NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

RODNEY L., DEANA L., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.L., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 19-0087

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. L8015JD201707004

The Honorable Douglas Camacho, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Harris & Winger PC, Flagstaff

By Chad J. Winger

Counsel for Appellant, Mother

Law Offices of Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson

By Harriette P. Levitt

Counsel for Appellant, Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Lauren J. Lowe

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 2-27-2020
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Rodney L. (“Father”) and Deana L. (“Mother”) appeal the 

superior court’s order terminating their parental rights to their son, J.L.

Father argues the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) provided 

insufficient evidence to support the statutory ground of fifteen months time 

in care, that his participation in services should overcome the grounds for 

termination, and that termination would not be in the best interests of the 

child. Both parents argue DCS failed to make diligent efforts to provide 

appropriate reunification services. Here, sufficient evidence supports the 

superior court’s findings. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Mother have one child together, a boy born in 

2015. Father has an extensive history of domestic violence with his intimate 

partners prior to and including his relationship with Mother. DCS got 

involved in late-December 2016 after a physical altercation in the child’s 

presence and left Mother with severe bruising and swelling on her face.

Father reportedly punched Mother in the face, and she responded by 

kicking Father in the groin. Father recorded the fight with his cell phone, 

and when Mother tried to take the phone from Father, he threw it at her 

face. Mother ran from the house screaming for neighbors to call 911. Both 

parents were arrested.

¶3 At an investigatory interview, both parents downplayed the 

severity of the fight, blaming it on stress. However, once Father left the 

interview, Mother admitted to another domestic violence incident from the 

year prior. DCS helped Mother and the child move out of the home. 

¶4 Shortly thereafter, Mother disclosed that there were over two 

years of physical and emotional domestic violence by Father, going back as 

far as to when she was pregnant with the child, and Father pushed Mother 

down the stairs. She disclosed another instance where Father choked her

until she passed out, reportedly telling her to “just go with it.” Mother’s 
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

3

doctors believe this loss of oxygen to her brain may have caused Mother’s 

memory issues. Mother also suffers from obsessive compulsive disorder 

and depression, and Father would not let her take medication for either 

condition.

¶5 DCS warned Mother that because of the extensive history of 

domestic violence and abuse, and the risks it posed for the boy, DCS would 

take custody of the child if she returned to Father. The next month, Mother 

obtained an order of protection against Father, filed for divorce, and filed 

for emergency temporary custody of the child. However, a few days after 

filing, Mother dropped the order of protection and returned to live with 

Father. 

¶6 Within the next month, Mother and Father engaged in 

another altercation, resulting in Mother’s arrest for domestic violence and 

criminal damage. Reportedly, Father wanted Mother to meet him at home 

to provide him a copy of the dropped order. Mother went to the home to 

do so but changed her mind, which lead to an altercation. After Mother got 

out of jail, she got a second order of protection against Father. 

¶7 As warned, DCS took custody of the child in January 2017 and 

filed a dependency petition alleging the child to be dependent regarding

both Mother and Father. DCS asserted Mother failed to treat her mental 

health, Father neglected the child due to substance abuse, and that both 

parents exposed the child to significant acts of domestic violence. In March 

of 2017, the superior court found the child dependent regarding both 

parents. 

¶8 DCS referred both parents for services including drug testing, 

psychological evaluations, individual counseling, domestic violence 

counseling, and supervised visitation. DCS also referred Father for 

substance abuse treatment. 

¶9 Mother and Father both completed psychological evaluations 

with Dr. Stephen Gill. Dr. Gill gave each parent a guarded prognosis 

regarding their ability to safely parent the child in the future, citing “serious 

concern” for parents’ violent history. Dr. Gill recommended Mother 

continue with mental health treatment, but specifically discouraged 

couples’ therapy “due to the severity” of parents’ domestic violence. 

Dr. Gill conditioned Father’s ability to safely parent the child “on his ability 

to demonstrate that he is not a candidate to engage in or return to his violent 

behaviors with” Mother, and recommended that Father meet weekly with 
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

4

a therapist who has an extensive background in substance abuse and 

domestic violence recovery. 

