alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 189 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 189

To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide that the authority of 
 the Director of the National Institute on Minority Health and Health 
Disparities to make certain research endowments applies with respect to 
 both current and former centers of excellence, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 5, 2021

   Ms. Barragan (for herself, Mr. Carter of Georgia, and Mr. Taylor) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                          Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide that the authority of 
 the Director of the National Institute on Minority Health and Health 
Disparities to make certain research endowments applies with respect to 
 both current and former centers of excellence, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``John Lewis NIMHD Research Endowment 
Revitalization Act of 2021''.

SEC. 2. RESEARCH ENDOWMENTS AT BOTH CURRENT AND FORMER CENTERS OF 
              EXCELLENCE.

    Paragraph (1) (beginning with ``(1) In general'') of section 464z-
3(h) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 285t(h)) is amended to 
read as follows:
            ``(1) In general.--The Director of the Institute may carry 
        out a program to facilitate minority health disparities 
        research and other health disparities research by providing for 
        research endowments--
                    ``(A) at current or former centers of excellence 
                under section 736; and
                    ``(B) at current or former centers of excellence 
                under section 464z-4.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Carole Gamwell JONES a/k/a Carole K. Gamwell, Appellant, v. John E. TRACEY et al., Appellees.

No. 73-324.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Nov. 9, 1973.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6834

JAMES DAVID NANNEY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ERIK A. HOOKS,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:19-cv-00215-MR)

Submitted: November 17, 2022 Decided: November 23, 2022

Before KING, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James David Nanney, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6834 Doc: 13 Filed: 11/23/2022 Pg: 1 of 2
2

PER CURIAM:

James David Nanney appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to refile 

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint and for a change of venue. We have reviewed the record 

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. Nanney v. 

Hooks, No. 1:19-cv-00215-MR (W.D.N.C. filed July 9, 2022 & entered July 11, 2022). 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6834 Doc: 13 Filed: 11/23/2022 Pg: 2 of 2
#### ROWELL-VAN ATTA, INC. v. BURNSTINE.

No. 38100.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 1969.,

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1969.

Certiorari denied without opinion. 216 So.2d 519.
[J-66-2018] [MO: Mundy, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

HIKO ENERGY, LLC,

Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY 

COMMISSION,

Appellee

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 39 EAP 2017

Appeal from the Order of 

Commonwealth Court entered on 

June 8, 2017 at No. 5 CD 2017 

affirming the Order entered on 

December 3, 2015 by the 

Pennsylvania Public Utility 

Commission at No. C-2014-2431410

ARGUED: September 26, 2018

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: June 5, 2019

I dissent. This Court granted allocatur to address three issues, including the 

following: 

(1) Whether the $1,836,125.00 penalty was so grossly 

disproportionate to the penalties the Commission has 

approved for similar or more egregious conduct as to violate 

the Excessive Fines Clause of the Pennsylvania and U.S.

Constitutions.

HIKO Energy, LLC v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 176 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017). This 

issue presents a constitutional question regarding the excessive fines clauses of the 

Pennsylvania and federal constitutions. In my view, this issue must be addressed and 

decided by this Court in our resolution of this appeal.

Rather than resolving the legal issue presented, the Majority shifts the focus to an 

entirely different legal issue, namely whether HIKO waived the constitutional issue below. 
[J-66-2018] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 2

This Court did not, however, grant allocatur to consider this issue of waiver, and we did 

not do so despite our full knowledge that the PUC had contested whether HIKO had 

preserved the constitutional issue in the Commonwealth Court and that the waiver issue

was a central issue in that court’s disposition of the case. The Commonwealth Court is 

well suited to address issues of waiver, for which there is already a well-established and 

comprehensive body of case law. In contrast, this Court is best suited to resolve the 

constitutional issue of first impression on which we granted allocatur.

If the Court had intended to decide the issue of waiver, we could have granted 

allocatur to review it. We did not. The waiver issue is not encompassed within our grant 

of allowance of appeal and is not an issue before the Court in this appeal. I must therefore 

dissent, as I am of the view that this Court should proceed to decide the constitutional 

issue on its merits by published opinion.

Chief Justice Saylor joins this dissenting opinion.
Cause No. 10-13-00313-CR 

## RECEIVEDIN COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS 

## JAN052015 HOWARD HARRIS, JR. § INTHE<§{&)®RikC©?4a,Clerk V. § CRIMINAL APPEALS THE STATE OF TEXAS § OF TEXAS

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT: 

### Now comes Howard Harris, Jr., Appellant in the above styled and numbered cause, and moves this Court to grant an extension of time to file a Petition for Discretionary Review and for good
cause shows the following: 1. This case is on appeal from the 85th Judicial District Court of Brazos County Texas. 2. The case is,styled Howard Harris,,Jr. v. The State of
Texas and numbered 12-02272-CRF-85. 3. Appellant is currently incarcerated at the Telford Unit TDCJ-ID in Bowie County. 4. On December. 11., 2014, the 10th Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction, and issued an opinion. 

