J-S51035-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellee : 

: 

v. : 

: 

DENNIS STEVEN BARNA, : 

: 

Appellant : No. 7 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on November 14, 2013 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Union County, 

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-60-CR-0000089-2008; 

CP-60-CR-0000162-2003; CP-60-CR-0000353-2005 

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014 

Dennis Steven Barna (“Barna”) appeals from the Order dismissing his 

first Petition for relief, filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), challenging the trial court’s purported error in failing to credit him 

with time served when sentencing him on his underlying convictions. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

 On April 5, 2006, Barna pled guilty at docket number 162-2003 (“No. 

162-2003”) to driving under the influence of alcohol, after which the trial 

court sentenced him to two days to six months in the Union County Prison, 

plus eighteen months of probation. On the same day, Barna pled guilty at 

docket number 353-2005 (“No. 353-2005”) to bad checks, after which the 

trial court sentenced him to a consecutive term of six months to one year in 
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prison, plus three years of probation. Barna was subsequently released from 

prison on parole/probation. 

 On January 9, 2007, police learned that Barna had committed 

technical violations of his parole/probation, and they took him into custody 

and incarcerated him in the Union County Prison. On April 11, 2007, the 

trial court revoked Barna’s parole at No. 353-2005, gave him credit for the 

ninety-one days that he had been incarcerated, and resentenced him to 

serve the balance of his underlying maximum sentence of one year in prison. 

Barna was subsequently released on parole in June 2007. 

On March 7, 2008, Barna was arrested and charged at docket number 

89-2008 (“No. 89-2008”) with several offenses, including burglary and theft 

by unlawful taking. In response, by an Order entered on April 23, 2008, the 

trial court revoked Barna’s probation at No. 162-2003, resentenced him to 

serve six to eighteen months in the Union County Prison, and gave him 

credit for forty-six days that he had served toward this sentence.1

Over five years later, Barna, pro se, filed his first PCRA Petition, 

alleging a claim of newly discovered facts – in the nature of new information 

showing that he did not receive proper credit for time he had served at No. 

162-2003 in the Union County Prison. On October 15, 2013, the PCRA court 

gave Barna Notice of its intent to dismiss his PCRA Petition without a 

 

1 Regarding Barna’s guilty plea at No. 89-2008 to the charge of theft by 

unlawful taking, the trial court sentenced Barna to serve eight months to five 

years in prison, consecutive to the probation revocation sentence imposed at 

No. 162-2003. 
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hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and issued an Opinion explaining its 

reasons for determining that Barna had failed to meet the requirements of 

the newly discovered facts exception. Barna filed a pro se response. On 

November 14, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed Barna’s Petition as untimely, 

after which Barna timely filed a Notice of Appeal. 

On appeal, Barna presents the following issues for our review: 

I. Whether the [PCRA] court erred when it summarily 

denied the issues raised in the PCRA Petition without 

an evidentiary hearing? 

II. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error 

when it failed to address whether [] Barna was 

entitled to credit for time previously served prior to

sentencing? 

Brief for Appellant at 7 (capitalization omitted). We will address Barna’s 

related issues simultaneously. 

In reviewing a challenge to an order dismissing a PCRA petition, our 

standard of review is “whether the determination of the PCRA court is 

supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Gandy, 38 A.3d 899, 902 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

Under the PCRA, any PCRA petition must be filed within one year of 

the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in 

nature and a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the 

PCRA petition was not timely filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 

1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010). 
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Where, as here, a PCRA petitioner challenges the legality of his 

sentence by asserting that he was not awarded credit for time served, this is 

a cognizable claim under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Beck, 848 A.2d 

987, 989 (Pa. Super. 2004). However, the petitioner must still meet the 

jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA or one of the exceptions 

thereto. Id.

