In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-1169

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY J. LEFLORE,

Defendants-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 18-CR-30074-MJR — Michael J. Reagan, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED JUNE 3, 2019 — DECIDED JUNE 12, 2019

____________________

Before FLAUM, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Anthony LeFlore, who has two prior felony 

convictions, traded drugs to minors in exchange for guns—

one of which he sold to a confidential informant. He pleaded 

guilty to the illegal possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g). The district judge sentenced him to 96 months in 

prison, the top of a 77 to 96 month Sentencing Guidelines 

range, based on an offense level of 21 and a criminal history 

category of VI (derived from 15 criminal history points).
2 No. 19-1169

LeFlore appealed, but his counsel asserts that the appeal is 

frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967). (LeFlore did not respond to counsel’s motion. 

See CIR. R. 51(b).) Counsel explains the nature of the case and 

the issues that the appeal would involve. His analysis appears 

thorough, so we limit our review to the topics that he discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 

2014).

Counsel first explains that he advised LeFlore of the possible disadvantages of contesting the adequacy of the plea colloquy and that LeFlore wants to challenge only his sentence. 

Counsel thus properly declines to discuss arguments related 

to the plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 

(7th Cir. 2012). 

Counsel then considers arguing that the district judge erroneously determined that LeFlore had 15 criminal history 

points, but he decides that it would be frivolous to do so. The 

judge, however, did make an error, in calculating the criminal 

history points. The Guidelines treat sentences that are “imposed on the same day” as one when scoring a defendant’s 

criminal history, unless there was an intervening arrest. 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2); see also Molina-Martinez v. United States, 

136 S. Ct. 1338, 1344–48 (2016). Here, accepting a probation officer’s recommendation, the judge assessed three points for a 

second-degree murder conviction and two more points for 

driving on a revoked license. But according to the presentence 

report, LeFlore was arrested on the same day for these offenses and was sentenced for both on the same day approximately one year later. The judge, accordingly, should have assigned only three points for these offenses, not five. 
No. 19-1169 3

Still, any challenge based on the miscalculation would be 

frivolous because we would conclude that the judge’s error 

was harmless. An error is harmless if it did not affect the ultimate sentence imposed. See United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 

1026, 1037 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Clark, 906 F.3d 667, 

671 (7th Cir. 2018). Excluding the two points added in error, 

the district judge should have determined that LeFlore had 

13 criminal history points: 12 points based on convictions resulting in prison sentences of varying lengths, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 4A1.1, and 1 point based on a conviction resulting in a fine, 

see id. at § 4A1.1(c); United States v. Fluker, 698 F.3d 988, 1003 

(7th Cir. 2012). With 13 criminal history points, LeFlore would 

remain in the same criminal history category of VI that the 

judge previously calculated based on having assigned 

15 points, and thus the same Guidelines range would apply. 

See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). The judge also 

added that the criminal history points and category underrepresented LeFlore’s criminality. 

At no point during sentencing did the judge give any indication that he would have imposed a lower sentence if 

LeFlore remained in the same criminal history category with 

fewer criminal history points. As other circuits have done under similar circumstances, we would conclude that the miscalculation of LeFlore’s criminal history points, which did not 

change the applicable criminal history category, was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Isaac, 655 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 

2011); United States v. Tiger, 223 F.3d 811, 812–13 (8th Cir. 

2000); United States v. Jackson, 22 F.3d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 1994); 

see also United States v. Monzo, 852 F.3d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 

2017) (ruling that additional criminal history points, if added 
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in error, were harmless when defendant already did not qualify for safety valve and received statutory minimum sentence).

Counsel then considers arguing that the court applied an 

excessively high base-offense level built on an erroneous conclusion that two of LeFlore’s prior Illinois convictions (for second-degree murder, 720 ILCS 5/9-2, and domestic battery, 

720 ILCS 5/12-3.2) were for crimes of violence. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 2K2.1(a)(2). He rightly concludes, though, that the argument 

would be frivolous. A conviction under Illinois’s second-degree murder statute is a crime of violence. United States v. 

Teague, 884 F.3d 726, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2018). So is a conviction 

for domestic battery based on causing bodily harm under 

720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1). See United States v. Waters, 823 F.3d 

1062, 1064–65 (7th Cir. 2016). True, a conviction under 720 

ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) for domestic battery based on making 

physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature falls outside the definition of a crime of violence, see United States v. 

Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 797 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Illinois battery 

statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-3), but LeFlore never objected to the 

presentence investigation report’s representation that his domestic battery conviction was for a violent felony, and we 

would not conclude that the district court plainly erred in accepting that it was, see id. at 799–800. 

Counsel next contemplates arguing that the sentence was 

substantively unreasonable. But counsel accurately concludes

that this argument would be frivolous, too. The district court 

appropriately considered the § 3553(a) factors, including the 

seriousness of the offense (LeFlore traded drugs to juveniles

for guns), and LeFlore’s history and characteristics (LeFlore’s 

criminal history category did not reflect his numerous other 
No. 19-1169 5

convictions during his “32-year crime spree”). The sentence, 

the court stated, was necessary to punish and deter LeFlore, 

as well as to protect the public, given his extensive criminal 

history. Counsel suggests that the court erred by not addressing LeFlore’s argument that his history of alcohol and drug 

use were mitigating factors. A district court, however, need 

not expansively respond to every argument if its reasoning is 

otherwise clear, and it need not respond at all to stock arguments. See United States v. Graham, 915 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 

2019). In any event, a defendant waives an appellate challenge 

to a district court’s explanation of the sentence when he does 

not accept a court’s invitation to object, see United States v. Salgado, 917 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 2019), and LeFlore declined 

the court’s offer of “further amplification of [§] 3553.” 

Last, counsel assesses potential challenges to LeFlore’s 

conditions while on supervised release, but he correctly determines that LeFlore waived any such challenge. A defendant waives appellate arguments against supervisory conditions when he has a chance to review them before sentencing 

and does not object to them. See United States v. St. Clair, No. 

18-1933, 2019 WL 2399597, at *2 (7th Cir. June 7, 2019); United 

States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2018). LeFlore 

said at the sentencing hearing that he reviewed the presentence investigation report with counsel, understood the proposed conditions, and agreed that they were appropriate. 

We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and 

DISMISS the appeal.