### 5. Appellant is an unskilled layman and is proceeding pro
se. He request this extension in order to research the cases pertaining to the issues and to seek assistance from the Law Library. 

### 6. The facts relied upon above are based on good cause and not for purpose of delay. 

## FILEDIN COURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALS i JAN122015 AbelAcosta,Clerk

### 7. Appellant respectfully request the Court to extend the time for filing his Petition for Discretionary Review for a period of ninety (90) days beginning from January 11, 2015 

### making his PDR due on or before April 11, 2015. WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays that this Court 

### grant this motion to extend time to file:, a petition for discretionary review, and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate. Respectfully Submitted, 

### Howard Harris/Jr. Telford Unit / 1882438 

### 3899 State Hwy 98 New Boston, TX 75570
Unsworn Declaration 

### I Howard Harris, Jr., #1882438, being presently incarcerated in the Telford Unit TDCJ-ID at Bowie County, Texas, verify and 

### declare under penalty of perlury that the foregoing statements

are true and correct., 

# Executedon this3fltt»_dayof_^Uuv^^_^JM3._• Howard Harris^Jr. Appellant Pro se Certificate of Service 

## I hereby certify that on Tte.CLW\b£f !k^2l£M , a true and correct copy of Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review Motion to extend time was mailed to the attorney for the State, 

### Jarvis J. Parsons, via U.S. first class mail to 300 E. 26th Street, 

## Suite 310, Bryan, TX 77803. . ,4, rA Howard Harris, Jr. Appellant Pro se
#### UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Robert J. FLYNN and Joyce Flynn, his wife, Appellees.

No. 70-732.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 9, 1971.

*282George J. Baya, Miami, for appellant.

Elliot L. Miller, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ-

PER CURIAM.

In this action the plaintiff, who was insured under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by the appellant defendant, sought recovery for a loss resulting from burglary. Partial summary judgment on liability was granted in favor of the plaintiff insured. On a jury trial of the issues relating to damages a verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiff for $5,000. Judgment was entered thereon which included an allowance for plaintiff’s attorney fees. The defendant appealed.

The appellant contends the trial court committed error in granting the partial summary judgment; in denying subsequent motions of the defendant to set the summary judgment aside and permit the filing of an amended answer; in excluding certain proffered evidence at the trial; and further contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and that the amount allowed to plaintiff for attorney fees was excessive. We have considered the several contentions of the appellant in the light of the record and briefs and conclude they are without merit, and that no reversible error has been demonstrated. No useful purpose would be served by detailed listing of facts and the procedural matters to which the appellant’s contentions relate and by reciting the respective arguments of counsel thereon.

The judgment is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 224 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 224

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 12, 2022

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 5302 Galveston Road in Houston, Texas, as the ``Vanessa Guillen Post 
                           Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. VANESSA GUILLEN POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 5302 Galveston Road in Houston, Texas, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Vanessa Guillen Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Vanessa 
Guillen Post Office Building''.

            Passed the House of Representatives May 11, 2022.

            Attest:

                                             CHERYL L. JOHNSON,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### Dean Evan HARRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. N-142.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 16, 1971.

W. Fred Turner, Lynn Haven, and Bower & Hayward, Panama City, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Nelson E. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a manslaughter conviction and ten-year sentence thereon. The evidence was conflicting as to who the aggressor was in the affray which resulted in a homicide. The rule is well settled that the jury is the trier of fact and that when the jury’s verdict is supported by competent substantial evidence, the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Kellogg v. State, 219 So.2d 745 (Fla.App.1969).

Numerous points have been raised by appellant, but our consideration of them fails to convince us that reversible error was committed in the trial of this cause.

Accordingly, the judgment reviewed herein must be

Affirmed.

WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and RAWLS and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the accompanying annual report on Form 10-K of Red Mountain Resources, Inc. for the year ended January 31, 2011, I, Kenneth J. Koock, Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer of Red Mountain Resources, Inc., hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge, that:





a)      such annual report on Form 10-K of Red Mountain Resources, Inc. for the year ended January 31, 2011, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





b)      the information contained in such annual report on Form 10-K of Red Mountain Resources, Inc. for the year ended January 31, 2011, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Red Mountain Resources, Inc.





Date: April 28, 2011/s/ Kenneth J. KoockKenneth J. Koock, Chief Executive Officer & Acting Chief Financial Officer (Principal Accounting Officer)





This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### In re ESTATE of Bella Le BLANC, Deceased. Israel MARYL, Appellant, v. CUBAN HEBREW CONGREGATION, Beneficiary and Rabbi Dow Rosensweig, Executor, Appellees.

No. 70-639.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 27, 1971.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Oscar Douglas NELSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73-387.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

July 5, 1973.

Appeal dismissed.
No. 00-7462.

#### Guerra v. United States.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 233 (Thursday, December 4, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 64214]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-31763]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket Nos. RP95-326-013 and RP95-242-012]


Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America; Notice of Proposed 
Changes in FERC Gas Tariff

November 28, 1997.
    Take notice that on November 25, 1997, Natural Gas Pipeline Company 
of America (Natural) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas 
Tariff, Sixth Revised Volume No. 1, Fifth Revised Sheet No. 19 and 
Seventh Revised Sheet No. 20, to be effective January 1, 1998.
    Natural states that the purpose of this filing is to implement 
certain provisions applicable to Rate Schedule BESS and NSS, and 
certain rates derived from the Rate Schedule BESS rate pursuant to the 
Stipulation and Agreement (Settlement) filed by Natural, in Docket Nos. 
RP95-326-010 and RP95-242-010 on May 31, 1996. The Settlement 
represents a comprehensive resolution of Natural's pending general rate 
case, which was approved by the Commission in a letter order issued on 
November 3, 1997, in said dockets.
    Natural requested any waivers that may be required to permit the 
tendered tariff sheets to become effective on January 1, 1998.
    Natural states that copies of the filing have been mailed to 
Natural's customers, interested state regulatory agencies, and all 
parties set out on the official service lists in Docket Nos. RP95-326 
and RP95-242.
    Any person desiring to protest said filing should file a protest 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., 
Washington, D.C. 20426, in accordance with Section 385.211 of the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such protests must be filed as 
provided in Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests 
will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate 
action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to 
the proceeding. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission 
and are available for public inspection in the Public Reference Room.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-31763 Filed 12-3-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### Paul STUPNER and Marilyn Stupner, his wife, Appellants, v. Constance CACACE and Tito Cacace, her husband, Appellees.

No. 69-481.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 3, 1970.

Rehearing Denied March 6, 1970.

Bernard B. Weksler, Miami, for appellants.

Nadler & Tunick, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, C. J., SWANN, J., and FALK, JACK A., Associate Judge.

FALK, JACK A., Associate Judge.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs below from a $615.00 Final Judgment entered by the Civil Court of Record in a non-jury case. The plaintiffs were the purchasers under a deposit receipt contract wherein the defendant-appellees agreed to sell a residence for $40,000.00. After the contract was executed, the vendors refused to conclude the transaction and subsequently sold the residence to another party for $45,000.00.

The lower court refused to consider as an element of the plaintiffs’ damages the loss of the plaintiffs’ bargain, and profit made by the defaulting vendors on the second sale.

A motion for new trial as to damages alone was made, and denied by the trial court.

We think that the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence relating to the value of the property at the time of the breach in the form of a subsequent deposit receipt for the sale of the property. The general rule is that any evidence is admissible which proves or tends to prove any fact material to the issues. Evidence is the means by which some fact in question is established or disproved. 13 Fla. Jur. Evidence § 2. The lower court should have permitted into evidence the deposit receipt of the second sale as reflecting on the value of the property at the time of the breach. See Gassner v. Lockett (1958, Fla.) 101 So.2d 33. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial as to damages only.

ON REHEARING

The appellees, petitioners for rehearing, state that this court erred in stating appel-lees subsequently sold their residence to another party and that indeed the sale did not take place. The record did reflect that appellants tried to introduce a deposit receipt contract between appellees and a third party for the sale of the property but the trial judge refused this evidence.

By our former opinion we did not intend that the trial judge on a retrial as to damages would be required to return a verdict *526m the amount of the alleged profit on the lost bargain, but that the deposit receipt contract should be admitted as evidence of the value of the property; so that if the trier of fact did determine (1) there was a lack of good faith on the appellees or (2) the appellee benefited from any mistake that may have been made, then a proper damage verdict could be entered.

If petitioners’ reasoning were followed, the trial judge could have found either of the alternatives mentioned, supra, to have existed but having excluded the deposit receipt as evidence not been able to return a verdict for appropriate damages.

Accordingly, we adhere to our former opinion and the petition for rehearing is denied.
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Congoleum Corporation (the “Company”) on
Form  10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Roger
S. Marcus, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.











May 9,
2008








/s/ Roger N.
Marcus


Roger S.
Marcus


Chief
Executive Officer








A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Congoleum Corporation and will be retained by Congoleum Corporation and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.