_______________ 

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

State of California 

ROB BONTA 

Attorney General 

: 

OPINION : 

: No. 20-301 

of : 

: February 3, 2022 

ROB BONTA : 

Attorney General : 

: 

ANYA M. BINSACCA : 

Deputy Attorney General : 

The HONORABLE THOMAS J. UMBERG, STATE SENATOR, has requested 

an opinion on a question relating to Good Samaritan immunity. 

QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION 

Does the declaration of a shelter crisis under Government Code section 8698 or a 

state of emergency under Government Code section 8625 create or define a “scene of an 

emergency” for purposes of the Good Samaritan law in Health and Safety Code section 

1799.102? 

No. Although a scene of an emergency within the meaning of Health and Safety 

Code section 1799.102 may sometimes exist within an area where a shelter crisis or state 

of emergency has been declared, such declarations do not, in and of themselves, 

categorically create or define a scene of an emergency under Health and Safety Code 

section 1799.102. 

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BACKGROUND 

California has a substantial population of people without homes.1 Concern for the 

healthcare needs of this unhoused population prompted the question here. We are 

informed that medical professionals otherwise willing to volunteer medical services to 

unhoused individuals sometimes decline to do so based on concerns relating to insurance 

coverage and liability issues. Senator Umberg asks whether these professionals could be 

exempted from liability by the Good Samaritan provision in Health and Safety Code 

section 1799.102. 

Common law principles provide that a person generally has no duty to come to the 

aid of another, but if a person elects to provide aid, that gives rise to a duty to exercise 

due care in doing so.2 Good Samaritan laws are a legislative response to this due care 

requirement, limiting or eliminating liability for those who offer aid with no expectation 

of payment.3 

The Good Samaritan law at issue here, Health and Safety Code section 1799.102, 

generally shields from liability a person who provides emergency care, not for 

compensation, at the “scene of an emergency.”4 We are asked whether the declaration of 

a shelter crisis under Government Code section 8698, or the declaration of a state of 

emergency under Government Code section 8625, creates or defines a scene of an 

emergency within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 1799.102. 

1 Homeless Data Integration System, Understanding Homelessness in California, 

<https://www.bcsh.ca.gov/hcfc/hdis.html> (last viewed Jan. 31, 2022). 

2 Van Horn v. Watson (2008) 45 Cal.4th 322, 324, superseded on other grounds by 

amendment of Health & Saf. Code, § 1799.102 as stated in Verdugo v. Target Corp. 

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 312, 327. 

3 Van Horn, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 324. 

4 Health & Saf. Code, § 1799.102, subds. (a), (b). Subdivision (a) provides immunity for 

medical, law enforcement, and emergency personnel, and subdivision (b) provides 

immunity for everyone else. Although there are differences between the two 

subdivisions, they contain identical references to the phrase relevant to our inquiry 

here—“the scene of an emergency.” The distinctions pertain to different standards of 

care applicable to each group: while there is no standard specified for the medical, law 

enforcement, and emergency personnel covered by subdivision (a), the immunity for lay 

persons extends only to acts or omissions not “constituting gross negligence or willful or 

wanton misconduct.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1799.102, subd. (b)(2).) 

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Government Code section 8698 allows political entities—including the State, 

cities, counties, and certain public agencies—to declare a “shelter crisis.”5 A shelter 

crisis is “a situation in which a significant number of persons are without the ability to 

obtain shelter, resulting in a threat to their health and safety.”6 A shelter crisis 

declaration limits the political entity’s liability for allowing the use of public facilities for 

housing, and relaxes standards regarding housing, health, and safety in favor of 

mitigating the shelter crisis.7 

Government Code section 8625 empowers the Governor to declare a “state of 

emergency” when conditions of disaster or extreme peril to the safety of people or 

property exist because of specified conditions, including natural disasters, riots, and 

cyberterrorism, and the conditions are beyond the ability of one locality to handle 

independently.8 The Governor may declare a state of emergency at the request of a local 

official (a city mayor or authorized county official), or if the Governor finds that a local 

government authority is inadequate to cope with the emergency.9 The declaration of a 

state of emergency gives the Governor “complete authority” over all state agencies; the 

right to exercise all of the State’s police powers within the affected area; and the ability to 

deploy state employees, facilities, and equipment to prevent or alleviate actual or 

threatened damage due to the emergency.10 

ANALYSIS 

Does either the declaration of a shelter crisis under Government Code section 

8698, or the declaration of a state of emergency under Government Code section 8625, 

create or define a “scene of an emergency” within the meaning of Health and Safety 

Code section 1799.102? Not categorically. As we explain below, the scene of an 

5 Gov. Code, §§ 8698, subd. (a) (defining “political subdivision” to include the State, any 

city, city and county, county, special district, or school district or public agency 

authorized by law), 8698.2, subd. (a) (declaration of shelter crisis). 

6 Gov. Code, § 8698, subd. (d). 

7 Gov. Code, § 8698.1, subd. (a) (immunity from liability for ordinary negligence in 

provision of emergency housing), subd. (b) (“state or local regulatory statute, regulation, 

or ordinance prescribing standards of housing, health, or safety shall be suspended to the 

extent that strict compliance would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay the mitigation of 

the effects of the shelter crisis”). 

8 Gov. Code, §§ 8558, subd. (b) (defining state of emergency), 8625, subd. (a) (referring 

to section 8558(b) for circumstances justifying declaration). 

9 Gov. Code, § 8625, subds. (b), (c). 

10 Gov. Code, §§ 8627, 8628. 

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emergency within Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 is a place where immediate 

medical attention is required. Although such scenes of emergency may exist within areas 

where a shelter crisis or state of emergency has been declared, declarations under 

Government Code sections 8625 or 8698 do not have the legal effect of classifying all 

areas covered by those declarations as a scene of an emergency for purposes of section 

1799.102. 

The fundamental task when interpreting a statute is “to determine the Legislature’s 

intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.”11 That begins by examining the statutory 

language and applying a plain, commonsense meaning, while placing the examined 

language in the context of the statute as a whole, as well as in the context of its larger 

statutory framework.12 Where the statutory language is unambiguous, its plain meaning 

controls. If the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, we may 

look to other sources, “including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative 

history.”13 

To determine whether the declaration of a shelter crisis under Government Code 

section 8698, or the declaration of a state of emergency under Government Code section 

8625, creates or defines a “scene of an emergency” within the meaning of Health and 

Safety Code section 1799.102, we must examine the meaning of “scene of an 

emergency.” Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 is part of the Emergency Medical 

Services System and the Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Personnel Act.14 The Act 

provides that its definitions control “[u]nless the context otherwise requires.”15 Although 

the Act does not define “scene of an emergency” or “scene,” it does define “emergency.” 

Under the Act, an “emergency” is “a condition or situation in which an individual 

has a need for immediate medical attention, or where the potential for such need is 

perceived by emergency medical personnel or a public safety agency.”16 “Immediate” is 

not defined in the Act, so we refer to dictionary definitions to ascertain its ordinary, usual 

meaning.17 The relevant definition of “immediate” is “occurring, acting, or accomplished 

11 People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142. 

12 Skidgel v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 14. 

13 People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975. 

14 Health & Saf. Code, § 1797. 

15 Health & Saf. Code, § 1797.50. 

16 Health & Saf. Code, § 1797.70, italics added. 

17 Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121–1122. 

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without loss or interval of time: instant.”18 Turning to the meaning of “scene,” the 

relevant dictionary definition is “the place of an occurrence or action.”19 Putting all of 

the above definitions together, the “scene of an emergency” described in Health and 

Safety Code section 1799.102 is a place where an individual has a need for instant 

medical attention, or where emergency medical personnel or a public safety agency 

perceive a potential need for instant medical attention. 

This definition is not equivalent to a shelter crisis under Government Code section 

8698 or a state of emergency under Government Code section 8625. As explained below, 

neither of those provisions contains the requirement of immediate medical care that is in 

Health and Safety Code section 1799.102. 

Government Code section 8698 defines a shelter crisis as “a situation in which a 

significant number of persons are without the ability to obtain shelter, resulting in a threat 

to their health and safety.” This “threat” to health and safety is by definition different 

from the immediate need for medical attention contemplated by Health and Safety Code 

section 1799.102. A “threat” is “an indication of something impending,” and thus 

inherently distinguished from an immediate need.20 Of course, individuals within a 

declared shelter crisis area may sometimes require immediate medical attention, and the 

need for immediate medical care may arise more frequently in a shelter crisis area than in 

areas where no shelter crisis has been declared. But a declared shelter crisis does not 

categorically create or describe the scene of an emergency within the meaning of Health 

and Safety Code section 1799.102 because the needs in a shelter-crisis area, however 

great, are not all needs for immediate medical treatment. 

18 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020) pp. 620-621 (capitalization 

omitted); accord, Oxford English Dict. (3d ed. 2015, updated Sept. 2021), “immediate,” 

definition 4b (“Occurring, accomplished, or taking effect without delay or lapse of time; 

done at once; instant”), Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), “immediate” 

(“Occurring without delay; instant”). 

19 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020) p. 1109, col. 2; accord, 

Oxford English Dict. (3d ed. 2015, updated Sept. 2021), “scene,” definition 8b (“The 

physical site or setting at which a particular event occurs; the location of a specific 

occurrence, activity, etc.”). 

20 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020) p. 1302, col. 1; accord, 

Oxford English Dict. (3d ed. 2015, updated Sept. 2021), “threat,” definition 2 (“A 

denunciation to a person of ill to befall him; esp. a declaration of hostile determination or 

of loss, pain, punishment, or damage to be inflicted in retribution for or conditionally 

upon some course; a menace. Also figurative an indication of impending evil”). 

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The same is true for states of emergency declared under Government Code section 

8625. The Governor may declare a state of emergency in “[c]onditions of disaster or of 

extreme peril to the safety of persons and property caused by conditions such as air 

pollution, fire, flood, storm, epidemic, riot, drought, cyberterrorism, sudden and severe 

energy shortage, plant or animal infestation or disease, the Governor’s warning of an 

earthquake or volcanic prediction, or an earthquake, or other conditions.”21 Although 

some of these conditions may result in a need for immediate medical attention, they do 

not all do so. For instance, states of emergency may relate to agricultural problems—like 

the medfly infestation of the 1980’s—that have little or nothing to do with medical 

emergencies.22 Thus, an area that is subject to a state of emergency declaration under 

Government Code section 8625 is not equivalent to an area that constitutes a scene of an 

emergency under Health and Safety Code section 1799.102. 

The California Supreme Court’s examination of the prior version of Health and 

Safety Code section 1799.102, and the Legislature’s subsequent amendment of section 

1799.102, further support the conclusion that section 1799.102 is appropriately read as 

limited to scenes where immediate medical treatment is needed. In a 2008 case, Van 

Horn v. Watson, the Supreme Court considered whether Health and Safety Code section 

1799.102 could apply where the defendant pulled the plaintiff from a car following an 

accident, fearing the car was going to catch fire.23 The plaintiff suffered paralysis and 

claimed that the defendant, who was not a medical professional, was negligent in 

unnecessarily moving plaintiff from the car.24 The defendant asserted immunity under 

section 1799.102, and the plaintiff argued that the statute did not apply to a Good 

Samaritan who rendered nonmedical care at the scene of an emergency.25 At the time, 

the statute read in its entirety: 

No person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency 

care at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for any civil damages 

resulting from any act or omission. The scene of an emergency shall not 

include emergency departments and other places where medical care is 

usually offered.26 

21 Gov. Code, §§ 8558, subd. (b), 8625. 

22 See, e.g., Martin v. Municipal Court (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 693, 695 (Governor 

declared state of emergency based on medfly infestation that caused “conditions of 

extreme peril to the agricultural industry and the safety of agricultural properties”). 

23 Van Horn, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 325. 

24 Id. at p. 326. 

25 Ibid. 

26 Former Health & Saf. Code, § 1799.102 (Stats. 1980, c. 1260, p. 4276, § 7). 

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The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to immunity because 

section 1799.102 applied only to people who rendered emergency medical care.27 The 

Court reasoned that because section 1799.102 is part of the Emergency Medical Services 

division of the Health and Safety Code, and was enacted as part of the Emergency 

Medical Services System and the Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Personnel Act, 

the Legislature intended the statute to apply to the provision of medical care at the scene 

of a medical emergency.28 The Court further noted that legislative statements in the Act, 

definitions in the Act, and legislative history all supported the conclusion that section 

1799.102 immunity was limited to the provision of medical care.29 Finally, the Court 

observed that reading the statute broadly to immunize “any person who provides any 

emergency care at the scene of any emergency” could render superfluous other Good 

Samaritan statutes, and would undermine the well-established common law principle that 

although people have no duty to act, when they do act they must do so with due care.30 

After the Van Horn decision, the Legislature acted promptly to amend section 

1799.102 to expand its coverage to Good Samaritans who provide non-medical care at 

the scene of an emergency. The legislative history of this 2009 amendment confirms that 

the Legislature was responding to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Van Horn, and intended 

the statute’s coverage to remain limited to scenes of emergency, where a need for 

immediate medical attention exists. A representative statement from a committee report 

provides: 

The measure responds to a recent ruling by the California Supreme Court 

that, if left unaddressed, could inadvertently discourage people from being 

courageous “Good Samaritans” by coming to the aid of accident victims 

facing great peril. In essence, the measure provides immunity from suit to 

all Good Samaritans who render emergency care at the scene of an 

emergency regardless of whether the care they provide is found to be of a 

medical (e.g., CPR) or non-medical nature (e.g., carrying someone out of a 

burning building). However, the bill appropriately makes clear that such 

27 Van Horn v. Watson, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 327. 

28 Ibid. 

29 Id. at pp. 328-332. 

30 Id. at pp. 332-334, citing Gov. Code, § 50086 (immunity relating to people trained in 

first aid asked to assist in search and rescue) & Harb. & Nav. Code, § 656, subd. (b) 

(immunity relating to assistance at scene of nautical vessel collision). 

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broad protection from suit is appropriately not available to rescuers who 

engage in grossly negligent or even reckless behavior.31 

After discussing the Van Horn decision, the committee report states that the bill responds 

to the issue raised in the case “by clarifying that this Good Samaritan statute provides 

immunity to all rescuers who render emergency care at the scene of an emergency— 

regardless of whether the care they provide is later found to be of a medical or nonmedical nature.”32 The Legislature left intact, however, the definition of “emergency” as 

limited to situations where “an individual has a need for immediate medical attention.”33 

Thus, all relevant information bearing on statutory meaning supports the 

conclusion that section 1799.102 covers only scenes of emergency where immediate 

medical attention is required. The Legislature has chosen to design Good Samaritan laws 

with specificity, and has remained consistent in limiting section 1799.102’s coverage to 

this type of emergency. It is this need for immediate medical attention that distinguishes 

a “scene of emergency” under section 1799.102 from areas where a declaration of a 

shelter crisis or state of emergency is in place. 

Because the questions here were prompted by issues surrounding medical 

professionals, we offer an additional observation that cautions against extending section 

1799.102’s coverage beyond scenes where individuals are in need of immediate medical 

attention. The practice of medicine is highly regulated, including through specific 

liability limitations, some of which relate to declared states of emergency and scenes of 

accidents. For instance, the Emergency Services Act contains Government Code section 

8625, empowering the Governor to declare states of emergency. That act also exempts 

from liability medical professionals who provide services during a state of emergency (or 

other specified emergency conditions) at the request of a government official or agency, 

31 Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Conc. in Sen. Amends., Assem. Bill 83 (2009-2010 reg. 

sess.) as amended June 15, 2009, p. 2; accord, e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 

Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 83 (2009-2010 reg. sess.), pp. 3-4, Sen. 

Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill 83 (2009-2010 reg. sess.) as amended May 6, 

2009, pp. 1-3, 5. 

32 Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Conc. in Sen. Amends., Assem. Bill 83 (2009-2010 reg. 

sess.) as amended June 15, 2009, p. 2. 

33 Health & Saf. Code, § 1797.70. 

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except for willful acts or omissions.34 This immunity differs from that in Health and 

Safety Code section 1799.102 by covering actions taken at the request of a government 

official or agency, and by excluding willful acts and omissions. Thus, these two 

immunity provisions may apply to different circumstances within one area where the 

Governor has declared a state of emergency. For example, Health and Safety Code 

section 1799.102(a) would cover a scenario where a medical professional provides care 

to someone in need of immediate medical attention, and Government Code section 

8659(a) would cover a medical professional providing care, including non-emergency 

care, at the request of government officials. 

Additionally, Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 itself states that it is not 

meant “to alter existing protections from liability for licensed medical or other personnel 

specified in subdivision (a) or any other law.”35 The specificity with which the 

Legislature has treated both the regulation of medical licensees and Good Samaritan 

statutes further weighs against imposing a broader reading of “scene of an emergency” in 

section 1799.102. 

We reiterate that there may well be scenes within an area that has been declared a 

shelter crisis under Government Code section 8698 or a state of emergency under 

Government Code section 8625 that qualify as scenes of emergency under Health and 

Safety Code section 1799.102, because individuals are in need of immediate medical 

attention. But areas subject to a declaration under Government Code section 8625 or 

8698 are not in and of themselves equivalent to scenes of emergency under Health and 

Safety Code section 1799.102. 

34 Gov. Code, § 8659, subd. (a) (“Any physician or surgeon (whether licensed in this state 

or any other state), hospital, pharmacist, respiratory care practitioner, nurse, or dentist 

who renders services during any state of war emergency, a state of emergency, or a local 

emergency at the express or implied request of any responsible state or local official or 

agency shall have no liability for any injury sustained by any person by reason of those 

services, regardless of how or under what circumstances or by what cause those injuries 

are sustained; provided, however, that the immunity herein granted shall not apply in the 

event of a willful act or omission”); see also, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 1627.5, subd. 

(b) (defining immunity for dentists proving emergency medical care without expectation 

of compensation during a state of emergency declared under Government Code section 

8625 and other specified statutes), 2395 (defining immunity for medical licensees 

providing emergency care at the scene of an emergency), 2396 (defining immunity for 

medical licensees when complications arise from care provided by another licensee), 

2397 (defining immunity for medical licensees when emergencies arise in the licensee’s 

office or a hospital). 

35 Health & Saf. Code, § 1799.102, subd. (b)(2). 

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