CORPORATE RESPONSE TO 
 


ACCELERATED TAX DEPRECIATION: 
 


BONUS DEPRECIATION FOR TAX YEARS 2002-2004 
 


by 
 


Matthew Knittel 
 


Office of Tax Analysis, US Department of Treasury 
 


OTA Working Paper 98 May 2007 
 


OTA Papers is an occasional series of reports on the research, models and datasets developed to 

inform and improve Treasury’s tax policy analysis. The papers are works in progress and subject 

to revision. Views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 

represent official Treasury positions or policy. OTA Papers are distributed in order to document 

OTA analytic methods and data and invite discussion and suggestions for revision and 

improvement. Comments are welcome and should be directed to the authors. 

Office of Tax Analysis 

US Department of the Treasury 

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20220 

The author is grateful to Bob Carroll, Don Kiefer, James Mackie, John McClelland, Joel Platt and Laura 

Power for their helpful comments. 
CORPORATE RESPONSE TO 

ACCELERATED TAX DEPRECIATION: 

BONUS DEPRECIATION FOR TAX YEARS 2002-2004 

by 

Matthew Knittel 

Office of Tax Analysis, US Department of Treasury 

OTA Working Paper 98 May 2007 

OTA Papers is an occasional series of reports on the research, models and datasets developed to 

inform and improve Treasury’s tax policy analysis. The papers are works in progress and subject 

to revision. Views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 

represent official Treasury positions or policy. OTA Papers are distributed in order to document 

OTA analytic methods and data and invite discussion and suggestions for revision and 

improvement. Comments are welcome and should be directed to the authors. 

Office of Tax Analysis 

US Department of the Treasury 

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20220 

The author is grateful to Bob Carroll, Don Kiefer, James Mackie, John McClelland, Joel Platt and Laura 

Power for their helpful comments. 
ABSTRACT 

This paper examines how corporations responded to temporary accelerated tax depreciation made 

available by the Jobs Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 

and Reconciliation Act of 2003. Data for tax years 2002 through 2004 reveal that 55 to 63 percent of 

corporate investment claimed accelerated tax depreciation. Utilization rates were slightly lower for C 

corporations (54 to 61 percent) than S corporations (65 to 70 percent). The lower C corporation 

utilization rate may be attributable to net operating losses and tax credits carried forward by C 

corporations as well as new tax credits. Utilization rates were generally higher for industries where 

investment is dominated by a relatively small number of firms (e.g., utilities and telecommunications) 

with longer-lived investment. 
3

I. INTRODUCTION 

On March 9, 2002, President Bush signed the Jobs Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 

into law.1

 The Jobs Creation Act provided an additional first-year depreciation allowance equal to 30 

percent of the expenditure for eligible investment acquired between September 11, 2001 and September 

11, 2004. This provision has been referred to as “bonus” depreciation because it allowed taxpayers to 

claim a temporary deduction over and above amounts they would ordinarily claim. On May 28, 2003, the 

Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 increased and extended bonus depreciation.2

 The 

Jobs and Growth Act increased first-year bonus depreciation to 50 percent for eligible investment 

acquired after May 5, 2003 and extended bonus depreciation to property acquired before January 1, 

2005.3 

Bonus depreciation reduces the effective tax rate on investment because it allows firms to deduct 

capital expenditures more quickly. Policymakers hoped that lower tax rates would encourage investment 

and stimulate economic growth. Using tax data to examine how corporations responded to bonus 

depreciation, we find that corporations claimed bonus depreciation for 55 to 63 percent of eligible 

investment. This percentage is referred to as the bonus “take-up” rate. While it is not known what 

specific factors caused take-up rates to be less than 100 percent, three factors seem particularly relevant: 

(1) the bonus provision was temporary, (2) many capital intensive firms had losses during this period or 

carried losses forward from prior tax years (which generally limits the benefit of bonus depreciation), and 

(3) many states chose not to conform their state tax systems to the federal change. 

This paper provides a general retrospective on bonus depreciation. It presents bonus take-up rates 

across organizational form (C versus S corporation), tax year, tax class of investment and industry. This 

paper does not address whether bonus depreciation increased investment above levels that would have 

occurred in its absence. Rather, this paper focuses on the overall utilization of bonus depreciation and the 

1

 Public Law 107-147.

2

 Public Law 108-27. 

3

 For both 30 and 50 percent bonus depreciation, acquired property must be placed in service prior to January 1, 

2005. 
4

characteristics of bonus and non-bonus firms. An examination of non-bonus firms reveals certain 

attributes which may dampen the appeal of accelerated tax depreciation. A better understanding of these 

attributes may help to inform future investment stimulus proposals. 

This paper proceeds as follows. Section Two describes the mechanics of bonus depreciation and 

the impact of bonus depreciation on firms’ effective tax rates. Section Three presents tabulations of 

corporate tax data by tax year, corporate form, tax class of investment and industry. Section Four 

concludes with some general observations on bonus depreciation and possible implications for future 

investment stimulus proposals. 

II. BONUS DEPRECIATION AND INVESTMENT 

Policymakers often use temporary tax provisions such as bonus depreciation to elicit a desired 

response from certain taxpayers. In order to understand the motivation for these provisions, one must 

consider the circumstances under which they were enacted. The first quarter of 2002 found the U.S. 

economy emerging slowly from the recession of the previous year. Although broad measures of the 

economy suggested that the 2001 recession was mild (real gross domestic product increased by 0.8 

percent on an annual basis), the recession’s impact on the business sector, and in particular, business 

investment, was more pronounced. From 2000 to 2001, the National Income and Product Accounts 

record a 10 percent reduction in corporate profits and a 16 percent reduction in equipment and inventory 

investment. 

