Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Minniefield, 2015 IL App (1st) 141094

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

GREGORY MINNIEFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Fifth Division

Docket No. 1-14-1094

Filed

Rehearing denied

August 14, 2015

September 21, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 3-CR-1284; the 

Hon. Thomas J. Byrne, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Yasaman Hannah Navai, 

all of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

Michelle Katz, Christine Cook, and Peter Maltese, Assistant State’s 

Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Palmer and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment 

and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant Gregory Minniefield appeals the trial court’s December 6, 2013, order striking 

defendant’s pro se document which was entitled “Motion to Vacate Conviction/Sentence as 

Void.”

¶ 2 Defendant was found guilty after a jury trial of first-degree murder and sentenced to a 

total of 50 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections. The sentence included a 25-year 

enhancement for personally discharging a firearm which proximately caused death. This 

court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal on April 11, 2007. 

People v. Minniefield, No. 1-05-2792 (2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 

23). Defendant then filed a pro se postconviction petition which the trial court summarily 

dismissed. On May 28, 2010, this court reversed the trial court’s summary dismissal and 

remanded for second-stage postconviction proceedings. People v. Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649 

(2010) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). After the remand, the trial court 

granted the State’s motion to dismiss on January 15, 2013. On December 13, 2013, this court 

affirmed the trial court’s second-stage dismissal. People v. Minniefield, 2014 IL App (1st) 

130535. 

¶ 3 While defendant’s appeal of the second-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition was 

pending, defendant filed on November 27, 2013, a document entitled a “Motion to Vacate 

Conviction/Sentence as Void.” The document claimed that he was wrongly sentenced under 

a firearm enhancement provision because the jury was incorrectly instructed under a 

modified instruction. 

¶ 4 On this appeal, defendant characterizes this document as a section 2-1401 petition (735 

ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2012)), but concedes that he “chose the incorrect vehicle to present 

his claims” and that “a circuit court is not required to construe a collateral petition arguing 

constitutional violations as a post-conviction petition if the pleading does not explicitly 

invoke the [Post-Conviction Hearing] Act, as is the case here.” In addition, defendant also 

observes that this court recently rejected his underlying substantive argument. People v. 

Sharp, 2015 IL App (1st) 130438, ¶¶ 79-80. 

¶ 5 For the following reasons, we do not find defendant’s arguments persuasive.

¶ 6 BACKGROUND 

¶ 7 I. The Evidence at Trial 

¶ 8 A. The Events 

¶ 9 On direct appeal, we summarized the evidence at defendant’s trial as follows:

“The trial evidence demonstrated that, on December 17, 2002, defendant fatally 

shot the victim, Theopolis Ransberry. Immediately prior, defendant was driving a car 

with two passengers, his girlfriend and cousin. The victim was simultaneously driving 

his car with three passengers. Although defendant admitted that he shot the victim, 

the trial testimony conflicted regarding the exact chain of events leading to the 

victim’s death. The State’s witnesses, including the victim’s passengers and 

defendant’s cousin, testified that defendant instigated the exchange with the victim by 

shooting at the victim’s car. Then, after the victim subsequently pulled his car over, 

defendant approached on foot and shot the victim several more times absent 
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provocation. Contrarily defendant testified that he did not shoot the victim until, after 

approaching the victim’s car to merely talk, he thought the victim was reaching for a 

gun, and thus responsively shot the victim’s hand twice. Then because the victim 

began to drive away while defendant’s hand remained partially inside the car, 

defendant’s hand hit the window causing the handgun to fire several more times.” 

Minniefield, No. 1-05-2792, slip op. at 2. 

¶ 10 B. Defendant’s Pretrial Confession

¶ 11 On direct appeal, we described defendant’s pretrial confession as follows:

“At trial, Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) John Brady testified that defendant 

agreed to have his statement videotaped, and it was published to the jury over defense 

counsel’s objections. In the statement, defendant admitted that he chased the victim’s 

car on the day in question because they were engaged in an ongoing feud over money. 

Defendant further admitted that, while chasing the victim’s car, he fired two gunshots 

into the air. Defendant additionally admitted that he approached the victim’s car, 

grabbed the chain around his neck and demanded money that the victim owed him. 

The victim moved and defendant fired his handgun toward the victim’s leg. Then, 

while defendant’s handgun remained inside the car, the car moved approximately two 

feet causing defendant to shoot the victim four additional times. Defendant admitted 

that no one was armed in the victim’s car. Defendant knew that bullets hit both the 

victim and Roshawn Adams, one of the passengers; however, he fled the scene and 

disposed of his handgun. Defendant stated that he merely intended to scare the victim, 

not to hurt him.” Minniefield, No. 1-05-2792, slip op. at 2. 

¶ 12 C. Defendant’s Testimony at Trial

¶ 13 We described defendant’s trial testimony as follows:

“Defendant testified that, in April 2002, he and the victim had a conversation 

during which the victim denied involvement in an incident with defendant’s 

girlfriend. He further testified that, early in the afternoon on the day in question, 

defendant was driving with his two-year old son when the victim opened fire at 

defendant’s car. Defendant found a police officer in the area and reported the 

incident; however, the officer was forced to leave on an emergency call. At some 

point during the day, defendant purchased a loaded handgun for protection. 

 Later in the evening, defendant was driving with his girlfriend, Nicole Saunders, 

and his cousin, Erica Simmons, when he recognized the victim’s car pass him and 

stop. Defendant approached the victim’s car on foot, armed with his handgun, to talk 

to him about a misunderstanding involving Sanders. Defendant, however, saw the 

victim reach for what he thought was a handgun, and as a result, shot inside the car in 

an attempt to shoot whatever the victim was trying to retrieve. After firing two shots, 

the victim began to drive away. Defendant’s hand, however, was still inside the car. 

As a result, the window frame hit defendant’s hand causing the gun to fire several 

more times. Defendant testified that he did not intend to fire the handgun and he did 

not think that he shot anyone. 
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 Defendant further maintained that he was mistreated while in police custody, and 

despite expressly invoking his rights to an attorney and to remain silent, his Miranda 

rights were violated.[1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant claimed 

that he told Detective Ron Lewis and Timothy Nolan that the victim threatened him 

and that he shot the victim because he thought the victim was reaching for a weapon. 

Defendant, however, admitted that he did not make the same claims in his videotaped 

statement.

 On cross-examination, defendant stated that he thought the victim initially shot at 

his car because the victim mistakenly thought that defendant was involved in a prior 

attack on the victim, which was actually instigated by defendant’s girlfriend. He 

admitted, however, that during the incident the victim did not make any threats.”

Minniefield, No. 1-05-2792, slip op. at 2-4. 

¶ 14 D. The State’s Rebuttal Evidence

¶ 15 We described the State’s rebuttal case as follows:

“In rebuttal, Detective Lewis testified that defendant did not report that the victim 

shot at him while he was driving his son or that he thought the victim was reaching 

for a handgun. On cross-examination, however, Lewis admitted that defendant told 

him that the victim had threatened defendant. Also, in rebuttal, Detective Nolan 

reiterated that defendant did not report that the victim shot at him. On 

cross-examination, however, Nolan admitted that defendant [stated] that he only shot 

inside the victim’s car because the victim was reaching for something.” Minniefield, 

No. 1-05-2792, slip op. at 4. 

¶ 16 E. Jury Instructions 

¶ 17 At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel requested instructions on both 

second-degree murder and self-defense, which the trial court gave over the State’s objection.

¶ 18 The jurors were instructed that, in order to sustain the charge of first-degree murder, the 

State had the burden of proving that “the defendant was not justified in using the force he 

used.”

¶ 19 As to when force is justified, the jurors were instructed: 

“A person is justified in the use of force when and to the extent that he reasonably 

believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself against the imminent use of 

unlawful force. 

 However, a person is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to 

cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is 

necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself.”

¶ 20 With respect to second-degree murder, the jury was instructed: 

“You may not consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of 

second degree murder until and unless you have first determined that the State has 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the previously stated propositions. 

 

1

Prior to trial, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the statements he made while in 

police custody. 
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 The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 

a mitigating factor is present so that he is guilty of the lesser offense of second degree 

murder instead of first degree murder. By this I mean that you must be persuaded, 

considering all the evidence in this case, that it is more probably true than not true 

that the following mitigating factor is present: that the defendant, at the time he 

performed the acts which caused the death of Theopulous Ransberry, believed the 

circumstances to be such that they justified the deadly force he used, but, his belief 

that such circumstances existed was unreasonable.”

Thus, the jurors were also instructed to consider, if they first found that the State had proved 

that “the defendant was not justified in using the force he used” and he was guilty of 

first-degree murder, whether he had an unreasonable belief in the need for the use of deadly 

force. 

¶ 21 After receiving their instructions, the jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, 

and defendant was sentenced to 50 years of imprisonment, and his conviction was affirmed 

on direct appeal on April 11, 2007. Minniefield, No. 1-05-2792. 

¶ 22 II. Postconviction Proceedings 

¶ 23 Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition on December 27, 2007, alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel, which the trial court summarily dismissed as frivolous on 

February 6, 2008. 

¶ 24 A. Reversal of First-Stage Dismissal 

¶ 25 On appeal, this court reversed the summary first-stage dismissal on May 28, 2010 

(Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 7), stating: 

“We find defendant’s claim should have survived first-stage review because his 

allegation that counsel failed to investigate or present witnesses has an arguable basis 

in law and fact. [Citation.] As a threshhold matter, we note that defendant appended 

his own affidavit as well as one from Ratliff. A claim that trial counsel failed to 

investigate and call a witness must be supported by an affidavit from the proposed 

witness. [Citation.] Therefore, we do not consider the proposed testimony from 

Knighton in our determination. [Citation.] 

We find that defendant’s allegation has an arguable basis in fact. At trial, 

defendant’s testimony presented an ‘imperfect self-defense’ theory: that he fired his 

gun at the victim after believing he saw the victim reach for a gun. However, the 

State’s testimony established that police did not recover a gun from the victim’s 

automobile. In his petition, defendant alleged that Ratliff would testify that an 

unknown man removed a silver gun from the automobile before police arrived on the 

scene. Defendant appended an affidavit in which Ratliff averred as such, and also that 

counsel never investigated his statement. In his own affidavit, defendant averred that 

he told counsel about Ratliff and Knighton. Taken as true at this stage [citation], 

Ratliff’s affidavit lends support to defendant’s theory of defense and defendant’s 

affidavit establishes that counsel knew of the witnesses. Therefore we cannot find the 

facts in defendant’s allegations ‘fantastic or delusional.’ [Citation.]
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We also cannot find defendant’s allegation presented an indisputably meritless 

legal theory. A constitutional claim that a defendant did not receive effective 

assistance of counsel must demonstrate that it is arguable that counsel’s performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and the defendant was arguably 

prejudiced as a result. [Citation.] Defendant testified at trial that he believed the 

victim was reaching for a gun and that based on this belief, fired one or two shots 

toward the victim. Testimony presented by the State established that the police did 

not recover a gun from the victim’s automobile. The allegations related to Ratliff’s 

testimony corroborate defendant’s belief that the victim was reaching for a gun. We 

find this failure to investigate could arguably demonstrate that counsel’s performance 

was objectively unreasonable. [Citation.] Finally, the affidavits support the allegation 

that counsel failed to investigate Ratliff’s testimony. Although the evidence against 

defendant was strong, it is at least ‘arguable’ that evidence of a gun in the victim’s car 

could have changed the outcome.” Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 5-7. 

¶ 26 The appellate court did not reach defendant’s second allegation concerning 

ineffectiveness based on a failure to ask for further jury instructions, since it was already 

reversing on the first issue. Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 7. 

¶ 27 B. Trial Court’s Order on Remand

¶ 28 On remand, counsel was appointed and filed a supplemental petition, supplementing the 

claims and allegations that defendant already made in his pro se petition. 

¶ 29 In his pro se petition, filed in December 2007, defendant alleged that “prior to trial, I 

informed my trial attorney that Michelle Knighton and Thomas Ratliff were present[ ] after 

the shooting and saw an unknown male take a silver gun off the front passenger floor and 

[leave] with it before the police came” and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 

call these two witnesses to testify. Defendant also alleged that “defense counsel was 

ineffective for not requesting an involuntary manslaughter instruction where there was 

sufficient evidence to support it.”

