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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED APRIL 30, 2002
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

v	 No. 119427
 

JAMAL S. ALLEN
 

Defendant-Appellant.
 

PER CURIAM
 

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree
 

premeditated murder, MCL 750.316. The mandatory sentence of
 

life imprisonment was imposed. The Court of Appeals affirmed
 

the defendant’s conviction and sentence. We do likewise,
 

rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court committed
 

a structural constitutional error when, after instructing the
 

jury that it must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
 

doubt, it failed to give a further instruction defining
 

reasonable doubt. For the reasons explained below, we hold
 

that the concept of reasonable doubt is within the common
 
understanding of jurors. It is sufficient that a jury is
 

instructed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in
 

order to convict a defendant. A court’s failure to define the
 

phrase “reasonable doubt” is not a plain error requiring
 

reversal of a defendant’s conviction.
 

I 


Mary Morgan died from strangulation and blunt force head
 

injury. The defendant was charged with first-degree murder in
 

connection with Ms. Morgan’s death. At the jury trial on that
 

charge, witnesses testified that Ms. Morgan sought refuge in
 

the witnesses’ home, but that the defendant followed Morgan
 

into the home. There, the defendant hit Ms. Morgan. She
 

fought back. The witnesses said they forced Ms. Morgan out of
 

the home, whereupon defendant pursued her. What occurred
 

after that was a matter of some dispute at the trial. Police,
 

who had been called, found Ms. Morgan on a nearby street lying
 

on her back. She had no vital signs.
 

The prosecutor contended that the defendant followed Ms.
 

Morgan, continued to beat her, and then strangled her.
 

Although the defendant admitted in his testimony that he hit
 

Ms. Morgan while in the witnesses’ home, he denied that he
 

strangled her after leaving there. Additionally, the
 

defendant interposed an intoxication defense. 


Trial was held in the Wayne Circuit Court. At the
 

conclusion of proofs, the jury was instructed as follows
 

2
 
regarding the prosecutor’s burden of proof:
 

[E]very crime is made up of parts called
 

elements. The prosecution must prove each element


of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.


The defendant is not required to prove his
 

innocence or to do anything. If you find the


prosecution has not proven every element beyond a


reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant


not guilty.1
 

The defendant did not object, nor did he request that further
 

instruction defining reasonable doubt be given.
 

The jury was instructed on first-degree murder and
 

second-degree murder. Additionally, the jury was instructed
 

on the defense of intoxication. The jury returned a verdict
 

of guilty of first-degree murder. The court then imposed the
 

mandatory term of life in prison.
 

The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
 

issued a divided unpublished per curiam opinion affirming the
 

conviction. The majority stated the trial judge was not
 

required to define the phrase reasonable doubt. Additionally,
 

the jury had been repeatedly told that to convict the
 

1 Preliminary instructions that were given to the jury


were accurate:
 

During arguments of counsel you will hear a


great deal about reasonable doubt. A reasonable
 

doubt is exactly what it infers. A reasonable
 

doubt is a fair, honest doubt growing out of the


evidence or lack of evidence in this case; or


growing out of any reasonable or legitimate


inferences drawn from the evidence or lack of
 

evidence. It is not merely an imaginary doubt or a


flimsy, fanciful doubt. But, rather, it is a fair,


honest doubt based upon reason and common sense.
 

3
 
defendant required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
 

dissenting judge opined that the failure to provide any
 

definition of reasonable doubt was a clear error that required
 

reversal. 


II
 

Defendant asks us to review a claim of error that he did
 

not preserve at trial. We thus apply the principles
 

articulated in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d
 

130 (1999):
 

To avoid forfeiture under the plain error


rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must


have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear


or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected
 

substantial rights. The third requirement


generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e.,


that the error affected the outcome of the lower
 

court proceedings. It is the defendant rather than
 

the government who bears the burden of persuasion


with respect to prejudice. . . . Reversal is


warranted only when the plain, forfeited error


resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent


defendant or when an error seriously affected the


fairness, integrity or public reputation of
 

judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s


innocence. [Citations and internal quotation marks


omitted.]
 

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude defendant has not
 

demonstrated that a plain error occurred.
 

The right to a jury trial in a criminal felony
 

prosecution is fundamental. Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145,
 

149; 88 S Ct 1444; 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968). The fundamental
 

nature of the right to a jury trial is reflected in both the
 

federal and state constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963,
 

4
 
 

 

art 1, § 20. Interrelated with the right to a jury trial is
 

the requirement that the prosecutor prove guilt beyond a
 

reasonable doubt. Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275, 279; 113
 

S Ct 2078; 124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993). The requirement of burden
 

of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is important because it
 

ensures a reliable determination of guilt. In Sullivan, an
 

erroneous definition of reasonable doubt was held to
 

constitute a “structural” error in the trial.2 A structural
 

error necessarily renders unfair or unreliable the
 

determination of guilt or innocence and defies harmless error
 

analysis. People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 50; 610 NW2d 551
 

(2000). An erroneous definition of reasonable doubt in a jury
 

instruction violates the jury trial guarantee. Sullivan,
 

supra. A decision rendered on the basis of an erroneous
 

definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not a true
 

“verdict” within the meaning of the constitutional guarantee
 

of a jury trial. Id.
 

III
 

That a constitutionally defective reasonable doubt
 

instruction violates the constitutional guarantee of a jury
 

trial does not necessarily imply that a failure to define
 

2 In Sullivan, the instructions included a definition of
 

reasonable doubt as a “grave uncertainty” and “moral
 

certainty.” State v Sullivan, 596 So 2d 177, 186, n 3 (La,


1992). Such instructions were found to be erroneous in Cage
 

v Louisiana, 498 US 39; 111 S Ct 328; 112 L Ed 2d 339 (1990).
 

5
 
reasonable doubt at all constitutes such a violation.3 For
 

well over a century, this Court has recognized that
 

“reasonable doubt” is not an arcane phrase beyond the
 

comprehension of jurors. Hamilton v People, 29 Mich 173
 

(1874), People v Cox, 70 Mich 247; 38 NW 235 (1888), People v
 

Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329; 28 NW 883 (1886), and People v
 

Trudell, 220 Mich 166, 172; 189 NW 910 (1922). 


In Hamilton at 194, this Court stated:
 

If a jury cannot understand their duty when
 

told they must not convict when they have a


reasonable doubt of the prisoner’s guilt, or of any


fact essential to prove it, they can very seldom


get any help from such subtleties as require a


trained mind to distinguish. Jurors are presumed
 

to have common sense, and to understand common
 

English. But they are not presumed to have


professional, or any high degree of technical or


linguistic training. 


In Stubenvoll at 334, this Court said: 


We do not think that the phrase “reasonable


doubt” is of such unknown or uncommon signification


that an exposition by a trial judge is called for.


Language that is within the comprehension of
 

persons of ordinary intelligence can seldom be made


plainer by further definition or refining. All
 

persons who possess the qualifications of jurors


know that a “doubt” is a fluctuation or uncertainty


of mind arising from defect of knowledge or of


evidence, and that a doubt of the guilt of the


accused, honestly entertained, is a “reasonable


doubt.”
 

3 As Justice Rehnquist noted in a concurring opinion in


Sullivan, “[a] trial in which a deficient reasonable-doubt


instruction is given seems to me to be quite different from


one in which no reasonable-doubt instruction is given at all.”


Sullivan, 508 US 284.
 

6
 
Therefore, giving an affirmatively misleading definition
 

differs substantially from merely declining to elaborate on
 

the meaning of a commonly understand phrase. If a trial court
 

gives a deficient definition of reasonable doubt, it cannot be
 

presumed that the jury has, in fact, found guilt beyond a
 

reasonable doubt, whereas, if the trial court instructs on the
 

need to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without more, it
 

can be presumed that the jury has, in fact, found guilt beyond
 

a reasonable doubt.
 

Accordingly, omitting a definition of reasonable doubt in
 

a jury instruction does not violate due process. Victor v
 

Nebraska, 511 US 1, 7; 114 S Ct 1239; 127 L Ed 2d 583 (1994).4
 

The failure to define reasonable doubt is not a structural
 

error, or any error for that matter, because it is not
 

necessary to define this commonly understood phrase. People
 

v Spears, 241 Mich 67, 71; 216 NW 398. The jury here was
 

adequately instructed that the prosecutor had the burden of
 

proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime
 

with which the defendant was charged. No structural error
 

occurred because defendant was not deprived of a basic
 

protection.5 The instructions that were given allowed the
 

4 “[T]he Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from


defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a


matter of course.” Victor, supra at 5.
 

5 “It is not a case where the trial judge gave a wrong


and harmful definition of the term, but where he did not give


any.” Trudell, supra at 171-172. 


7
 
jury to determine reliably the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
 

We hold that a defendant is not entitled to reversal of
 

a jury conviction because of the unchallenged omission of a
 

definition of “reasonable doubt.” We affirm the judgment of
 

the Court of Appeals.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,
 

concurred.
 

8
 
 

___________________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

No. 119427
 

JAMAL S. ALLEN
 

Defendant-Appellant.
 

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).
 

I concur with the result in this case, affirming
 

defendant’s conviction and sentence and rejecting defendant’s
 

claim that the trial court committed a structural
 

constitutional error when it failed to define reasonable
 

doubt. However, I write separately because in reaching this
 

result, the majority applies the plain error principle
 

articulated in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d
 

130 (1999). 


In Carines, I joined Justice Kelly’s partial dissent,
 

which stated that “a contemporaneous objection to an erroneous
 

jury instruction is not required to preserve the issue for
 
appeal.” 460 Mich 778. Justice Kelly also stated:
 

Defendant’s conviction should only “be
 

affirmed if the reviewing court is satisfied that


the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”


People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 482; 581 NW2d 229


(1998). Given that “erroneous jury instructions


regarding essential elements [are] reviewed for


harmless error by utilizing a ‘prejudice’


standard,” this Court must assess whether a
 

properly instructed jury might have reached a


different result, had the error not occurred.


[People v Vaughn, 447 Mich 217, 228, 230, 238; 524


NW2d 217 (1994) (opinion of Brickley, J.).] [Id.]
 

I agree with the majority that defendant is not entitled
 

to reversal of his jury conviction because of the omission of
 

a definition of “reasonable doubt” because I do not believe
 

that a jury would have found any differently even if the trial
 

judge would have defined reasonable doubt. Because I disagree
 

with the principle articulated in Carines that is applied
 

here, I am unable to join the majority opinion.
 

KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
 

2