### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A U G U ST 24, 200 5 S es sio n YELENA UTK INA KE STERS ON v . THOMAS MICHAE L KES TERSO N, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Carr oll Coun ty No. 03-DR -0063 Ron Harm on, Chan cellor

No. W2004-02815-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Janu ary 4, 2006

This ca s e in v o lv e s is s u e s ar is in g o u t o f th e p ar ti e s ’ d iv o r c e
. T h e c h a n c e r y c o u r t d e s ig n a te d and divided the parties’ assets a nd place d an equitable lien on the s epar ate property of t he husband. The c h a n c e r y c o u r t d idn o t a w ar d a li mo n y o r a tt o r n e y ’ s f

e e s a n d d is c r e ti o n ar y costs to th e w if e
. We aff irm in part, vac ate in part, reve rse in part, and remand for further proce eding s. Further, we decline to a wa rda tto rn e y ’s fe e s a ndc os ts o n a pp e a l. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in Par t, Vacat ed in Par t, Re verse d in P art, and Rem anded
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
W. Brown Ha wley , I I , Paris, TN, for Appellant
L arry J . L og an, McK enzie, TN, for Appellee s

OP IN ION
I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
Helena Utkina Keste rson (“ Wife” or “ Appellant”) and T h o mas Michae l Kesterson (“ Hu sb a nd ,” a ndc oll e c tiv e ly wi th Wife , th e “ Part ie s” ) m arrie d o n F e br ua ry 4, 19 99 , in Ta sh ke nt, Uzbekistan. At the time the y marrie d, Wife was 28 y ear s old, and Husband wa s 49 y ear s old. They have no c hildren of their

marria g e, but, af

ter their marriag e, W ife brought her nine y ear old daug hter to liv e wi th Hu sb a nd in Carr oll Cou nty , Te nn e sse e a t Hu sb a nd ’s pr e -m ari ta l ho me . H us ba nda lso has a daug hter, Mrs. Stormi Prather (“Prathe r,” and collectively with Husband, the “Appellee s”), by a pre vious marriag e.-2-

O n M a y 6 , 2 0 0 3 , W i f

e f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t f

o r d i v o r c e i n th e C h a n c e r y C o u r t o f C arr o l l C o u n t y, Tenne ssee. Husba nd left t he United States and remained outsi de the country when Wife filed he r complaint for divorce

. Husband did not return during the pende ncy of the proc eeding s below, but he dide mpl oy

c ou ns e l to re pr e se nt h im d uring the pro cee din g s. At the tim e of

he r m arria g e to Husband, Wife wa s a pra cticing phy sician in Uzbekistan. Upon coming t o the United States, Wife did not work outsi de the mar riag e. Ac cording to Wi fe, shewas una ble to work a s a phy sician in the Un ite d St a te s bec a us e he r f or e ig n li c e ns e wa s n ot r e c og nize d h e re , a ndsh e ha s b e e n u na ble to p a ss numerous tests re quired for her to obtain h er l i ce n se in the United States. During the ir marriag e, Husband pa id for Wife to take a course to a ssist her in obtaining he r license , howeve r, Wife quit the course b ef

o re co m pletion. Wi fe is cur rently enrolled in school wor

king towa

rd her Phy sician’s As s i s t an td egr ee at a c o s to f a p p ro x i m at el y $ 2 0 , 0 0 0

. 0 0 p ery ea r. At t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v o rc e h ea ri n g, Wife lacke d approximately twenty -one ( 21) months of course work to complete her de g ree
. At the time of the Parties’ marria g e, Husba nd owned two businesse s, Mi n to nE n ter p ris e s , In c. (“Minton”) and Tomlin I ndustries (“Tomlin”) with his then ex-wife, Linda Keste rson, ea ch holding a fifty perc ent (50%) interest in the businesses. During the Parties’ marria g e, Husba nd purcha sed his e x-w if

e ’ s i n t e r e s ti n M i n t o n a n d T o m l i n
. T h e r e a f t e r , H u s b a n d m e r g e d T o m l i n a n d a n e wl y formed corpor ation, Tristar Manufa cturing , I nc. (“Tristar”) , into a new corpor ation, Three Star, I nc. (“Thr ee Star ”). Further, Husband cre ated a certificate of deposit valued at $70,000.00 in Prather’s name ( the “Prather Certificate of Deposit”). H usband also attempted to tr ansfe r numerous shar es of stock in Minton to P rathe r. I n addition, Husband transf err ed an a ccount he ld with Edward Jones I nvestments (the “Edwa

rd J ones Acc ount”) into Wife’s name, which Wife conten d s h e t h en liq uid a te d with ou t her c on se nt. Wif e c on te nd s tha t Hus ba nd dis sip a te d the ir mari ta l ass e ts p ri or to leaving the country

