[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-14023

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WILLIAM R. TINNERMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-01429-TJC-PDB

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14023

Before BRANCH, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

William R. Tinnerman, a counseled plaintiff, appeals the 

dismissal of his amended complaint against the government in 

which he sought judicial review of and relief from a certification 

that he had seriously delinquent tax debts for certain years. The 

government, in turn, moves to dismiss the appeal in part, and for 

summary affirmance in part. It also moves to stay the briefing 

schedule. Tinnerman has, in response, filed three motions for 

sanctions regarding the motions for partial dismissal, partial 

summary affirmance, and the motion to stay the briefing schedule.

Because we agree with the government that two of Tinnerman’s 

claims have been mooted by the government’s recent write-off of 

his tax liabilities and its reversal of the certification of seriously 

delinquent tax debt, we grant the government’s motion to dismiss

those claims. And because we agree that Tinnerman’s last two 

claims are barred by sovereign immunity, we summarily affirm the 

district court’s decision on those claims as well.

I. Background 

In 2019, Tinnerman filed the present counseled action 

against the United States in the Middle District of Florida. 

Ultimately, Tinnerman alleged that he was entitled to: (1) judicial 

review of the actions the IRS took with respect to his liabilities for 

tax years 1999 through 2002, and a request that the district court 

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21-14023 Opinion of the Court 3

void or reverse decisions made by, inter alia, the U.S. Tax Court;

(2) a refund of taxes that were allegedly assessed erroneously and 

collected by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for tax years 1999 

and 2000; and (3) a determination that the IRS’s Notice of 

Certification of Seriously Delinquent Tax Debt to the State 

Department was erroneous and reversal of that certification. 

Tinnerman raised four claims for relief. In the first 

(“Claim I”), he alleged that the IRS violated his due process rights 

when officials denied him an appeal hearing for decisions it made 

on the 1999–2002 tax years, relied on incorrect filings to determine 

that he owed taxable income, and denied him the opportunity to 

challenge the incorrect filings before the agency, meaning he had 

to challenge them before the tax court.1 In his second (“Claim II”), 

Tinnerman alleged that the IRS erroneously certified that his tax 

debt was seriously delinquent for the years 1999–2002, as he did not 

1 According to court records, the Tax Court case Tinnerman referred to 

resolved two petitions he had previously filed concerning certain IRS 

determinations for the years 1999–2002. See Tinnerman v. Comm’r of 

Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2006-250, 2006 WL 3299074 (November 14, 

2006). The Tax Court ultimately issued a decision for the IRS and found that: 

(i) he had committed tax fraud for 1999, 2000, and 2001, and was liable for the 

deficiencies in his income tax for those years; (ii) he fraudulently intended to 

understate his income on his taxes for 1999–2001; (iii) he was liable for 

additions to his tax liability (5% of the taxes owed for each month he failed to 

pay with a 25% cap) for failure to file an income tax return for 1999 through 

2002; and (iv) he was subject to penalties for filing a frivolous petition. Id. at 

*4–*7.

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-14023

have legally enforceable tax debt; the notice of certification of the 

delinquency to the State Department2 was untimely, 

unauthorized, and invalid; and the notice violated his due process 

rights, especially considering it was issued without statutory 

authority. In his third (“Claim III”), Tinnerman alleged that he was 

not required to file returns for 1999 or 2000 and was not notified 

otherwise, and he erroneously self-assessed $2,449.00 in taxes in 

1999, meaning that he did not owe taxes for that year and should 

have had that amount refunded. For his fourth claim (“Claim IV”), 

Tinnerman alleged that he had made the same mistake in 2000 and 

was owed a $2,629.00 refund of the amount he paid. 

The government responded by moving to dismiss 

Tinnerman’s amended complaint. It argued that the district court 

lacked jurisdiction over Counts I, III, and IV based on the AntiInjunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421, Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 2201 and because Tinnerman had not established that the 

government had waived sovereign immunity for tax suits, 29 

U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). Additionally, the government argued that 

Count II failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 

under 26 U.S.C. § 7345 because, even taking his allegations as true, 

Tinnerman’s debt to the IRS qualified as “seriously delinquent tax 

2

The IRS can certify seriously delinquent tax debt to the State Department so 

the Department knows to deny the renewal of or revoke a debtor’s passport. 

