Present: All the Justices 

MIMI DIDATO 

v. Record No. 003030 

PAUL M. STREHLER, M.D., ET AL. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

 November 2, 2001 

GARY DIDATO 

v. Record No. 003031 

PAUL M. STREHLER, M.D., ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 

 In these consolidated appeals from judgments sustaining 

the defendants' demurrers in medical negligence actions, we 

consider whether the plaintiffs' motions for judgment alleged 

viable causes of action based upon negligence, the assumption 

of a duty, and the creation of a special relationship. 

I. 

 Mimi Didato and her husband, Gary Didato, filed separate 

amended motions for judgment against Paul M. Strehler, M.D., 

and Chippenham Pediatric & Adolescent Medicine, P.C. 

(Chippenham Pediatric). Mimi Didato and Gary Didato, to whom 

we will refer jointly as the plaintiffs, alleged in their 

separate motions for judgment that the defendants breached 

certain duties owed to them. The defendants filed demurrers 

to the amended motions for judgment and asserted that the 
plaintiffs failed to allege viable causes of action against 

them. 

 The circuit court sustained the demurrers. The circuit 

court concluded that: the plaintiffs failed to allege that 

they were patients of the defendants and, therefore, the 

defendants owed no duty to the plaintiffs; a special 

relationship did not exist between the plaintiffs and the 

defendants and, therefore, the defendants owed no duty to the 

plaintiffs under that theory of recovery; and the defendants 

did not assume a duty owed to the plaintiffs. 

 The circuit court entered judgments in favor of the 

defendants. We awarded the plaintiffs appeals from the 

judgments, and we consolidated their cases. 

II. 

A. 

 A demurrer "admits the truth of all material facts that 

are properly pleaded, facts which are impliedly alleged, and 

facts which may be fairly and justly inferred from alleged 

facts." Cox Cable Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 242 

Va. 394, 397, 410 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1991). Thus, we will state 

the relevant facts, contained in the plaintiffs' amended 

motions for judgment, which are necessary for our resolution 

of these appeals. 

2
 Strehler is a physician licensed to practice medicine in 

this Commonwealth, and he is engaged in the practice of 

pediatrics. Chippenham Pediatric is a professional 

corporation registered to do business in this Commonwealth and 

provides pediatric services. Strehler is an officer and 

employee of Chippenham Pediatric. The Didatos are the parents 

of three children: Matthew, born on January 21, 1993; 

Gabrielle, born on September 28, 1994; and Nicholas, born on 

May 12, 1998. 

 In 1993, the plaintiffs "presented to Dr. Strehler and 

Chippenham Pediatric and requested that they provide their 

family including themselves and their infant son Matthew all 

health care [that] a family should receive from a pediatrician 

and a professional corporation engaged in providing health 

care services relating to the practice of pediatrics." 

Pursuant to this request, "Dr. Strehler and Chippenham 

Pediatric agreed to provide the Didato family all health care 

[that] members of a family should receive from a pediatrician 

and a professional corporation engaged in providing health 

care services relating to the practice of pediatrics." The 

relationship between the Didato family and the defendants 

"continued without interruption until 1997," when the 

plaintiffs moved from Virginia to Connecticut. 

3
 According to the plaintiffs, thalassemia and sickle cell 

disease are inherited diseases of the blood known as 

hemoglobinopathies. "Thalassemia is a form of anemia (red 

blood cell deficiency). Hemoglobin is the oxygen-carrying 

component of the red blood cells. It is made of two different 

kinds of proteins, called alpha and beta globins. If the body 

doesn't produce both of these two proteins, the red blood 

cells do not form properly and do not carry sufficient oxygen. 

The result is anemia that begins in early childhood and 

persists throughout life. There are a number of varieties of 

thalassemia. If the body does not produce beta globins, the 

resultant disease is called beta thalassemia." 

 The plaintiffs stated in the amended motions for judgment 

that "[s]ickle cell disease (also referred to as 'sickle cell 

anemia') is caused by the presence of an abnormal type of 

hemoglobin called 'sickle hemoglobin' in red blood cells. The 

presence of sickle hemoglobin causes red blood cells to change 

from their usual biconcave disc shape to a crescent or sickle 

shape. The abnormal hemoglobin makes the red blood cells 

unable to carry oxygen and the abnormal shape can also cause 

the red blood cells to clog small blood vessels forming clots 

and preventing some organs and tissue from receiving 

sufficient oxygen. When this occurs, red blood cells are 

damaged and destroyed producing anemia and the victim of 

4
sickle cell disease will experience episodes of severe pain 

and sustain damage to organs and tissue." 

 Continuing, the plaintiffs stated that "[s]ome of the 

various clinical manifestations of sickle cell disease include 

painful swelling of the hands and feet caused by ischemic 

necrosis of the small bones, illnesses accompanied by fever, 

hypoxia and acidosis, infarction of bone marrow, splenic 

infarcts, splenic enlargement leading to circulatory collapse, 

pulmonary infarction, strokes, ischemic damage to heart, 

liver, kidneys and eyes and priapism (painful penile 

erections)." 

 According to the plaintiffs, "[v]ictims of sickle cell 

disease are susceptible to meningitis, sepsis and other 

serious infections and a high risk for a lethal, rapid 

decrease in hemoglobin level (aplastic episode). . . . By 

mid-childhood most victims of sickle cell disease are 

underweight and have an enlarged heart. Puberty is frequently 

delayed. Throughout life, the victim of sickle cell disease 

will suffer a barrage of medical crises and can expect to 

experience pain in varying levels of intensity on a daily 

basis. . . . The life expectancy of sickle cell disease 

victims is dramatically reduced as a consequence of the 

disease and its sequelae." 

5
 The plaintiffs also pled that "[b]oth thalassemia and 

sickle cell disease are autosomal recessive disorders. This 

means these disorders only occur when both parents carry the 

gene for the disorder. If both parents are carriers of the 

abnormal gene responsible for producing the disorder, there is 

a 25 per cent possibility that a child of the parents will 

have the disorder. A person who carries the gene for 

thalassemia has the 'thalassemia trait.' A person who carries 

the gene for sickle cell disease has the 'sickle cell trait.' 

. . . If one parent is a carrier of the beta thalassemia trait 

and the other parent is a carrier of sickle cell trait, there 

is a 25 per cent possibility that a child of the parents will 

be born with a type of sickle cell disease known as sickle 

beta thalassemia." Continuing, the plaintiffs stated that 

"[o]ne form of sickle beta thalassemia disease is called 

sickle beta O thalassemia. This is the most severe form of 

sickle beta thalassemia." 

 "The beta thalassemia trait is found primarily in persons 

of Mediterranean, African or Southeast Asian origin. . . . 

[Mr.] Didato is of Sicilian descent and is therefore a person 

of Mediterranean origin. . . . The sickle cell trait is found 

primarily in persons of African, Caribbean, Latin American, 

Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern or Mediterranean origin. . . . 

Mrs. Didato's mother is Dominican and her father is of Spanish 

6
and Portuguese descent and Mrs. Didato is therefore a person 

of Caribbean, Latin American and Mediterranean origin." 

 The plaintiffs stated in their amended motions that "[b]y 

the 1970's, technology to screen infants for sickle cell trait 

and disease and thalassemia trait and disease was 

available. . . . By 1979, a number of pediatricians were 

advocating screening of newborns for sickle cell trait and 

disease and thalassemia trait and disease to help accomplish 

two objectives: provision of optimum medical care of patients 

with the disease and the prevention of the disease through 

genetic counseling." 

 According to the plaintiffs, "[p]urposes of genetic 

counseling include making persons such as the parents of [a] 

newborn who tested positive for sickle cell or thalassemia 

trait aware of the risk of parenting a child with thalassemia 

or sickle cell disease, the availability of further genetic 

testing for the parents and the various alternatives for 

disease prevention. The information made available to parents 

through genetic counseling and follow-up activities 

recommended by genetic counseling would include the 25 per 

cent risk of future offspring with sickle cell disease if both 

parents were carriers of sickle cell trait or one parent was a 

carrier of sickle cell trait and the other a carrier of 

thalassemia trait. In such parents, the options made known to 

7
the parents through genetic counseling and its follow-up 

activities would include preventing the birth of a child with 

sickle cell disease by termination of any unplanned pregnancy 

when prenatal diagnosis revealed the fetus was positive for 

sickle cell disease or thalassemia or avoiding all pregnancies 

by birth control." 

 The plaintiffs alleged that in 1987, representatives of 

certain medical specialties, including pediatricians, reached 

a consensus that "[g]ood medical practice dictated that 

screening for sickle cell disease and thalassemia should be 

provided to all newborns as a result of ordinary care and that 

state law should require provision of such services[; i]f the 

screening demonstrated that the newborn did not suffer from 

the disease and therefore required no specialized medical care 

but was a carrier, information about the newborn's carrier 

state should be furnished to the parents of the newborn[; t]he 

information provided to the parents should explain that 

although the newborn's carrier state is not a disease, there 

may be implications for other family members, and, depending 

on results of family studies, future children may be at risk 

for a clinically significant hemoglobinopathy[; and a] 

referral source for family testing and genetic counseling 

should be clearly identified for the parents." 

8
 The plaintiffs further stated that "[p]rior to 1994, 

Virginia and most other states had initiated a newborn 

screening program for hemoglobinopathies." Continuing, the 

plaintiffs alleged that in 1994, Code § 32.1-65 "provided that 

each infant born in the Commonwealth would be subject to a 

screening test for sickle cell diseases unless the infant's 

parent or guardian objected on religious grounds." The 

plaintiffs also alleged that before September 28, 1994, 

"pediatricians in Virginia and elsewhere in the United States 

had determined that [a] pediatrician who [was] caring for a 

newborn and [was] aware that the newborn carries the sickle 

cell trait [was] in the best position to alert the parents" of 

a newborn of their child's status as a carrier and to 

communicate certain information to the parents. 

 Strehler and Chippenham Pediatric became aware that Mr. 

Didato and his son Matthew carried the thalassemia trait 

before the birth of Gabrielle on September 28, 1994. "At the 

time of the birth of Gabrielle on September 28, 1994, Dr. 

Strehler and Chippenham Pediatric agreed to become the 

pediatrician and pediatric practice entity responsible for 

providing Gabrielle and her family including [Mr.] and Mrs. 

Didato all health care [that] Gabrielle and her family should 

receive from a pediatrician and a professional corporation 

9
engaged in providing health care services relating to the 

practice of pediatrics." 

 The plaintiffs alleged that "[a]t the time of the birth 

of Gabrielle on September 28, 1994, Dr. Strehler and 

Chippenham Pediatric knew that blood would be drawn for 

Gabrielle and screened for the presence of 

hemoglobinopathies." These defendants "knew that the results 

of the newborn screening of Gabrielle for the presence of 

hemoglobinopathies would be reported to [them]." The 

defendants also knew that the plaintiffs expected the 

defendants to communicate to the plaintiffs any information 

and facts of clinical significance concerning the results of 

the newborn screening of Gabrielle. 

 In October 1994, the defendants were notified in writing 

that a newborn screening test of Gabrielle indicated 

"HEMOGLOBIN PATTERN = PROBABLE FAS." The defendants also knew 

that "FAS" meant fetal adult sickle hemoglobin. When the 

defendants were notified of these results, Strehler knew that 

the newborn screening of Gabrielle's blood indicated that she 

was a carrier of the sickle cell trait. Strehler and 

Chippenham Pediatric were notified and knew that Mr. Didato 

was a carrier of the thalassemia trait. The defendants also 

knew "that it was very possible that [the plaintiffs] would 

conceive together other children in the future." The 

10
defendants "knew that any child born to [the plaintiffs] in 

the future had a 25 per cent risk of suffering from sickle 

cell beta thalassemia." 

 After Gabrielle's birth, Mrs. Didato, "acting on her 

behalf and on behalf of Gabrielle and [Mr.] Didato, asked an 

employee of Chippenham Pediatric about the results of the 

newborn screening of Gabrielle and was informed by an employee 

acting in the scope of the employee's employment by Chippenham 

Pediatric and authorized to speak on behalf of Chippenham 

Pediatric that since Mrs. Didato had not been informed about 

any abnormality by Dr. Strehler or Chippenham Pediatric, it 

meant the newborn screening was normal." 

 The plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the representation 

of Chippenham Pediatric that Gabrielle's newborn screening 

results were normal. The plaintiffs alleged that the 

defendants knew that the plaintiffs would rely upon these 

representations. 

 On May 12, 1998, Mrs. Didato gave birth to Nicholas, who 

was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from sickle cell beta 

O thalassemia. The plaintiffs learned for the first time, 

after Nicholas' birth, that Gabrielle was a carrier of the 

sickle cell trait. Had the defendants informed the plaintiffs 

that Gabrielle was a carrier of the sickle cell trait, the 

plaintiffs would not have conceived any additional children 

11
thereby avoiding the risk of having a child born with sickle 

cell beta thalassemia. 

III. 

A. 

 Plaintiffs argue that they pled sufficient facts to 

support a cause of action for negligence against the 

defendants and that contrary to the circuit court's ruling, a 

physician-patient relationship existed between the plaintiffs 

and the defendants. The defendants respond that the 

plaintiffs were not patients of Strehler or Chippenham 

Pediatric within the meaning of Code § 8.01-581.1 and, 

therefore, they did not owe any duties to the plaintiffs. 

Hence, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs failed to 

plead a cause of action against them. We disagree with the 

defendants. 

 Code § 8.01-581.1, which is a part of the Virginia 

Medical Malpractice Act, states in relevant part: 

 " 'Health care' means any act, or treatment 

performed or furnished, or which should have been 

performed or furnished, by any health care provider 

for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the 

patient's medical diagnosis, care, treatment or 

confinement. 

 " 'Health care provider' means (i) a person, 

corporation, facility or institution licensed by 

this Commonwealth to provide health care or 

professional services as a physician or hospital 

. . . [or] (ii) a professional corporation . . . . 

. . . . 

12
 " 'Malpractice' means any tort based on health 

care or professional services rendered, or which 

should have been rendered, by a health care 

provider, to a patient. 

 " 'Patient' means any natural person who 

receives or should have received health care from a 

licensed health care provider except those persons 

who are given health care in an emergency situation 

which exempts the health care provider from 

liability for his emergency services in accordance 

with § 8.01-225." 

 There is no dispute that the defendants are health care 

providers within the meaning of the Medical Malpractice Act. 

The only dispute is whether the plaintiffs are patients within 

the meaning of the Act. 

 The plaintiffs pled in their amended motions for judgment 

that they requested the defendants to provide all health care 

that a family should receive from a pediatrician and a 

professional corporation engaged in providing health care 

services relating to the practice of pediatrics. The 

plaintiffs alleged that the defendants agreed to provide the 

Didato family with the requested services. Code § 8.01-581.1 

defines a patient as "any natural person who receives or 

should have received health care from a licensed health care 

provider." Applying the definitions in Code § 8.01-581.1, we 

hold that the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts which, if 

proven at a trial, would establish the existence of a 

13
physician-patient relationship between the plaintiffs and the 

defendants. 

 Additionally, we observe that "[a] physician's duty 

arises only upon the creation of a physician-patient 

relationship; that relationship springs from a consensual 

transaction, a contract, express or implied, general or 

special . . . and a patient is entitled to damages resulting 

from a breach of a physician's duty." Lyons v. Grether, 218 

Va. 630, 633, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1977) (citations omitted); 

accord Prosise v. Foster, 261 Va. 417, 421, 544 S.E.2d 331, 

332 (2001). The facts pled in the plaintiffs' motions, if 

proven at trial, would permit a jury to find that a physicianpatient relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the 

defendants. 

 The defendants, relying upon Gray v. INOVA Health Care 

Services, 257 Va. 597, 514 S.E.2d 355 (1999), contend that as 

a matter of law, they owed no duties to the plaintiffs. We 

disagree. Our decision in Gray is simply not pertinent here. 

 In Gray, we considered "whether a parent who witnesses 

the effects of a negligent tort committed upon a child in the 

presence of the parent has a cause of action in tort against 

the tortfeasor for negligent infliction of emotional distress 

and its symptomatic effects." Id. at 598, 514 S.E.2d at 355-

56. Holly Gray alleged in her motion for judgment that her 

14
three-year-old daughter was admitted to a hospital owned and 

operated by INOVA Health Care Services. According to her 

motion, health care providers negligently administered the 

drug Fentanyl to Mrs. Gray's daughter during a procedure to 

test her for meningitis. The daughter experienced a 

convulsion, stopped breathing, and her face turned blue. Mrs. 

Gray, who was "standing next to her daughter . . . observed 

the condition of her daughter [and Gray] experienced extreme 

fright and shock, temporarily blacked out, fell to the floor, 

and became physically sick and vomited." Id., 514 S.E.2d at 

356. 

 We reviewed the allegations contained in Gray's motion 

for judgment, and we held that INOVA owed no duty to Mrs. Gray 

because she was not the patient upon whom medical tests were 

performed. Id. at 599, 514 S.E.2d at 356. Unlike the 

pleadings in Gray, the plaintiffs' motions for judgment filed 

in the present cases contain allegations that defendants 

Strehler and Chippenham Pediatric "agreed to provide the 

Didato family all health care [that] members of a family 

should receive from a pediatrician and a professional 

corporation engaged in providing health care services relating 

to the practice of pediatrics." 

 Moreover, we have stated that a "plaintiff who seeks to 

establish actionable negligence must plead the existence of a 

15
legal duty, violation of that duty, and proximate causation 

which results in injury." Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 

Corp., 259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 826, 830 (2000). The 

plaintiffs pled that in 1987, a consensus was reached among 

representatives of the concerned medical specialties, 

including pediatricians, that "[g]ood medical practice 

dictated that screening for sickle cell disease and 

thalassemia should be provided to all newborns," that the 

results of such tests should be communicated to the parents of 

the child and that "[a] referral source for family testing and 

genetic counseling should be clearly identified for the 

parents." Assuming that the plaintiffs can establish at a 

trial that the standard of care in this Commonwealth required 

that a reasonably prudent pediatrician discharge these duties, 

that the defendants failed to do so, and that their failure 

was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, then the 

plaintiffs would establish prima facie cases of negligence. 

B. 

 The plaintiffs contend that their amended motions for 

judgment contain cognizable causes of action against the 

defendants because the plaintiffs pled that "the defendants 

assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care in the 

communication of information [to them,] even if no duty had 

existed prior to this undertaking." Thus, the plaintiffs 

16
contend that the circuit court erred in sustaining the 

defendants' demurrers. Responding, the defendants state that 

they cannot assume a duty to a non-patient to comply with the 

standard of care set forth in [Code] § 8.01-581.20, which 

states in relevant part: 

 "A. In any proceeding before a medical 

malpractice review panel or in any action against a 

physician . . . or other health care provider to 

recover damages alleged to have been caused by 

medical malpractice where the acts or omissions so 

complained of are alleged to have occurred in this 

Commonwealth, the standard of care by which the acts 

or omissions are to be judged shall be that degree 

of skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably 

prudent practitioner in the field of practice or 

specialty in this Commonwealth and the testimony of 

an expert witness, otherwise qualified, as to such 

standard of care, shall be admitted; provided, 

however, that the standard of care in the locality 

or in similar localities in which the alleged act or 

omission occurred shall be applied if any party 

shall prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the health care services and health care facilities 

available in the locality and the customary 

practices in such locality or similar localities 

give rise to a standard of care which is more 

appropriate than a statewide standard. . . . 

 "B. In any action for damages resulting from 

medical malpractice, any issue as to the standard of 

care to be applied shall be determined by the jury, 

or the court trying the case without a jury." 

We disagree with the defendants' contentions. 

 As the plaintiffs correctly point out, and the defendants 

do not dispute, we have cited with approval the legal 

principle that "[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes 

to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject 

17
to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." Nolde 

Bros. v. Wray, 221 Va. 25, 28, 266 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1980) 

(quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922)); 

accord Ring v. Poelman, 240 Va. 323, 326, 397 S.E.2d 824, 826 

(1990); Cofield v. Nuckles, 239 Va. 186, 192, 387 S.E.2d 493, 

496 (1990). We also observe that this common law principle is 

embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323: 

"One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 

consideration, to render services to another which 

he should recognize as necessary for the protection 

of the other's person or things, is subject to 

liability to the other for physical harm resulting 

from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 

perform his undertaking, if 

 "(a) his failure to exercise such care 

increases the risk of such harm, or 

 "(b) the harm is suffered because of the 

other's reliance upon the undertaking." 

 Even if the plaintiffs are unable to establish with 

evidence at trial that the standard of care required that a 

reasonably prudent pediatrician communicate certain 

information to them, the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts 

which, if proven at trial, would permit the finder of fact to 

conclude that the defendants assumed the duty to convey to the 

plaintiffs the correct results of their daughter's test, which 

indicated that she carried the sickle cell trait. 

 The defendants' contention that they could not assume a 

duty to a non-patient to comply with the standard of care in 

Code § 8.01-581.20 is without merit. We find no language in 

18
Code § 8.01-581.20 which vitiates the common law rule that one 

who assumes a duty must discharge that duty with reasonable 

care. 

C. 

 The plaintiffs contend that "[u]nder certain 

circumstances . . . a physician will owe a duty to a person 

who is not a patient if there is a special relationship 

between the person and the physician." Continuing, the 

plaintiffs contend that a special relationship existed between 

them and the defendants which imposed certain duties upon the 

defendants, including the duty to warn the plaintiffs that 

there was "a mathematically certain risk of 25% that any 

future child of the Didatos would suffer from sickle cell beta 

O thalassemia." The plaintiffs rely upon the following 

decisions to support their contentions: Thompson v. Skate 

America, Inc., 261 Va. 121, 540 S.E.2d 123 (2001); Delk, 259 

Va. 125, 523 S.E.2d 826; A.H. v. Rockingham Publishing Co., 

255 Va. 216, 495 S.E.2d 482 (1998); and Burdette v. Marks, 244 

Va. 309, 421 S.E.2d 419 (1992). We disagree with the 

plaintiffs' contentions. 

 We have held that generally a person does not have a duty 

to protect another from the conduct of third persons. Delk, 

259 Va. at 132, 523 S.E.2d at 830; Burdette, 244 Va. at 311, 

421 S.E.2d at 420; Marshall v. Winston, 239 Va. 315, 318, 389 

19
S.E.2d 902, 904 (1990). However, we stated that this general 

rule does not apply when a special relationship exists between 

a defendant and a plaintiff which gives rise to a right to 

protection to the plaintiff or between the defendant and third 

persons which imposes a duty upon the defendant to control the 

third person's conduct. Thompson, 261 Va. at 129, 540 S.E.2d 

at 127; Delk, 259 Va. at 132, 523 S.E.2d at 830-31; A.H., 255 

Va. at 220, 495 S.E.2d at 485; Burdette, 244 Va. at 312, 421 

S.E.2d at 420; Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration, 241 Va. 

270, 276, 401 S.E.2d 878, 881 (1991); Fox v. Custis, 236 Va. 

69, 74, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1988); Klingbeil Management Group 

Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 447-48, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1987). 

We hold that the plaintiffs failed to plead cognizable causes 

of action within the ambit of our jurisprudence governing 

special relationships as discussed in Thompson v. Skate 

America, Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., A.H. v. 

Rockingham Publishing Co., Burdette v. Marks, and Nasser v. 

Parker, 249 Va. 172, 455 S.E.2d 502 (1995), because those 

relationships give rise to a duty of protection from criminal 

acts committed by third parties. The legal principles 

articulated and applied in these cases have no application 

here. 

IV. 

20
 Accordingly, we will affirm that portion of the circuit 

court's judgments that sustained the defendants' demurrers on 

the basis that the plaintiffs failed to plead causes of action 

that gave rise to a special relationship between the 

plaintiffs and the defendants. We will reverse the remaining 

portions of the circuit court's judgments, and we will remand 

these cases for further proceedings on the plaintiffs' claims 

of negligence and assumption of duties. 

Record No. 003030 – Affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

and remanded. 

Record No. 003031 – Affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

and remanded. 

21