NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 14

- 4576

___________ STEPHEN C. BOWEN,

Appellant

v. REGINALD ROBERSON; TROOPER JOHNATHAN BURNHAM; CORPORAL

ALAN TREES; CORPORAL BRIAN TORKAR

_____ _______________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania ( District Court N o. 1

- 12

- cv
- 00036 ) District Court Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 12, 2017

Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : May 1 5 , 2017 )

___________ OPINION *

___________ PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

Stephen C. Bowen appeals th e District Court’s judgment entered upon a jury

verdict in favo r of Defendants in his civil rights lawsuit. We will affirm.
Bowen sued four pol ice officers, claiming that each of them used excessive force
when arresting him after he led them on a high

- speed chase. Bowen , represented by
counsel, tried his case to a jury. A t the close of evidence , Bowen moved for a directed
verdict on his excessive force claims against two of the officers, Defendants Trees and

Trokar. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). The District Court denied Bowen’s motion. The jury

found that Defendan ts had not use d excessive force against Bowen, and the District Court
entered judgment for them

. Bowen, then proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal in the District Court. In
his notice, Bowen also indicated that he wished to file two motions , which he
acknowledged were untimely . First, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), Bowen argued that the
District Court should have directed a verdict against Defendants Trees, Trokar, and

Burnham . Second, Bowen sought a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 because he

bel ieved the weight of the evidence compelled the jury to find in his favor. Because Bowen’s motions were untimely, 1 the District Court denied them. Bowen appeals. 2

1 The District Court co rrectly found that Bowen’s motions were untimely. The District Court ente red judgment on October 8, 2014, and Bowen had 28 days from that date to seek a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Bowen did not file his post

- verdict moti ons until November 24, 2014

— more than two weeks too late

.

2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court granted Bowen’s Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) motion to extend the time to file his appeal, and his notice of appeal was thus timely f

iled.3

While Bowen purports to raise a number of claims, they all have the same thrust:

he con tends that the jury’s verdict was unsupported by the weight of the evidence.
However, Bowen’s “ failure to comply with Rule 50(b) forecloses [ his ] challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence

. . . . ” Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift

- Eckrich, Inc. , 546

U .S. 3 94, 404 (2006). Where, as here, a party moves for judgment as a matter of law
under Rule 50(a) , he must renew that request after the jury has reached a verdict, as required by Rule 50(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (providing that a party may move fo r a
post

- verdict judgment under Rules 50(b) or 59). If he does not, he is foreclosed from
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Unitherm , 546 U.S. at 404 ; see
also Ortiz v. Jordan , 562 U.S. 180, 189 (2011) (reaffirming that absent a Rule 50(b)
motion in the District Court, an appellate court will not review the sufficienc y of the

evidence supporting the verdict ).
Here, Bowen did not timely challenge the jury’s verdict in the District Court under
Rule 50(b). And, a lthough Bowen ultimatel y filed motions under Rule s 50(b) and 59 , he

did so too late. B ecause Bowen did not seek to overturn the jury’s verdict within 28 days

of the trial , see Johnson v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co. , 344 U.S. 48, 53 (1952) (noting that a
timely post

- verdict motion is “ an essential part of the rule ” ) , t he District Court correctly
denied his untimely request

. See Rosenberg v. DVI Re ceivables XIV, LLC , 818 F.3d
1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2016) (an untimely Rule 50(b) motion challenging the sufficiency

of the evidence is insuf

ficient to preserve such a challenge for appellate review ) ; see also
Cone v. W. Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. , 330 U.S. 212, 218 (1947) (rejecting a rgument that4

a circuit court should grant a new trial on appeal absent a timely post

- verdict motion

because that “ would enable litigants to ext end indefinitely the prescribed

. . . period
simply by adoption of the expedient of an appeal” ). Bowen ’s failure to properly
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the District Court has forfeited his right to do

so on appeal. See Rosenberg , 818 F.3d at 1292. 3
Accordingly , we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

3 Even if we were to review Bowen’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our independent review of the record reveals ample support for the jury’s verdict. Each of the four Defendants testified as to their actions , and e ach explained how th eir actions were designed to stop Bowen as he led them on a dangerous, high

- speed cha se and then to safely effect his arrest and to respond to his repeated attempts to assault them until he was subdued

. See Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Tha t testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to Defendants, supports the jury’s finding in their favor. See Kinnel v. Mid

- Atlantic Mausoleums, Inc. , 850 F.2d 958, 961

- 62 (3d Cir. 1988).