* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-31271

Summary Calendar

KENNETH R. DEROUEN,

Plaintiff.

versus

TAYLOR ENERGY CO.,

Defendant.

TAYLOR ENERGY CO.,

Third-party Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SOUTHWEST FABRICATORS, INC.; RIUNIONE ADRIATICA DI SICURTA; and

ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI, S.P.A.,

Third-party Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(Civ. No. 6:95-1110)

July 10, 1997

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*
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Taylor Energy Co. appeals from the district court’s entry of

judgment for third-party defendants Southwest Fabricators, Riunione

Adriatica Di Sicurta, and Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A.

(collectively “the Defendants”) on Taylor’s indemnity claim.

Taylor had moved for summary judgment claiming an absence of

genuine issues of material fact as to the application of the

Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (LOAIA). While the

Defendants opposed the motion, they did not file their own crossmotion for summary judgment. The district court nevertheless

determined that judgment should be entered in favor of the

Defendants and that Taylor would not be prejudiced thereby. Taylor

asserts that the court’s entry of summary judgment was

inappropriate for three reasons: the court’s construction of the

LOAIA was incorrect; there was insufficient evidence in the record

for its conclusion; and the court improperly entered summary

judgment sua sponte.

We first consider whether the district court erred in

concluding the contract “pertained to a well,” thereby making

applicable the anti-indemnity provisions of Louisiana law. The

LOAIA renders void indemnity agreements which protect the principal

against its own fault at the expense of a contractor if the

indemnity provisions are part of an agreement pertaining to an oil

or gas well. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2780(A). The question of

whether a contract “pertains to a well” is no stranger to us,
3

having been the subject of numerous cases. E.g., Transcontinental

Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985 (5th

Cir. 1992). The district court determined that the LOAIA applied

for a number of reasons, one of them being on authority of our

decision in Broussard v. Conoco, Inc., 959 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1992).

Broussard involved a contract to provide food service to production

workers on a platform adjacent to a production platform. We

concluded that the purpose of the contract was to sustain manpower

for production, thereby supplying the required “functional nexus.”

Id. at 44-45. Here, likewise, Southwest provided employees who

performed work on the platform’s living quarters. Our recent

decision in Roberts v. Energy Dev. Corp., 104 F.3d 782 (5th Cir.

1997), bolsters our conclusion. We held in Roberts that a contract

to provide safety equipment on a platform “pertained to a well”

because it assisted in sustaining the manpower and equipment on the

site. The record here indicates that Southwest employees worked on

the platform’s fire water protection system. We agree with the

district court that the LOAIA renders unenforceable the indemnity

provision of Taylor’s contract with Southwest.

Taylor also argues that, regardless of the district court’s

construction of the LOAIA, it erred by assuming facts not in

evidence. The Key is the question of whether the information

contained on the delivery tickets indicates that Southwest

performed the work the district court found it did. Having
4

reviewed this evidence, we conclude the district court did not err

in relying upon it.

Taylor finally complains it had no notice that the district

court was prepared to consider summary judgment in favor of the

Defendants and that its consequent granting of judgment was

improper. A district court need not wait for the filing of a

cross-motion under Rule 56 before entering a summary judgment in

favor of a non-movant. See McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d

1085, 1088 (5th Cir. 1991); Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600, 618

(5th Cir. 1988); 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2720 (“the practice of allowing summary judgment to be

entered for the nonmoving party in the absence of a formal crossmotion is appropriate” and “in keeping with the objective of Rule

56 to expedite the disposition of cases.”) A court must be careful,

however, that the original movant has had an adequate opportunity

to show that there is a genuine issue and that the non-movant is

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Because Taylor’s

motion centered on the applicability of the LOAIA and the court

granted judgment on that same issue, there can be no question that

Taylor was in any way prejudiced. Taylor’s reliance upon our

decision in Washington v. Resolution Trust Corp., 68 F.3d 935, 939

(5th Cir. 1995), is misplaced. In that case the district court

entered a summary judgment on an issue that the losing party was

not prepared to address. Here, by contrast, the issue ruled upon
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was the same one briefed by Taylor in its own motion. The issue

was properly before the court and ripe for adjudication.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on Taylor’s indemnity

claim.

AFFIRMED.