## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Nettles v. Allstate Insu rance Co. , 2012 IL App (1st) 102247

Appellate Court Caption SHEL ENE A. NETTL ES and ED CZA RNECKI
, Individually
, and on Be half of All Others Simi larly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants and CrossAppellee s, v. AL L STATE I NSURANCE COMPANY, an I llinois C o r p o r a t i o n , A L L S T A T E P R O P E R T Y A N D C A S U A L T Y I NSURANCE COMPANY, an I llinois Corpo ra t ion, and AL L STATE I NDEMNI T Y COMPANY, an I llinois Corporation, DefendantsAppellee s and Cross-Appe llants.

District & N o. First District, F irst Division Docke t No. 1-10-2247

Filed May 29, 2012

Held (Note : This syl lab us

c ons ti tut es no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt e r of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In a class action b y i n s u rance claims adjusters alleg ing that they wer e entitled to ove rtime wag es, the trial court proper ly enter ed judgme nt for defe ndants based on the deter mination that p l ai n t iffs’ employer met its burden of establishing that plaintiffs’ primary job duties came within the provision of the I llinois Minimum Wage L aw exempting employ er from
paying overtime wag es t o employ ees wo rking in a bona fide executive, administrative or prof

essional ca

pacity

.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 02-C H-14426; the Hon. Kathlee n M. Pantle, J udg e, pre siding.J udg ment Affir med.

Counsel on Appea l Wil liam J

. Har te L td. (Will iam J

. Har

te and J oan M. Mannix
, of counsel), Walner L aw Firm, L td. (L awr ence Walner and Michae l S

. Hi licki, of counsel), a

nd L aurie E. L eade r, of Chicag o-Ke nt College of L aw, all of Chicag o, and Gatti, Gatti, Maier, Krue g er, Say er & Associates, of Salem, Ore g on (Da

niel Gatti, of counse l), for a ppellants.

Kirkland & Ellis L L P, of Chicag o (Richar d C. Godfre y , P.C., Donna M. Welch, P.C., Kathlee n A. Ehrhar t, and Amy E. Crawf

ord, of counsel), for appellee s.

L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Chicag o (Michae l Scodro, Solicitor Gene ral, and Br ian F. Ba rov, Assistant Attorney Ge n eral, of counsel), amicus curiae

.

Panel J USTI CE KARNEZ I S delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice Hoffma n and J ustice Rochford concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 This case p re s en t s t h e question of whether insurance claims adjusters are entitled to overtime. We answe r the question in the neg ative, as did the trial court. Plaintiffs-appellants and cross-a

ppellees Shelene A. Nettles and Ed Cz arne cki, individually
, and on behalf of all others simil arly s it

u a te d ( collectively plaintiffs, unless otherwise noted), appea l from the trial court’s order in favor of defe ndants-appe llees and cross-a ppellants Allstate Insuranc e Company
, an I llinois corpor ation, Allsta t e P roper ty and Casualty Insuranc e Company
, an I llinois corpor ation, and Allstate Indemnity Company
, an I llinois corpor ation (collec tively
, Al lstate). On appea l, plaintiffs contend that they should rec eive overtime wag es bec au s e

1 Al l s t at e did not prove that plaintiffs came within the administrative exemption. For the followingrea sons, we af

firm the trial c ourt’s orde r in favor of Allstate.

All st at e fi le d a not ic e of con dit ion al cr oss

- app eal re gardi ng the tr ia l cou rt ’s ord er cer ti fying 1 the cl ass

. However, All st at e nei the r ar gued the cr oss

- app eal in it s re spo nse bri ef nor fi le d an add it ion al br ie f.

