COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphreys, Kelsey and Alston

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

JAMES LITTLE, A/K/A 

 JAMES BRADLEY

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 1136-11-4 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS

MARCH 6, 2012

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA

Nolan B. Dawkins, Judge

Joseph D. King (King, Campbell, Poretz, PLLC, on brief), for 

appellant.

Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. 

Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

James Little1 (“Little”) appeals his conviction from the Circuit Court for the City of 

Alexandria (“trial court”) of two counts of receiving stolen property in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-108.2

 Specifically, Little contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of violating 

Code § 18.2-108 (receiving stolen property) because the Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence that the value of the stolen goods met or exceeded the minimum amount 

required by the statute. Because we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to 

establish that the stolen goods meet the statutory minimum, we affirm. 

 1 James Little changed his name to James Bradley after the charges were brought in this 

case. 

2 Little was also convicted of two counts of statutory burglary in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-91 and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-371. However, these convictions are not before us on appeal. 
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I. Background

In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, “‘we view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom.’” Baylor v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 82, 84, 683 S.E.2d 843, 844 

(2009) (quoting Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 135, 455 S.E.2d 730, 731 

(1995)). So viewed, the evidence is as follows. 

Little was a teacher at Potomac High School, where Nathaniel Wooten (“Wooten”) 

matriculated as a student. Little served as both an educator and mentor to Wooten, as he taught 

Wooten environmental science and acted as Wooten’s modeling coach. However, the

student-teacher relationship evolved into criminal activity when Wooten involved Little in his 

plan to break into cell phone retail stores, steal the phones on display, and sell them. Wooten 

asked Little to drive him to the stores since he did not have a driver’s license. Little agreed.

On May 29, 2010, Wooten and Little drove to an AT&T store in the Potomac Yards 

shopping center. Little drove past the store so that Wooten could check out the surroundings and 

then parked the car. Wooten then donned a mask and gloves, exited the vehicle, and threw a 

brick through the store’s glass door. Wooten quickly ran into the store using the hole in the glass

and stole four display phones, including three Apple iPhones and a Motorola “Backflip.” He 

then returned to the car, and Little drove him home. 

Two nights later, Little picked up Wooten and drove him to the AT&T store on Duke 

Street in Alexandria. After waiting for a nearby store to close, Wooten again donned a mask and 

gloves, used a brick to smash the window, and entered the store. Wooten managed to steal

another four display phones, including three more Motorola “Backflips” and an HTC Tilt 2. He 

then returned to the car, and Little drove him home again. 
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At trial, the Commonwealth called two different representatives from AT&T to testify as 

to the value of the stolen phones. Neil Carver (“Carver”), an asset protection manager with 

AT&T, testified as follows: On May 29, 2010, there were no iPhones in the store valued below

$200. Specifically, the cost to the store for a new unit of each stolen iPhone on that date was

$524. He then clarified that the full retail cost would be above this value, although he failed to 

give an actual retail value. Carver also explained that the full retail value of a phone is different 

from the price customers often pay for phones because they buy them with service contracts. 

There is a difference in price because 

when somebody comes in to AT&T to buy a phone, they’re 

normally signing a contract for a certain length of time. It’s a two 

or three year contract. AT&T will subsidize the actual cost of the 

phone, because they figure lowering that cost will drive the 

customer into the store. But the company will make the cost of 

that phone back up, plus more, over the length of the contract. 

So—so a phone that—that may be worth $500 may be sold for 

$200, with a two year contract.

On cross, Carver testified that demonstration phones are new when they are placed on 

display. However, through normal use as a “demo,” the phones become “used and abused.” 

Once a phone is used as a “demo,” it is never sold from the store. Instead, “demo” phones are 

sent back to Supply Chain Management.3

 

Ellen Board (“Board”), the retail sales manager of the AT&T store on Duke Street in 

Alexandria, testified as follows: Board was informed of the break-in from the alarm company 

and went to the store in the early hours of May 31. Upon arrival, she observed that three 

“Motorola backflips [sic] and an HTC Tilt 2” phone were stolen. The value of each Motorola 

Backflip was $350 at the time of the robbery, and the HTC Tilt 2 was valued at $400. When the 

 3 Supply Chain Management is the AT&T group responsible for handling the store’s 

inventory, including purchasing phones from manufacturers. 
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display models were stolen, the store replaced them with new phones that were taken out of 

inventory. 

Board went on to explain that display phones are “all shipped to [the store] as inventory. 

They’re received in inventory, and then the phones that [the store] put[s] out on display are 

adjusted out of [the store’s] inventory. So they’re all the same, whether they’re sold to a 

customer or put out in inventory.” However, the store itself does not sell the display phones and, 

as such, they have no retail value to the store. Instead, when the display phones are no longer 

meant to be displayed, the store simply adjusts them back into inventory and then transfers them 

to the return center. 

Little was tried in a bench trial and found guilty of two counts of statutory burglary in 

violation of Code § 18.2-91, two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in 

violation of Code § 18.2-371, and two counts of receiving stolen property in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-108. He then noted this appeal of the two counts of receiving stolen property. 

II. The Value of the Stolen Goods

When evaluating an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we must “review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. The judgment appealed from will be affirmed unless it 

appears from the evidence that it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” McGee v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 322, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1987) (citations omitted).

Defendant was convicted of violating Code § 18.2-108(A), which states that any person 

who “buys or receives from another person, or aids in concealing, any stolen goods or other 

thing, knowing the same to have been stolen, . . . shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof, and 

may be proceeded against, although the principal offender is not convicted.” A conviction under 

this statute is made larceny, so it must be read in connection with Code §§ 18.2-95 and 18.2-96 
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to determine the degree of larceny. See Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 133, 82 S.E.2d 

603, 604 (1954). On appeal, the only issue is whether the value of the stolen goods reached the 

$200 minimum to elevate the offense to grand larceny. 

At common law the value of the article stolen must be 

alleged and proved. Proof that an article has some value is 

sufficient to warrant a conviction of petit larceny, but where the 

value of the thing stolen determines the grade of the offense, the 

value must be alleged and the Commonwealth must prove the 

value to be the statutory amount.

Id. at 139, 82 S.E.2d at 607 (internal citations omitted). In Robinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 

3, 516 S.E.2d 475 (1999), the Supreme Court of Virginia discussed how the value of an item is 

determined:

The test is market value, and particularly retail value. “Fair market 

value is the price property will bring when offered for sale by a 

seller who desires but is not obliged to sell and bought by a buyer 

under no necessity of purchasing.” And the original purchase price 

of an item is admissible as evidence of its current value. 

Id. at 5-6, 516 S.E.2d at 476 (quoting Board of Supervisors v. Donatelli & Klein, Inc., 228 Va. 

620, 628, 325 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1985)). Furthermore, “[t]he value of the stolen property is 

measured as of the time of the theft . . . .” Parker v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 118, 121, 489 

S.E.2d 482, 483 (1997) (internal citations omitted). However, “there must also be ‘due 

allowance for elements of depreciation.’ Without a showing of the effect of age and wear and 

tear on the value of an item . . ., the jury might be misled to believe that original price equals 

current value.” Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 704, 705, 284 S.E.2d 792, 792 (1981) (quoting 

Gertler v. Bowling, 202 Va. 213, 215, 116 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1960)).

However, in this case, there is no retail value for these phones. While one could infer

that they would have some value in an open market, the fact remains these “demo” phones are 

not sold by AT&T. Instead, they are sent back to Supply Chain Management, at which point the 

record is unclear as to their ultimate fate. Put another way, the AT&T stores have no “desire” to 
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sell them. Robinson, 258 Va. at 5-6, 516 S.E.2d at 476. Thus, because of the unique nature of 

these phones as demonstration units, they have no clear market value. However, that does not 

end our analysis.

The situation in this case is similar to that presented in Baylor v. Commonwealth, 55 

Va. App. 82, 683 S.E.2d 843 (2009). In Baylor, the appellant was removing catalytic converters 

from used cars. Id. at 84-85, 683 S.E.2d at 844. Under the facts of that case, the catalytic 

converters stolen could not legally be resold in Virginia. Because of this unique circumstance, 

we held that “‘where an item had no market value, the actual value must be shown.’” Id. 

(quoting DiMaio v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 755, 764, 621 S.E.2d 696, 701 (2005)).

In Baylor, we ultimately held that the Commonwealth had not met its burden in 

establishing that the actual value of the stolen goods met the statutory minimum. Id. at 90, 683 

S.E.2d at 846. However, the record in Baylor is very different from the record before the Court 

in this case. In Baylor, the only testimony elicited at trial to establish the value of the catalytic 

converters was that of the owner of the auto dealership and the owner of the body shop where the 

catalytic converters were stolen. Id. at 85-86, 683 S.E.2d at 844-45. Each testified only to the 

cost of replacing the catalytic converters with new ones, despite the fact that the catalytic 

converters were taken from cars that were three and four years old in the first instance, and from

cars of an unknown age in the second instance. Id. The record was devoid of any evidence 

establishing the original cost of the catalytic converters or their fair market value at the time of 

the larceny. Id. at 86, 683 S.E.2d at 845. Because of this, we held that the evidence was 

inadequate to link the replacement cost to an accurate determination of the actual value, and thus, 

the replacement value alone was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the statutory 

threshold was met. Id. at 90, 683 S.E.2d 846. However, we left open the possibility of using 

replacement cost to assist in establishing value in future cases:
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To be clear, we expressly do not hold that evidence of an item’s 

replacement cost may never be used to assist in establishing a 

stolen item’s value. It is axiomatic that some items appreciate in 

value with the passage of time just as other items depreciate. 

Moreover, it is certainly conceivable that stolen property may be of 

such a character or recent manufacture that replacement value 

accurately reflects actual or fair market value. 

Id. at 89-90, 683 S.E.2d at 846. 

The case at bar is a good example of a scenario where replacement value can properly be 

considered in establishing actual value. The thefts in this case involved only “demo” phones. 

The stolen “demo” phones came from regular inventory and so did their replacements when they 

were stolen. The record reflects that there is no mechanical or design difference between the 

demonstration phones and the phones any customer receives when they purchase one from the 

store. Although there was no testimony as to the age of the phones and how long they had been 

used as “demo” models, a reasonable fact finder could nevertheless infer that they were new

models, since stores only display phones currently for sale, and these phones were actually on 

display in the store. Furthermore, a reasonable fact finder could draw an inference that the 

phones were in good working condition, because stores do not tend to display broken inventory

for demonstration purposes. Thus, since it is reasonable to infer that these phones were new 

models in good working condition, it naturally follows that evidence of their replacement value 

closely approximates their actual value. 

The three iPhones stolen in the Potomac Yards incident cost the store $524 each to 

replace as of the date they were stolen. A new Backflip was valued at $350 just a few days later. 

Cumulatively, the replacement cost of the stolen phones would have been $1,922. In the Duke 

Street incident, three Motorola Backflips with a replacement cost of $350 each and an HTC Tilt 

2 with a replacement cost of $400 were stolen. Cumulatively, the replacement cost of these 

phones totaled $1,450. Thus, in both incidents, the value of the stolen phones far exceeded the 
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statutory amount required to elevate the offense to grand larceny. Thus, we hold that the trial 

court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to establish that the value of the stolen goods 

met or exceeded the $200 minimum amount required to elevate these offenses to grand larceny. 

III. Conclusion

The facts of this case present a situation in which the stolen items have no clear market 

value. As such, their actual value must be used to establish their value for the purpose of proving

grand larceny. In this case, the evidence of value regarding the stolen items was of such a nature 

that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that their replacement cost was sufficient to establish 

that their actual value exceeded the statutory minimum of $200. Therefore, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.