UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4342

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JEREMY ANDREW ATKINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-4343

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JONATHAN DAVID HILLSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00377-WO-20; 1:14-cr-00377-

WO-19)

Submitted: March 30, 2016 Decided: April 25, 2016

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
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No. 15-4342, affirmed, and No. 15-4343, vacated and remanded by 

unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stephen F. Wallace, WALLACE LAW FIRM, High Point, North 

Carolina; Renorda E. Pryor, HERRING LAW CENTER, PLLC, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States 

Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

In these consolidated appeals, Jeremy Atkins and Jonathan 

Hillson challenge their sentences. Atkins and Hillson each pled 

guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine 

with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, a violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(c)(2), 846 (2012). Atkins challenges the drug 

quantity attributed to him at sentencing. Hillson challenges 

the district court’s refusal to award a three-level reduction 

for acceptance of responsibility and the district court’s 

Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Finding no error in Atkins’ 

sentence, we affirm. Because the district court erred in 

recalculating Hillson’s Guidelines range, we vacate his sentence

and remand for further proceedings. 

“We review the district court’s calculation of the quantity 

of drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes for 

clear error.” United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 188 (4th 

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Clear error 

occurs if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Jeffers, 

570 F.3d 557, 570 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In calculating drug amounts, the district court may 

“consider [any] relevant information . . . , provided that the 

information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its 

probable accuracy.” United States v. Crawford, 734 F.3d 339, 
4

342 (4th Cir. 2013); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 6A1.3(a), p.s. (2014). We will afford the district court 

“broad discretion in determining what information to credit in 

making its calculations.” United States v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 

231, 253 n.18 (4th Cir. 2001).

Here, the district court heard testimony from two law 

enforcement officers to determine the appropriate drug amount to 

attribute to Atkins. Other codefendants’ statements to law 

enforcement also informed the investigation. And, the district 

court used the National Precursor Log Exchange records to 

determine the amount of pseudoephedrine Hillson purchased. The 

district court’s calculations are thus supported by reliable 

evidence and are not clearly erroneous, and this claim entitles 

Atkins to no relief. 

Hillson challenges the district court’s decision to deny 

him an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. This 

determination is a factual one and thus reviewed for clear 

error. United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 

2007). “[T]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to 

evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and thus 

. . . the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to 

great deference on review.” Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 

753, 761 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Section 3E1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

provides for a two-level reduction for a defendant who “‘clearly 

demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.’” 

United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 678 (4th Cir. 2011)

(quoting USSG § 3E1.1(a)). To merit this reduction and the 

additional reduction outlined in USSG § 3E1.1(b), the defendant 

must establish by a preponderance of the evidence “that he has 

clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal 

responsibility for his criminal conduct.” United States v. 

Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1996). “[A] denial of 

relevant conduct is inconsistent with acceptance of 

responsibility.” Elliott, 332 F.3d at 766 (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1 (A). 

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err 

when it ruled that Hillson’s denial of offense conduct was 

inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. After 

conducting a thorough examination, the district court continued 

the sentencing hearing to provide Hillson an opportunity to 

discuss his conduct with his attorney. At the reconvened 

hearing, Hillson continued to maintain that he did not know the 

pseudoephedrine would be used to make methamphetamine. This 

denial of the offense conduct is inconsistent with the 

acceptance of responsibility. 
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Although the district court properly denied Hillson a 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, it erroneously

recalculated Hillson’s Guideline sentencing range after 

eliminating the § 3E1.1 reduction. In assessing Guidelines 

calculations, we review factual findings for clear error, legal 

conclusions de novo, and unpreserved arguments for plain error. 

United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012). 

Because Hillson did not challenge the recalculation at 

sentencing, our review is for plain error. To establish plain 

error, Hillson must show “(1) that the district court erred, (2) 

that the error is clear or obvious, and (3) that the error 

affected his substantial rights, meaning that ‘it affected the 

outcome of the district court proceedings.’” United States v. 

Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640-41 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993)). If this burden 

is met, we exercise discretion to correct the error only if the 

error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 641 (brackets and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

Hillson’s properly calculated total offense level, without 

the § 3E1.1 reduction, was 24, but the district court applied an 

offense level of 26. Based on this error, Hillson likely 

received a higher sentence than he would have if the had court 

correctly calculated his base offense level. Consequently, the 
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error affected Hillson’s substantial rights and affected the 

outcome of the proceedings. We therefore exercise our 

discretion to correct the error and vacate Hillson’s sentence. 

Accordingly, we affirm Atkins’ sentence and we vacate and 

remand Hillson’s sentence for further proceedings. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

No. 15-4342: AFFIRMED;

No. 15-4343: VACATED AND REMANDED