¶10 In July 2017, Father completed a bonding and best interests 

assessment with Dr. Kathryn Menendez. Dr. Menendez noted that Father 

downplayed the potential risks that witnessing domestic violence could 

cause to the child’s health and instead focused heavily on Mother’s mental 

health. Dr. Menendez concluded that although Father and the child have a 

good bond, Father “fails to accept full responsibility for his domestic 

violence issues and his problematic relationship with” Mother, “fails to 

acknowledge the emotional and physical threat to the children” from his 

aggression, and “minimizes his past history, heavily emphasizing his wife’s 

limitations.” Dr. Menendez also noted a potential increase in “stressors” 

which may cause Father’s “propensity to violence [to] increase” as he and 

the child grow older. Because of Father’s likelihood of continued 

aggression, Dr. Menendez concluded “[t]his would be a high-risk 

reunification.”

¶11 While both parents participated in services, both failed to 

make the behavioral changes necessary to safely parent the child, and 

instead remained in their combative relationship until they divorced in 

December 2018. Moreover, against professional recommendations, parents 

began couples counseling through their church, and Father moved to have

all services provided jointly.

¶12 In October 2017, the superior court denied Father’s motion for 

joint services and changed the case plan from family reunification to 

severance and adoption. DCS then moved to terminate Mother and Father’s 

parental rights, alleging the statutory grounds of neglect and nine months

time in care. In May 2018, DCS amended its motion to add the statutory 

ground of fifteen months time in care. 

¶13 The court held a joint contested hearing in the summer of 2018 

but the hearing resulted in a mistrial once the court granted a request to 

bifurcate Mother and Father’s termination hearings. The court then held a 

contested termination for Father in February 2019 and, separately, for 

Mother in March 2019. The court terminated both parents’ rights to the 

child.
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

5

DISCUSSION

I. Termination Ground

¶14 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the superior court 

must find at least one statutory ground for severance under A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 

279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). The court must also find severance is in the child’s best 

interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

¶15 We review the court’s severance determination for an abuse 

of discretion and will affirm unless no reasonable evidence supports the 

court’s findings. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 

(App. 2004). The superior court “is in the best position to weigh the 

evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and 

resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 

334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004).

¶16 The superior court may terminate parental rights under the 

fifteen month out-of-home placement ground if it finds that (1) “[t]he child 

has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of 

fifteen months or longer”; (2) “the parent has been unable to remedy the 

circumstances” causing the out-of-home placement; and (3) “there is a 

substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising 

proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.” A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(8)(c).1 

¶17 The superior court must also find that DCS made diligent 

efforts to provide appropriate reunification services. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). 

DCS makes diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services 

when it provides a parent with the “time and opportunity to participate in 

programs designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for the child.” 

Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 94, ¶ 20 (App. 2009). DCS 

“is not required to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a 

parent participates in each service it offers.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. 

JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). 

A. Father 

¶18 Father argues no reasonable evidence supports the fifteen

month time in care ground for terminating his parental rights by 

1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of rules and statutes.
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

6

challenging the credibility of Mother and his ex-wife regarding other acts 

of domestic violence and points to a single arrest of domestic violence as 

support for this claim. Father asserts that even if DCS painted him as 

controlling and manipulative, this was not grounds for termination. Father 

also argues that termination was improper because he participated in 

services. Lastly, Father argues that DCS failed to make diligent efforts to 

provide appropriate rehabilitation services. 

¶19 Father’s first argument is not substantiated by the record. 

Upon due consideration of the evidence and testimony, the superior court 

specifically found that Father had a significant history of committing acts 

of domestic violence which dated back as early as 2002. This finding is 

supported by testimony from Mother that Father would engage in “violent 

episodes” “sometimes daily, sometimes weekly.” 

¶20 We will not reweigh evidence, but rather we view all evidence 

and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to affirming 

the superior court’s order. Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 93, ¶ 18. 

¶21 Mother disclosed numerous examples of Father’s violence to 

DCS. During her pregnancy, Father would choke her until she felt like she 

was going to lose consciousness and punch her in the stomach. Mother 

testified that her obstetrician told her she “start[ed] to have a miscarriage.” 