See IRS, Revocation or Denial of Passport in Case of Certain Unpaid Taxes

(Aug. 22, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-selfemployed/revocation-or-denial-of-passport-in-case-of-certain-unpaid-taxes

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21-14023 Opinion of the Court 5

debt” under 26 U.S.C. § 7345. After a series of replies and 

responses, the district court agreed with the government, 

dismissing all four claims, and denying Timmerman’s request for 

leave to file a second amended complaint. Tinnerman timely 

appealed.

The government moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction as to Claims I and II, for summary 

affirmance as to Claims III and IV, and to stay the briefing schedule.

With regard to Claims I and II, the government contended that the 

claims were moot and should be dismissed because, following the 

district court’s dismissal, the IRS wrote off Tinnerman’s tax 

liabilities for 1999 through 2002 due to the expiration of the 

statutory deadlines to collect them. The IRS also reversed the 

certification of seriously delinquent tax debt to the State 

Department.3 

After responding to the government’s motions, Tinnerman 

responded with three separate motions for sanctions. 

For ease of reference, we will first address the government’s 

motion to dismiss in part, then its motion for summary affirmance 

in part or to stay the briefing schedule, and finally Tinnerman’s 

motions for sanctions.

3

The government attached the transcripts reflecting these developments to its 

motion to dismiss. We exercise our equitable authority to supplement the 

record with the transcripts “in aid of making an informed decision.” Schwartz 

v. Millon Air, Inc., 341 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003).

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-14023

I.

For its motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, as to Claims I and II, the government argues 

that the appeal is moot as to those claims. The government asserts

that Claims I and II both relate to Tinnerman’s challenge to his 

income tax liabilities for 1999 through 2002, with (a) Claim I 

challenging the validity of those liabilities and seeking a declaration 

regarding past actions of the IRS and Tax Court and (b) Claim II 

challenging the related notice to the State Department regarding 

Tinnerman’s certification as an individual having a seriously 

delinquent tax debt. Because these liabilities were written off and 

the State Department notice reversed, the government argues 

these claims are moot and therefore, we lack jurisdiction to 

adjudicate those claims. We agree. 

While Tinnerman opposes the government’s motion on 

various procedural grounds, he does not provide a substantive 

response concerning whether his appeal still presents an active case 

or controversy as to Claims I and II. 

“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the 

federal courts to the consideration of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” 

Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). “The doctrine of mootness derives directly 

from the case-or-controversy limitation because an action that is 

moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.” Id.

(quotation omitted). “[A] case is moot when the issues presented 

are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest

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21-14023 Opinion of the Court 7

in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). 

“Put another way, a case is moot when it no longer presents a live 

controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful 

relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep’t of 

Health and Rehab., 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) (alteration 

adopted) (quotation omitted).

“If events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or 

an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or 

appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be 

dismissed.” Al Najjar, 273 F.3d 1336; see also United States v. Sec’y, 

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2015) (“An appeal 

is moot ‘when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals 

cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the 

appellant.’” (quoting Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996))). 

“Indeed, dismissal is required because mootness is jurisdictional.” 

Al Najjar, 273 F.3d at 1336. 

Here, we grant the government’s motion to dismiss the 

appeal in part for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the 

appeal is moot as to Claims I and II. There is no longer a live 

controversy. Count I involves a claim for an appeal of a tax 

assessment for the 1999–2002 tax years that the IRS wrote off 

because the collection deadline of I.R.C. § 6502(a) expired. Count 

II is a request for reversal of a certification that the State 

Department has already removed. There is no meaningful relief 

we can grant because the relief requested—to appeal to change and 

contest a tax assessment and to remove the “seriously delinquent” 

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-14023

classification from Tinnerman’s passport—has already been 

granted. Because we lack jurisdiction, dismissal is required.

II.

For its motion for summary affirmance relating to Claims III 

and IV, the government argues that the court lacks jurisdiction 

because Tinnerman did not meet the requirements to qualify for a 

sovereign immunity waiver under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) because 

Tinnerman had not made full payment of income taxes for the 

years 1999 and 2000.4 

Tinnerman opposes the government’s motion on various 

procedural grounds. He also argues in his initial brief that Claims 

III and IV sought to recover the sums paid for 1999 and 2000 that 

were erroneously assessed, and the district court erred by finding 

there was no subject-matter jurisdiction, as he was proceeding 

under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and not under 

28 U.S.C. § 1346. He also asserts that rather than dismissing his 

case, the district court should have given him the opportunity to 

file a second amended complaint. 