. On Octobe r 5, 2004, t h e chancery court issued its order

g ranting a divorc e to Wife based upon inappropriate marital c onduct by Hu sband. The c hance ry

court a war ded Wife $121,283.00, less $5,000.00 cre dit for the value of the horse s and all the home furnishings. The awa rded amount included one- half of the m ortg ag e pay ments made by Husband during the marriag e, one- half of the appra ised value of

the “li t t l e h o use,” one -half of the money

withdrawn f

rom the Edwa

rd Jones Acc ount, one-ha lf of the money ref unded base d upon a wiretransfe r, and one -half of the money transfe rre d by

Prather throug h wire transfe rs to H usband. The court a lso ordere d that Husband a nd Prather to pay

off the de bt owed on Wife’s Chevr olet pickup truck and that Husband’s Chevr o l et Corvette, which w as titled in Prather’s name, would stand as security to e nsure Husband pa y s off the debt o w e d o n Wi f

e ’ s tr u c k

. F in a ll y , th e c h a n c e r y c o u r t f o u n d th a t th e in te r e s ts inM inton Enterprises, I nc. ( ‘ M in to n ” ) an d Three Star, I nc. (“ Three Star”) w ere not marital property and g rante d an equitable/judgment lien in fa vor of Wife on all assets owne d by husband, which inc luded all the assets of Minton and Thr ee Star , I nc. as w ell as his interest in the “little house.” The c hance ry court also place d a judg ment lien on the Chevrolet Corve tte, which wa s still in Prather’ s name. On J anuary

10, 2005, Husband filed a mot ion to rele ase the judgme nt lien on Three Star due to a pe nd ing sa le . A c c or din g to H us ba nd , T hr e e Sta r w a s h e a vil y

ind e bte d a ndse ve ra l in div idu a ls wer e intere sted in purcha sing Thr ee Star by assuming the debt of Three Star. On January 28, 2005,-3-

the Parties entered into a consent order

. I n this order , Wife ag ree d to rele ase the equitable/judg ment lie n o n T hr e e Sta

r i n r e turn f

or Hu sb a nd ’s ha lf ow ne rs hip of the “ lit tle ho us e ;” the tr a ns fe r o f the tit le of the Chevr olet pickup truc k fr o m Hu s band to Wife’s name ; the rele ase of the lien ag ainst the Chevrolet pickup truc k held by the B ank of G leason; the pay ment of $3 , 000.00 from the B ank of Gleason to Wife; and the tr ansfe r of Husband’s owner ship inter est in the horses owned by the Parties to Wi fe. Wife a lso ag ree d to subordinate her judgme nt lien in the Chevrolet Corvette to the Bank of Glea son’s lien on it. The Parties ag ree d that the owner ship inter est in the “little house” would not be conside red a s part of the m arital estate for any purposes, including appea l of the cha ncery court’s decision. On May 16, 2005, the cha ncery

court a mended its order filed Oc tober 5, 2004 with an or der nunc pro tunc to d e ny

Ap pe lla nt’ s r e qu e st f

or a lim on y a nda tto rn e y ’s fees anddis c re tio na ry c os ts incurre d at trial. The or der a lso denied any reques t s b y ei t h er party for r elief that were not specific ally

addre ssed in its original or der or any subsequent judg ment.
II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED Appellant has timely

filed a notice of appe al and pr esents the f ollowing issues for

revie w:
1. Whe the r the c ha nceryc ou rt e rr e d in its de sig natio n a nddiv isi on of mari ta l a ndse pa

rate p r o p e r t y; 2

. W h e t h e r

t h e c h a n c e r y c o u r te rr e d b y f a i l i n g t o g r a n tA p p e l l a n ta l i m o n y; 3. Whether the c hance ry court erre d by failing to awar d Appellant her attorney ’s fe es and discretionary

costs; and 4. Whe the r A pp e lla nt i s e nti tle d to he r atto rn e y ’s fe e s a nddis c re tio na ry c os ts o n a

pp e a l. Appellee s have pr esente d the following additional issue for r eview:
5

. Wh e th e r th e c h a n c e r y c o u r t e rr e d b y imp o s in g a n e q u it ab le li e n o n th e a s s e ts of Minton, which is curr ently

owned by

Prather.
For the following rea sons, we af firm in part, va cate in part, and r ever se in part the de cision of the chanc ery court, a nd rema nd this c ase for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. Furthe r, we de c lin e to a wa

rda tto rn e y ’s fe e s a ndc os ts o n a pp e a l.
III . S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW

“ A p p e l l a t e r e v i e w o f a d i v i s i o n o f m ar i t a l p r o p e r t yis d e novo upon the re cord w ith a presumption of the c orre ctness of the t ri al court’s finding s of fa ct.” Dellinger v. De llin ger , 958 S.W. 2d77 8, 78 0 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) (c iti ng Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Has s v. K n i g h t on , 676 S.W. 2d554, 55 5 ( Te nn . 1 98 4) ; Dalton v. Dalton , 858 S.W .2d 324, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993))