The physical abuse continued after the child was born. Mothertestified that 

Father choked her painfully, beat her with a stick on the bony parts of her 

body, dragged her across gravel, pushed her down the stairs, and punched 

her in the head and body while she was holding the child. 

¶22 Father would psychologically abuse Mother as well, which 

aligned with DCS’s evidence that Father was controlling and manipulative. 

Father refused to allow Mother to take medication for her OCD, which 

impaired her self-esteem, anxiety and, “ability to function.” When Father 

would respond violently to Mother’s anxious and obsessive behavior, he 

would blame Mother, making her believe that “if [she] didn’t poke the bear 

then [she] wouldn’t have been abused.” Father would berate Mother for 

having mental illnesses, call her crazy, and tell her she deserved to burn in 

hell. 

¶23 At least two times Father threatened to kill Mother. On 

another occasion, Father threatened to push Mother out a window while 

she was holding the child so they both would “fall to the ground.” Father 

referred to the child as Mother’s “human shield.” In fact, the child was 
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

7

either present, nearby, or in Mother’s arms for many domestic violence 

incidents. 

¶24 Father also tried to control Mother. There were times he 

refused to let Mother see her own family and certain friends. Mother 

disclosed that on multiple occasions, Father told her “if she didn’t lie [in 

court], he would make her out to be crazy.”

¶25 Father’s abuse “got progressively worse” over time. Mother 

reported that “the verbal abuse became so bad that [she told Father] to just 

kill her because she couldn’t take it anymore.” Father continued his 

controlling abusive behavior with Mother throughout the relationship, up 

until the parents divorced in December 2018, only two months before the 

termination hearing. 

¶26 Accordingly, while Father’s argument centers primarily on 

his single arrest for domestic violence giving rise to DCS’s involvement in 

December of 2016, reasonable evidence in the record supports the superior 

court’s finding that Father engaged in multiple acts of domestic violence. 

¶27 Father also argues against termination by asserting that he 

participated in services. It is true Father participated in services, except that 

he did not obtain proper counseling until after August 2018. Based on 

Dr. Gill’s recommendation, DCS required him to engage in individual 

counseling with a licensed therapist who had significant training in 

domestic violence and substance abuse. The case manager discussed this 

requisite with Father, but he insisted on seeing his own counselors who did 

not meet the professional requirements.

¶28 The court expressly acknowledged that Father participated in 

other services. However, as DCS noted, “engagement is not the same as a 

behavioral change.” The court found that although Father “completed 

classes and counseling, he has no insight into his domestic violence.” The 

DCS case manager testified that, even after the first trial, Father believed he 

did “not need to make behavior changes.” Instead, Father said that “all of 

the allegations made by [DCS] are false or based on lies.” Father continually

blamed others for the situation including Mother and her parents for lying 

to DCS, Mother’s attorney for “inventing a smear campaign against him,” 

and DCS for being “corrupt.” 

¶29 Father also claimed that Mother and her mental illness are the 

reasons why the child was removed. The case manager testified that “even 

when [Father] does take responsibility, it is with stipulations, . . . meaning 

he admits to violence but then sees that violence as acceptable because it’s 
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

8

in response to [Mother] or [that] she’s crazy so [Father] had no choice but 

to act with violence . . . .” 

¶30 The court also referenced Father’s history of domestic 

violence in his prior relationships, dating back to 2002. From 2002 to 2011, 

DCS received numerous reports of violence between Father and his ex-wife. 

In these reports, Father’s ex-wife and older children disclosed that Father 

was abusive and that they were afraid of him. Evidence at trial showed 

Father engaged in a pattern of domestic violence spanning at least 16 years 

and had engaged in domestic violence counseling on multiple occasions, 

with no positive change noted.

¶31 The case manager concluded that Father’s actions “show[] a 

lack of insight, a lack of personal judgment, and ultimately a failure to 

accept responsibility.” This testimony is consistent with that of other 

professionals overseeing the case. Father’s counselor at Interagency noted 

that while Father “shows resp[onsibility] for his actions,” he “downplay[s]

it.” Dr. Gill testified that Father acknowledged the December 2016 charges 

of domestic violence, but “did not admit that he was engaged in domestic 

violence and instead felt that he was being victimized by [Mother] and her 

family.” Dr. Menendez concurred that Father blamed others and generally 

downplayed the domestic violence. The case manager and Dr. Gill also 

testified about how witnessing domestic violence is extremely harmful to 

children. DCS further explained that the child is “extremely vulnerable 

due to his age,” and that because of parents’ “erratic and unpredictable” 

behavior, “neither parent is able to provide the child with a safe home free 

from abuse or neglect.”

¶32 On this evidence, the court found Father has been unable to 

remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home 

placement, and that there is a substantial likelihood Father will not be 

capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the 

near future. 

¶33 Father next argues termination was improper because DCS 

failed to make diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services 

by failing to increase visitation with the child, failing to formulate a 

transition plan, and failing to direct him to an appropriate therapist.2

2 In his reply brief, Father cites more services that he claims DCS 

should have provided. Because he did not raise these in his opening brief, 
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

9

¶34 First, Father fails to develop his argument or cite to the record 

in support of his claim that visitation “was supposed to be six hours per 

week but was never more than four hours per week.” See ARCAP 13(a)(7)

(requiring an “argument” contain the appellant’s “contentions concerning 

each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each

contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate 

references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies”). He 

also did not raise this concern with the superior court. See Shawanee S. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179 (App. 2014) (“A parent who does 

not object [to the adequacy of services] in the juvenile court is precluded 

from challenging that finding on appeal.”). When Father did raise a 

visitation issue to the superior court, he limited his argument to specific 

missed visits between April and August 2017. The court held an 

evidentiary hearing and ruled on the issue. Finally, contrary to Father’s 

argument, records show he was in fact receiving over four hours of 

supervised visitation each week. 

¶35 Next, Father contends DCS should have created a plan to 

transition the child back into his custody because he was participating in 

services. Father’s argument ignores the fact that he was still engaging in a 

violent relationship with Mother for most of the dependency and, as 

discussed above, failed to make the requisite behavioral changes in order 

to be able to safely parent the child. This is consistent with the court’s 

findings and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Jesus M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 (App. 2002).

¶36 Finally, Father’s argument relies on DCS’s alleged failure to 

direct him to an appropriate counselor. Foremost, DCS “is not required to 

provide every conceivable service.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No-JS-501094, 

180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). Besides, the record shows DCS provided 

Father with individual counseling with an approved licensed counselor to 

address domestic violence treatment, and Father participated in this 

service. However, DCS explained he would need to find a licensed 

counselor specializing in substance abuse treatment in addition to the 

domestic violence counseling. Per this record, Father never sought a 

substance abuse counseling referral from DCS. Instead, Father arranged for

counseling on his own through his church pastor.

we do not address them. See Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Ormond Builders, Inc., 

216 Ariz. 379, 385 (App. 2007).
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

10

¶37 Reasonable evidence supports the fifteen month time in care 

ground for terminating his parental rights and that DCS made diligent 

efforts to provide appropriate rehabilitation services.

B. Mother

¶38 Mother argues termination pursuant to the statutory ground 

of fifteen months time in care is not appropriate because DCS failed to make 

diligent efforts to provide adequate rehabilitation services. Mother names 

three specific services DCS allegedly failed to provide: a psychiatric 

assessment, boundary-setting treatment, and a follow-up psychological 

evaluation. Mother also argues that DCS failed to adequately develop a 

case plan for Mother after August of 2017 by failing to consider her status 

as a domestic violence victim.

¶39 For purposes of this appeal, Mother has waived any issues 

with respect to inadequate provision of mental health or domestic violence 

services because Mother did not raise these issues in the superior court at 

the dependency hearing nor at the termination hearing, and we generally 

do not consider any issue on appeal that was not raised below. See Shawanee 

S., 234 Ariz. at 178–79, ¶ 16.

¶40 Even if Mother had not waived the issue, the record shows 

she was provided with all but one of the services she claims were not

provided. Mother received mental health services through her own 

providers throughout the dependency, and those mental health providers 

offered psychiatric services. Mother also received training on setting 

healthy boundaries through Southwest Behavioral & Health Services. 

Additionally, Mother was provided with domestic violence victims’ 

counseling through Interagency and again later through Southwest 

Behavioral & Health Services. 