Summary disposition is appropriate where, among other 

things, “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter 

of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the 

4 Alternatively, the government argues for the first time on appeal that the 

district court lacked jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 6512(a). We need not 

discuss this alternative grounds for dismissal because we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds.

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21-14023 Opinion of the Court 9

outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the 

appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 

1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).5

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint 

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Center v. Sec’y, Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 895 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2018). A federal 

court is obligated to inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua 

sponte whenever it may be lacking. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). We review de 

novo the district court’s decision to deny leave to amend based on 

futility. Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th 

Cir. 2008). 

We grant the government’s motion for summary affirmance 

as to the dismissal of Claims III and IV because its position is clearly 

correct as a matter of law. “The United States, as sovereign, is 

immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.” United States v. 

Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). “Absent a waiver, sovereign 

immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from 

suit.” JBP Acquisitions, LP v. U.S. ex rel. F.D.I.C., 224 F.3d 1260, 

1263 (11th Cir. 2000). In 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), the government 

has expressly waived its sovereign immunity for tax refund suits. 

28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (authorizing “[a]ny civil action against the 

5 Fifth Circuit decisions issued prior to October 1, 1981, are binding on the 

Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th 

Cir. 1981). 

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-14023

United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged 

to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any 

penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any 

sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully 

collected under the internal-revenue laws”). However, the 

Supreme Court has held that the waiver of sovereign immunity 

provided for in § 1346(a)(1) only applies when a taxpayer has paid 

to the IRS the full amount of the contested tax liability. See Flora 

v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150–51, 177 (1960) (“Reargument has 

but fortified our view that s 1346(a)(1), correctly construed, 

requires full payment of the assessment before an income tax 

refund suit can be maintained in a Federal District Court.”).

Tinnerman asserts he was not seeking to recover under 

§ 1346 and was instead proceeding under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702, 

which provides for the right of judicial review of an agency action

and operates as a general waiver of sovereign immunity for suits 

against the United States seeking nonmonetary relief, even if the 

claim does not arise under the APA. Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. 

Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The defense of 

sovereign immunity is waived in actions against federal 

government agencies seeking nonmonetary relief if the agency 

conduct is itself subject to judicial review.”). 

However, § 702’s waiver did not apply because Tinnerman 

sought monetary relief and because § 702 states that “[n]othing 

herein . . . confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that 

grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which 

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is sought.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Section 1346 authorizes tax refund suits 

but only when the plaintiff has paid their tax liability in full, which 

Tinnerman had not, and the APA does not create a cause of action

when another “statute that grants consent to suit expressly”—

§ 1346—would bar relief for failure to comply with its jurisdictional 

requirements.

Accordingly, because Tinnerman did not pay in full what he 

owed before filing a claim for recovery, the district court lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his claims for recovery and 

properly dismissed these claims. 

Additionally, the district court did not err in denying 

Tinnerman leave to amend his complaint a second time because 

doing so would have been futile. Regardless of any amendment he 

might make, Claims III and IV (for a refund of monies paid) would 

still be barred by sovereign immunity because he did not pay the 

total tax liability. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 

1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (“This court has found that denial of leave to 

amend is justified by futility when the complaint as amended is still 

subject to dismissal.” (quotations omitted)). Thus, the 

government’s position is correct as a matter of law, and we grant

the government’s motion for summary affirmance as to Claims III 

and IV and deny as moot its motion to stay the briefing schedule.

 

Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.

We GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss this appeal

as to Claims I and II. Moreover, because the government’s position 

concerning Claims III and IV is clearly correct as a matter of law, 

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-14023

we GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance as 

to those claims and DENY AS MOOT its motion to stay the 

briefing schedule. We also DENY Tinnerman’s motions for 

sanctions.6

DISMISSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART. 

6 As noted above, Tinnerman has filed three separate motions for sanctions 

relating to the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal, the motion for 

summary affirmance, and the motion to stay the briefing schedule. These 

motions are frivolous and we deny them.

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