IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 28, 2023 at Knoxville

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. STEVEN RAY CROCKETT

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County

No. 76996 Barry Tidwell, Judge

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No. M2023-00388-CCA-R3-CD

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The defendant, Steven Ray Crockett, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court jury 

conviction of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is 

insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by imposing a 12-year 

sentence, by ordering the sentence to run consecutively to his prior felony conviction from 

Virginia, and by accrediting only a portion of his pretrial time served in incarceration. 

Because the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing was superfluous and because 

it failed to properly accredit the defendant’s pretrial jail credits, we reverse and remand for 

entry of a corrected judgment on these issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all 

other respects. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in Part; Reversed and 

Remanded in Part

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Taylor Dale Payne, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the defendant, Steven Ray Crockett.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney 

General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and Eric Farmer and Trevor Lynch, 

Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

OPINION

The Rutherford County Grand Jury charged the defendant with one count of 

aggravated robbery of a Mapco gas station in LaVergne, Tennessee, that occurred on

November 9, 2016. 

01/31/2024
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At the defendant’s May 2021 trial, MacKayla Rembert testified that she 

previously worked as a cashier at the Mapco gas station located on Waldron Road in 

LaVergne. She testified that on November 9, 2016, she arrived at work between 2:30 and 

3:00 p.m. and was the sole employee present until approximately 8:00 p.m. As she was 

assisting a customer with a purchase, she observed the defendant enter the store. After 

concluding the transaction, she moved to sit on a set of crates behind the cash register, 

where she remained until the defendant approached her. Upon standing, she saw the 

defendant carrying two 20-ounce beer cans and pointing a loaded revolver at her. Ms. 

Rembert testified that the defendant demanded that she give him “all the money that you 

have in your register.” She recalled being so shocked that she did not immediately respond, 

which prompted the defendant to repeat his demand. Ms. Rembert testified that she opened 

the register and lifted its drawer, allowing the defendant to gather the cash stored therein. 

She estimated that the defendant stole $37 from the register. Ms. Rembert then watched 

as the defendant left the store and drove away in a large red Chevrolet sport utility vehicle. 

She thereafter called 9-1-1. 

Ms. Rembert testified that when the police arrived, she exited the store, 

smoked a cigarette, and provided a statement. She later did a follow-up interview in which 

she identified the defendant from a photographic array. She also assisted the LaVergne 

Police Department in reviewing the store’s surveillance video footage, which was played 

for the jury. 

Ms. Rembert described the robber as a younger African American gentleman 

wearing a grill in his mouth. She noted that he had a wide nose, a moustache, and a beard. 

She also stated that he wore no facial covering. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Rembert testified that when the defendant 

approached her to rob the store, he leaned over the register, placing them within two feet 

of one another. She stated that she obeyed the defendant’s requests because her employee 

training had taught her that “nothing in the store is worth your life.” She was unsure 

whether the defendant’s mouth grill was gold or silver. 

Special Agent Joel Wade of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation testified 

as an expert in digital forensics. He testified that a cell phone was sent to his office for 

examination in relation to the robbery and that an extraction was performed by Special 

Agent Douglas Williams, who had since retired. Special Agent Wade reviewed Special 

Agent Williams’ work and identified a text message recovered from the cell phone. This 

text message was introduced via Detective Kevin Stolinsky’s testimony. 

Detective Stolinsky of the LaVergne Police Department’s Investigations 

Division testified that he responded to the November 9, 2016 robbery. He reviewed the 

store’s surveillance video footage and obtained still photographs of the defendant’s license 
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plate. He noted that the surveillance video footage indicated that the defendant wore a 

Vanderbilt baseball cap during the robbery. Detective Stolinsky recalled that between 

November 11 and 12, his office received a tip claiming that the defendant had used his 

father’s red Chevrolet Suburban to rob the Mapco on Waldron Road. He also testified that 

Ms. Rembert identified the defendant from a photographic array between November 11 

and 13, and that he and his office thereafter attempted to locate the defendant. 

