In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 05-3264

DARNELL BRIDGES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JOHN CHAMBERS, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 C 6447—Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 13, 2006—DECIDED MAY 12, 2006

____________

Before KANNE, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Darnell Bridges was convicted

in Illinois of aggravated battery. He is before us now on his

28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, which was denied by the district

court. The sole issue centers on whether Bridges’s confession to the Chicago police was voluntary, given that he

was only 17 years old at the time and that the police

purposefully separated Bridges from his parents during

both his arrest and subsequent interrogations. Although we

are disturbed with the choice of tactics used by the police,

the Appellate Court of Illinois appropriately evaluated all

of the circumstances surrounding the confession, and its

decision that the confession was voluntary was not contrary
2 No. 05-3264

to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. We therefore affirm.

I. HISTORY

Stacy Spires, an off-duty Chicago police officer, was an

innocent bystander who was accidently shot during a gangrelated shooting. Upon investigating, the police immediately suspected Bridges was involved. Detective Stanley

Turner, along with other Chicago police officers, went to

Bridges’s home, where Turner spoke with Bridges’s mother.

She was unwilling to divulge Bridges’s location, but offered

to take the police to him. She then led officers to a local

grocery store where Bridges worked. After asking Bridges

a few questions in the presence of his mother and his

employer, Turner (and the mother) left the store. Before

leaving, Turner told the mother he would contact her should

further questioning be necessary. Some 10 to 15 minutes

later, three different officers returned to the store and took

Bridges to the police station for questioning. Bridges’s

mother was not contacted, and she did not learn of the

arrest until hours later. Upon her arrival at the police

station, she was told she could see her son, but she was not

actually allowed to do so at any time.

Bridges was interrogated three times while in police

custody. The first interrogation began at 8:30 p.m., and

Bridges was questioned by a detective for 30 minutes. He

was questioned again for 30 minutes starting at 3:30 a.m.

the following morning. Neither interview was eventful.

Beginning at 6:00 a.m., Bridges was questioned for about an

hour, and he provided a statement at that time in which he

admitted to being a lookout for the shooters. Based on this

statement, Bridges was indicted and ultimately went to

trial, where he was acquitted of attempted murder, but was

found guilty of aggravated battery of Spires with a firearm.
No. 05-3264 3

Bridges appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois,

raising several issues. The most important issue for our

purposes was whether Bridges’s statement was voluntary,

given that he was under 18 years of age and he was not

allowed to have a parent or other friendly adult present.

Without recounting all the issues, suffice it to say the

appellate court evaluated the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession and found it was

voluntary. Bridges’s petition for leave to appeal to the

Illinois Supreme Court was subsequently denied. Bridges

then filed his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the

district court, raising two issues, including whether his

confession was voluntary. Both issues were denied, and

the district court granted Bridges a certificate of appealability with respect to the voluntariness issue. It is to this

issue that we now turn.

II. ANALYSIS

“[I]n habeas cases, we review the district court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”

Charlton v. Davis, 439 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”), we may grant

habeas corpus relief only if the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or employs an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000). A decision is “contrary to”

clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at

a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme

Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. A decision represents an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies
4 No. 05-3264

1 Bridges acknowledges that, “This precept [has] never [been]

articulated this way . . . .” Furthermore, at oral argument,

Bridges’s counsel conceded that at the time of Bridges’s arrest,

there was no Supreme Court case involving a 17-year-old in the

present context. Bridges certainly has an uphill battle to show the

Illinois court acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied, Supreme

Court precedent if there was no such precedent to point to.

the correct governing principle from [the Supreme Court’s]

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

At the outset, we note Bridges’s argument relies on a

faulty premise. Bridges argues, “In short, the Illinois courts

did not apply the correct totality of the circumstances test

because there are two different tests—one for juveniles and

one for adults.”1

 It is undisputed that the voluntariness of

confessions has long been analyzed by examining the

totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).

However, there is only one test, not two. It is logically

impossible to have more than one totality-of-the-circumstances test. Either all relevant circumstances are considered or they are not. Essentially, Bridges argues his

supposed juvenile status entitles him to an evidentiary

presumption where none exists. “This totality-of-thecircumstances approach is adequate to determine whether

there has been a waiver even where interrogation of

juveniles is involved.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725

(1979); see Ruvalcaba v. Chandler, 416 F.3d 555, 560-61

(7th Cir. 2005) (quoting same); see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962) (explaining, in evaluating the

voluntariness of a child’s confession, “There is no guide to

the decision of cases such as this, except the totality of

circumstances. . . .”).

Bridges does not argue the Illinois appellate court did not

consider the circumstances surrounding his statement. In
No. 05-3264 5

fact, Bridges goes so far as to say that court “may have

applied a totality of the circumstances test” (emphasis

in original), which is confirmed by the Illinois court’s

opinion:

We look to the totality of the circumstances to

determine the voluntariness of a statement. Factors

to be considered include: the defendant’s age,

intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education and physical condition at the time of

questioning, the legality and duration of the detention, the duration of the questioning, and any

physical or mental abuse by the police, including

any threats or promises. No single factor is

dispositive.

People v. Bridges, No. 1-01-0914, slip op. at 15 (Ill. App. Ct.

May 20, 2003) (citations omitted). The court then looked at

each of these factors individually and concluded the statement was made voluntarily. See id. at 15-19. Given that the

court applied the proper test as required by the Supreme

Court, we are not in a position to find its decision was

contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by

the Supreme Court.

Bridges then makes a second argument, this one concerning his age. Bridges was one month shy of his 18th birthday

at the time of the interrogation. Bridges argues that

because he was a juvenile at the time, the court

was required to consider his prior experience with the

criminal justice system and the presence or absence

of friendly adults, usually the parents. Furthermore,

according to Bridges, “when reviewing the statements of

a juvenile, the Supreme Court recognizes a ‘special caution’ factor.” Because the Illinois court did not consider

these additional “juvenile factors,” its decision was both

contrary to and constituted an unreasonable application of

“Supreme Court law,” or so the argument goes.
6 No. 05-3264

Once again, Bridges’s argument relies on a faulty premise, namely that Bridges was a juvenile. Contrary to his

argument, the law in Illinois could not be any clearer. The

Illinois General Assembly has spoken and has declared that

a juvenile is someone under the age of 17. See 705 ILCS

405/5-105(3) (“‘Delinquent minor’ means any minor who

prior to his or her 17th birthday . . . .”). Bridges does not

dispute that the Illinois statute applies to him and that it

does not categorize him as a juvenile. Rather, he argues the

Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 17-year-olds as

juveniles, and he seems to argue that recognition trumps

the Illinois statute. Bridges then provides a wide array of

Supreme Court cases in which the Court referred to 17-

year-olds as “juveniles,” “children,” “boy[s],” “adolescent[s],”

and “minors.” None of these cases involved the voluntariness of a confession. A review of the cases cited by Bridges

shows these descriptive terms did not establish any constitutional rule, nor did they create any legal significance. In

other words, the characterizations were not all that material to the outcome of the case, nor did the Court come close

to establishing that those under 18 must be considered

juveniles. Moreover, it is common for federal courts to look

to state law to determine a person’s status. Cf. Elk Grove

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (“The

whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,

parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not

to the laws of the United States.”) (quotations and citations

omitted). It was therefore not unreasonable for the Illinois

court, consistent with Illinois law, to conclude Bridges

was not a juvenile.

Bridges then points to other sources to argue he must

be considered a juvenile. For example, for federal juvenile

delinquency purposes, 18 U.S.C. § 5031 defines a juvenile

as someone under the age of 18. Also, according to Bridges,

Congress has interpreted Supreme Court precedent to

establish that 17-year-olds are juveniles. Furthermore,

Bridges argues “the Supreme Court and everyone else”
No. 05-3264 7

2 This tactic might be invalidated in the future. See Roper v.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring execution of a 17-year-old

under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (considering interaction of police

with the parents of a 17-year-old when evaluating whether he was

“in custody” for purposes of Miranda). However, these cases were

decided after Bridges’s conviction became final and are of no use

to him now.

implicitly considers 17-year-olds as juveniles, citing “the

history leading up to the passage of the 26th Amendment.”

All of these sources are unpersuasive for the same reason:

None involve Supreme Court precedent that clearly established that 17-year-olds must be considered juveniles. As

stated earlier, this is the requirement under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), and Bridges has failed to meet his burden.

Bridges’s final argument is that his statement was not

voluntary, given the “chilling facts” surrounding his

interrogation, including the “peculiarly outrageous” conduct

of the police in keeping Bridges’s parents away from their

son during questioning. The police did orchestrate the

situation in a conscious effort to keep Bridges’s parents,

especially his mother, from being present. It appears the

police did not even inform the parents that Bridges was in

custody. Bridges argues this police behavior is the culture

in Illinois, as it is one of the few jurisdictions in which the

police can intentionally separate a 17-year-old suspect from

his or her parents during questioning, despite the suspect’s

requests to the contrary.2

 While this conduct gives us pause,

and indeed we encourage the police to consider other

interrogation techniques for 17-year-olds, this behavior by

itself is not enough to warrant a finding that the Illinois

court’s decision was contrary to, or employed an unreasonable application of, federal law.

The Illinois court considered the totality of the circumstances, and its decision did not involve an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. It noted
8 No. 05-3264

3 In fact, as was confirmed at oral argument, Bridges could not

even be charged as a juvenile for his actions under Illinois law,

given that he was over 16.

Bridges was almost 18, he was a senior in high school, he

was receiving average grades, he regularly attended school,

and he also held down a part-time job. He lived in a stable,

two-parent household. As for the actual questioning, it was

relatively brief. He was questioned for 30 minutes beginning at 8:30 p.m., then again at 3:30 a.m. for 30 minutes.

He was then questioned for an hour starting at 6:00 a.m., at

which time he gave his statement. He was allowed to use

the restroom, and he was given something to drink. There

was no evidence he was not allowed to sleep between

interviews. Finally, the Illinois court found the police did

not engage in any physical or mental abuse. In the end, the

court examined Bridges’s intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition, as

well as the legality and duration of the detention, the

duration of the questioning, and any physical or mental

abuse by the police, including any threats or promises. The

court also explained how relevant Illinois law considered

Bridges an adult, and not a juvenile.3

 Properly evaluating

all of these factors using the totality-of-the-circumstances

test, the court determined that Bridges’s statement was

voluntary. Having reviewed the record before us, we find

nothing in the decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court.
No. 05-3264 9

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s

decision to deny Bridges’s § 2254 petition is AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—5-12-06