1

Filed 6/23/23 P. v. Janda CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Butte)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOHNNY RAM SINGH JANDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

C096945

(Super. Ct. Nos. 20CF03300, 

21CM01750, 21CF03198)

In three separate cases, defendant Johnny Ram Singh Janda pleaded no contest to

criminal threats, exhibiting a deadly weapon, carrying a dirk or dagger, and disobeying a 

court order. On the principal term of criminal threats, the trial court sentenced defendant 

to the upper term of three years.
2

Defendant now contends (1) the trial court erred in sentencing him to the upper 

term in violation of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567)

(Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b);

1 Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022); (2) if he 

forfeited the first argument, his counsel was ineffective in failing to object; and (3) we 

should correct the trial court’s inaccurate statement that defendant would be subject to 

parole for three years following his release from custody.

We conclude (1) defendant forfeited the challenge based on Senate Bill 567, (2) he 

has not established ineffective assistance, and (3) because the trial court’s comment 

regarding parole was not part of the imposed sentence, it requires no further action on our 

part. We will affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Because the parties stipulated to the probation report as the factual basis for 

defendant’s pleas, we take the facts from that report.

In case No. 20CF03300, defendant threatened to kill his father with a knife in 

July 2020. Specifically, defendant was under the influence of drugs, picked up a kitchen 

knife, thrust it at his father, and said “I’m going to kill you . . . .” The complaint, later 

deemed an information, charged defendant with criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)) and

exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)).

In case No. 21CM01750, defendant violated the protective order issued in the 

prior case by telling his father he was going to kill his father’s wife (defendant’s mother)

in March 2021. The complaint in that case charged defendant with disobeying a court 

order. (§ 166, subd. (a)(4).)

In case No. 21CF03198, defendant was kneeling on the sidewalk in front of his 

home in June 2021. A responding officer found an eight-inch chef’s knife in his right 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

front pants pocket. The complaint in that case charged defendant with carrying a dirk or 

dagger (§ 21310) and disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)).

On July 28, 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to

criminal threats (§ 422) and exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)) in case 

No. 20CF03300; disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)) in case No. 21CM01750; 

and carrying a dirk or dagger (§ 21310) and disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4))

in case No. 21CF03198. The trial court informed defendant his maximum potential 

sentence under the agreement was three years eight months, and defendant said he 

understood.

At a sentencing hearing on September 7, 2022, the trial court indicated a tentative 

sentence and heard from counsel, defendant, and the victim. The trial court then said: 

“[Defendant] didn’t stipulate to the existence of aggravating factors, nor did the jury find 

aggravating factors to be true; however, the court here, nonetheless, finds that 

aggravating circumstances outweigh the circumstances in mitigation. [¶] In aggravation, 

his prior convictions as an adult are numerous. He has served prior prison terms. He was 

on probation when he picked up new criminal offenses. [¶] In mitigation, it does appear 

to the court that much of [defendant’s] issues with substance abuse are related to his 

service in the military.”

The trial court sentenced defendant as follows: the upper term of three years for

the criminal threats (§ 422), a concurrent six-month term for exhibiting a deadly weapon

(§ 417, subd. (a)(1)), a consecutive eight-month term (one-third the middle term) for 

carrying a dirk or dagger (§ 21310), a concurrent one-year term for disobeying a court 

order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)), and a concurrent one-year term for disobeying a court order 

(§ 166, subd. (a)(4)). The trial court stated: “He’ll be on parole for three years following 

his release.”
4

DISCUSSION

I

Defendant argues we must remand the matter for resentencing because the trial 

court sentenced him to the upper term in violation of section 1170, subdivision (b) as 

modified by Senate Bill 567.

Senate Bill 567 became effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731; 

Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c).) The legislation generally prohibits a trial court 

from imposing an upper term sentence except where there are circumstances in 

aggravation of the crime that justify imposing the upper term and the facts underlying 

those circumstances (1) have been stipulated to by the defendant, or (2) have been found 

true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. 

(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) 

The record shows defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court were aware 

of Senate Bill 567 during the sentencing hearing because the presentence probation report 

referenced the change brought about by the new legislation. The report stated: “The 

middle term is now recommended due to the sentencing constraints that have gone into 

effect since the original sentencing date on December 1, 2021.” Further, at sentencing, 

the trial court expressly stated defendant “didn’t stipulate to the existence of aggravating 

factors, nor did the jury find aggravating factors to be true; however, the court here, 

nonetheless, finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh the circumstances in 

mitigation.” The trial court indicated awareness of the new sentencing requirements. 

Defendant could have, but did not, object to the upper term sentence. His

failure to object forfeited the appellate challenge here. (People v. Garcia (2010) 

185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1218 [“ ‘Claims of error relating to sentences “which, though 

otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner” 

are waived on appeal if not first raised in the trial court.’ ” (Italics omitted.)].)
5

II

Anticipating forfeiture, defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective in failing 

to object to the aggravated term.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that 

(1) trial counsel’s representation was deficient because it fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficiency resulted in 

prejudice to defendant. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai); Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688.)

“On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if 

(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the 

challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, 

or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 

p. 1009.)

The record here is silent as to counsel’s reasons for not objecting to the upper term 

sentence. Defense counsel was not asked on the record for his reason, nor does the 

record contain any affirmative evidence counsel had no rational tactical purpose for 

refusing to object. We surmise there could have been a legitimate reason why defense 

counsel may have chosen not to object.

Section 1203 mandates that a presentence probation report be made available to 

the court and the prosecuting and defense attorneys at least five days prior to the hearing. 

(§ 1203, subd. (b)(2)(E).) The report referenced defendant’s prior convictions, prior 

prison terms, and probation violations. It indicated that defendant was on probation at the 

time of the current offense. There is no indication defense counsel did not receive the 

report and did not fully investigate the report and its attachments prior to the hearing.

(In re Brown (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1223.)

Defense counsel could have concluded that in light of the probation report, 

objecting under Senate Bill 567 would accomplish nothing more than requiring the 
6

prosecution to introduce certified records matching what the probation report already 

detailed. (Burt v. Titlow (2013) 571 U.S. 12, 22 [under Strickland, “counsel should be 

‘strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment’ ”].) In other words, 

defense counsel reasonably could have determined that raising a Senate Bill 567 

objection would merely prolong the sentencing proceeding but would not change the 

ultimate outcome. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 [defense counsel does not 

render ineffective assistance of counsel by declining to make objections that counsel 

reasonably determines would be futile].) Indeed, although defense counsel urged 

treatment for his client, defense counsel conceded that the prosecution’s 

recommendations were otherwise appropriate. Because we cannot exclude a reasonable 

tactical basis for the absence of an objection, defendant has failed to carry his burden on 

direct appeal to show his counsel provided ineffective assistance.

III

In addition, defendant asks us to correct the trial court’s statement at sentencing 

that defendant would be on parole for three years following his release from custody.

Section 3000.01 governs periods of parole for individuals released from state 

prison on or after July 1, 2020. (§ 3000.01, subd. (a).) It limits, with exceptions not 

applicable here, the period of parole for an inmate serving a determinate term to two 

years. (§ 3000.01, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court made a misstatement when it said that 

defendant would be on parole for three years.

Nevertheless, parole “is a statutorily mandated element of punishment, and neither 

the prosecution nor the sentencing court has authority to impose a prison sentence 

without parole or to alter the applicable period of parole established by the Legislature 

and imposed by the Board of Prison Terms.” (People v. Renfro (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 

223, 232.) We assume the trial court was aware it had no authority to set a parole term 

different than that imposed by section 3000.01. (See People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
7

1107, 1114 [a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable 

law].) Given the trial court’s limited authority, we interpret its comment regarding parole 

as merely an attempt to inform defendant of the additional consequences of his 

conviction. We conclude the comment requires no further action on our part.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 /S/

MAURO, J.

We concur:

 /S/

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

 /S/

RENNER, J.