2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-25-2009

Mindy Zied-Campbell v. Estelle Richman, et

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-2254

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Recommended Citation

"Mindy Zied-Campbell v. Estelle Richman, et" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1694.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-2254

___________

MINDY JAYE ZIED-CAMPBELL, 

 Appellant

v.

ESTELLE RICHMAN, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare;

FREDERICK LANDAU, Director, The York County Assistance Office; DOES 1-25;

STEPHANIE LUDWIG, Supervisor, York County Assistance Office

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-00026)

District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 10, 2009

Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 25, 2009)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Mindy Jaye Zied-Campbell, proceeding in forma pauperis, filed a lawsuit to

protest how she was treated when she tried to secure welfare benefits. The named
 Zied-Campbell filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied on 1

February 26, 2008. Zied-Campbell then filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Februrary 26, 2008 order/a second motion for reconsideration of the March 30, 2007

order. When the defendants opposed the motion/second motion, Zied-Campbell moved to

strike their brief. On April 23, 2008, the District Court denied the motion/second motion

and the motion to strike. 

 PACER, an acronym for Public Access to Electronic Records, is the service that 2

provides electronic access via the Internet to case and docket information from the federal

courts. 

2

defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the District Court granted

in part and denied in part on March 30, 2007. They subsequently filed a motion for 1

summary judgment, which remains pending. On Zied-Campbell’s motion, the District

Court case is stayed pending this appeal.

In the District Court, Zied-Campbell filed a motion to waive PACER fees “due to

indigency [sic].” She claimed that she needed access to the documents in her case on the 2

docket because she was no longer represented by appointed counsel. The District Court

denied her motion without prejudice to a renewed motion in which she showed good

cause for the waiver of fees. The District Court noted that Zied-Campbell should have

received copies of the relevant documents in her case, and that she had not identified

which documents she lacked or stated whether she had requested her case file from her

attorney. The District Court also stated that it could not evaluate from Zied-Campbell’s

short motion whether there were alternative means of providing Zied-Campbell with the

documents she wanted. The District Court explained that Zied-Campbell could refile her

motion with a brief and proper evidentiary support. 
3

Shortly thereafter, Zied-Campbell filed a renewed motion for the waiver of

PACER fees, expanding her request to include free access to the documents in her case as

well as any other cases that are relevant to her case. She listed the information that

entitled her to in forma pauperis status. She explained that she moved from Harrisburg so

she could no longer go to the Harrisburg library that has Westlaw access and she cannot

afford gas for the 20 to 30 mile trip to libraries in Philadelphia or the (unspecified) fees at

those libraries. Zied-Campbell also noted her confusion while doing research at the

Harrisburg library and her belief that she could best do research at home between the

hours of midnight and four in the morning. She stated that she would like to see cases

accessible on PACER that might help her succeed in her case. 

On April 23, 2008, the District Court denied Zied-Campbell’s renewed motion. 

The District Court noted again that she had not identified which documents (if any) from

her case she did not have or whether she had requested her case file from her attorney. 

The District Court rejected Zied-Campbell’s desire to have a more convenient and

effective way to conduct legal research as good cause for a waiver of PACER fees. The

District Court acknowledged that Zied-Campbell may face difficulties in pursuing her

case pro se, but concluded (citing the Electronic Fee Access Schedule) that she had not

shown that a fee waiver was “necessary to avoid unreasonable burdens and to promote

public access to information.” 

Zied-Campbell filed a notice of appeal. She specified the April 23, 2008 order and
4

stated that she was appealing from the denial of her motion to waive PACER fees. She

attached the order, her motion, her earlier motion to waive PACER fees, and a letter

requesting a waiver of the fees. She subsequently filed an amended notice of appeal to

attach a copy of a motion for reconsideration she had filed previously (apparently to show

“initial IFP status denied even though food stamp document had been attached originally

as proof of indigence,” Amended Notice of Appeal 1.)

Our first question, one which we asked the parties to address in their briefs, is

whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Zied-Campbell contends that we have

jurisdiction over her appeal, which she describes as encompassing challenges to more

orders than she designated in her notice of appeal. Specifically, she cites the District

Court’s orders of March 30, 2007, February 26, 2008 (the one noted above and others),

and April 23, 2008. Appellees argue that we have jurisdiction only to review the District

Court’s decision to deny the waiver of PACER fees, and request that we dismiss the rest

of Zied-Campbell’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Despite Zied-Campbell’s discussion of many orders in her brief, our focus remains

on the denial of her request for a waiver of the PACER fees. She did not list the other

orders from which she now seeks to appeal in her notice of appeal in compliance with

Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). She

specified one order by referring to it by date, docket number, the motion she had filed,

and related documentation she had submitted to the District Court. Although the Court
 Furthermore, even if Zied-Campbell’s notice of appeal were sufficient to bring up the 3

unspecified orders, we would still lack jurisdiction over them. The other orders that ZiedCampbell discussed in her brief are not appealable until the District Court enters a final

judgment in her case. See In re Kelly, 876 F.2d 14, 15 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that an

order denying leave to amend a complaint is not a final and immediately appealable

order); McNasby v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 832 F.2d 47, 49 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that

an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an immediately appealable

order); In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975)

(holding that pre-trial orders are interlocutory and not immediately appealable); see also

Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 273 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. Pa.

2001) (noting that the fact that a defense warrants pre-trial dismissal does not control

whether the issue is immediately appealable). Zied-Campbell seeks to characterize one of

the District Court’s orders of February 26, 2008, as an order denying an injunction. 

However, even assuming the order can be characterized as one denying injunctive relief,

our jurisdiction would not attach because the injunctive relief was unrelated to the relief

sought by Zied-Campbell in her case, as the District Court stated. See Hershey Foods

Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 F.2d 1272, 1277 (3d Cir. 1991) (describing the

requirement that an interlocutory order denying an injunction must relate to the relief

ultimately sought in order to be appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292). 

5

liberally construes the requirements of Rule 3, see Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 776

(3d Cir. 1999), Zied-Campell only designated the order of April 23, 2008, a non-final

order, in her notice of appeal and her amended notice of appeal. Accordingly, this is not

the case in which an appeal from a final judgment puts in question earlier non-final

orders. See Pacitti, 193 F.3d at 776-77. 

3

We conclude that we have jurisdiction over the April 23, 2008 order denying the

waiver of PACER fees. Ordinarily, for jurisdiction to attach under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

there must be a District Court decision that “‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves

nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” See Coopers & Lybrand v.

Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 299, 233
6

(1945)). A judgment must be final as to all parties, all causes of action, and the whole

subject-matter. See Andrew v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963) (citing Collins v.

Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920)); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945

F.2d 635, 640 (3d Cir. 1991). The District Court has not finally adjudicated ZiedCampbell’s claims. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment remains pending.

However, the District Court’s order fits within the judicially crafted exception to

the usual final judgment rule. “To come within the ‘small class’ of decisions excepted

from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively determine the

disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the

action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers &

Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468. Among the decisions held appealable under Cohen are orders

denying in forma pauperis status. See Roberts v. U.S. Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845

(1950) (per curiam); Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 16 (3d Cir. 1976). The District

Court’s order is like an order denying in forma pauperis status because it relates to a

litigant’s ability to pay case-related fees and proceed before a court. For the same reasons

we have held orders denying in forma pauperis motions to be immediately appealable

under the collateral order doctrine, we conclude that the April 23, 2008 order is

immediately appealable in this case. Cf. Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083

(3d Cir. Pa. 1995). 
 To aid our consideration of this appeal, each side has moved to file a supplemental 4

appendix (Zied-Campbell also has moved to strike Appellees’ proposed supplemental

appendix). We grant Appellees’ motion to provide us with a short supplemental appendix

that includes District Court orders that may have been overlooked by Zied-Campbell in

assembling her lengthy appendix. We deny Zied-Campbell’s motion to strike. We also

deny as unnecessary her request to file a supplemental appendix. 

7

Upon consideration of the April 23, 2008 order, we will affirm it. Although 4

courts may allow indigent litigants to access PACER without charge for cause shown,

see Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule (reprinted with 28 U.S.C. § 1914), the District

Court did not abuse its discretion, cf. Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir.

1985) (stating the standard of review for orders denying in forma pauperis motions), in

rejecting Zied-Campbell’s broad request for access to PACER so that she could see the

documents filed in her case as well as conduct legal research from home in the middle of

the night. As the District Court noted, it was not clear what documents from her case she

did not have (the District Court having previously provided copies of orders and opinions

to the parties as well as having sent Zied-Campbell an extra copy of the docket sheet so

that she could identify any missing documents) or why she could not get copies of

documents in her case from her former counsel. Also, Zied-Campbell seemingly did not

show that free legal research on PACER was “necessary to avoid unreasonable burdens,”

see Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, although she did show that free access to

PACER would be highly convenient for her. In short, for the reasons given by the

District Court, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Zied-Campbell’s

renewed request for a waiver of PACER fees.