¶41 The only service Dr. Gill recommended that DCS did not 

provide to Mother was a follow-up psychological evaluation. However, the 

purpose of a follow-up evaluation would have been to “determine her level 

of treatment progress,” and was contingent on the case manager’s 

agreement that it was necessary to do so. Thus, such service was not 

required, but rather solely within the agency’s discretion. Dr. Gill testified

there were no other services that DCS could have provided Mother that 

would have resolved her domestic violence issues. Accordingly, reasonable 

evidence supports the court’s finding that DCS made diligent efforts to 

provide appropriate reunification services.
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

11

II. Best Interests

¶42 Father argues that DCS presented insufficient evidence to 

support the court’s best interests finding. We disagree.

¶43 In considering whether termination of parental rights is 

appropriate, the superior court must find termination is in the Children’s 

best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149–50, ¶ 8 (2018). Termination of parental rights is in 

the children’s best interests if termination would benefit the children or if 

continuation of the relationship would harm the children. Aleise H. v. Dep’t 

of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 569, 572, ¶ 9 (App. 2018) (internal citation omitted). 

¶44 Once the court’s focus shifts to the best interests analysis, the 

“foremost concern is protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.” 

Id. (internal quotations omitted). The superior court also considers whether 

the current placement is meeting the child’s needs and whether the 

placement wants to adopt the child. Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 

Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “The existence 

and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, 

although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in addressing best 

interests.” Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98–99, ¶ 12

(App. 2016).

¶45 Here, reasonable evidence supports the court’s determination 

that termination would be in the child’s best interests because continuation

of the relationship would be harmful to the child. Father never gained 

insight into or took responsibility for his role in a 16-year pattern of 

domestic violence, leaving him susceptible to repeating the cycle. Not once 

during the dependency did Father acknowledge the harm that domestic 

violence has on the child. Father never acknowledged how he jeopardized 

the child’s health and wellbeing by making him a witness to his parents’ 

discord and violence. The court heard testimony that witnessing domestic 

violence can have a negative impact on a child’s brain development, 

including increased susceptibility to mental health issues, substance abuse, 

and future violent relationships. The court also heard evidence that 

termination of Father’s rights would benefit the child. The child is in a 

family placement where his needs are being met, and he is thriving in their 

care. The home is free of violence and neglect and would provide the child 

permanency and stability because the family is loving and wishes to adopt 

the child. In light of the evidence presented, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that termination was in the child’s best interests.
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

12

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶46 Father argues the superior court erred in finding that he failed 

to establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Father and DCS 

suggest that Arizona courts have recognized that the law permits relief for 

ineffective assistance of counsel in a proceeding to terminate parental 

rights.

¶47 However, Arizona case law appears to leave open the 

question of whether we have expressly adopted ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims in the context of dependency or severance proceedings, and 

we have not articulated any particular standard for what those claims 

would require. See, e.g., John M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 320, 322–

25, ¶¶ 8–17 (App. 2007) (summarizing arguments for and against 

recognizing ineffective assistance of counsel as constitutional grounds for 

reversible error in a severance case but ultimately declining to resolve the 

issue). Here, even if Arizona were to recognize an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim in dependency proceedings, Father’s appeal is untimely, and 

we lack jurisdiction to consider it. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 104(A) (“A notice of 

appeal shall be filed with the clerk of the superior court no later than 15 

days after the final order is filed with the clerk.”); Pima Cty. Juv. Action No. 

S-933, 135 Ariz. 278, 279 (1982) (“The failure to file an appeal in a timely 

fashion deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.”).

¶48 The superior court heard evidence regarding Father’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the initial joint termination 

hearing. At Father’s own insistence, the court issued a ruling on October 26, 

2018, determining that Father failed to establish that he was provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Father did not appeal that order. 

¶49 Because Father did not file an appeal to that order, we do not 

have jurisdiction to consider the issue. The issue has been waived.
RODNEY L., DEANA L. v. DCS, J.L.

Decision of the Court

13

CONCLUSION

¶50 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

3

3 Because we affirm the termination order under the fifteen month 

out-of-home placement ground, we need not consider the parents’ 

arguments regarding the remaining grounds. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3.