W e note that t he judg m ent re f

le ct s that t

he of f ens e is a “ 1ST D EG RE E FE L ON Y. ” H ow ev er , the v er dic t f orm s ig ned by 1 the pre si dingjur or s how s that a ppel la nt w as c onv ic te d of “F ai lure to Com ply Wi th Sex O f f ende r R eg is tra

tion Re quire m ent s, a

T hird Deg ree Felony , a les ser included off ense.” T heref

ore, w e m od ify

the jud gm ent to correct the m istake and to ref lect that the “De gree of O f f ens e” is a “ 3RD D EG RE E FE L ON Y. ” Opinion filed October 23, 20 08



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

____________ 

### No. 1 1- 07 -0 00 98 -CR

____ ____ __ CHA RLE S WILLIA M R OBER TSON , A ppellant
V.
STA TE OF TEX AS , A ppellee

On App eal from the 70th Distric t Court

Ector C ounty, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. A- 33,465

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N The jury convicted Cha

rles W illiam Robertson of t he thi rd deg ree felony offe nse of f

ailure 1 to comply with the sex off

ender reg istration r equire ments, found the enha nceme nt alleg ations to be true, a nd assessed punishment at confineme nt for life. We modify and af firm.2 I

. Issues Appellant pre sents five iss ues for revie w. In the first and second issues, he challeng es the leg al and f

actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence . In the third issue, he contends that the jury char g e on the le sse r inc lud e d of

fe ns e wa s fu

nd ame nta lly de fe c tiv e in that it did no t c on ta in a ll o f t he e le me nts of the off ense. In the fourth issue, a ppellant ar g ues that the tr i al co u rt err ed in admitting State’ s Ex hibit No. 1, a copy

of a f ax reg ardingappellant’ s prior re g istration as a sex offende r. Appe llant

c on te nd s in

his fi na l is su e that th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o p ro ve the e nh anc e me nt a lle g a tio ns
. I I

. Sufficiency of the E

videnc e A. Sta nd ar ds of R e v ie w. I n addre ssing a

ppellant’s first a

nd second issues, we will apply the f o ll o w in g w e ll -re cog nized standards o f r e v ie w
. T o d e te r mi n e if th e e v id e n c e is le g a ll y s u f f ic ie n t, w e mu s t r e v ie w a ll o f the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t a

nd deter mine whether

any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt. Jack son v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 (1 97 9) ; J ac k so n v . S tate , 17 S.W .3d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). To deter mine if the evide nce is fa ctually sufficie nt, we must review all of the evidence in a neutr al light

and de te rm ine whe the r t

he e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g the ve rd ic t is so we ak th a t th e ve rd ic t is c le arl y
w r o n g an d

ma n if e s tl y u n ju s t o r w h e th e r th e v e r d ic t i s a g a in s t t

h e g r e a t w e igh t a

n d p r e p o n d e r an ce of the c onflicting evidenc e. W ats on v . S

tate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006); Cle wis v . S

tate , 922 S.W .2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). W e m u s t consider the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e measure d by the eleme nts of the offe nse as de fined by the hy pothetically

corr ect jury char g e for

this case. Ma lik

v . S tate , 9 53 S.W. 2d

23 4, 23 9- 40 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); se e als o Go lli ha r v . S

tate , 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d

2 4 3 (T ex
. C ri m
. Ap p
. 2 0 0 1 ). T h e h y p o th et i ca l l y

co rr ec tj ury

ch ar ge for a case is “one t h at ac curately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not

unnece ssarily

incre ase the State’s burde n of proof or unnec essar il y re s t rict the State’s the ories of liability , and ade quately

descr ibes the par

ticular off ense f or which the defendant was tried.” Ma lik, 95 3 S.W.2 d at2 4 0

. W e mu s tg i v e d u e d e f e r e n c e t o t h e j ur

y ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f

f a c t , p art i c u l a rl y those deter

minations concer

ning the weig ht and cr edibility of the e vidence

. Joh nson v . S tate , 23 S.W .3d 1, 8-9 (Te x . Crim. App. 2000).See A rticles 62.1 02 (b)(1 ) (state jail f elon y ), 62 .10 1(b ) (juvenile at tim e of com m ission ), 62 .10 1(c) (com m ission of oth er 2 of f ens es , s uch as de linque nt c onduct ), and 62.407 ( ea rly te rm ination g ra

nte d by tr ia l c ourt)

. 3 B. Legal Sufficiency. I n the first issue, appe llant as s er t s t h at the evide nce is leg ally insufficient to prove that he failed to re port in person a s char g ed and that he fa iled to reg is t er wi t h t h e local law enf orce ment authority as re quired by

statute. 1. Re po rt v . R e gis te r. Appellant summarizes this portion of his sufficiency argument as follows: “Appe llant was

c ha rg e d w itha

fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th a re po rt ingre qu ir e me nt a

nd the State ’s p roo f wen t so le ly tow ard pr ov ingAp pe lla

nt fai led t o c omp ly

wi th a re g istra tio n r e qu ir e me nt, a

tot a lly se pa rate violation.” We do not discern such a distinction. A sex offende r is require d to reg ister pursuant to the provisions of T EX
. C ODE C R IM
. P R OC
. ANN . c h. 62 (V e rn on

20 06 & Sup p. 20 08 ). A p e rs on wi th a re po rt abl e con vi ction s ha ll t ime ly reg ister or ve rify

his reg istration with the l ocal law enfor ceme nt authority

wher e the pe rson re sides

or int e nd s to re sid e fo r m or e tha n s e ve n d ay s. Ar

tic le 62 .0 51 . A rt ic le 62 .0 55 (a ) p ro vid e s: I f a pe rson re quired to regi s t er change s addre ss, the person sha ll, not later than the later of the s ev en t h d ay

afte r cha ng ing the addre ss . . . report in per son to the local law enf orce ment authority

in the municipality or county in which the per son’s new residenc e is locate d and provide the authority with proof of ide ntit y

and proof

of residenc e. A p e rs on su bje c t to Cha

pte r 6 2 “ sh a ll r e po rt

to t he loc a l la

w e nf or c e me nt a

uth or ity” to ver if

y his reg ist ra t i o n i n fo rm ation. Article 62.058( a). Aperson with two or more prior convic tions for a sexually violent offense must report once ever y ninety day s; others must report annua lly

. Id. I f a pe rson is require d t o re gi s t er b ut fails to comply with any one of the reg istration require ments of Chapter 62, the person commits an offense pur suant to Article 62.102. With a few exceptions not ap p licable to this case , the offe nse of f ailing to c omply

with a re g istration 2 require ment is a third deg ree felony if the per son is require d to verify his reg istration annually

and

a se c on d d e g re e fe lony

if the per so n is re qu ir e d to ve ri fy his re g ist

ratio n e ve ry

nin e ty da y s. Article 62.102( b)(2) , (3). The re is no separ ate violation or offe nse involving the failure to “re port”;4

a ll v iol a tio ns of

Cha pte r 6 2 a re c ov e re d b y

Ar tic le 62 .1 02 , w hic h is ent itl e d “F a ilure to C omp ly With Reg istration Requirements.” The re cord shows that appellant moved to Ode ssa in October 2005 but that, as of the date of his arre st, he had not re ported to the Ode ss a P olice De partment to re g ister, to show proof r elating to h is c ha ng e of a dd

re ss, or to v e ri fy any pr ior re g ist ratio n a s a

se x off e nd e r. De te c tiv e Ke lly

Ce c il informed a

ppellant on J une 8, 2006, that h e wa s require d to come in and r eg ister base d upon a L ou isi ana c onvic tio n, wh ic h wa s a 19 90 c on vic tio n fo r the of fe ns e of “ fo rc ibl e ra

pe .” Ap pe lla

nt s a id he would come in the nex t day , but he did not show. Appellant wa s arr ested on June 12, 2006, for failing to comply

with the reg istration require ments. The evide nce show s that appellant ha d reg istered in 2001 in B urleson County , Texas, as a sex offende r based upon his prior L ouisiana conviction. The jury was instructed to f ind a ppellant g uilty of the third deg ree felony offe nse of “ Fa ilure to Compl y

Wit h Sex Offe nder Reg istration Re quirements” if it f ound beyond a re asonable doubt that he: [D] id then and ther e intentionall y o r knowing ly fail to repor

t in person to the local law e n forc ement author ity with whom he must reg ister, to-wit: the Odessa Police Depa rtment and with whom said De fenda nt is reg istered unde r the Sex Offende r Reg istration Progr am, and the sa id Defe ndant is require d to reg ister annua lly to v e r if y the information in the re g istration form maint ai ned by said law e nforc ement authority , and the sa id Defe ndant had r ece ived a r eporta ble conviction or adjudication, to-wit: For cible Rape on Fe bruar y 13, 1990, in . . . L ouisiana. Ap p el l an t c o r r ec t l y

p o i n t s o u tt h at b o tht h e i n d i ct m en tan d th e j ury ch ar ge i n cl u d edl an gu age indicating that appellant “ is reg istered” with the Odessa Police D epar tment – though the evidence showed that a

ppellant had never reg istered in Ode ssa. While we ag ree that both the indictment and jury char g e (which had other inacc urac ies as well) wer e inartfully written, we cannot hold that the evidenc e, when measure d by the elements of t he offense as define d by the hy pothetically

corr ect jury

c ha rg e fo r thi s c a se , is le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt to su

pp or t a pp e lla nt’ s c on vic tio n fo r fa iling to comp ly with the reg istration require ments for sex offen d ers. As c harg ed and pr oved, appe llant had a

re po rt a ble c on vic tio n; a

pp e lla nt w a s re qu ir e d to re g ist e r a s a se x off e nd e r a nd to v e ri fy

his

re g istratio n a

nnua lly ; a

pp e lla nt w a s r e qu ir e d to re po rt in pers on in O de ssa

(a ft e r h e mov e d to Odessa) ; and appe llant failed to re port as re quired.5 2. Local Law Enforceme nt Authority. Appellant next argues that the e vidence is leg ally insufficient be cause there was no e vidence that he fa ile d to r e g ist e r w ithor re po rt to t he a pp ro pr iate “ loc a l la

w e nf or c e me nt a

uth or ity , to wi t: the Chi e f

o f P o l i c e o f

t h e C i t y

o f O d e s s a
. ” P ur s u an tt o t h e d e f i n i t i o np r o v i d e d

f o r in Article 62.001(2), l ocal law enfor ceme nt authority “mea ns the chief

of police of

a municipality

or the sherif f of a county in this st ate.” I n th is c a se , bo th the ind ic tme nt and the a pp lic a tio n p ara g ra

phof the jur y c ha rg e re fe rr e d to the local law

enfor cemen t au t h o ri ty

as the “ Odessa Police D epar tment.” The e vidence at trial showed that Mar

y Bur ditt was the rec ords cler k and the se x offe nder r eg istrar for the Odessa

Police Depa rtment. Bur ditt testi fied a t trial that appellant was supposed to be reg istered as a sex offende r in Odessa but that he had ne ver r eg istered in Ode ssa. B urditt’s testimony constitutes some evidenc e that appell an t fa i l ed to report to or r eg ister with the local law enfor ceme nt authority

reg ardle ss of whether that authority

be the Ode ssa Police Depa rtment or its chief. We hold that the jury

could h av e found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a

rea sonable doubt and that, theref ore, the evidenc e is leg ally suffici en t t o s u pport appe llant’s conviction. Appellant’ s first issue is, theref ore, ove rruled. C. Factual Sufficiency. I n h is s e c on d is su e , a

pp e lla nt co nte nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o li nk

him to the L ouisiana conviction, to prove that there was a final conviction in L ouisiana, to show that the L ouisiana convic tion is a “repor table convic tion,” and to show that appe llant failed to re port to the

a p p r o p r i a t e l o c a l l aw e n f

o r c e m e n ta

u t h o r i ty. 1. Prior Conviction. Un de r t his iss ue , a

pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t th e pr ior

c on vic tio n w a s n ot s uf

fi c ie ntl y linke d to him

. The trial c ourt admitted into evidenc e over objection S tate’s Ex hibit No. 2, containing a uthenticated do c ume nts fr om t

he L ou isi ana

De pa rtme nt o f P ub lic Sa fet y and Cor re c tio ns . T he se do c ume nts ref lect that Charle s Wi lliam Robertson was convicte d of forc ible rape in L ouisiana on F ebrua ry 13, 19 90 . Afi ng e rp ri nt e xpe rt c omp are d th e fi ng e rp ri nts c on ta ine d in Exhi bit No . 2 wi t h th e fi ng e rp ri nts of a pp e lla nt t ake n w he n h e wa s arr e ste d in this ca se and the fi ng e rp ri nts fr om a

fi ng e rp ri nt d a ta

ba se in Austin. The fing erpr ints matched. Consequently , the prior L ouisiana convic tion for forc ible rapeArti cl e 62.003(a ) pr ov ide s that t he De par tm ent of Public Sa f

et y is re spons ible f

or de te rmin in g whet

her an out- of -s tate 3 convictio n con tains elem ents that are substantially sim ilar to the elem ents of a n off ense und er the law s of

T exa s. 6 was suff iciently linked to appellant by

fing erpr int analy sis an dshowed that a ppellant had be en convicted of

forc ible rape in L ouisiana. F urthermor e, eve n though E x hibit No

. 2 m ay not have contained a

document purpor

ting to be the actua l “judg ment” of conviction, the exhibit contained sufficie nt evidenc e to prove that appellant ha d a prior c onviction for for cible ra pe. See F lowers v. Sta te , 220 S.W .3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The ne x t question, then, is whether that conviction constitutes a re portable c onviction for purposes of

s ex offender

reg istration. Article 62.001(5) define s the term “r eporta ble conviction” a

nd lists s ever al Texas offe nses that ar e re portable of fense s. Although a conviction for “for cible ra pe” in L ouisiana is not specifica lly listed as a re portable c onviction under Ar ticle 62.001(5), Ar tic le 62 .0 01 (5 )( H) pr ov ide s th a t a con vict ion

un de r t he laws of

ano the r s tate is a

re po rt a ble conviction i f t he elements of the off ense “ are substantially

simil ar” to the elements of c erta in Texas offe nses, including sexual assault and ag g ravated sexual assault. The sex offende r re g istration ag ent

a t th e Te xas De pa

rtme nt of Pub lic Sa fe ty ve ri fi e d that a convic tio n f or fo rc ibl e ra

pe in L ou isi ana

is

a re port ab l e conviction under Texas law, and the of

fense was re fer

red to in appe llant’s previous 3 Texas reg istration rec ords as a n ag g ravated sexual a ssault. Fur thermore , the trial court took judicial notice of the L o u isiana statute under which appe llant was convic ted. The e vidence reg ardingthe L ouisiana convic tion be ing a repor table conviction is not so weak that the verdic t is c lear ly wrong and manife stly

unjust, nor is such a findingag ainst the g reat weig ht and p re pondera nce of the conflictingevidenc e.

2. Local Law Enforceme nt Authority. Appellant next contends that the evide nce is fa ctually insufficien t t o show that appe llant failed to re port to or re g ister with the appr opriate loc al law e n fo rc em en t authority : that being the chief of police. This contention is the same as the challeng e to the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence

. L ikewise, we hold that the testimony from B urditt, the rec ords cler k and sex offende r re g istrar for the Od e ssa

Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt, that app ell ant wa s su pp os e d to be re g ist e re d a s a se x off e nd e r i n Odessa but that he had neve r re g istered in Ode ssa consti t u t es fac tually sufficie nt evidence that appellant f

a il e d to r e p o rt to o r r e g is te r w it h th e a p p r o p r iate lo c a l la

w e n f o r c e me n t a

u th o r it y
. The7

evidenc e is not so weak that the verdic t is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, nor i s such a f inding ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the conf licting e vidence . Appellant’s se cond issue is overrule d. I I I

. Jury Charge I n h is thir d is su e , a

pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t th e jur

y c ha rg e is f un dame ntally defe ctiv e be c a us e it a uth or ize d a

c on vic tio n on the le sse r inc lud e d of fe ns e wi tho ut pr oo f of a ll of the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the of fe ns e . App e lla

nt c on ten ds th at th e c ha

rg e a uth or ize d a

c on vic tio n f

or me re ly fa ili ngto repor t in person, which, he argues, “is not an offense at all.” B eca use appe llant did not object to the jury char g e on this basi s , we m u s t revie w the entire jury char g e, the e vidence , the ar g uments of counsel, a nd any other rele vant information and deter mine whether the err or was so egreg ious that appellant wa s denied a

fair a nd impartial trial. T EX
. C ODE C R IM
. P R OC
. ANN . art. 36.19 (V ernon 20 06 ); Al ma nz a v . S

tate , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Whil e the jury

char g e is not fre e fr om error , it is not fundame ntally defe ctive and does not authorize a c onviction without proof of all of the e ssential elements o f t h e o ff ense. A g ain, if a person who is re quired to re g ister fa ils to comply with any one of the re g istration require ments of Chapter 62, the pe rson commits a n offe nse. Article 62.055(a) require s a sex offende r who c hang es addre sses to “re port in person” an d p ro v i d e p roof of his identity and new

addre ss. Under Article 62.058( a), a

sex offender

“shall re port” in orde r to v er i fy information. In order

to convict appellant a s char g ed, the jury had to find that appe llant had a r eportab l e co n v i ct i o n , that he wa s
re qu ir e d to re g ist e r a s a

se x off e nd e r a nd to v e ri fy his re g istra

tio n a nnua lly , th a t he wa s r e qu ir e d to repor t in person in Odessa, a

nd that he failed to repor

t as requir ed. The jury

was a lso instructed that

a pe rs on wh o is re qu ir e d to re g ist e r m us t r e g ist e r o r v e ri fy

re g ist ratio n in any mun ic ipa lity

or c ounty wh e re the pe rs on

re sid e s o r i nte nd s to re sid e fo r m or e tha n s e ve n d ay s. I n light of the entire jury char g e, the evidenc e, and the arguments of counsel, we hold that

any e rr or in t he jur y c ha rg e wa s n ot s o e g re g iou s a s to de ny a pp e lla nt a fa ir and imp art ia l tr ia l. Appellant’s third issue is over ruled. I V. Ad mi ssi on of E x hib it I n h is f ourt h is su e , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t the tr ia l court e rr e d in a dmi tti ngState ’s Exhi bit No. 1 into evidence . That exhibit consisted of appellant’ s previous reg istration f orm and ver ification8

updates fr om Burle son County . We must review a tr ial court’s de cision to admit eviden ce over objection under an abuse- of-discr etion standard, and we will not reve rse the trial cour t ’s d ec i s i on ab s en t a clea

r abuse of discre tion. Zul ian i v . S tate , 97 S.W .3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A tri a l c ourt

a bu se s it s d isc re tio n w he n its de c isi on lie s outs ide the zon e of re a so na ble dis a g re e me nt. Id. I n this case, the e x hibit was introduced through Bur ditt upon her testimony that she re ceive d the documents via f

ax from the Bu rl eson C ounty Sheriff’ s Offic e. Appe llant objected that the d o c u m e n t s w e r e h e ar s ay b e c a u s e B u r d i t tw a s th e r e c o r d s c u s t o d i an i n O d e s s a , n o tB ur l e s o nC o u n ty. The doc uments wer e not authenticated by anyone fr om Burle son County . The State, c iting inapplicable c ases r eg ardingthe collec tive knowledg e of of fice rs on the is s u e o f p ro bable c ause, argues that the doc uments beca me par t of Odessa ’s file whe n Bur ditt rec eived them from Bur leson County . At trial, the State ar g ued that the documents became the business rec ords of Ode ssa when

rec eived. Althoug h the documents may have become part of Odessa’ s file, t he documents were not shown to fall into the business rec ords ex ception to t he hea rsay rule be cause the State fa iled to lay the prope r pre dicate unde r T EX
. R. E V ID . 803 (6 ). No thi ng in the re c or d s ho ws tha t th e do c ume nts

wer e made a t o r n e ar th e ti me b y a p e r s o n w it h kn o w le d g e o r th a t th e d o c u me n ts s e t f o rth the activities of the of

fice

. SeeRule 803(6). Th ou g h St a te ’s Exhi bit

No . 1 may

no t ha ve be e n p ro pe rl y

a dmi tte d into evid e nc e , it s admission does not constitute rever sible err or. Pursuant to T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 4 4. 2( b) , a no nc on sti

tutional error must be dis reg arde d unless it aff ects a defe ndant’s substantial rig hts. “A substantial rig ht is affe cted when the err or had a substantial a nd injurious effe ct or influenc e in deter mining the jury ’s ver dict.” Kin g v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this case, ther e wa s oth e r e vid e nc e ind ic a tin g tha t a pp e lla nt h a d b e en regis tere d a s a se x off e nd e r i n B ur le so n Co un ty and that appellant had a prior repor table offe nse. In light of this other evidenc e, we cannot f ind that State’s Exhi bit No. 1 had a substantial or i n j u ri o u s i n fl u ence on the jury ’s dec ision. See id. The fourth issue is overr

uled. V. Sufficiency of Enhanc eme nt Proof I n h is f ina l is su e , a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s that, “ a ssumin g thi s Court a g re e s that th e e vid e nc e is fac tually insufficient re g ardingState’s Ex hibit 2,” the evidenc e is also fac tually insufficient to link9

him to the two prior convictions used for enhanc ement purpose s. Appellant’s c ontention in this issue is depende nt upon our deter mination reg ardingS t at e’ s E x h ibit No. 2. As we held a bove, State’s Ex hibit No. 2 was sufficie ntly linked to a ppellant by fing erpr int a

naly sis. The re cord shows that the enhanc ement convi ct i o n s we re l i n k edt o ap p el l an tb y a h an dwr i t i n g ex p ertwh o co mpare d appellant’ s sig natur e on

State ’s Exhi bit

No . 2 to his signatur e s o n th e tw o c onvic tio ns us e d f or e nh anc e me nt. Ac c or din g to t

he e xpe rt , a ll thr e e we re signe d by th e same pe rs on . Co ns e qu e ntl y , th e e vid e nc e is suffic i en t t o l i n k appellant to those c onvictions and to support the jury ’s findingof true to the enhanc ement alleg ations. Appellant’s fif th issue is overruled. VI

. Holding The judg ment of the trial c ourt is modified to show that appellant was convicte d of a third deg ree felony

offe nse and, a s modified, aff irmed.

RI CK STRANGE

JUSTI CE

October 23, 2008 Do not publish. SeeT EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.