-2-¶ 2 Ba ckg round

¶ 3 Plaintiffs are curr ent or former insurance claims adjusters employ ed by Allstate. Nettles,

a former Allstate claims adjuster in the state of Washington, filed a class action suit ag ainst Allstate in the circ uit court of Cook County i n 2 0 0 2

. Ne ttles asser ted class claims on her behalf under the Washington Mi nimum Wage Act (W ash. R ev. C ode Ann. § 49.46.005 et seq. (West 2002) ), and on behalf of other class members under the minimum wag e laws of the various states in which they worke d. In 2004, Nettles filed a third amende d class action complaint in which she joined Czarnec ki, a forme r Allstate cla ims adjuster in I llinois , as a named plaintiff. Cz arne cki asser ted a simil ar claim under I llinois ’s M i n i m u m Wage L aw (820 I L CS 105/4a(1) (West 2002)). The class was cer tified in Ma

rch 2006, with Czarne cki

as the lone class repr esentative. This resulted in two independe nt, but joined, claims for trial: C z arnecki and the class members’ claims ag ainst Allstate for violations of I llinois ’s M i n i mum Wage L aw, and Nettles’ individual claim ag ainst Allstate for violations o f t h e Washington Minimum Wage Act. The case was bifurcated in order to defe r discovery on the issue of dama g es, and it proc eede d to trial on the issue of liability

.

¶ 4 Fe dera l and I llinois Over time Wage L aws ¶ 5 The Fa ir L abor Standards Act of 1938 (F L SA) (29 U.S. C

. § 2 0 1 et seq. (2006)) was

en acted by Congr ess to ensure the g ener al well-be ing of worke rs and to eliminate labo r conditions “detrimental to the maintenanc e of the minimum standard of living.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006). The FL SA provides that an employ er must pay an employee overtime wag es if that employ ee works more than 40 hours a wee k. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1) (2006). I llinois ’s Minimum Wage L aw ( 820 I L CS 105/ 4a(1) (West 2010)) provide s the same. ¶ 6 Howeve r, section 4a(2) of I llinois ’s Minimum Wage L aw contains nume r o u s e xc eptions. The exception contained in section 4a(2) (E) c o n c e r ning administrative employ ees is rele vant here . In 2002, section 4a( 2)(E) excluded: “[a]ny employ ee employ ed i n a bona fide executive, administrative or profe ssional
capa city *** as define d by or cover ed by the Fe dera l Fa ir L abor Standards Act of 1938, as now or he rea fter a

mended.” 820 I L CS 105/ 4a(2) (E) ( West 2002). ¶ 7 The Co d e o f Fe d er al R egu l at i o n s d ef i n ed an employ ee employ ed in a bona fide administrative capa city as any employ ee whose primary job duties: (1) consist of the “per form a

n c e o f o f f ic e o r n o nma

nual work direc tly related to manag ement policies or g ener al business operations of hi s employ er or his employ er’ s customers”; a nd (2) “ includes work requiring the exercise of discretion and independe nt judgme nt.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(a) (1), (e) (2) ( 2003).

¶ 8 Analy sis ¶ 9 Standard of Re view ¶ 10 At trial, Allstate had the burden of proving by a prepondera n ce o f t h e evidenc e that plaintiffs wer e exempt from rec eiving overtime wag es. Co r n i n g Glass W orks v. Brennan
,

-3-417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974). Ex emptions are to be construed narr owly ag ainst the employ er.

Ave ry v. City of Talladega
, 24 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 19 9 4 ). De t er mining the duties
encompa ssed by an employ ee’ s position is a question of fac t; deter minin g t h e appropr iate FL SA classification is a question of law. Roe-M idgett v. CC Servic es, Inc.
, 512 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2008). For mix ed questions of fac t an d law, or wher e a case involves an examination of the leg al eff ect of a g iven set of fac ts, the court must ap p l y a “cle arly

err oneous” standard of revie w. City of Belvide re v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board
, 181 I ll. 2d 191, 205 (1998).

¶ 11 I dentifying Plaintiffs’ Primar y J ob Duties ¶ 12 On ap p ea l, plaintiffs first contend that the trial court failed to identify their “a ctua l ” primary job duties

. P l aintiffs t ake issue with the t rial court’s char acte rization of the is sues at trial set forth in its written order

. The court’s written order stated that one of the issues in the case was, “D o t h e assi g ned duties of auto and casua lty adjusters in I llinois
, under the policies, p ro cedur es and guidelines applicable to the class as a whole, fall within the administrative exemption under [I llinois ’s Minimum Wage L aw]? ” Plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have focuse d on plaintiffs’ “ac tual” du t i es , rathe r than their “assig ned” duties. ¶ 13 Her e, the trial court’s order consisted of 66 pag es. I t included 36 pag es of fac tual finding s and 20 pag es of leg al conclusions. The order set forth the job duties of Allstate’s casua lty and
auto adjusters in g reat detail. I t first descr ibed the job of a casua lty adjuster and the various ty pes of casua lty adjusters there wer e d epending upon whether they handled first-par ty

casua lty claims or third-par ty casua lty claims. I t then descr ibed the job of a n auto adjuster, noting that there wer e four ty pes of auto adjusters, which could be further broken down into subcate g ories. The order also descr ibed the environments wher e casua lty and auto adjusters perf ormed their work ( e.g. , traditional office s, marke t c laim of fice s, drive-in fac iliti es, and field inspection cente rs). The order additionally deter mined that casua lty adjusters’ primary duties included: (1) setting and adjusting the rese rve for eac h claim; (2) investigating and deter mining cover ag e; (3) deter mining liability in mul tip a r ty a c c id e nts ; ( 4 ) e v aluating specia l and g ener al damag es; and (5) neg otiating with c laimants, attorney s, and/or other insurance companies to settle claims. The order further deter mined that auto adjusters’ primary duties included: (1) estimating damag es; (2) deciding whether a vehicle was a total loss, including deter mining the condition of the vehicle as it aff ects the vehicle’ s cash value; (3) neg otiating with insureds, claimants, and body shops; and (4) settling claims, including the issuance of chec ks wi t h in their persona l authority level. We find that the trial court identified plaintiffs’ “a ctual” primary job duties.

¶ 14 Work Directly Related to Allstate’s Ge nera l Business Ope rations ¶ 15 Pl ai n t i ff

s n ext contend that Allstate failed to prove that plaintiffs’ primary job duties consisted of the perf

ormanc e of office or nonmanual work direc tly rela ted to the ma

n a g ement policies or g ener al business opera tions of Allstate or Allstate’s c ustomers. ¶ 16 P l ai n t i ffs’ brief is silent as t o the “office or nonmanual work” requirement. The ref ore,

-4-they have forf eited any argument with respe ct to that part of the issue. See I llinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (ef f. Jul y 1, 2008). ¶ 17 The Code of Fe dera l Regulations define d the phrase “dire ctl y re l ated to manag ement policies or g ener al business operations of his employ er or h i s em p l o y er’ s customers” as meaning “those ty

pes of activities relating to the administrative opera tions of a business as distinguished from ‘produ ct i on’ or, in a reta il or service establishment, ‘sales’ work.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(a) (2003). The Code of Fe dera l Regulations further provided that the above phrase “limits the exemption to persons who perf orm work of substantial importance to the
manag ement or operation of the business of his employer or his employ er’ s customers.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(a) (2003). An employ ee’ s job title is not controlling ; c ourts instead must
eng ag e in a case -by -ca se analy sis of the employ ee’ s duties and responsibilities. Roe-M idgett
, 512 F.3d at 870. ¶ 18 Plaintiffs specific ally argue that they wer e eng ag ed in “produc tion” work, which was not administrative in natur e an d was not of substantial importance to the manag ement or operations of Allstate and that the trial court err oneously relied on their job titles rathe r than their job duties. ¶ 19 The trial court found that plaintiffs’ primary job duties consisted of adjusting claims. The
court further noted that there was a “unanimous chorus of fede ral case law” holding that the claims adjusting function of the insurance business was administrative in nature and was direc tly related to the insurance companies’ manag ement policies and business operations. ¶ 20 Her e, contra

ry to plaintiffs’ contentions, plaintiffs’ pri m ar y j o b duties did not involve “produc tion” work. Plaintiffs’ primary job duties involved adjusting claims, which included administrative functions such as neg otiating with various parties and repr esenting Allstate. Despite plaintiffs’ rhetoric that “[ e] v er y day
, all day
, the adjusters proce ss a never -ending assembly line of claims,” plaintiffs did not work on a production line or produce any thing; rathe r, plaintiffs provided a service

. Al s o contra ry to plaintiffs’ contentions, plaintiffs’ primary job duties wer e of substantial importance to Allstate’s business. Allstate’s insurance adjusters investigate and deter mine cover ag e of claims, neg otiate with nume rous parties to settle claims, and leg ally bind Allstate to settlement ag ree ments. This is not the ty pe of work that would be considere d of littl e importance to Allstate’s business. Rather, adjusting claims is one of the c ore se rvice s of Allstate’s business. ¶ 21 Fur

ther, the trial court’s order did not rely solely on plaintiffs’ job titles rathe r than their specific job duties. The court’s order noted that Allstate’s casua lty adjusters “re prese nt the
company in deter

mining and adjusting rese rves, deter mining cover ag e, detec ting fra ud,
g ather ing evidenc e, assessing cre dibilit y , deter mining liability
, evaluating damag es, making

a re commendation on claims above their established authority
, neg otiating with claimants, settling claims, interac ting with customers, claimants, attorney s, and other insurance companies, and, in the case of repr esente d casua lty adjusters, neg otiating with attorney s and collaborating with the company ’s counsel if the case results in litigation.” The court’s order als o noted that Allstate’s auto adjusters “estimate the damag e to a vehicle and deter m i n e whether it is rela

ted to the cover ed loss or a prior loss, deter mine whether a vehicle is a total loss, neg otiate with claimants and body shops, settle claims, and make rec ommendations on

-5-claims above their settlement authority .” The order further noted that auto adjusters’ duties

may also include “dete rmining cover ag e and detec ting fra ud.” The trial court did not solely rely on plaintiffs’ job titles rather than their job duties. The trial court’s determination t hat Allstate met its burden of establishing that plaintiffs’ primary job duties came within the first part of the administrative exemption is not clear ly err oneous.

¶ 22 Work Requiring D iscretion and I ndepende nt J udg ment ¶ 23 Plaintiffs next contend that Al l s t at e fa iled to prove that plaintiffs’ primary job duties inclu d e d w o r

k r e q u ir in g th e e xe r c ise of discretion and independe nt judgme nt. Plaintiffs argue that their primary job duties wer e “skill” based rathe r than discretionar y

. Plaintiffs maintain that beca use they wer e only g iven limit ed authority to settle claims and beca use that authority

was further limit ed by various computer prog rams and softwar e, they did not use discretion or indepe ndent judg ment to settle claims. ¶ 24 The Code of Fe dera l R egu l at i o n s define d the exercise of discretion and indepe ndent judgme nt as “the compar ison and eval u at ion of possible course s of conduct and acting or making a decision afte r the various possibili ties have been considere d.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(a) (2003). The Code further provided that the phrase “impl ies” that “the person has the authority or power to make an independe nt choice
, fre e from immediate direc tion or supervision and with re spect to matters of signific ance .” 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(a ) (2003)

. ¶ 25 The trial court deter mined that plaintiffs’ p ri m ar y j o b du t ies require d the exercise of discretion and independent judgment because with respe ct t o Allstate’s ca sualty adjusters, they made final decisions wi th respe ct to setting and adjusting rese rves; deter mining

cover ag e; deter

mining li abil ity ; evaluating damag es; and neg otiating with claimants, attorney s, and/or other insurance companies to settle claims within their persona l authority

. Wit h respe ct to A llstate’s auto adjusters, the trial court found that they made final, binding decisions on the estimate and pay ment of all claims within their personal au t h o ri ty level; made judgme nts about whether to repa ir or repla ce a part; what ty pe of parts to use; how to condition the vehicle, or

whether the vehicle was a

total loss. ¶ 26 Her e, as t h e t ri al co u rt fo u nd, plaintiffs’ primary job duties wer e discretionar y and require d independe nt judgment. Plaintiffs job duties wer e not sy nony mous with data entry cler ks. Although their job duties wer e limit ed by cer tain computer prog rams and there wer e monetary limit s for which they could s ettle claims, these li mitations did not dispense with their authority or powe r t o make independe nt decisions. Plaintiffs wer e g iven authority to settle claims within cer

tain limit s without input or approva l from their supervisors. Settling claims is considere d a “matter of signific ance ” and is important to A llstate’s business. The trial court’s deter

mination that Allstate met its burden of establishing that plaintiffs’ primary job duties came within the second p ar t of the administrative exemption is not clea rly

err oneous. ¶ 27 This case is simil ar to Roe-M idgett v. C C Services, Inc.
, 512 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2008), wher e the court held that the defe ndant’s employees who wer e automobile insurance claims adjusters came within the administrative e x emption and wer e not entitled to rec eive overtime
wag es. The court first found that the plaintiffs’ job duties consisted of work direc tly related

-6-to the g ener al business operations of the emplo y er o r employ er’ s customers beca use the plaintiffs play ed a signific ant role in the c laims adjusting ser vice the employ er provided to its insurance car

rier clients; wer e at the “fr ont lines” of the employ er’ s auto claims adjusting
operation; and spent most of their time in the field and repr esente d the “fa ce” of the employ er to the claimants and mechanics with whom they interac ted. Roe-M idgett
, 512 F.3d at 871. The court further deter

mined that the plaintiffs’ job duties of investigating, estimating, and ultimately settling auto damag e claims wer e “obviously ‘work of substantial importance ’ ”
to the employ er’ s business operations and wer e the core service it provided to its customers. Roe-M idgett , 512 F.3d at 871. The court then found that the plaintiffs exercised discre tion and independe nt judgme nt when they inspected vehicles for damag e and verifie d whether the
actua l damag e was consistent with th e cl ai m ed damag e; evaluated whether the claimed damag e was likely pree x isting, inconsistent with the alleg ed cause , or otherwise suspicious; and considered the p re s en ce o r absenc e of fra ud. Roe-M

idgett
, 512 F.3d at 874. The court further noted that its conclusions wer e consistent with numerous other opinions where a claims-proc essing employ ee with simil ar responsibilities to the plaintiffs’ responsibilities

came within the administrative exemption and wer e not entitled to rec eive overtime wag es. Roe-M idgett
, 512 F. 3 d at 875 (citing In re Farmers Insurance Exc hange, Claims Represe ntatives’ Ove rtime Pay Liti gation
, 481 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2007), C h ea t h a m v. Allstate Insurance Co.
, 465 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2006)
, Jastremsk i v

. Safeco Insurance Cos.
, 243 F. Supp. 2d 743 (N.D. Ohio 2003), and Palacio v. P rogressive Insurance Co.
, 244 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). ¶ 28 Simi larly h er e, plaintiffs’ job duties encompa ssed many of the same job duties as the plaintiffs in Roe-M

idgett that wer e deter

mined to come within the administrative exemption. Plaintiffs’ casua lty and auto claims adjusting duties g ener ally included investiga ting claims, deter mining co v er age, estimating damag es, neg otiating with various parties and settling claims. As the court found in Roe-M idgett
, we also find that these are the ty pes of duties that

come within the administrative exemption, there by exempting plaintiffs from rec eiving overtime wa g es. ¶ 29 Ad d itionally
, plaintiffs note that the trial court err ed in considerin g t h e o p i n i o n s o f Allstate’s expert, Dr. David L ewin. Plaintiffs argue that Dr. L ewin’s testimony should have been disre g arde d beca

use his opinions were ir

rele vant and unr eliable. ¶ 30 Her e, plaintiffs do not argue that Dr. L ewin’s testimony was inadmissible. Plaintiffs only
argue that the trial court should not have “conside red” his opinions. Howeve r, plaintiffs do
not cite to any specific part of the trial court’s 66-pag e order reg arding any possible err or in the cour t’s consideration of Dr. L ewin’s testimony

. The issue is f orfe ited. See I ll. S. C t. R. 341(h)( 7) (e ff. July

1, 2008).

¶ 31 I llinois ’s 2004 Amendment to I llinois ’s Minimum W ag e L aw ¶ 32 L astly
, plaintiffs contend that for claims afte r April 2, 2004, the date that section 4a(2) (E) of I llinois ’s Minimu m Wage L aw was amende d, the trial court should have applied a differ ent test to deter

mine whether plaintiffs wer e exempt from overtime wag es. In 2004, the I llinois leg islature ame nded sec tion 4a(2)( E) to exempt from overtime:

-7-“Any employ ee employ ed in a bon a fi d e ex ecutive, administrative or profe ssional
capa city *** as define d by or cover ed by the Fe dera l F air L abor Standards Act of 1938 and the rules adopted under that Act, as both exis t on Marc h 30, 2003, but compensated
at t he amount of salary specifie d in subsections (a) and (b) of S ection 541.600 of Title 29 of the Code of Fe dera l Regulations as proposed in the Fe dera l Reg ister on Marc h 31, 2003 or a g reater amount of salary as may be adopted by the United States Depa rtment of L abor.” Pub. Act 93-672 (ef f. Apr. 2, 2004) (ame nding 820 I L CS 105/4a(2)( E) (West 2004)). ¶ 33 On M arc h 30, 2003, section 541.2 of t he C ode of Fe d er al R egulations provided that if

an employ ee ear

ned a salary of “not less than $155 per wee k,” and satisfied n u m erous additional fac tors, he or she would be exempt from overtime wag es. Those cer tain additional fac tors wer e refer

red to as t he “ l o n g test.” I f an employ ee ear ned a salary of “not less than $250 per w eek” and satisfied only two additional fac tors, he or she would be exempt from overtime wa g es. Those two a dditional factors w ere ref err ed to as the “ short test.” ¶ 34 In other words, if an employ ee ear ned less than $155 a wee k, the employee would never be exempt and would alway s rec eive overtime. I f an employ ee ear ned $155 a wee k but less than $250 a wee k, the employ ee would be exempt from overtime if the employer could prove that the employ ee’ s duties satisfied the require ments of the long test. I f an employ ee ear ned $250 or more a wee k, the employee would be exempt fr om ove rtime if the employ er could prove that the employ ee’ s duties satisfied the re quirements of the short test. ¶ 35 By amending section 4a(2) (E), I llinois adopted the definitions and rules in the FL SA a s they exis ted on Marc h 30, 2003, for deter mining exempt employ ees, but adopted them using
t h e compensation stated i n section 541.600 or an amount later adopted by the Departmen t of L abor. Section 541.600 provides that to qualify as an exempt employ ee, the employ ee must be compensated at a rate of not less than $455 a wee k. 29 C.F.R. § 541.600 (2004). The question raised here is the eff ect of the leg islature’s actions in following the 2003 definitions and rules of the FL SA, but adopting the $455 compensation rate to qualify for the exemption. ¶ 36 We note that plaintiffs did not raise the issue that a differ ent test should apply to part of plaintiffs’ claim until afte r trial, albeit befor e th e co u rt ’s judgme nt order

. Plaintiffs first raised the issu e in their proposed conclusions of law they submitt ed to the court. Allstate filed a motion to strike, which the trial co u rt grante d. Despite the unfairne ss to Allstate inhere nt in plaintiffs’ chang e in their play book at the end of the gam e, the trial court

never theless addre ssed the issue, finding that the $455 amount elevated the statutory minimum to qualify for the exemption whi l e k ee p i ng the rest of the regulations the same. The trial court further found that the amendment eff ectively eliminated the long test and kept the s hort test beca

use t he mi nimum l ev el to qualify for the exemption was higher than t he threshold for the application of the short test. There fore
, the trial court applied the short test to plaintiffs’ claims. Although plaintiffs arg uably forf eited this issue by not raising it at trial,

we will ad d re s s it. We agree with the trial court that the short test applied to plaintiffs’ claims. ¶ 37 The goa l of st atutory interpre tation is to asce rtain the in t en t of t he legislature

. Brucke r

v. Merc ola
, 227 I ll. 2d 502, 513 (2007). The best ind i ca t i o n of leg islative intent is the

-8-statutory languag e, g iven its plain and ordinary m eaning

. Bee lman Trucking v. Illinois

W orkers’ Compensation Comm’n
, 233 I ll. 2d 364, 370 (2009). I f t h e s t atut ory languag e is clea r and unambiguous, there is no need to resor t to other aids of construction. Brucke r , 227 I ll. 2d at 513. Statutory interpre tation is a question of law, which we revie w de novo

. Solon v. Midwest Me dical Rec ords Ass’n., 236 I ll. 2d 433, 439 (2010). ¶ 38 The statutory languag e of section 4a(2 )(E) is clea r and unambiguous. In amendingthe section, the I llinois leg islature soug ht to follow the fede ral rule s and re gulations e x actly as they exis ted on Marc h 30, 2003, except at a salary amount desig nated by the Depa rtment of L abor. The salary amount adopted by the Depa rtment of L abor to qualify as an exempt employ ee is an employee ear ning not less than $455 a wee k. Plaintiffs ag ree that they ear ned $455 or more a wee k. Using that salary amount ($455 or more a wee k), we now look to the rules and regulations as t hey exis ted on Marc h 30, 2003. As stated above, those rules included the long test and the short test and their respe ctive salary thresholds of not less than $155 a wee k but less than $250 a wee k, and $ 2 5 0 o r m o re a wee k. Acc ording to section 541.2 as it e x isted on Marc h 30, 2003, an employ ee who ear ned a salary of $250 or more a

wee k would be exempt from overtime if the employ er could prove that the employ ee’ s duties satisfied the require ments of the short test. Since plaintiffs ear ned $455 or more a wee k, the short test applies to their claims. As Allstate simply states in its brief, “ [i ]f the short test applies to all employ ees ear ning over $250 per wee k, a fortiori
, it must apply to I llinois worke rs ear

ning $455 or more per wee k.” Fur ther, as the trial court stated i n its order
, “[t] houg h this amendment eff ectively eliminates the long test, t he reme dy lies with the leg islature, not the cour

ts.” ¶ 39 We are not persua ded by both plaintiffs’ and the Att orney Gene ral’s a

rgument that the

new “not less than $455 per wee k” minimum repla ced the “not less than $155 per wee k” minimum in section 541.2 as it exis ted on Marc h 30, 20 0 3

. Do i n g so would be rewriting section 541.2. The leg islature soug ht to p re s er v e the fede ral rules and regulations as they exis ted on Marc h 30, 2003. Rewriting section 541.2 to chang e the minimum salary threshold would be impro p er

. Ou r above application of the Depa rtment of L abor’ s latest salary specific ation to section 541.2 as it exis ted on Marc h 30, 2003, g ives the I llinois amendment its p l ai n an d o rdi nary meaning

. There fore
, we find that the trial court’s application of the short test to plaintiffs’ claims was pr oper.

¶ 40 Conclusion ¶ 41 For the afor ementioned rea sons, we aff irm the judgme nt of t h e t ri al court in favor of Allstate.

¶ 42 Affir

med.

-9-