Detective Stolinsky testified that on November 18, 2016, he unsuccessfully 

attempted to locate the defendant at the defendant’s parents’ home in Nashville. After 

returning to his office in LaVergne, Detective Stolinsky received a call from A. B. Collier, 

a Nashville-based towing company, advising him that an abandoned red Chevrolet 

Suburban had been located. Detective Stolinsky testified that this vehicle matched the 

description of the one used in the November 9, 2016 robbery. The vehicle’s license plate 

was registered to William Crockett, the defendant’s father. Detective Stolinsky requested 

that the vehicle be held for him pending a search and contacted Mr. Crockett. Mr. Crockett 

consented to Detective Stolinsky’s request to search the vehicle and was present during the 

search. 

The search of Mr. Crockett’s vehicle recovered several documents bearing 

the defendant’s name and his parents’ address, as well as a black sock tied in a knot. Upon 

examination of this sock, Detective Stolinsky discovered that it contained 20 .38 caliber 

bullets. On November 29, 2016, the defendant was located and arrested at Skyline Medical 

Center in Nashville. Detective Stolinsky testified that a search of the defendant incident to 

his arrest recovered a silver mouth grill bearing “dull gold lines between the teeth,” along 

with an LG-model cell phone, which was sent to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation for 

a data extraction. Detective Stolinsky testified that this extraction recovered a text message 

sent to the defendant reading “There are cops at your house. Just a heads up.” The text 

message was dated November 18, 2016. 

On cross-examination, Detective Stolinsky noted that the text message 

recovered from the defendant’s cell phone also read “Status: Unread” near its timestamp. 

He testified that he believed the defendant had been using his father’s vehicle for 10 to 15 

days prior to November 18, 2016. He was unsure whether other individuals would have

had access to the vehicle during this same time period. He testified that though .38 caliber 

bullets are commonly used for revolvers, they are sometimes used by high-end target 

shooters in competitions. He also stated that the revolver used in the robbery was never 

recovered and that he could not identify from the surveillance video footage precisely what 

type of revolver was used, though he noted that he believed it to be a “snub nose revolver.” 

He also testified that the Vanderbilt baseball cap shown in the surveillance video footage 

was not recovered. 

On redirect examination, Detective Stolinsky averred that the defendant’s 

father did not match the description of the robber involved in the Mapco robbery. 
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The State rested. After a Momon colloquy, the defendant elected not to 

testify and did not present additional proof. Upon this evidence, the jury convicted the 

defendant as charged. 

During the defendant’s November 22, 2021 sentencing hearing, the parties 

agreed that the defendant was a Range I offender. The defendant requested that the court 

consider that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia in the weeks prior to the 2016 

robbery but had been receiving effective treatments as of September 2020. The defendant 

introduced a memorandum from Doctor Jonathan Littman, a neuropharmacologist, in 

support of this argument. The defendant’s counsel also noted that there had been a marked 

change in the defendant’s disposition since the outset of his representation of the defendant. 

The defendant further introduced as exhibits four letters from his family and pastors to 

indicate his support from his community. The defendant requested credit be applied to his 

sentence for the time he had served in incarceration from his November 29, 2016 arrest to 

his September 22, 2021 conviction. 

During his allocution, the defendant apologized for his actions and stated that 

he wished to repay “the things that I . . . took and stole.”

The State introduced as an exhibit a screenshot of a report from the Virginia 

Judiciary’s website showing the defendant’s 2008 conviction for robbery, for which the 

defendant received 10 years of probation. The State contended that the defendant’s 

probation would have ended in 2018 and that because the defendant committed the instant 

offense in 2016, Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2)(B) required the 

defendant’s 2021 sentence to run consecutively to his 2008 conviction. Consequently, the 

State argued that the defendant should only receive credit for his time served after the 

conclusion of his 2008 sentence. The State also introduced as an exhibit the defendant’s 

presentence report and requested that the court consider the defendant’s criminal history 

and the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense in making its 

sentencing determination. 

The trial court stated that in determining the defendant’s sentence, it

considered the evidence presented at trial and the sentencing hearing, the defendant’s 

allocution, the general principles of sentencing, arguments regarding sentencing, the nature 

and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved, mitigating and enhancement factors, 

statistical information regarding sentencing practices for similar offenses, the defendant’s 

potential for rehabilitation, and the possibility of alternative sentencing. 