. “ Tria l c ou rt s h a vewi de dis c re tio n in the ma nn e r i n w hic h ma ri ta l pr op e rt y

is d ivi de d, andthe ir d e c is io n s ar e a c c o r d e d g r e a t w e ig h t o n ap p e a l. ” Id. ( ci t i n g W ade v. W ade , 897 S.W .2d 702, 715-4-

(T e nn . Ct. App . 1 99 4) ; W

allace v. W

allace , 733 S.W .2d 102, 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)) . “The trial court’s de cision on the distribution of marital property is presumed c o rr ect unless the evidence preponde rate s otherwise.” Id. (c iti ng Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; W allace , 733 S.W .2d at 107).
Further, “ [t ]rial courts have broad discretion conce rning the amount and duration of spousal support.” Bro wn v . Br

own , 9 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d 1 6 3 , 1 6 9 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Loyd v. Loyd , 860 S.W. 2d40 9, 41 2 ( Te nn . Ct. A pp . 1 99 3) ; Jones v . Jones , 784 S.W .2d 349, 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)). As suc h, “[a]ppellate courts should not interfe re with the trial court’ s decision except when there is a clea

r showing that the trial court, in its discretion, rea ched the wrong conclusion with the result that a manif

est injustice will be done if the trial court’s de cision is allowed to stand.” But ler v. Butler , 6 8 0 S

. W

. 2 d 4 6 7 , 4 7 0 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 4 ) ( ci t i n g Crouch v. Crouch , 385 S.W .2d 288, 29 3- 94 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 96 4) ; Raskind v. Rask ind , 325 S.W .2d 617, 622-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959); 24 Am.J ur.2d Divorce and Separation § 625 (1983))

. This Court r eviews a ny conclusions of law by the trial court under a de novo standard with no presumption of cor rec tness. Union C

arbide Co. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993)

. IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. D e sig nat

ion & D iv isi on o

f M ar ita l & Se pa ra te Pr op e rty On appe al, Appellant a sserts that the chancerycourt e rre d when it desig nated the E dwar d J ones Ac count as marital property and the business intere sts of Husband, the Prather Certificate of De po sit , a ndthe un a c c ou nte d mo ne y re mov e d b y

Hu sb a ndfr om T hree S tar , Inc . a s se pa rate property . We addre ss eac h property in turn.
1. Edwar d Jo ne s A c c ount First, Appe llant contends that the Edwar d J ones Ac count was w rong ly desig nated a s marital proper t y an d s h o u l d h av e b ee n d es i gn at ed t h e s ep ar at e p ro p er t y o f A p p el l an t

. Or i gi n al l y , t h e E d ward J ones Ac count was in Husba nd’s name. In order for the E dwar d J ones Ac count to be desig nated a s the se pa rate pr op e rt y

of Ap pe lla nt, Hu sb a ndmus t ha ve ma de a g if t in te r v ivo s o f the accoun t to Appellant.
As this Court has rece ntly stated, [t ]wo elements must be prese nt in order to find a properly ex ecuted g ift inter vivos. Arno ult v . G rif fin , 490 S.W. 2d70 1, 71 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p
. 1 9 7 2 ) ( ci t i n g Do ds on v . M att he ws , 117 S.W .2d 969 (Tenn. 1938)). F irst, the donor mus t h av e t h e present intent to make a g ift to the donee. Id. I ntent is determined f rom the totality

o f t he circ umstances. Id. Second, the donor must del i v er the g ift to the donee. Id. F or de liv e ry to oc c ur , the do no r mus t “ su rr e nd e r c omp le te domin i on and contr ol of the g ift” to the donee

. Pam plin v.-5- Sat te rf ie ld , 2 6 5 S

. W

. 2 d 8 8 6 , 8 8 8 ( T e n n
. 1 9 5 4 )

. T o p r o v e d e l i v e r y, the d o n e e mu s t s h o w “ e v id e n c e f r e e f r o m p e r s o n a l i n te r e s t an d not e qu ivo c a l in c ha

ra c te r that th e pr op e rt y

c la ime d w as de liv e re d to donee during the donor’s life . . . .” Atchley v. Rim m er , 2 5 5 S. W. 366, 369 (Tenn. 1923) . “The testimonyof the be nefic iary of an inter v i v os g ift is not sufficient to establish the g ift.” Union Pl anters v. She pa rd , N o
. W 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 1 8 8