Although Barna concedes that his PCRA Petition is facially untimely, he 

asserts that he has met the requirements of the “newly discovered facts” 

exception to the PCRA’s time limitation. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

(providing that a PCRA petitioner may file a petition after the expiration of 

the one-year time bar if the petitioner can plead and prove that “the facts 

upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could 

not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(stating that “[d]ue diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable 

steps to protect his own interests.”). “The focus of the exception is on the 

newly-discovered facts, not a newly discovered or newly willing source for 

previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 

(Pa. 2008). “[The Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has addressed the meaning 

of ‘facts’ as that term is employed in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) and held that, to 

constitute such ‘facts,’ the information may not be part of the public record.” 

Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 352 (Pa. 2013) (citation 
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omitted). The requirement that the petitioner must explain why he could 

not have obtained the new fact(s) earlier with due diligence is strictly 

enforced. Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1216 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (en banc) (citation omitted). Finally, any PCRA petition invoking one 

of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time limitation must be filed within 

sixty days of the date that the claim could have been presented. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

 Barna argues that the probation revocation court at No. 162-2003 

erred in failing to credit him for time that he had served toward that case in 

the Union County Prison between January 9, 2007, and June 19, 2007, 

which, Barna asserts, was not applied to any of the other sentences that he 

was serving. See Brief for Appellant at 15-17; see also PCRA Petition, 

10/7/13, at 3-4. Barna maintains that he first discovered that he was not 

credited with the time in question when he allegedly received a letter from 

the Snyder County Prison in August 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the 

Snyder Prison Letter”).2

 According to Barna, the Snyder Prison Letter 

included a separate letter addressed to him from the Union County 

Prothonotary’s Office (hereinafter referred to as “the Union County Letter”), 

dated December 3, 2010, which merely stated that Barna had been 

 

2

 We observe that the Snyder Prison Letter, which Barna attached to his 

PCRA Petition, consists only of a handwritten note, on which Barna himself 

had also written, as well as a copy of an envelope addressed to Barna from 

the Snyder County Prison, date-stamped August 14, 2013. See PCRA 

Petition 10/7/13, Exhibit B. 
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incarcerated in the Union County Prison between January 9, 2007, and June 

19, 2007. Id.; see also PCRA Petition 10/7/13, Exhibit C. Additionally, 

Barna maintains that he filed his PCRA Petition within sixty days of receiving 

the Snyder Prison Letter. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-6.

 Barna has failed to explain why he could not have learned of the 

purported lack of credit for time served earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence. Not only was the amount of time that he served in the Union 

County Prison a matter within Barna’s personal knowledge, but this 

information was also part of the public record. See Edmiston, supra

(stating that a petitioner cannot meet the newly discovered facts exception 

fails if the “facts” were part of the public record).3

 

Nevertheless, even if Barna had established the newly discovered facts 

exception, our review of the certified record shows that he was credited at 

No. 353-2005 with the time he served in the Union County Prison between 

January 9, 2007, and April 11, 2007.4

 See Probation Revocation Court 

Order, 4/13/07, at ¶ 3. Barna was not entitled to have this time also 

credited toward his sentence at No. 162-2003. See Commonwealth v. 

 

3

 Moreover, Barna received the Union County Letter in December 2010, but 

he never raised a claim that he was not credited with the time referenced in 

that letter until nearly three years later. Accordingly, Barna failed to file a 

PCRA Petition invoking the newly discovered facts exception within sixty 

days after receiving the Union County Letter, as required by section 

9545(b)(2). 

4

 Barna fails to acknowledge in his brief that the trial court revoked his 

parole at No. 353-2005. 
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Davis, 852 A.2d 392, 400 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating that a defendant is 

entitled to credit only once for presentence detainment). Additionally, Barna 

was released on parole, at No. 353-2005, on June 19, 2007, and, therefore, 

the time he served in prison between April 11, 2007, and June 19, 2007, 

was applied toward his sentence at No. 353-2005. See Commonwealth’s 

Motion to Revoke Defendant’s Probation/Parole (No. 353-2005), 3/19/07, 

Exhibit C. 

Accordingly, because (1) Barna’s PCRA Petition is facially untimely and 

he has failed to meet his burden of proof with regard to the newly 

discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time limitation; and (2) we discern 

no illegality in Barna’s sentence, we conclude that the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Barna’s PCRA Petition without a hearing. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/26/2014