J-S53021-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROBERT POWELL,

Appellant No. 1137 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order May 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000905-1990

BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 17, 2016

Robert Powell (“Appellant”) appeals from the May 12, 2015 order 

denying his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

Roy Myran (“the victim”) was shot outside Jones’ bar on Wood Street 

in Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, on February 5, 1990.1 

Witnesses identified Appellant and his brother, Paul Powell (“Paul”),2as 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 The facts underlying Appellant’s 1991 convictions of first degree murder 

and conspiracy are fully set forth in this Court’s memorandum decision of

Appellant’s direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Powell, 660 A.2d 124 (Pa. 

Super. filed January 17, 1995) (unpublished memorandum at 1–3).

2

 Paul’s appeal is under review by this Court at 1136 MDA 2015.
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responsible for the victim’s death. Appellant was charged with one count of 

murder in the first degree, two counts of criminal conspiracy to commit 

criminal homicide, and one count of criminal attempt to commit homicide.

Appellant waived his right to a jury trial. Following a bench trial on 

October 8, 1991, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, two counts 

of criminal conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and criminal attempt. 

On May 20, 1993, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of life 

imprisonment for first degree murder, a term of imprisonment of two to four 

years on each count of criminal conspiracy to commit first degree murder, 

and a term of two to four years for criminal attempt. The sentences were 

imposed concurrently. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further review. Commonwealth v. 

Powell, 660 A.2d 124 (Pa. Super. filed January 17, 1995) (unpublished 

memorandum), appeal denied, 665 A.2d 469 (Pa. 1995).

Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on December 19, 1996.3 The 

PCRA court conducted a hearing on October 1, 1997, and denied relief on 

March 16, 2000. On March 29, 2000, Appellant filed a pro se notice of 

appeal with this Court. In an opinion dated December 4, 2001, this Court 

vacated the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and remanded the 

____________________________________________

3

 Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final before January 16, 1996, 

the effective date of the 1995 PCRA amendments. Thus, Appellant had until 

January 16, 1997, to file a timely first PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. 

Merritt, 827 A.2d 485 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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matter for appointment of counsel. Commonwealth v. Powell, 787 A.2d 

1017 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

On January 18, 2002, the trial court appointed an attorney to 

represent Appellant. A subsequent PCRA hearing was held on July 17, 2002, 

and on August 26, 2002, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA 

petition. Appellant filed a pro se appeal on September 30, 2002. This Court 

affirmed the PCRA court’s order, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Powell, 841 A.2d 578 (Pa. 

Super. filed October 29, 2003) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 

864 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 2005).

Through counsel, Appellant sent a serial PCRA petition to the Luzerne 

County Clerk of Courts, which was received on December 27, 2013, and 

docketed on January 2, 2014. Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition on 

May 8, 2014, and, with leave of court, a second amended petition on June 

20, 2014. In his serial petition, Appellant claimed that he was eligible for 

collateral relief on two grounds. First, Appellant asserted “the unavailability 

at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become 

available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been 

introduced.” Second Amended PCRA Petition, 6/20/14, at ¶¶ 14–15. That 

evidence was a recantation by witness Charles Eckhart. Second, Appellant 

raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim (“IAC”), alleging that 
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defense counsel was ineffective for not locating a witness, Stanley Petroski. 

Id. at ¶¶ 17–18. 

The PCRA court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for August 7, 2014, 

which was eventually held on December 18, 2014. At the hearing, counsel 

testified that the defense theory was intoxication, i.e., Appellant and Paul 

were too drunk to form the intent necessary for first degree murder. N.T., 

12/18/14, at 9–19. Additionally, Appellant and Paul testified, as did Stanley 

Petroski and Charles Eckhart. Id. at 22, 32, 49, 65. Following the 

evidentiary hearing, the PCRA dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. 

Order, 5/12/15.

This appeal followed.4 Appellant presents the following question for 

our consideration: “A. Whether [Appellant] should be granted a new trial on 

the basis of after-discovered exculpatory evidence?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.5

When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we 

consider the record “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the 

PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence 

____________________________________________

4

 Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

5

 Appellant has abandoned the ineffectiveness claim raised in his petition by 

failing to present any discussion or argument on that topic in his appellate 

brief.
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of record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling 

is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). We grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that 

are supported in the record and will not disturb them unless they have no 

support in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 

1084 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the 

judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This time 

requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and may not be 

ignored in order to reach the merits of the petition. Commonwealth v. 

Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000). A judgment of sentence “becomes 

final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3).

Our review of the record reflects that the trial court imposed a 

sentence of life imprisonment on May 20, 1993. This Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on January 17, 1995, and the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further review on September 15, 1995. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on December 

14, 1995, ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal and the time for filing an appeal 
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to the United States Supreme Court expired. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); 

U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13 (stating that a petition for writ of certiorari must be filed 

within ninety days of final judgment). Because Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final before January 16, 1996, the effective date of the 

1995 PCRA amendments, he had until January 16, 1997, to file a timely 

PCRA petition. Merritt, 827 A.2d 485. Appellant did not file the instant 

PCRA petition until January 2, 2014. Thus, the instant PCRA petition is 

patently untimely.

However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to 

the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), 

and (iii), is met.6 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed 

____________________________________________

6

 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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within sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the 

PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove 

specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time 

frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 

1167 (Pa. Super 2001).

The record reflects that Appellant attempted to raise the second timebar exception, i.e., that the facts upon which his claim was predicated were 

unknown to him at the time of trial. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Regarding 

this exception, we have stated the following:

In order to sustain an untimely PCRA petition under the

after-discovered evidence exception, a petitioner must show that 

the evidence: (1) has been discovered after the trial and could 

not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the 

exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative 

or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely for impeachment 

purposes; and (4) is of such a nature and character that a 

different verdict will likely result if a new trial is granted.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 841 A.2d 136, 140-141 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

In addition, our Supreme Court explained that “the after-discovered facts 

exception focuses on facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing 

source for previously known facts[.]” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 

A.2d 714, 721 (Pa. 2008) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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1263, 1269 (Pa. 2008) (concluding that alleging a new conduit for a 

previously known fact “does not transform [the] latest source into evidence 

falling within the ambit of § 9545(b)(1)(ii)”) (citation omitted).

On appeal, Appellant claims that he is entitled to PCRA relief on the 

basis of after-discovered facts contained in an October 2013 letter Appellant 

received from Charles Eckhart and the statement of Stanley Petroski. 

According to Appellant, Charles Eckhart stated in his letter, for the first time, 

that Appellant was intoxicated on the night of the murder, and that he did 

not disclose this information during Appellant’s trial for fear of his own 

safety. Appellant’s Brief at 24–27. Regarding Stanley Petroski, Appellant 

asserts that the witness “was able to articulate with particularity what he 

observed of the Powells.” Id. at 27. Appellant argues that, as strangers to 

Appellant with no motive to lie, Charles Eckhart and Stanley Petroski 

provided evidence that “was not cumulative to [the other defense 

witnesses’] testimony in that it would have been untainted and objective and 

not at all like family members and [Appellant and Paul] themselves testifying 

that [they] were drunk.” Id. at 29–30.

The PCRA court found that Appellant’s serial petition was filed within 

sixty days of receiving Charles Eckhart’s letter; however, it found no merit to 

Appellant’s substantive claims:

Pursuant to Section 9545, the PCRA petition would have 

been due within 60 days of October 30, 2013, when [Appellant] 

received a letter from Charles Eckhart, or by December 29, 

2013. At the PCRA hearing, the defense presented evidence, 
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specifically, a receipt from Fed-Ex indicating that the PCRA 

petition was sent by priority delivery overnight and received on 

December 2[7], 2013 at 10:00 a.m. by John with the sender 

being Gerald A. Lord, Esquire. See Transcript from PCRA 

evidentiary hearing on December 18, 2014 at page 6.

Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 903(A) the Clerk of Courts shall 

promptly time stamp the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 

Because the petitions were received at 10:00 a.m. on December 

27, 2013, a prompt time stand would and should have the same 

date. The Court finds the Petition was filed within sixty days.

However, [Appellant] must prove one of the exceptions 

pursuant to §9545 and what cannot be ignored is that the facts 

upon which [Appellant’s] claims are predicated were known to

[him] at the time of the trial. The record reveals that while Mr. 

Petroski was unavailable to both the Commonwealth and the 

defedants at the time of the trial, the trial court allowed the 

defendants to present the written statement of Mr. Petroski. Mr. 

Eckhart was available and testified at the trial of this matter. 

The statement he provided in October 2013 and his testimony at 

the [PCRA hearing] is merely corroborative or cumulative of the 

other testimony already presented to the fact finder.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/12/15, at 5–6.

Upon review of the certified record, we discern no basis on which to 

disturb the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition. The record 

supports the PCRA court’s finding that Appellant filed his PCRA petition 

within sixty days of Charles Eckhart’s letter. N.T., 12/18/14, at 99, Defense 

Exhibit 1. 

The record also supports the PCRA court’s conclusions that Appellant 

had the benefit of Stanley Petroski’s written statement at trial and that 

Charles Eckhart’s 2013 statement was cumulative evidence of Appellant’s 

intoxication defense. Specifically, at the December 2014 hearing, defense 
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counsel testified that “just about all of those ten [defense] witnesses 

testified in some form or other about intoxication,” “we had the officer who 

issued the public drunkenness citation to [Appellant] and to [Paul],” and the 

“forensic toxicologist . . . opined that the blood alcohol was . . . high; 

between .20 and .25.” N.T., 12/18/14, at 11–13. Additionally, Appellant 

and/or Robert confirmed at the hearing that their defense was intoxication; 

their witnesses “stated that we were intoxicated;” the toxicologist testified to 

high blood alcohol levels; and Stanley Petroski’s statement was admitted 

into evidence at trial. Id. at 23–32; 34–47. Also, Charles Eckhart testified 

that he assumed Appellant and Paul were intoxicated, and he explained his 

reasons for not disclosing his opinion at the time of Appellant’s trial. Id. at 

65–77, 86–96. As to the weight of Charles Eckhart’s and Stanley Petroski’s 

proffered testimony, we note that the police officer, the toxicologist, and 

Stanley Petroski’s written statement provided the fact finder with objective 

evidence of Appellant’s intoxication.

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the PCRA court that Charles 

Eckhart’s proffered testimony was corroborative and cumulative evidence of 

Appellant’s intoxication and that the outcome of Appellant’s trial would not 

have been different if Charles Eckhart and Stanley Petroski had testified. 

Thus, Appellant failed to prove that these witnesses’ statements constituted 

after-discovered facts that could render Appellant’s serial petition timely. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); Johnson, 841 A.2d at 140-141.
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Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely, and he failed to plead and 

prove an exception to the time-bar. Therefore, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to accept Appellant’s petition and grant relief. See 

Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding 

that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear untimely petition). Likewise, we 

lack the authority to address the merits of any substantive claims raised in 

the PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 

(Pa. 2007) (“[J]urisdictional time limits go to a court’s right or competency 

to adjudicate a controversy.”).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/17/2016