No. 88-624 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1989 

CANYON CREEK EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 

affiliated with the Montana Education 

Association. and KAREN TINNES, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

-VSBOARD OF TRUSTEES, YELTdOWSTONE COUNTY 

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Diane G. Rarz, Judqe presiding. 

COIJNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Emilie Loring; Hilley & Loring, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Charles E. Erdmann; Erdmann & P?right, Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Nov. 21, 1989 

Decided: January 11, 1990 

Filed: 
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Thirteenth 

Judicial District, Yellowstone County, finding that the 

Respondent, Board of Trustees, did not breach the terms of 

the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into with the 

Appellant, Canyon Creek Education Association. We find that 

the District Court was without jurisdiction to hear the 

matter and therefore remand for dismissal without- reachinq 

the substantive issues concerning breach of contract. 

The sole issue on appeal is: 

Whether the District Court has jurisdiction to hear and 

decide an action alleging breach of a collective bargaining 

agreement, when the plaintiff has not first brought the case 

before the County Superintendent. 

Karen Tinnes (Mrs. Tinnes), the plaintiff in this 

action, had been employed by the School District as a 

nontenured substitute teacher and as a teacher's aid in the 

1983-84 school year. In the 1984-85 and 1985-86 school 

years, she had been employed as a full time teacher. 

In the spring of 1986, it became evident to the School 

Board that the School District was facing financial 

uncertainty for the upcoming school year. State funding was 

reduced and an attempt to pass a local mill levy had failed. 

Due to such financial problems, the School Board decided to 

meet on March 26, 1986, at a special meeting to address the 

status of the nontenured teachers. A two day notice of the 

meeting was given. At the meeting, the financial status of 

the District was discussed and a decision was made not to 

renew nontenured teachers. A letter was sent to all 

nontenured teachers, including Mrs. Tinnes who was not 

present at the meeting, informing them of the Roard's action. 
Eventually Mrs. Tinnes was recalled to fill a 

one-quarter time position for the 1986-87 school year. She 

was not, however, recalled to fill six other positions which 

opened during the year. Three of these positions--an 

elementary counselor, a seventh grade school teacher, and a 

music teacher, required special endorsements or experience 

which Mrs. Tinnes did not have. However, she was qualified 

to fill the other three positions. She was not given an 

opportunity to fill these positions because the District 

decided to fill them with a teacher who had prior experience 

teaching in the grades where the openings occurred. 

In 1987, the District was again experiencing financial. 

difficulties and uncertainty. The Board met without givins 

any type of notice to the nontenured teachers on February 16, 

1987 to determine their status. The decision was made to 

non-renew their contracts. Later in 1987, as the financial 

situation for the District stabilized, the District recalled 

and hired new teachers for various positions. Mrs. Tinnes 

was not among those recalled. 

Followinq her non-renewal in 1986, Mrs. Tinnes filed a 

complaint in District Court alleging that the School Board 

had breached the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into 

by the School District and the teachers association. In 

December of 1987, she filed an amended complaint which 

contained additional allegations for the 1987-88 school year. 

Trial was held on July 12, 1988 and the District Court found 

in favor of the School District. This appeal followed. 

On July 12, 1988, the same day that trial was held on 

this case, this Court issued a decision in Throssell v. Board 

of Trustees (Mont. 1988), 757 P.2d 348, 45 St.Rep. 1228. In 

Throssell, we held that under S 20-3-210, MCA, the County 

Superintendent must hear and decide all matters of 

controversy arisinq as a result of decisions of the Board of 
Trustees. Section 20-3-210, MCA, states in pertinent part 

that: 

. . . the county superintendent shall hear and 

decide all matters of controversy arising in his 

county as a result of decisions of the trustees of 

a district in the county. 

In Throssell, the plaintiff relied upon McBride v. 

School District No. 1 (1930), 88 Mont. 110, 290 P. 252, in 

support of his position that actions for money owed pursuant 

to a contract are not contemplated within the meaning of 

S 20-3-210, MCA. In McBride, -- this Court held that when a. 

teacher brings an action for a money judgment based upon 

breach of contract, the rule of exhausting one's 

administrative remedies does not apply. McBride, 290 P. at 

254. The plaintiff in Throssell argued that because his 

complaint sought solely monetary damages, the rule of McBride 

applied. 

We disagreed and held that as a general rule a claimant 

in the school system must exhaust his administrative remedies 

before filing a complaint or petition in District Court. 

Throssell noted this general rule has three limited 

exceptions. These exceptions are situations where state 

agencies have been directly granted primary jurisdiction, 

where the matter is governed by a specific statute or where 

the Board has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. 

Throssell, 752 P.2d at 349-50. Because the plaintiff's cause 

of action in Throssell did not come under any of these 

exceptions, we held the District Court had no jurisdiction. 

The case now before us involves two Collective 

Bargaining Agreements. The first agreement was effective 

between June 30, 1984 and June 30, 1986 and was in force when 

Mrs. Tinnes was non-renewed in 1986. The second agreement 

was effective from July 1, 1986 through June 30, 1988. This 
Collective Bargaining Agreement was applicable to the 1987 

non-renewal. 

Following her non-renewal in 1986, Mrs. Tinnes filed an 

appeal before the Yellowstone County Superintendent of 

Schools. In this matter, she alleged that the reasons given 

by the School Board for her non-renewal were not true. The 

Superintendent found in favor of the School District on July 

14, 1986, and dismissed the appeal. 

Mrs. Tinnes continued, following this ruling, to pursue 

her administrative remedies, on the grounds stated, and 

appealed to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 

However, on November 17, 1986, she also filed the District 

Court action now on review, alleging breach of contract, due 

to the School District's failure to comply with notice and 

layoff-rehire provisions in the Collective Bargaining 

Agreement. The complaint was amended in December of 1987 to 

include breach of contract allegations arising out of the 

1987 non-renewal. The State Superintendent, on April 6, 

1987, affirmed the decision of the County Superintendent and 

dismissed Mrs. Tinnes' administrative appeal. 

From the above facts, it is apparent that the District. 

Court did not have jurisdiction to hear Mrs. Tinnes' 

complaint. The action before the lower court was based upon 

completely different theories than that presented to the 

County Superintendent for the 1986 non-renewal and were never 

presented for administrative review. Furthermore, the 

allegations arising out of the 1987 non-renewal also were 

never presented for administrative review. 

In light of Throssell, in order for the District Court 

to have jurisdiction, it is necessary for the litigant to 

exhaust her administrative remedies. Accordingly, we hold 

that the District Court was without jurisdiction to hear Mrs. 

Tinnes' complaint and the complaint is to be dismissed. 
As a final point, we note that Mrs. Tinnes relies 

heavily upon McBride in support of her theory that she need 

not exhaust her administrative remedies before filing her 

complaint in District Court. This confusion on her part may 

be partly caused by our failure to affirmatively overrule 

McBride in Throssell. Therefore, in order to prevent further 

confusion, we hereby affirmatively overrule McBride, and hold 

that unless a claimant's cause of action falls under the 

three exceptions enumerated in - Throssell, he/she must present 

his/her claim to the County Superintendent, invoking and 

completing the administrative process first before resorting 

to the courts. 

Remanded for dismissal. 

&8- Justice 

- /' We concur: 

Chief Justice 

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