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File Name: 15a0279n.06

Case No. 14-2059

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PRESIDENTIAL FACILITY, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROBERT P. PINKAS, et al.,

Defendants,

GREGORY S. CAMPBELL,

Defendant-Appellee,

DIANE CAMPBELL; CHESTER COUNTY 

AVIATION HOLDINGS, LLC; CDV 

CAPITAL, LLC,

Appellees.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

BEFORE: GUY, COOK, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

COOK, Circuit Judge. In this contract action, Plaintiff-Appellant Presidential Facility, 

LLC seeks to recover a debt owed by Defendant-Appellee Gregory S. Campbell. The district 

court entered judgment in favor of Presidential two years ago, and Presidential instituted 

supplementary proceedings to aid in execution of the judgment. Believing that Campbell 

fraudulently transferred assets to his wife, Appellee Diane Campbell, and two closely held 
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businesses, Appellees Chester County Aviation Holdings, LLC and CDV Capital, LLC, 

Presidential moved to join them as parties to the post-judgment proceedings. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 69; Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6128. The district court denied the motion because Presidential 

failed to show that the court had personal jurisdiction over the new parties. The court later 

denied a renewed motion and a motion for reconsideration on the same grounds. Presidential 

appeals, and we VACATE the district court’s orders and REMAND for further proceedings.

“[P]roceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution . . . must accord 

with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the 

extent it applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). Here, both sides agree that Michigan Compiled 

Laws (“MCL”) § 600.6128 governs Presidential’s ability to bring Diane Campbell and the 

businesses into supplemental proceedings, but they dispute whether the statute permits courts to 

require a showing of personal jurisdiction before joining new parties.

MCL § 600.6128 provides in relevant part:

(1) Where it appears to the court that:

(a) The judgment debtor may have an interest in or title to any real property, 

and such interest or title is disclaimed by the judgment debtor or disputed by 

another person;

(b) The judgment debtor may own or have a right of possession to any 

personal property, and such ownership or right of possession is substantially 

disputed by another person; or

(c) A third party is indebted to the judgment debtor, and the obligation of the 

third party to pay the judgment debtor is disputed; the court may, if the person 

or persons claiming adversely is a party to the proceeding, adjudicate the 

respective interests of the parties in such debt or real or personal property, and 

may determine such property to be wholly or in part the property of the 

judgment debtor, or that the debt is owed the judgment debtor.

(2) If the person claiming adversely to the judgment debtor is not a party to the 

proceeding, the court shall by show cause order or otherwise cause such person to 
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be brought in and made a party thereto, and shall set such proceeding for early 

hearing.

Id.

The statute sets forth a simple procedure for joining third parties who possess property in 

which the judgment debtor may have an interest. See Ducana Windows & Doors, Ltd. v. Sunrise 

Windows, Ltd., No. 09-12885, 2014 WL 1683279, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2014) (applying 

the proper procedure). The creditor must present evidence that the judgment debtor “may have”

an interest in property held by a third party. This is not an onerous burden as “the word ‘may’ 

indicates a possibility,” not a certainty. Estes v. Titus, 731 N.W.2d 119, 136 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2006), aff’d in relevant part, 751 N.W.2d 493, 503–04 (Mich. 2008). Michigan courts consider

an alleged fraudulent transferee to be a “person claiming adversely” within the meaning of MCL 

§ 600.6128, whether or not that party affirmatively asserts his or her interest the transferred 

assets.

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 See id. at 137 (explaining that courts should equitably construe “person claiming 

adversely” to include all recipients of the debtor’s fraudulently transferred assets).

After the creditor shows the judgment debtor might have an interest in property held by 

another, the court “shall by show cause order or otherwise cause [the person claiming adversely] 

to be brought in and made a party.” MCL § 600.6128(2). Thus, the statute grants the trial court 

some discretion in deciding whether the judgment creditor has made the requisite showing, but 

once it decides the showing has been made, the trial court must add the third party holder of the 

 

1Campbell mistakenly relies on Green v. Ziegelman, 767 N.W.2d 660 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2009). There the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because it entered a second 

judgment holding the judgment debtor’s principal shareholder—not named as a defendant in the 

underlying action or supplemental proceedings—personally liable for the entire debt under a 

veil-piercing theory. Id. at 664. The Green court explicitly distinguished that case from a 

fraudulent transfer claim like the one here. Id. at 667. Presidential seeks not to hold Diane 

Campbell personally liable for her husband’s debt, but to recover specific assets allegedly 

fraudulently transferred.
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property to the proceedings. Michigan courts generally interpret “shall” as mandatory language.

Browder v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 321 N.W.2d 668, 673 (Mich. 1982). MCL § 600.6128 is no 

exception. Estes, 731 N.W.2d at 137 (quoting Mich. Ct. R. 2.205) (holding that MCL 

§ 600.6128 “required” joinder of the alleged fraudulent transferee to accord her due process as 

well as to ensure complete relief in the event the creditor proved her claim).

The district court bypassed this analytic framework. It made no determination as to 

whether Presidential had shown Gregory Campbell might have an interest in the transferred 

assets. Instead, it decided sua sponte not to join Diane Campbell and the other alleged 

transferees on the ground that Presidential failed to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction. 

This was error.

Requiring proof of personal jurisdiction at this stage clashes not only with the inquiry set 

forth in MCL § 600.6128, but also with the usual operation of state and federal civil procedure. 

Plaintiffs serve process after instituting an action and naming defendants; the defendants then 

either challenge the court’s personal jurisdiction or submit to it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3–4(a), 8(a), 

12(b), (h); Mich. Ct. R. 2.101–.102, 2.108, 2.116; Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514, 518 (6th Cir. 

2011) (holding that personal jurisdiction is a waivable personal defense). Courts do not consider 

personal jurisdiction sua sponte. See, e.g., AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1–1058, 752 F.3d 990, 994 

(D.C. Cir. 2014); Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 1986) (per 

curiam); Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1978). And judgment 

debtors like Campbell lack standing to assert that defense on behalf of third parties. See Phillips 

Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (“One of these prudential limits on standing is 

that a litigant must normally assert his own legal interests rather than those of third parties.”);
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Synthes, Inc. v. Marotta, 281 F.R.D. 217, 229–30 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (rejecting party’s standing to 

assert lack of personal jurisdiction on behalf of others and listing similar cases).

Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s orders denying Presidential’s motion for 

post-judgment relief (August 9, 2013), renewed motion for post-judgment relief (January 9, 

2014), and motion for reconsideration (July 10, 2014) and REMAND for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.