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the Iranian

PUZZLE Piece

Understanding Iran in the Global Context

Marine Corps University 

Quantico, Vi rgi nia

2009

Edited by Amin Tarzi
ii 

Marine Corps University Press

3079 Moreell Avenue

Quantico, Virginia

22134

1st Printing, 2009

Note on Transliteration

In this work, an attempt has been made to simplify transliteration 

of non-Latin terms and names. As such, the system does not strictly 

follow any of the standard transliteration systems commonly in use 

in academic works in the United States. With exception of some 

proper names, the use of diacritical marks has been limited to few 

cases. Moreover, in this work, the Arabic and Persian consonant is not 

transliterated; however, the vowel that is attached to the consenant has 

been represented by that vowel. For example, Ali, not ‘Ali; or Masud, 

not Mas’ud. When terms of Arabic origin are used in reference of Iran, 

the Persian transliteration has been adopted, such as mojahedin, not 

mujahidin; or sayyed, not sayyid.

Terms and names which have become Anglicized in major dictionaries 

of the English language, such as “Quran,” are not transliterated. 

Likewise, terms such as “mullah” are used in place of “mulla.” Names 

which have common usage but are not transliterated are used in their 

familiarized form, such as Saddam Hussein.
iii 

Contents

Note on Transliteration..................................................................ii 

Foreword

By Major General Donald R. Gardner, USMC (Ret)....................................v

Introduction

By Amin Tarzi............................................................................................1

Chapter One: Iran Under Ahmadinejad

By Ali M. Ansari.......................................................................................11

Chapter Two: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, 

About What, and How?

By Karim Sadjadpour................................................................................21

Chapter Three: When U.S.-Iranian Negotiations Start: A Primer

By Ronald E. Neumann.............................................................................39

Chapter Four: The Iranian Nuclear Issue

By Simon Shercliff......................................................................................49

Chapter Five: Iran’s Policies and Iraq

By Mohsen M. Milani...............................................................................57

Chapter Six: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception

By Gerald M. Steinberg..............................................................................71

Epilogue: The 2009 Iranian Presidential Election 

and Its Implications

By Karim Sadjadpour................................................................................83

Glossary.........................................................................................91

Acknowledgments.........................................................................97

Contributors ...............................................................................100

Index............................................................................................102

Illustrations

Map of Iran.....................................................................................iv

Iranian Power Structure................................................................10
iv 
v 

Foreword

Major General (Ret) Donald R. Gardner

This book contains the collected work from “The Iranian Puzzle 

Piece: Understanding Iran in the Global Context.” This one-day 

international symposium, held at Marine Corps University (MCU), 

was cohosted by MCU and the Marine Corps University Foundation 

and was coordinated by the Marine Corps University’s Middle East 

Studies (MES) that was established in 2007. 

MCU is a world-class educational institution focused on the art and 

science of war and is fully engaged in and dedicated to its students’ 

professional military education. Through educational forums like the 

“Iranian Puzzle Piece,” MCU develops the professional competence 

of Marines and other leaders. Knowledge can be a powerful weapon 

for the 21st-century Marine. It was under this prerogative that MCU 

initiated the MES to help educate and prepare the next generation of 

leaders and war-fighters for the missions ahead. 

The purpose of MES is to broaden the understanding of the Middle 

East and to assess emerging issues in the region that affect the 

Department of Defense, specifically the Marine Corps. The MES

focused its initial efforts on Iran, providing a balanced assessment of 

Iran in terms of all diplomatic, information, military, and economic 

areas of influence. The MES supports the University and the Marine 

Corps by conducting lectures, seminars, and briefings on Iran and its 

foreign policy.

The symposium from which these essays originated offered a forum 

to enhance the overall understanding of Iran, exploring its internal 

dynamics, regional perspectives, and extra-regional factors and 

examining its near-term political and strategic options and their 

potential impact on the United States and the Marine Corps. This 

event joined together colleagues from the Armed Services, joint, 
Foreword

vi 

interagency, coalition partners, and security communities and explored 

various perspectives to help develop an understanding of the role 

played by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the global community.

I would sincerely like to thank our distinguished authors and speakers 

whose expertise and insight made the “Iranian Puzzle Piece” an 

absolute success and this timely publication possible.

Donald R. Gardner

Major General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

President Emeritus, Marine Corps University
1 

Introduction

Amin Tarzi

The legendary period of Persian history begins far back in the mists 

of time. It is the custom to assume that legend means fiction; but historians are now beginning to perceive that the legends of a nation 

are often not only more interesting and poetic than what is called 

its authentic history, but that they really suggest actual facts, while 

nothing can be more fascinating than the study of such legends. No 

country has more attractive legends than Persia; and to judge from 

them we cannot avoid the conclusion that no nation now existing 

has such a continuous vitality as the old land of Cyrus and Xerxes.

Samuel G. W. Benjamin

First U.S. Minister to Persia1

The Islamic Republic of Iran, birthed from the legendary Persian Empire, remains the complex blend of fact and narrative described 

by Benjamin in 1902. It is this complexity that shapes Iranian national 

identity, policies, and strategies and defines its relations with others. 

The web of fact and fiction; history and legend; reality and perception 

bodes well for poetry, but it presents a challenge for political decision 

making in an international arena where waters are already muddied. 

A symposium at Marine Corps University, “The Iranian Puzzle Piece: 

Understanding Iran in the Global Context,” held in September 2008, 

sought to clarify the waters—to examine the “puzzle piece” labeled 

Iran and understand how it fits into the larger, global puzzle. Out of 

that symposium came these papers, which provide insight into the 

multifaceted nature of Iran and its regime, examine the feasibility and 

possible outcomes of official engagement of the regime, and discuss 

the domestic, regional, and international implications of Iran’s

nuclear ambitions.

1. Samuel G. W. Benjamin, The Story of Persia (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 

1902), 1.
Introduction

2 

It is the pursuit of nuclear technology that has catapulted Iran to center 

stage. Escalated tensions in the region as well as internationally have 

prompted calls for engagement and, at the same time, stern warnings 

and sanctions. How the game plays out determines if this becomes 

a potential conflict flashpoint or if Iran becomes a responsible, 

transforming partner in the region and beyond. To ensure the latter 

instead of the former requires a deep understanding of Iran’s power 

structures and the grievances that thwart rapprochement to determine 

with whom and about what to speak, a thorough analysis of the Iran’s 

nuclear posture to avoid premature detonation of this explosive issue, 

and an appreciation for Iran’s potential in the region to influence its 

choices to positive ends.

With Whom to Talk?

In his chapter on dialogue between the United States and Iran, Karim 

Sadjadpour argues the futility of the isolationist position but recognizes 

the challenges facing the United States in discerning with whom or 

which center of power to engage. The overlapping and complicated 

power structure of the Islamic Republic was intentionally designed in 

1979 to obfuscate lines of authority and ensure no single entity became 

powerful enough to bend to foreign pressure, resulting in a myriad of 

power centers, none with supreme authority. While decision-making 

processes remain ambiguous, both Sadjadpour and Mohsen M. Milani, 

in his chapter on Iran’s policy toward Iraq, maintain that the Supreme 

Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Hoseyni Khamenei has the most power 

within the Iranian political structure; however, both note that he may 

not act in isolation like Iran’s last monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah 

Pahlavi, whose reign ended with the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 

Khamenei’s role in the controversial presidential election held on 12 

June 2009 has further complicated this discussion. The election pitted 

three candidates against the incumbent, Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Other 

candidates included Mir-Hoseyn Musavi, a former prime minister; 

Mohsen Rezaei, a former commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard 

Corps; and Mehdi Karrubi, former speaker of the Iranian parliament 
Amin Tarzi

3 

(Majles). Preelection predictions were that if Khamenei stayed neutral 

and did not intervene on behalf of his protégé Ahmadinejad, Musavi 

would win. However, as pointed out by Ali M. Ansari in his chapter 

on Ahmadinejad, Khamenei’s preelection support of Ahmadinejad’s 

policies and presidency revealed his political leanings. Sadjadpour’s 

prediction that Khamenei would heavily influence the electoral 

outcome materialized as the events of June 2009 unfolded. 

By placing his office and his person on the side of Ahmadinejad 

rather than acting as an impartial judge in the controversial elections, 

Khamenei has bogged down the office of the supreme leader with 

political minutia and raised further questions about his objectivity and 

apolitical position. Khamenei’s backing of Ahmadinejad is not new, 

and as Ansari explains, does not have its roots in ideology but rather 

in an attempt to consolidate power within the Iranian power structure. 

Khamenei has been seen to largely endorse Ahmadinejad’s first-term 

governmental reforms and his policies, even as other conservatives 

and a large number of Iranians find themselves farther apart from 

Ahmadinejad’s policies and ideological worldview. For Khamenei, 

this partnership may prove costly. He has alienated a large number 

of his peers and traditional supporters, and his ability to make tough 

decisions on Iran’s foreign relations and policies is being called into 

question. This short-term victory may have long-term negative effects 

on his or his office’s position of supremacy in Iran’s decision-making 

process. Khamenei did not follow Milani’s advice to remain neutral in 

the electoral process so that his position would be secure. So now the 

questions remain: is Khamenei the person with whom the U.S. should 

engage, or has the pendulum of power begun to swing? 

What Should the Parties Discuss?

If or when negotiations between the United States and Iran occur, 

determining the agenda will be a tricky endeavor. Ronald E. Neumann 

cautions, in his chapter on U.S.-Iranian negotiations, that it is important 

to keep in mind the almost irreconcilable positions of the parties. 

One country’s desired outcome is anathema to the other. While the 
Introduction

4 

commonalities are few, the list of grievances, both historical and current, 

is long, the latest entry being the accusations made by the Iranian 

regime against a number of Western countries for alleged involvement 

in the post-election protests and demonstrations. Neumann recounts 

the myriad of hurdles—historical misunderstandings, suspicion, legal 

battles, and internal domestic opposition—that both parties will face 

and have to overcome on the path to rapprochement. While daunting, 

Neumann sees value in pursuing negotiations, if only to chip away at 

the hardened positions to slowly improve relations.

There are many deal breakers for both Iran and the United States.

Three of the most intractable are Iran’s rejection of Israel’s right to exist; 

its support for terrorism; and of course the nuclear issue. Neumann 

describes Iran’s nuclear posture and its continued support of terrorism 

as the major issues, adding that there are numerous other issues as 

potentially intractable. Sadjadpour lists Iran’s position on Israel as the 

greatest obstacle to improved relations, as he notes belligerency toward 

Israel is one of three ideological symbols of the Islamic Republic, and 

he sees the nuclear and Israeli issues as inextricably linked. Gerald 

M. Steinberg, in his chapter on Iran in the Israeli threat perception, 

explains Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas and its nuclear 

ambitions as manifestations of the existential threat Israel continues 

to face from the Iranian regime. This threat has been in existence since 

the 1979 Islamic Revolution and is perceived to be escalating with the 

rise of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. He cautions that Israel is considering 

all options to counter this threat.

Khamenei illustrated his distaste for any hint of niceties toward Israel in 

his public rebuking of Ahmadinejad in July 2009, this just shortly after 

having backed him in the elections. As part of his new government, 

Ahmadinejad appointed his son’s father-in-law, Esfandiar Rahim 

Mashaii, as his first vice president. The first vice president wields a 

degree of power within Iran’s power structure, leading cabinet sessions 

in the absence of the president. Khamenei, however, issued a decree 

ordering Ahmadinejad to remove Mashaii from his post and asserting 
Amin Tarzi

5 

he has no place in the current cabinet.2 According to Tehran Times, 

in 2008 while serving as director of Iran’s Cultural Heritage, Tourism 

and Handicrafts Organization, Mashaii had said, “Iran is a friend of 

the Israeli people,” which violated the official Iranian position on the 

“Zionist regime”—the name by which Iran refers to Israel.3

 This simple 

remark about friendship between peoples could not be tolerated by 

Khamenei and those around him, as it is seen as legitimizing Israel. 

That said, there may be an opportunity for Iran to revisit its stance 

on Israel if it is determined to be expedient to the regime. Milani 

discusses Iran’s use of maslehat (expediency) as a tool to weigh the 

costs and benefits of potential actions and provides examples of how 

maslehat has been employed in recent history to ensure the regime’s 

objectives are fulfilled. Sadjadpour believes that the regime may 

change its position regarding the legitimacy of the Israeli state if the 

Palestinians reach an agreed path forward, which the regime could 

justify by invoking maslehat.

Iran’s Nuclear Program

Despite Iranian assurances otherwise, the international community 

believes Iran is in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Simon 

Shercliff, in his chapter on the Iranian nuclear issue, explains that this 

is a result of the huge mistrust of Iranian intentions and motivations 

and a complete disconnect between Iranian civilian needs and 

technological pursuits. And despite U.S. assurances that the U.S. does 

not seek regime change, Iran is convinced otherwise. So suspicion is 

alive and well on all fronts. Shercliff asserts, however, that regardless of 

Iran’s stated motivations, intentions, and claims of scientific progress, 

the international community is right to be concerned about Iran’s 

nuclear activities. Sadjadpour contends that resolution of this issue will 

first require the United States and Iran to settle broader diplomatic 

2. “Leader Has Ordered President to Dismiss Rahim-Mashaii: Top MP,” Tehran Times, 

22 July 2009 (http:www.tehrantimes.com/NCms/2007.asp?code=199282).

3. Ibid.
Introduction

6 

challenges, which as stated above will prove challenging and require 

profound and mature diplomacy on both sides. 

Sadjadpour points out that the devil is in the details. The most 

significant detail is that of time. Once the nuclear cat is out of the 

bag, paradigms shift, and there is no turning back. Time is influencing 

the direction of both the existing multilateral diplomatic approach 

regarding Iran’s nuclear program—E3+3, comprised of China, France, 

Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and 

other potential advocates of Iran changing its course. As such, Shercliff 

advocates for forcing Iran’s hand, compelling Iran to choose between 

cooperation and confrontation before it is too late. Neumann promotes 

a two-pronged approach, borrowing former Israeli Prime Minister 

Yitzhak Rabin’s strategy of negotiating as if there is no fighting and 

fighting as if there are no talks. Neither talks nor pressures should 

restrict the employment of the other, as a balance between the two 

ensures a more successful outcome.

Steinberg affirms Neumann’s recommended approach, noting that 

Israel’s policy is to consider all available options to resolve Iran’s nuclear 

issue while pursuing a diplomatic solution. However, in the end, as 

time pressures build, patience for a lengthy diplomatic process may 

wane, or the process will be overcome by events. Steinberg, in closing, 

provides an ominous yet realistic assessment of Israeli perceptions visà-vis Iran’s threat:

Overall, the Iranian nuclear threat has reinforced the realism 

that forms the Israeli approach to security threats. While there 

is still hope that international action, including serious sanctions, will stop Iran before the nuclear finish line, this is by no 

means assured. Proposals by foreign diplomats and academics 

suggesting that alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Israel could provide a 

sufficient response to an Iranian nuclear capability, or that a 

defense treaty with the United States would be important in 

this respect, are not likely to be seen as effective by Israelis. 
Amin Tarzi

7 

The U.S. is seen as weakened economically and overcommitted 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the weakness of European members of NATO , particularly with respect to security, reinforces 

the skepticism. While there are many complexities, the possibility for a preventive Israeli military strike remains significant.

Ali-Akbar Salehi, the newly appointed director of the Atomic Energy 

Organization of Iran, called for closure of his country’s nuclear dossier 

on 19 July 2009, citing completion of all required legal and technical 

discussions and noting that any remaining concerns are undocumented 

and unsubstantiated.4

 If Salehi’s actions are indicative of what 

Ahmadinejad’s nuclear posture will be during his second presidential 

term, the possibility of confrontation instead of cooperation is so much 

more real. In facing this reality, creativity and maturity need to prevail 

to avoid an escalation that leads to a no-win endgame. 

Iran’s Regional Ambitions

Complicating matters further are Iran’s calculations that a nuclear 

capability will help it fulfill its regional ambitions. Salehi, when saying 

that the “importance of Iran’s status in the region is obvious,”5 echoes 

the sentiments of a broad segment of Iranian society. He talks of Iran 

possessing “the golden key in the region.” This key to which he alludes 

has physical and historical attributes. Iran’s geostrategic position and 

its imperial legacy propel Iran to pursue regional hegemony.

Iran is the only country with access to the Caucuses, Middle East, 

Central and South Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the 

open seas. From a hydrocarbon perspective, with its location and vast 

amounts of oil and natural gas, Iran has the potential of being one of 

the most, if not the most, influential supplier and transportation hub 

of oil and gas not only in the region, but also in the global market. 

However, as Sadjadpour points out, Iranian assets have been plagued 

4. “Iran’s Nuclear Dossier Must be Closed: AEOI Director,” Tehran Times, 19 July 2009 

(http:www.tehrantimes.com/NCms/2007.asp?code=199120).

5. Ibid.
Introduction

8 

by mismanagement, and this, coupled with the sanctions and political 

tensions, has resulted in Iran becoming “a perennial underperformer.” 

Shercliff posits that Iran could assume its natural position as the key 

country in hydrocarbon production, transportation, and politics if it 

would accept the “refreshed” E3+3 package, which remains on the 

table since offered in June 2008.

Beyond geography, Iran’s narrative of Persian expansionism and 

destined leadership in the region, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi 

Khomeini’s message “of spreading the revolution and establishing 

the Islamic Republic’s preeminence,” continues to resonate with the 

Iranian population.6

 This imperial collective identity remains and has 

been reinvigorated with the removal of the Saddam Hussein and the 

Taliban. Milani argues that this shift in regional politics has expedited 

Iran’s regional ambitions and that the current situations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq present an opportunity for cooperation between the United 

States and Iran, assuming that the two parties can overcome their 

inherent distrust and recognize that their strategic interests lie on the 

same path forward. It would appear that some of these fears have yet 

to be conquered, as Sadjadpour indicates that Iran continues to be 

identified as the principal source of instability in Iraq.

One voice absent from this discussion is that of Iran’s Arab neighbors, 

due to a late cancellation of the Arab presenter at the symposium. The 

Arab states should not be expected to take sitting down Iran’s regional 

ambitions and its interest and influence in Iraq. Iran’s involvement in 

Iraq and Lebanon and with Palestinian groups such as Hamas, coupled 

with its nuclear pursuits, has created noise in many Arab capitals. 

Ahmadinejad’s 2007 offer to help fill the security vacuum that would 

be created when Western forces leave Iraq remains on the table and 

has been met with skepticism and suspicion from Iran’s neighbors.7

6. Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: 

Times Books, 2006), 11. Takeyh uses Arab states rather than all of Iran’s neighboring states.

7. See Amin Tarzi, “The World’s Ninth Nuclear Power: Iran’s Ambitions in the Middle 

East and Beyond,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 6 (Summer 2007): 63 (http://www.turkishpolicy.

com/images/stories/2007-02-centraleurasia/TPQ2007-2-tarzi.pdf).
Amin Tarzi

9 

As Ansari notes, the apparent rise in Iranian regional influence, 

spanning from Lebanon to Afghanistan, has emboldened Iran, and 

Milani reminds readers of the power that perception wields in politics. 

As Iran plans its course, it needs to recognize how the region and 

the world perceive its regional ambitions and pursuit of nuclear 

technology. Iran’s posturing toward Israel and its fiery politics take on 

a new dimension when coupled with the threat of a nuclear weapons 

capability. Iran needs to employ maslehat to determine its course of 

action and to ensure that the outcome affords Iran the prestige and 

status it desires and deserves. “We want Iran to calculate what I think 

is a fair assessment that if the U.S. extends a defense umbrella over the 

region, if we do even more to support the military capacity of those in 

the Gulf,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in Phuket, 

Thailand, in July 2009. “It’s unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or 

safer, because they won’t be able to intimidate and dominate, as they 

apparently believe they can, once they have a nuclear weapon.”8

The authors’ expertise and in-depth analysis broaden and deepen 

the available discourse on Iran and provide context and guidance for 

confronting the Iranian nuclear issue. As revealed through their work, 

the Iranian puzzle piece is complex and demands close examination to 

ascertain its rightful place within the global puzzle.

8. Mark Landler, “Clinton Hints at ‘Defense Umbrella’ to Deter Iran,” New York Times, 

23 July 2009 (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/asia/23diplo.html?).
10 
11 

Chapter 1 

Iran Under Ahmadinejad

Ali M. Ansari

Mahmud Ahmadinejad was elected as the president of the 

Islamic Republic of Iran in 2005 promising to rid the 

government of the corruption that had accrued since the death of 

Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini in 1989, to pursue social and 

economic justice, and to return to the values of the early revolution. 

Armed with the self-confidence of a man immersed in religious 

convictions and an unshakable self belief, Ahmadinejad approached 

government with the reckless abandon of an iconoclast. It was an 

approach that proved as popular with the disenfranchised as much 

as it horrified the intellectual and bureaucratic elite, many of whom 

were likewise dismayed by the failures of the Islamic Republic—and 

the unaccountability of the revolutionary organs in particular—but 

felt that wholesale overhaul portended by the incoming president 

threatened to undermine the very foundations of a somewhat fragile 

political and economic system.

While it is true that Ahmadinejad found himself facing the natural 

inertia of any established system, he nonetheless spent the better part 

of the first term of his presidency reshaping the government of the 

Islamic Republic in his own image, in large measure supported by the 

office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Hoseyni Khamenei, 

for whom Ahmadinejad’s public obsequiousness and ideological 

world view have proven attractive. Perhaps more importantly, the 

dramatic rise in oil prices enabled Ahmadinejad to play the role of 

populist and to disguise the many fissures within the system under 

a torrent of oil money, which he injected into the economy with 

very little rhyme or reason.1

 Iranian economists protested that this 

1. The price of crude oil rose from $35 per barrel in January 2005 to highs of around 

$140 during the summer of 2008, only to fall back to around $35 by the end of the year. 

Historical oil price data here and throughout the article is from U.S. Department of Energy, 

Energy Information Agency, “Petroleum Navigator” (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/

hist/wtotworldw.htm).
Chapter 1: Iran Under Ahmadinejad

12 

lack of planning simply ensured a massive and unplanned injection 

of capital into an economy that could not sustain it, fueling inflation 

and a housing boom, which, in a scenario familiar to the West, has 

encouraged people to believe that real economic growth has in fact 

been taking place. They further warned that the drawing down of the 

oil reserve fund—built up by the administration of former president 

Sayyed Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005)—and the development 

of budgets dependent on ever higher receipts from oil would simply 

make the economy more vulnerable to a sudden reduction in the oil 

price. Ahmadinejad, buoyed by his own apparent popularity and an 

international environment that appeared to flaunt American failure in 

the region, dismissed these and other criticisms of his administration 

as the idle ranting of orthodox thinkers who had failed to appreciate 

his innate and instinctive genius.

Ahmadinejad is a product of the Khatami reform movement in more 

ways than one.2

 In an obvious sense, his emergence, and the ideals he 

represents, reflect a complete rejection of the reform process and the 

personality of Khatami in particular. Ahmadinejad himself takes the 

distinction further by distancing himself not only from Khatami but from 

the administration of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 

(1989-1997), to whom he ascribes much of the economic ills of the 

country. Yet as Ahmadinejad’s presidency rejects much of the economic 

policy and planning of the previous sixteen years, his populism also 

reflects a profound desire to overturn the popularity of his immediate 

predecessor, a popularity that the hard right in Iran has resented and 

regarded as a perversion of the true values of the revolution. Defining 

these values and debating the legacy of the founder of the revolution, 

Ayatollah Khomeini, have been the stock and trade of the politics of 

the Islamic Revolution, and the claim that Rafsanjani and Khatami 

represented a loss of revolutionary focus is dubious to say the least.

2. Editor’s Note: The reform movement (1997-2005) was the political momentum 

behind President Khatami’s terms in office. The movement promised to bring greater freedom 

and democracy to Iranian politics and government, and the failure of its efforts has given 

strength to its conservative detractors. See Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in 

the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), 44-45.
Ali M. Ansari

13 

One of the striking anomalies of the hard right Principle-ist challenge 

is that it does not have the support of many of Khomeini’s closest 

supporters, allies, and family members.3 Indeed, the Principleist challenge can be better interpreted as the attempt by Khamenei 

to supplant the founder of the revolution as the leading light of 

revolutionary ideology. It is quite clear that there is a tight and highly 

dependent relationship between Khamenei and the Principle-ist 

faction. This is not simply an ideological relationship, but a partnership 

in the consolidation of power, and it is important to recognize this 

relationship as one of mutual dependence. This interdependence explains 

the continued and critical support provided by the supreme leader for 

the president and his government, even when other conservatives have 

increasingly criticized the president’s incoherent policies.

Another factor also helps explain this support, and it reflects the 

personality of the supreme leader as much as his political relationship 

with Ahmadinejad. Khamenei is haunted by the example of the last 

shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who is generally considered 

to have lost his throne through indecisiveness and weakness. 

Consequently, Khamenei has sought to overcompensate for what 

is generally regarded to be his political and theological weakness 

by appearing and behaving in a manner that is both interventionist 

and resolute. In such a climate, considerable credence is given to not 

changing one’s mind and to appearing consistent. The immediate 

consequence of this approach, of course, is that Khamenei is likely to 

continue supporting Ahmadinejad long after most observers consider 

it prudent or necessary. This support is mutual, and in rejecting his 

predecessors’ policies, Ahmadinejad emphatically allied himself with 

the supreme leader, to whom he has shown an unprecedented public 

deference. If Rafsanjani and Khatami enjoyed difficult relationships 

3. Editor’s Note: The Principle-ists are the religious and social conservative factions 

that opposed the liberal policies of former President Khatami. They arose as the result of 

Khatami’s reform efforts and are now a considerable political conservative force. See Ali 

M. Ansari, Iran Under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation. Adelphi Paper 393. 

(Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), 32; 

Raz Zimmt, “The 2008 Iranian Parliamentary Elections: A Triumph of the System,” Middle 

East Review of International Affairs 12 (June 2008): 41-43.
Chapter 1: Iran Under Ahmadinejad

14 

with Khamenei, whom they regarded as little more than the first 

among equals, if that, Ahmadinejad—in public at least—has been very 

clear about the nature of the hierarchy.

Ahmadinejad’s domestic agenda and the realignment of power 

were ably facilitated by highly fortuitous circumstances both with 

respect to the economy and the international environment. In 2005, 

Ahmadinejad inherited a nuclear crisis, which, after two years of 

tortuous negotiations, had not reached a satisfactory conclusion. The 

details of this process can be found elsewhere, but suffice it to say 

that both Iran and the parties with which it negotiated share the 

blame for the failure of progress by 2005.4

 It is with no little irony 

that it was only at this late date that the Europeans had convinced the 

United States to take a much more visible role in the negotiations, at 

the very time when the inauguration of Ahmadinejad represented a 

shift away from negotiations for the Iranians encouraged not only by 

the failures of the Khatami administration, but also by the realization 

that the U.S. position in the Middle East was no longer as robust or 

confident as it had been in 2003. Ahmadinejad argued that Iran could 

only achieve the results it wanted by being robust and confrontational, 

that the willingness to compromise was taken as a sign of weakness 

of the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, and perhaps 

most importantly, that by 2005, America’s room for maneuver was 

considerably more limited.

There were many within the Iranian political elite who accepted this 

general assessment, arguing that Khatami’s good will had largely been 

rejected and that the United States only respected force. Ahmadinejad’s 

approach was reinforced by a world view that took this analysis a stage 

further. While some viewed the change to a more confrontational 

stance as tactical rather than strategic—a means to securing an end—

for Ahmadinejad, this shift represented deeper ideological convictions 

that drew on a Marxist understanding of global politics that pointed 

4. For the nuclear issue, see Simon Shercliff’s essay, which is chapter 4 of this book, 

as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s site, “In Focus: IAEA and Iran” (http://

www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml).
Ali M. Ansari

15 

to the inevitable collapse of capitalism. For Ahmadinejad, the politics 

of confrontation was not a means to a redefined relationship, but a 

means to revolutionizing the international system in Iran’s favor. Such 

a grandiose vision, which was derided and ridiculed by his political 

opponents, struck a chord with an overwhelmingly nationalistic 

population eager for international stature and success. Indeed, for 

all his religious heterodoxy, Ahmadinejad found nationalism and its 

accompanying rhetoric far more intoxicating for both the Iranian 

public and for himself.

With the apparent growth in Iranian power throughout the region, 

from Afghanistan to Lebanon—a consequence of Western incoherence 

more than real Iranian strength—Ahmadinejad’s belief in himself 

seemed justified and became contagious. The more people believed, the 

more the critics were silenced, and the more Ahmadinejad’s self belief 

was reinforced. Much is said about Ahmadinejad’s incorruptibility, 

especially in contrast to some members of the political elite, yet while 

this may allude to financial probity (an aspect that has come under 

increasing scrutiny of late), it was very clear from quite early in his 

presidency that Ahmadinejad was easily overcome by the possibilities 

and perks of power. This bent was not only reflected in his highly 

personal choices for government posts, with officials chosen mainly 

for the personal loyalty to the man (Ahmadinejad) and mission rather 

than professional competence, but also in his obvious contempt for 

what remained of process and procedure. Ahmadinejad’s disdain for 

the Majles (the Iranian parliament) was especially irksome to the hardline deputies who had done so much to see him elected. Rather than 

face questions in parliament, Ahmadinejad was far happier playing 

the role of leader, either on the world stage in front of an international 

media, who seemingly thirsted after his every statement, or in lavish 

provincial tours in which he performed for adoring masses in increasing 

desperation for some sort of hope and salvation. Ahmadinejad clearly 

relished the role, and a dependency culture emerged between a people 

in need and a leader who craved attention.
Chapter 1: Iran Under Ahmadinejad

16 

Facilitating this process was the availability of enormous amounts 

of oil revenue. When Khatami came into office in 1997, oil stood at 

approximately $17 per barrel. It had dropped to the $10-12 range by 

the spring of 1998. Consequently, Khatami was forced to approach the 

economy with a degree of prudence and austerity. The lack of finance 

meant that he was unable to push through many of the ideas he had 

envisaged for the transformation of the Iranian economy. Ultimately, 

Khatami’s economic legacy was managing a bad economy well, and 

as oil prices gradually rose, he left a growing oil reserve fund to be set 

aside for possible downturns in the economy and for investment in 

large infrastructural projects.

Ahmadinejad entered office with oil at around $60 a barrel and 

without much idea of economic planning or policy. Khatami had left 

a strategic plan for the next twenty years, although it was so vague as 

to allow any subsequent president considerable room for maneuver. 

Ahmadinejad and his allies, who were eager to consolidate power and 

to eradicate the popularity of Khatami among the people, used the 

funds to effectively buy the public. The days of austerity were over; 

oil money was provided to every citizen. The availability of such large 

amounts of money also allowed Ahmadinejad to indulge in theatrical 

politics on a scale not seen since the days of the last shah. Not only did 

he embark on a series of expensive provincial tours, he also used these 

“meet the people” expeditions to distribute cash, raise salaries, and 

announce dramatic initiatives, many of which had not been budgeted 

or were administratively difficult to achieve.

In the early days of his presidency, criticism of these adventures in the 

countryside was relatively muted, but it did not take long for contrary 

voices to be heard. Both conservatives and professionals raised concerns 

over Ahmadinejad’s policies, including an extensive critique of his lack 

of economic planning issued by fifty-seven economists, who warned 

of the dire consequences of the massive injection of liquidity into the 

economy.5

 More damning than their economic critique, which warned 

5. “Namah-ye chaharome eqtesad-danan be ra’is-e jomhur” [Fourth Letter of Economists 

to the President], Mardom-Salari, 22 December 2007 (http://www.mordomsalari.com/

Template1/Article.aspx?AID=2397).
Ali M. Ansari

17 

of high inflation and property speculation, was their observation that 

the president seemed uninterested in any professional advice, appeared 

to appoint officials on the basis of ideology, and moreover, boasted 

about his “instinctive” and “anti-intellectual” approach to government. 

Ahmadinejad not only dismissed such comments but also sought 

to present himself as a new type of revolutionary intellectual with 

access to radical ideas. One of his supporters argued that people did 

not understand the president because he moved at the speed of a 

“phantom jet,” with the idea clearly being that Ahmadinejad operated 

on an altogether different plane of thought.

The antiestablishment posture worked for a time, but problems were 

bound to arise once the masses, whose loyalty he craved, began to suffer 

through the high inflation his policies were promoting. Ahmadinejad 

sought to ascribe these problems to international sanctions, but few 

commentators within the country believed this argument. When the 

Majles criticized the rise in prices of everyday goods, Ahmadinejad 

simply resorted to a swift dismissal of the criticisms as either politically 

unfounded or ignorant. His ability to remain on this path depended 

on two factors: the continued support of the supreme leader, who had 

effectively entered into a dependent relationship with him; and the 

continued rise in the price of oil. Indeed, even government officials 

and ostensible allies of the president grew weary and warned of the 

excessive dependence on rising oil prices. In April 2008, Interior 

Minister Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, a noted hard-liner, resigned his 

post, citing differences that were later revealed to be concerns that the 

president had illegally raided the oil reserve fund.

News that the oil reserve fund has been severely depleted over the 

last few years has come as a considerable shock to Iranians. While 

precise figures remain vague, the inadvertent leak from a government 

minister that the fund stood at $9 billion in the fall of 2008 resulted in 

immediate attempts at damage limitation control from the government, 

which countered with an estimate of $25 billion.6

 This figure still 

is considerably lower than the $82 billion that the government was 

6. “Iran: Oil under $60 Troubling for the Economy,” Fars New Agency, 4 November 

2008 (http://english.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8708141516).
Chapter 1: Iran Under Ahmadinejad

18 

calculated to have had in March 2008, which would have provided a 

financial cushion in case of an oil price drop.7

 Indeed, although they 

publicly gloated at the collapse of Western financial institutions in 

September, it took little more than four weeks for Iranian officials 

to realize that the consequences of this global economic downturn 

would affect Iran in a concomitant deflation of the oil bubble. Within 

weeks, the price of oil dropped to below $60 a barrel, the price that 

had greeted Ahmadinejad on his inauguration, creating a situation for 

which the president had no answer.

Not surprisingly, recriminations followed. A particularly combative 

and boisterous Majles decided to impeach the minister of interior, 

Ali Kordan, for professing to hold an honorary doctorate from the 

University of Oxford. The impeachment is significant for a number of 

reasons. Ahmadinejad has to lose but one more minister (to dismissal 

or impeachment) to force a vote of confidence in his entire cabinet. 

Perhaps more importantly, it is no longer clear who will manage the 

forthcoming presidential elections ( June 2009). Indeed, some are 

speculating that a combination of economic woes, a change of guard 

in the White House, and general disillusionment with Ahmadinejad 

among former allies, let alone the populace at large, will result in an 

opening up of the political contest.

Powerful voices in support of a renewed Khatami candidacy are already 

being heard.8 However, much depends not only on developments in 

the economy, but on the attitude of the supreme leader, who finds 

himself in an increasingly awkward position. Most recently, he yet 

again came out in support of Ahmadinejad and his policies, thereby 

tying himself most emphatically to the cause. He can of course change 

his mind, if events force him to do so, but like all weak men, he places 

7. Chip Cummins and Farnaz Fassihi, “Weaker Oil May Crimp Iran’s Spending,” Wall Street 

Journal Online, 25 October 2008 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122489443738668849.

html).

8. Editor’s Note: Khatami was the leading pro-reform candidate for the presidency until 

he withdrew from the race on 16 March 2009 citing the need for unity among reformists and 

pledging his support for former Prime Minister Mir-Hoseyn Musavi.
Ali M. Ansari

19 

unusual emphasis on not changing his mind, confusing stubbornness 

with strength. In short, it will take a remarkable economic shock to 

shift him, and even then, it may be too late.
20 
21 

Chapter 2 

Talking to Tehran: With Whom, 

About What, and How?

Karim Sadjadpour

The long-standing policy debate about whether or not to “engage” Iran is now futile. In the post-September 11 world, Iran is integral 

to several issues of critical importance to the foreign policy of the 

United States, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, Arab-Israeli peace, terrorism, 

nuclear proliferation,  and  energy security. Shunning Iran will not 

ameliorate any of these issues, and confronting Iran militarily will 

exacerbate all of them. The only remaining option is talking to Tehran. 

The devil, however, is in the details. With whom in Iran should the 

U.S. talk? What should the U.S. talk to them about? And how should 

the U.S. talk to them?

For the last several years, U.S. policy toward Iran has focused almost 

exclusively on short-term tactics at the expense of a coherent strategy. 

The results are self-evident: today Iran is more repressive, its nuclear 

stance has grown more defiant, and its support for extremist groups 

has increased. This chapter will focus less on ways to punish troubling 

Iranian behavior and more on a strategy that attempts to modify 

Iranian policies, allay the long-standing enmity between Washington 

and Tehran, and facilitate internal political reform with Iran. It begins 

with four fundamental premises:1

 

1. Talking to Iran does not imply offering concessions, in no 

way implies appeasement of troubling Iranian behavior, and 

does not preclude efforts to simultaneously counter Iranian influence and policies that are problematic.

1. For a discussion of some of these premises, also see Ronald E. Neumann’s essay, 

which is chapter 3 of this book.
Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How?

22 

2. The Islamic Republic is not on the verge of collapse, and any 

reform movement will require time to revive. Abrupt political 

change in Tehran is unlikely and would not necessarily be an 

improvement on the status quo, as the only groups that are 

both organized and armed in Iran are the Islamic Revolution 

Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia. More liberal political groups are unorganized and unarmed.

3. U.S. concerns about the Iranian behavior—whether it is nuclear ambitions, opposition to Israel, or support for extremist 

groups—will not be allayed as long as the status quo regime is 

in power in Tehran and its relations with Washington remain 

adversarial. In the current context, U.S. concerns that Iran is 

pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program will remain 

even if Iran were to announce suspension of uranium enrichment activities tomorrow.

4. The greatest impact Washington can have to help advance 

the causes of democracy, civil society, and human rights in Iran 

are policies that facilitate, rather than impede, Iran’s path to 

modernization. Improved Iranian ties with the United States 

are a prerequisite to Iran’s reintegration into the global economy, which would expedite internal political and economic reform in Iran and dilute rather than fortify hard-liners’ control 

of power.

I. Who to Talk to

There is good reason why policy makers have often struggled to 

understand where and how power is wielded in Tehran. From the 

Islamic Republic’s inception in 1979, the revolution’s father, Ayatollah 

Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, aimed to set up the government’s power 

structure in a way that would make it impervious to foreign influence. 

This meant creating multiple power centers whose competition would 

provide checks and balances to prevent one branch or individual from 

becoming too powerful and susceptible to outside influence. The result 
Karim Sadjadpour

23 

has been frequent political paralysis, an inability to make big decisions, 

and a tendency to muddle along with entrenched policies.

The Power of Khamenei

While three decades later it remains difficult to discern why and 

how important decisions are made in Tehran, what can be said with 

confidence is that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hoseyni Khamenei 

is Iran’s most powerful man. He may not make decisions unilaterally, 

but no major decisions can be taken without his consent. As supreme 

leader, he has constitutional authority over the main levers of state, 

namely the judiciary, military, and media. He also has effective control 

over the country’s second most powerful institution, the Guardian 

Council, a twelve-member body (all of whom are directly or indirectly 

appointed by him) that has the authority to vet all electoral candidates 

and veto any parliamentary decisions.

Various domestic factors have made Khamenei’s role in the 

consensus-building process greater than ever before: 1) a vast 

network of commissars stationed in strategic posts throughout 

government bureaucracies, dedicated to enforcing his authority; 2) 

the rapidly rising political and economic influence of the IRGC,

whose top leaders are directly appointed by Khamenei; 3) the political 

disillusionment and disengagement of Iran’s young population, 

prompted by the unfulfilled expectations of the reformist era;2

 4) the 

2005 election of hard-line President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who 

trounced Khamenei’s chief rival, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi 

Rafsanjani, in a second-round runoff; and 5) the conservativedominated parliament, headed by Khamenei loyalist Ali Ardashir 

Larijani. Individuals who are either directly appointed by Khamenei 

or unfailingly obsequious to him currently lead the most influential 

institutions in Iran’s byzantine power structure.

2. Editor’s Note: The reform movement (1997-2005) was the political momentum 

behind President Khatami’s terms in office. The movement promised to bring greater freedom 

and democracy to Iranian politics and government, and the failure of its efforts has given 

strength to its conservative detractors. See Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in 

the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), 44-45.
Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How?

24 

Externally, up to the fall of 2008, soaring oil prices together with 

Iran’s expanded regional influence has given the Islamic Republic 

unprecedented power vis-à-vis the United States, offering Khamenei 

and Iran’s hard-liners a newfound confidence. Iran’s virtual encirclement 

by U.S. forces, efforts by the administration of U.S. President George W. 

Bush to promote democracy in Iran, and repeated threats of military 

action have combined to create a highly securitized atmosphere, 

allowing Tehran’s hard-liners a further pretext to silence dissent and 

limit political and social freedoms.

While these factors are dynamic—oil prices may drop further, the 

state of Iraq may improve still, and Ahmadinejad may not be reelected 

president—for the foreseeable future, Iran will remain a vital influence 

on major U.S. interests, and Khamenei will continue to be the most 

critical figure in Iran.

What Does Khamenei Want?

Advocates of engagement often speak of the need for a bold U.S.

gesture, a “Nixon to China” approach. Before this can happen, 

however, a fundamental question needs clarification: does Ayatollah 

Khamenei genuinely seek a modus vivendi with Washington? Or is 

enmity toward the United States necessary to retain the ideals of the 

revolution and the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic? 

Khamenei’s nineteen-year track record depicts a risk-averse leader—

courting neither confrontation nor accommodation with the West—

who is also saturated with mistrust.3 He believes that Iran’s strategic 

location and energy resources are too valuable to the United States to 

be controlled by an independent-minded Islamic government, hence 

Washington aspires to go back to the “patron-client” relationship 

existing at the time of the shah. In this context, whether U.S. officials 

announce they want to have a dialogue with Iran or to isolate it, 

Khamenei presumes nefarious intentions.

3. Editor’s Note: Khamenei has been the supreme leader of Iran since 1989. Prior to this, 

he was the president of Iran from 1981 to 1989.
Karim Sadjadpour

25 

At the same time, the role of ideology and political expediency in 

Khamenei’s anti-American worldview cannot be discounted. A

conciliatory approach toward the United States and a nonbelligerent 

approach toward Israel would be parting ways with two of the three 

ideological symbols of the Islamic Republic (the other being the 

mandatory hejab for women). For Khamenei, if the Islamic revolution 

was all about momentous change, the years since have been about 

maintaining the revolutionary status quo. Nor is Khamenei’s rationale 

purely ideological; his writings and speeches suggest that he agrees 

with Western advocates who argue that were Iran to open up to the 

United States, such engagement would spur major cultural, political, 

and economic reform.

For these reasons, as long as Khamenei remains supreme leader, a 

fundamental shift in Iranian domestic and foreign policy appears 

unlikely. Given that his selection as leader was based on his fealty to 

revolutionary ideals and the vision of Khomeini—whose political views 

crystallized in the anti-imperialist heyday of the 1960s and ’70s—the 

chances of Khamenei being willing or able to reinvent himself at the 

age of seventy do not appear strong.

II. What to Talk About

There are few nations in the world with which the United States 

has less reason to quarrel or more compatible interests than Iran. 

. . . There is no American geopolitical motivation for hostility between Iran and the United States. . . . Iran is destined to play 

a vital—in some circumstances, decisive—role in the [Persian] 

Gulf and in the Islamic world. A prudent American government 

needs no instruction on the desirability of improving relations 

with Iran.

Henry A. Kissinger, Does American Need a Foreign Policy?4

4. Henry A. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for 

the 21st Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 196. 
Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How?

26 

Iran scholars often debate to what degree the country’s foreign policy 

is driven by national interests as opposed to revolutionary ideology. 

Examples of each abound. Invoking Islamic solidarity to support 

the Palestinian cause is consistent with Iran’s revolutionary ideology, 

while ignoring Islamic solidarity in Chechnya for fear of antagonizing 

Russia is consistent with Iranian national interests.

Another interpretation of Iranian foreign policy is that it is a by-product 

of U.S.-Iran relations. According to this line of thinking, Iran is not 

inherently opposed to America, but it is driven by a sense of insecurity 

vis-à-vis the United States. Hence, when U.S.-Iran relations are most 

adversarial—as they have been the last several years—Tehran strives to 

make life difficult for the United States as a means of protecting itself. 

Iran’s friendship with Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez can be explained in 

this context.

The task of the U.S. President Barack H. Obama’s administration 

should be to test whether a refined, conciliatory U.S. approach could 

compel Tehran to dilute, or perhaps even abandon, the revolutionary, 

anti-American aspect of its foreign policy in favor of a more 

cooperative working relationship with Washington. A survey of the 

issues of broad concern between the two countries—Iraq, Afghanistan, 

nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy security, and Arab-Israeli 

peace—underscores former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s 

argument that Washington and Tehran have much in common:

Iraq

While U.S. and Iranian interests in Iraq are certainly not identical, a 

good argument can be made that Washington has more overlapping 

interests with Tehran in Iraq than with any of Iraq’s other neighbors:

Stability. Instability and carnage provide more fertile ground for 

radical Salafist groups—such as al-Qaeda—who are violently opposed 

to American, Iranian, and Shiite influence, and would also create an 

influx of Iraqi refugees to Iran.
Karim Sadjadpour

27 

Territorial Integrity. The implications of a partitioned Iraq—namely an 

independent Iraqi Kurdistan—are serious for Iran, which has its own 

disaffected Kurdish community. At the same time, both Washington 

and Tehran can live with a degree of Kurdish autonomy, which makes 

Turkey very uncomfortable. 

Sectarian Harmony. Given its quest to be the vanguard of the largely 

Sunni-Arab Middle East, the last thing Iran wants to do is project 

Shiite power or stir Sunni resentment throughout the region.

Democracy. Given the Shiite demographic majority, Iran feels confident 

that elections are the best vehicle to assert its interests.5

 Fearing Shiite 

ascendancy in Baghdad, U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and 

Kuwait are far more concerned about a democratic Iraq.

Despite these overlapping interests, Iran’s role in Iraq has been at best 

schizophrenic and at worst nefarious. Both U.S. military personnel 

and Iraqi officials have described Iran as a primary source of instability.

From Tehran’s perspective, given that one of the underlying premises 

of the 2003 U.S.-led Iraq war was to change the political culture of the 

Middle East, it made little sense to Iran for it to play a cooperative or 

passive role in Iraq. On the contrary, believing that the United States 

was intent on installing in Baghdad a pro-American puppet regime 

sympathetic to Israel and hostile to Iran, Tehran had an incentive 

to try to make life difficult for the United States and ensure that its 

friends ascended to positions of power.

Afghanistan

Likewise in Afghanistan, Washington has more overlapping interests 

with Tehran than it does with allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia:

Stability and economic reconstruction. Having accommodated more 

than 2 million Afghan refugees, Tehran does not stand to gain from 

5. Editor’s Note: According to the Central Intelligence Agency’s “World Factbook,” 

Shiites make up 60-65 percent of Iraq’s population. They comprise 89 percent of Iran’s 

population (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/). 
Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How?

28 

continued strife in Afghanistan and has sought to play a leading role 

in the country’s reconstruction, ranking among the top ten aid donors. 

Counter-narcotics. With one of the highest incidence of drug addiction 

in the world and a strict penal code prohibiting drug use, Iran has been 

highly vigilant in policing drug traffickers.6

 

Support for the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. While 

it has not abandoned its support for other allies in Afghanistan, Iran 

has been supportive of the Karzai government and made numerous 

pledges of security and economic cooperation. 

Opposition to the Taliban. Iran nearly fought a war against the inherently 

anti-Shiite Taliban in 1998 and supported the opposition Northern 

Alliance long before September 11. 

Similar to Iraq, however, in an effort to make life difficult for the United 

States,Tehran’s behavior has been at times schizophrenic and counter 

to its own national interests. Iranian state radio programs broadcast 

in Afghanistan have referred to Karzai as the “stooge of the U.S.,” but 

most egregious are accusations that Iran has provided support to its 

old nemesis the Taliban.7

Nuclear Proliferation

The impetus for Iran’s nuclear ambitions remains nebulous. Is the 

country’s clerical leadership fixed on acquiring a nuclear weapons 

capability in order to dominate the Middle East and threaten Israel? 

Is Iran a misunderstood and vulnerable nation driven by a need to 

protect itself from unstable neighbors and a hostile U.S. government? 

Or is Iran simply moving forward with its nuclear program to gain 

leverage with the United States?8

6. Editor’s Note: According to the Central Intelligence Agency’s “World Factbook,” 

“Iran remains one of the primary transshipment routes for Southwest Asian heroin to 

Europe; suffers one of the highest opiate addiction rates in the world, and has an increasing 

problem with synthetic drugs” (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

fields/2086.html?countryName=Iran&countryCode=IR®ionCode=me&#IR).

7. For example, see Amin Tarzi, “The World’s Ninth Nuclear Power: Iran’s Ambitions in 

the Middle East and Beyond,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 6 (Summer 2007): 61-65.

8. For more on the nuclear issue see, Simon Shercliff’s essay, which is chapter 

4 of this book.
Karim Sadjadpour

29 

While threat perception, geopolitics, and national pride are important 

facets of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the nuclear issue is more a symptom 

of the deep mistrust between Washington and Tehran than the 

underlying cause of tension. The United States has no confidence that 

Iran’s intentions are peaceful and believes that in light of Tehran’s past 

nuclear indiscretions, hostility toward Israel, and support for extremist 

groups, it should not be permitted to enrich uranium (the process 

required for both a civilian nuclear energy program and a weapons 

program). Iran is equally convinced that Washington is opposed to its 

technological advancement and is using the nuclear issue as a pretext 

to confront it.

Ultimately, the nuclear issue will never be fully resolved absent a 

broader diplomatic accommodation between the two sides, wherein 

the United States alters its approach to Iran and Tehran alters its 

approach toward Israel. If there is one common goal that both the 

United States and Iran share, it is the avoidance of nuclear arms race 

in the Middle East.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

The greatest impediment to an improvement in U.S.-Iran relations 

is Tehran’s position toward Israel. Whereas regarding the prospect 

of normalized relations with the United States, Iranian leaders have 

sometimes allowed room for ambiguity, Tehran’s public rejection of 

the Jewish state has always been vociferous and unequivocal. 

Iran’s policy is a two-pronged approach of armed resistance as a prelude 

to a “popular referendum.” Reasoning that “the Zionists have not pulled 

out of even a single square meter of occupied territories as a result of 

negotiation,”9 Tehran openly supports militant groups such as Hamas 

and Islamic Jihad. But rather than seek Israel’s physical destruction, 

Iran’s proposed solution is a scenario whereby all inhabitants of Israel 

and the occupied territories—Jewish, Muslim, and Christian—would 

be given a vote to determine the country’s future outlook. Given that 

Palestinians—including those in refugee camps—now constitute a 

9. Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful 

Leader (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 20.
Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How?

30 

demographic majority, Iran believes that a popular referendum would 

lead to the Jewish state’s political dissolution.10 

Yet behind Tehran’s seemingly intractable position, an important 

caveat exists: Iran’s leaders have long made it clear that they will accept 

any territorial solution agreed upon by the Palestinians. 

Energy Security

With the world’s second-largest oil and natural gas reserves, Iran’s 

importance to the global energy market is self-evident.11 Yet a variety 

of factors—mismanagement, sanctions, and political tension—have 

made Iran a perennial underperformer. Its oil output, around 4.2 

million barrels per day, is far below the 6 million barrels it produced 

prior to the revolution, and while it has 15 percent of the world’s 

natural gas reserves, it has only 2 percent of total production.12

Notwithstanding the political implications, the benefits of a U.S.

energy relationship with Iran would be numerous. For one, energy 

cooperation between the two countries would decrease the political risk 

premium currently in established oil prices; increased Iranian supply 

to the market would likely reduce cost; and development of Iranian 

national gas reserves and pipelines would weaken the tremendous 

leverage Russia currently holds over Europe.

There are economic imperatives for Iran to cooperate with the 

United States as well. Given the combination of heavily subsidized 

10. Editor’s Note: This takes into account UN Resolution 242, which some argue grants 

Palestinian refugees the “Right of Return.” This resolution is not recognized by Israel, and as 

Ruth Lapidoth has written, “Neither under the international conventions, nor under the major 

UN resolutions, nor under the relevant agreements between the parties, do the Palestinian 

refugees have a right to return to Israel.” Ruth Lapidoth, “Do Palestinian Refugees Have 

a Right to Return to Israel?” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, 15 January 2001 

(http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Do+Palestinian

+Refugees+Have+a+Right+to+Return+to.htm).

11. Editor’s Note: According to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information 

Administration, Iran holds the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves and the world’s 

second-largest natural gas reserves. Energy Information Administration, “Iran Energy 

Profile” (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=IR).

12. Ibid.
Karim Sadjadpour

31 

gasoline, rising domestic consumption, and stagnating or decreasing 

production due to infrastructure deterioration, Iran’s oil exports are 

projected to drop.13 If the trends continue—increased consumption 

and decreased output—Iran could conceivably be on the path to 

being a net oil importer. 

Such a situation would force very painful decisions. Either the regime 

would have to cut gasoline subsidies—a difficult task for a president 

who ran on a populist platform—or the leadership would have to alter 

its policies to attract rather than repel outside investment. Most likely 

it will require a combination of both. 

Terrorism

For more than a decade, Iran has been atop the State Department’s list 

of “state sponsors of terror,” due mainly to its support for Hezbollah 

and the Palestinian militant groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Absent 

either a Palestinian-Israeli settlement or a U.S.-Iranian diplomatic 

accommodation, this situation will likely continue. At the same time, 

however, Iran and the United States share a common enemy in the 

inherently anti-Shiite al-Qaeda. 

III. How to Talk to Iran

The long-standing taboo about talking to America has seemingly 

been broken in Tehran. While just five years ago, individuals could be 

imprisoned in Iran for advocating dialogue with the United States,

today Iran’s president has written open letters to former President 

Bush and challenged him to debates. 

Nonetheless, there are a variety of reasons why even a sincere, sustained 

American attempt to dialogue with Tehran may not bear fruit: 

13. Editor’s Note: According to the Central Intelligence Agency’s “World Factbook,” 

Iran produces 4.7 million barrels of oil per day and consumes 1.6. The country also produces 

111.9 billion cubic meters of natural gas and consumes 111.8 billion cubic meters (https://

www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/IR.html).
Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How?

32 

• Historically, the Islamic Republic has tended to make difficult decisions only under duress. Intoxicated by their newfound standing, Iran’s hard-liners may not feel compelled to 

make any compromises. 

• Paralyzed by the competing ambitions of various factions 

and institutions, the Islamic Republic may prove incapable 

of reaching an internal consensus, falling back on long-entrenched policies.

• Unconvinced of U.S. intentions, the regime may shun increased ties with Washington, believing it to be a Trojan horse 

for a counterrevolution.

• Fearful of the unpredictable domestic change that an opening with the United States might catalyze, Iran’s leadership 

may well perceive reconciliation with Washington as an existential threat. 

To ensure the greatest possible chance of success, there are eight useful 

prescriptions the Obama administration should keep in mind when 

dealing with Iran:

1. Build Confidence on Areas of Common Interest

In the past, the one issue on which there is intense disagreement and 

seemingly no common ground—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—has 

dominated the context of the U.S.-Iranian relationship and set the 

underlying tenor of distrust and ill will between the two sides.

Given that the fundamental source of tension between Washington 

and Tehran is mutual mistrust, confidence will be easier to build on 

areas of common interest, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, as opposed 

to areas of little or no common interest, such as the Palestinian-Israeli 

conflict or the nuclear issue. The Obama administration should seek 

to resume the U.S.-Iran discussions that the Bush administration 

initiated in Baghdad, while opening a similar channel of discussion 
Karim Sadjadpour

33 

in Kabul. Ideally, these talks can be gradually, quietly expanded to 

encompass the broader areas of contention.

2. Begin Cautiously

Timing is important. It is inadvisable for President Obama to immediately 

adopt a comprehensive engagement approach that could enhance 

Ahmadinejad’s chances of reelection in Iran’s June 2009 presidential 

elections.14 

If there is one thing that Ahmadinejad’s presidency has proven, it is 

that the institution of president in Iran has real power, influence, and 

responsibilities. Since his tenure began in August 2005, he has used 

that influence to amplify objectionable Iranian foreign practices, while 

domestically, he has curtailed political and social freedoms and shown 

a flagrant disregard for human rights. While Ahmadinejad’s reelection 

would not entirely preclude the prospect of a U.S.-Iran diplomatic 

breakthrough, his mere presence could present an insurmountable obstacle 

to confidence-building with Tehran. 

To be clear, even without a major U.S. overture, there is a decent likelihood 

that Ahmadinejad could be reelected. For one, a combination of political 

inertia and name recognition has helped incumbents win Iran’s last three 

presidential elections. More importantly, elections in Iran are not free and 

open, and this particular election will be strongly influenced by the wishes 

of the supreme leader—who has been generally supportive of Ahmadinejad.

Nonetheless, just as his election in 2005 shocked the most seasoned 

observers, Ahmadinejad’s defeat in 2009 is certainly a possibility. Given 

his considerable mismanagement of the economy, it will be difficult for 

Ahmadinejad to run on the platform of economic justice and populism 

14. Editor’s Note: In March 2009, U.S. President Barack H. Obama made an address to the 

people and leaders of Iran, who were celebrating Nowruz. Nowruz is the commemoration of the 

spring equinox in the northern hemisphere and is celebrated as the beginning of the new year in the 

Iranian world. In the address, Obama made a request that the two nations (Iran and the U.S.) begin 

a practice of constructive engagement. (Online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/

Videotaped-Remarks-by-The-President-in-Celebration-of-Nowruz/).
Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How?

34 

that got him elected in 2005. A major overture from the United 

States before the elections take place could redeem Ahmadinejad’s 

management style and increase his popularity, both in the eyes of the 

public and political elites, particularly Khamenei. For this reason, it is 

better to begin with cautious, limited engagement until Iran’s domestic 

situation is clearer.

3. Deal with Those Who Hold Power

Successful engagement will require a direct channel of communication 

with the supreme leader’s office, such as former Foreign Minister Ali 

Akbar Velayati, one of Khamenei’s chief foreign policy advisors, or 

perhaps ultimately with the leader himself.

Khamenei must be convinced that the United States is prepared to 

recognize and respect the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and must 

be disabused of his conviction that U.S. policy is to bring about regime 

change, not negotiate behavior change. What is more, Khamenei will 

never agree to any arrangement in which Iran is expected to publicly 

retreat or admit defeat, nor can he be forced to compromise through 

pressure alone. Besides the issue of saving face, he believes deeply 

that compromising in the face of pressure is counterproductive, as it 

projects weakness and only encourages greater pressure.

4. Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick

The Obama administration should heed the wisdom of former U.S.

President Theodore Roosevelt. While in the context of domestic 

U.S. politics, threatening violence against Iran has become a way of 

appearing tough on national security for Democrats and Republicans 

alike. In the last five years, such rhetoric has empowered Tehran’s hardliners and aggrandized Iran’s stature on the streets of Cairo, Amman,

and even Jakarta as the Muslim world’s only brave, anti-imperialist 

nation that speaks truth to power. What is more, when oil prices jump 

with each threat against Iran, Iran’s nuclear program and its financial 

patronage of Hezbollah and Hamas become less costly.
Karim Sadjadpour

35 

With its weekly “death to America” diatribes, the Iranian government 

is certainly complicit in engaging in bellicose rhetoric. The United 

States need not take its behavioral cues from an insecure, repressive, 

undemocratic regime. Instead of reciprocating a culture of threats and 

name-calling, the Obama administration should project the dignity 

and poise of a superpower rather than allow the Iranian regime to 

define the tenor of the public discourse. A rhetorically hostile U.S.

approach allows Iran’s leadership to paint the United States as an 

aggressor, both internationally and domestically, and absolve itself 

from responsibility for its largely self-inflicted isolation and soiled 

international reputation.

5. Do Not Let the Spoilers Set the Tenor

Though small in number, powerful cliques, both within Iran and 

among Iran’s Arab allies, have entrenched economic and political 

interests in preventing U.S.-Iran reconciliation. Domestically, these 

actors recognize that improved Iranian ties with Washington would 

likely induce political and economic reforms and competition that 

would undermine the quasi-monopolies they enjoy in isolation.

Among Iran’s Arab allies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, the prospect 

of a U.S-Iranian accommodation could mean an end to their primary 

source of funding. For this reason, when and if a serious dialogue 

commences, the spoilers will likely attempt to torpedo confidencebuilding efforts.

Their tactics vary. They may issue belligerent rhetoric, target U.S.

soldiers and interests in Iraq or Afghanistan, or see to it that a 

shipment of arms originating from Iran on its way to south Lebanon 

or Gaza is “discovered.” Their intention is to leave fingerprints in order 

to sabotage any chance of a diplomatic breakthrough.

If Washington ceases dialogue or confidence-building with Tehran in 

retaliation for an egregious act committed by the spoilers, they will 

have achieved their goal.
Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How?

36 

6. Be Discreet

When it comes to U.S.-Iranian interaction, empirical evidence has 

shown that covert discussions outside of public earshot have a greater 

success rate. Building confidence in the public realm will be difficult, 

as politicians from both sides will likely feel the need to issue harsh 

rhetoric in order to maintain appearances. In addition, the likelihood 

that spoilers can torpedo the process either through malicious rhetoric 

or action is more limited if they do not know about it.15

Recognizing that their regional influence derives in large part due to 

their defiance of the United States, Iran would likely prefer not to 

publicly advertise its discussions with the Americans.

7. Keep International Coalition Intact

More than any other actor, the United States has the capability to 

influence Iranian behavior, both for better and for worse. To the extent 

possible, however, it is essential that Washington attempt to maintain 

a common international approach toward Iran, especially regarding 

the nuclear issue. Tehran is highly adept at identifying and exploiting 

rifts in the international community, and diplomatic efforts to check 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions will unravel if key countries approach Iran 

with competing red lines.

A common European Union-U.S. approach is imperative. Given their 

divergent national interests, it may not be possible to unite China 

and Russia behind the U.S. position, although Moscow certainly has 

an interest in avoiding the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran within 

missile range. A more robust U.S. effort at direct dialogue with Tehran 

would assuage international concerns about U.S. intentions and send 

the signal to the EU, Moscow, and Beijing that the United States is 

serious about reaching a diplomatic resolution to this dispute, which 

will likely strengthen the health of the coalition.

15. For a different opinion on secrecy during negotiations, see Ronald Neumann’s essay, 

which is chapter 3 of this book.
Karim Sadjadpour

37 

8. Have Realistic Expectations

Around the same time President Obama was inaugurated in January 2009, 

the Iranian revolution marked its thirty-year anniversary. Throughout 

these last three decades, the U.S.-Iran relationship has been mired in 

deep-seated mistrust and ill will on a myriad of issues. Mindful of this 

mutual skepticism, results will not be instantaneous. Such antagonism 

will not melt away after one, two, or even six meetings. The initial pace 

will likely be painfully slow as each side ascertains whether the other 

truly has good intentions.
38 
39 

Chapter 3 

 When U.S.-Iranian Negotiations Start:

 A Primer

Ronald E. Neumann

Whether the United States should talk to Iran is fiercely debated. Rarely discussed are the obstacles a U.S. administration will 

face, and issues it must be prepared for, when the time does come to 

talk. Yet success or failure may well turn on just such matters.

Talking with enemies is a long tradition in diplomacy. This is so 

because unless defeat of the enemy is likely, some compromise is 

eventually needed. If total victory seems unlikely, discourse is useful. 

However, negotiations are not an end in themselves and may reveal 

that resolution is not possible. Nor are negotiations an alternative to 

conflict; both can be pursued simultaneously. Indeed, that was exactly 

how the United States negotiated independence from Great Britain. 

But that analogy should remind us that one may have conflict and 

discussions continuing side by side for long periods.

Advocates of talks tend to point to opportunities missed. Recent books 

have noted particularly an Iranian offer in May 2003 to enter into 

comprehensive talks.1 Writers have pointed to the interests in common 

and suggested the possibility of a “grand bargain.”2

 That is one possible 

outcome. But to attempt to reach a bargain without adequate advance 

reflection on how to overcome the problems that must be dealt with 

along the way is unlikely to lead to successful negotiations. And failure 

may be politically painful.

1. See Tarita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the 

United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007); and Barbara Slavin, Bitter 

Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, 2007).

2. The question of dealing with Iran on issues of common interest is addressed by Karim 

Sadjadpour in chapter 2 of this book.
Chapter 3: When U.S. - Iranian Negotiations Start: A Primer

40 

True, there are some common interests, including the potential for 

stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. And each side has things to offer the 

other, including an end to support for terrorism and development of 

Iran’s oil and gas resources without the impediment of U.S. hostility. 

However, it is important to remember is that each side wants things 

that the other will be most loath to concede. To reach an agreement, 

the United States will have to cut through massive amounts of 

suspicion, misunderstanding, legal obstacles, and the domestic political 

opposition each side will face. 

Suspicions

That the United States does not trust Iran needs little proof. It is 

worth understanding that they may be equally mistrustful. The Iranian 

government believed the George H.W. Bush administration would 

open talks after the hostages in Lebanon were released, but that 

did not happen. The Six-plus-Two talks led to Iranian cooperation 

in negotiating the Afghan peace arrangements of the Bonn Accord 

but withered thereafter.3 The Iranian offer of 2003 appears to have 

met without even the courtesy of a response. For Iran, the present 

demand for nuclear preconditions to talk may look very much like a 

continuation of a familiar pattern in which U.S. willingness to engage 

disappears once U.S. goals are achieved. This does not mean that a deal 

cannot be reached, but it does suggest that preconditions will be hard 

to achieve and that Iran will seek guarantees from the United States,

and vice versa.

Domestic suspicions and political opposition will complicate matters 

for each side. There remain Iranian elements with a deeply entrenched 

ideological opposition to talking with the United States. Talks 

themselves, and any arrangement reached, will potentially be a political 

stick that various Iranian opposition elements will find convenient to 

attack whoever is conducting the talks. Whatever the complexion of 

3. These talks involved Afghanistan’s six neighboring countries plus the United States 

and Russia. 
Ronald E. Neumann

41 

the Iranian government that enters into talks, it will be aware of this. 

Thus the domestic pressures on the Iranian side to reach a deal that 

can be justified as heavily in favor of Iran will be large.

The same will be true in reverse for a U.S. administration. Particularly 

after the disputed Iranian presidential election, there will be many in 

the U.S. domestic political arena ready to criticize the fact of talks, 

and even more any outcome that seems to “reward terrorism” or to 

surrender U.S. positions, especially on the nuclear issue. Finding an 

agreement that each side can defend successfully to its own domestic 

critics is going to be intensely difficult. The concessions needed by 

one side will be exactly the “giveaways” for which the other will be 

attacked. In the Americans’ case, this issue will be intensified by the 

probability that some issues to be settled may need legislation either to 

provide new arrangements or to remove old sanctions.

The “Larger” Issues

What one might call the major issues are much discussed in this book. 

In this chapter, it suffices to note them briefly. The biggest is of course 

the nuclear issue.4 Close behind it comes Iranian support for terrorism, 

particularly for Hezbollah and Hamas.5 For the Iranians, these groups 

are major geostrategic allies. While changes in Iraq and Afghanistan 

have removed major threats to Iran, it has no trusted friends on its 

borders. Iran is distrusted by the Sunni Arab regimes of the region 

and worries that U.S. troops could use its forces on Iran’s borders for a 

future attack. What level of U.S. concessions would Iran ask for from 

the United States for Iran to surrender or weaken ties to its allies? It 

is not known.

Then there is Iranian support for insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

For Iran, these issues look different. Fighting two wars ties up the 

United States and reduces the odds that it will use force against Iran.

4. See Simon Shercliff’s essay, which is chapter 4 in this book.

5. Editor’s Note: For more on Iran’s support of Hezbollah and Hamas and its perception 

within Israel, see Gerald M. Steinberg’s essay, which is chapter 6 in this book.
Chapter 3: When U.S. - Iranian Negotiations Start: A Primer

42 

What manner of guarantees will Iran seek to reduce what it may see 

as a potential threat from the United States? It is doubtful that Iran 

would simply trust promises from the U.S. as sufficient and equally 

doubtful that the U.S. would willingly give Iran a voice in limiting 

American troop numbers or deployments in either country.

None of this is meant to suggest that answers cannot be found over 

time. It is simply a reminder that finding solutions to the major issues 

in a bargain will be difficult, and that the odds of failure or impasse are 

at least as good as those of success.

The “Lesser” Issues

There are a host of issues on which Iran has been insisting for many 

years. Each could be a deal breaker for a U.S. administration. One 

is the Iranian demand for the payment of the so-called “frozen 

accounts” held by the United States since the hostage affair in Tehran 

(4 November 1979 to 29 January 1981). In reality, there are no bank 

accounts as such. All of the blocked accounts were released at the time 

of the Algiers declaration that settled the hostage crisis.6 There may 

be some limited funds held by the U.S. Treasury. However, most of 

what is at issue are Iranian claims for payments made for U.S. military 

equipment either never built or never delivered. In many cases, the 

money went to U.S. contractors in settlement of claims. The claims 

now amount to between $20 and $30 billion, depending on interest 

calculations. There are some 1,100 such cases. In the 30 years since the 

Iran-United States Claims Tribunal at The Hague went to work to 

resolve disputed claims (as part of the Algiers Accords that freed the 

hostages), only 130 of these cases have been submitted to the tribunal, 

and none of them have been heard or resolved.7 Expecting the tribunal 

process to resolve these 1,100 cases in anything like the time needed 

for a political settlement is unrealistic. So too is an expectation that the 

Iranians are likely to accept waiting many more years for one of their 

6. Editor’s Note: For a review of U.S.-Iranian relations, including the hostage crisis, see 

Kenneth Katzman, U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws 

and Regulations (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1999).

7. For an overview and a database of the claims, see the site for the Iran-United States 

Claims Tribunal (http://www.iusct.org/).
Ronald E. Neumann

43 

largest (and politically most sensitive) issues to be resolved. Assuming 

at least some of the Iranian claims are sustained, the U.S. paying them 

may require the use of appropriated funds. Congress may not agree.

Additionally, the Iranians have brought new claims for damages 

inflicted by U.S. sanctions that they claim are in violation of the 

Algiers Accords. They have also alleged that U.S. covert actions have 

caused damages and that these too are in violation of the accords. It is 

not known whether these are serious claims or bargaining positions.

Another particularly troubling issue will be the private claims of U.S.

citizens upheld by U.S. courts against Iran on grounds of terrorism. 

Some estimates of these claims put them in the neighborhood of $16 

billion in compensatory damages and perhaps another $25 billion in 

punitive damages. An additional $50 billion or so in such judgments 

relate to Iranian actions in Iraq.8

Iran has never recognized U.S. jurisdiction. It is unlikely to do so now 

and still less likely to pay such claims. Unless the issue is settled, a wide 

variety of U.S. and international businesses and even some international 

organizations could find their assets under threat in the United States 

for settlement of these damages. It is highly unlikely that Iran would 

close a deal on other matters and leave itself vulnerable to pressure 

from this source.

There would be no shortage of congressional voices ready to defend 

American citizens and U.S. court judgments from “giveaways to 

terrorists.” An American administration that begins negotiations 

would be well-advised to have thought through this issue and found 

some negotiating ideas.

Other troublesome issues may arise. The Iranians previously wanted 

the United States to turn over leaders from the Mujahdin-e-Khalq 

8. I am indebted to the Legal Advisor’s office at the U.S. Department of State for 

background on these legal issues. Figures are estimates, but the order of magnitude makes 

the point.
Chapter 3: When U.S. - Iranian Negotiations Start: A Primer

44 

(MEK) that are held in loose confinement in Camp Ashraf in Iraq.9

Forced turnover would probably be illegal under international law 

be, opposed by human rights groups, and meet with at least some 

congressional opposition. MEK leaders have officially passed into 

Iraqi custody, but the Iranians may believe that the United States will 

be unable to control the Iraqis and, thus, this issue may not yet be 

removed from the debate. But that is not yet certain, and so far it 

remains an Iranian counter to U.S. requests for the surrender of alQaeda members held by Iran.

The Legal Structure

Some U.S. sanctions on Iran have been codified in law, while others 

are contained in a series of executive orders.10 While in theory the 

executive branch has considerable freedom to change these sanctions, 

there will be a variety of forces intent on maintaining them, and 

they may lobby intensely for congressional action to put more of the 

sanctions into laws. Interested parties will range from committed 

proponents of overthrowing the Iranian regime to California pistachio 

growers wanting to protect their market.11

A U.S. administration that reaches a deal with Iran will have to 

persuade Congress to remove sanctions or not extend them over 

executive branch statements that their intent has been met. This in 

turn will increase pressures on the administration to show it has gained 

9. Editor’s Note: According to Acting Deputy Department Spokesman Gordon Duguid 

of the U.S. State Department, “the disposition of Camp Ashraf was given a full transfer to the 

responsibility of the Iraqis on February the 20th [2009].” He went on to say, “responsibility 

for resolving the situation at the camp rests with the Government of Iraq at this time.” For 

the full statement, see the Daily Press Briefing, 30 March 2009 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/

prs/dpb/2009/03/120983.htm). 

10. Relevant laws and executive orders are summarized by the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, in a January 2009 document, “Iran: What You 

Need to Know about U.S.Economic Sanctions” (http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/

ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf).

11. When sanctions on Iranian pistachios were lifted during the Clinton administration’s 

effort to reach out to Iran, California growers managed in effect to maintain them through 

intensive lobbying that retained prohibitive duties dating from 1985 based on an allegation of 

dumping. See John Lancaster, “Pistachio Diplomacy,” Washington Post, 23 March 2000; and 

Scott Peterson, “Iran’s Prized, and Political, Nuts,” Christian Science Monitor, 2 December 

1999. I am also indebted to professors W. Scott Harrop and Rouhollah K. Ramazani for 

further updates.
Ronald E. Neumann

45 

a victory in the negotiations. Grand bargains and one-sided victories 

are uneasy bedfellows.

Negotiating Styles and Starting Points

With so many domestic political perils awaiting, there may be a desire 

for secret talks. This was a repeated idea when Iran flirted with contacts 

during the Clinton administration.12 It may be again.13 However, it 

is a temptation that should be avoided since the probability of leaks 

from one side or the other is high, and the results are usually to put 

one or both governments on the defensive with domestic critics. The 

United States may, and probably should, try to keep the content of 

negotiations under wraps but should avoid the vulnerability of trying 

to keep the talks themselves secret.

The secrecy issue is but one example of the difference in styles and 

starting points between Washington and Tehran. While a new 

U.S. administration may have different tactics, the U.S. tendency 

in negotiations has usually been to precede them with extensive 

interdepartmental negotiations (the interagency process). Departments 

of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice are likely to have 

different views in regard to negotiations with Iran. This is akin to 

negotiating with oneself before negotiating with others.

The result is that U.S. negotiators often lack flexibility, and negotiations 

can stall for long periods while the U.S. government fights within 

itself. Some administrations have tried to avoid this by negotiating 

in great secrecy from most of the government. Sometimes this works. 

U.S. Secretaries of State James A. Baker III and Henry A. Kissinger 

were masterful in this regard. But poorly handled, the results of such 

an approach produced the Iran-Contra scandal, complete with a key12. I was Iran Country Director for part of this time. Our answer that we could 

only pledge best efforts at confidentiality but not promise it was for us an honest answer, 

recognizing the probability of leaks. The Iranians seemed to regard the response as a trap, 

leaving us free to leak on purpose to weaken them at a time of our choosing.

13. Editor’s Note: See also Karim Sadjadpour’s essay, chapter 2 of this book.
Chapter 3: When U.S. - Iranian Negotiations Start: A Primer

46 

shaped cake and a Bible.14 Only strong presidential leadership can 

steer through such problems.

American negotiators tend to start from interests. The inclination is 

to list what is wanted and what can be given and then to try it out 

on representatives of the other side. From their reactions, negotiators 

then try to judge how to repackage the deal and what shifts they may 

have to accommodate. Having watched Iranians negotiate off and 

on for three decades, my guess is that the Iranian style will be very 

different. They will hold out vaguely worded promises in return for 

specific concessions, and later, the promises may dissolve when one 

tries to grasp them. Deals may seem close, only to fall apart as new 

demands or issues are advanced.

Americans may see such tactics as bad faith. For the Iranians, it is a 

matter of testing to see how firm or weak the other side is, whether it 

can be manipulated, and whether it is in so much of a hurry to reach 

agreement that it will make foolish concessions.

Iranians place great emphasis on “respect.” Persian culture has 

complicated and deeply ingrained habits of speech and manners to 

show respect for person and position in social interaction that are very 

foreign to American habits of frankness and direct speech. Ignorant 

negotiators can easily find themselves at cross purposes, particularly 

since the overheated public rhetoric in each country’s domestic 

discourse is unlikely to be controllable. The Iranian government is likely 

to react harshly—in American eyes perhaps disproportionately—to 

phrases like “Axis of Evil.” Misunderstandings arising from these 

stylistic differences can arouse anger and confusion.

This Iranian style is all the more likely if they misunderstand a U.S.

decision to negotiate after years of refusal. Iranian analysis is likely 

14. Editor’s Note: “These operations [Iran-Contra] were the provision of assistance to 

the military activities of the Nicaraguan contra rebels during an October 1984 to October 

1986 prohibition on such aid, and the sale of U.S. arms to Iran in contravention of stated U.S. 

policy and in possible violation of arms-export controls.” See Lawrence E. Walsh, “Final 

Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,” U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia Circuit, 4 August 1993 (online at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/).
Ronald E. Neumann

47 

to be along the lines that when the United States felt strong, it made 

demands. Now that it is in trouble in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and 

in seeking an Arab-Israeli peace, it is weak and willing to pay heavily 

for Iranian support. Simply working through such preconceptions 

may be very time consuming and frustrating for the unprepared.

What to Do

The preceding catalogue of difficulties suggests neither that negotiations 

should not take place, nor that they cannot succeed. It does suggest 

certain conclusions.

First, negotiations must have strong presidential support and guidance. 

Without this, they will flounder in a morass of interagency differences, 

leaks, and domestic pressures.

Second, talks should be preceded by careful consideration within the 

administration of how far the United States might go in meeting 

Iranian demands. It is probably unwise to try for full interagency 

agreement, as it is likely to come at the cost of inflexible negotiating 

positions. But a president should have some idea of the problems 

negotiations will encounter and the price he might have to pay.

Third, the American public and the Congress need to be told frankly 

not only why the United States and Iran are talking, but that we expect 

talks to be long, possibly lasting years, that they will be difficult, and 

that essential interests will not be forfeited.

Fourth, neither talks nor pressures should be hostage to the other. To 

paraphrase former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the United 

States needs to negotiate as if there were no conflict and struggle 

as if there were no talks. The alternatives are either failed talks or a 

position of great weakness if every confrontation is hobbled by fears 

that it will undermine talks. The Iranians have mastered this quite 

traditional method of diplomacy, and the United States and its allies 

must do likewise.
Chapter 3: When U.S. - Iranian Negotiations Start: A Primer

48 

Fifth, it is advisable to start slowly, exploring with the Iranians where 

there may be areas suitable for agreement. There have not been bilateral 

negotiations about a broad range of issues for years. Guesswork 

constitutes much of what Americans assume in the Iranian position, 

and the same is true of the Iranian assumptions. Haste will only convey 

weakness and misestimating of what is possible. Proceedings should 

be neither timid nor harsh, but should proceed slowly, identifying 

issues and problems, and trying to understand the Iranians and repay 

them in kind. Only from such a process can negotiators judge whether 

to pursue a great bargain or a series of smaller steps and agreements.

Finally, managing complicated allied relationships will not be an easy 

task. America’s European allies, and even the Russians and Chinese, 

have been partners in joint positions toward Iran. The Gulf Arabs fear 

Iranian claims to hegemony in the Persian Gulf. Israel has strong views 

about the danger Iran poses for Israeli security. If U.S. consultation 

is deemed too little, suspicion will be intense and have ramifications 

in many other areas. If consultation is too broad, negotiations may 

become hostage to too many conflicting views, a circumstance that 

also would surely invite leaks.

It is not possible to reduce the difficult process of allied consultations 

to a set of propositions. But it is necessary to remember to manage the 

process carefully.

In the end, negotiations are worthwhile. At a minimum, they are likely 

to clear away misconceptions and improve the conditions for eventual 

improvements. So long as proceedings are undertaken carefully, without 

a sense of pressure, and with an eye fixed on the above cautions, even 

an unsuccessful effort need not be costly. And who knows, there might 

be success. The potential rewards in regional stability are great enough 

to warrant considerable efforts.
49 

Chapter 4 

 The Iranian Nuclear Issue

Simon Shercliff

Goal: An Iran Without Nuclear Weapons

The Iranian nuclear issue has not been far from the top of the international agenda since late 2002, when important but 

hitherto secret aspects of the Iranian program were first brought 

to the attention of the general public. The issue is simple: whatever 

the reality of Iran’s motivations, intentions, and scientific progress, 

there are fundamental reasons to be concerned about Iran’s activities 

involving uranium enrichment and heavy water projects. The concern 

of the British government is that these proliferation-sensitive 

activities, like plutonium reprocessing, could become part of a nuclear 

weapons program.

The goal of the British government is to ensure that Iran does not 

build a nuclear weapon. London believes that the best way to do this 

is by securing an Iranian suspension of proliferation-sensitive nuclear 

activities until the international community can be satisfied that Iran’s 

intentions are indeed peaceful, as the Iranians claim. The United 

Kingdom and its allies are not trying to stop Iran from constructing 

power reactors that will generate electricity as part of a peaceful, 

civilian nuclear program.

Why Are We Worried?

Our concern, shared formally with members of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and the 

United Nations (UN) Security Council and informally with almost 

every other country in the world, is that the Iranian regime wants 

to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. This concern is rooted in 

the huge confidence deficit felt by the international community in 

Iran’s intentions. This lack of confidence stems in large measure from 
Chapter 4: The Iranian Nuclear Issue

50 

the inability to understand Iran’s urgent determination to develop 

uranium enrichment and heavy water projects for which it currently 

has no apparent civilian need, but which would give it the capabilities 

to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does 

allow its nonnuclear-weapon state parties to develop sensitive fuel cycle 

technologies, but only if they are properly declared and safeguarded.1

Iran has fallen short compared to other countries in this last regard. 

It has been found in past noncompliance with the treaty’s safeguards 

obligations and has continued to be much less than fully cooperative 

with the IAEA. This is another major reason for the confidence deficit 

in Iran’s intentions.

The international community has many questions about why Iran is in 

such a hurry to develop its enrichment program. Enrichment facilities 

are expensive, and most operators of civilian nuclear power stations 

contract their fuel supply from elsewhere for this reason, particularly if 

they only have a few power reactors. Iran has only one civilian nuclear 

power station, which is being built in Bushehr by the Russians. It 

is not yet completed. The Russians have guaranteed the fuel supply 

for the first ten years of Bushehr’s operation, with the prospect of 

continued supply beyond that period. No one is trying to prevent the 

Russians from completing construction on the Bushehr plant or from 

supplying its fuel.

There are two other reasons for concern. First, prior to 2002, Iran 

deliberately concealed the proliferation-sensitive elements of its nuclear 

program for almost twenty years. It did so in clear contravention of 

its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA under the 

NPT, and it has never been able to explain why.2 Second, once the 

1. Editor’s Note: The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into 

force in 1970 and currently has 187 member states. The United Nations site has information 

about the treaty as well as the full text (http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/).

2. Editor’s Note: According to the IAEA site, “Safeguards are activities by which 

the IAEA can verify that a State is living up to its international commitments not to use 

nuclear programs for nuclear-weapons purposes.” See IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview: 

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols” (http://www.iaea.org/

Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html).
Simon Shercliff

51 

IAEA inspectors were permitted into Iran, under great international 

pressure, to assess the hitherto secret aspects of Iran’s nuclear 

program, they uncovered evidence that called into question Iran’s 

activity relating to what the IAEA itself has called “possible military 

dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.”3

 Iran is still refusing to answer 

these questions. These and other concerns create the confidence deficit 

that the international community feels about Iran’s intentions.

The IAEA, in its report on Iran’s nuclear program (19 November 2008), 

repeated its frustration that Iran is still not sufficiently cooperating.4

Moreover, according to this report, Iran had almost 4,000 centrifuges 

being fed with uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas, and all the indications 

are that it intends to install additional centrifuges.5

 The report showed 

that Iran has already enriched 630 kilograms of low enriched uranium 

(LEU). It also makes clear that Iran is still refusing to implement the 

Additional Protocol, which it has already signed.6

3. Editor’s Note: See IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement 

and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 

1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director 

General, GOV/2008/59, 19 November 2008 (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/

Board/2008/gov2008-59.pdf). See also that organization’s site, “In Focus: IAEA and Iran,” 

which includes an archive of reports, statements, and UN resolutions (http://www.iaea.org/

NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml).

4. Editor’s Note: See IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement 

and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 

1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director 

General, GOV/2008/59, 19 November 2008 (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/

Board/2008/gov2008-59.pdf).

5. Editor’s Note: According to a report issued by the IAEA director general “On 1 

February 2009, 3936 centrifuges were being fed with UF6; 1476 centrifuges were installed 

and under vacuum, and an additional 125 centrifuges were installed but not under vacuum.” 

See IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of 

Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the 

Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, GOV/2009/8, 19 February 2009 

(http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-8.pdf).

6. Editor’s Note: According to the IAEA site, the Additional Protocol is a legal document 

complementing comprehensive safeguards agreements. The measures enable the IAEA not 

only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances 

as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a state. See IAEA, “IAEA 

Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols” 

(http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html). For Iran’s signing 

of the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003, see the IAEA site (http://www.iaea.org/

NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html).
Chapter 4: The Iranian Nuclear Issue

52 

This lack of cooperation inevitably leads to the suspicion that Iran 

does not want to provide the IAEA with the greater information 

and access that an Additional Protocol would give compared to Iran’s 

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the agency. 

The director general of the IAEA, Mohamed M. ElBaradei, observed 

in September 2008 that “only through the expeditious resolution 

of these outstanding issues can doubts arising there from about the 

exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme be dispelled, 

particularly in light of many years of clandestine activities by Iran.”7

Notwithstanding its Obligations, What is the 

Problem with Iran Having a Nuclear Weapon? 

Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon would have dangerous 

consequences in an already unstable region. Iran might be emboldened 

to exert its influence even more than it is already doing. Other countries 

in the region would consider acquiring their own nuclear capabilities, 

driven by their own mistrust of Iran’s intentions. Iranian possession 

of a nuclear weapon also could do great damage to regional security 

and to the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the international 

nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

What About Allowing Limited Enrichment on 

Iranian Soil, which They Seem to Want?

Many experts believe that if Iran is allowed to continue with developing 

uranium enrichment technology, even on a small scale, this experience 

would enable them to replicate the technology elsewhere in a covert 

military program.8

 It is worth noting that when the United Kingdom 

developed its own centrifuge enrichment program, it ran a sixteen7. Editor’s Note: See IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and 

relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 

(2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, GOV/2008/38, 15 

September 2008 (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-38.pdf).

8. Editor’s Note: For examples, see Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, The Last 

Resort: Consequences of Preventative Military Action against Iran. Policy Focus, no. 84. 

(Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008; online at http://www.

washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus84.pdf); and Kori Schake, “Dealing with a 

Nuclear Iran,” Policy Review 142 (April and May 2007; online at http://www.hoover.org/

publications/policyreview/6848072.html).
Simon Shercliff

53 

centrifuge cascade for two years before moving to larger cascades. It 

was this very limited program that allowed us to take significant steps 

toward mastering the processes and technology.

In addition, as has been pointed out by some experts, if Iran is permitted 

to continue small-scale enrichment, the IAEA would be hindered in its 

efforts to detect clandestine enrichment activity because procurement 

of the necessary materials for a clandestine program could be masked 

by legitimate procurement for the permitted program.9

Iran has already produced 630 kilograms of UF6 enriched to 3.5 

percent LEU. Unless there is a suspension of its production soon, it 

may not be long before Iran has generated sufficient LEU to enable it 

to produce, after further enrichment, enough highly enriched uranium 

(HE U) for a first weapon. These developments reinforce the need for 

us to move fast toward our goal: regaining Iranian suspension of its 

program until we can be sure of its intentions.

So What Are We Doing About It?

In confronting this challenge, we are up against a self-confident, 

ideological regime. It senses that the West currently is overburdened 

in Iraq and Afghanistan and unwilling or unable to challenge Iran in 

a meaningful way. Until recently, with oil at $140-plus per barrel, it 

was flush with cash.10 But Iran too is now suffering with the downturn 

in the international financial situation, and sanctions are biting. Our 

need is to present the Iranian decision-making machinery—confusing 

and opaque though it is—with an absolutely clear choice between 

cooperation and confrontation with the international community. The 

best policy is the classic diplomatic approach of carrots and sticks. 

This is the so-called dual-track policy, settled on and implemented 

by the UN Security Council at the instigation of the E3+3 (United 

Kingdom, United States, France, Germany, Russia, and China).

9. Ibid.

10. Editor’s Note: This refers to oil prices in June-July 2008. See U.S. Department of 

Energy, Energy Information Agency, “Petroleum Navigator” (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/

pet/hist/wtotworldw.htm).
Chapter 4: The Iranian Nuclear Issue

54 

Iran does have a choice between confronting or cooperating. It is clear 

that some in the regime worry that the price of confrontation is too 

high. Others are interested in the benefits a good relationship with 

the international community can bring. We need to continue making 

plain this choice in order to achieve the eventual goal.

Why Do We Think Such an Approach Will Work?

First, some in the Iranian regime, unlike in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or 

Kim Jong-il’s North Korea, want to be respectable. The regime goes 

to great lengths to present its nuclear program as legal. This means 

that censure by international organizations like the IAEA and UN

Security Council, and the international unanimity we have worked 

hard to maintain through the E3+3, are powerful points of pressure in 

their own right.

Second, Iran, while far from being an ideal democracy, does have 

a system that allows for some differences of opinion and in which 

there are competing voices and power centers. There is, therefore, 

considerable debate within the country on the regime’s handling of 

the nuclear file, often in public, and there may be opportunities to 

exploit this debate to our advantage.

Third, Iran has a young, open society, and the majority of its people 

aspire to reintegrate with the world. This offers us the opportunities 

through our policies to influence political debates and create bottomup pressures.

Fourth, we have things that Iran needs, including the technology that 

it needs to develop and meet the needs of its young population.

How Does the Policy Work?

Sustained, unanimous diplomatic pressure is one powerful tool at our 

disposal. Iran has consistently and incorrectly calculated that it can 

divide the international community. It thought that China and Russia 

would never allow them to be referred to the UN Security Council. 
Simon Shercliff

55 

Once there, they thought that China and Russia would never allow 

the adoption of sanctions against them. In fact, the Security Council 

has now adopted five mandatory resolutions on Iran.11

Sanctions and economic pressures are another important tool. They 

affect the debate at different levels. Ordinary Iranians worry about the 

impact of inflation and growing unemployment. The financial sector 

is suffering from financial sanctions. The politically influential bazaari

(merchant) class are finding it increasingly expensive and difficult to 

do business as access to international credit dries up. Many European 

banks have stopped dealing with Iran. In the United Kingdom, for 

example, Iranian banks no longer have access to clearance in sterling.

Finally, we see real nervousness about the impact of de facto sanctions. 

Iran’s aging oil industry is creaking, with production declining. The 

future depends on the development of Iran’s enormous gas reserves, but 

to do so will require both technology and major foreign investment. 

The political class and technocrats worry about how Iran is going to 

pay the bills and provide for its people, 70 percent of whom are under 

age thirty, in a few years’ time. 

So while we have not yet persuaded them to stop enriching, pressures 

are building. The European Union (EU) has already applied measures 

complementary to, and exceeding, UN Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 1803.12 Measures that both processes have so far yielded 

include: designating banks; making further travel bans and asset 

freezes; limiting export credits; imposing export bans on sensitive 

dual-use items; and conducting cargo inspections for Iran’s national 

airline and shipping line. But we must still do more, and do it urgently.

11. Editor’s Note: Four UNSCR resolutions were adopted unanimously: 1737 (2006); 

1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008). A fifth, 1696 (2006) was passed with a vote of 

fourteen in favor, and one (Qatar) opposed. All of the resolutions can be found online through 

both the UN (http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm) and the IAEA (http://www.iaea.org/

NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml).

12. Editor’s Note: UNSCR 1803 (March 2008) called for Iran to abide by the NPT 

(http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf).
56 

While increasing pressure is important, the other strand of our policy is 

the carrots. Sharpening the choice for Iranian decision-makers means 

demonstrating that there is a price to be paid for unacceptable policies, 

but also that there is a way out if the regime modifies its behavior. That 

means continuing to hold out the offer of a new relationship if Iran 

modifies its policies. The package that the E3+3 first proposed in June 

2006—with the U.S. administration’s support—remains on the table 

and was “refreshed” in June 2008. This offer includes providing help 

to Iran to build power reactors for the generation of electricity and 

guaranteeing supplies of nuclear fuel for them. It also would extend 

significant political and economic benefits, including a trade and 

cooperation agreement and strategic energy partnership with the EU, 

the lifting of sanctions in some areas crucial to the Iranian economy, 

and the chance to discuss regional security issues with the six as a 

whole, including the United States.

Conclusion

Our approach should remain one of using a combination of pressure 

and incentives to persuade the Iranians to change their behavior. 

There are always frustrations with such an approach, but we believe 

that, if vigorously pursued, this approach can still offer the best way of 

achieving our ultimate goal: an Iran without nuclear weapons.
57 

Chapter 5 

Reflections on Iran’s Policy Toward Iraq

Mohsen M. Milani

There are hardly any disagreements among experts that the Islamic 

Republic of Iran is an influential and important foreign power in 

post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. At dispute is the extent of that power as 

well as Iran’s intentions and objectives. On one hand, there are those 

who maintain that Iraq is “lost” to Iran. Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, 

Saud al-Faisal, was quoted in 2006 as saying that “we are handing the 

whole country [Iraq] to Iran without reason.”1 A 2007 report by the 

British Chatham House concluded that “Iran has superseded the U.S.

as the most influential power in Iraq.”2 On the other hand, the Islamic 

Republic of Iran insists that Iran is well-intentioned and a natural 

ally of the new Iraq and that Iranian policy toward that country is 

designed solely to support the territorial integrity of Iraq and its 

political independence and economic prosperity. Tehran rejects as 

propaganda the assertion that it interferes in Iraq’s internal affairs.

Although both of these extreme perspectives contain elements of 

truth, neither does justice in accurately depicting Iran’s strategic goals 

or its actual power inside Iraq. This chapter briefly identifies some of 

Iran’s main strategic goals toward the new Iraq without discussing 

the mechanisms, the tactics, and the channels Tehran is employing to 

achieve them. First, though, here are a few general comments about 

the nature of Iran’s regional policies, placing Iran’s policy toward Iraq 

in a proper context and framework. 

1. Saud al-Faisal quoted in Megan K. Stack and Borzou Daragahi, “Iran Was on Edge; 

Now It’s on Top,” Los Angeles Times, 18 February 2006 (http://articles.latimes.com/2006/

feb/18/world/fg-iranrising18).

2. Gareth R.V. Stansfield, “Accepting Realities in Iraq” (briefing paper, Chatham House, 

London, 2007), 8 (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/501/).
Chapter 5: Reflections on Iran’s Policy Toward Iraq

58 

I. Is Iranian Foreign Policy Made by “Mad 

Mullahs” or by Calculating Ayatollahs?

In politics, perception is sometimes more powerful than reality. 

Incorrect perceptions can lead to incorrect policies, and misleading 

policies can have devastating consequences. For the past few years, a 

popular image has gained increasing acceptance in the American mass 

media and even among some prominent academics. This perception 

is labeled the “mad mullah narrative” in this article. Stripped to its 

core, the narrative depicts Iranian leaders as dangerously irrational 

and even suicidal, a cabal of mostly bearded and turbaned men who 

cannot be deterred and who are obsessed with apocalyptic delusions, 

imperial ambitions, and even harboring death wishes. Professor 

Bernard Lewis, an erudite historian of the Near East, portrays Iran’s 

leaders as apocalyptic believers in martyrdom: “For people with this 

mindset, MAD [Mutually Assured Destruction] is not a constraint; 

it is an inducement.”3

 Many others have embellished Lewis’s alarmist 

assertions.4 Norman Podhoretz, for example, argued that “if the 

mullahs get the bomb . . . it was not they who would be deterred, but 

we,” because Iran’s “Islamofascist revolutionaries” are “ready to die for 

their beliefs” and thus do not care “about protecting their people.”5

Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s puerile questioning of the 

Holocaust, his reprehensive declaration that Israel “will be wiped out 

from the map of the world,” and his policy of continuing to enrich 

3. Bernard Lewis, “Does Iran Have Something in Store,” Wall Street Journal, 8 August 

2006 (http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110008768).

4. See Christopher Orlet, “Apocalyptic Ahmadinejad,” American Spectator, 6 October 

2006 (http://spectator.org/archives/2006/10/06/apocalyptic-ahmadinejad); Walter R.

Newell, “Why is Ahmadinejad Smiling? The Intellectual Sources of his Apocalyptic Vision,” 

Weekly Standard, 16 November 2006 (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/

Articles/000/000/012/795hlmvk.asp); and Joel C. Rosenberg, “Apocalypse Now? Is Iran 

Planning a Cataclysmic Strike for August 22?” National Review Online, 10 August 2006 

(http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NWNmMWM5MjhhMzVjZTM0ZmI1ZmJlYzAx

NzU3NDEyMWI=).

5. Norman Podhoretz, “Stopping Iran: Why the Case for Military Action Still Stands,” 

Commentary Magazine, February 2008, 11-19 (http://www.commentarymagazine.com/

viewpdf.cfm?article_id=11085).
Mohsen M. Milani

59 

uranium have surely rendered the mad mullah narrative deliciously 

palatable in the United States. But does the narrative accurately 

explain how key foreign policy decisions are made in Tehran?

The mad mullah narrative can unquestionably mobilize American 

public opinion against Iran’s nuclear ambitions and could be used 

to justify “regime change” or even war with Iran. It also creates the 

unambiguous impression that negotiations with Tehran’s “mad men” 

would be futile. Despite its clear benefits as a public relations strategy 

to undermine the Islamic Republic, the narrative’s analytical utility is 

limited. First, it overexaggerates the impact of certain Shiite beliefs on 

Iranian policies and sometimes confuses the rhetorical pronouncements 

of Iranian leaders with their actual policies. Second, the narrative 

focuses mostly on Ahmadinejad’s religious proclivities and creates 

the misleading impression that he, rather than Iran’s supreme leader, 

Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Hoseyni Khamenei, is the ultimate “decider” of 

Iranian foreign policy.6

In Iran’s bifurcated system of governance, the popularly elected 

president is a powerful force that cannot be ignored, but ultimately, 

he does not determine the tenor and direction of Iran’s foreign and 

security policies. The supreme leader alone makes those vital decisions. 

Moreover, the supreme leader, and not the president, is the commander 

in chief of the Iranian armed forces, including the regular armed 

forces and the Pasdaran (Islamic Revolution Guard Corps [IRGC]). 

The supreme leader appoints all commanders of Iran’s military and 

paramilitary forces. All report directly to him, and all are accountable 

to him, not to the president.

The supreme leader, who is unquestionably the most powerful figure 

in the Islamic Republic, does not run a one-man show, however, as 

Iran’s last monarch did. Despite all his powers, the supreme leader

must operate in a complex, fluid, and unpredictable system. To secure 

his own position, he must maintain some semblance of neutrality in a 

6. For an analysis of the role and ideas of Khamenei, see Karim Sadjadpour, Reading 

Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader (Washington D.C.: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, 2008), as well as Sadjadpour’s essay in this book (chapter 

2).
Chapter 5: Reflections on Iran’s Policy Toward Iraq

60 

highly factionalized polity, address the needs of various interest groups, 

and appease ambitious politicians and clerics.7 His most important 

responsibility is in fact protecting the survival of the entire system.

The mad mullah narrative seems to put the cart in front of the horse: 

Iranian policy makers formulate policy only after they determine their 

goals, evaluate their resources, and assess their enemies. Only then do 

they open their diverse ideological/Islamic toolbox to choose the most 

appropriate religious beliefs or symbols to legitimize and ultimately 

achieve their desired goals. The mad mullah narrative thus has the 

order in reverse. By focusing strictly on the religious dimension of 

Iranian foreign policy, the advocates of the mad mullah narrative are 

destined to see the tree but miss the forest.

Most critically, the mad mullah narrative ignores that both regime 

survival and expediency have played an infinitely more defining role 

in Iran’s foreign policies than some of its leaders’ apocalyptic and 

messianic beliefs. With the 1979 Tehran hostage crisis, former allies 

Iran and the United States became bitter enemies. Since that time, 

Iran’s top leadership, from Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini to 

Ayatollah Khamenei, has consistently perceived the United States as 

an existential threat.8 Ironically, both the shah’s regime and the Islamic 

Republic relied on an “American-centric” foreign policy to survive: 

the former by its alliance with the United States, and the latter by its 

unremitting hostility toward America.

Obsessed with regime survival, Iranian leaders have also skillfully 

institutionalized maslehat, or expediency. In the convoluted vernacular 

of Iranian foreign policy, maslehat can be accurately interpreted as 

nothing less than a “cost-benefit” approach to decision making. 

Interestingly, the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 

“Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” profoundly debunked 

7. Mehran Kamrava and Houchang Hassan-Yari offer an interesting analysis of the inner 

workings of Iran’s factionalized system. See their “Suspended Equilibrium in Iran’s Political 

System,” The Muslim World 94 (October 2004): 495-524.

8. See Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path 

to Confrontation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007).
Mohsen M. Milani

61 

the key assumptions of the mad mullah narrative; instead, it offered 

a nuanced and more accurate picture of how decisions are made in 

Iran.9 Based on the consensus of sixteen intelligence agencies, the 

controversial report concluded that Iran halted its “nuclear weapons 

program” in 2003 based on a “cost-benefit” approach—the exact 

opposite of what the mad mullah narrative suggests. Thus the report 

recognizes that Iran is not run by mad mullahs, but rather by calculating 

ayatollahs. There are in fact numerous other cases in which the Islamic 

Republic has utilized a “cost-benefit” approach in making key foreign 

policy decisions.

During the hostage crisis (1979-81), Khomeini ordered the release 

of the hostages only after the benefits outweighed the costs.10 The 

same “cost-benefit” approach guided his decision in approving secret 

dealings with the United States and Israel, which he had called the 

“Great Satan” and “Smaller Satan,” respectively. His tactical goal 

was to obtain weapons in order to achieve the strategic objective 

of defeating Iraq on the battlefield. Equally telling was the pivotal 

moment when he faced the impossibility of victory and the growing 

domestic opposition to the war Saddam Hussein had started and he 

had refused to end: Khomeini said he was willing to drink “from the 

chalice of poison” in order to sanction a cease-fire with Iraq in 1988. 

He justified it as maslehat.

The same temperament of decision making continued after Khomeini’s 

death. During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Tehran retained active 

neutrality, although Saddam Hussein offered lucrative concessions in 

an attempt to woo Tehran to side with him. Tehran also welcomed 

the liberation of Kuwait, acquiesced to the presence of U.S. troops in 

the region, and remained silent when Saddam massacred Iraqi Shiites.

Those decisions were made because the new president, Ali Akbar 

Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the new supreme leader, Khamenei, did not 

9. National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” 

(National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007; online at http://www.dni.gov/press_

releases/20071203_release.pdf).

10. See Mohsen M. Milani, “The Hostage Crisis,” Encyclopedia Iranica (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2004; online at http://www.iranica.com/newsite/).
Chapter 5: Reflections on Iran’s Policy Toward Iraq

62 

wish to antagonize the West in the unpredictable environment of the 

post-Khomeini era. Their ultimate goal was to consolidate their power.

Most interestingly, Iran did not support the Republic of Azerbaijan, 

the only country besides Iran and Iraq that is predominantly Shiite, 

in its conflict against the Republic of Armenia, an orthodox Christian 

country (1988-94). Iran’s motivation was, and still is, to protect its 

province of Azerbaijan against any secessionist impulse supported 

by the Republic of Azerbaijan. Similarly, Tehran did not back the 

Muslim Chechens against predominantly Christian Russia, whose 

support Iran needed to neutralize the U.S. containment of the Islamic 

Republic.

Iran’s strategies changed after the United States toppled the Taliban in 

2001.11 In Afghanistan, the IRGC rubbed shoulders with U.S. military 

advisors, providing intelligence to assist in the defeat of the Taliban.

At the same time, Iran moved opportunistically to gain strategic depth 

by expanding its sphere of influence in that country.

In all the cases cited above, decisions were made after a deliberative 

process; in each instance, the traits of flexibility were apparent. It 

would be foolhardy to think that the Iranian leadership formulates its 

foreign or nuclear policies based on such notions as the return of the 

Imam or martyrdom. Such beliefs are central to Shiite consciousness, 

but they cannot alone explain Iranian policies. The track record of the 

Islamic Republic in the past thirty years similarly does not suggest that 

the ayatollahs are suicidal, even if they support gullible masses who 

commit suicidal acts, and even though Iran has sponsored terrorism in 

some aspects of its foreign policy.

General John P. Abizaid, former commander of U.S. Central 

Command, understands these realities about the leadership of the 

Islamic Republic. He argues that while everything must be done to 

prevent Iran from going nuclear, the United States is perfectly capable 

11. See Mohsen M. Milani, “Iran’s Policy Toward Afghanistan,” Middle East Journal 60 

(Spring 2006): 235-56.
Mohsen M. Milani

63 

of containing a nuclear Iran, just as it contained the Soviet Union.12

Similar to the NIE, General Abizaid rejects the notion that Iranian 

leaders are irrational or suicidal. The political ramifications of such 

conclusions are rather straightforward: you can negotiate with Iran 

even though you might despise the regime and its policies. 

II. Iran’s Top Strategic Goals in Iraq

It is gradually becoming conventional wisdom in Washington that 

Iran has emerged as a regional power in one of the most troubled 

and strategically vital regions of the world. In an article published in 

2005, I made the same argument and maintained that Iranian policy 

toward Iraq needs to be analyzed and understood in the framework 

of Iran’s emergence as a regional player.13 By removing the Taliban 

and Saddam Hussein from power—Iran’s two nemeses—the United 

States accelerated Iran’s drive toward being a regional power, a process 

that began some years ago.14 Today, the United States and Iran are 

engaged in a fierce rivalry within Central Asia, the Caucuses, and a 

vast area between Afghanistan and Lebanon. That competition shapes 

the direction of Iranian foreign policy in fundamental ways.

Mohsen Rezai, a former IRGC commander, reflects the dominant 

view of the foreign policy establishment in Tehran when he argues 

that Iran is an “indispensable” regional power. He wrote in 2007:

Today Iran has no meaning without Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, 

and Syria. There was a time when Iran within its [own] borders meant something, but today, Iran is the region and our 

identity has now become intertwined with that of the region. 

It is our principle and undisputable right to become a regional 

12. David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Washington Sees an Opportunity in Iranian’s 

Defiance,” New York Times, 27 September 2007 (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.htm

l?res=9E03E0DE1E3EF934A1575AC0A9619C8B63&sec=&spon=&&scp=1&sq=Washing

ton%20Sees%20an%20Opportunity%20in%20Iranian%E2%80%99s%20Defiance&st=cse).

13. Mohsen M. Milani, “Iran, the Status Quo Power,” Current History, January 2005, 

30-36.

14. Ibid.
Chapter 5: Reflections on Iran’s Policy Toward Iraq

64 

power. We are a nation that can play such a leadership role, 

but they [the West/U.S.] would like to deprive us from playing such a role.15

The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush seemed to 

partially agree with Rezai’s analysis. In discussing the passage of 

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 in 

March of 2007, a U.S. official confirmed that the imposed sanctions 

had broader goals than just dealing with Iran’s nuclear program: “Its 

language was written to rein in what they [Security Council members] 

see as Tehran’s ambitions to become the dominant military power in 

the Persian Gulf and across the broader Middle East.”16

It is only after Iran is viewed as an emerging regional power with 

its own set of priorities and objectives that an understanding of the 

complexities of Iran’s deep involvement in Iraq today can take place.17

The remainder of this article briefly discusses five of Iran’s goals in 

Iraq. This list is far from complete and omits some key components 

of Iranian policy. It also does not address the nature of Iran’s support, 

military or otherwise, to various groups inside Iraq, nor the complex 

economic and security relations with Iraq; nor does this list address 

Iranian involvement in the Attabat (the cities in southern Iraq where 

the shrines of Shiite imams are located and a considerable population 

of Iranians or Iraqis of Iranian descent reside). However, this list is 

useful in understanding the overall themes of Iranian policy in Iraq 

and may serve as guidelines for future policy makers.

The list of five goals is not based on the order of their significance or 

their priority for Tehran, partly because Iranian policy toward Iraq 

changes as the ground situation in Iraq changes. Moreover, Iranian 

15. Iranian Students News Agency, 26 February 2007, translation by the author (http://

www.isna.ir/).

16. Thom Shanker, “Security Council Votes to Tighten Iran Sanctions,” New York 

Times, 25 March 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/world/middleeast/25sanctions.

html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Security%20Council%20Votes%20to%20Tighten%20Iran%20

Sanctions&st=cse).

17. The main arguments in this section are taken from my forthcoming book chapter, 

“Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy in the Post-Saddam Era,” in Ali Gheissari, ed., Contemporary 

Iran: Economy, Society, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Mohsen M. Milani

65 

policy toward Iraq is organically linked to Iran’s regional policies and 

to its own security concerns. Chief among these concerns are the 

situations in Afghanistan and Lebanon; the Arab-Israeli conflict; 

Iran’s nuclear dispute with the West; and Tehran’s perceived threat 

from Washington. In short, an Iran that believes it is making progress 

on these key fronts is an Iran that is more likely to collaborate with 

the United States in Iraq. An Iran whose survival is perceived as 

threatened, and whose security needs and growing regional influence 

are both ignored and not respected, is an Iran that is more likely to 

involve itself in acts of mischief against the United States in Iraq.

In Iraq, as elsewhere, Iranian policy is determined by the “cost-benefit” 

approach. Iran’s first and most important strategic goal toward Iraq 

is to ensure that a friendly Shiite-dominated government remains in 

power in Baghdad. Iran’s preference seems to be a reasonably strong 

federal system—powerful enough to impose internal order and 

maintain cohesion, but not strong enough to pose a serious security 

threat to the Islamic Republic. Iran understands that demography 

in elections is destiny and has consistently called for and supported 

free national elections in Iraq, convinced that the Shiite majority 

will prevail. Both Washington and Tehran have thus far supported 

successive Iraqi governments in the post-Saddam era; thus, there seems 

to be a convergence of strategic interests between them. Among Iraq’s 

neighbors, and in fact among all Islamic countries, none has been as 

supportive of the post-Saddam governments in Iraq as Iran has.

There are both strategic and security-related reasons for Iranian 

support for establishing a friendly Iraqi government in Baghdad. 

Iranian engagement in Iraq has deep historical roots that predate the 

advent of Islam. Ctesiphon, one of the palaces of the Sassanid dynasty 

(226-642), was located in the vicinity of present-day Baghdad. In the 

Islamic period, Persians provided financial and logistical support to the 

Abbasids, who overthrew the Ummayd dynasty (661-750) and moved 

the capital of the Islamic empire from Damascus to Baghdad. The era 

universally recognized as the golden age of Islam during the Abbasid 

rule was greatly aided by great Persian thinkers: scientists like Abu 
Chapter 5: Reflections on Iran’s Policy Toward Iraq

66 

Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariya Razi, who discovered how to make 

alcohol (ethanol); Avicenna (Ibn Sina), who is known as the prince of 

physicians; and mathematicians like Abu Abdallah Muhammad ibn 

Musa al-Khwarizmi, who was one of the fathers of algebra.

Iran continued to play an important role in Mesopotamia when it 

was part of the Ottoman Empire. For nearly four centuries, until the 

British established Iraq in 1921, the Persian Empire, as the defender 

of the Shiite faith, and the Ottoman Empire, as the protector of Sunni 

faith, fought numerous wars and signed more than twenty bilateral 

agreements about the thorny issue of the control over Mesopotamia. 

Historically, Iranian strategists looked at Mesopotamia and later Iraq 

as a prized and key region to expand Iranian influence in the Middle 

East as well as a dangerous land bridge for cruel invaders. 

There is simply no other issue more important to Tehran than 

preventing the establishment of an Iraqi government that is hostile 

to Iran, be it Shiite- or Sunni-dominated. This is indeed the defining 

lesson Iran has learned from its bloody, long, and devastating war 

with Iraq—a war that Saddam Hussein started. Not since the Twelver 

Shiism was established as the state religion in Iran in 1501 has any 

country inflicted as much pain, suffering, and destruction on Iran as 

did Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988. This explains why, 

when the U.S. troops overthrew Saddam Hussein, Iranians from all 

walks of life celebrated the historic event, some privately and many 

publicly. The Iranian policy of supporting a friendly government in 

Iraq, therefore, has a popular base of support within Iran. Tehran is 

likely to support any Shiite government, even a highly secular one, as 

long as it is not overtly hostile to Iran.

Iran’s second goal, which is in many ways complementary to its first, is 

the empowerment of the Shiite groups. Tehran has pursued this goal 

with sensitivity, determined not to alienate the Sunnis and certainly 

not the Kurds. The clerical leadership in Tehran views the Iraqi Shiites 

as a natural ally and sees their empowerment as a vehicle that would 

facilitate the expansion of Iranian influence within Iraq, the Persian 
Mohsen M. Milani

67 

Gulf, and far beyond. Tehran believes that the situation in Iraq is still 

fluid and that Iraq is in the first phase of a dangerous transition whose 

outcome is rather uncertain and hard to predict. To be on the winning 

side, therefore, Tehran is hedging its bets, supporting all Shiite 

factions, albeit to different degrees, and is seeking not to alienate any 

such group.

This is not to suggest that Tehran’s real agenda is to establish an 

Iranian-style Islamic order in Iraq—far from that. Iran understands 

that the Sunni minority as well as the Kurds would vociferously and 

violently reject such a Shiite theocracy. In the event of a partitioning 

of Iraq along sectarian lines, this policy can of course change, and Iran 

would then likely support an Iranian-style government in what could 

become a new “Shiistan.”

Iranian support for the main Shiite groups predates the removal of 

Saddam Hussein. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran helped create the 

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and 

trained its military wing, the Badr Brigade.18 Tehran also supported the 

Al-Dawa Party.19 Those two organizations have been the most powerful 

forces within the successive Iraqi governments since Saddam Hussein 

was overthrown. Additionally, they are Iran’s most trusted allies. To 

this day, Iran has maintained close and friendly relations with both and 

has sought to manage and contain tensions and disagreements with 

them, particularly over the issue of the future role of the United States 

in Iraq and the two organizations’ intimate connection to the U.S.

The Shiites of Iraq are hardly homogenous and are divided along 

ideological and class lines. Iran is expanding its influence among all of 

18. Editor’s Note: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is 

an Iraqi Shiite political party founded in 1982 and is supported by Iran. The SCIRI adheres 

to the tenets of Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih. See Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Activities and 

Influence in Iraq” (Congressional Research Service report for Congress, 8 November 2007; 

online at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/96430.pdf).

19. Editor’s Note: Al-Dawa party is an Iraqi Shiite political party that supported the 

Islamic Revolution in Iran and opposed Saddam Hussein. It continues to receive support from 

Tehran and are part of the “United Iraqi Alliance,” a Shiite Islamist bloc. See ibid.
Chapter 5: Reflections on Iran’s Policy Toward Iraq

68 

them. This explains the Iranian support for the rebel cleric, Muqtada 

al-Sadr, and his Mahdi Army.20 Iran has supported Sadr not so much 

because it endorses and appreciates his nationalistic and anti-Persian 

sentiments, but because he can provide insurance for Tehran in case 

Tehran’s two favorite organizations alluded to earlier were to fail. 

Moreover, al-Sadr’s movement is popular among the lower-class 

Shiites, particularly in Baghdad, and Tehran cannot afford to not 

support them. Tehran also views al-Sadr as a potential counterforce 

against the more moderate clerics, particularly Grand Ayatollah Ali alHusayni al-Sistani, whose views on velayat-e faqih, the philosophical 

underpinning of Iran’s system of governance, are radically different 

from Iran’s governing ayatollahs. Finally, Tehran has supported Sadr 

because his insurgency opposed U.S. occupation and undermined the 

American presence in Iraq.

Iran’s third goal is to reduce U.S. influence in Iraq and prevent the 

United States from establishing permanent military bases in Iraq. 

This goal is probably the most complex of all of Iran’s objectives, 

and its nature has changed over time. At first, the remarkably easy 

U.S. victory in Iraq frightened the ayatollahs who thought Iran, as 

a certified member of the “Axis of Evil,” might be the next target of 

American wrath. That initial fear dissipated as the Iraqi insurgency 

gained momentum, however, and Tehran came to the conclusion that 

a U.S. invasion of Iran is no longer feasible. For years now, Tehran 

appears to have made an important strategic decision to avoid any 

direct military confrontation with the United States. This does not 

mean or imply that Iran has not actively sought to undermine the 

Americans in Iraq. It surely has. It is clear that Tehran’s policy has 

oscillated between the two goals of preventing the U.S. from a total 

and clean victory and of avoiding any direct confrontation with the 

United States.

Iran’s fourth goal is to expand its sphere of influence in southern Iraq. 

Just as Iran has created a sphere of influence in Herat Province in 

20. Editor’s Note: The Mahdi Army is an Iraqi Shiite paramilitary force that has opposed 

the Coalition presence within post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Created in 2003 by Muqtada alSadr, this group has received support from Tehran. See Ibid.
Mohsen M. Milani

69 

western Afghanistan, it would like to expand its power in southern Iraq. 

Iran’s rather extensive participation in Iraq’s reconstruction, particularly 

in the Shiite-dominated areas, is part and parcel of this policy.

The creation of spheres of influence, which include support for 

formal and informal organizations, is a central component of Iran’s 

deterrence strategy as well as a function of both its ambitions and 

its threat perceptions. It is designed to deter potential aggression, to 

bolster Iran’s regional standing, and to protect its interests. There is 

also an economic dimension to this strategy: Iran seeks to become a 

hub for the transit of goods and services between the Persian Gulf, 

Iraq, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and possibly China.

Iran’s fifth goal is to help maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq and 

to thus prevent its Balkanization. Iran, like Turkey, would not tolerate 

an autonomous Kurdistan in Iraq. The creation of an independent 

Kurdistan could entice Iran’s other ethnic minorities to establish their 

own autonomous governments. This, in turn, would jeopardize Iran’s 

own territorial integrity.

Iran is also concerned about two other key issues. One of these sources 

of anxiety is the possible manipulation of the Iraqi-based Mojahedin-e 

Khalq (MEK) to destabilize Iran. That organization was supported by 

Saddam Hussein and operated within Iraq; its members are now under 

direct American control.21 Tehran, like the United States, considers 

this organization a terrorist entity. However, Tehran condemns the 

U.S. failure to condemn and disarm the MEK and believes that MEK 

members can be trained to destabilize Iran.

Iran also worries about the potential for U.S. manipulation of the 

Qom-Najaf corridor. Historically, the seminaries, or hawzeh, in Iraq 

21. Editor’s Note: The main MEK base is Camp Ashraf. According to Acting Deputy 

Department Spokesman Gordon Duguid of the U.S. State Department, “the disposition of 

Camp Ashraf was given a full transfer to the responsibility of the Iraqis on February the 

20th [2009].” He went on to say, “responsibility for resolving the situation at the camp rests 

with the Government of Iraq at this time.” For full statement, see the Daily Press Briefing, 

30 March 2009 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/03/120983.htm). See also Abigail 

Hauslohner, “Iranian Group a Source of Contention in Iraq,” Time, 5 January 2009 (http://

www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1869532,00.html).
Chapter 5: Reflections on Iran’s Policy Toward Iraq

70 

have had a significant impact on Iranian politics. Today, there are 

those in Iran, including some clerics, who either seek to democratize 

or altogether reject the velayat-e faqih doctrine. These voices are often 

suppressed. A powerful hawzeh in Najaf could reverse this trend. 

Ayatollah Sistani, who has millions of followers in Iran, belongs 

to the “quietist” school of Shiite thought, which rejects Khomeini’s 

interpretation of the velayat-e faqih doctrine. Could a Najaf hawzeh

that is unfriendly toward Iran’s version of the velayat-e faqih doctrine 

and is supported with Iraqi petrodollars pose a significant threat to 

the durability of Iran’s clerical government?

It appears that Iran enjoys more power in Iraq than the other neighbors 

of Iraq. Still, its power is rather limited, and it is unable to determine 

the future of Iraq, although it can become a spoiler and disrupt any 

Western design for Iraq. Additionally, Iraqi Shiites, who are Iran’s 

main lever of influence in Iraq, are first and foremost Iraqis and thus 

will not allow Iraq to become anything more than an ally of Iran—and 

certainly not a proxy.

Today, Iran has clear security concerns and identifiable interests in Iraq. 

The United States could simply ignore Iran and seek to marginalize it. 

This path would likely lead to more instability in Iraq and the Persian 

Gulf. Alternatively, the two countries could recognize each other’s 

interests and concerns and negotiate.22 The fact that the two countries 

have held a few meetings at the ambassadorial level in Iraq is a small 

but prudent step in the right direction.

22. For further reading on negotiations, see the Karim Sadjadpour and Ronald E. 

Neumann essays in this book (chapters 2 and 3).
71 

Chapter 6

Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception 

Gerald M. Steinberg

Since independence in 1948, Israel has been faced with a complex 

security environment resulting from the combination of intense 

hostility and extreme asymmetry. Israel’s territory is very narrow, 

with essentially no strategic depth. Strong and consistent responses 

to attack, including asymmetrical warfare and terror campaigns, have 

created a credible deterrent, contributed to the peace treaties with 

Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), and prevented direct clashes with 

Syria (since 1982).1

In parallel, however, the radius of the conflict has expanded far beyond 

the bordering Arab states, and the Islamic regime in Iran has become 

the main threat to Israeli security and regional stability. Although 

Israeli relations with Iran were quite cooperative until the Islamic 

revolution in 1979 and included significant strategic cooperation, this 

situation has changed completely in the last three decades.2 Iran is 

now seen as a triumphalist force with steadily increasing influence and 

in the process of acquiring regional dominance, particularly following 

the 2003 war in Iraq that removed Saddam Hussein from power.

The Iranian threat takes many forms, including the Shiite Hezbollah 

force in Lebanon, which launched an attack in July 2006, and which 

is armed, trained, and financed from Tehran; the Hamas organization 

that controls Gaza fired thousands of rockets of increasing range 

at Israel until the December 2008 Israeli response; the Iranian 

alliance with Syria, which has provided support for ballistic missile 

1. Gerald M. Steinberg, “Israel at Sixty: Asymmetry, Vulnerability, and the Search for 

Security” (Jerusalem Viewpoints 564, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, June 2008; online 

at http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&

FID=283&PID=1844&IID=2206).

2. David Menashri, “Iran, Israel and the Middle East Conflict,” Israel Affairs 12 (January 

2006): 107-22; Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power 

(London: Frank Cass, 2001).
Chapter 6: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception 

72 

development and may have been linked to the illicit North Korean 

nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israel in September 2007; and 

the Iranian nuclear weapons project and ballistic missile capabilities.3

Iranian rhetoric and statements from leaders that reflect hatred and 

deny Israeli legitimacy, reinforced by military parades in Tehran 

featuring missiles with signs proclaiming “Wipe Israel off the Map” and 

“Destination Tel Aviv,” increase the Israeli determination to prevent 

Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iranian President Mahmud 

Ahmadinejad’s genocidal declarations reflect a fundamentalist and 

apocalyptic Islamist whose words and intentions are focused on the 

destruction of Israel. The Holocaust denial conference that took place 

in early 2007 in Tehran, in which Ahmadinejad played a central role, 

highlighted the anti-Israeli rhetoric that has been part of the Islamic 

regime’s platform from the beginning. In 2001, former President Ali 

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani called the establishment of Israel the 

“worst event in history” and declared that “in due time the Islamic 

world will have a military nuclear device, and then the strategy of the 

West would reach a dead end, since one bomb is enough to destroy all 

Israel.”4 Similar attention was given to bellicose statements by Iran’s 

supreme leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Hoseyni Khamenei, such as “the 

cancerous tumor called Israel must be uprooted.”5 Such statements 

provided evidence of the intention, while the pursuit of nuclear 

3. Editor’s Note: For more on the 2006 Lebanon war and the 2008 Gaza war, see Asher 

Susser, “The War in Gaza—A View from Israel” (Royal United Services Institute commentary, 

13 January 2009; online at http://www.rusi.org/research/studies/menap/commentary/

ref:C496C7AEB68B4A/); and Alon Ben-Meir, “After Gaza—A Two State Solution is the 

Only Option” (Royal United Services Institute commentary, 26 January 2009; online at http://

www.rusi.org/research/studies/africa/commentary/ref:C497D9F21ECFCD/).

4. The Iranian broadcast agency released two versions of Rafsanjani’s remarks, which 

were made during a Friday sermon (on “Quds,” or Jerusalem Day) at a mosque on the campus 

of Tehran University. See “Qods Day Speech (Jerusalem Day): Chairman of Expediency 

Council Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,” Tehran,Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 

1, 14 December 2001 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2001/011214-

text.html); “Iran: Expediency Council Office Says Israel Distorted its Chairman’s Remarks,” 

2002 BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2 January 2002 (www.lexisnexis.com).

5. “Iran Leader Urges Destruction of ‘Cancerous’ Israel,” Reuters, 15 December 2000 

(http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/12/15/mideast.iran.reut/). 
Gerald M. Steinberg

73 

weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems were the evidence of 

incipient capability.

6

As a result, the question of how best to respond to the Iranian threat 

has become the central issue on the Israeli security agenda and 

also in the domestic political framework. Headlines in newspapers 

frequently highlight the latest Iranian developments, including 

weapons tests, exercises, and bellicose pronouncements. Israeli news, 

talk shows on radio and television, and academic conferences include 

frequent discussions and debates on the implications of the Iranian 

nuclear threat and potential policy options for response.7 Sanctions, 

a preemptive military strike, deterrence, missile defense, and the 

likelihood that Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia will 

follow Iran on the path to proliferation are among the topics.

International negotiations, very limited and belated sanctions, and 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection process 

under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

(NPT) have failed to slow or end the Iranian nuclear program. The 

weakness of the United States in leading the international response, 

inept European diplomacy, and the hesitation of Russia and China 

have contributed to this outcome. Russia and China in particular have 

emphasized their competition with the United States over threats 

to their vital interests resulting from an Iranian nuclear capability. 

These slow-moving international responses have given the Iranian 

leaders the time necessary to expand their uranium enrichment and 

plutonium production efforts. The strategy of buying time has been 

very successful—from the Iranian perspective.

6. Ephraim Asculai, “How Iran Can Attain its Nuclear Capability—and Then Use It,” 

in Ephraim Kam, ed., Israel and a Nuclear Iran: Implications for Arms Control, Deterrence, 

and Defense (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2008), 13-32 (http://www.inss.

org.il/upload/(FILE)1216205056.pdf).

7. For more on the nuclear issue, see Simon Shercliff’s essay, which is chapter 4 of 

this book.
Chapter 6: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception 

74 

Prevention and Defense in Israeli Strategy

The failure of diplomacy and sanctions, to date, have revived Israeli 

discussion of the “Begin Doctrine,” formulated in 1981 under Prime 

Minister Menachem Begin, when the government acted unilaterally 

to destroy the French-supplied Iraqi reactor in Osiraq after diplomatic 

efforts failed to result in international action. According to the Begin 

Doctrine, any state that acquires nuclear weapons and is actively 

involved in promoting violence and conflict would constitute an 

unacceptable threat.8

 (Pakistan is not considered to be a “confrontation 

state” and is not included in this category.) The Israeli raid that 

destroyed Syria’s nuclear reactor in 2007 marked a second example of 

the Begin Doctrine and served as a reminder to Iran of Israeli policy 

and capabilities.9

In addition, there are unconfirmed media reports regarding discussions 

of options with the U.S. government.10 On 13 August 2008, the deputy 

prime minister and defense minister, Ehud Barak, who also served as 

prime minister and Israel Defense Forces chief of staff, declared that 

“our position is that no option is to be taken off the table, but in the 

meantime, we have to make diplomatic progress.”11

Prior to becoming Israel’s prime minister in March 2009, Benjamin 

Netanyahu had compared the Iranian threat to that posed to Europe 

by Germany in 1938, declaring that “there is time to act in a variety of 

ways, and all ways must be considered, and all ways that work must be 

8. Haaretz, 9 June 1981, cited in Shai Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited,” 

International Security 7 (Fall 1982):114-43; Gerald M. Steinberg, “The Begin Doctrine and 

Deterrence,” in Israel in the Middle East—The Legacy of Menachem Begin. Begin-Sadat 

(BESA) Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy 15. (Tel Aviv: BESA Center for Strategic 

Studies, 2000). 

9. Editor’s Note: On 6 September 2007, it is believed that the Israel Air Force performed 

an air strike on what some say was a Syrian nuclear reactor. For further reading on this 

event, see Ephraim Asculai, “Syria, the NPT, and the IAEA” (INSS Insight 53, Institute for 

National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, 29 April 2008; online at http://www.inss.org.il/research.

php?cat=6&incat=&read=1778).

10. Aluf Benn, “U.S. Puts Brakes on Israel Plan to Hit Iran Nuclear Facilities,” Haaretz

(English edition), 13 August 2008 (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1010938.html).

11. “U.S. Against Strike on Iran: Israeli Defence Minister,” AFP Worldwide, 13 August 

2008 (http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hbHuCrDv8ufAXISj6SLUMFe_FxHw).
Gerald M. Steinberg

75 

employed.” He spoke of preemption, noting that “of all the activities 

required in the political, economic, and military fields, preemption is 

the most difficult. For us the Jewish people, too many times in our 

history we didn’t see danger in time, and when we did, it was too late.”12

At the same time, in considering a preventive military strike, Israelis are 

aware of the differences between the two previous implementations of 

the Begin Doctrine in the cases of Iraq and Syria. No single air attack 

would be able to destroy the multiple elements that constitute the 

Iranian nuclear program. The Iranians have learned from the Osiraq 

case and have dispersed, hidden, and hardened their nuclear facilities, 

making them far less vulnerable to attack.

However, the United States and Israel have also advanced significantly 

in terms of intelligence, targeting, and penetration in the past quarter 

century, including the development of precision long-range surfaceto-surface missiles, reducing the need for vulnerable manned aircraft 

sorties. To destroy the fifteen to twenty key installations that are at 

the heart of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, there would be no need 

for ground attacks and massive waves of airborne missiles aimed at 

Iranian military assets. Even if some facilities survive and others are 

well hidden and are not subject to attack, the large buildings housing 

the banks of centrifuges used for enrichment, as well as their very 

visible power supplies and related systems, and the foundations of 

the production reactor, could be damaged to the point that rebuilding 

would take many years.

Regarding the bellicose Iranian threats of retaliation, many of 

these are based on exaggerated military claims, including the use of 

photo-enhancement techniques and announcements of nonexistent 

exercises. Nevertheless, this is a factor in Israeli decision making. 

12. Peter Hirschberg, “Netanyahu: It’s 1938 and Iran is Germany; Ahmadinejad is 

Preparing Another Holocaust,” Haaretz, 14 November 2006 (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/

spages/787766.html); for partial text of the speech, see “Netanyahu’s ‘1938’ Speech,” Jewish 

Current Issues, 16 November 2006 (http://jpundit.typepad.com/jci/2006/11/netanyahus_1938.

html).
Chapter 6: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception 

76 

Iranian capabilities include a small number of Shahab-3 missiles with 

a range of 1,300 kilometers, which could be equipped with chemical 

or biological agents, as well as Tehran’s cooperative relationship with a 

dispersed and experienced terror network.13

In parallel, Israel has been accelerating its missile defense capabilities, 

including expansion of the operational Arrow system and research and 

development aimed at staying ahead of the Iranian ballistic missile 

deployment. As Israeli missile analyst Uzi Rubin has noted, “To date, 

the Arrow has scored fourteen successes in sixteen tests, a success rate 

of about 88 percent. . . . The system is currently in operation by the 

Air Defense Command of the Israel Air Force (IAF) in conjunction 

with the U.S. Patriot system, which serves as the lower tier in a 

combined two-tier missile defense array protecting most of Israel’s 

homeland territory.”14 Israel has deployed three Arrow batteries, 

with eight launchers each holding six interceptors (a total of 144 

Arrow interceptors). In addition, Israel deploys several Patriot PAC 2 

batteries, to be upgraded to PAC 3 capabilities, providing the second 

tier for its missile shield.15

Deterrence and Its Limitations

Netanyahu’s reference to 1938 and Nazi Germany reflects a widely 

held view in Israel that a nuclear-armed Iran ruled by fanatical leaders 

such as Ahmadinejad is incapable of maintaining a stable deterrence 

relationship.16 This perception explains and is reinforced by the video 

clips of Ahmadinejad’s statements, the scenes from the Holocaust 

denial conference, and the attention given to Iranian boasts of military 

“breakthroughs.” From this perspective, Israelis reject the dominant 

13. For a detailed analysis, see Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, The Last 

Resort: Consequences of Preventative Military Action against Iran. Policy Focus 84. 

(Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008; online at http://www.

washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus84.pdf).

14. Uzi Rubin, “Missile Defense and Israel’s Deterrence against a Nuclear Iran,” 

in Kam, Israel and a Nuclear Iran, 65-81 (http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE) 

1216205936.pdf).

15. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israeli Defenses to Use Artificial Intelligence,” Defense News,

21 January 2008 (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3361962&c=FEA&s=CVS).

16. Editor’s Note: This perception is addressed by Mohsen M. Milani in his essay, which 

is chapter 5 of this book.
Gerald M. Steinberg

77 

European position that the Iranian leaders are seeking nuclear 

weapons for deterrence, implying that Iran is a status quo power. 

Instead, the fanatical leadership is viewed as not subject to a rational 

deterrence relationship.

The attempt to apply the Cold War analogy of deterrence, based on 

assured second-strike capabilities and mutual assured destruction, 

to the Iranian leadership is very problematic in at least three 

important dimensions:

While the United States and Soviet Union were engaged in intense 

ideological confrontation, they had direct lines of communication, 

including diplomatic relations and embassies. This contact was 

extremely important in periods of instability that threatened the 

structure of deterrence. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 

for example, the leaders were able to assess each other’s intentions 

and commitment and to make decisions to de-escalate the conflict. 

Similarly, India and Pakistan have formal communications links, 

which served to de-escalate their crisis in 2000.

1. Iranian decision makers, in contrast, have no direct or indirect communication links with Israeli counterparts, increasing 

the likelihood of misperception and making crisis management extremely difficult.17

2. The very small size of Israel’s territorial extent makes it difficult to maintain an assured and survivable second-strike capability, which is vital to stable deterrence. The narrowness of 

the Israeli borders and the ease with which they can be overrun 

by conventional forces, as well as the apparent vulnerability of 

a small number of bases to a first strike involving ballistic missiles, increases this perceived vulnerability. In contrast, Iran has 

a large territorial extent in which to disperse strategic weapons. 

17. Gerald M. Steinberg, “Deterrence Instability: Hizballah’s Fuse to Iran›s Bomb” 

(Jerusalem Viewpoints 539, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, April 2005; online at http://

www.jcpa.org/jl/vp529.htm); Yair Evron, “An Israel-Iran Balance of Nuclear Deterrence: 

Seeds of Instability,” in Kam, Israel and a Nuclear Iran, 47-63 (http://www.inss.org.il/

upload/ (FILE)1216205527.pdf).
Chapter 6: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception 

78 

While Israel has reportedly addressed this issue by acquiring a 

small number of advanced diesel submarines, this is far from an 

ideal solution to the problem.

3. In a multipolar environment in which Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, 

Saudi Arabia, perhaps Syria (after the destruction of the North 

Korean-built reactor) and other Arab countries can be expected 

to follow the Iranian nuclear lead, stable deterrence is far more 

complex than the bipolar system of the Cold War.

In addition to the absence of direct communications between Israel and 

Iran, the lack of any form of significant contact is likely to create major 

misunderstandings and misconceptions, which could be extremely 

dangerous in a crisis. Leaders in Tehran and Jerusalem do not know 

how to assess the other’s red lines and are not able to predict responses 

to various moves and countermoves. In this situation, there would be 

a strong likelihood of a spiral of destabilizing actions in which the 

decision makers respond to perceived threats through worst-case 

analyses without any history of interaction or expertise by which to 

interpret and predict further moves. 

In the murky Iranian decision-making process, the power of elected 

and visible leaders and government officials is often secondary to 

the power of the clerics and the supreme leader, who operate in far 

greater secrecy, and whose understanding of the intricacies of stable 

deterrence is likely to be low. As a result, Israeli decision makers 

will have difficulty predicting Iranian policies and reactions. And 

while the Israeli decision-making process is far more public, and the 

governmental leaders are the key decision makers, the members of 

the Iranian inner circle appear to have no understanding of Israeli 

operational codes and responses to threat.18

The impact of such lack of contact and understanding was illustrated 

in the 2006 Lebanon war, in which Hezbollah leader Hassan 

18. See Gerald M. Steinberg, “Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle 

East,” The Nonproliferation Review 7 (Fall-Winter 2000): 43-60 (http://cns.miis.edu/

npr/pdfs/73stein.pdf); Steinberg, “Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to 

Iranian Nuclear Developments,” in Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, Reassessing the 

Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran. McNair Paper 69. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2005; online at http://www.ndu.edu/

inss/mcnair/mcnair69/McNairPDF.pdf).
Gerald M. Steinberg

79 

Nasrallah, who is closely linked to the Iranian leadership, admitted 

that he had totally misjudged the Israeli decision-making process 

and “disproportionate” response. Nasrallah said that he did not expect 

Israel to launch an all-out attack, including heavy bombing of South 

Beirut neighborhoods in which Hezbollah had strongholds, after the 

“limited” cross-border attack in July 2006 in which two soldiers were 

kidnapped (and later found to have died), eight others were killed, 

and the border area including houses and towns were subjected to 

heavy bombardment.

For Israelis, however, the need for a major response was clear, and there 

had been numerous public warnings to Hezbollah that were unheeded. 

For Israeli leaders, such kidnappings are unacceptable. They also saw 

a confrontation with Hezbollah as a means of demonstrating Israeli 

power and determination to the population and decision makers 

in Tehran and throughout Iran.19 Hezbollah serves as an Iranian 

proxy force located on Israel’s northern border, and Israelis saw this 

confrontation through this lens.20

Israeli Reliance on Washington and Its Limitations

Since the 1990s, when Israeli intelligence began to track accelerated 

Iranian efforts to acquire the technology for producing nuclear 

weapons, policy makers have maintained a low profile on this issue, 

emphasizing that the threat is global and needs to be addressed 

globally. In this post-Cold War period in which the United States 

was the uncontested superpower and global leader, this approach 

meant following the American lead and working closely with the 

U.S. in dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat. In 2003, after the 

initial phase of the second Iraqi War and U.S.-European tensions over 

Middle East policy, Israel reluctantly accepted U.S. President George W. 

19. Ephraim Kam, “The Ayatollah, Hezbollah, and Hassan Nasrallah,” 

Strategic Assessment 9 (August 2006; online at http://www.inss.org.il/publications.

php?cat=25&incat=0&read=100).

20. Steinberg, “Deterrence Instability.”
Chapter 6: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception 

80 

Bush administration’s decision to agree to European leadership in the 

diplomatic efforts to contain Iran, despite recognition that the European 

Union policy was unlikely to slow or end the nuclear weapons program. 

Following the realization that this effort had failed, and as the United 

States again became the de facto global leader on this issue, including 

the sanctions process, the Israeli reliance on Washington returned to the 

previous level.

In November 2007, however, the publication of a short summary 

of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Iranian nuclear 

program came as a major shock and shattered Israeli confidence in, 

and reliance on, American leadership. The summary, which was widely 

reported in the media around the world, claimed Iran had frozen its 

active efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons in 2003 and estimated 

that the Iranians would not have such a capability until at least 2012. 

This public document stated that the U.S. intelligence community 

had “high confidence” that the Iranians halted their nuclear weapons 

program in 2003, but only “moderate confidence” that Tehran had not 

restarted the program.21

Israeli intelligence analysts, as well as their British and French 

counterparts, had reached totally different conclusions. Israeli Defense 

Minister Barak stated in the wake of the NIE release that while it 

is “apparently true that in 2003, Iran stopped pursuing its military 

nuclear program for a certain period of time,” he added that “in our 

estimation, since then it is apparently continuing with its program to 

produce a nuclear weapon.”22

A number of factors can explain the differences in assessments. Israel, 

which would be the prime potential target for a nuclear Iran, cannot 

afford to take the chance of underestimating the threat. Therefore, it 

relies on what policy makers refer to as a “worst-case” analysis. This 

21. Editor’s Note: See National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and 

Capabilities” (National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007; online at http://www.dni.gov/

press_releases/20071203_release.pdf).

22. Steven Erlanger and Graham Bowley, “Israel Unconvinced Iran Has Dropped Nuclear 

Program,” New York Times, 5 December 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/05/world/

middleeast/05webreact.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Israel%20Unconvinced%20Iran%20Has%20

Dropped%20Nuclear%20Program&st=cse).
Gerald M. Steinberg

81 

means that the focus is on Iranian capabilities, rather than intentions, 

which can only be guessed. Using this approach, when Iran reaches the 

technological potential to produce enough fissile material necessary to 

make a nuclear weapon, it will be considered a nuclear state, capable 

of threatening Israel with annihilation.

Israeli analysts have warned their U.S. counterparts about the potential 

for a parallel “black” Iranian weapons program, based on a small nuclear 

reactor producing plutonium, following the North Korean model, 

as illustrated in Syria. Indeed, Iran is known to be constructing just 

such a reactor at Arak, leaving room for another undetected facility.23

The consequences of a small, secret Iranian nuclear program are less 

significant for the United States, given its massive military superiority 

over Iran. Therefore, there is more room for political factors and 

influence in the official U.S. estimates.

The publication of the NIE summary and the headlines proclaiming 

that Iran had halted its nuclear program also had important political 

consequences and greatly reduced the ability of the United States to 

pressure and deter Iran through the threat of military force. Although 

President Bush responded to the NIE report by reconfirming his 

determination to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, Iranian 

policy makers most likely concluded that the probability of attack 

from the United States in the next five years had been rendered much 

less credible. Given the disquiet in America over the status of the 

situation in Iraq, and with an official assessment stating that Iran gave 

up its program to develop nuclear weapons four years ago, it was clear 

to all parties that the U.S. president would face strong opposition 

to any decision ordering U.S. forces into battle again. The fear of 

a potential Iranian counterattack, in the form of mass terror and 

possible missile attacks against American assets in the region, serves 

to increase this opposition.

The overall result of both the content of the NIE publication and 

the manner in which it was suddenly released, without any prior 

23. Editor’s Note: Arak is where Iran’s heavy water reactor is located.
Chapter 6: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception 

82 

consultation, has weakened Israeli reliance on American security 

guarantees. As a result, a defense treaty designed to provide deterrence 

against eventual Iranian nuclear capabilities has become less credible 

in light of the NIE summary on the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Conclusions

While Israel is clearly concerned about the potential impact of an 

Iranian nuclear weapons capability and has given this threat significant 

attention, in some ways, the discussions of this threat are part of the 

“normal” Israeli environment. New developments, including Iranian 

declarations regarding uranium enrichment, or missile tests, do not 

affect the Israeli stock market, for example.

Overall, the Iranian nuclear threat has reinforced the realism that 

forms the Israeli approach to security threats.24 While there is still hope 

that international action, including serious sanctions, will stop Iran 

before the nuclear finish line, this is by no means assured. Proposals 

by foreign diplomats and academics suggesting that alliances such as 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Israel 

could provide a sufficient response to an Iranian nuclear capability, 

or that a defense treaty with the United States would be important 

in this respect, are not likely to be seen as effective by Israelis. The 

U.S. is seen as weakened economically and overcommitted in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and the weakness of European members of NATO ,

particularly with respect to security, reinforces the skepticism.

While there are many complexities, the possibility of a preventive 

Israeli military strike remains significant.

24. Gerald M. Steinberg, “Realism, Politics and Culture in Middle East Arms Control 

Negotiations,” International Negotiation 10 (2005): 487-512.
83 

Epilogue 

The 2009 Iranian Presidential 

Election and its Implications

Karim Sadjadpour

Editor’s Note: This piece was Karim Sadjadpour’s written 

opening statement for his testimony before the U.S. House 

Committee on Foreign Affairs on 22 July 2009.1 Sadjadpour 

kindly has allowed the reproduction of his testimony to provide insight into the post-election Iranian reality. His analysis 

offers perspective on how that reality has shifted the political 

landscape of the Iranian puzzle piece and on the impact that 

shift has on the potential for rapprochement with the United 

States. The one outlier in the evolving situation is whether 

there is time for the dust to settle within the Iranian political structure before the nuclear issue reasserts its position on 

center stage.

The enormous cloud of suspicion hanging over Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s 12 June 2009 presidential election victory has 

produced the greatest political and popular eruptions in Iran since 

the 1979 revolution. Members of the committee have surely seen the 

remarkable images and amateur videos—both heroic and harrowing—

that have emerged from Iran over the past five weeks.

The United States now faces a unique challenge. After 30 years of 

not having official relations, we finally prepared ourselves to recognize 

the legitimacy of an Iranian government, only to find that legitimacy 

has arguably been squandered. Now the administration of President 

Barack Obama has the difficult task of reconciling when and how to 

1. A transcript and webcast of the full hearing on “Iran: Recent Developments and 

Implications for U.S. Policy” can be found online (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_

notice.asp?id=1101).
Epilogue: The 2009 Iranian Presidential Election and its Implications

84 

deal with a disgraced regime that presents urgent national security 

challenges, while at the same time not betraying a popularly driven 

movement whose success could have enormously positive implications 

for the United States.

I. Implications for Iran

The Regime’s Eroded Legitimacy

The events of the last six weeks have had enormous implications 

for Iran. At a political level, the Islamic Republic of Iran has ceded 

any pretensions of being a republic. Past Iranian governments did 

not necessarily represent a wide swath of Iranian society, but they 

did encompass a fairly wide swath of the Iranian political elite. If 

the Ahmadinejad government maintains power, the country will be 

ruled by a small cartel of hard-line clerics and nouveau riche Islamic 

Republic Guard corpsman who reflect not only a relatively narrow 

swath of Iranian society, but also a narrow swath of the political elite.

Along with the legitimacy of the republic, another election casualty is 

the legitimacy of Iran’s most powerful man, Supreme Leader Ayatollah 

Ali Khamenei. For two decades, Khamenei had carefully cultivated 

an image of a magnanimous guide who stays above the political fray, 

allowing him to deflect responsibility for Iran’s deepening economic 

malaise and political and social repression. Those days are now over. 

In defiantly supporting Ahmadinejad, Khamenei has exposed himself 

as a petty partisan. Formerly sacred red lines have been crossed, as for 

the first time people have begun openly challenging Khamenei with 

chants of “marg bar dictator”—death to the dictator.

Despite the popular outcry, Khamenei has refused to cede any ground, 

believing that compromise projects weakness and invites more pressure. 

Today, his future rests largely in the hands of the regime’s most elite 

fighting force, the 120,000-strong Islamic Revolution Guard Corps 

(IRGC). While growing fissures and dissent among senior clergy in 

Qom is certainly worrisome for Khamenei, dissent and fissures among 

top IRGC commanders would be fatal for him. While at the moment 
Karim Sadjadpour 

85 

they seemingly remain loyal to him as their commander in chief, as 

the economic situation continues to deteriorate and popular outrage 

persists, their fidelity is not a given.

The Opposition’s Plight

The popular implications have been equally enormous. At their peak, 

the demonstrations in Tehran included as many as 3 million people—

according to Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, himself 

a former senior IRGC commander—representing a diverse socioeconomic swath of society, with women often at the forefront. While 

the scale of the demonstrations has subsided due to the regime’s skilled 

use of repression, people’s sense of injustice and outrage has not.

The more hard-line elements of the Basij militia seem to truly relish 

violence. People are up against an ostensibly religious government 

that has shown no moral compunction, a government that blames the 

murder of an innocent 26-year-old woman, Neda Agha-Soltan, on the 

BBC and CIA. Every time people take to the streets, they are risking 

their lives, and for every individual who takes to the streets, there are 

likely hundreds if not thousands more at home who feel solidarity 

with them. Nightly protest chants of “Allahu Akbar”—reminiscent of 

the 1979 revolution and meant to keep the momentum alive—have 

continued unabated.

The images and videos outside of Tehran have been similarly remarkable. 

In Isfahan, whose population is more traditional than that of Tehran, 

the demonstrators filled up the enormous Nagsh-e Jahan Square, the 

largest historic square in the world. Similar protests have taken place 

in important cities like Shiraz, Tabriz, Mashhad, and Kashan. In short, 

unrest has transcended age, religiosity, socio-economic status, gender, 

and geography.

One problem outside of Tehran, however, is that people are often less 

connected to the outside world via the Internet and satellite television, 

and have less access to technologies like video phones to document 

what is taking place. For this reason, there is much concern that the 
Epilogue: The 2009 Iranian Presidential Election and its Implications

86 

type of repression and human rights abuses that take place outside of 

the capital are much greater than that which has been documented 

only in Tehran alone. Outside of major cities, the regime’s repressive 

apparatus can act with impunity and without accountability.

Nonetheless, the government’s indiscriminate use of force and 

unwillingness to compromise have not forced the opposition into 

submission. Indeed, the current scale of repression has been both 

politically and financially costly for the regime. In the last week alone, 

former Presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani—a founding father of the 1979 

revolution—and Mohammad Khatami have challenged the legitimacy 

of the election, with the normally timid Khatami even calling for a 

popular referendum. Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, the 

most senior cleric in Iran, recently issued a fatwa stating that the 

supreme leader is no longer fit to rule, arguably the greatest verbal 

challenge to Khamenei’s leadership in the last 20 years.

The opposition’s primary challenge at the moment is that its leadership 

and brain trust are either imprisoned, under house arrest, or unable to 

communicate freely. Despite the tremendous popular outrage, at the 

moment there is no leadership to channel that outrage politically.

Still, the financial costs of maintaining martial law, overflowing 

prisons, and media and communications blackouts are significant 

for the government. According to European diplomats, the Iranian 

government expends several thousand dollars per minute—tens of 

millions per week—to jam satellite television broadcasts from Voice of 

America and BBC Persian. Given the decline in oil prices, the current 

scale of repression will prove difficult to sustain for a long period.

II. Implications for U.S. Policy

Before President Obama’s inauguration in January 2009, I wrote that 

“in charting a new strategy toward Tehran, the Obama administration 

must first probe a seemingly simple but fundamental question: Why 

does Iran behave the way it does? Is Iranian foreign policy rooted in 

an immutable ideological opposition to the United States, or is it a 
Karim Sadjadpour 

87 

reaction to punitive U.S. policies? Could a diplomatic U.S. approach 

beget a more conciliatory Iranian response?”2

The Obama administration’s unsuccessful attempts to change the tone 

and context of the long-fraught U.S.-Iran relationship, coupled with 

the events of the last six weeks, make it abundantly clear that Tehran’s 

hard-line leadership—particularly Ayatollah Khamenei—views an 

adversarial U.S.-Iran relationship as politically expedient.

Whereas the George W. Bush administration unwittingly united 

Iran’s disparate political factions against a common threat, the Obama 

administration’s overtures accentuated the cleavages among Tehran’s 

political elites. As one pragmatic conservative Iranian official noted 

to me several months ago, Tehran’s hard-liners were under newfound 

pressure to justify their hostility towards the United States: “If Iran 

can’t make nice with a U.S. president named Barack Hussein Obama 

who is preaching mutual respect on a weekly basis and sending us 

Nowruz greetings, it’s pretty evident that the problem lies in Tehran, 

not Washington.”

In light of the incredible events of the last six weeks, however, the 

Obama administration should reassess several aspects of its preelection 

policy toward Iran:

Don’t Engage—Yet

When the demonstrations were at their peak, the Obama 

administration prudently refrained from inserting the United States 

into Iran’s internal political battles for fear that we would taint those 

whom we aimed to help. We should continue to adhere to our policy 

of noninterference in Iran’s internal affairs.

By prematurely engaging—before the dust has settled—we run the risk 

of implicitly endorsing an election that is still being hotly contested in 

Tehran and tipping the balance in favor of the hard-liners. This would 

2. Karim Sadjadpour, “U.S. Engagement with Iran: A How-to Guide,” Middle East 

Bulletin, 25 November 2008 (http://middleeastprogress.org/2008/11/us-engagement-withiran-a-how-to-guide/).
Epilogue: The 2009 Iranian Presidential Election and its Implications

88 

demoralize the opposition and the millions of people who took to the 

streets and who continue to reject the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad 

government. It is telling that one of the popular protest chants of 

recent weeks has been “Death to Russia,” condemnation of Moscow’s 

early decision to recognize the election results.

While the costs of engagement in the short term are very high, the 

benefits of immediate engagement are negligible. Tehran is still in 

disarray, and Iranian officials have not shown any indication that they 

are prepared or capable of making the types of compromises necessary 

to reach an accommodation with the U.S. when it comes to the nuclear 

issue or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Engagement is not a policy in itself, but rather a tool that seeks, 

among other things, to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and moderate 

its regional policies. Premature engagement, however, could have 

precisely the opposite effect, by sending the signal to Tehran that its 

nuclear program is of such paramount importance to Washington that 

it can act with impunity. Iran would not be incentivized to limit its 

nuclear ambitions, but rather to expand them.

Pausing engagement until the dust has settled in Tehran does not mean 

renouncing it altogether. Given Iran’s sizeable influence on several key 

U.S. foreign policy challenges—namely Afghanistan, Iraq, the ArabIsraeli conflict, nuclear proliferation, energy security, and terrorism—

shunning Iran entirely is not a medium- or long-term option.

Don’t Make Military Threats

If the events following the June elections proved one thing, it is that 

the Iranian regime is not suicidal. On the contrary, it ruthlessly clings 

to power and calibrates its actions accordingly. The Iranian regime, in 

other words, is odious but deterrable.

Indeed, the problem we have with Iran has far more to do with the 

character of the regime than the nuclear program. The reality is that 

as long as Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and company are in power, we 
Karim Sadjadpour 

89 

are never going to reach a modus vivendi which sufficiently allays our 

concerns—and Israel’s—about Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions.

Based on both recent and historical precedent, there is good reason 

to believe that not only would Khamenei and Ahmadinejad not be 

cowed by military threats, but that they would actually welcome 

U.S. or Israel strikes in order to try and achieve the same outcome as 

Saddam Hussein’s 1980 invasion of Iran—namely, to unite squabbling 

political factions against a common threat and keep agitated Iranian 

minds busy with foreign quarrels.

Ahmadinejad will also attempt to draw the United States into a war 

of words; we would be wise to ignore him. The Obama administration 

should continue to project the dignity and poise of a superpower rather 

than reciprocate the diatribes of an oppressive and undemocratic regime.

Condemn Human Rights Abuses and Help Ease 

the Communications Embargo

The Obama administration should not refrain from condemning the 

Iranian government’s flagrant violence against its own citizenry and 

wrongful detention of political prisoners. While the regime claims 

only a few dozen have been killed and a few hundred imprisoned, 

European embassies in Tehran and independent human rights groups 

estimate that several thousand have been imprisoned and several 

hundred killed. Recent history has shown that outside pressure and 

condemnation works, as the regime incurs no costs for its egregious 

human rights abuses when the world remains silent.

One practical way of helping the cause of human rights in Iran is 

to help ease the communications embargo that Iranians are currently 

experiencing. Given the fact that foreign media were forced to leave 

and domestic media cannot freely report, everyday citizens bearing 

witness to events, whether via video phone or even simple e-mail or 

blog communication, have become very important. For this reason, 

the Iranian government has implemented Internet, satellite television, 

and SMS communication (text messaging) blackouts as a means of 
Epilogue: The 2009 Iranian Presidential Election and its Implications

90 

preventing Iranians from communicating with one another, and also with 

the outside world.

The United States and European governments, as well as NGOs and 

private-sector companies, should do everything in their power to ease 

this communications embargo. Companies like Siemens-Nokia, which 

have provided the Iranian government sophisticated technologies used 

for intelligence gathering and repression, should be publicly shamed and 

encouraged to donate their business profits from deals with Iran to human 

rights causes.

Don’t Underestimate the Magnitude of this Moment

In an atmosphere of repression and intimidation, millions of Iranians 

throughout the country, representing a diverse swath of society, have 

taken to the streets since 12 June, agitating for greater political freedoms 

that many of us take for granted. Having endured a repressive religious 

autocracy for the last 30 years, Iran is arguably the only country in the 

Muslim Middle East in which popularly driven change is not of an 

Islamist, anti-American variety.

While the type of change Iranians seek may continue to prove elusive 

for months, if not years, we should not underestimate the size, strength, 

maturity, and resolve of this movement, nor its enormous implications. 

While this movement must be driven by Iranians themselves, it should 

remain a U.S. foreign policy imperative not to do anything to deter its 

success or alter its trajectory. Just as Iran’s 1979 revolution dramatically 

impacted world affairs, so could the emergence of a more moderate, 

democratic Iranian government at peace with its neighbors and the 

outside world.
91 

Glossary

Additional Protocol-The Additional Protocol is a legal document 

granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

complementary inspection authority to verify all nuclear activities 

within a state that are provided in underlying safeguard agreements.

Assembly of Experts—Majles-e Khobragan is a group of eighty-six 

clerics directly elected by the people of Iran for eight-year terms. 

Considered one of the most powerful institutions in the Islamic 

Republic, the Assembly of Experts has the power to elect and review 

the performance of the supreme leader and technically can remove 

him from office. The Assembly of Experts candidates, similar to other 

elected officials in the Islamic Republic, have to be vetted by the 

Guardian Council, where the supreme leader has direct influence.

Ayatollah—Literally “Sign of God” in Arabic/Persian, it is the title 

for the high-level scholars among Shiites.

Basij—The term basij in Persian translates to “mobilization.” In the 

Islamic Republic of Iran, the Basij, or Basij Volunteer Force (BVF), 

is the collective name for a volunteer public force formed by decree 

in November 1979 and accredited to the Islamic Revolution Guard 

Corps (IRGC). Officially there are more than 8 million BVF members 

who support the IRGC’s mission of protecting the Islamic Revolution 

through various organizations, both military and civilian. Apart from 

the paramilitary and military organizations of the BVF, there are Basij 

organizations for teachers, artists, construction workers, etc. 

Bazaari—From the Persian word bazaar (market), the Bazaari class 

refers to the Iranian merchant class.

Begin Doctrine—Israeli foreign policy by which Israel acts to prevent 

an enemy of the State of Israel from developing weapons of mass 

destruction. The policy is named for former Israeli Prime Minister 
Glossary

92 

Menachem Begin (1977-83), who ordered the destruction of Iraq’s 

Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981.

Bushehr—City in Bushehr Province of Iran on the Persian Gulf coast. 

Location of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Dawa Party—Al-Dawa (The Call) is an Iraqi Shiite political party 

that was founded in 1958 and later opposed Saddam Hussein. The 

party forms a part of the Shiite Islamist bloc under the collective name 

of the United Iraqi Alliance. Although al-Dawa receives support from 

Iran, publicly the party supports Wilayat al-Ummah (authority of the 

people) as opposed to Velayat-e Faqih (authority of the jurists), the 

theory of government adopted by Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 

1979 based on Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s theories.

Expediency Council—Short name for the Expediency Discernment 

Council of the Regime (Majma’-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam), 

which was established in 1988 and now is a constitutional body meant 

to discern the interests of the Islamic Republic by trying to resolve cases 

of conflict between the Majles and the Guardian Council. Technically, 

the Expediency Council has the task of advising the supreme leader in 

strategic matters and can act as his unofficial deputies if he so elects. 

The supreme leader appoints thirty members of the Expediency 

Council and is also a member himself.

Guardian Council—Short name for the Guardian Council of the 

Constitution (Shura’-ye Negahban-e Qanun-e Asasi), which is a twelvemember council that approves all applicants for eligibility in Iranian 

elections and determines whether laws passed by the Majles are 

constitutional and based on the shari’ah (Islamic law). The supreme 

leader appoints six of Guardian Council members, and the other six 

are appointed by the Majles at the recommendation of the head of 

the judiciary. 

Hamas—Islamic Resistance Movement, or Harakat al-Muqawamat 

al-Islamiyyah, is a Sunni Islamist Palestinian political and paramilitary 

organization founded in 1987. It has governed the Gaza Strip of the 
Glossary

93 

Palestinian Territories since elected into power during the Palestinian 

parliamentary elections of January 2006.

Hejab—Arabic for cover or woman’s veil. Refers to the Islamic dress 

code for women, especially the covering of the face.

HEU—Highly Enriched Uranium is uranium with the amount of 

uranium 235 isotopes (U-235) increased above 20 percent. A nuclear 

weapon requires enriched uranium with U-235 assays of 90 percent 

or more.

Hezbollah—Literally translated the “Party of God,” Hezbollah 

is a Shiite Islamist political and paramilitary organization based in 

Lebanon. It was formed during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 

Since its inception, it has had strong ties to Iran. Its leaders were 

influenced by the Iranian revolution and declared Ayatollah Khomeini 

their leading religious authority. As a result of this relationship, 

Hezbollah has received ongoing support from Iran.

Hawzeh—The term is derived from the Arabic word hauza (area or 

territory) and refers to an area where mainly theological study takes 

place. The largest and most important of these centers in Iran is located 

in the city of Qom.

IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency, based in Vienna,

Austria, bills itself as “the world’s center of cooperation in the nuclear 

field.” Established in 1957 under the auspices of the United Nations, 

it works to promote safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear technologies.

IDF—Israel Defense Forces.

IRGC—Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, also known as Pasdaran 

(Guardians) from the organization’s Persian name, Sipah-e Pasdaran-e 

Inqelab-e Islami. It was established in the wake of the 1979 Islamic 

Revolution in Iran with the task of protecting the newly established 

order from both foreign and domestic threats. The IRGC initially 

functioned as a safeguard against Iran’s regular military, which was 

deemed as having loyalties to the ousted monarchal system. The 
Glossary

94 

IRGC has its own ground, air, and naval forces in addition to the Basij 

and Qods Forces. Brigadier General Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari has 

served as commander in chief of the IRGC since September 2007.

ISCI—Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which was known until 

May 2007 as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 

(SCIRI). The ISCI is an Iraqi Shiite political party that was founded 

in 1982 and constitutes part of the “United Iraqi Alliance,” a Shiite 

Islamist bloc. As an opposition group to Saddam Hussein, many of its 

leaders operated from Tehran until 2003 when Hussein was removed 

from power and they were able to return to Iraq. The ISCI continues 

to receive support from Iran.

LEU—Low Enriched Uranium is uranium with the amount of 

U-235 increased less than 20 percent. LEU can be used in civil nuclear 

reactors, which only require uranium that has assays of 2-5 percent 

U-235.

Majles—Short for Majles-e Shrua-ye Islami (Islamic Consultative 

Assembly), it is the Iranian parliament.

MEK—Mojahedin-e Khalq, or “People’s Mojahedin of Iran” (PMOI), 

is a militant Islamist-Marxist political group. The MEK was founded 

in the 1960s and supported movements opposing the shah including 

the 1979 Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 

However, the MEK soon organized against the new Iranian theocracy, 

even supporting Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-

88). The MEK operated with relative freedom within Iraq from 1986 

until the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. After the invasion, allied forces 

confined the MEK to Camp Ashraf in Iraq, which has since been 

turned over to Iraqi control. The MEK’s political wing is the National 

Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), and the group continues to be 

an active Iranian opposition group. Both the MEK and the NCRI 

are listed in the U.S. Department of State’s “Country Reports on 

Terrorism 2008.”
Glossary

95 

Natanz—Township in Isfahan Province where Iran’s pilot fuel 

enrichment plant and its main commercial-scale fuel enrichment 

plant are located.

NIE—National Intelligence Estimate. NIEs are the Director of 

National Intelligence’s (DNI) most authoritative written judgments 

concerning national security issues. They contain the coordinated 

judgments of the U.S. intelligence community regarding the likely 

course of future events.

Nowruz—Also spelled Navrooz, Nawrooz, or Nawruz, literally “new 

day.” It marks the vernal equinox, which is the first day of the calendars 

used in Iran and Afghanistan. Celebrated as national holidays in Iran, 

Afghanistan, and some of the Central Asian republics, the holiday is 

particularly significant in Iran.

NPT—Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which 

entered force in 1970 and currently has 187 member states

Qods Forces—Literally meaning “Jerusalem” forces, this is a special 

unit of the IRGC that is active in organizing, training, equipping, 

financing, and supporting foreign Islamic revolutionary movements. 

The Qods forces are thought to facilitate and maintain contacts 

with underground Islamic militant organizations throughout the 

Islamic world. The group’s perceived support and influence with 

organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah have aided in increasing 

Iran’s regional influence.

Salafi—Derived from Arabic al-salaf al-salih (the righteous ancestors), 

this is a term that was originally given to an Islamic philosophical 

movement that began in the mid-19th century and advocated a 

return to the origins of Islam as a countermeasure to colonialism and 

the overall malaise of the Islamic world. In modern times, the term 

signifies those groups of Islamists who advocate a return to Islam’s 

origins by changing the current state structures in the Muslim world 

through various means, including armed struggle and violence.
Glossary

96 

Sayyed (Seyyed/ Sayyid/ Said)—Derived from Arabic root sada—to 

be or become master, lord, or chief—the term sayyed in Arabic means 

master, sir, gentlemen, or is used as the honorific title for descendents 

of Mohammad. In the Iranian world, sayyed mostly refers to the 

descendents of Mohammad. 

SCIRI—The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, 

known since May 2007 as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). 

See ISCI.

UF6—Uranium hexafluoride. UF6 is the compound used in the 

process of enriching uranium.

Velayat-e Faqih—“Authority of the Jurists,” Ayatollah Khomeini’s 

theory of Islamic government where the state is governed by a faqih

(Islamic jurist).
97 

Acknowledgments

This work is a compendium of essays that were presented on 17 

September 2008 during a one-day symposium, “The Iranian Puzzle 

Piece: Understanding Iran in the Global Context,” sponsored by 

Marine Corps University (MCU) and the Marine Corps University 

Foundation (MCUF) as part of the efforts of MCU’s Middle East 

Studies. I wish to thank Major General Donald R. Gardner, USMC

(Ret), under whose leadership as the president of MCU (2004-2009) 

the Middle East Studies was established.

Many other Marines and civilians from MCU also made contributions 

toward the organizing and execution of the symposium. In particular, a 

special note of gratitude is due to Dr. Jerre W. Wilson, vice president for 

academic affairs, for supervising the symposium from its infancy; to Dr. 

Kurt A.Sanftleben, vice president for instructional and research support, 

for providing the space and conference support; to Mary M. Lanzillotta 

for her tireless and patient handling of the contractual aspects; and to 

Bud Hilbmann and his team for making everything work.

The symposium was sponsored generously by MCUF from the 

beginning. Special gratitude is due to Brigadier General Thomas V.

Draude, USMC (Ret), president and CEO of the foundation, and to 

John R. Hales, the COO.

The symposium and the current publication would have not been 

possible without the participation of the panelists, chairs, and those 

who enriched the session with their contributions in the form of 

questions and discussion. To the panel chairs, General Draude and Dr. 

Douglas E. Streusand, professor of international relations at MCU, 

thank you for making the symposium punctual and for guiding the 

question-and-answer period in a manner which made the entire day 

so much richer and more informative. I want to especially thank 

Professor F. Gregory Gause, director of the Middle East Program 

at the University of Vermont, for accepting the invitation to speak 

on Iran’s policies in the Gulf region on short notice. General John P. 
Acknowledgments

98 

Abizaid, USA (Ret), opened the symposium, setting the tone for an 

excellent day of discussion on the Iranian piece of the puzzling world 

of the Middle East. I wish to thank him for accepting the invitation 

and for setting such a high standard for the rest of the day.

Many colleagues and friends provided suggestions for topics and 

speakers or facilitated meetings with the contributors. I wish to 

especially recognize Professor Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber, director 

of the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton 

University, and Brigadier Phil Jones, military attaché, British Army 

Staff in the United States, for putting me in contact with several of 

the contributors to this volume and for their continued friendship 

and professional camaraderie. I extend thanks to Lieutenant Colonel 

Christopher C. Starling, USMC, for his help in arranging General 

Abizaid’s participation.

To the contributors of this volume, thank you each and every one for 

accepting the invitation to speak at the symposium and for submitting 

your contributions. Your persistence through the stages of publication 

is much appreciated. While the symposium occurred close to a year 

before the publication of your contributions, I not only thank you for 

your collective patience, but also for your insightfulness, which has 

kept your writings relevant and forward looking. A special thank 

you to Karim Sadjadpour for granting permission to publish his 

congressional testimony on post-election Iran.

Kenneth H. Williams, senior editor of MCU Press, found the time 

in his demanding schedule to work on this volume. This publication 

would have not been possible without Mr. Williams’ full support and 

efforts. Emily D. Funderburke of MCU Press, with assistance from 

Vincent J. Martinez and W. Stephen Hill, designed the book. Special 

thanks to Robin E. Joel for volunteering to design the symposium 

logo, schedule, and folder. The current cover is an inspiration of her 

work.
Acknowledgments

99 

Erika A. Tarzi of the USMC Center for Advanced Operational 

Culture Learning read and edited the introduction and the final proof 

of the work and provided invaluable suggestions making it much fuller 

and finer. I am indebted to Erika for her efforts on this project and am 

eternally grateful for her companionship in walking this journey called 

life together with me.

Last, but certainly not least, I thank Michael C. Joel for working on 

every aspect of this project from the very beginning to the end. He 

was instrumental in organizing the symposium, worked—and often 

led—the publication process, and helped in the editing of the papers.
100 

Contributors

Ali M. Ansari is professor of Iranian history and director of the Institute 

for Iranian Studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, and 

associate fellow of the Middle East Programme, Royal Institute for 

International Affairs (Chatham House). He has authored numerous 

works, including Iran Under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation

(2007); Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and 

the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East (2006); and Modern Iran since 

1921: The Pahlavis and After (2003).

Mohsen M. Milani is professor of politics and chair of the Department 

of Government and International Affairs at the University of South 

Florida in Tampa. He is currently working on a book about Iran’s 

regional policies.

Ronald E. Neumann is president of the American Academy of 

Diplomacy. Ambassador Neumann served previously as a deputy 

assistant secretary of state and three times as ambassador, to Algeria, 

Bahrain, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. He was also the 

director of the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs (Iran and Iraq) as well 

as the principal officer in Tabriz, Iran. He is the author of The Other 

War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan (2009). 

Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace. Previously, he served as the chief Iran analyst at the 

International Crisis Group, based in Tehran and Washington, D.C.He 

is author of Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful 

Leader (2008).

Simon Shercliff is the first secretary for counter proliferation at the 

Embassy of the United Kingdom, Washington, D.C. Previously he has 

served as a political officer in the British Embassy, Tehran; the chief 

press officer for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; the first deputy 

director of communications; and the director of communications and 

press secretary for the foreign secretary.
Contributors

101 

Gerald M. Steinberg heads the Political Studies Department at Bar 

Ilan University in Ramat Gan, Israel, outside of Tel Aviv. He is the 

founder of the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation 

at the university and is a fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Public 

Affairs. Some of his recent publications include “Examining 

Israel’s NPT Exceptionality: 1998-2005” (2006); “The Centrality 

of Confidence Building Measures: Lessons from the Middle East” 

(2004); “Deterrence Instability: Hizballah’s Fuse to Iran’s Bomb” 

(2005); and “Israel at Sixty: Asymmetry, Vulnerability, and the Search 

for Security” (2008).

Amin Tarzi is director of Middle East Studies at Marine Corps 

University in Quantico, Virginia. He supports the university by 

providing a resident scholar with expertise in Iran, Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf region. His latest work, The Taliban and 

the Crisis in Afghanistan (2008), is a coedited volume with Robert D. 

Crews of Stanford University.
102 

Abizaid, John P., 62-63

Additional Protocol: defined, 51, 91; 

Iran refuses to implement, 51-52

Afghanistan: Iranian influence in, 9, 15, 

26, 27-28, 32, 35, 40, 41, 62, 63, 65, 

69; Nowruz in, 95; U.S. in, 7, 8, 21, 

26, 27-28, 32, 35, 40, 41, 47, 53, 62, 

63, 82, 88

Agha-Soltan, Neda: death of, 85

Ahmadinejad, Mahmud: and 2005 

election, 11, 23, 33-34; and 2009 

election, 2-3, 18-19, 24, 33-34, 

83-90; denies Holocaust, 58, 72, 

76-77; and Iraq, 8; and Israel, 58-

59, 72, 76, 89; and Khamenei, 3, 

11, 13-14, 34, 84-85, 88-89; and 

Khatami, 12, 16; and Majles, 15, 

17, 18; nuclear ambitions of, 7, 14, 

76; as president of Iran, 3, 11-19, 

23, 34; and U.S., 14, 33

Algeria, 73, 78

Algiers Accords, 42, 43

Arab-Israeli conflict: Iran and 29-30, 

65; mentioned, 1, 26, 47, 88. See 

also Israel

Arak, Iran: location of heavy water 

reactor, 81

Armenia, 62

Assembly of Experts, 10, 91

Atomic Energy Organization (Iran), 7

Azerbaijan, 62

Badr Brigade, 67

Baker, James A., III, 45

Barak, Ehud: on Iranian threat to 

Israel, 74, 80

Basij, 10, 22, 85, 91

Bazaari, 55, 91

Begin, Menachem, 74-75, 91

Begin Doctrine, 74-75, 91

Benjamin, Samuel G.W., 1

Bonn Accord, 40

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 

85, 86

Bush, George H.W.: and Iran policy, 40

Bush, George W.: and Iran policy, 14, 24, 

31, 32, 64, 79-80, 81, 87

Bushehr, Iran: site of Russian-built 

nuclear plant, 50, 91

Camp Ashraf, 44

Caspian Sea, 8

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 85

Chavez, Hugo, 26

Chechnya, Russia, 26, 62

China: diplomacy with Iran, 6, 36, 48, 

53, 54-55, 73; trade with Iran, 69; 

mentioned, 24

Clinton, Hillary Rodham: and Iran policy, 

9

Clinton, William J.: and Iran policy, 44, 

45

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 77

Damascus, Syria, 65

Dawa Party, 67, 92

E3+3: and negotiations with Iran, 6, 8, 53, 

54, 56

Egypt, 34, 71, 73, 78

Index
Index

103 

ElBaradei, Mohamed M.: on Iranian 

nuclear program, 52

European Union (EU): and negotiations 

with Iran, 36, 55-56, 80

Expediency Council, 10, 92

Al-Faisal, Saud, 57

France: party in talks with Iran, 6, 53; 

supplies reactor to Iraq, 74

Gaza, 35, 71-72, 93

Germany: party in talks with Iran, 6, 53; 

mentioned, 74, 76

Ghalibaf, Mohammad Bagher, 85

Grand Bargain, 39, 45

Guardian Council: defined, 10, 92; 

Khamenei and, 23

Gulf War. See Persian Gulf War

Hamas: defined, 92-93; Iran support for, 4, 

8, 29, 31, 34, 41, 71

Hawzeh, 70, 93

Hejab, 25, 93

Herat Province, Afghanistan: Iranian 

influence in, 69

Hezbollah: defined, 93; Iran support for, 4, 

31, 34, 41, 71, 78-79

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), 53, 93

Holocaust: Ahmadinejad denies, 58, 72, 

76-77

Hostage Crisis (1979-81), 42, 60, 61

Human rights: in Iran, 31, 33, 89, 90

Hussein, Saddam: Dawa party opposes, 92; 

deposed, 8, 63, 66-67, 71; Iraq after fall 

of, 57, 65, 68; and Iran-Iraq War, 61, 

66, 89, 94; and MEK, 66, 94; nuclear 

ambitions of, 54

India, 77

International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA): defined, 93; and Iranian 

nuclear program, 49, 50-52, 53, 54, 73, 

91

Iraq: British establish (1921), 66; and Iran, 

2, 8-9, 26, 27, 32, 35, 41, 43, 57-70, 

71; Israel destroys reactor in, 74, 75, 

92; MEK prisoners in, 43-44, 69-70, 

94; U.S. in, 7, 8-9, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 

32, 35, 40, 47, 53, 57-70, 80, 81, 82, 

88; mentioned, 54. See also Hussein, 

Saddam

Iran: 2005 election in, 11, 23, 33-34; 2009 

election in, 2-3, 4, 18, 24, 33-34, 41, 

83-90; and Afghanistan, 9, 15, 26, 27-

28, 32, 35, 40, 41, 62, 63, 65, 69; and 

G.H.W. Bush, 40; and G.W. Bush, 14, 

24, 32, 64, 80, 81, 87; and China, 6, 36, 

48, 53, 54-55, 69, 73; and W.J. Clinton, 

44, 45; economy of, 11-12, 16-18, 

53-54, 84; and France, 6, 54, 74; and 

Germany, 6, 54; governmental structure 

of, 10, 22-23, 59-60; and Hamas, 4, 8, 

29, 31, 34, 41, 71; and Hezbollah, 4, 31, 

35, 41, 71, 78-79; human rights issues 

in, 31, 33, 89, 90; and IAEA, 49, 50-52, 

53, 54, 73, 91; and Iraq, 2, 8-9, 26, 27, 

32, 35, 41, 43, 57-70, 71; and Israel, 4, 5, 

6-7, 9, 22, 25, 28, 29-30, 48, 58, 71-82; 

and Lebanon, 8, 9, 35, 63, 65, 71, 79, 93; 

nuclear ambitions of, 2, 3, 4, 5-7, 9, 14, 

21, 22, 26, 28-29, 41, 49-56, 58-59, 62-

63, 65, 72-82, 83, 88; and Obama, 26, 

32-33, 34, 37, 83, 86-87, 89; oil prices 

and, 11-12, 16, 17-18, 24, 34, 53-54, 

86; oil and gas resources of, 7-8, 24, 

30-31, 40; reform movement in, 12, 23; 
Index

104 

revolution in (1979), 2, 4, 8, 12, 22, 25, 

37, 71, 83, 85, 86, 90; and Russia, 6, 26, 

30, 36-37, 48, 50, 54, 55, 62, 73, 88, 91; 

and Syria, 63, 71; and Taliban, 28; and 

United Kingdom, 6, 49-56; and U.S.

negotiations (potential), 1-6, 21-48, 79-

81, 83-84, 86-90; and U.S. Congress, 43, 

44, 47, 83; U.S. hostage crisis in (1979-

81), 42, 60, 61

Iran-Contra Scandal, 45-46

Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), 66, 67, 89, 94

Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 42-43

Isfahan, Iran: 2009 protests in, 85

Islamic Jihad, 29, 31

Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC): 

in Afghanistan, 62; defined, 93-94; 

influence of, 23; mentioned, 2, 10, 22, 

59, 63, 84, 85, 91, 95

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), 94, 

96. See also Supreme Council for the 

Islamic Revolution in Iraq

Israel: and Ahmadinejad, 58-59, 72, 76, 

89; destroys Osiraq reactor, 74, 75, 92; 

IDF, 74, 93; Iran as threat to, 4, 5, 6-7, 

9, 22, 25, 28, 29-30, 48, 58, 71-82; and 

Khamenei, 4-5, 72-73; and Middle East 

peace process, 21, 26, 27, 29-30, 31, 32, 

47, 65, 88, 89; and U.S., 6, 61, 71-82. 

See also Arab-Israeli conflict

Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 74, 93

Jafari, Mohammad Ali (Aziz), 94

Jordan, 27, 34, 71

Karrubi, Mehdi, 2

Karzai, Hamid, 28

Kashan, Iran: 2009 protests in, 85

Kim Jong-il, 54

Khamenei, Sayyed Ali Hoseyni: and 2005 

election, 23; and 2009 election, 2-3, 84-

85; and Ahmadinejad, 3, 11, 13-14, 34, 

84-85, 88-89; and Guardian Council, 

23; and Israel, 4-5, 72-73; and Khatami, 

13-14; and Majles, 23; and Rafsanjani, 

13-14, 23 61-62; and U.S., 25, 34, 60, 

61-62, 87; as president of Iran, 24; as 

supreme leader of Iran, 2, 3, 13, 23-25, 

34, 59-60, 84-86, 88-89

Khatami, Sayyed Mohammad: and 2009 

election, 18, 86; Ahmadinejad rejects 

efforts of, 12, 16; as Iranian president, 

12, 14, 16; and Khamenei, 13-14

Khomeini, Ruhollah Musavi: death of, 11, 

61-62; ideology of, 25, 70, 92, 96; and 

Hezbollah, 93; and Iranian Revolution, 

12, 22, 94; leadership of Iran, 8, 13, 22, 

25; and U.S., 60, 61; and war with Iraq, 

61

Kissinger, Henry A., 25, 45

Kordan, Ali, 18

Kurds, 27, 66, 67, 69

Kuwait, 27, 61

Larijani, Ali Ardashir, 23

Lebanon: Iran and, 8, 9, 35, 63, 65, 71, 78-

79, 93; hostages in, 40; and U.S., 47, 63. 

See also Hezbollah

Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU): defined, 

94; Iran produces, 51, 53

Majles: and Ahmadinejad, 15, 17, 18; 

defined, 94; and Khamenei, 23; 

mentioned, 3, 10, 92

Mashhad, Iran: 2009 protests in, 85

Mashaii, Esfandiar Rahim, 4

Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK): defined, 94; 
Index

105 

leaders held in Iraq, 43-44; and Saddam 

Hussein, 69, 94; as threat to Iran, 69-

70, 94

Montazeri, Hoseyn-Ali, 86

Musavi, Mir-Hoseyn: and 2009 election, 

2-3, 18

An-Najaf, Iraq, 69

Nasrallah, Hassan, 78-79

Natanz, Iran, 95

National Council of Resistance of Iran 

(NCRI), 94

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): 2007 

report on Iranian nuclear program, 80-

82, 95

Nowruz: defined, 95; Obama sends 

greetings on, 33, 87

Netanyahu, Benjamin: on Iranian threat to 

Israel, 74-76

Nixon, Richard M., 24

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 6, 82

North Korea: and nuclear issues, 54, 71-72, 

78, 81

NPT. See Treaty on the Non-proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons: British develop, 52-53; 

Iranian ambitions to develop, 2, 3, 4, 

5-7, 9, 14, 21, 22, 26, 28-29, 41, 49-56, 

58-59, 62-63, 65, 72-82, 83, 88; Israeli 

response to threat of, 4, 5-7, 48, 71-82

Obama, Barak H.: and Iran policy, 26, 32-

33, 34, 35, 37, 83, 86-87, 89

Oil: Iranian resources, 7-8, 24, 30-31, 40; 

price of, 11-12, 16, 17-18, 24, 34, 53-54, 

86

Osiraq, Iraq: Israel destroys nuclear reactor 

at, 74, 75, 92

Ottoman Empire, 66

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 2, 13, 16, 

24, 60, 94

Pakistan, 27, 74, 77

Palestine/Palestinians, 5, 8, 26, 30, 31, 32, 

63, 88, 93. See also Hamas

Pasdaran. See Islamic Revolution Guard 

Corps

Persian Empire, 1, 66

Persian Gulf, 8, 25, 48, 64, 69, 70, 92

Persian Gulf War (1991), 61

Pour-Mohammadi, Mostafa, 17

Principle-ists (Iran), 13

Al-Qaeda, 26, 31, 44

Qods Forces, 94, 95

Qom, Iran, 70, 84, 93

Rabin, Yitzhak, 6, 47

Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi: and 2005 

election, 23; and 2009 election, 86; as 

Iranian president, 12, 23, 61-62; on 

Israel, 72; and Khamenei, 14, 23, 61-62

Reform Movement (Iran), 12, 23

Rezaei, Mohsen, 2, 63-64

Roosevelt, Theodore, 34

Rubin, Uzi, 76

Russia: builds Iranian nuclear power plant, 

50, 91; and Iran, 26, 30, 50, 55, 62, 88; 

diplomatic relations with Iran, 6, 36, 48, 

53, 54-55, 73. See also Soviet Union 

Al-Sadr, Muqtada, 68

Salafi, 26, 95

Salehi, Ali-Akbar, 7

Saudi Arabia, 27, 57, 73
Index

106 

Shiraz, Iran: 2009 protests in, 85

Siemens-Nokia: provides technology to Iran, 

90

Al-Sistani, Ali al-Husayni, 68, 70

Soviet Union, 63, 77

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 

in Iraq (SCIRI), 67, 96. See also Islamic 

Supreme Council of Iraq

Supreme Leader. See Khamenei, Sayyed Ali 

Hoseyni

Syria: and Iran, 63, 71; and Israel, 71, 74, 75; 

nuclear ambitions of, 73, 74, 78, 81

Tabriz, Iran: 2009 protests in, 85

Taliban: in Afghanistan, 8, 62, 63; Iran and, 28

Tehran, Iran: 2009 protests in, 85-86, 89; 

Holocaust denial conference in, 72; 

military parades in, 72

Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT), 50, 55, 73, 95

Turkey, 27, 69, 73, 78

United Kingdom: establishes Iraq (1921), 66; 

and Iran, 49-56; nuclear program of, 52-

53; party in talks with Iran, 6, 53; and U.S.

independence, 39 

United Nations Security Council (UNSC): 

and Iranian nuclear program, 49-50, 53-

56, 64

United States: and Afghanistan, 7, 8, 21, 26, 

27-28, 32, 35, 40, 41, 47, 53, 62, 63, 82, 88; 

and Ahmadinejad, 14, 33; G.H.W. Bush 

Iran policy, 40; G.W. Bush Iran policy, 14, 

24, 31, 32, 64, 79-80, 81, 87; CIA, 85; W.J. 

Clinton Iran policy, 44, 45; Congress and 

Iran, 43, 44, 47, 83; and Iraq, 7, 8-9, 21, 

24, 26, 27, 28, 32, 35, 40, 47, 53, 57-70, 80, 

81, 82, 88; and Iran hostage crisis (1979-

81), 42, 60, 61; and Iran negotiations, 1-6, 

21-48, 53, 79-81, 83-84, 86-90; and Iran 

nuclear ambitions, 2, 3, 5-7, 14, 21, 22, 

26, 28-29, 41, 49-56, 58-59, 62-63, 65, 

73, 74, 75, 79-82, 83, 88; and Iran-U.S.

Claims Tribunal, 42-43; and Israel, 6, 61, 

71-82; and Khamenei, 25, 34, 60, 61-62, 

87; and Khomeini, 60, 61; and Lebanon, 

47, 63; and MEK leaders, 43-44; National 

Intelligence Estimate on Iranian nuclear 

program (2007), 80-82, 95; Obama Iran 

policy, 26, 32-33, 34, 37, 83, 86-87, 89; 

Voice of America, 86

United States Congress: and Iran, 43, 44, 47; 

testimony on Iran before, 83-90

Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6), 51, 53, 96

Velayat-e Faqih, 68, 70, 92, 96

Velayati, Ali Akbar, 34

Venezuela, 26

Voice of America, 86

Wilayat al-Ummah, 92