¶ 30 Counsel’s supplemental petition argued (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

calling Ratliff who indicated prior to trial that the victim was armed; and (2) that the newly 

available testimony of Noah Redic and Antoine Nash that the victim was armed with a gun 

would have changed the outcome at trial, resulting in an acquittal or reducing the conviction 

to second-degree murder. The supplemental petition stated that Ratliff was not a newly 

discovered witness and that his affidavit was submitted to support defendant’s ineffective 

assistance claim. 

¶ 31 Both Redic and Nash swore in their affidavits that defendant “stepped back” from the 

victim’s vehicle immediately before firing the first shot. We previously observed that these 

statements contradicted defendant’s trial testimony that he reached his hand inside the 

victim’s vehicle to fire the first couple of shots at whatever the victim was reaching for on 

the floor. Minniefield, 2014 IL App (1st) 130535, ¶ 43. 

¶ 32 The State moved to dismiss defendant’s pro se petition as supplemented by counsel, and 

the petition proceeded to a second-stage hearing. The State conceded that Redic’s and Nash’s 

affidavits, which were submitted in support of defendant’s actual innocence claim, were 

newly discovered but argued that they were not material. Minniefield, 2014 IL App (1st) 

130535, ¶¶ 46-47. The State argued that Redic and Nash’s testimony would not have 
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changed the result at trial because, at most, their affidavits showed mutual combat2 not 

self-defense by defendant. Defendant testified that he was armed when he approached the 

victim’s vehicle. Redic and Nash both swore in their affidavits that the victim said “Oh, 

sh***” when he observed defendant’s approach and then reached for a gun. At most, this 

chain of events showed aggression by defendant, a self-defense response by the victim, and 

then shooting by defendant toward the seated victim. The State argued that this chain of 

events could not possibly serve as the basis for a self-defense claim by defendant. 

¶ 33 On January 15, 2013, the trial court again dismissed the petition, ruling (1) that trial 

counsel was not ineffective for allegedly failing to investigate; and (2) that defendant had 

failed to make a substantial showing of actual innocence. 

¶ 34 On appeal of the second-stage dismissal, defendant argued: (1) that he made a substantial 

showing that he acted in self-defense and thus is actually innocent; and (2) that his counsel 

was ineffective (a) for failing to ask for an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction and (b) 

for failing to investigate or call occurrence witnesses. We did not find these claims 

persuasive, and on December 31, 2014, we affirmed the trial court’s second-stage dismissal 

of defendant’s postconviction petition. Minniefield, 2014 IL App (1st) 130535, ¶¶ 51, 100. 

Defendant’s petition for rehearing was denied on February 5, 2015. 

¶ 35 III. “Motion to Vacate Conviction/Sentence as Void”

¶ 36 While defendant’s appeal of the second-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition was 

pending, defendant filed on November 27, 2013, a document entitled “Motion to Vacate 

Conviction/Sentence as Void.” This document is the subject of the current appeal.

¶ 37 In this document, defendant claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to challenge the trial court’s imposition of a 25-year-to-life sentencing enhancement pursuant 

to section 5-8-1(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 

2012)), which provided that: 

“if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm 

that proximately caused *** death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of 

natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.”

¶ 38 Defendant attached the modified first-degree murder instructions that were tendered to 

his jury, as well as a portion of the sentencing transcript during which his trial counsel 

objected to the imposition of the sentencing enhancement because the jury did not receive a 

separate verdict form for the firearm enhancement. Defendant claimed that he was wrongly 

sentenced pursuant to the firearm enhancement provision because the jury was not correctly 

instructed. 

 

2

“Mutual combat” has been defined by our supreme court as a “fight or struggle which both parties 

enter willingly or where two persons, upon a sudden quarrel and in hot blood, mutually fight upon equal 

terms and where death results from the combat.” People v. Austin, 133 Ill. 2d 118, 125 (1989). See also 

People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 152 (the offense of first-degree murder may be “mitigated” to 

second-degree murder if the defendant “killed while under the influence of a sudden, intense passion 

engendered by mutual combat”); 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a) (West 2012) (a “mitigating factor” for 

second-degree murder occurs if defendant is “acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from 

serious provocation by the individual killed *** but he or she negligently or accidentally causes the 

death of the individual killed”).
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¶ 39 With respect to defendant’s document, the trial court observed on December 6, 2013: 

“First whether or not it’s properly filed here that’s the first issue. If it’s not properly filed, I’ll 

strike the motion. Are you able to tell me if it’s properly filed? It’s not a [section 2-]1401 

petition.” The trial court also stated: “This Court loses jurisdiction *** [a]fter the appeal is 

concluded. Then there’s other remedies [section 2-]1401 remedies, post-conviction remedies 

and so it would come back to the original court. This could just be a guy that’s busy typing 

from jail while he’s being represented by the Appellate Defender’s Office.” The trial court 

then struck defendant’s document in a written order, filed December 6, 2013, which stated in 

full: 

“It is hereby ordered that the defendant’s ‘Motion to Vacate Conviction/Sentence 

as Void’ is not properly filed.

 This matter is currently pending before the Appellate Court under case number 

13-535.

The defendant’s motion is stricken.”

It is this order which is the subject of the current appeal. 

¶ 40 On April 29, 2014, this court entered an order allowing defendant’s late notice of appeal 

and appointing the State Appellate Defender to represent him. On May 9, 2014, the trial court 

also entered an order appointing the State Appellate Defender, and this appeal now follows. 

¶ 41 ANALYSIS 

¶ 42 On this appeal, defendant characterizes his “Motion to Vacate Conviction/Sentence as 

Void” as a section 2-1401 petition (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2012)), but concedes that he 

“chose the incorrect vehicle to present his claims” and that “a circuit court is not required to 

construe a collateral petition arguing constitutional violations as a post-conviction petition if 

the pleading does not explicitly invoke the [Post-Conviction Hearing] Act, as is the case 

here.” In addition, defendant also observes that this court recently rejected his underlying 

substantive argument. Sharp, 2015 IL App (1st) 130438, ¶¶ 79-80. 

¶ 43 For the following reasons, we do not find defendant’s arguments persuasive.

¶ 44 I. Standard of Review 

¶ 45 Defendant argues that our standard of review is de novo and cites in support People v. 

Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 (2007). In Vincent, our supreme court held that, in section 2-1401 

proceedings, where a trial court enters either judgment on the pleadings or a dismissal for 

failure to state a cause of action, the proper standard of review is de novo. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 

at 15-17. Without conceding that defendant’s document was a section 2-1401 petition, the 

State agrees that the issue before us is a question of law subject to de novo review. 

¶ 46 However, defendant also argues that the trial court had the discretion to treat his 

document as a postconviction petition even though it did not invoke the Post-Conviction 

Hearing Act (Act), and that the trial court should have done so. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(d) (West 

2012) (a trial court “need not evaluate” under the Act a document which fails to specify the 

Act); People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 53 (2005) (“where a pro se pleading alleges a 

deprivation of rights cognizable in a postconviction proceeding, a trial court may treat the 

pleading as a postconviction petition, even where the pleading is labeled differently”). This 

argument suggests an abuse-of-discretion review. 
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¶ 47 However, whether we applied a de novo or an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, our 

conclusion would be the same. 

¶ 48 II. Section 2-1401 

¶ 49 On appeal, defendant characterizes his filing as a section 2-1401 petition. 

¶ 50 Section 2-1401 permits relief from final judgments, which are older than 30 days but 

were entered less than 2 years ago. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a), (c) (West 2012); People v. 

Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d 318, 322 (2009). “To obtain relief under section 2-1401, the defendant 

‘must affirmatively set forth specific factual allegations supporting each of the following 

elements: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or claim; (2) due diligence in presenting 

this defense or claim to the circuit court in the original action; and (3) due diligence in filing 

the section 2-1401 petition for relief.’ ” People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 565 (2003) 

(quoting Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21 (1986)). “[A]n action brought under 

section 2-1401 is a civil proceeding and, according to this court’s long-standing precedent, is 

subject to the usual rules of civil practice, even when it is used to challenge a criminal 

conviction or sentence.” Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 6. 

¶ 51 III. Incorrect Vehicle 

¶ 52 In defendant’s brief to this court, he acknowledges: “It is true that [defendant] chose the 

incorrect vehicle to present his claims ***.” Defendant explains that his “petition for relief 

from judgment and supporting documentation challenged appellate counsel’s performance 

for failing to raise a jury instruction claim, but this ineffectiveness claim, based upon the 

federal and Illinois constitutions, was only cognizable pursuant to the Post-Conviction 

Hearing Act (the Act)” (725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2012) (providing prisoners with a 

process to challenge “a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the 

United States or of the State of Illinois” in the proceedings which resulted in his or her 

conviction)). Nonetheless, defendant argues that, “while a circuit court is not required to 

construe a collateral petition alleging constitutional violations as a post-conviction petition if 

the pleading does not explicitly invoke the Act, as is the case here, it is within a court’s 

discretion to do so.”

¶ 53 Section 122-1(d) of the Act provides in full: 

“(d) A person seeking relief by filing a petition under this Section must specify in 

the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section. A trial court that has 

received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the 

petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition 

to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this 

Article.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/122-1(d) (West 2012). 

¶ 54 Although a trial court “need not evaluate” a mislabeled petition, our supreme court has 

held that it may. In Shellstrom, cited by defendant, our supreme court held: “where a pro se

pleading alleges a deprivation of rights cognizable in a postconviction proceeding, a trial 

court may treat the pleading as a postconviction petition, even where the pleading is labeled 

differently.” Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 53. 

¶ 55 In a footnote, the Shellstrom court further explained, that “while a trial court may treat a 

pro se pleading as a postconviction petition, there is no requirement that the court do so.” 
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(Emphases in original.) Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 53 n.1. The supreme court then quoted 

subsection (d) and stated: 

“In other words, if a pro se pleading alleges constitutional deprivations that are 

cognizable under the Act, but, as in the case at bar, the pleading makes no mention of 

the Act, a trial court is under no obligation to treat the pleading as a postconviction 

petition. Nevertheless, as our appellate court has pointed out, this does not mean that 

a trial court is barred from treating a pro se pleading as a postconviction petition. ‘If 

the court need not do so, then, by the strongest of implications, it also may do so.’ 

(Emphases in original.) People v. Helgesen, 347 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676 (2004).” 

(Emphases in original.) Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 53 n.1. 

¶ 56 Our supreme court then noted the adverse consequences that could flow to the defendant 

from the trial court’s recharacterization and held that, in the future, when a circuit court 

recharacterizes as a postconviction petition a pleading that a pro se litigant has labeled 

differently, “the circuit court must (1) notify the pro se litigant that the court intends to 

recharacterize the pleading, (2) warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any 

subsequent postconviction petition will be subject to the restrictions on successive 

postconviction petitions, and (3) provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the pleading 

or to amend it so that it contains all the claims appropriate to a postconviction petition that 

the litigant believes he or she has.” Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 57. 

¶ 57 In the case at bar, we cannot find that the trial court erred by not recharacterizing 

defendant’s document, which set forth only one claim, as a successive postconviction 

petition, in light of the consequences to defendant that such a recharacterization would have. 

¶ 58 Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that this court recently rejected an argument 

similar to the underlying substantive argument made by defendant. Sharp, 2015 IL App (1st) 

130438, ¶¶ 79-80 (no error in modified attempted first-degree murder instruction, which 

included the 25-to-life personal discharge sentencing enhancement for proximately causing 

great bodily harm). In his brief, defendant acknowledges: “It is true that one panel of the First 

District Appellate Court recently rejected a similar argument.” However, defendant argues 

that the very fact that “such a challenge was raised” shows that his claim was not meritless. 

On the contrary, the fact that this court rejected the claim does not show its merit. 

¶ 59 CONCLUSION 

¶ 60 For the foregoing reasons, we cannot find any error in the trial court’s striking of the 

document which defendant labeled a “Motion to Vacate Conviction/Sentence as Void.”

¶ 61 Affirmed.