[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 233 (Thursday, December 4, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64237-64239]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-31797]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket 70-7002]


Amendment to Certificate of Compliance GDP-2 for the U.S. 
Enrichment Corporation, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Portsmouth, 
OH

    The Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, has 
made a determination that the following amendment request is not 
significant in accordance with 10 CFR 76.45. In making that 
determination, the staff concluded that: (1) There is no change in the 
types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may 
be released offsite; (2) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative occupational radiation exposure; (3) there is no 
significant construction impact; (4) there is no significant increase 
in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, 
previously analyzed accidents; (5) the proposed changes do not result 
in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident; (6) there is 
no significant reduction in any margin of safety; and (7) the proposed 
changes will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of 
the plant's safety, safeguards, or security programs. The basis for 
this determination for the amendment request is described below.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the certificate amendment application 
and concluded that it provides reasonable assurance of adequate safety, 
safeguards, and security and compliance with NRC requirements. 
Therefore, the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards, is prepared to issue an amendment to the Certificate of 
Compliance for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS). The 
staff has prepared a Compliance Evaluation Report which provides 
details of the staff's evaluation.
    The NRC staff has determined that this amendment satisfies the 
criteria for a categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. 
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact 
statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for this 
amendment.
    USEC or any person whose interest may be affected may file a 
petition, not exceeding 30 pages, requesting review of the Director's 
Decision. The petition must be filed with the Commission not later than 
15 days after publication of this Federal Register Notice. A petition 
for review of the Director's Decision shall set forth with 
particularity the interest of the petitioner and how that interest may 
be affected by the results of the decision. The petition should 
specifically explain the reasons why review of the Decision should be 
permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) The 
interest of the petitioner; (2) how that interest may be affected by 
the Decision, including the reasons why the petitioner should be 
permitted a review of the Decision; and (3) the petitioner's areas of 
concern about the activity that is the subject matter of the Decision. 
Any person described in this paragraph (USEC or any person who filed a 
petition) may file a response to any petition for review, not to exceed 
30 pages, within 10 days after filing of the petition. If no petition 
is received within the designated 15-day period, the Director will 
issue the final amendment to the Certificate of Compliance without 
further delay. If a petition for review is received, the decision on 
the amendment application will become

[[Page 64238]]

final in 60 days, unless the Commission grants the petition for review 
or otherwise acts within 60 days after publication of this Federal 
Register Notice.
    A petition for review must be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or may be 
delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date.
    For further details with respect to the action see: (1) The 
application for amendment and (2) the Commission's Compliance 
Evaluation Report. These items are available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L 
Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the Local Public Document Room.
    Date of amendment request: July 1, 1997.
    Brief description of amendment: On July 1, 1997, United States 
Enrichment Corporation (USEC) submitted a request to revise Issue 3 of 
the Plan for Achieving Compliance with NRC Regulations at the 
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (Compliance Plan) and Chapter 3 of 
the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The proposed amendment corrects 
statements made in Issue 3 of the Compliance Plan and Chapter 3 of the 
SAR which incorrectly depict the Autoclave Locking Ring Interlock 
System as having two redundant pressure ``switches'' set at +0.5 psig 
to prevent the autoclave from being inadvertently opened while under 
pressure. In fact, the autoclaves have always had only one ``switch'' 
set at +0.5 psig.
    The existing Commitments section of Issue 3 of the Compliance Plan 
states:
    ``In addition to the safety systems summarized above, the following 
systems and limits are present to enhance safety:

    <bullet> The Locking Ring Interlock contains pressure limit 
switches which interlock with the hydraulic system to prevent 
opening the autoclave shell while under pressure (above 0.5 psig). 
Although only * * * ''

    USEC has proposed to replace the phrase ``pressure limit switches'' 
with ``a pressure limit switch.''
    The existing Justification for Continued Operation section of Issue 
3 of the Compliance Plan states:

    4. * * * alarm condition. Also, the autoclave locking ring 
interlock contains pressure limit switches which lock out the 
hydraulics to prevent the autoclaves from being opened when the 
internal pressure is greater than 0.5 psig. The autoclave * * *

    USEC has proposed to replace the phrase ``pressure limit switches 
which lock'' with ``a pressure limit switch which locks.''
    Accordingly, the pertinent SAR Chapter 3 sections have also been 
modified to address this oversight made when the initial certificate 
application was submitted.
    PORTS uses thirteen cylindrical (6, 7, and 8 foot diameter) steam 
autoclaves in buildings X-342, X-343 and X-344 to feed, transfer and 
sample UF6 contained in cylinders. These autoclaves were designed and 
constructed in accordance with ASME Section VIII and provide safety by 
confining UF6 and any reaction products in the event of a major UF6 
release inside an autoclave. Steam used to heat UF6 cylinders within 
autoclaves is typically controlled at approximately 5 psig. This 
pressure differential between the autoclave and the outside environment 
is maintained by way of a locking ring between the autoclave's 
hydraulically mobile shell and fixed head. An Autoclave Locking Ring 
Interlock (ALRI) system, which permits steam to be supplied to an 
autoclave only while it is closed, also contains a pressure switch set 
at -0.5 psig, which prevents the opening of an autoclave while it has 
an internal pressure greater than 0.5 psig. This system protects 
workers, who may be located in close proximity to the autoclave, from 
steam burns and possible contamination, in the event an autoclave is 
inadvertently opened while its internal pressure is greater than 0.5 
psig. This pressure switch is considered to be important to safety. The 
ALRI system includes another pressure switch set at -0.5 psig to 
prevent possible damage to the autoclave hydraulic system if the 
autoclave is opened at a significant internal vacuum. This pressure 
switch is not considered to be important to safety.
    Basis for finding of no significance:
    1. The proposed amendment will not result in a change in the types 
or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite.
    The ALRI is designed to protect workers, from exposures to UF6 and 
the products of its reaction with steam, while they are in close 
proximity to a closed autoclave. Such exposures could only occur 
following an inadvertent opening of the autoclave while it is 
pressurized with UF6 and its reaction products resulting from a UF6 
release accident in a closed autoclave. In addition, the ALRI is 
designed to protect workers from steam burns while they are in close 
proximity to an inadvertently opened autoclave that was pressurized 
with steam.
    USEC has identified the ALRI systems, including the pressure 
switches and control relays, as Augmented Quality (AQ) systems. As 
such, USEC is required to apply a high level of quality control 
(portions of ASME NQA-1) as committed to in the Quality Assurance Plan. 
Application of additional QA requirements to the ALRI augments the 
reliability of the system (no such failure events have been reported 
since March 3, 1997). In addition, the interlocks are fail safe in that 
while the autoclave is closed, an electrical interruption to the 
interlock would cause the pressure switch contact and the control relay 
contact to remain open, which in turn would deactivate the hydraulic 
system keeping the locking ring from disengaging.
    The UF6 containment boundaries provided by the cylinder, pigtail 
and valves inside an autoclave, and steam and UF6 reaction product 
confinement boundaries provided by the autoclave shell and piping and 
valves out to and including the second containment valve, are 
designated as ``Q'' systems. As such, USEC is required to apply the 
highest level of quality control (ASME NQA-1) to ensure that the 
pressure boundaries within these systems are maintained. Taking into 
consideration the applicable safety requirements (administrative and 
installed hardware) for preventing and/or mitigating UF6 releases 
associated with autoclaves, and past operational history at PORTS, the 
staff concludes that a major accidental release of UF6 inside a closed 
autoclave is highly unlikely. However, if such an accident were to 
occur, the pressure rise inside the autoclave would activate the 
autoclave containment system and the operators would be promptly 
alerted. Small releases of UF6 are also unlikely to occur in a closed 
autoclave. However, in the event of a small release, the condensate 
conductivity monitoring cells, which are not considered as important to 
safety but rather as enhancements to safety, would also activate the 
autoclave containment system and the operators would be promptly 
alerted.
    The staff has concluded that having a single pressure switch in the 
ALRI set at +0.5 psig, which has always been the operating condition at 
PORTS, as opposed to having redundant pressure switches, which is 
indicated in USEC's Compliance Plan and SAR approved by the NRC, will 
not significantly increase the risk of an inadvertent release of UF6, 
or of the products of its reaction with steam, from the autoclave. 
Therefore, this amendment will not result in a

[[Page 64239]]

significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts 
of any effluents that may be released offsite.
    2. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase 
in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
    For the reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the 
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a UF6 
release. Therefore, having a single pressure switch in the ALRI set at 
+0.5 psig, as opposed to having redundant pressure switches, will not 
result in a significant increase in individual or cumulative 
occupational radiation exposures.
    3. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant 
construction impact.
    The proposed amendment does not involve any construction, 
therefore, there will be no construction impacts.
    4. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant increase 
in the potential for, or radiological or chemical consequences from, 
previously analyzed accidents.
    For the reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the 
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a 
release of UF6 or of the products of its reaction with steam. 
Therefore, having a single pressure switch in the ALRI set at +0.5 
psig, as opposed to having redundant pressure switches, will not result 
in a significant increase in the potential for, or radiological or 
chemical consequences from, previously analyzed accidents.
    5. The proposed amendment will not result in the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident.
    Based on the staff's review of the proposed amendment, no new or 
different accidents were identified.
    6. The proposed amendment will not result in a significant 
reduction in any margin of safety.
    For the reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the 
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a 
release of UF6 or of the products of its reaction with steam. Based on 
the staff's review of the proposed amendment, the staff concludes that 
there will be no significant reduction of any margin of safety.
    7. The proposed amendment will not result in an overall decrease in 
the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards, or security 
programs.
    For similar reasons provided in the assessment of criterion 1, the 
proposed amendment will not significantly increase the risk of a 
release of UF6 or of the products of its reaction with steam. In 
addition, the staff has not identified any criticality related 
implications from the proposed amendment. Based on the staff's review 
of the proposed amendment, the staff concludes that there will be no 
decrease in the effectiveness of the overall plant's safety program.
    The staff has not identified any safeguards or security related 
implications from the proposed amendment. Therefore, the proposed 
amendment will not result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness 
of the plant's safeguards or security programs.
    Effective date: The amendment to GDP-2 will become effective 5 days 
after issuance by NRC.
    Certificate of Compliance No. GDP-2: The amendment will revise the 
Compliance Plan and the SAR.
    Local Public Document Room location: Portsmouth Public Library, 
1220 Gallia Street, Portsmouth, Ohio 45662.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of November 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carl J. Paperiello,
Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 97-31797 Filed 12-3-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P