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 3 T e n n
. A p p
. LE X IS 4 9 8 , at * 1 2 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. J u l y 1 4 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Atchley , 2 5 5 S. W. at 369). Mer e possession of t he property at i ssue i s not enoug h. Id. The done e mu s t p r o v e b o thin te n t an d d e li v e r y b y c le ar a nd c o n v in c in g e v ide nce. Parsley v . Harlan , 702 S.W .2d 166, 173 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 5 ) ( ci t i n g Ingram v. P hillips , 684 S.W

. 2 d 9 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984))

. In re Est ate of Gr e e ne , No. W2004-02910-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Te n n . App. LEXI S 698, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2005)

. I n this case, Appe llant has failed to de monstrate that Husband intended to ma ke a g ift of the Edwar d J ones Ac count and de livered the g ift to Appellant. At trial, the only evidenc e that Appe llant pr e se nte d to sh ow that a

g if t inter vivos had been made was her own testimony . This evidence alone is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o d e mon str a te that a g if t inter vivos had been m ade. Howeve r, even assuming that this evidence would be sufficie nt to support a g ift, her testimony does not support the finding of a g ift. Acc ording to Appellant, after the Parties m arried, Husband place d the account in Appellant’s name, informing Appe llant that he wanted t o keep the Edwar d J ones Ac count for both of their future use in her name. This statement by Husband de monstrates that he did not intend to make a g ift of the Edwa rd Jo n es Ac co unt. Rather, this statement demonstrate s that Husband tra nsmutated the property from his separ ate pr operty to become pa

rt of the marital estate.
“Unde r the doc trine of tra nsmutation, sep arate prope rty may become the prope rty

of the mari ta l e state if

the re is e vid e nc e that th e pa rt ie s in te nd e d f

or it t o b e mari ta l pr op e rt y

a ndtr e a te d it as such.” Whit ley v . Whit ley , No. M2003-00045-COA- R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 373, at *17 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Langschmi d t v. Langschmidt , 81 S.W .3d 741, 747 (Tenn. 2002) ). “Tre ating the prope rty

in such a w ay

cre ates a rebuttable presumption of a g ift to the marital estate , which can be over come by ‘“e vidence o f circumstance s or communications cle arly indicating an intent that the property

rema in separate.”’ ” Id. (q uo tin g 2 H ome r H. Cla rk , Th e L a w o f D ome sti c Relations in the United States § 16.2 at 185 (2d ed. 1987) ). Thus, we a ffirm the de cision of the c hance ry court de signating the E dwar d J ones Ac count as marital pr operty

.-6- 2. Husb and’s B usin ess Intere sts Next, Appellant cont en d s t h at the chancery court e rre d when it did not desig nate the owner ship interests in Minton and Three Star as marital property

. Section 36-4-121( b)(2) define s

“ Se pa rate Pr op e rt y ” a s: (A) A ll real a nd person al p roperty owned by

a spouse be fore marria g e, including, but not limi ted to, assets held in individual re t i re ment acc ounts (I RAs) as that term is defined in the I nterna l Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; (B ) Property

acquir ed in exchang e for property acquir ed bef

ore the marria g e; (C ) Inc ome fr om andapp re c ia tio n of p ro pe rt y ow ne d b y

a sp ou se befor e mar

riag e except whe n char acte rized as marital property under subdivision (b)(1); (D ) P ro pe rt y

a c qu ir e d by a sp ou se a t any tim e by g if t, b e qu e st, de vis e or de sc e nt; (E ) Pa in a ndsu ff

e ri ng a wa rd s, vic tim

of c ri me c omp e ns a tio n a wa

rd s, future me dical expenses, and f uture lost wag es; and (F ) Property

acquir ed by

a spouse afte r an orde r of leg al sepa ration w h e r e t h e c o u r th a s m a d e a f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f

p r o p e r t y.
Te nn . Code An n. § 36- 4- 12 1( b) (2 )( A) -( F ) (2 00 5)

. Se c tio n 3 6- 4- 12 1( b) (1 ) d e fi ne s ma ri ta l pr op e rt y a s: 1) (A ) “ Ma ri ta l pr op e rt y ” me a ns a ll re a l a ndpe rs on a l pr op e rt y , b oth tang ible and intang ible, acquir ed by either or both spouses during the course of the mar

riag e up to the date of the final divorce he aring and owned by either or both spouse s as of the date of filing of a c omplaint fo r d ivor ce, e xce pt i n th e c a se of fr a ud ule nt c on ve y a nc e in anticipation of filing , and including any property to which a right wa s acquir ed up to the date of the final divorce hearing, and valued a s of a date as nea

r as r easona

bly possible to the final divorce hearing date. I n the ca se of a

complaint for leg al sepa

ration, the c ourt may

make a final disposition of the marital property either at the t ime of ente ring an orde r of leg al sepa

ration or at the time of entering a final divorce decr ee, if any . I f the marital property is divided as part of the orde r of le g a l se pa