In an effort to encourage business investment, Congress enacted bonus depreciation. The motivation 

for bonus depreciation is summarized by the FY 2004 Economic Report of the President: 

The tax cuts provided further stimulus by increasing incentives for business investment. Some of 

these incentives come in the form of bonus depreciation for business investment.... The bonus 

depreciation was introduced in the 2002 tax cut (JCWAA), which specified that 30 percent of the 

price of investments made by September 10, 2004 could be treated as an immediate expense under 

the corporate profits tax and the remaining 70 percent depreciated over time according to the regular 

depreciation schedules. Moving depreciation closer to the time of new investment increased the 
5

present value of depreciation allowances and the net after-tax return on investment..... These tax 

changes lowered firms’ cost of capital and likely provided support for investment at a crucial time.4 

Prior to the presentation of tax data, it is useful to examine the mechanism by which accelerated 

tax depreciation affects the taxpayer’s marginal effective tax rate and investment decision. (For the 

remainder of this paper, we use the term “firm” in lieu of taxpayer.) 

A. The Mechanics of Bonus Depreciation 

To illustrate the impact of bonus depreciation, Table 1 lists the “regular” tax law and temporary 

30 and 50 percent bonus depreciation schedules for the six classes of eligible investment. A simple 

example demonstrates how bonus depreciation works. Assume that a firm invests $100 in equipment that 

has a tax life of five years. If the investment qualifies for the 50 percent bonus allowance, then the firm 

can write-off or deduct 50 percent of the investment in the first year (i.e., $50). The firm then depreciates 

the remaining amount using the regular depreciation schedule. In this example, the firm would claim 

another $10 of regular depreciation ($50 times 20 percent), for a total deduction equal to $60 in the first 

year. Note that if the firm had not claimed bonus depreciation, the deduction would have been $20. 

Thus, the bonus deduction does not represent the net additional deduction claimed by the firm in the year 

the investment is made. The additional deduction attributable to the bonus provision is somewhat less 

than the bonus deduction itself; $40 in this example. 

Firms may claim bonus depreciation only for eligible investment. Eligible investment is 

investment to which the general rules of the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) 

apply that has a class life of 20 years or less.5

 This broad definition generally includes most equipment 

investment. To qualify for 30 percent bonus depreciation, eligible investment must have been acquired 

on or after September 11, 2001 and before September 11, 2004. To qualify for 50 percent bonus 

4 FY 2004 Economic Report of the President, page 45. 5

 For tax purposes, class life refers to the amount of time over which an asset must be depreciated. Under MACRS, 

there are 9 class lives: 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20 25, 27.5 and 39 year property. In addition, taxpayers may be required to

use the alternative depreciation system (ADS) or the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) depending on the 

type of assets and the original date of purchase. 
8

6

depreciation, eligible investment must have been acquired after May 5, 2003 and before January 1, 2005.6 

Original use must have commenced with the firm claiming the deduction; used equipment purchases did 

not qualify for bonus depreciation.7 

If a firm claims bonus depreciation, it claims a deduction equal to eligible investment multiplied 

by the appropriate 30 or 50 percent factor, regardless of when the property was acquired during the tax 

year. A firm may elect out of bonus depreciation for any or all classes of eligible investment made 

during the tax year. For example, a firm may claim bonus depreciation for twenty-year property, but not 

for five-year property. Once a firm elects to forego bonus depreciation, the election for that tax year 

cannot be reversed through an amended return. However, an election in one tax year does not constrain a 

firm to the same treatment in future years. For example, if a firm does not claim bonus depreciation for 

investment made in tax year 2002, it may still claim bonus depreciation for investment made in tax year 

2003. 

B. Impact of Bonus Depreciation on Effective Tax Rates 

Bonus depreciation reduces the effective tax rate on investment because it increases the net 

present value of the depreciation allowance. Table 2 shows the net present value of deductions using 

regular MACRS depreciation and the 30 and 50 percent bonus depreciation schedules.9 Bonus 

depreciation can substantially accelerate deductions, especially for longer-lived property. Compared to 

regular tax depreciation, bonus depreciation increases the net present value of deductions by 18 percent 

6

 Property is not eligible for 50 percent bonus if there was a binding written contract for the acquisition prior to May 

6, 2003. For property placed-in-service after May 5, 2003, taxpayers may elect to use either 30 or 50 percent bonus 

depreciation.

7

 Eligible investment also includes water utility property, computer software other than software covered by section 

197 and qualified leasehold improvement property. The January 1, 2005 placed-in-service date for 30 and 50 

percent bonus depreciation was extended one year to January 1, 2006 for property that (1) is produced by a taxpayer 

and is subject to Code Section 263A uniform capitalization rules, (2) has a production period greater than two years, 

or greater than one year and a cost exceeding $1 million and (3) has a MACRS recovery period of at least ten years 

or is used in the trade or business of transporting persons for hire, such as commercial aircraft. The American Jobs 

Creation Act of 2004 extended the placed-in-service date to January 1, 2006 for certain noncommercial aircraft. 

8 Unlike regular depreciation, bonus depreciation does not use a half-year or mid-quarter convention. These 

conventions reduce the full-year deduction based on the timing of the purchase during the tax year. 

9

 The calculations in Table 2 assume a nominal discount rate of 6.5 percent equal to the real return (3.5 percent) plus 

inflation (3.0 percent). 
7

(30 percent bonus) and 31 percent (50 percent bonus) for twenty-year property. Conversely, for threeyear property, bonus depreciation adds little to net present values: one and two percent respectively. 

Although present value comparisons are straightforward and can be informative, they do not 

provide a comprehensive measure of the impact that accelerated tax depreciation has on investment 

incentives.10 A more complete measure is a firm’s marginal effective tax rate which is a derivative of the 

cost of capital as first developed by Hall and Jorgensen (1967). The cost of capital is the pre-tax rate of 

return on a barely profitable investment that covers the investment’s tax cost while still leaving the 

investor his or her required after-tax rate of return. The cost of capital represents the pre-tax return on the 

final or marginal investment; firms should undertake additional investment as long as the (net of 

depreciation) marginal product of capital exceeds the cost of capital.11 

Based on the formula originally derived by Hall and Jorgensen, a simplified version of the cost of 

capital may be expressed as follows: 

(1) p = (r + d)(1 – uz) / (1 – u) – d 

where r is equal to the real discount rate, d is the economic rate of depreciation, u is the statutory 

corporate income tax rate and z is the present discounted value of allowances for tax depreciation for one 

dollar of investment. As shown by equation (1), faster write-off of investment reduces the cost of capital 

by increasing the present value of depreciation (z). We note that this simple cost of capital formula: (1) 

assumes that firms have sufficient tax liability to utilize all deductions, (2) ignores state and local taxes, 

and (3) assumes that firms do not resell assets. 

Table 2 depicts the impact of bonus depreciation on firms’ cost of capital for the six classes of 

eligible investment. Following Brazell and Mackie (2002), the computations assume that investments are 

held forever and two-fifths of investment is financed by debt, the remainder with equity which is split 

10 For example, bonus depreciation does not significantly increase investment incentives for longer-lived assets 

compared to short-lived assets, as is misleadingly suggested by the computation of present value of deductions. 

11 As noted by Cohen et al. (2002), this condition assumes that the following conditions apply: (1) zero adjustment 

or installation costs, (2) no time required to build or plan additions to the capital stock and (3) taxpayers expect tax 

laws to remain unchanged. 
8

between retained earnings and new share issues.12 (In equation (1), the method of financing affects r and 

is not explicitly visible.) The computations assume that the required real return to investment is equal to 

3.5 percent and inflation equals three percent. The computations also include the effects of taxes at the 

investor level: we set individual/investor level tax rates at 14.5 percent for capital gains, 16.5 percent for 

dividends and 22.5 percent for interest income.13 14 

Using these assumptions, the marginal effective tax rate is then equal to the difference between 

the cost of capital (p) and the required return on investment (s) divided by the cost of capital or (p – s) / p. 

The marginal effective tax rate is the tax rate that, if levied on economic income, would be equivalent in 

its incentive effects to the various features of the tax code modeled in the cost of capital formula, such as 

depreciation, statutory tax rates at the entity and investor levels and indexing provisions (Brazell and 

Mackie, 2002).15 If the tax system measured and taxed economic income, then the marginal effective tax 

17 rate on investment would equal the statutory tax rate.16 

12 The computations assume that retained earnings comprise 93 percent of equity’s share and new issues comprise 7 

percent. 

13 These rates are “average marginal” tax rates from the Treasury individual income tax simulation model for tax law 

effective for tax year 2004. For example, the dividend tax rate of 16.5 percent (mix of qualified and non-qualified) 

implies that tax receipts would increase by $16.5 billion if dividends were increased by $100 billion and pro-rated 

across all individuals that held dividends in the sample. Qualified dividends received after December 31, 2002 are 

taxed at the same rate as an individual’s long-term capital gains. For long-term capital gains reported for tax year 

2004, the tax rate is 5 percent for individuals in the 10 or 15 percent income tax brackets and 15 percent otherwise. 

The long-term gains rate falls to zero for individuals in the 10 and 15 percent income tax brackets for tax years 

2009-2011. For tax year 2012, the long-term gains rate reverts to pre-2003 law: 10 percent (10 or 15 percent income 

tax bracket) or 20 percent (all others). We further reduce the capital gains tax rate to account for deferral and taxfree step-up at death. Rates are not adjusted to account for any tax-exempt ownership of assets. 14 These computations assume implicitly that bonus depreciation is permanent. For a discussion of the effects of 

temporary partial expensing on investment incentives, see Cohen and et al. (2002). The authors find that temporary 

stimulus provides greater investment incentives than permanent stimulus. 15 Economic income is generally defined as consumption plus change in wealth. For corporate profits, economic 

income implies that assets would be depreciated using economic depreciation and would be marked-to-market each 

year.

16 For example, if the investment were equity financed and there were no shareholder level taxes, then the marginal 

effective tax rate would equal the statutory tax rate on corporate income (u). Accelerated depreciation would reduce 

the marginal effective tax rate below u. Debt finance typically would reduce the marginal effective tax rate below u 

because the lender’s tax rate typically is below u. By contrast, the double tax on corporate profits (i.e., shareholder 

taxes on dividends and capital gains) would raise the marginal effective tax rate. 

17 Under certain conditions, it is possible for the marginal effective tax rate on investment to be negative. This result 

will occur for debt-financed investments where borrowers face higher tax rates than lenders, interest is not indexed 

for inflation or tax depreciation is very accelerated (e.g., expensing). In those cases, the after-tax return on 

investment exceeds the pre-tax return. 
9

Marginal effective tax rates are shown in the final columns of Table 2. Compared to regular tax 

law, 30 percent bonus depreciation reduces the marginal effective tax rate by 12-21 percent; 50 percent 

bonus depreciation reduces the rate by 21-37 percent. Most eligible investment (approximately 75-78 

percent of outlays) is for five and seven-year property where 30 percent bonus depreciation reduces the 

marginal effective tax rate by 17-18 percent and 50 percent bonus depreciation reduces the rate by 29-32 

percent. 

C. Cash Flow Benefit of Bonus Depreciation 

Marginal effective tax rates are useful when considering the firm’s investment decision, but they 

do not provide insight regarding bonus depreciation’s cash flow benefit to a firm. Table 3 shows the 

maximum potential benefit to firms who claim bonus depreciation for a $1 million investment. The 

computed cash flow benefit is simply the net present value of the change in tax liability over the tax life 

of the investment. For example, bonus depreciation on a $1 million investment in five-year property 

would reduce tax liability by $140,000 in the year of investment: $600,000 times 35 percent less 

$200,000 times 35 percent. Bonus depreciation then increases tax liability by $56,000 in the second year, 

$34,000 in the third year, $20,000 in the fourth and fifth years and $10,000 in the sixth year (a net 

differential of zero if we ignore present value). The net present value of this change in tax liability over 

the investment’s tax life ($13,700) yields the firm’s cash flow benefit from delaying tax payments. Such 

figures are relevant for firms that are merely deciding whether to claim bonus depreciation, as opposed to 

firms deciding whether to increase investment in response to the temporary stimulus. 

For three-year property, the computed cash flow benefit is quite modest ($6,400). The cash flow 

benefit more than doubles ($13,700) for five-year property. For twenty-year property, the cash flow 

benefit is significant ($64,500) because bonus depreciation pulls deductions forward from tax years many 

years in the future. It should be noted that the cash flow benefit appears much larger for longer-lived 

property largely due to the asset’s longer tax life for a given outlay. If a similar comparison were made 

between a single $1 million investment in twenty-year property and four $1 million investments in fiveyear property over a twenty-year period, the cash flow benefit difference would be much smaller. 
18

10

These simple cash flow computations assume that firms have sufficient taxable income to make 

full use of all accelerated deductions in the first year of bonus depreciation. However, this assumption 

does not hold for many firms. For example, loss firms cannot immediately use the accelerated deduction 

to offset taxable income and must instead carry the loss forward to offset taxable income in a future 

year. Alternatively, firms with stocks of unused credits or loss carryforwards may receive less benefit 

from bonus depreciation if the accelerated deduction merely displaces a credit or loss carryforward that 

would have been claimed in its absence. For carryforward firms and firms that generate new tax credits, 

it is possible that bonus depreciation has little or no impact on the stream of tax liability reported by the 

firm. 

Table 3 lists the cash flow benefit if the additional bonus depreciation allowances cannot be used 

to offset taxable income for one or two tax years. This delay may effectively occur if the firm reports a 

tax loss or if the firm had loss carryforwards or credits that could have been used to offset taxable income. 

For three-year property, a one-year delay reduces the cash flow benefit by 54 percent; a two-year delay 

reduces the benefit by 90 percent. For five-year and seven-year property, a one-year delay reduces the 

cash flow benefit by 20-30 percent; a two-year delay by 50-65 percent. For fifteen and twenty-year 

property, a one-year delay reduces the cash flow benefit by only 8-10 percent; a two-year delay by 22-26 

percent. 

Given these computations, a pertinent question is: what was the cash flow benefit for a typical 

firm claiming bonus depreciation? For tax year 2004, the median level of eligible investment for C 

corporations claiming bonus depreciation in our dataset was $215,000. If we assume that (1) a firm can 

immediately use the accelerated deduction to offset taxable income, (2) the deduction does not displace a 

loss carryforward or credit that would otherwise be claimed, (3) the firm pays tax at 35 percent, and (4) 

the firm invests in five-year property, then the cash flow benefit from bonus depreciation was 

18 However, it is possible that the firm could also carry the loss back to offset tax liability from the prior two tax 

years. If the firm is able to carry the entire loss back, then the tax benefit of bonus deprecation is not muted. 
11

approximately $3,000 for the median firm. We note that the cash flow benefit will be significantly higher 

for a small number of firms that report the majority of tax investment.19 

III. CORPORATE TAX DATA 

The data used for this analysis are from the IRS’ Statistics of Income (SOI) corporate income tax 

files for tax years 2002 through 2004. The data file for each tax year is a stratified sample of returns for C 

and S corporations with tax years ending July of year t through June of year t+1. For example, tax year 

2002 includes firms with tax years that end in July 2002 through June 2003. 

For the tabulations that appear in this paper, we use a subset of the SOI annual samples. The 

subset is composed of firms that report at least $100,000 of total depreciation allowances for the tax year. 

This depreciation floor serves two purposes. First, it screens out many small firms that may neglect to 

supply relevant detail on their tax return. Second, the floor minimizes the impact from changes to Section 

179 expensing thresholds. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 increased the 

Section 179 expensing limit from $24,000 for tax year 2002 to $100,000 for tax year 2003 and $102,000 

for tax year 2004. Small firms eligible to use Section 179 expensing would not claim bonus depreciation 

because the treatment is less generous than full expensing. Although the depreciation floor eliminates 

most firms that claim Section 179 expensing, the final dataset does retain some of these firms.20 21 

Table 4 compares our dataset to the entire corporate population and the SOI corporate sample. 

For tax year 2004, 5.5 million corporations filed tax returns: 2.0 million C corporations and 3.5 million S 

corporations. The SOI corporate sample that is weighted to produce population totals includes 128,839 

firms: 78,746 C corporations and 50,093 S corporations. For tax year 2004, corporations claimed $168 

billion of bonus depreciation deductions. Although our dataset includes only five percent of firms from 

19 For tax year 2004, the top fifty C corporations ranked by eligible investment reported approximately one-third of 

total eligible investment for that entity type; the top one hundred firms reported approximately 46 percent of total 

eligible investment. 

20 The exclusion of these firms has a very minor effect on overall bonus take-up rates for both C and S corporations. 

21 See Knittel (2005) for a discussion of how small firms utilized Section 179 expensing and bonus depreciation for 

tax years 2002-2003. 
12

the corporate population (and 55 percent of firms from the SOI sample), it does capture approximately 95 

percent of total bonus deductions because it includes all large firms. 

A. Computation of Eligible Investment 

Firms claim depreciation allowances on Form 4562, Depreciation and Amortization, which 

accompanies the filing of corporate income tax Form 1120. On Form 4562, firms list the deduction 

attributable to bonus depreciation, regular MACRS deductions for assets placed in service during prior 

tax years, and regular MACRS deductions for assets place in service during the tax year just ended. Next 

to the deduction for new investment, firms report the basis for each class of property: 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20 

and 25-year property as well as residential and non-residential rental properties (tax life more than 25 

years). Because bonus depreciation is claimed first, reported basis amounts are net of any bonus 

depreciation. 

In order to gauge how intensively firms used bonus depreciation, we must compute total 

investment that is eligible for the additional deduction. Eligible investment includes investment in new 

equipment that has a tax life between three and twenty years. Most of the data necessary to make this 

computation are reported by firms on Form 4562. However, there are two notable exceptions. First, 

firms do not report how much of their current year investment is new (eligible) versus used (not eligible). 

The Annual Capital Expenditures Survey published by the Census Bureau indicates that approximately 

five percent of all equipment sales are purchases of used equipment. For the purposes of this analysis, we 

deflate our computed eligible investment figures by five percent to remove used assets. If this adjustment 

is overstated (understated), then it will imply that our estimates of bonus take-up rates are also overstated 

(understated). 

Second, although we use a screen to eliminate small firms from the dataset, reporting issues 

remain for some firms. A small number of firms report total depreciation but do not provide certain 

investment detail because the tax return will be amended and re-submitted at some later point. If the firm 

did not report any current year investment (i.e., basis amounts were blank), then we impute investment for 

these firms. For firms that claimed bonus depreciation, this computation was straightforward: we assume 
13

that eligible investment is equal to the grossed-up bonus deduction. For example, if the firm claimed 

$100 of bonus depreciation but did not report any eligible investment, then we assume that eligible 

investment was equal to $100 divided by 50 percent or $200 (for 2004). For firms that did not claim 

bonus depreciation, we impute an amount based on the reported total depreciation deduction for the year. 

Overall, this investment imputation increased total eligible investment by approximately 10 percent.22 

B. Bonus Depreciation: C Corporations 

Table 5 presents tabulations for C corporations for tax years 2002 – 2004 grouped based on tax 

year and bonus status (claim or do not claim). For tax year 2002, 61 percent of firms in our dataset 

claimed bonus depreciation (30 percent bonus effective for the entire tax year). Although the bonus 

allowance increased to 50 percent by tax year 2004, the share of firms claiming bonus fell slightly (59 

percent). The slight reduction in the participation rate was attributable to the increase in the Section 179 

expensing thresholds. Firms eligible to expense investments under the higher Section 179 thresholds did 

so rather than claim bonus depreciation. 

For tax years 2002-2004, computed eligible investment declined from $492 billion to $460 billion 

(-7 percent). For all tax years, bonus firms reported approximately 78 percent of total eligible investment. 

Bonus depreciation deductions increased from $80 billion for tax year 2002 to $140 billion for tax year 

2004 (76 percent). If the bonus depreciation deduction is grossed up by the relevant bonus factor, we 

derive the amount of investment that used bonus depreciation. For tax year 2002, the bonus factor is 

equal to 30 percent since that allowance was effective for nearly the entire tax year.23 For tax year 2003, 

the relevant bonus factor is less straightforward because some investment qualified for 30 percent bonus 

depreciation while other investment qualified for 50 percent bonus depreciation. We use a weighted 

22 Approximately 75 to 78 percent of eligible investment is investment in five or seven-year property. If a firm only 

invests in five-year property and investment is flat over a five-year period, then depreciation claimed in the fifth year 

would equal new investment in that year. If investment increases slightly over the five-year period, then investment 

would slightly exceed total depreciation claimed in the fifth year. For firms that do not provide investment detail, 

we assume that investment is equal to 80 percent of claimed depreciation. This ratio is generally consistent with 

firms that do report investment detail. 

23 The only exception is firms with tax years that end in May or June 2003 who made the investment after May 5, 

2003. Those firms could claim 50 percent bonus depreciation for that investment. Because the great majority of 

investment is reported by firms that have tax years that do not end in May or June, we assume those amounts are 

very small. 
14

average factor of 43.8 percent for tax year 2003.24 For tax year 2004, 50 percent bonus depreciation was 

effective for the entire tax year. 

Having computed the amount of investment that used bonus depreciation, we then derive bonus 

“take-up” rates. The bonus take-up rate is equal to the ratio of investment that used bonus to total eligible 

investment. Aggregate take-up rates for C corporations are as follows: 54 percent for tax year 2002, 58 

percent for tax year 2003 and 61 percent for tax year 2004. 

The aggregate take-up rate for all firms is a weighted average rate for bonus and non-bonus firms. 

Aggregate take-up rates are less than 100 percent because many firms did not claim bonus depreciation 

and some bonus firms did not fully use the provision. As shown by Table 5, take-up rates for bonus firms 

ranged from 71 to 77 percent; they are not 100 percent. The partial utilization of bonus depreciation 

might be attributable to a variety of factors. Firms might claim bonus depreciation only for certain classes 

of property, such as longer-lived property, where the cash flow benefit is greatest. Alternatively, firms 

might have subsidiaries that elected to claim bonus depreciation while other subsidiaries did not. Finally, 

it is possible that these firms had significant investment in used assets that is not eligible for bonus 

depreciation. For such firms, the five percent deflator we use for used equipment would be too small an 

adjustment and the firm would appear to underutilize the provision.25 

The tabulations from the bottom of Table 5 suggest two possible explanations as to why firms did 

not claim bonus depreciation. First, non-bonus firms were clearly less profitable (on a tax basis) 

compared to firms that claimed bonus depreciation. Average net income for bonus firms was 

considerably higher than non-bonus firms. As noted above, the cash flow benefit of bonus depreciation is 

smaller for loss firms because they cannot immediately use the accelerated deduction. Second, non-bonus 

24 For each tax year, corporate taxpayers can be divided into 12 groups based on the month their tax year ends. Each 

group will have a different number of months that 30 and 50 percent bonus was effective. For example, firms with 

tax years ending December 2003 had 30 percent bonus for 4 months and 50 percent bonus for 8 months, yielding an 

average of 43.3 percent. This average is computed for all twelve groups. Those amounts are then weighted by each 

group’s share of eligible investment for the tax year. We note that this computation assumes that investment is 

evenly distributed throughout the tax year. 

25 It is also possible that firms continued to claim bonus depreciation at 30 percent rather than 50 percent in tax years 

2003 and 2004. However, these firms still underutilize the provision. 
15

firms relied relatively more on other means to reduce or eliminate tax liability. For non-bonus firms, net 

operating loss deductions (NOLDs) and tax credits reduced tax liability by approximately 60 percent. For 

bonus firms, the comparable figure is 30 percent. Firms with stocks of unused credits or loss 

carryforwards have less incentive to claim bonus depreciation because the corresponding tax benefit is 

smaller. Bonus depreciation might simply displace a credit or loss carryforward that must now be 

claimed in a future tax year.26 

C. Bonus Depreciation: S Corporations 

Table 6 reproduces the tabulations from Table 5 for S corporations. The share of firms claiming 

bonus depreciation was flat from tax year 2002 to 2004 (71 versus 70 percent). S corporations claiming 

bonus depreciation reported approximately 80 percent of total eligible investment. Aggregate take-up 

rates ranged from 65 to 70 percent, slightly higher than C corporations. Bonus firms were generally 

larger (as measured by average eligible investment) and more profitable (as measured by average net 

income). 

D. Bonus Take-Up Rates Across Investment Classes 

Because temporary bonus depreciation has the greatest impact on cash flows for longer-lived 

property, one would expect that take-up rates increase with the tax life of the investment. Table 7 

displays bonus take-up rates across the six eligible classes of investment for C corporations. As noted, 

five and seven-year property comprise the majority of eligible investment; approximately 75-78 percent 

for all tax years. Five-year property includes cars, light and heavy general-purpose trucks, qualified 

technological equipment, semi-conductor manufacturing equipment, computers and peripheral equipment 

and office machinery. Seven-year property includes office furniture and equipment that is not structural 

in nature, assets used in commercial and contract carrying of passengers and freight by air, certain 

livestock and machinery and equipment used in agricultural activities. All remaining eligible investment 

26 In addition, some credits or loss carryforwards might expire if unused. Expiration is unlikely for loss 

carryforwards and general business credits as they expire after 20 years. However, this explanation may be pertinent 

for foreign tax credits, which expire after five years if unused. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 extends the 

carryforward period to 10 years for foreign tax credits arising in tax years after October 22, 2004. 
16

is composed of three-year property (certain software and rent-to-own property), ten-year property (vessels 

and barges, certain agricultural structures and trees or vines that bear nuts or fruits), fifteen-year property 

(telephone and telegraph equipment, gas facilities and certain engines and turbines) and twenty-year 

property (electric light and power facilities, railroads and farm structures). 

Similar to the overall average, take-up rates for each class of eligible investment increased 

between tax years 2002 and 2004. The data do not suggest a strong relationship between average take-up 

rates and the tax life of the investment. For all tax years, the average take-up rate for five-year property 

was slightly above the overall average. Conversely, the average take-up rate for fifteen-year and twentyyear property was below the overall average for two of three years. This result is likely attributable to the 

commingling of firms with different tax attributes within each investment class (e.g., the combination of 

profit and loss firms). 27 

E. Bonus Take-Up Rates Across Industries 

Compared to tabulations based on the tax life of the investment, average industry take-up rates 

reveal greater dispersion. Table 8 presents average take-up rates for 19 industries ranked in ascending 

order by that metric. Industries composed of small firms with low average levels of investment 

(agriculture, real estate and rental (excludes autos), and construction) tend to have lower take-up rates 

compared to industries where investment is heavily concentrated in a few large firms (utilities, 

information-telecommunications and transportation equipment manufacturing). This result is intuitive 

because firms must incur fixed costs to claim bonus depreciation, such as learning how the provision 

works and alterations to firm-specific tax software programs.28 If the firm is a multi-state firm, then any 

fixed costs might be higher because many states decoupled from bonus depreciation and disallowed it for 

27 To derive the splits used in Table 7, it is necessary to attribute the bonus deduction to the tax class from which it 

arose. Firms do not report explicitly the investment composition of the bonus deduction reported on the tax return; 

only the total bonus deduction is reported. For the purposes of the computations in Table 7, we assume that bonus 

depreciation is apportioned in a manner similar to the residual basis amounts that firms do report on Form 4562 for 

each property class. For example, if 20 percent of the total residual basis (post-bonus) was attributable to 7-year 

property, we assume the same split for bonus depreciation. 

28 In addition, firm size could serve as a proxy for sophistication. Large firms have tax departments that are wellinformed regarding all new tax provisions. By contrast, small firms may not have personnel dedicated solely to tax 

issues. 
17

state income tax purposes. For many multi-state firms, it may have been necessary to compute tax 

depreciation both with and without the bonus allowance on a state-by-state basis. Data from the 

Commerce Clearing House show that only 14 out of 46 states with a corporate income tax fully 

conformed to the federal provision. Of the non-conforming states, 21 states completely disallowed bonus 

depreciation and 11 states required taxpayers to add back some portion of the bonus deduction. 

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 

This paper examines the corporate response to bonus depreciation for tax years 2002-2004. We 

find that corporate take-up rates ranged from 54 to 61 percent for C corporations and 65 to 70 percent for 

S corporations. Take-up rates rose only slightly when the bonus factor increased from 30 to 50 percent. 

An interesting result is that we did not observe a stronger relationship between take-up rates and average 

tax life of investment. Even for utilities where eligible investment has an average tax life of 16.6 years, 

the bonus take-up rate for tax year 2004 was only 67 percent.29 

We discuss several plausible explanations for why C corporations opted to forgo bonus 

depreciation. For some firms, bonus depreciation may have afforded little, if any, benefit. Specifically, 

loss firms, firms with loss or credit carryforwards and firms that generate new credits may realize little 

cash flow benefit. A closer inspection of large non-bonus firms (firms with eligible investment exceeding 

$1 billion) for tax year 2004 reveals that nearly all firms reported a tax loss or used a loss carryforward or 

foreign tax credit to eliminate tax liability. Due to their complexity and relatively short life (five years), 

firms may have been reluctant to displace a foreign tax credit with temporary bonus depreciation. We 

also noted that most states disallowed bonus depreciation for state income tax purposes. Although we 

cannot quantify the impact of those actions, they likely reduced bonus take-up rates. 

Despite these explanations, there remain inexplicable cases of non-bonus firms that have 

significant tax liabilities. While the reasons for this outcome are not immediately clear, it is consistent 

29 For utilities, one explanation for the lower-than-expected bonus take-up rate could be the interaction with rate-ofreturn regulation. Bonus depreciation would alter expected or projected tax payments and possibly affect the 

formula for determining a utility’s revenue requirement. 
18

with the corporate response to the implementation of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system in 

1971. The Revenue Act of 1971 provided a range of asset lives for various classes of assets placed in 

service after December 1970. The Revenue Act of 1971 allowed firms to use shorter asset lives than 

provided for under prior law. Although more generous depreciation allowances were made available, 

Vasquez (1974) found that many firms elected not to use the ADR system and instead used less generous 

schedules that decreased the present value of deductions. Even among large firms, Vasquez found that 

only 63 percent of firms elected to use the ADR system. Similar to our results, Vasquez found higher 

utilization rates for industries dominated by large firms with longer-lived property. 

What lessons can be inferred from these data? This analysis suggests that the bonus factor was 

not high enough to induce firms with two-fifths of corporate investment to improve their cash flow by 

deferring tax liability to a future year. The bonus factor may not have been high enough to offset loss 

status, credits and loss carryforwards that may dampen the appeal of temporary accelerated depreciation. 

This fact is especially relevant if the policy is used when the economy is emerging from recession, as 

many large firms will have generated stocks of loss and credit carryforwards. 

In addition to the bonus factor, another key parameter of temporary investment stimulus is the 

length of the time that accelerated depreciation is made available. Tax data are less helpful in assessing 

this parameter. Bonus depreciation spanned three and one-quarter years from September 11, 2001 to 

December 31, 2004.30 It is not clear whether bonus depreciation would have been more or less effective 

if allowed for a shorter time interval. Despite the uncertainty, policymakers should be aware that 

providing firms with too much time to react to temporary investment stimulus could dilute its impact. In 

order to realize the full immediate benefit of temporary investment stimulus, investment that will be 

“pulled forward” from future time periods when stimulus is not available should occur sooner rather than 

later. If the temporary provision is available over a number of years, then this pull forward effect could 

be delayed. 

30 However, bonus depreciation was applied retroactively to investment made between September 2001 and March 

2002. 
19 

REFERENCES 

Brazell, David W., and Mackie, James B. “Depreciation Lives and Methods: Current Issues in the U.S. 

Capital Cost Recovery System.” National Tax Journal 53 No. 3 (June 1991): 531-561. 

Cohen, Darrel S., Hansen, Dorthe-Pernille and Hassett, Kevin A. “The Effects of Temporary Partial 

Expensing on Investment Incentives in the United States.” National Tax Journal 55 No. 3 (September, 

2002): 457 – 466. 

Cohen, Darrel and Cummins, Jason. “A Retrospective Evaluation of the Effects of Temporary Partial 

Expensing.” Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C., No. 

2006-19. 

Fullerton, Don. “The Indexation of Interest, Depreciation, and Capital Gains: A Model of Investment 

Incentives.” NBER Working Paper No. 1655. June 1985. 

Gravelle, Jane E. “Whither Tax Depreciation.” National Tax Journal 54 No. 3 (September, 2002): 513 – 

526. 

Hall, Robert E., and Dale W. Jorgensen. “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior.” American Economic 

Review 57 No. 3 (June, 1967): 391-414. 

Hulten, Charles R., and Frank C. Wykoff. “The Measurement of Economic Depreciation.” In 

Depreciation, Inflation and the Taxation of Income from Capital, edited by Charles R. Hulten. 

Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1981. 

Knittel, Matthew. “Small Business Utilization of Accelerated Tax Depreciation: Section 179 Expensing 

and Bonus Depreciation.” Proceedings of the National Tax Journal, Ninety-Eighth Annual Conference, 

Fall 2005, p. 273 – 286. 

Vasquez, Thomas. “The Effects of the Asset Depreciation Range System on Depreciation Practices.” 

OTA Working Paper 1, May 1974. Office of Tax Analysis, US Department of Treasury. 
Table 1: Regular MACRS and Bonus Depreciation Schedules 

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 201

Regular MACRS Depreciation Schedule (half-year convention) 3 yr property 33.3 44.5 14.8 7.4 5 yr property 20.0 32.0 19.2 11.5 11.5 5.8 7 yr property 14.3 24.5 17.5 12.5 8.9 8.9 8.9 4.5 10 yr property 10.0 18.0 14.4 11.5 9.2 7.4 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 3.3 15 yr property 5.0 9.5 8.6 7.7 6.9 6.2 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 20 yr property 3.8 7.2 6.7 6.2 5.7 5.3 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 Modified Schedule with 30 Percent Bonus Depreciation 3 yr property 53.3 31.1 10.4 5.2 5 yr property 44.0 22.4 13.4 8.1 8.1 4.0 7 yr property 40.0 17.1 12.2 8.7 6.3 6.2 6.3 3.1 10 yr property 37.0 12.6 10.1 8.1 6.5 5.2 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 2.3 15 yr property 33.5 6.7 6.0 5.4 4.9 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 20 yr property 32.6 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 Modified Schedule with 50 Percent Bonus Depreciation 3 yr property 66.7 22.2 7.4 3.7 5 yr property 60.0 16.0 9.6 5.8 5.8 2.9 7 yr property 57.1 12.2 8.7 6.2 4.5 4.5 4.5 2.2 10 yr property 55.0 9.0 7.2 5.8 4.6 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 1.6 15 yr property 52.5 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 20 yr property 51.9 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Note: Depreciation for twenty-year property continues for an additional five years. 
Table 2: Cost of Capital and Marginal Effective Tax Rates 

Present Value of Deduction (1) Cost of Capital Marginal Effe

Tax Life MACRS 30% Bonus 50% Bonus MACRS 30% Bonus 50% Bonus MACRS 30% 

3 year 93.2 94.3 95.0 4.9% 4.7% 4.5% 28.7% 255 year 89.0 91.4 92.9 4.8% 4.5% 4.3% 26.8% 227 year 85.0 88.6 90.9 4.8% 4.5% 4.3% 27.5% 22

10 year 79.5 84.7 88.2 4.8% 4.5% 4.2% 26.7% 2115 year 67.4 76.3 82.1 4.8% 4.4% 4.2% 26.3% 2020 year 60.0 71.1 78.4 5.0% 4.6% 4.3% 29.5% 23

(1) Assumes discount rate of 6.5 percent. 
Table 3: Cash Flow Benefit from Bonus Depreciation 

$1 million eligible investment, 50 percent bonus depreciation 

Immediate Delay Delay 

Tax Class Use (1) One Year Two Years 

3-year property 6,400 2,900 700 5-year property 13,700 9,500 4,700 7-year property 20,700 16,200 10,100 10-year property 30,400 25,700 18,500 15-year property 51,500 46,600 38,000 20-year property 64,500 59,500 50,600 (1) Assumes discount rate of 6.5 percent. 
Table 4: Corporate Tax Data 

tax years, billions of dollars 

2002 2003 

All Firms All C Corps S Corps All C Corps S Corps A

Number Firms 5,254,451 2,100,074 3,154,377 5,389,199 2,047,593 3,341,606 5,54Number Sample Firms (unweighted) 127,439 80,007 47,432 123,967 78,407 45,560 12Bonus Depreciation Deductions 96 82 14 134 114 20 Corporate Tax After Credits 153 153 0 177 177 0 Dataset: Firms with Depreciation > $100,000 Number Firms 254,118 129,680 124,438 262,355 137,295 125,060 25Number Sample Firms (unweighted) 69,008 44,750 24,258 67,848 44,031 23,817 6Bonus Depreciation Deductions 90 80 10 128 112 16 Corporate Tax After Credits 142 141 0 166 165 0 Dataset Share Number Firms 5% 6% 4% 5% 7% 4% Number Sample Firms (unweighted) 54% 56% 51% 55% 56% 52% Bonus Depreciation Deductions 94% 98% 74% 96% 98% 80% Corporate Tax After Credits 92% 92% 90% 94% 94% 83% 
Table 5: Tax Data for C Corporations 

tax years, billions of dollars 

All Firms 

2002 2003 2004 

Number Firms 129,680 137,295 133,158 

Firms Claiming Bonus Fi

2002 2003 2004 20

79,638 80,996 77,957 50

Eligible Investment (1) 492 449 460 373 353 367 Bonus Depreciation 80 112 140 

Bonus Factor 30% 44% 50% 

Investment Using Bonus 265 257 280 

Bonus Take-Up Rate (2) 54% 58% 61% 

80 112 140 

30% 44% 50% 

265 257 280 

71% 73% 77% 

Net Income 265 454 

Positive Net Income 617 719 Negative Net Income -352 -266 

705 326 462 630 

911 476 567 715 

-206 -150 -105 -84 

Tax After Credits 141 165 210 119 143 180 Average Levels (millions)

 Eligible Investment (1) 3.8 3.3 

Net Income 2.0 3.3 Tax After Credits 1.1 1.2 

3.5 4.7 4.4 4.7 

5.3 4.1 5.7 8.1 

1.6 1.5 1.8 2.3 

(1) Assumes used equipment comprises 5 percent of total equipment investment. (2) When computing bonus take-up rates, we exclude eligible investment that used Section 179 expensing because that 

 prior to bonus depreciation. Section 179 deductions for firms included in our dataset were as follows: $0.6 billion (200 and $4.2 billion (2004). 
Table 6: Tax Data for S Corporations 

tax years, billions of dollars 

All Firms 

2002 2003 2004 

Number Firms 124,438 125,060 124,178 

Firms Claiming Bonus Fir

2002 2003 2004 200

88,265 82,622 86,785 36

Eligible Investment (1) 53 58 67 40 46 55 Bonus Depreciation 10 16 23 

Bonus Factor 30% 44% 50% 

Investment Using Bonus 34 36 45 

Bonus Take-Up Rate (2) 65% 65% 70% 

10 16 23 

30% 44% 50% 3

34 36 45 

86% 84% 87% 

Net Income 59 64 

Positive Net Income 82 87 Negative Net Income -23 -23 

83 55 57 72 

106 69 71 88 

-23 -14 -15 -15 

Average Levels (millions)

 Eligible Investment (1) 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 

 Net Income 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 

(1) Assumes used equipment comprises 5 percent of total equipment investment. (2) When computing bonus take-up rates, we exclude eligible investment that used Section 179 expensing because that 

 prior to bonus depreciation. Section 179 deductions for firms included in our dataset were as follows: $0.6 billion (20 and $3.2 billion (2004). 
Table 7: Bonus Take-Up Rates Across Eligible Investments 

tax years, C corporations only 

Tax Class 2002 2003 2004 

3-year property 56% 58% 62% 5-year property 58% 61% 64% 7-year property 50% 51% 54% 10-year property 44% 49% 55% 15-year property 49% 56% 64% 20-year property 42% 55% 64% Weighted Average 54% 58% 61% 
6.6 4.8% 28.0 

Deduction Share Investment L

Table 8: Bonus Take-Up Rates Across Industries 

tax year 2004, C corporations only 

Industry Aver

Bonus Eligible T

NAICS Industry 

1 agriculture 0.5 0.4% 0.4 2 finance - insurance 1.7 1.2% 5.2 3 real estate and rental - except autos 2.4 1.7% 1.3 4 manufacturing, except transportation equipment 25.8 18.4% 4.5 5 transportation and warehousing 6.3 4.5% 3.7 6 construction 1.7 1.2% 0.4 7 information - except telecommunications 3.9 2.8% 4.9 8 repair / personal / other services 0.3 0.2% 0.5 9 professional services (legal, accounting) 1.9 1.3% 0.8 

10 mining 3.2 2.3% 5.5 11 accomodations and food service 2.3 1.7% 2.7 12 administrative services and health care 3.8 2.7% 1.1 13 banks / thrifts / credit intermediaries 12.6 9.0% 6.5 14 utilities 15.9 11.4% 72.4 15 information - telecommunications 13.2 9.4% 30.1 16 retail 4.7 3.4% 6.0 17 wholesale 16.0 11.4% 2.3 18 manufacturing - transportation equipment 17.0 12.2% 34.5 19 real estate and rental - autos only 

All Firms 139.9 100.0% 3.6