The trial court found that the defendant had been arrested multiple times, 

resulting in four violations of his probation in 2014 for domestic violence and failure to 

appear, among other charges. The trial court, therefore, applied enhancement factor (1), 

finding that the defendant had “a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal 
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behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range.” T.C.A. § 40-

35-114(1). The trial court declined to apply enhancement factor (9), finding that though 

“[t]he defendant possessed or employed a firearm, explosive device, or other deadly

weapon during the commission of the offense,” the defendant’s use of a firearm was an 

element of the aggravated robbery offense for which the defendant was convicted. Id. § 

40-35-114(9). 

The trial court noted that the defendant’s 2008 conviction carried an eightyear sentence for which the defendant received 10 years of probation. The trial court found 

that the effective beginning of the defendant’s probation was May 8, 2008, with an 

effective conclusion on May 8, 2018. Therefore, the trial court applied enhancement factor

(13), finding that at the time the felony was committed, the defendant was released on 

probation for the 2008 conviction. Id. § 40-35-114(13)(C). The trial court found no 

mitigating factors applied; though it noted that the defendant’s exhibits could fit within 

various mitigating factors, the trial court found that they did not lessen the defendant’s 

culpability and thus did not consider them. 

The trial court found that the defendant was a Range I standard offender 

convicted of the Class B felony of aggravated robbery, with a sentence range of eight to 12 

years. Applying the above enhancement factors, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 

12 years in confinement. The trial court further found Tennessee Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32(c)(2)(B) applicable, concluding that because the defendant committed the 

felony while still on probation for his 2008 conviction, consecutive sentencing was 

required. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)(B). Accordingly, the trial court awarded pretrial jail 

credits to the defendant for his time served only after the conclusion of his prior sentence 

on May 8, 2018.

Following a timely but unsuccessful motion for new trial, the defendant filed 

a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his conviction for aggravated robbery, the length and consecutive 

alignment of his sentence, and the award of pretrial jail credit.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence adduced at trial was 

insufficient to convict him of aggravated robbery, specifically arguing that the State failed 

to prove his identity as the perpetrator. The defendant notes that Detective Stolinsky 

testified that he did not know the caliber of revolver used to commit the robbery and that 

no revolver was ever recovered in connection with this case. Further, though Detective 

Stolinsky testified as to the recovery of a hat from the vehicle used in the robbery, the 

defendant maintains that this hat did not match the Vanderbilt hat shown in the Mapco’s 

surveillance video footage. 
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Sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction if, after considering the 

evidence—both direct and circumstantial—in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); 

State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011). This court will neither re-weigh the 

evidence nor substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d at 379. The verdict of the jury resolves any questions concerning the credibility of 

the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and the factual issues raised by the 

evidence. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Significantly, this court 

must afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record 

as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. 

Id. 

As relevant here, an aggravated robbery is “the intentional or knowing theft 

of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear” which is 

accomplished with a deadly weapon. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401(a), 39-13-402(a)(1). 

Additionally, “[t]he identity of the perpetrator is an essential element of any crime.” State 

v. Rice, 194 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 

793 (Tenn. 1975)). Whether the State has established the defendant as the perpetrator of 

the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt is “a question of fact for the jury upon its 

consideration of all competent proof.” State v. Bell, 512 S.W.3d 167, 198 (Tenn. 2015) 

(citing State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 388 (Tenn. 2005)); accord State v. Crawford, 

635 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tenn. Crim App. 1982) (citing Stubbs v. State, 393 S.W.2d 150, 153 

(Tenn. 1965)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude 

that the evidence sufficiently supports the defendant’s conviction. Ms. Rembert identified 

the defendant as the individual who robbed the Mapco store on November 9, 2016. She 

testified that she clearly viewed his face and noted that he wore a gold or silver grill during 

the robbery. She also testified that the defendant pointed a firearm at her and ordered her 

to give him “all the money that you have in your register.” Detective Stolinsky testified 

that he recovered a silver and gold grill from the defendant upon the defendant’s arrest. 

The jury reviewed surveillance video footage of the defendant’s use of a firearm in the 

commission of the robbery. Ms. Rembert also testified that the defendant drove a red 

Chevrolet, and Detective Stolinsky testified that the defendant was in possession of and 

using his father’s red Chevrolet at the time of the robbery. The jury accredited this 

evidence and resolved the issue of identity by convicting the defendant of the charged 

offense. 

II. Sentencing

A. Length of Sentence
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The defendant argues that the trial court erred both in its application of the 

enhancement factors listed in Code section 40-35-114 and in its imposition of the 

maximum sentence of 12 years. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion. 

Our supreme court has adopted an abuse of discretion standard of review for 

sentencing and has prescribed “a presumption of reasonableness to within-range sentencing 

decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing 

Act.” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012). The application of the purposes 

and principles of sentencing involves a consideration of “[t]he potential or lack of potential 

for the rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant . . . in determining the sentence 

alternative or length of a term to be imposed.” T.C.A. § 40-35-103(5). Trial courts are 

“required under the 2005 amendments to ‘place on the record, either orally or in writing, 

what enhancement or mitigating factors were considered, if any, as well as the reasons for 

the sentence, in order to ensure fair and consistent sentencing.’” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 698-

99 (quoting T.C.A. § 40-35-210(e)). Under the holding in Bise, “[a] sentence should be 

upheld so long as it is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the 

sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id.

at 709.

As a Range I offender, the defendant was subject to a sentencing range of 

eight to 12 years for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A §§ 39-13-402(b), 

40-35-112(a)(2). The trial court imposed the maximum 12-year sentence after articulating

its reasons for doing so in accordance with the purposes and principles of sentencing, 

considering the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and the possibility of alternative 

sentencing, reviewing the presence and absence of enhancement and mitigating factors, 

and weighing those factors. Thus, we will review the within-range sentence imposed by 

the trial court under an “abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of 

reasonableness.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 708. 

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in applying enhancement 

factor (1) and finding that the defendant had “a previous history of criminal convictions or 

criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range” 

because the defendant had only one prior felony conviction. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1). 

Though the defendant is correct that he only had one prior felony conviction, this 

enhancement factor is not limited to consideration of felony convictions. The defendant’s 

presentence report evidenced, and the trial court considered, a history of prior misdemeanor 

convictions, including two 2016 convictions for resisting a stop, frisk, halt arrest, or search, 

one 2014 conviction for domestic violence, one 2014 conviction for failure to appear, one 

2014 conviction for driving without a driver’s license, two 2012 convictions for casual 

exchanges, and one 2012 conviction for possession of a weapon with intent to go armed. 

The record therefore supports the trial court’s application of enhancement factor (1). 
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The trial court also applied enhancement factor (13), finding that the 

defendant was released on probation from a prior criminal conviction in Virginia at the 

time he committed the felony. See id. § 40-35-114(13)(C). The trial court accredited the 

State’s report from the Virginia Judiciary’s website indicating that the defendant had been

convicted of felony robbery under Virginia Code section 18.2-58 and sentenced to eight 

years of incarceration and 10 years of probation. Though the trial court noted that the 

defendant pled guilty and was sentenced on October 9, 2008, it found “the effective date . 

. . of the Virginia conviction is May the 8th, 2008.” The trial court further found that, in 

the absence of any evidence indicating that the defendant served this sentence, that his 

probation was violated, or that his probation ended early, the defendant’s “probation would 

have ended May the 8th, 2018.” We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the record. 

Given that the robbery in the instant case occurred on November 9, 2016, the trial court 

properly applied enhancement factor (13). 

The defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum 

sentence of 12 years because it only considered two enhancement factors and afforded 

disproportionate weight to enhancement factor (1). Sentencing determinations, however,

are made upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, rather than the number of 

enhancement or mitigating factors which apply. See State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 236

(Tenn. 1986). The trial court is afforded discretion in its consideration of the totality of the 

circumstances and in the weight it accords to each enhancement factor it determines 

applicable. T.C.A. § 39-11-403, Sentencing Comm’n Comments. As noted above, the 

trial court clearly articulated its reasons for applying enhancement factors (1) and (13), and 

the record supports these reasons. Affording it the presumption of reasonableness, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the within-range 

sentence of 12 years. 

B. Consecutive Sentencing

The defendant also argues that the trial court erred in requiring him to serve 

his 12-year sentence consecutively to his 2008 conviction. The State responds that that 

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2)(B) required consecutive sentencing 

because the defendant committed the instant offense before his probation for his 2008 

conviction from Virginia had concluded. 

The standard of review adopted in Bise “applies similarly” to the imposition 

of consecutive sentences, “giving deference to the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary 

authority to impose consecutive sentences” so long as the trial court articulates on the 

record the reasons establishing at least one of the grounds listed in Code section 40-35-

115(b). State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 861 (Tenn. 2013). 

The trial court imposed consecutive sentences on the grounds of Tennessee 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2)(B), which provides: 
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If, as the result of conviction in another state or in federal court, 

the defendant has any additional sentence or portion thereof to 

serve, the court shall impose a sentence that is consecutive to 

any such unserved sentence unless the court determines in the 

exercise of its discretion that good cause exists to run the 

sentences concurrently and explicitly so orders.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)(B). The defendant contends that the trial court erred in its 

analysis of the record, arguing that “there is no evidence that the sentence in [the 2008 

conviction] was unserved or that any portion was remaining to be served. There is no 

violation of probation . . . [or] parole.” The State responds that there is “no evidence of an 

agreement to end probation early” and that the defendant’s “numerous convictions in 

Tennessee between 2010 and 2016 demonstrate that he was not in prison in Virginia during 

that timeframe.”

As noted above, we defer to the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s 

probation for his 2008 conviction concluded on May 8, 2018, and we defer to its conclusion 

that the defendant committed the instant offense prior to that date. See T.C.A. § 40-35-

115(b)(6). Though the defendant correctly notes that the report from the Virginia 

Judiciary’s website indicates that a post-trial motion was filed and subsequently withdrawn 

in 2010 for his 2008 conviction, it does not indicate that this motion concluded the 

defendant’s probation. In the absence of any evidence that the defendant’s probation

concluded early, we will not read such evidence into the record. 

That said, the 10-year probated sentence imposed in Virginia ended in May 

2018, while the defendant was sentenced in the instant case on November 22, 2021. 

Without any effort to revoke the Virginia probation, the Virginia sentence does not qualify 

as an unserved sentence as defined in Rule 32(c)(2)(B). As such, no sentence remained to 

serve as a basis for consecutive sentencing. With the paltry state of the record concerning 

the Virginia sentence, we must conclude that an order for consecutive sentencing was 

superfluous. 

C. Pretrial Jail Credits

Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in awarding pretrial jail 

credits only for his time served in incarceration after May 8, 2018, when the trial court 

determined that the defendant’s Virginia probation would have concluded. In support of 

this argument, the defendant contends that the record is unclear as to whether he had any 

additional time left to serve on his 2008 conviction and that the trial court “ostensibly 

applied” his pretrial credit to both the Virginia and Tennessee convictions. The defendant 

notes that “without any proof that [the defendant] is actually receiving that credit, he is 

deprived of that credit in both Virginia and Tennessee.” The State responds that the record 
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does not indicate whether the defendant served his eight-year prison sentence in Virginia, 

though it does show that he was in Tennessee for a portion of that time. The State further 

argues that the record establishes that the defendant’s probation for his 2008 conviction 

was still in effect when he was arrested on November 29, 2016. The State contends that 

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 precludes awarding the defendant pretrial jail 

credits beginning at his 2016 arrest because he still had some portion of his prior sentence 

left to serve and that the defendant’s sentence for his 2021 conviction could not take effect 

until the conclusion of his 2008 sentence. 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-23-101 provides, in pertinent part, as 

follows:

The trial court shall, at the time the sentence is imposed and 

the defendant is committed to jail, the workhouse or the state 

penitentiary for imprisonment, render the judgment of the court 

so as to allow the defendant credit on the sentence for any 

period of time for which the defendant was committed and held 

in the city jail or juvenile court detention prior to waiver of 

juvenile court jurisdiction, or county jail or workhouse, 

pending arraignment and trial. The defendant shall also 

receive credit on the sentence for the time served in the jail, 

workhouse or penitentiary subsequent to any conviction arising 

out of the original offense for which the defendant was tried.

T.C.A. § 40-23-101(c). “The purpose of the statute was to provide jail time credit prior 

and subsequently to conviction for indigents unable to make bond.” State v. Abernathy, 

649 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). “The language [of Code section 40-23-

101(c)] leaves no room for discretion, and when the word ‘shall’ is used in constitutions or 

statutes it is ordinarily construed as being mandatory and not discretionary.” Stubbs v. 

State, 393 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. 1965). The statute provides that a detainee has “an 

absolute right to credit for time in jail in ‘which he was committed pending his arraignment 

and trial’ and ‘for the time he served in the jail, workhouse or penitentiary subsequent to 

any conviction arising out of the original offense for which he was tried.’” Trigg v. State, 

523 S.W.2d 375, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975) (quoting T.C.A. § 40-23-101(c)) (first 

emphasis added). “It is only when the time spent in jail or prison is due to or, as the statute 

says, ‘arises out of’ the offense for which the sentence against which the credit is claimed 

that such allowance becomes a matter of right.” Trigg, 523 S.W.2d at 376. Thus, the trial 

court is statutorily required to credit the defendant with all time spent in confinement 

pending arraignment and trial on the offense or offenses that led to the challenged 

convictions. 

On October 9, 2008, the defendant pled guilty to a single count of felony 

robbery and was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment in Arlington, Virginia. The 
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record indicates that this sentence was suspended and that the defendant was subsequently 

sentenced to 10 years of supervised probation. As the State notes, the defendant’s 

presentence report indicates that he was in Tennessee throughout this 10-year sentence. 

Upon this evidence, the trial court found that the defendant was under a prior conviction at 

the time of his arrest, finding that the defendant’s 10 years of supervised probation would 

not have concluded until May 8, 2018, 10 years after the date of his initial arrest in Virginia. 

The defendant was arrested in this case on the charge of aggravated robbery, 

not for a violation of his probation in Virginia. The defendant correctly notes that the trial 

court ostensibly applied the defendant’s pretrial credits to his 2008 conviction first, which 

had flattened at the time of his 2021 sentencing, and then to his 2021 conviction. However, 

the trial court is without jurisdiction to accredit the defendant’s time served arising from a 

Tennessee arrest and conviction towards an unrelated out-of-state conviction. The 

defendant has an absolute right to his credit for the time he served in incarceration arising 

out of the offense for which he was originally arrested, and here, that offense was for 

aggravated robbery. Trigg, 523 S.W.2d at 376. Virginia would not be obligated to respect 

the trial court’s ostensible accreditation for the defendant’s time served from November 

29, 2016 to May 8, 2018 towards his Virginia conviction. State v. Larenzo Jerome Morgan, 

Jr., No. W2016-00114-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 5643596, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

Jackson, Aug. 2, 2016) (holding that Missouri sentencing laws do not affect previouslyentered judgments in Tennessee and “does not bind our courts”) (citing Smith v. 

McWherter, 1987 WL 6069, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Feb. 4, 1987) (stating that 

a California court has no power to affect how a defendant’s Tennessee sentences would be 

served)). The trial court noted that it attempted to give the defendant “any potential credit 

for time that he served in that case in Virginia” based on the evidence before it, but the trial 

court cannot make that decision for Virginia. To use a rather bucolic parlance, the first 

horse to the trough gets to drink, and we do not know that the Virginia horse will ever show 

up. 

The sole evidence of the defendant’s 2008 conviction was the screenshot 

from the Virginia Judiciary’s website. No judgment forms were entered, and, as both the 

defendant and the State note, the record is devoid of evidence of violation, revocation, or 

an agreement to end probation early. Given the strong statutory policy in favor of 

accreditation for time served arising out of the offense leading to the instant conviction, we 

cannot say that the record supports the trial court’s decision to only accredit the defendant’s 

time served beginning on May 9, 2018, nearly one-and-a-half years after his initial arrest 

and incarceration.

Accordingly, the provisions of the defendant’s judgment relative to 

consecutive sentencing and his pretrial jail credits are reversed and remanded for entry of 

a corrected judgment on these issues. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all 

other respects. 
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 __________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE