IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0945

Filed July 24, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DERONTA MICHAEL JAMISON JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Joel W. Barrows, 

Judge.

Defendant appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to second-degree 

robbery. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Deronta Jamison Jr. appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to 

second-degree robbery. We conclude Jamison was not entitled to an 

individualized hearing to consider the factors associated with juvenile offenders 

because no minimum sentence was imposed. We also determine the court did not 

abuse its discretion in sentencing Jamison to a term of imprisonment. Accordingly, 

we affirm Jamison’s sentence.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

In October 2022, when Jamison was seventeen years old, he and an 

associate went into a store in Davenport wearing masks. One of the two produced 

a handgun and demanded all the money from the cash register. They also took 

several game consoles. Photographs of some of the stolen property were found 

on Jamison’s phone, as well as evidence that he attempted to sell the game 

consoles. 

The State charged Jamison with robbery in the first degree. He entered into 

a plea agreement where he agreed to plead guilty to the lesser-included offense 

of second-degree robbery, in violation of Iowa Code section 711.3 (2022). This 

was an open plea, and the parties were free to make any recommendation at 

sentencing. Jamison admitted the minutes of testimony were true and correct. 

The court accepted Jamison’s guilty plea.

The presentence investigation report (PSI) noted that Jamison was on 

probation in Illinois at the time of the offense.1 About the current offense, Jamison 

1 Jamison had a juvenile adjudication in Illinois and was placed on probation there.
3

stated, “I was feeling desperate for money. I went in GameStop and threatened 

the cashier. I took the money and I ran.” The PSI recommended incarceration, 

stating that on assessment, “[t]he defendant scored in the moderate category for 

future violence and the moderate/high category for future victimization.”

At the sentencing hearing, held on May 31, 2023, the district court stated, 

“Because of the fact that Mr. Jamison was seventeen at the time of this offense, 

mandatory incarceration is not required, and in addition, the mandatory minimum 

could not be imposed without an independent Miller[2]factors hearing.” The plea 

agreement recited that the State would cap its minimum prison sentence request 

at five years. But at the sentencing hearing, the State informed the court that it 

was not intending to seek a mandatory minimum sentence and would forgo a Miller

factors hearing. Based on this concession, a separate Miller hearing was not 

conducted. 

The State recommended “a ten-year indeterminate sentence with no 

mandatory minimum.” Defense counsel recommended a deferred judgment and 

probation. The court sentenced Jamison to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 

ten years. Jamison now appeals his sentence for the offense of second-degree 

robbery.

3

2

In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court ruled the Eighth 

Amendment prohibited a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole 

for children. 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).

3 Under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3), a defendant who pleads guilty is 

generally barred from appealing absent good cause. State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 

455 n.2 (Iowa 2024). “[T]he good-cause requirement is satisfied in this context 

when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to 

in the plea bargain.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020). Jamison 

is appealing his sentence and has therefore demonstrated good cause to appeal.
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II. Sentencing

A. Jamison contends the district court should have held a hearing on

the Miller factors. A court must hold “an individualized sentencing hearing if it is 

contemplating imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on a juvenile offender.” 

State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 386 (Iowa 2020). He claims the court’s failure 

to conduct such a hearing was unconstitutional. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 

378, 402 (Iowa 2014) (finding it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile offender 

to a mandatory prison sentence without the possibility of parole). We review 

constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 

107, 113 (Iowa 2013).

In State v. Propps, the Iowa Supreme Court held a juvenile defendant was 

not entitled to a Miller hearing where the sentence for a criminal offense has no 

mandatory minimum period of incarceration and the defendant is immediately 

eligible for parole. 897 N.W.2d 91, 101 (Iowa 2017). The court stated:

Completely eliminating the mandatory imposition of a prison term, 

even when the term is indeterminate and the individual is 

immediately eligible for parole, would not serve the proportionality 

concept we have addressed in our previous juvenile sentencing 

cases. In those cases, we sought to eliminate the mandatory nature 

of mandatory minimums and sentences that were the functional 

equivalent of life without parole because those sentences did not 

offer juveniles a “meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate their 

rehabilitation before the parole board. See, e.g., Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 

at 402–03; [State v.] Null, 836 N.W.2d [41,] 75 [(Iowa 2013)]; [State 

v.] Pearson, 836 N.W.2d [88,] 97 [(Iowa 2013)]; Ragland, 836 

N.W.2d at 121. Our goal was not to excuse the behavior of juveniles, 

but rather to impose punishment in a way that was consistent with 

the lesser culpability and greater capacity for change of juvenile 

offenders. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 398, 402–03; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 75 

(“[W]hile youth is a mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an 

excuse.”). . . .

This is in stark contrast to the situation presented here. In this 

case, Propps was immediately eligible for parole and able to 
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demonstrate by his own actions his maturation and rehabilitation. 

When a one-size-fits-all mandatory minimum is imposed, an arbitrary 

amount of time spent in prison dictates when a juvenile will be 

released. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122. In contrast, when 

an indeterminate sentence is given that contains no mandatory 

minimum sentence and allows a juvenile to be immediately eligible 

for parole, the juvenile defendant’s behavior in prison dictates when 

parole will be available—with the potential for immediate parole if 

rehabilitation, maturity, and reform have been demonstrated.

Id.

Jamison claims that the holding in Propps does not apply here because, 

under section 901.5(3), the court could have imposed a prison sentence with a

mandatory minimum time of incarceration. He asserts that “unlike the juvenile 

defendant in Propps, Jamison was subjected to a potential mandatory minimum 

period of incarceration for the robbery in the second-degree charge when he 

entered his plea of guilty pursuant to the plea agreement.” He contends that the 

court should have held an individualized sentencing hearing to consider the factors 

outlined in Miller and the relevant mitigating factors of youth.

We note first that while Jamison refers to the possibility of a mandatory 

minimum sentence, the applicable code section provides the sentencing court 

discretion as to whether to impose a determinate minimum period of incarceration. 

Had the district court imposed a minimum period of incarceration, it would have 

been a discretionary minimum, rather than a mandatory minimum sentence. See 

State v. Howard, No. 14-1549, 2016 WL 4051322, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27, 

2015) (discussing and distinguishing Lyle from a “discretionary minimum”). 

In State v. Crooks, the district court could have imposed a minimum 

sentence, but it expressly declined to consider this possibility. 911 N.W.2d 153, 

173 (Iowa 2018). The Iowa Supreme Court concluded, “Under Propps, no hearing 
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on the Miller/Lyle factors was required to sentence Crooks to prison with immediate 

eligibility for parole.” Id.; accord State v. Shade, No. 17-1541, 2018 WL 3654856, 

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2018) (“More recently, the supreme court concluded 

the district court was not required to conduct a Miller hearing where the juvenile 

defendant could have been subject to a minimum sentence but where the district 

court declined to impose a minimum sentence.” (citing Crooks, 911 N.W.2d at 

173)). In Shade, “the district court declined to impose a minimum sentence and 

instead made the defendant immediately eligible for parole.” 2018 WL 3654856, 

at *2.

We conclude Jamison was not entitled to a hearing on the Miller factors. At 

the start of the sentencing hearing, the State indicated it was not requesting that 

the court impose a minimum term of incarceration. The court then determined, 

“since the State is not putting on Miller factors evidence, that’s not an issue.” As 

in Crooks and Shade, because the court declined to impose a minimum sentence, 

no Miller hearing was required. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d at 173; Shade, 2018 

WL 3654856, at *2.

B. Jamison also contends the district court abused its discretion by 

sentencing him to a term of imprisonment. He claims the court should have 

considered the Miller factors when determining an appropriate sentence.4 When 

a sentence is within statutory limits, we review the court’s sentencing decision for 

4 The Miller factors consists of the age of the offender and the features of youthful 

behavior; the particular family and home environment that surround the youth; the 

circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role in the commission of 

the crime; the challenges for youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal 

process; and the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change. 567 U.S. 

at 477–78. 
7

an abuse of discretion. Majors, 940 N.W.2d at 385. “[O]ur task on appeal is not 

to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was 

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 387 (citation omitted).

Jamison has the burden to show the court abused its discretion. See Crooks, 911 

N.W.2d at 171.

Although we have determined Jamison was not entitled to a hearing to 

consider the Miller factors, “a sentencing court is to consider any mitigating 

circumstances relating to a defendant,” including “the circumstances of youth and, 

specifically, any applicable Miller/Lyle factors.” See id. at 173 (citations omitted). 

Once the sentencing court declines to impose a minimum period of incarceration 

without parole, the Miller/Lyle factors remain relevant in considering the remaining 

sentencing options, along with all other mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 

Yet the court is not required to specifically examine and apply each factor on the 

record at this point. It considers all relevant factors in exercising its discretion to 

select the proper sentencing option. We may find an abuse of discretion “[i]f a 

sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received 

significant weight.” Id. “[T]he failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing 

circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered.” State v. Boltz, 

542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).

The PSI recited Jamison’s criminal history and facts concerning his 

childhood. The PSI also noted that Jamison was placed on probation for an 

offense only two months prior to the current offense. 

At the sentencing hearing, the court stated:
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The reasons for the sentence: I’m certainly cognizant of Mr. 

Jamison’s age, but this was an extremely serious offense. Because 

of—because of the nature of the offense, his criminal history, for 

purposes of protection of the community, and because of the

recommendation of the PSI author, those are the reasons the Court 

is imposing the sentence in this case.

The court considered Jamison’s youth when imposing sentence along with 

other relevant sentencing factors. We find the court’s decision was not 

“unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” See Majors, 940 N.W.2d at 387. 

Jamison participated in an armed robbery. “Robbery, especially armed robbery, 

requires the use of force and is ‘so inherently dangerous’ that participating in it as 

the principal or aider and abettor in the manner that [defendant] did carries with it 

an undeniable prospect of grave harm to the life of others.” State v. Harrison, 914 

N.W.2d 178, 196 (Iowa 2018) (citing Conner v. State, 362 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa 

1985)).

While the reasons stated by the district court are brief and do not specifically 

address the Miller/Lyle factors other than Jamison’s age, the statement does not 

prevent appellate review. “A terse and succinct statement is sufficient provided 

that the brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent appellate review of the 

exercise of the trial court's sentencing discretion.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 

402, 408 (Iowa 2015). 

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing 

Jamison to a term of imprisonment.

AFFIRMED.