Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2394 | March 23, 2020 Page 1 of 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Brian Woodward

Office of the Lake County Public 

Defender – Appellate Division

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Roger P. Orich,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 23, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2394

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G04-1809-F5-195

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Roger P. Orich (“Orich”) pleaded guilty in Lake Superior Court to one count of 

Level 5 felony possession of child pornography and was sentenced to five years, 
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with four years to be served in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) and one 

year in community corrections. Orich appeals and presents three issues, which 

we restate as: 

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Orich’s 

request to remove copies of the charging information and the 

probable cause affidavit from the presentence investigation report; 

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by considering 

aggravating factors that were not supported by the record; and 

III. Whether the trial court overlooked mitigating factors that were 

clearly supported by the record. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The facts, as admitted by Orich at his guilty plea hearing, are that he collected 

images depicting children under the age of twelve displaying their genitals, 

uncovered breasts, and being fondled. Orich also admitted that these images 

had no literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. On September 21, 2018, the 

State charged Orich with Level 5 felony possession of child pornography and 

Level 6 felony possession of child pornography. On September 10, 2019, Orich 

pleaded guilty to both charges.1

1 The trial court “merged” the Level 6 felony conviction with the Level 5 felony charge for purposes of 

sentencing and entered judgment of conviction only on the Level 5 felony. 
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[4] At the subsequent sentencing hearing, Indiana State Police detective Vicki 

Maxwell (“Detective Maxwell”) testified regarding the investigation of Orich. 

She explained that the case began when she received a tip from the National 

Center for Missing and Exploited Children that someone had uploaded pictures 

to the Internet that depicted child pornography. Further investigation 

determined that the person who had uploaded the pictures was Orich. Detective 

Maxwell learned that, in 1991, Orich had been charged with battery and child 

molesting against his adopted daughter but convicted only of battery. In 1993, 

he was charged with, but found not guilty, of molesting the same victim. Orich 

had also been arrested in 1981 for exposing himself to school children. 

[5] Detective Maxwell also explained that, when the police executed the warrant to 

search Orich’s residence, they found various items, including “naked posters of 

women on the walls, anime. Anime children were on his sheets.” Tr. p. 23. 

They also found a chair with a painting of a nude woman tied to the chair with 

a gag-ball in her mouth, sex toys, women’s lingerie, and dolls. She explained 

that all of the items appeared to be sexual in nature. In the nightstand next to 

Orich’s bed the police found pictures of child pornography. She also testified 

that, during the search of Orich’s home, the police found DVDs containing 

numerous image files of child pornography and a hard drive containing over 

340,000 images of pornography, including images of adult pornography; 

bondage; sexual torture; child pornography; virtual pornography of adults, 

children, and infants; children in “seductive” poses; infants with their genitals 
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exposed; children bathing; children using the toilet; and sexual acts with child 

dolls.

[6] A search of an external hard drive found in Orich’s home revealed 4,790 

pornographic images. Some of the images depicted the worst forms of child 

sexual assault, including young children being raped vaginally and anally by 

adults. The police submitted the images found in Orich’s collection to the 

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, who identified 366 images 

as known images of child pornography involving scores of known child victims. 

A search of Orich’s computer also revealed that he had used an internet search 

engine to look for several disturbing terms, including “daughter yells no daddy, 

stop daddy, violent rape, 3D dad f**king baby son, 3D incest sex, 3D kidnap 

little girl torture, 3D little girls dead abused.” Tr. p. 26. The search engine had 

also been used to look for images of bestiality. 

[7] At the sentencing hearing, Orich presented the testimony of psychologist 

Robert Coyle (“Dr. Coyle”), who began treating Orich in January 2019 after he 

had been charged in the present case. Dr. Coyle testified that Orich had a 

hoarding disorder and that his collection of child pornography was a “small 

part” of the items he collected, including such innocuous items as comic books. 

Tr. p. 52. Dr. Coyle testified that Orich had an average IQ of 94 but had a lower 

level of cognitive functioning, which he attributed to a childhood injury and 

chronic alcohol abuse. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Coyle admitted 

that most of the information he had regarding Orich had been self-reported by 
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Orich. He also admitted that Orich had underreported the magnitude and 

nature of his pornography collection. 

[8] At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found as mitigating 

that Orich had pleaded guilty, that he had expressed remorse, and that 

incarceration would cause an undue hardship on Orich due to his mental health 

issues. The trial court also noted that Orich had led an apparently law-abiding 

life for twenty years. The trial court found as aggravating Orich’s prior criminal 

history and his pattern of inappropriate behavior involving children. The trial 

court also found as aggravating the quantity of images Orich possessed and the 

horrific nature of the abuse depicted. The trial court noted that Orich 

underreported his conduct to Dr. Coyle. The trial court sentenced Orich to five 

years, with four years to be served in the DOC and one year to be served in 

community corrections. Orich now appeals. 

I. Presentence Investigation Report

[9] Orich first claims that the trial court erred by denying his request to remove 

copies of the charging information and the probable cause affidavit from the 

presentence investigation report (“PSIR”). In the present case, the charging 

information provided: 

COUNT I

[POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (a Level 5 

Felony)]

Vicki Maxwell, upon oath, says that on or about September 19, 

2018, in the County of Lake, State of Indiana, Roger Paul Orich 

did knowingly or intentionally possess or access with intent to 
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view pictures or photographs that depicts or describes sexual 

conduct by a child who appears to be less than eighteen (18) 

years of age and that lacks serious literary, artistic, political or 

scientific value and the child who is depicted or described is less 

than twelve (12) years of age contrary to I.C. 35-42-4-4(d) and 

I.C. 35-42-4-4(e)(1) and against the peace and dignity of the State 

of Indiana.

COUNT II

[POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (a Level 6 

Felony)]

Vicki Maxwell, upon oath, says that on or about September 19, 

2018, in the County of Lake, State of Indiana, Roger Paul Orich 

did knowingly or intentionally possess or access with intent to 

view pictures or photographs that depicts or describes sexual 

conduct by a child who appears to be less than eighteen (18) 

years of age and that lacks serious literary, artistic, political or 

scientific value contrary to I.C. 35-42-4-4(d) and against the 

peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.

Appellant’s App. p. 10. 

[10] The probable cause affidavit described the execution of the search warrant at 

Orich’s home and detailed some of the items found during the search. 

Specifically, it described fourteen photos of child pornography found near 

Orich’s bed, which included depictions of children from the age of five through 

sixteen in various sexual situations, including exposing their genitals, buttocks, 

and breasts. One of these photos depicted a three-to-five-year-old child holding 

a man’s penis; and another depicted a four-to-six-year-old child with a man’s 

penis in her vagina. Six other pictures were found that depicted young girls 
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between the ages of seven to twelve in their underwear and in sexually 

suggestive poses. 

[11] The probable cause affidavit further stated that the police found 691 images 

containing child pornography on various electronic devices in Orich’s home. 

The victims depicted in these images ranged in age from infants to adolescents. 

The images depicted young boys and girls in underwear or bathing suits, in 

sexually suggestive poses. Others depicted nude children, and some had been 

altered to put cartoon anime faces on the children. Others depicted young girls 

giving and receiving oral sex from adult men or having sex with adult men. The 

affidavit then gave a detailed description of six of these images, which included 

a young girl with a man’s penis in her mouth, another young girl licking a 

man’s penis, a girl with what appeared to be semen on her, another of a baby 

with a penis in her mouth, another with a young girl with a penis in front of her 

mouth, and one of a baby with her genitals exposed. Id. at 11–12. 

[12] At the sentencing hearing, Orich asked that the trial court “excise” the charging 

information and the probable cause affidavit from the PSIR. Tr. p. 73. The trial 

court denied this request, noting that the DOC uses the PSIR in determining 

placement. Orich now claims that the trial court erred by denying his request. 

[13] In addressing Orich’s claim, we note that decisions regarding the admission of 

evidence at a sentencing hearing are entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. 

Couch v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1013, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The 

Indiana Rules of Evidence, other than those regarding privileges, do not apply 
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at sentencing hearings. Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2). We have explained before 

that: 

[t]he rationale for the relaxation of evidentiary rules at sentencing 

is that in a trial the issue is whether a defendant is guilty of 

having engaged in certain criminal conduct. Rules of evidence 

narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is strictly 

relevant to the crime charged. At sentencing, however, the 

evidence is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. The task is 

to determine the type and extent of punishment. This 

individualized sentencing process requires possession of the 

fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and 

characteristics.

Thomas v. State, 562 N.E.2d 43, 47–48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 

[14] Indiana Code section 35-38-1-8(a) provides that, with certain exceptions for a 

person convicted of a Level 6 felony,2 “a defendant convicted of a felony may 

not be sentenced before a written presentence report is prepared by a probation 

officer and considered by the sentencing court.” See also Dickenson v. State, 835 

N.E.2d 542, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“The only reason to file a PSI[R] is to 

provide information to the court for use at individualized sentencing.”), trans. 

denied.

[15] The content of a PSIR is controlled by Indiana Code section 35-38-1-9, which 

first describes the presentence investigation as consisting of “the gathering of 

2

Indiana Code section 35-38-1-8(c) provides that a trial court may sentence a person convicted of a Level 6 

felony without considering a written PSIR. If, however, a defendant convicted of a Level 6 felony is 

sentenced to the DOC or a community corrections program, then the probation officer must prepare a report 

to be sent to the DOC. 
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information with respect to . . . the circumstances attending the commission of 

the offense [and] . . . the convicted person’s history of delinquency or 

criminality, social history, employment history, family situation, economic 

status, education, and personal habits.” Id. at § 9(b)(1), (2). The investigation 

must also gather information regarding “the impact of the crime upon the 

victim,” and whether the convicted person is in a licensed or certified 

profession, or employed, or previously employed, as a teacher. Id. at § 9(b)(3), 

(4). The presentence investigation must include: “(1) any matters the court 

directs to be included; (2) any written statements submitted to the prosecuting 

attorney by a victim under IC 35-35-3; (3) any written statements submitted to 

the probation officer by a victim; and (4) preparation of the victim impact 

statement required under section 8.5 of this chapter,” and may include “any 

matter that the probation officer conducting the investigation believes is 

relevant to the question of sentence.” Id. at § 9(c). 

[16] Once a PSIR is prepared, a trial court must, prior to sentencing, either “advise 

the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney of the factual contents 

and conclusions of the [PSIR]” or “provide the defendant or his counsel and the 

prosecuting attorney with a copy of the [PSIR].” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-12(a). If 

the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the PSIR must be sent to 

the DOC. 

[17] Thus, under the statutes governing PSIRs, there is no requirement that a PSIR 

must include the charging information or probable cause affidavit. But there is 

also nothing that prohibits the inclusion of these items in a PSIR. To the 
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contrary, a PSIR must include “the circumstances attending the commission of 

the offense,” I.C. § 35-38-1-9(b)(1), and may include “any matter that the 

probation officer conducting the investigation believes is relevant to the 

question of sentence.” Id. at § 9(c). Thus, if the probation officer believes the 

charging information or probable cause affidavit to be relevant, they may be 

included in the PSIR. We therefore cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying Orich’s request to excise the charging information and 

probable cause affidavit from the PSIR. 

[18] Furthermore, the charging information and probable cause affidavit were 

already a part of the trial court’s record. And the testimony of Detective 

Maxwell at the sentencing hearing detailed the circumstances of Orich’s 

possession of child pornography. We therefore fail to see how the inclusion of 

the charging information or the probable cause affidavit in the PSIR prejudiced 

Orich beyond the information that was already in the trial court’s record.

[19] Orich nevertheless claims that this court has held before that, simply because a 

defendant acknowledges that the information in a PSIR is correct, does not 

mean that the facts contained in the PSIR may be used to enhance a sentence. 

See Appellant’s Br. at 9 (citing Vela v. State, 832 N.E.2d 610, 613–14 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005)). Vela was decided after our supreme court held that Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applied to Indiana’s old “presumptive” 

sentencing scheme. See Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005). At the time 

Vela was decided, any fact—other than the fact of a prior conviction or one 

admitted to by the defendant—that was used to enhance a sentence had to be 
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found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. See Vela, 832 N.E.2d at 613. 

Thus, what the Vela court held was that a defendant’s act of admitting that the 

information in a PSIR was correct was not equivalent to admitting to the facts 

contained therein for purposes of Blakely and Smylie.

3

[20] Shortly after Vela was decided, our General Assembly abandoned the old 

“presumptive” sentencing scheme and adopted the current “advisory” 

sentencing scheme, under which a trial court may sentence a defendant within 

the statutory sentencing range regardless of the presence of aggravating or 

mitigating facts. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 488 (Ind. 2007), clarified 

on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (citing Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d)). Accordingly, the 

holding in Vela, which applied to the prior sentencing scheme, does not apply 

here. 

II. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

[21] Orich also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in its identification of 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Sentencing decisions are entrusted to 

the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court’s decision 

only for an abuse of this discretion. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490. A trial court 

abuses its discretion when its sentencing decision is “clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, 

3 This holding was not shared by other panels of this court. See Sullivan v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1031, 1036 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2005); Carmona v. State, 827 N.E.2d 588, 596–97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (both holding that a 

defendant’s confirmation of the accuracy of a PSIR, when given an opportunity to contest it, amounts to an 

admission of information contained in the report for Blakely purposes).
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probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. There are several 

ways in which a trial court may abuse its discretion, including: failing to enter a 

sentencing statement at all, articulating reasons in a sentencing statement that 

are not supported by the record, omitting reasons in a sentencing statement that 

are clearly supported by the record, or articulating reasons that are improper as 

a matter of law. Id. at 490–91. However, the relative weight the trial court 

assigns to various aggravators or mitigators is no longer subject to review for an 

abuse of discretion. Id. at 491.

[22] Orich argues that the trial court abused its discretion by considering certain 

factors as aggravating. He first claims that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the following findings of the trial court in its sentencing order: 

1. The defendant has had prior contact with the criminal justice 

system. The Court finds that in 1981, the defendant was 

arrested for “flashing” school children. Further, in 1991, the 

defendant was charged with Battery and Child Molesting his 

daughter. In 1993, the defendant was once again charged with 

Battery and Child Molesting of his daughter. The 1991

molesting resulted in a conviction for Battery. The Court finds 

that there [is] also uncharged conduct where the defendant 

was reported to the Department of Child Welfare Services for 

allegedly fondling his daughter in 1986; 

2. The Court finds the defendant to have a pattern of 

inappropriate behavior with children, which reflects adversely 

on the defendant’s character; 

3. In several reports, the defendant admitted touching his 

daughter[.]
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Appellant’s App. p. 88. Contrary to Orich’s claims, there was ample evidence to 

support these findings. 

[23] Detective Maxwell testified to the following facts: her investigation of Orich 

revealed that he had been arrested in 1981 for exposing himself to school 

children; he was arrested and charged for battery and child molesting in 1991 

and was convicted of battery; he was arrested again for child molesting his 

daughter in 1993 but found not guilty; and he had been investigated by child 

welfare services in 1986 for fondling his daughter and admitted to sexual 

misconduct with his daughter to the investigators. Thus, there was evidence 

before the court to support the trial court’s findings. 

[24] To the extent that Orich claims that the trial court could not consider these 

incidents as aggravating because they did not result in criminal convictions, he 

is mistaken. It is true that a history of arrests, without more, does not establish 

the historical fact that a defendant committed a criminal offense, and may not 

be properly considered as evidence of criminal history; however, an arrest 

record, especially a lengthy one, may indicate that a defendant has not been 

deterred from criminal activity even after extensive contact with the criminal 

justice system. Vermillion v. State, 978 N.E.2d 459, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)

(citing Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 (Ind. 2005)). “Such information may 

be relevant to the trial court’s assessment of the defendant’s character in terms 

of the risk that he will commit another crime.” Id.
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[25] Here, Orich was repeatedly arrested for sexual misconduct involving children. 

The trial court could properly consider this in determining Orich’s sentence. See 

id.; see also Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 841 (Ind. 1999) (holding that trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by considering evidence at sentencing hearing 

that defendant had attempted to molest his three-year-old sister a few weeks 

before murdering another child).

[26] Orich also claims that the trial court erred by relying upon other aggravators 

that were not supported by the record. Specifically: 

4. The defendant gave a statement wherein he said that the 

child pornography did not arouse his sexual desires and 

reported [the] same to Dr. Coyle. However, the detective 

testified that sexual toys were found in the defendant’s 

home, which the Court presumes were used for their 

intended purposes; 

* * *

10. Several items searched for or downloaded by the defendant 

are heinous such as a six (6) year old boy being penetrated 

while crying. Some searches found on the defendant’s 

computer were of “dead and abused children.” 

11. The Court finds that in Dr. Coyle’s report, the defendant 

seriously under reported, what the Court assumes to be an 

addiction to pornography, to Dr. Coyle because he said part 

of the his [sic] total collection of various types of 

pornography were mostly “cartoonish” in nature, with some 

disrobed children in photographs who were engaging in 

various sexual acts that rarely involve “coitus,” which is 

clearly a misrepresentation of the content that was found at 

the defendant’s home. 
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Appellant’s App. pp. 88–89. 

[27] Orich claims that the finding No. 4 “is not aggravating at all and is in fact a 

non-sequitur.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. He contends that there was no evidence 

linking the child pornography found in his home, his sexual desires, or the sex 

toys found in his home. We think the trial court was well within its discretion, 

as the finder of fact at a sentencing hearing, to make a reasonable inference that 

Orich collected child pornography to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires. This is 

especially so given his prior history of sexual behavior with children, his 

disturbing internet searches, and his collection of sexual toys. 

[28] Orich claims that finding No. 10 is “simply not supported by the record.” Id. at 

15. This is incorrect. Detective Maxwell specifically testified that images and 

videos found in Orich’s possession included a video of a young child4 being 

anally penetrated while crying. Tr. p. 29. She also testified that the search of 

Orich’s computer revealed that he had used a search engine to look for terms 

including “3D incest sex, 3D kidnap little girl torture, 3D little girls dead 

abused.” Tr. p. 26. Thus, the trial court’s finding is well supported by the 

record. 

[29] Despite this, Orich claims that the trial court “misinterpreted” these searches as 

searches for real-life depictions, whereas, he claims, they were merely searches 

4 According to Detective Maxwell, this child was a “unknown white female” approximately four to six years 

old. Tr. p. 29. The trial court’s sentencing order states that this child was a “boy.” Appellant’s App. p. 89. 

This minor discrepancy is not grounds for reversal, as the fact remains that Orich was in possession of a 

video depicting a horrific sexual assault of a young child. 
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for virtual images. Again, we disagree. First, the fact that Orich searched for 

“3D images” does not necessarily mean that he was interested only in virtual 

images; it is well known that even real-life photographs and videos can be 

captured and viewed in 3D. Moreover, even assuming that Orich was interested 

only in virtual images, the fact that Orich searched for such vile terms is 

indicative of the depth of his depravity and his prurient interest in violent sex 

acts involving children. The trial court properly considered such circumstances 

as aggravating. 

[30] Lastly, Orich claims that there was no evidence to support the trial court’s 

conclusion that Orich had a pornography addiction. This argument borders on 

frivolous. Given both the staggering amount and disturbing nature of the 

pornography found in Orich’s possession, the trial court could reasonably 

conclude that Orich had an obsession with or an addiction to pornography.

[31] Orich also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to “properly 

consider” his mental health issues as a mitigating factor. Mental illness is not 

necessarily a significant mitigating factor. Townsend v. State, 45 N.E.3d 821, 831 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Ousley v. State, 807 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2004)), trans. denied. Instead, mental illness may be a mitigating factor under 

certain circumstances, such as when the evidence demonstrates longstanding 

mental health issues or when the jury finds the defendant mentally ill. Id. The 

mitigating weight to be given to a defendant’s mental illness depends on several 

factors, including: 
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(1) the extent of the defendant’s inability to control his or her 

behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall 

limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; 

and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or 

impairment and the commission of the crime. 

Lopez v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1254, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Biehl v. State, 

738 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied), trans. denied. 

[32] Here, there was some evidence that Orich had suffered a traumatic brain injury 

and that he suffered from mental health issues. The trial court specifically noted 

that Orich had attempted suicide in the past, and Dr. Coyle testified that Orich 

had a hoarding disorder. The trial court recognized these facts as mitigating but 

did not assign them significant mitigating weight. Specifically, the trial court 

stated that imprisonment would be a hardship on Orich because he has suffered 

traumatic “brain injury and has attempted suicide several times in the past[.]” 

Appellant’s App. p. 88. The trial court was also not persuaded by Dr. Coyle’s 

testimony, noting that Orich had significantly underreported the nature and 

quantity of his child pornography collection: 

You have been seeking counseling with Dr. Coyle. Although I’m 

sure it is helpful, I’m not sure that it was geared specifically to the 

issues that were brought forth today. On Page 3 [of his report], 

Dr. Coyle says that you admit you had child pornography as 

total – as a part of your total collection of various types of porn, 

but said it was mostly cartoonish in nature with some disrobed 

children in photographs that were engaged in various sex acts 

that rarely involved coitus. The evidence today presented by the 

State would belie that. So I don’t know that Dr. Coyle had an 
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accurate depiction of why it is that you should have been there, 

but you did seek treatment. 

Tr. pp. 85–86. 

[33] Accordingly, this is not a case where the trial court wholly overlooked the 

defendant’s mental illness. Instead, the trial court recognized Orich’s mental 

health issues but assigned them little mitigating weight. The trial court also 

considered Dr. Coyle’s testimony but gave it little weight because it was based 

on Orich’s own reports of his behavior, in which he seriously underreported the 

nature and scope of his child pornography collection. On appeal, we may not 

re-assess the trial court’s decision to assign this mitigator little weight. See 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. We therefore cannot say that the trial court 

abused its discretion by failing to consider Orich’s mental health issues as a 

significant mitigating factor. 

Conclusion

[34] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Orich’s objection to the 

inclusion of the charging information and probable cause affidavit in the 

presentence investigation report. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in 

its identification of aggravating and mitigating factors. Accordingly, we affirm 

the judgment of the trial court. 

[35] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.