Opinion filed January 2 8 , 201 9



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

___ __ ______ No. 11

- 1 8

- 00 2 04

- C V

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IN THE INTEREST OF S.L.S ., A CHILD

On Appeal from the Co unty Court at Law Erath County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CV08670

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
The trial court entered an order in which it terminat ed the parental rights of
S.L.S .’s parents

. The mo ther filed an a ppeal

. In a single issue o n appeal, s he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best interest finding. We affirm. Termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 161.001 (b) (West Supp. 201 8 )

. To determine on appeal if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether2 a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or convicti on that its finding

was true. In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25

– 26 (Tex. 2002). To terminate parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts list ed in
Section 161.001 (b) (1)(A)

– ( U ) and that termination is in the best interest of the child.
F AM

. § 161.001 (b) . In this case, the trial court found that Appellant had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surrounding s that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well

- being, had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well

- being, and had failed to comply with provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her

to o btain the return of the child. See id. § 161.001 (b) (1) (D), (E), (O) . Appellant does not challenge th ese finding s , but s he does challenge the trial court’s finding
that termi nation is in the child’s best interest

. See id. § 161.001 (b)(2)

. Accordingly, we will uphold the order of termination if the evidence is sufficient to support the
best interest finding

. With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be proved. In re C.J.O. , 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2010, pet. denied). But courts may use the non

- exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adam s , 544 S.W.2d 367, 371

– 72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the3 programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the stab ility of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent

- child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence tha t proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best
interest. C.J.O. , 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The record in this case reflects that the Department of Family and Protective
Services became involved with S.L.S. when he was less than two weeks old. During an investigation of a report ed concern related to the baby’s health , the Department
determined that S.L.S. was very lethargic , had a bad case of thrush, and was too skinny

. S.L.S. weighed 6.5 pounds at birth ; at eleven days old, he had lost over 30% of his body weight and weighed only 4.5 pounds. However, n e ither parent was concerned about S.L.S.’s apparent health problems at that time. T he Department’s investigator believed that S.L.S. needed to be taken to a hospital immediately

. The investigator took S.L.S. , along with Appellant, to the emergency room at Cook
Children ’s Hospital

. S.L.S. was admitted to the hospital and was treated for severe
thrush and severe mal nutrition. S.L.S. gained weight while at the hospital.
T he trailer home in which the family lived at the time of removal was in poor
condition. It had broken windows and hole s in the floor , and it was hot inside

— as only one bedroom had a window unit. Ad ditionally, there was no food in the house other that a box of pancake mix and rotten milk.
The evidence showed that Appellant compl ied with some, but not all, of the provisions of he r court

- ordered service plan

. In this regard, the use of drugs by Appellant did not seem to be an ongoing problem, although Appellant did test positive for methamphetamine at the time of removal. Appellant, however, denied4 ever using methamphetamine. Appellant was aware that S.L.S.’ s father had a criminal history, had been “locked up” for six years, and was on parole. The father

test ed positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine while this case was pending. After she ended her relationship with the baby’s father, Appellant engaged in a relationship and moved in w it h a man who was under indictment for the offense of
sexual assault of a child. The record reflects that Appellant did not have a car or a driver’s license, that her housing situation was tenuous
, and that the Department had concerns about how Appellant “would do on her own” because she had not demonstrated an ability to provide a healthy, stable home environment or a stable job. Appellant did, however, regularly attend visitation with S.L.S. while this case was pending. Not long a fter removal, the Depar tment placed S.L.S

. in a foster home; he
remained in that same foster home at the time of trial. The foster parents would like to adopt S.L.S. if possible. S.L.S. i s doing well in that home and ha s bonded with his foster parents

. The record reflects tha t the foster parents are able to meet all of S.L.S.’s current and future needs, including some special needs

. The optic nerve in
S.L.S. ’s left eye never developed, and he is permanently blind in that eye . A portion of S.L.S.’s brain, the septum pellucidum, is also absent. The conservatorship caseworker testified that the Department’s plan for
S.L.S. was termination of the parents’ parental rights and adoption by the foster parents

. The caseworker belie ved that termination of Appellant’s rights would be in
S.L.S .’s best interest. The child ’s guardian ad litem informed the trial court that Appellant’s judgment was poor , that she believed Appellant’s judgment would continue to be poor
, and that the child would not be safe with Appellant. The child’s attorney ad litem recommended that the trial court terminat e Appellant’s parental rights.5 Appellant did not agree with these assessments ; she did not want her parental rights to be terminated and did not beli eve that it would be in S.L.S.’s best interest to do so. She believed that “a child can bond better with the actual parents and stuff.” Although she admitted at trial that she had endangered S.L.S. prior to the removal,
she believed that she had learned how to be a better parent. Based upon the Holley factors and the evidence in the record, we cannot hold that the trial court’s best interest finding is not supported by clear and convincing
evidence

. See Holley
, 544 S.W.2d at 371

– 72. T he trial court could reasonably have
formed a firm belief or conviction that it would be in the child’s best interest for Appellant’s parental rights to be terminated. We hold that t he evidence is legally
and factually sufficient to support the trial cour t’s best interest finding. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal

. We affirm the trial court’s order of termination

.

JIM R. WRIGHT
SENIOR CHIEF JUSTICE

January 2 8 , 2019
Panel consists of: Bailey
, C. J. , Stretcher , J. , and Wright, S.C.J. 1
Willson, J., not participating.

1 Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, sitting by assignment.