1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

MICHAEL QUIROZ, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10358 

18-10037 

D.C. No. 

4:11-cr-00794-RCC-DTF-3 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 11, 2019**

Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, IKUTA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Michael Quiroz appeals his convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy, 

as well as the district court’s $2.3 million restitution order. Quiroz challenges the 

admission of certain loan files as well as the admission of charts summarizing the 

government’s evidence. He also argues that his restitution amount should be offset

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 23 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

because the banks he victimized received a bailout from the U.S. Treasury. We 

affirm. 

1. Quiroz first argues that the district court erred in admitting files 

containing loan applications that he prepared that allegedly contained materially 

false information. Our review is for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1988).

The loan file records were admissible nonhearsay as they were 

instrumentalities of the charged crimes, alleged to contain material false 

statements. See Fed. R. of Evid. 801(c). In addition, many parts of the files were 

nonhearsay because they were statements of a party opponent or statements made 

in furtherance of a conspiracy. See Fed. R. of Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) and (E). And, the 

files are admissible as records of a regularly conducted activity under Rule 803(6) 

of the Federal Rules of Evidence, even though the files contained photocopies, see 

Fed. R. Evid. 1003, and were made by an entity other than the custodian, see 

United States v. Childs, 5 F.3d 1328, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1993). The district court 

did not abuse its discretion in admitting the loan files. 

2. The district court also did not abuse its discretion, see United States v. 

Meyers, 847 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1988), in admitting evidence in summarychart form. Although this court has “long held that . . . pedagogical devices should 

be used only as a testimonial aid, and should not be admitted into evidence or 
3

otherwise be used by the jury during deliberations,” United States v. Wood, 943 

F.2d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991), the court has never reversed a conviction because

the district court improperly received into evidence summary exhibits like those 

here, see United States v. Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2012). The jury 

was properly instructed, the underlying evidence was admissible, the defendant did 

not object to the accuracy of the summary, and any error in admitting the charts 

was harmless. See id.

3. Lastly, Quiroz argues that his restitution amount should have been 

offset because his victims, several large banks, received bailout funds from the 

government in 2008. “We review the district court’s restitution order ‘for an abuse 

of discretion, provided it is within the bounds of the statutory framework. Factual 

findings supporting an order of restitution are reviewed for clear error.’” United 

States v. Eyraud, 809 F.3d 462, 467 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. 

Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2008)). Here, the Mandatory Victims 

Restitution Act forecloses the relief Quiroz seeks. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B). 

And, in any case, the banks repaid the funds to the Treasury.

AFFIRMED.