ratio n, a ny pro pe rt y

a c qu ir e d b y

a sp ou se the re a ft e r i s deeme d separ ate pr operty of that spouse. All marital pr operty shall be valued as of a date as near as possible to the date of e ntry of the orde r f i n a l l y d i v i d i n g t h e m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y. (B ) “ Ma

ri ta l pr op e rt y ” inc lud e s in c ome fr om, a nda ny inc re a se in va lu e du ri ng the marria g e of , p ro pe rt y de te rm ine d to be se pa

rateA ltho u g h the c h a n c e ry c o u rt’s initial d e c isio n d id n o t d e sig n a te the P ra the r C e rtifi c a te o f D e p o sit as se p a ra te 1 p rop ert y , t he chancery co urt ent ered an ord er nunc pr o t unc t h at h el d t h at “ [ t ] h e r equ es t s for e i t h er pa r t y for r el i ef n ot sp e c ifi c a lly a d d re ss [sic ] i n the C o u rt’s ru ling o r t h e su b se q u e n t Ju d g m e n t we re c o n sid e re d b y the C o u rt to b e d e n ie d .” T h u s , Appel l an t ’ s r equ es t t h at t h e Pra t h er Cer t i f i ca t e of D epos i t be t r ea t ed as ma r i t al pr oper t y w as de n i ed. -7- pr op e rt y in a c c or da nc e wi th s ub div is ion ( b) (2 ) i f e a c h p art y substantially contributed to its prese rvation and a pprec iation, and the value of vested a nd unvested pe nsion, vested and unve s t ed stock op tion rig hts , r e tir e me nt o r o the r f ri ng e be ne fi t r ig hts re la tin g to employ ment that acc rued during the period of the marria g e. ( C ) “ M ar i t a l p r o p e r t y” i n c l u d e s r e c o v e r y i n p e r s o n a l i n j u r y, worke rs' compensati o n , s ocial sec urity disabilityactions, and othe r simil ar a ctions fo r t h e following : wag es lost during the marriag e, reimburse ment for medic al bills incurred a nd paid wi th marital p r o p e r t y, a n d p r o p e r t y d a m a g e t o m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y. (D) As used in this subsection (b), “substantial contribution” may include, but not be limit ed to, the direc t or indirect c ontribution of a spouse as ho m emaker, wa g e ea rner , pare nt or family

financ ial manag er, tog et h er w ith such other fa ctors as the court ha ving jurisdiction thereof may

determine. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(b) (1)( A)-( D) (2005)

. Apply ing these definitions to the evidence adduced at trial, this Court finds that the chanc ery court wa s in error

when it found the o wn er s h i p of the c ompanies to be the se parate prope rty of Hu sb a nd . Wh e n th e Part ie s ma rrie d, Hu sb a ndow ne d 5 0% of Min ton a ndof

To mli n. Af

te r h is marria g e to Ap pe lla nt, Hu sb a nd a c qu ir e d the oth e r 50 % ow ne rs hip of Min tona ndTo mli n f ro m hi s ex-wife, and sta

rted a new c ompany , Tristar. Subsequently , Husband mer g ed Tomlin and Tristar int o a ne w c or po ratio n, Th re e Sta

r. Th us , H us ba nd ’s 50 % o wn e rshi p o f M int on a ndTo mli n acquir ed af

ter marriag e and the ownership of Tristar wer e part of t he marital estate. See Tenn. Code An n. § 3 4- 6- 12 1( b) (1 )( A) . A c c or dingly , we r e ve rs e the c ha nc e ry c ou rt ’s de c isi on to d e sig nate owner ship of Minton and Three Star as sepa rate property

of Husband and rema nd.
3. P r at he rCe r ti fic at e of D e pos it Appellant also a sserts th at t h e chance ry court e rre d when it denied he r re quest to treat the Prather Ce rtificate of De posit as marital property

. We disag ree
. 1
“Whether the property

is marital or sepa

rate property

for the pur

poses of prope rty

division is a q u es t ion of fac t.” Renick v. Renick , N o
. 0 1

- A

- 0 1

- 9 0 0 7

- C V

- 0 0 2 6 3 , 1 9 9 1 T e n n
. A p p
. LE X IS 489, at *8 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 12, 1991). T h u s , we must aff irm the cha ncery

court’s de cision unless the evidenc e adduc ed at tria l preponde rate s otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).W e di s cuss in part I V

. A. 2. of t hi s O pi ni on t hat par t of t he owner s hi p of

t he t wo com pani es i s mar i t al 2 p ro p e rty. -8- At tr ia l, A pp e lla nt p re se nte d th e te sti mon y of Jer ry Da le Smith, c e rt if

ie d p ub lic a c c ou ntant, (“ CPA ” ) t o pr ov e that the mon e y us e d fo r the Pr athe r Ce rt if ic a te of De po sit ha d to be fr om i nc ome derive d during the marriag e. CPA testified that Husband ha d no appre ciable sa vings or assets whe n th ePa r ties marrie d other than the Edwar d J ones Ac count. Appellant c oncludes that be cause Husband had no income or

assets whe n they

marrie d, the money

must have bee n from income ma de during the marriag e. However , Appellant admitt ed during trial that Husband ke pt money and jewe lry

in a safe ty deposit box . Any

money or jewe lry

kept in this box would not hav e bee n part of CPA’s analy sis of Husband’s a ssets and saving s. Further, it wa s adduce d at trial that Husband purc hased a Chevrole t Corvette and had it place d in Prather’ s name. From t he evidence, it appea rs that Husband maintained ce rtain asse ts in other people’ s names. Thus, we cannot say that the chanc ery court e rre d when it found that the Prather Certificate of Deposit was separate property

. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the dec ision of the chanc ery court a s to this i ssue. 4. Unaccounted Money Re m oved by Hu sban d f romThree Star, Inc.
L astly , Appellant conte nds that the unac counted money remove d by

Husband fr om Three Star, I nc. shoul d b e co n s i d ere d part of the marital estate . As we ha ve stated e arlier , part of the owner ship of Three Star is marital property . Thus, our ana ly s i s h i n ges on whether Husband dissipated these funds in anticipation of divorce . I f Husband ha s done so, a portion of this money will become pa

rt of the marital estate. 2
As we ha ve pre viouslystated,

“ Th e bu rd e n o f p e rs ua sio n a ndthe ini tia l bu rd e n o f p ro du c ti on in showing dissipation is on the party m ak i ng the alleg ation, and that party reta ins throughout the bur den of persua ding the court that funds ha ve b e e n d i s s i p a t e d , b u ta f t e r t h a tp ar t y

e s t ab l i s h e s a

p r i m a f a c ie c a se that mo ne y s h a ve be e n d iss ipate d, the bu rd e n s hif ts t o the pa

rt y who spent the money to produce evidenc e suff icient to show that the expenditures wer e appr opriate.”
Wil tse v . W ilt se , N o. W20 02 -0 31 32 -C OA -R 3- CV , 2 00 4 T e nn . App . L EX I S 54 6, a t *19 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Aug . 24, 2004) (quoting 24 Am.J ur.2d Divorce and S ep a ra t ion § 560 (1998) ( citations omitted)).
The evidenc e at trial fails to support a finding that Husband dissipated the marital a ssets. At trial, Appellant a

rg ued that Husba nd dissipated the funds of Thr ee Star when he took out a $150,000 loan from the Ba nk of Gleason, a portion of which w as paid dire ctly to Husband alleg edly

to pay off a no te re c e iva

ble . Ot her than th e a lle g e d r e -p a y me nt o f c or po rate de bt, Ap pe lla nt w a s u na ble to show how Husband use d these funds. In essenc e, Appe llant’s arg ument is that, since she doe s not-9-

know how the money was spent, dissipation must have occur red. Appellant has failed to meet her burden in this case . Thus, we c annot say that chanc ery court e rre d when it found no dissipation of assets. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the de cision of the chancery court with re g ard to this issue.

B. D e nia l of

Alimony Ap pe lla nt a lso c on te nd s th a t th e c ha nc e ry c ou rt e rr e d w he n it de c lin e d to a wa

rda lim on y

to Ap pe lla nt. We dis a g re e
. Se c tio n 36 -5 -1 21 of the Te nn e sse e Cod e pr ov ide s g uid a nc e fo r t ri a l c ou rt s w h e n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a m o u n to f a l i m o n y a

c o u r ts h o u l d a w ar d a

p ar t y: (i) I n determining whe ther the g ranting o f an order for pay ment of support and maintenance to a party is appropriate, and in determining the nature , amount, leng th of term, and ma nner of payment, the court s h al l co n s i d eral l re l ev an tfa ct o rs , i n cl u d i n g: (1) The relative earning c apac ity , obligations, needs, and f inancial r e s o u r c e s o f

e a c h p ar t y , i n c l u d i n g i n c o m e f r o mp e n s i o n , p r o f

it sh ari ng or re tir e me nt p la ns a nda ll o the r s ou rc e s; (2) The relative education and training of eac h party , the ability and opportunity

of each party to secure such educ ation and training, a nd the ne c e ssi ty

of a pa rt y to s e c ur e fu rthe r e du c a tio n a ndtr a ini ng to imp ro ve su c h p art y ' s e arn ing s c apa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l; (3) The duration of the ma rriag e; ( 4 ) T h e a g e a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n o f e a c h p ar t y; (5) The phy sical condition of ea ch party , including, but not limi ted to, phy sical disability

or inca pacity due to a c hronic de bilitating disease; (6) The ex tent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek employ ment outside the home, beca use such party will be custodian of a minor c hild of the marriag e; (7 ) T he se pa

rate a sse ts o f e a c h p art y , bo th rea l a ndpe rs on a l, tang ible and intang ible; (8 ) T h e p r o v is io n s ma d e w ith r e g ar d to th e ma r it a l p r o p erty , as define d in § 36-4-121; (9) The s t an d ar d of living of the parties established during the marria g e; (10) The extent to which each p ar t y h as m ade suc h tang ible and intang ible contributions to the marria g e as monetary and homemake r c on tr ibu tio ns , a ndta ng ibl e a nd int a ng ibl e c on tr ibu tio ns by a pa rt y to t h e e d u c a t i o n , tr a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y; (1 1) Th e re la tiv e fa

ult of the pa rt ie s, in ca se s whe re the c ou rt , in it s discretion, dee ms it appropriate to do so; andT hese s t and ards were previousl y co d i f i ed i n s ect i o n 36

- 5

- 1 0 1 of t he T enness ee C o d e, whi ch b ecam e ef fect i ve 3 on Sept emb er 1, 198 3. B eca us e of t hi s , we nee d n ot deci de whe t her t he s t andar ds can be appl i ed r et r oact i vel y t o cau s es of a ct i on t h at a cc r u ed pr i or t o J u l y 1, 2005. -10-

(12) Such other

fac tors, including the tax consequence s to eac h pa rt y , a s a re ne c e ssa

ry to c on sid e r the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-121(i)( 1)-( 12) (2005)

. “The two most important fac tors are the obligor ’s 3 ability to pay and the oblig ee’ s need.” Wil tse v . W ilt se , No. W2002-03132-COA-R3-CV, 2004 T en n
. Ap p
. LE XIS 5 4 6 , at * 1 9 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. Au g. 2 4 , 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Lancaster v. Lancaster , 671 S.W .2d 501, 503 (Tenn. C t

. Ap p
. 1 984)). “ The propriety of aw arding alimony

as we ll as the adequa cy of the amount of an alimony awa rd depends upon the uni que facts of e ach c ase.” But ler v. Butler , 680 S.W .2d 467, 470 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). Apply ing the se standar ds to the evidenc e adduc ed at trial, we cannot sa y that the cha ncery c ou rt abu se d its dis c re tio n wh e n it did no t a wa rd a lim on y to Ap pe lla nt. B e fo re Ap pe lla nt m ov e d to the United States, she w as a p rac ticing phy sician in Uzbekistan. After withdrawing from cour ses to become a

licensed phy sician in the United States, Appellant enr olled in a university level prog ram to become a

phy sician’s a ssistant and, at the time of trial, was less than two y ear s awa y from completion of the prog ram. At the time Appe llant filed for d i v o rc e, t h e Parties ha d been ma rried on ly 4 y e ars . A pp e lla nt i s 3 5 y e ars old , o f s ou ndmin d, a ndwi th n o p hy sic a l c on dit ion s w hic h w ou ld limit her a

bilityto earn income. The Parties had no children of the marria g e. Further, the cha ncery c ou rt a wa rd e d A pp e lla nt a

su bs ta nti a l a mou nt o f a sse ts t ota lin g ov e r $11 5, 00 0. Hu sb a nd wa s at f ault for the divorce , but that f

act alone does not ne cessitate an awa rd of a limony . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm t h e d e c i s i o n o f

t h e c h a n c e r y c o u r tn o tt o a w ar d a l i m o n y.

C. Equ itable Lien On appe al, Appellee s assert that the c hance ry court erre d when it pl ace d an equitable lien on all the assets of Minton and a ll the stock ownership of Minton. We ag ree
. Section 36-4-121( e)( 2) of the Tenne ssee Code states “[t] he court may impose a lien upon the m ar i t a l r e a l p r o p e r t y a s s i g n e d t o a p ar t y as se c ur ity for the pay ment of spous e support or payme nt pursuant to property division .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(e) (2) ( 2005) (e mphasis added)

. “[C] ourt s m u s t attempt to give e ffe ct to the leg islative purpose a nd intent of a statute, a s determined by the ordinary meaning of its tex t, rather than see k to alter or amend it.” Wa usa u Ins
. Co. v . D or

se tt , 1 7 2 S

. W

. 3 d 5 3 8 , 5 4 3 (T en n
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( q u o t i n g W ilkins v. Kellogg Co. , 48 S.W .3d 148, 152 (Tenn. 2001) ). “In att em p t i n g t o acc omplish t his goa l, courts must keep in mind that the ‘leg islature is presume d to use ea ch wor d in a stat u t e d el i b erately , and that the use of ea ch wor d convey s some intent and has a specific meaning and purpose.’ ” Wil kin s , 48 S.W .3d at 152 (quoting Bryant v. Ge nco Stamping & Mfg. Co. , 33 S.W .3d 761, 765 (Tenn. 2000)). “‘Conseque ntly , wher e-11-

the leg islature includes particular lang uag e in one section of t he st atute but omits it in another se ction of the same act, it is pr esumed that the leg islature acte d purposef ully in inc luding or excluding that particula r subject.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g Bryant , 33 S.W .3d at 765).
Whil e sec tion 36-4-121(e )(2) does not specif ical ly state that a lien may

be imposed on separ ate pr operty

for the pay ment pursuant to prope rty division, Tenn. Code Ann § 36-4-121(e)( 2), se c tio n 3 6- 4- 12 1( e )( 1) of

the Te nn e sse e Cod e a llo ws lie ns to be pla c e d on the mari ta l re a l pr op e rt y and sepa rate rea l property

of a spouse as security for pay ment of child support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121( e)( 1). Ha d the leg islature intended f or a spouse ’s sepa

rate property

to serve a s security

for pay ment pursuant to a property division, i t would have state d so, espec ially g iven that sepa

rate rea l pr op e rt y wa s sp e c if

ic a lly inc lud e d a s p os sib le se c urity fo r p a y me nt o f c hil d s up po rt . T hu s, we ho ld that c ou rt s may

no t use se pa

rate pr op e rt y of a

sp ou se a s se c urity

fo r p a y me nt p ur su a nt t o a pr op e rt y division. According ly , the dec ision of the chanc ery court a s to this i ssue is vacated.
D. Attorn ey’s Fees & Costs at Trial
L astly , Appellant conte nds that the cha ncery court e rre d when it did not awar d her attorney ’s fee s and discre tionary

costs incurre d at trial. “The decision to awa rd attorne y ’s fe es to a pa

rty in a div or c e pr oc e e din g , an d the a mou nt the re of , ar e larg e ly

wi thi n th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s dis c re tio n a ndwi ll not be disturbed upon appea l unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst such a de cision.” Hou ghl and v . Ho ughl

and , 8 4 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 1 9 , 6 2 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g Batson v. Batson , 76 9 S.W. 2d 84 9, 86 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 8) ; Lyon v. Lyon , 765 S.W .2d 759, 762-63 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1988)). “B eca

use an awa

rd of attorney ’s fees is treate d the same a s an aw ard of alimony , the trial court should consi d er t h e factors of T enn. Code Ann. [36-5-121( i)] to determine whethe r such a n awa rd is appropriate.” Wil

tse , 2 0 0 4 T e n n
. Ap p
. LE XIS 5 4 6 , at * 2 3 -2 4 (c i t i n g Koj a v . Ko ja , 42 S

. W

. 3 d 9 4 , 9 8 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Umstot v. Umstot , 968 S.W .2d 819, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 97 ); Duncan v . Duncan , 686 S.W .2d 568, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)) ).
Earlier i n this opini on, this Court applied the standards f or dete rmining w hether

to awar d alimony to the evidenc e adduc ed at tria l and found that the chanc ery court’s de nial of alimony was proper
. L ikewise, we cannot sa y that the cha ncery

court a bused its discretion when it did not awa rd attorney ’s fe es and discr etionary costs to Appellant. Althoug h Appellant arg ues that attorne y ’s fe es and discre tionary

costs should be awa

rded be cause her a war d of asse ts from the divorce d i d not include any

liquid assets, we find appe llant was aw arde d a substantial am o u nt of money in the divorce decr ee. A ccor dingly , we affirm the decision of the cha ncery court not to awa

rd attorne y ’s fee s and discre tionary

costs incurre d at trial.
E. Attorney’s Fee s & Cost s on Appeal Appellant has r equeste d that this Court awa rd her attorney ’s fe es and discr etionary costs that she has incur

red a s a result of this appea l. I n this appeal, both parties have be en succ essful. “Where both parties ar e partially succe ssful on appea l, it has been he ld that no counsel fe es s h ould be awa rded in re spect to the a

ppeal.” Bag

ge tt v . Ba gg e tt , 512 S.W .2d 292, 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)-12-

(citing 27B C.J.S

. Divorce § 325(2)c ). Thus, we decline to awa rd Appellant her attorney ’s fe es and discretionary

costs incurre d on appea l.
V. C ONCL US I ON
For the re asons set forth here in, we af firm i n p ar t , v ac at e in part, and re verse in part the chanc ery court’s decision. We r emand for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. Furthe r, we de c lin e to a wa

rda tto rn e y ’s fe e s a ndc os ts o n a pp e a l. C os ts o f this app e a l a re ta xedon e -h a lf

to Appellant, Ye lena Utinka K esters o n and her surety , and one- half to Appe llees, Thomas Micha el K e s t e r s o n a n d S t o rm i P r a t h e r , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE