2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-21-2011

Laura Iovanella v. Genentech Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-1266

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Laura Iovanella v. Genentech Inc" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 171.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/171
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ 

No. 11-1266

_____________

 

LAURA IOVANELLA,

Appellant

v.

GENENTECH, INC. 

_____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-01024)

District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden

_____________ 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 17, 2010

Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: November 21, 2011) 

_____________

OPINION OF THE COURT 

_____________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Laura Iovanella (“Iovanella”) appeals from an order of the District Court 

granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Genentech, Inc. (“Genentech”) in her

employment discrimination suit. Though Iovanella contends that the District Court erred 

in several respects by granting summary judgment, her arguments are unconvincing. The
2

District Court‟s thorough consideration of the issues demonstrates clearly that summary 

judgment was proper. We will therefore affirm. 

I.

Since we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we need 

not fully recount the extensive historical background set forth in the District Court‟s 

opinion. Instead, we recite only the facts that are relevant to our analysis.

Iovanella worked as a sales representative for Genentech from March 2001 to 

March 2008. In early 2006, Genentech redistributed sales territories and accounts in 

Iovanella‟s division, causing at least one of her clients to withdraw from the company

completely. In March 2006, Genentech hired a new manager for Iovanella‟s sales group, 

Wolfgang Ziegenhagen, with whom she clashed. An early point of contention was 

Ziegenhagen‟s decision not to replace a Blackberry Iovanella had previously been given 

because she was a single mother, despite the company‟s policy not to give its employees

phones. Ziegenhagen, too, conducted field rides to evaluate Iovanella‟s work and, as a 

result, noted several performance issues which Iovanella claims were inaccurate. Those 

issues led the company not to grant Iovanella discretionary stock options in August 2006.

The decision led Iovanella to accuse Ziegenhagen of treating her unfairly. 

Iovanella claims that after bringing her alleged mistreatment to a human resources 

manager, she was given the only “partially meets expectations” rating in her sales group

and denied an adjustment to her salary that other similarly rated employees outside of her 

sales group received. Despite receiving an increase in her base salary in March 2007, 

Iovanella hired a lawyer after Ziegenhagen allegedly acted negatively toward her at a 
3

sales meeting. Her lawyer sent Genentech a letter, asserting that Iovanella had been 

subjected to gender discrimination and retaliation. After conducting an investigation,

though, a Genentech human resources manager found no evidence to support Iovanella‟s 

claims. In August 2007, Iovanella filed a complaint with the EEOC, which she 

subsequently withdrew.

Later in 2007, Genentech investigated Iovanella after receiving reports that she 

went to a patient‟s home to assist with one of Genentech‟s products. Iovanella was

cleared of any charges related to the incident. Though she received stock options in 2007 

and a salary increase in early 2008, Iovanella claims not have been given a corporate 

bonus to which she was entitled. In March 2008, she resigned from Genentech. In 

January 2009, she filed suit claiming discrimination based on her gender and status as a 

single mother.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have 

jurisdiction to review the District Court‟s final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 

review of the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary. See Turner v. 

Hershey Chocolate U.S.A., 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is 

appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In reviewing the grant of 

summary judgment, we view all of the facts in the light most favorable to Iovanella as the 

non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Bowers v. Nat’l 

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 535 (3d Cir. 2007).
4

III.

Iovanella first argues that the District Court erred by concluding that employment 

discrimination based on familial status, namely her status as a single mother, is not 

actionable under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 10:5-1, et seq. We nevertheless find the District Court‟s thoughtful analysis of the 

pertinent statutory provisions and related case law convincing, and therefore agree with 

its conclusion.

Causes of action under the NJLAD like Iovanella‟s arise from § 10:5-12, such that 

the District Court rightly focused its analysis upon the provision‟s terms. See Mt. Holly

Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, No. 08-2584, 2009 WL 3584894, at *8-9

(D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2009). With respect to employment practices, § 10:5-12(a) prohibits an 

employer from basing decisions on a host of suspect characteristics, including race, 

national origin, age, sex, and disability. Notably absent from the list of protected 

classifications, however, is familial status. The inclusion of familial status as a prohibited 

basis for housing-related decisions in other portions of § 10:5-12, and the state 

legislature‟s failure to add it to § 10:5-12(a) despite amending the sub-section four times,

cautions against now inferring the claim of which Iovanella urges recognition. That the 

only New Jersey state court to consider this issue similarly refrained from reading 

familial status into the list of expressly protected classifications in § 10:5-12(a), see 

Bumbaca v. Twp. of Edison, 373 A.2d 156, 162-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004),

corroborates the propriety of the District Court‟s analysis. We therefore find no error in 

its conclusion.
5

The remainder of Iovanella‟s arguments on appeal all contest the District Court‟s 

failure to identify genuine issues of material fact with respect to her claims of gender 

discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge.

With respect to her gender discrimination claim, the District Court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Genentech because Iovanella failed to prove the fourth 

element of a prima facie employment discrimination claim, that she was treated less 

favorably than employees not within her protected class. See Deguzman v. N.J. Dep’t of 

Military and Veterans Affairs, 113 Fed. App‟x 438, 440 (3d Cir. 2004). There was 

simply no evidence that Iovanella was treated differently than the male sales 

representatives with whom she worked. Furthermore, the District Court explained that, 

even had Iovanella presented evidence of less favorable treatment, summary judgment 

would still have been proper because she did not cast sufficient doubt on Genentech‟s 

proffered, legitimate explanations for the actions about which Iovanella complained –

namely, her documented performance issues – to suggest that they were pretextual. See 

id. Indeed, Iovanella did not dispute that Genentech based its decisions on her alleged 

performance problems, and instead only argued that Ziegenhagen conjured up those 

issues out of discriminatory animus without any support in the record for such a claim. 

The District Court granted summary judgment as to Iovanella‟s retaliation claim

for similar reasons. With respect to her first protected activity, complaints about 

Ziegenhagen‟s conduct, the District Court concluded that Iovanella failed to prove the 

second prong of a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation, that adverse employment 

action occurred after or contemporaneous with the protected activity. See Abramson v. 
6

William Paterson College of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001). All of the adverse

employment decisions about which she complained, including Genentech‟s territorial 

reorganization, failure to award stock options, and denial of a work Blackberry, occurred 

after Iovanella complained about Ziegenhagen‟s behavior. Furthermore, with respect to 

her second protected activity, hiring a lawyer and submitting an EEOC complaint, the 

District Court concluded that Iovanella again did not sufficiently undermine Genentech‟s 

proffered, legitimate explanations. Specifically, Iovanella failed to show that 

Genentech‟s compliance investigation and sub-par evaluations were actually a response 

to her legal actions rather than to reports of her visit to a patient‟s home and other 

performance-related issues. See Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 199 (3d Cir. 

1996).

Last, the District Court concluded that “Iovanella fails to show discrimination 

„severe and pervasive‟ enough to establish a hostile work environment, and falls shorter 

still of demonstrating the „intolerability‟ required for constructive discharge.” 

The District Court‟s opinion on defendant‟s motion for summary judgment 

evidences a thorough review of the record and well-reasoned analysis of whether any 

genuine issue of material fact existed. Even after duly considering all of Iovanella‟s 

arguments, we neither believe any additions to the District Court‟s opinion are warranted 

nor find any reversible error in its determination that Genentech was entitled to summary 

judgment. We will therefore affirm for the reasons put forth by the District Court.
7

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting 

summary judgment in favor of defendant Genentech, Inc. and dismissing plaintiff 

Iovanella‟s suit with prejudice.