ith him a ndpr ov ide d h im wi th c op ie s o f d oc ume nts fi le d in the c a se

. He c omp la ine d, ho we ve r, that he ha d g ive n c ou ns e l a lis t of qu e sti on s to a sk

a t tria l a ndthat c ou ns e l “ c ha ng e d th e m aro un d” a nd“ pu t [th e m] lik e in h is

ow n w or ds .” He op ine d that tr ia l c ou ns e l “ c ou ld ha ve pr e se nte d the c a se

. . . b e tte r, sh ow [n] in te re st in my case , investigated my case better, more thoroug hly .” Stil l, the petitioner testified, “ I fee l that he wa s – he wa s g ivi ng me his be st a dv ic e wi th be ing able to

. . . g e t a c ha nc e to s e e the str e e ts a g a in one day at the time.”

The pe titioner testified that he believed he was convicted sole ly upon his “aff

iliation” with the G a n g s te r

D is c ip le s

. H e a ls o c laim e d th a t b e c a u s e h e h a d r e s ig n e d f r o m th e G a n g ster Disciples while his trial was pe nding, he felt threatened by g ang members a nd by

the news that a

codefe ndant had be en stabbe d in the penitentiary . He testified that he did not rec eive the benef icent plea of fer that his co-def

endants re ceive d.

On c ro ss- e xami na tio n, the pe tit ion e r a dmi tte d th a t t ri a l c o un se l vi sit e d h im i n th e ja il, pr ov ide d h im w ith c op ie s o f the state ’s re sp on se s to di sco very req ue sts , a nddis c us se d w ith him

“ dif fe re nt o pti on s” fo r d e fe nd ing the c ha rg e s. He fu rthe r a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he g a ve c ou ns e l on ly-3-

the names of

people who c ould serve a s char acte r wit nesses; he proposed no “fa ct” witnesses. He admitted that counsel wa s awa re of the ex pecte d testimony from prosecution witnesses. He admitted that he a ns we re d a ff

ir ma tiv e ly

to the tr ia l judge’s que sti on s a bo ut w he the r h is g uil ty

ple a a ndhis waiver of trial rig hts w ere voluntary . When asked a bout severa l passag es in the g uiltyplea he aring
transcript that refe rre d to 100 perc ent of ser vice of the proposed sentenc e, the pe titioner testified that he did not hear

the re fer ence s because he w as not listening. The petiti oner admitted that he pleade d g uiltyon the first day

schedule d for tria l and that his counsel wa s rea dy for tria l at that time.

Trial counse l testified that all of the c o-def endants who w ere tried bef ore the petitioner’s trial date wer e convicted. Counsel r epre sented the pe titioner in the preliminary hearing

a n d th r o u g h th e g u il ty p le a

. The victim who survived th e c o

- d efe ndants’ attac k testified at the preliminary

hearing. When the pe titioner’s case went to criminal court, counsel obtaine d discovery

m at er i al s f

ro mt h e s t at e, an d t h e t ri al co u rt ap p o i n t ed an i n v es t i gat o r t o as s i s th i mi n p re p ar i n g a defe nse. Copies of the doc uments g arne red by the def ense w ere g iven to th e petitioner, a nd the petitioner sig ned a r ece ipt for them. These materia ls included a tr an s cr i p t o f the pe titioner’s preliminary

hearing a nd transcripts of previous trials of som e of the co-defe ndants. Counsel testified that he a lso g a ve the pe tit ion e r c op ie s o f s ta te me nts of pr os e c uti on wi tne sse s a ndof c o- de fe nd a nts in the case . Counsel testified that he made 17 trips to the jail to vis it the petitioner, and the investigator visited the petitioner at the ja il two or three times. Counsel also met with the petitioner
at the courthouse when hearings or appea ranc es wer e set. Counsel r eca lled that, i n ea ch m ee t ing with the petitioner, he “ updated him as to the prog ress of the investigator and the information that [counsel] had . . . re ceive d from the [s] tate.”

Couns el testified that he wa s prepa red to g o to trial on the schedule d date. Con c e rn ing the iss ue of

the pe tit ioner ’s g a ng inv olv e me nt, c ou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe ns e investigator i n t er viewed the defe ndant’s propose d char acte r witnesses. Althoug h counsel wa s pr e pa re d to c a ll c ha

ra c te r w itn e sse s, he e xpre sse d c on c e rn to the pe tit ion e r t hat th e ta c tic wo uld “open the door for

the [s] tate to put on bad chara cter proof, and there wer e som e thing s on his recor d that would not ha ve otherwise come into the trial but f or the door being open.” Counsel testified that the petitioner provide d the names of no witnesses other tha n potential char acte r witnesses.

Counsel testified that pri o r t o t h e t rial date , the state’s only offe r ca lled for a

life

se nte nc e wi th the po ssi bil ity of pa ro le . Co un se l a dv ise d th e pe tit ion e r that su c h a se nte nc e wo uld

e nta il s e rv ing 51 y e ars be fo re be ing e lig ibl e fo r p aro le . O n th e da y of tr ia l, the tw o c o- de fe nd a nts wh o w e re g oin g to t

ri a l w ith the pe tit ion e r p le a de d g uil ty

. Cou ns e l a ndthe pr os e c uto r e ng a g e d in plea ba rg aining , resulting in the s t at e’ s o ffer to ac cept a n ag g reg ate se ntence of 45 y ear s, which

c ou ns e l r e la y e d to the pe tit ion e r. Cou ns e l tes tif ie d th a t he e xpla ine d to the pe tit ion e r that be c a us e the proposed c onviction offense s of sec ond deg ree murder and espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping are violent offense s, h e wo u l d be re quired to ser ved 100 per cent of the ag g reg ate se ntence . Counsel emphatica lly

opined that the petitioner “ went in under standing ” the 10 0 p er cent feature of the

se nte nc e . Co un se l te sti fi e d th a t, be fo re ple a din g , the pe tit ion e r d isc us se d th e ple a pr op os a l w ith his g randmother

and dec ided to acc ept the off er. I n the evidentiary hearing, c ounsel introduced c opies of the ple a do c ume nts, whi c h r e fl e c te d th a t 10 0 p e rc e nt o f the se nte nc e mus t be se rv e d in-4-

confine ment. Counse l t est ified that he r eviewe d the plea pe tition and waiver w ith the petitioner “ver batim, rea d it line by line, asked him did he unde rstand ea ch par ag raph.” Counsel said that he revie wed the filled-out judgme nt f orms with the petitioner in the same ma nner. Counsel pointed out that the judg ments included provisions for the 100 perc ent s ervic e of the s entenc es. C ounsel opined that the petitioner fully

understood the de tails of the plea a g ree ment.

On cr oss-examination, counsel testified that he wa s fa m iliar with the expected testimonyof prose cution witnes s es beca use he ha d repr esente d the petitioner in his preliminary hearing a nd either he or t he investi g ator attended t he trials of co-defe ndants. Counsel stated that the investigator followed up on inconsistenc ies in w itnesses’ testimony as re veale d in the series of court proce eding s.

Counsel ack n o wl ed ged t h at t h ro u gh o u tt h e p en d en cyo f t he proc eeding s the petitioner

was conce rned about reprisals f rom the Gang ster Disciples. Counsel r ecounte d that, afte r the plea was submitted and acce pted, t he petiti oner told hi m about an individual being attacke d by Gang ster Disciples in a particular c orre ctional facility

. Counsel testified t hat he obtained an order from the trial judg e to have the petitioner inca rce rate d at a diff

ere nt fac ility

. Subsequent to the ev identiary hearing, the post-conviction court entere d an orde r expressing its finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law a nd deny ing post-c onviction r elief. The c ourt found that trial counse l fully advised the petitioner during the cour se of his ca se and f urnished the petitioner with transc ripts and documents obtained throug h the discovery proce ss. The court found that tria l c ou ns e l tho ro ug hly app ri se d the pe tit ion e r of the na tur e of the c ha rg e s, the rang e of

po ssi ble sanctions, the available theories of defe nse, and the probabilities of results. Essentially
, t h e c o urt determined that counsel did not perf orm defic iently in failing to advise a nd counsel the pe titioner.

I n addition, the post-conviction court found that counsel, throug h his own eff orts and those of an investigator, thoroug hly investigated the ca se and pr epar ed it for tria l. The court found that counsel wa s fully

prepa red f or trial. The court discerne d no defic iency of counse l’s perf

ormanc e in investiga ting a nd prepa ring the petitioner’s c ase.

The court further found t hat t he petiti oner did not car ry his burden of e stablishing that counsel did not ade quately explain the terms of the plea ag ree ment. The court determined that trial counsel a nd the t rial j udg e fully acqua inted the petit ioner with the t erms of the ag ree ment, including the mandatory

provision for ser ving 100 pe rce nt of the sentenc e.
The post-c onviction court then a ddre s sed the pe titioner’s claim that his plea wa s involuntary

or unknowing . The c ourt first found that the pe t i t i o n er f ailed to establish that he wa s misinformed about his rele ase e ligibility date. The judge cited the various written notations in the ple a pa pe rs a ndthe jud g me nts tha t c or re c tly re fe rr e d to the 10 0 p e rc e nt- of -s e rv ic e re qu ir e me nt. Additionally , the court found no basis for c oncluding that the petitioner was uninformed about the
nature of the char g es ag ainst him a nd the applicable minimum and maxi mum pe nalties provided by law. The post-conviction court determined that the trial judg e ade quately in fo rm ed the petitioner-5-

of these a spects of the char g es during the pl ea colloquy

. The court held t hat t he petiti oner’ s plea wa s based upon a

full comprehe nsion o f t h e ri gh t s he wa s waiving and wa s, theref ore, know ing a nd

v o l u n t ar y.

A post-conviction petitioner bear s the burden of establishing, at t h e e v i d entiary hearing, his alleg ations by clea r and convincing evidenc e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-210(f ) (2003)

. Ev ide nc e is c le ar a ndc on vin c ing wh e n th e re is n o s e ri ou s o r s ub sta nti a l do ub t a bo ut the c or

re c tne ss of the conclusions draw n from the evidenc e. Hodges v . S.C. Toof & Co.
, 833 S.W .2d 896, 901, n.3 (Tenn. 1992) . An appe llate court is bound by the trial court’s finding s of fa ct unless it concludes that the ev i dence in the rec ord pre ponderates ag ainst those finding s. Hi c k s v . S tat e , 983 S.W .2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.

The Six th A mendment of the United States Consti tution and Article I , section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constitution bot h require that a def endant in a c riminal case rec eive e ffe ctive assistance of counse l. B a x t e r v . R os e , 52 3 S .W .2 d 9 30 (T e nn . 1 97 5) . Wh e n a de fe nd a nt c la ims ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel, the standa rd applied by

the courts of Tenne ssee is “w hether the advice g iven or the se rvice rende red by the attorne y is within the rang e of competenc e dema nded by attorney s in criminal case s.” Hicks
, 9 8 3 S

. W

. 2 d at 2 4 5 (q u o t i n g Su mm e rlin v . S tat e , 607 S.W .2d 495, 496 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) ).

I n Strickland v. W

ashington
, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), the U nited States Supreme Court def

ined the Six t h Am en d m en t rig ht to effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. First, the

app e lla nt mus t show that c ou ns e l’ s p e rf orma nc e fe ll b e low a n o bje c tiv e sta nd ardof re a so na ble ne ss under pr evailing profe ssional norms and must de monstrate that counsel made err ors so serious that he was not functioning as “counsel” gua rante ed by

the Constitut ion. Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Second, the pe titione r must show that counsel’s per formanc e pre judiced him, that the er

rors we re so serious as to depr i v e t h e d efendant of a fair trial, and ca ll into questi on the re liabilityof the
outcome. Id.

A r e v i e w i n g c o u r tm u s ti n d u l g e a s tr o n g p r e s u m p t i o n t h a tc o u n s e l ’ s c o n d u c tf a lls within t h e r an ge o f r ea s o n ab l e p ro fe s s i o n al as s i s t an ce an d m u s tev al u at e c o u n s el ’s perf ormanc e fr om counsel’s pe rspec tive at the ti me of the allege d err or and in light of the totalityof the e vidence

. Id.

a t 69 5, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 20 70

. Th e pe tit ion e r mus t de mon str a te that th e re is a re a so na ble pr ob abil ity that bu t f or c ou ns e l’ s d e fi c ie nt p e rf

or ma nc e , th e re su lt of

the pr oc e e din g wo uldha ve be e n d if fe re nt. Id ., 104 S. Ct . at 2070.

To establish ineff

ective assistance of counsel in Tennesse e, evide nce ste mming fr om

a fa ilu re to pr e pa

re a so un d de fe ns e or pr e se nt wit ne sse s must be sig nif ic a nt. Ho we ve r, a

re a so na ble probability

of being found g uiltyof a le sser c harg e, or a shorter se ntence , sat isfies the pre judice require ment of Strickland

. Hicks , 983 S.W .2d at 246.

I n case s involving a g uiltyplea or plea of no lo c on te nd

e re , the petitioner must show pr e jud ic e by de mon str a tin g that, b ut f

or c ou ns e l’ s er

ro rs , he wo uld no t ha ve ple a de d g uil ty bu t w ou ld-6-

have insisted upon g oing to tria l. Se e Hi ll v . Lo c k ha rt , 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985); Hicks , 983 S.W .2d at 246.

I n the pre sent ca se, the re cord supports the trial court’s conclusions that trial counsel did not perform deficie ntly . I ndeed, upon our revie w of the r ecor d, we c onclude that tria l counsel rende red a

high le vel of pe rformance . The pe titioner utterly failed to de monstr at e ineffec tive assistance of counse l.

We now addre ss the petitioner’s c laim that his pleas wer e not voluntarily and k n o w i n g l y m a d e

. C e r t a i n l y, w h e n a d e f e n d a n to p t s t o p l e a d g u i l t y , t h e p l e a m u s tb e v o l u n t ar i l y, understanding ly , and knowing ly enter ed to pass constit utional muster. Boyk in v. Alabama , 3 95 U. S. 23 8, 24 4, 89 S. Ct . 1 70 9, 17 13 (1 96 9) . I n T e nn e sse e , a ple a mus t be ma de vo lun tari ly a ndwi th f

ull understanding of its conseque nces. State v. Neal
, 810 S.W .2d 131, 134-35 (Te nn. 1991), overruled in p ar t on oth e r grou nd

s by Bl an k e ns hip v . S tat e , 8 97 S.W. 2d90 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; State ex re l. Barnes v. He nderson , 220 Tenn. 719, 727, 423 S.W .2d 497, 501 (1968). Entry of a g uiltyplea c onstitut es

a wa ive r o f c on sti tut ion a l r ight s in c lud ing the privi le g e a g a ins t se lf -i nc ri min a tio n, the ri g ht t o confr ont witnes s es , an d t he rig ht to a trial by jury

. Boy k in , 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S. Ct . at 1714. Waiver of these constitutional rights m ay n o t b e p resumed from a silent re cord. Id. ; Hicks , 983 S.W .2d at 246.

I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e iss ue of the va lid ity

of the g uil ty ple a is narr ow e d to a c la im that the conviction court did not fully advise the petitioner pursuant to the provisions of Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Specifica lly
, the petitioner claims that the conviction court did not apprise him that he mig ht be ac quitted at trial, fa i l ed t o ex plain the minimum and max imum

se nte nc e s p ro vid e d b y

la w, a ndfa ile d to ex plai n th a t hi s c on vic tio n w ou ld s e rv e to e nh a nc e his punishment should he later be convicted of another crime.

I n determining w h et h er a plea of g uiltywas voluntarily , understanding ly , and intelligently

enter ed, this court, li ke the trial court, must consider all of the re levant cir cumstance s that exis ted at the e ntry of the plea. State v. Turner , 919 S.W .2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. A r e vie wi ng c ou rt

may loo k to a ny

rel evan t evi de nc e in the re c or d to de te rm ine the vo lun tari ne ss of the plea

. Id. Rule 11 of the Te nnessee Rules of Cri m i n al P ro cedure a nd our supre me court’s decisions in State v. Mac key
, 553 S.W .2d 337 (Tenn. 1977) , and State v. Mc Clint ock , 732 S.W .2d 268 (Tenn. 1987) , control the g uilty plea proce ss in Tenne ssee. Trial judg es ar e re quired to adhe re

su bs ta nti a lly to the pr oc e du re pr e sc ri be d in the ru le . A su bmi ssi on he ari ng tr a ns c ri pt mus t e sta bli sh

on its fac e that the t rial court substantially complied wit h the requirements of Rule 11 and Boy k in v. Alabama and the tea ching s of Mackey and McClintock

. See Turner , 919 S.W .2d at 352.

As mentioned above the fe dera l constituti on require s that a guilty plea be knowing and voluntary

. Se e ge ne ra lly Boy k in , 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S. Ct . at 1712. “To be voluntary [t he plea ]

mus t be kn ow le dg e able a ndthe failu re to p ro pe rl y ins truc t a de fe nd a nt i s a viol a tio n of d ue pr oc e ss and the g uilt y p l ea i s void.” State v. Newsome , 778 S.W .2d 34, 35 (Tenn. 1989) . The constitutionallyrequire d instructions, however , rela te to the waive r of c erta in “fe dera l constituti onal-7-

rig hts,” namely , the privileg e ag ainst compulsory self-inc rimination, the rig ht to a jury trial, and the rig ht to confront the a ccusing witnesses. Boy k in , 3 95 U. S. at 24 3, 89 S. Ct . at 17 12 ; Neal , 810 S.W .2d at 135.

I n Mackey , a dire ct appe al of a conviction bas ed u p o n a g uiltyplea, the T ennesse e Supreme Court, in an e x erc ise of i ts “super visory power to insure that the courts of this State affor d fa ir ne ss a ndjus tic e to d e fe nd a nts in c ri min al cas e s, ” pr omu lg a te d a pr oc e du re fo r t

ri a l c ou rt s to follow when a cce pting g uiltypleas. See M acke y , 553 S.W .2d at 340. The c ourt ac knowledg ed that the litany of instructions contained in the proce dure were “stricter standards than those mandate d by

. . . Boy k in .” Id. This litany includes instructions on the mandatory minimum and the maximum possi b l e penalties whic h the ac cused f ace s and advic e on the possibilitythat punishment may be based upon a

consideration of prior convic tions. Id. at 341.

M a n y , b u t n o t a ll
, o f the Mack ey g uil ty ple a re qu ir e me nts are no w s e t f orth i n Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 11( c). H oweve r, the thre e basic waiver issues that were identified in Boy k in – the privileg e ag ainst compulsory self-inc rimination a nd the rig hts to a jury trial

a ndto c on fr on t w itn e sse s – c on tin ue to b e the to uchsto ne fo r c on sti tut ion a l c on c e rn s a bo ut g uil ty pleas. See, e .g., State v. Prince , 781 S.W. 2d 84 6, 85 2 (T e nn . 1 98 9) ; Be ntl ey v . S tat e , 938 S.W .2d 706, 711 (Tenn. C ri m. App. 1996), ov e rru le d o n o the r g ro un ds by Sta te v . W e st , 19 S.W .3d 753 (Tenn. 2000). The additional proce dural requireme nts set forth in Rule 11, Mackey and McClintock do not raise “issue[s] of constit utional dimensions.” Prince
, 78 1 S. W.2 d a t 85 2; see also Bryan v

. Sta te , 848 S.W .2d 72, 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Thus, the pe titioner’s instant complaints about his g uilty pleas a

re ba sed upon non-c onstitut ional elements of Mackey

. See Ne al
, 810 S.W .2d at 138 (fa iling to warn that “the r esulting judg ment of convic tion may be used in a

subsequent proc eeding
to en ha nc e the pu nis hme nt” do e s not ra ise a ma tte r of c on sti tut ion a l c on c e rn ); Prince
, 781 S.W .2d

a t 85 3 ( statin g that a dv ic e abo ut the “ fu tur e us e of prior c on vic tio ns a nd the fu tur e us e of the c a se

un de r c on sid e ratio n .

. . is not ba se d upo n an y c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on ” ); Bryan , 848 S.W .2d at 75 (stating that advice about minimum and max imum punis hments is not constitutionally based) . As such, these c omplaints are not justiciable in a post -convic tion procee ding. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 ( 2003) (e stablishing constitutional violations as the sole bases f or post-convic tion relief) ; W i l l s v

. S tate , 85 9 S .W.2d30 8, 31 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; McClintock , 7 32 S.W. 2da t 27 1; Bryan , 848 S.W .2d at 75.

Acc ording ly , the petitioner’s claims that the conviction court inadequate ly advised h i mp u rs u an tt o R u l e 1 1 (c ) a re n o tco gn i z ab l e i n t h i s p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n p ro ce ed i n g.

F or the r e a s o n s e xp l a i n e d ab o v e , th e j u d g m e n to f t h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c o u r tis aff irmed.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE