J-A35028-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

J.F.M., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

C.P.,

Appellant No. 910 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order May 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County

Civil Division at No(s): 10709 of 2012, C.A.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2016

C.P. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on May 12, 2015, in 

the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas, denying her petition to 

relocate to Austin, Texas, with her daughter, K.N.M. (“Child”), born in April 

of 2012. The order also denied the petition filed by Child’s father, J.F.M. 

(“Father”), seeking to modify the existing custody order.1 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history 

of this appeal as follows:

The Plaintiff, [Father] and the Defendant, [Mother] are the 

natural parents of the minor child. . . . Father initiated the 

instant custody action on June 12, 2012 by filing a Complaint in 

Custody. Following a Custody Conciliation Conference, an 

____________________________________________

1

Father has not challenged the denial of his petition for modification of 

custody.
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agreed upon Custody Order was entered whereby Mother 

enjoyed primary custody of [Child], subject to Father’s partial 

custody on Monday and Wednesday evenings and overnights 

every Friday. On April 22, 2013, Father petitioned to modify the 

existing Custody Order to increase his periods of partial custody. 

Following another Custody Conference, Father’s partial custody 

increased to overnight visitation every Wednesday evening and 

every weekend from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 

8:00 p.m., in addition to extensive summer and holiday 

visitation. Father filed a second Petition for Modification on 

August 4, 2014, wherein Father requested primary physical 

custody of [Child]. On October 27, 2014, Mother filed a Petition 

to Relocate with the minor child to Austin, Texas. Father 

opposed Mother’s relocation, and the [trial court] consolidated 

Mother’s request to relocate and Father’s request for primary 

physical custody for trial. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/15, at 1-2. 

The trial court held the custody trial over five days in March and April 

of 2015. During the trial, on March 18, 2015, Father presented the 

testimony of Kirk Lunnen, Ph.D., who conducted a custody and psychological 

evaluation of the parties. On March 18, 2015 and March 19, 2015, Father 

presented the testimony of Child’s paternal grandmother, R.M., who had 

notified Lawrence County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) about alleged 

potential health and safety concerns for Child at Mother’s home. On March 

18, 2015, Father presented the testimony of Gary Zarilla, who was the CYS 

Youth caseworker assigned to Child’s case. On March 19, 2015 and March 

27, 2015, Father testified on his own behalf. On April 16, 2015, Mother 
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testified on her own behalf. On April 23, 2015, Mother presented the 

testimony of her husband, J.M.2

The trial court summarized the testimony from the custody trial as 

follows:

Doctor Kirk Lunnen, a psychologist employed by People In Need, 

conducted a custody and psychological evaluation of the parties. 

Dr. Lunnen’s evaluation consisted of multiple interviews with the 

parties, Mother’s current husband, the paternal grandparents, 

and a home visit of Mother’s residence and Father’s residence. 

Dr. Lunnen ultimately opined that the best interests of the minor 

child would be served by implementing a fifty-fifty division of 

physical custody between the parties. Dr. Lunnen stated that he 

reached his conclusion after considering each party’s 

psychological evaluations, the parents’ relationship with the 

[Child], the close proximity of the parties’ residences, the ability 

of both Mother and Father to parent, and the parties’ available 

support systems. Dr. Lunnen further opined that the minor child 

is developing appropriately and, so far, appears unaffected by 

the custody dispute between the parties.

Father is currently twenty-three years old. Father resides 

with his parents, [R.M. and F.T.]. Father attends college at 

Youngstown State University full time, and he does not work. 

Father is completely reliant upon his parents for all of his 

financial support, including his monthly child support obligation 

of $100. Father is pursuing a degree in criminal justice. Father 

aspires to become a police officer. Father attends class every 

weekday at 10:000 [sic] a.m., and typically finishes his courses 

in the afternoon.

Father and Mother met in high school. They dated for 

approximately three years prior to Mother becoming pregnant. 

Mother and Father remained close, but they did not maintain an 

exclusive relationship. Father was present for [Child’s] birth, 

and he tried to assist Mother in caring for [Child] following her 

____________________________________________

2 Although both Father and Mother presented other witnesses, these were 

the witnesses whose testimony the trial court found significant. 
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birth. Father stated that he helped assemble [Child’s] crib, 

purchased clothing and baby items for [Child] and tried to assist 

Mother in feeding, clothing and comforting their child. 

Although Father and Mother tried to maintain a cordial 

relationship, their efforts were strained by the presence of 

Mother’s current husband, [J.M.]. When Father’s relationship 

with Mother began to deteriorate, Father filed a custody 

complaint in an effort to secure a steady visitation schedule 

between himself and [Child].

Mother notified Father of her desire to move to Austin, 

Texas in the Fall of 2013. Father stated that Mother was vague 

about her intentions, and she seemed to only be considering the 

idea. Father stated that the petition to modify custody, most 

recently filed, was not initiated by his fear that Mother would 

move, but rather, because Father was concerned that [Child] 

was arriving at his residence with scratches, bug bites and lice 

on her body. Father stated that he felt Mother was not keeping 

her home clean, and that the animals in Mother’s residence were 

causing [Child’s] ailments.

[Child’s] paternal grandmother, [R.M.], testified that 

[Child] has her own room at her residence. Father is the 

primary caregiver for [Child] when she is with Father, but [R.M.] 

enjoys assisting Father when [Child] is with him. [R.M.] stated 

that she has serious concerns about Mother’s household because 

[Child] frequently came to her house with lice, bug bites, and 

severe rashes on her private parts. [R.M.] contacted Children 

and Youth Services of Lawrence County regarding her concerns 

and they proceeded to conduct an evaluation.

Gary Zarilla was the Children and Youth caseworker 

assigned to [Child’s] case. Mr. Zarilla stated that when he 

initially visited Mother’s residence, there was a lot of garbage 

and clutter. There were dishes piled up in the sink and several 

pets living in the house. Mr. Zarilla generally described Mother’s 

house as “overwhelming”, but he did not observe any definitive 

safety concerns. Mr. Zarilla asked Mother to try and improve the 

overall appearance and cleanliness of her house. Mother 

complied with Mr. Zarilla’s request, and the conditions were 

drastically remedied upon Mr. Zarilla’s follow-up visit. Mr. Zarilla 

did not initiate any dependency proceedings on [Child’s] behalf.
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Mother testified that she has been the primary care giver 

[sic] for [Child] since [Child’s] birth. Following [Child’s] birth, 

Mother returned to her mother’s residence and lived with 

maternal grandmother until Mother obtained a residence with 

[J.M.]. Mother and [J.M.] subsequently married on August 28, 

2014 and had a child together on November 28, 2014. Mother 

stated that her desire to relocate is primarily based upon a job 

opportunity provided to her husband by her mother-in-law. 

Mother stated that she does not perceive Father as being a good 

provider for [Child], considering the fact that Father is 

completely dependent upon his parents for his financial needs. 

Mother believes that she and her husband could better provide 

for [Child] if they relocated to Austin, Texas because her 

husband would be working for his family’s business and earning 

in excess of $3,000.00 per month.

Mother wishes to further her education and believes this 

could be more easily accomplished if she was permitted to 

relocate with [Child] to Austin, Texas. Mother stated that she is 

amicable [sic] to the idea of living with her in-laws, and Mother 

believes that [J.M.] and his family could provide an adequate 

support system for her children subsequent to moving.

[J.M.], Mother’s husband, also testified on Mother’s behalf. 

[J.M.] is twenty-three years old. In addition to Mother and 

[J.M.’s] child, [J.M.] stated that he loves and cares for [Child]. 

However, [J.M.] is also conscientious of his role as her stepfather. [J.M.] does not intend to replace Father as a male figure 

in [Child’s] life.

[J.M.] would like to move with his family to Austin, Texas 

so that he could work for his mother in her family restaurant. 

[J.M.] proposed that he and Mother could move into his mother’s 

residence during their transition, and that they could save 

money to buy their own home. [J.M.] believes that his family 

could provide an adequate support system for Mother and her 

children.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/15, at 2-6.

In the order entered on May 12, 2015, the trial court denied Father’s 

petition to modify the existing custody order and denied Mother’s petition to 
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relocate to Austin, Texas, with Child. On June 10, 2015, Mother filed a 

notice of appeal along with a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 

In her brief on appeal, Mother raises five issues:

Issue I. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Mother 

failed to meet her burden of establishing that the relocation to 

Austin, Texas, would be in the child’s best interests and enhance 

the quality of life for the mother and the minor child[?]

Issue II: Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 

failing to take into consideration all of the relocation factors as 

set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h) in finding that “any benefit 

bestowed by relocation to Austin, Texas, could not outweigh the 

detrimental impact suffered by limiting Father’s relationship with 

[Child] to summer and holiday visitations[?]”

Issue III. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Mother 

failed or was required to exhaust all alternatives in Lawrence 

County to attempt to provide a financially stable lifestyle for her 

family before attempting to relocate to Austin, Texas[?]

Issue IV: Whether the trial court erred in failing to take into 

consideration as part of the mother’s request for relocation that 

the father currently provides very minimal, if any, financial 

support for the minor child[?]

Issue V: Whether the trial court erred in finding that the 

father/daughter relationship could not be preserved if the 

mother relocated to Austin, Texas[?]

Mother’s Brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted).

Initially, we observe that, as the custody trial in this matter was held 

in March of 2015, the Child Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5321 et seq. (the 

“Act”), is applicable. C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 445 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(holding that if the custody evidentiary proceeding commences on or after 
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the effective date of the Act, i.e., January 24, 2011, the provisions of the Act 

apply).

Our scope and standard of review is set forth below:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept 

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent 

evidence of record, as our role does not include making 

independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to 

the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses 

first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s 

deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, 

the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable 

as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the 

conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, 

or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the 

trial court.

C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443 (citation omitted).

We have also stated: 

[t]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters 

should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature 

of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on 

the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge 

gained by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody 

proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court 

by a printed record.

 

Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting

Jackson v. Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

In M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc), we 

observed the following regarding an abuse of discretion standard:

Although we are given a broad power of review, we are 

constrained by an abuse of discretion standard when evaluating 

the court’s order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error 
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of judgment, but if the court’s judgment is manifestly 

unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record, discretion is 

abused. An abuse of discretion is also made out where it 

appears from a review of the record that there is no evidence to 

support the court’s findings or that there is a capricious disbelief 

of evidence.

Id. at 18-19 (quotation and citations omitted).

With any custody case decided under the Act, the paramount concern 

is the best interests of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5328, 5338. Section 

5338 of the Act provides that, upon petition, a trial court may modify a 

custody order if it serves the best interests of the child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5338. 

Section 5323 of the Act provides for the following types of custody 

awards:

(a) Types of award.—After considering the factors set forth in 

section 5328 (relating to factors to consider when awarding 

custody), the court may award any of the following types of 

custody if it is in the best interest of the child:

(1) Shared physical custody.

(2) Primary physical custody.

(3) Partial physical custody.

(4) Sole physical custody.

(5) Supervised physical custody.

(6) Shared legal custody.

(7) Sole legal custody.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5323.
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In A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818 (Pa. Super. 2014), this Court explained 

the trial court’s duty to explain its custody decision. We opined:

“All of the factors listed in section 5328(a) are required to be 

considered by the trial court when entering a custody order.” 

J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis 

in original). Section 5337(h) requires courts to consider all 

relocation factors. E.D., supra at 81. The record must be clear 

on appeal that the trial court considered all the factors. Id.

Section 5323(d) provides that a trial court “shall delineate 

the reasons for its decision on the record or in open court or in a 

written opinion or order.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. 5323(d). Additionally, 

“section 5323(d) requires the trial court to set forth its 

mandatory assessment of the sixteen [Section 5328 custody] 

factors prior to the deadline by which a litigant must file a notice 

of appeal.” C.B. v. J.B., 65 A.3d 946, 955 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 70 A.3d 808 (Pa. 2013). Section 5323(d) applies 

to cases involving custody and relocation. A.M.S. v. M.R.C., 70 

A.3d 830, 835 (Pa. Super. 2013).

In expressing the reasons for its decision, “there is no 

required amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all 

that is required is that the enumerated factors are considered 

and that the custody decision is based on those considerations.” 

M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 68 A.3d 909 (Pa. 2013). A court’s explanation of 

reasons for its decision, which adequately addresses the relevant 

factors, complies with Section 5323(d). Id.

A.V., 87 A.3d at 822-823.

Moreover, “[w]hen a custody dispute involves a request by a party to 

relocate, we have explained ‘there is no black letter formula that easily 

resolves relocation disputes; rather, custody disputes are delicate issues that 

must be handled on a case-by-case basis.’” C.M.K. v. K.E.M., 45 A.3d 417, 

421 (Pa. Super. 2012), (quoting Baldwin v. Baldwin, 710 A.2d 610, 614 

(Pa. Super. 1998)). As the party proposing the relocation, Mother had the 
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burden of establishing that the relocation will best serve the interests of the 

children as shown under the factors set forth in section 5337(h). C.M.K., 45 

A.3d at 427 n.1; 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(i)(1). Each party had the burden of 

establishing the integrity of his or her motives in either seeking or opposing 

relocation. C.M.K., 45 A.3d at 427 n.1; 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(i)(2).

In J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. 2011), our Court 

explained that in any child custody case, the primary concern is the best 

interests of the Child. Section 5328(a) of the Act sets forth the best interest 

factors that the trial court must consider. E.D. v. M.P., 33 A.3d 73, 80-81, 

n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011). Further, with regard to relocation, “Section 5337(h) 

mandates that the trial court shall consider all of the factors listed therein, 

giving weighted consideration to those factors affecting the safety of the 

child.” E.D., 33 A.3d at 81 (emphasis in original). Here, because Mother is 

seeking to relocate with Child, the trial court was required to consider both 

the section 5328(a) custody/best interest factors and the section 5337(h) 

relocation factors.

The trial court addressed the custody/best interest factors under 

section 5328(a), and found:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent 

and continuing contact between the child and another party.

Father and Mother both encourage and permit contact 

between the other party and the minor child. Father and Mother 

have testified to times when they were able to modify the 

[c]ourt[-]ordered custody arrangements without incident, but 
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Father does become frustrated that Mother is not willing to 

comply with Father’s requests.

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued 

risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can 

better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of 

the child.

There has not been sufficient evidence to warrant a finding 

of abuse committed by either party toward each other or the 

minor child.

 

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the 

child.

Both Mother and Father perform all the necessary tasks 

associated with raising the minor child when they are exercising 

custody. Mother and Father both play a strong role in caring for 

the minor child since the minor child’s birth. Mother and Father 

both demonstrate a present willingness and capability to care for 

[Child]. 

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education, 

family life and community life.

The minor child has always lived primarily with Mother, but 

Father enjoys a liberal partial custody schedule. The parties 

currently live very close to each other, and this provides for 

easier transitions during custody exchanges. [Child] is less than 

three years old, so the [c]ourt’s consideration of [Child’s] need 

for stability and continuity is limited to [Child’s] home life at 

Mother’s residence and Father’s residence.

(5) The availability of extended family.

Father has a very strong support system in the Lawrence 

County area. Father lives with his parents, who play a 

substantial role in [Child’s] upbringing. Mother’s family support 

in Lawrence County is limited to maternal grandmother and 

Mother’s current husband, [J.M.]. 

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.
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[Child] is the only child born between the parties. 

Mother’s second child, [L.M., a son born in November of 2014] to 

her current husband is [Child’s] half-sibling. Although L.M. is 

very young, the testimony established that [Child] enjoys being 

around her half-brother. Any custody arrangement entered 

must foster this relationship.

 

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the 

child’s maturity and judgment.

Based on the child’s age, this factor shall not be 

considered by the [c]ourt in reaching a determination.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other 

parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable 

safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.

The testimony presented did not include sufficient evidence 

to support a finding regarding a party’s attempt to turn the child 

against the other parent. The [c]ourt will not consider this factor 

in its determination.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for 

the child’s emotional needs.

Both Mother and Father are able to provide the minor child 

with a loving and stable environment. Furthermore, the [c]ourt 

is satisfied that both Mother and Father care for the minor child’s 

emotional needs while she is in their custody.

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, 

emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the 

child.

Similar to the [c]ourt’s determination under subsection 

nine, both Mother and Father are able to attend to the minor 

child’s daily needs. The [c]ourt recognizes that Father is 

extremely dependent upon his parents for his own physical, 

educational and financial needs, and thus, the minor child is also 

when she is in Father’s custody. Alternatively, however, Mother 

is dependent upon her husband because [J.M.] is the only source 

of income in Mother’s residence. The parties are extremely 
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young and their dependence upon others is indicative of their 

youth.

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

The parties currently reside within two city blocks from one 

another. Father and Mother can easily walk to the other’s 

residence. This fact promotes a very liberal custody schedule 

even when [Child] becomes of school age because the parties 

reside in the same school district. 

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to 

make appropriate child-care arrangements.

The [c]ourt is satisfied that both parties are able to care 

for the minor child while she is in their custody. Father’s 

testimony establishes that Father has a stronger support system 

because of his parents and extended family. Mother, however, 

can rely upon [J.M.] for assistance, and after observing [J.M.] 

during his testimony, the [c]ourt finds [J.M.] to be very sincere 

and dependable in this regard. 

 

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness 

and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A 

party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by another party is 

not evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that 

party.

Each party testified that there can be high levels of conflict 

and poor communication between them. Mother has displayed 

poor temperament when communicating with Father, which in 

turn causes Father to be despondent. Mother and Father have 

attended communication/co-parenting counseling, which helped 

them for a short period of time. 

 

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member 

of a party’s household.

Father previously had one Driving While Under the 

Influence charge in 2013. Father completed the ARD program 

without further incident. Mother has no involvement with drug 

abuse or improper alcohol use.
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(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of 

a party’s household.

Mother and Father are both in good physical and mental 

health.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/15, at 13-18 (emphasis in original).3 Moreover, 

the trial court addressed the relocation factors set forth in section 5337(h), 

finding as follows:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of 

the child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate and 

with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant 

persons in the child’s life.

[Child] has a very strong relationship with Mother and 

Father. Mother has served as the primary caregiver since [Child] 

was born, but Father has been actively involved in parenting 

[Child] following her birth. The evaluation submitted by Dr. 

Lunnen establishes that [Child’s] relationship with each parent is 

healthy and well-established.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the 

likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, 

educational and emotional development, taking into 

consideration any special needs of the child.

[Child] is presently three years old. She is developing 

normally and appropriately; and, therefore, has no special 

needs. The [c]ourt does believe[,] however, that [Child] is old 

enough to be cognitive of the drastic changes relocating to 

Austin, Texas would create. Mother’s proposed relocation will 

permit Mother to continue serving as [Child’s] primary caregiver, 

____________________________________________

3 Effective January 1, 2014, the statute was amended to include an 

additional factor at 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(2.1) (providing for consideration of 

child abuse and involvement with child protective services). Although 

applicable at the time of the custody hearings in this matter, there was no 

evidence that would have required the trial court’s consideration of this 

factor. 
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and [Child] is not old enough to experience a change in school 

system as a result of the move. The [c]ourt is concerned about 

the emotional impacts that [Child] could face because [Child] 

has a very strong relationship with Father and Father’s family. 

This relationship would be negatively impacted by relocating 

because of the distance between New Castle, Pennsylvania and 

Austin, Texas. 

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the 

nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody 

arrangements, considering the logistics and financial 

circumstances of the parties.

This factor creates significant concerns for the [c]ourt in 

evaluating Mother’s request to relocate. Father currently enjoys 

custody of [Child] every Wednesday evening and every 

weekend. The parties could never maintain such a liberal 

visitation schedule if Mother moves with the minor child because 

of the distance and limited financial resources available to the 

parties. Although Mother proposes that Father could have 

extensive summer and holiday visitation, Mother could not 

articulate a viable plan to pay for the child’s airfare or alternative 

transportation expenses. Even if the custody changes were 

effectuated, summer and holiday visitation could not adequately 

perverse [sic] Father’s relationship with [Child] considering the 

fact that Father typically sees [Child] three to four days a week.

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age and 

maturity of the child.

Given the child’s young age, the parties did not offer the 

minor child’s testimony in support of their respective positions. 

Therefore, this factor is not before the [c]ourt for consideration. 

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of either 

party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the 

other party.

There was insufficient evidence presented during these 

proceedings to warrant a finding that either party has tried to 

inhibit the minor child’s relationship with the opposing party. In 

fact the [c]ourt received testimony that both Father and Mother 

place value on the other party in their parental role. The [c]ourt 

reaches this conclusion despite Father’s contention that Mother 
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has been verbally aggressive and oppressive during several 

custody exchanges. The [c]ourt believes the disagreements 

sustained by the parties are not untypical of young parents who 

have opposing beliefs regarding the custody of a mutual child. 

 

(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life 

for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not limited to, 

financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

Mother’s proposed relocation is premised upon her 

husband’s desire to obtain employment at his family’s 

restaurant. [J.M.] testified that his mother offered him a 

position as head chief [sic]/manager of her restaurant, which 

would be a substantial increase in wages for [J.M.]. [J.M.] 

testified as to his efforts to obtain comparable employment in 

the Lawrence County and surrounding areas. [J.M.] stated that 

he was only able to secure a job at Wal-[M]art making $9.20 per 

hour. [J.M.] typically works thirty-three hours per week. 

[J.M.’s] current income is inadequate to financially support all of 

his family’s needs, and [J.M.] and Mother rely on medical 

assistance and food stamps.

Mother believes that if she could move her family to 

Austin, Texas, [J.M.’s] increase in income could promote her 

family’s financial security. Mother even speculates that she 

might be able to attend college after they move and become 

stabilized.

In considering the benefits proposed by Mother, the 

[c]ourt believes that, other than the possibility of improved 

financial security, Mother’s quality of life would not drastically 

change. Mother is currently a full-time caregiver for her two 

children and homemaker. This would not change if Mother 

relocated. Mother’s support system is primarily based in the 

local areas, and she would be completely dependent on [J.M.’s] 

extended family if they moved. If Mother and [J.M.] moved, 

they would be living with [J.M.’s] parents until they secured 

enough savings to purchase their own home.

Additionally, the [c]ourt believes that Mother’s desire to 

attend college is not dependent upon moving, and that Mother 

could fulfill her desire to further her education locally.

 
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(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life 

for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional 

benefit or educational opportunity.

The [c]ourt’s analysis under this factor is very similar to its 

preceding discussion under factor six. [Child] clearly has the 

opportunity to enjoy increased financial stability through her 

family, but it comes at the cost of leaving a well[-]established 

support system and relationship with Father. Although Mother 

did present testimony as to her proposed household and 

surrounding school district, the [c]ourt cannot conclusively infer 

that either would be better than Mother’s current household and 

the schooling currently available to [Child].

 

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or 

opposing the relocation.

Mother’s desire to relocate is sincere; Mother believes that 

if her husband can obtain better employment, Mother and [J.M.] 

could create a better lifestyle for their children.

Alternatively, Father’s objections to Mother’s relocation are 

sincere. Father believes that if Mother moves to Austin, Texas 

with [Child] he will not play a strong parental role in [Child’s] 

daily life.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household and whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party.

There has been no evidence regarding abuse committed by 

either party or that the minor child is at risk of harm in either 

household.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/15, at 8-13 (emphasis in original).

Mother argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant her request 

to relocate with Child to Austin, Texas, because the relocation was in Child’s 

best interest, as it would enhance the quality of life for both her and Child. 

Mother claims that the most significant benefits of relocating would be that 
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Mother’s husband, J.M., could work for his family’s restaurant, thereby 

increasing the family income from approximately $900 per month to $3,000 

per month. She asserts J.M. would have permanent employment as a chef 

at his family’s restaurant, Mother could be a stay-at-home mother for Child 

and her other child, and Mother would have the potential to continue her 

education in a Texas college. Mother’s Brief at 8-16.

The trial court considered each of these matters, and determined that 

they were not due any additional weight. As we explained above, with 

regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to 

the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. 

C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443. We conclude that the trial court’s conclusions are 

not unreasonable under the circumstances presented here. As we may 

reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law or 

are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court, we will 

not do so here. Id.

In her second issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred in 

finding that any benefit bestowed by relocation did not outweigh the 

potential detrimental impact suffered by limiting Father’s relationship with 

Child to summer and holidays. Mother’s Brief at 16-17. Mother claims that 

this finding gives greater weight to one specific factor and fails to consider 

all of the relocation factors equally. Id.
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We find no merit to this contention. After review of the trial court’s 

opinion, it is readily apparent that the trial court did not improperly give 

weight to one factor or fail to consider the other relocation factors. It was 

within the trial court’s province to weigh the relocation factors and assess 

Child’s best interest. C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443. 

In her third issue, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in requiring 

Mother to exhaust all alternatives in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania, prior to 

attempting to relocate, as this is not a requirement prior to a party 

requesting relocation, and puts an unfair restriction or condition on the 

party. Mother’s Brief at 17-19. Again, we find no merit to this contention. 

The trial court did not place any requirement on Mother in addition to the 

statutory relocation factors, but rather, found that the evidence related to 

those factors weighed against Mother. C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443. 

 In her fourth issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

take into consideration, as one of the relocation factors, that Father 

currently provides only minimal financial support for Child, in the amount of 

$100 a month. Mother’s Brief at 19-20. In assessing factor ten of the 

custody/best interest factors under section 5328(a), the trial court stated:

The [c]ourt recognizes that Father is extremely dependent upon 

his parents for his own physical, educational and financial needs, 

and thus, the minor child is also when she is in Father’s custody. 

Alternatively, however, Mother is dependent upon her husband 

because [J.M.] is the only source of income in Mother’s 

residence. The parties are extremely young and their 

dependence upon others is indicative of their youth.
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Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/15, at 16.

In its opinion that accompanied the order denying Mother’s petition to 

relocate, the trial court explained, “The [c]ourt believes that if Father 

finishes college, he will be in a better position to achieving independence.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/15, at 20. We find no merit to Mother’s contention 

that the trial court failed to consider the amount of financial support that she 

receives from Father for Child. The trial court properly weighed this 

evidence as one of the custody/best interest factors in relation to other 

considerations under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)(10). As repeatedly stated, it was 

within the trial court’s province to weigh the relocation factors and assess 

Child’s best interest. C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443. 

In her fifth issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred in finding 

that the father-daughter relationship could not be preserved if Mother 

relocated to Austin, Texas, because there was nothing in the testimony to 

indicate that this relationship could not be preserved with the alternative 

partial custody offered by Mother. Mother’s Brief at 20-21. In addressing 

this issue, the trial court concluded:

After reviewing all of the statutory factors pertaining to 

Mother’s request to relocate, in addition to the statutory factors 

pertaining to Father’s request for modification, the [c]ourt 

determines that Mother’s request to relocate must be denied. 

The [c]ourt bases its determination on the fact that [Child] has a 

very well-established relationship with both Father and Mother. 

[Child] enjoys regular and frequent contact with Father and his 

extended family, and the [c]ourt believes that any benefit 

bestowed by a relocation to Austin, Texas could not outweigh the 

detrimental impact suffered by limiting Father’s relationship with 
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[Child] to summer and holiday visitation. In reaching this 

determination, the [c]ourt further considered the case of C.M.K. 

v. K.E.M., 45 A.3d 417 (Pa. Super. 2012). In C.M.K., the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court’s ruling 

that petitioner’s/mother’s request to relocate was not in the 

minor child’s best interest because the relocation would

substantially impair the respondent’s/father’s ability to preserve 

his strong parental relationship with the minor child. Id. at 427. 

The [c]ourt considered the fact that respondent/father was 

extremely involved in the minor child’s life and participated in 

many of the child’s daily activities. Id. Although 

petitioner/mother[’s] request to relocate was from Grove City, 

Pennsylvania to Erie, Pennsylvania, a distance of only 68 miles, 

the trial court held, and the Superior Court agreed, that such a 

move presented de minimis improvements to the minor child’s 

overall quality of life. Id. 

Furthermore, the [c]ourt finds that Mother’s request is 

primarily premised upon [J.M.’s] desire to pursue a career 

opportunity with his family’s restaurant. While Mother’s 

objectives are sincere, the [c]ourt is not satisfied that Mother 

has exhausted reasonable alternatives to providing a more 

financially stable lifestyle for her family. Many of the additional 

benefits referenced by Mother could be achieved locally and are 

not subjective to relocation entirely.

Additionally, in evaluating Father’s request to modify the 

current Custody Order, the [c]ourt believes that a modification is 

not appropriate at this time. Father wishes to implement a 50-

50 custody schedule; however, Father has extensive 

commitments to his college education. Father attends classes 

daily, and the [c]ourt cannot realistically implement an equal 

custody schedule knowing that Father will not be available to 

care for [Child] for substantial periods of time. The [c]ourt 

believes that if Father finishes college, he will be in a better 

position to achieving independence.

The [c]ourt accredits Mother with being [Child’s] primary 

caregiver, and the [c]ourt believes that in order to secure a 

consistent schedule, this arrangement should continue for a 

period of time. The [c]ourt believes that the issues raised by 

each party during these proceedings should cause the parties to 

strongly re-evaluate some of their parenting choices, and hopes 

that, following the entry of this Opinion, the parties could agree 
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to begin a fresh start to their co-parenting and communication 

methods.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/15, at 18-20.

We conclude that Mother’s argument lacks merit. The trial court 

properly considered all of the custody/best interest and relocation factors 

and determined that Mother failed to sustain her burden of establishing that 

the third relocation factor, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)(3), should be weighted in 

Mother’s favor. The trial court held:

Although Mother proposes that Father could have extensive 

summer and holiday visitation, Mother could not articulate a 

viable plan to pay for the child’s airfare or alternative 

transportation expenses. Even if the custody changes were 

effectuated, summer and holiday visitation could not adequately 

perverse [sic] Father’s relationship with [Child] considering the 

fact that Father typically sees [Child] three to four days a week.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/15, at 9.

The trial court properly weighed this evidence as part of its 

assessment of the first, second, and third relocation factors. 23 Pa.C.S. § 

5337(h)(1), (2), and (3). It was within the trial court’s province to weigh 

the relocation factors and assess Child’s best interest. C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 

443. 

In her brief, Mother sets forth the ten relocation factors, casting the 

facts in a light most favorable to herself. Mother asserts:

When evaluating all of the factors associated with the 

relocation and in viewing those as to what is in the best interests 

of the minor child, . . . it clearly establishes that the Trial Court 

erred in finding that the mother failed to meet her burden of 
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establishing that the relocation to Austin, Texas, was in the 

minor child’s best interests.

Mother’s Brief at 15.

Mother argues that the trial court improperly considered the C.M.K.

case as precedent, and she argues that C.M.K. is inapplicable to the instant 

appeal. We do not agree. Although Mother desires that the relocation 

factors are weighted in her favor, the trial court must consider all of the 

factors on a case-by-case basis and make a decision that is in the best 

interest of the child, taking into account the child’s physical, intellectual, 

moral, and spiritual well-being. S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 554 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In S.J.S., a panel of this 

Court affirmed the denial of a mother’s petition to relocate with her two 

minor daughters from Erie County, Pennsylvania, to Buckingham, Bucks 

County, Pennsylvania. The panel stated:

No doubt, the cost and logistics of [the father] maintaining 

contact with his daughters from across the state would weigh 

against relocation unless other factors militated strongly in favor 

[of relocation]. We agree with the trial court that there is little 

to favor relocation here. The children are doing well in school 

and their activities, they have a strong bond with their [f]ather 

and their extended families in Erie, [the mother’s] employment 

prospects in Buckingham are nebulous at best, and [the 

mother’s] motives for moving do not appear to be driven by her 

children’s best interests.

S.J.S., 76 A.3d at 554. 

After a careful review of the record in this matter, including the 

testimony and documentary evidence, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant 
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law, we find no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in 

finding that Mother failed to sustain her burden in the present appeal. As in 

S.J.S., Mother failed to present sufficient evidence to convince the trial court 

that her relocation with Child to Austin, Texas, was driven by Child’s best 

interest, as opposed to her own. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial 

court denying Mother’s petition for relocation.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/5/2016