Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests: 

Evidence from Two Tax Regimes 

by 

David Joulfaian 

US Department of the Treasury 

OTA Paper 92 March 2005

OTA Papers is an occasional series of reports on the research, models, and data sets 

developed to inform and improve Treasury’s tax policy analysis. The papers are works in 

progress and subject to revision. Views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily represent official Treasury positions or policy. OTA Papers are 

distributed in order to document OTA analytic methods and data and invite discussion and 

suggestions for revision and improvement. Comments are welcome and should be directed 

to the authors. 

Office of Tax Analysis 

Department of the Treasury 

Washington, DC 20220 

_________________ 

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the January 2005 American Economic 

Association annual meetings in Philadelphia. The author is grateful to comments from 

Gerald Auten, Jon Bakija, Robert Carroll, and participants at the Tax Economist Forum, 

and to discussions with Rob McClelland and Bill Randolph. The views expressed are those 

of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of the Treasury. 

Comments welcome at david.joulfaian@do.treas.gov. 
Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests: 

Evidence from Two Tax Regimes 

by 

David Joulfaian 

US Department of the Treasury 

OTA Paper 92 March 2005

OTA Papers is an occasional series of reports on the research, models, and data sets 

developed to inform and improve Treasury’s tax policy analysis. The papers are works in 

progress and subject to revision. Views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily represent official Treasury positions or policy. OTA Papers are 

distributed in order to document OTA analytic methods and data and invite discussion and 

suggestions for revision and improvement. Comments are welcome and should be directed 

to the authors. 

Office of Tax Analysis 

Department of the Treasury 

Washington, DC 20220 

_________________ 

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the January 2005 American Economic 

Association annual meetings in Philadelphia. The author is grateful to comments from 

Gerald Auten, Jon Bakija, Robert Carroll, and participants at the Tax Economist Forum, 

and to discussions with Rob McClelland and Bill Randolph. The views expressed are those 

of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of the Treasury. 

Comments welcome at david.joulfaian@do.treas.gov. 
Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests: 

Evidence from Two Tax Regimes 

Abstract 

Much of the literature on the effects of estate taxation on charitable bequests has relied on 

cross sectional data, reflecting the uniqueness of death. Few have explored longitudinal 

data to exploit exogenous variations in tax regimes. The latter, however, continue to be 

susceptible to omitted variable as well as measurement error biases attributable to changes 

in the treatment of spousal bequests and frequent changes in tax regimes. This paper 

explores the effects of the estate tax on charitable bequests using administrative data from 

two tax regimes where earlier biases are minimized. The deductibility of charitable 

bequests is found to have significant implications for giving. However, the effects of estate 

tax repeal are much smaller. These findings are sensitive to expectations of the tax regime 

in effect at time of death. 

JEL Fields: D19, H24, H31 

Keywords: Bequests, Taxes, Charitable Giving 

1
I. Introduction 

Individuals save for a variety of reasons. For some, savings is bequest motivated, 

be it altruistic or strategic in nature. For others, it may reflect the simple desire to 

accumulate wealth. Regardless of the motivation, wealthy savers may have preset 

preferences as to how to divide their accumulated wealth among the various donees and 

heirs at death. Estate and inheritance taxes, by altering relative prices, may alter the 

division of these bequests. Even in the case of accidental bequests, savers may not be too 

indifferent as to how their terminal wealth is ultimately divided between the government 

and potential heirs. 

Because bequests to charitable organizations are deductible in computing the estate 

tax liability, estate taxation lowers the price of such transfers relative to those to children. 

At the very same time, the estate tax lowers after-tax terminal wealth and the potential size 

of inheritances. These tendencies raise important policy considerations related to how 

changes in estate tax rates, including the elimination of the estate tax, may affect giving. 

Indeed, charitable bequests and the potential effects of estate taxation continue to attract 

attention, and feature prominently in the debate on taxing inheritances in the United States. 

With the wealthy leaving behind some $20 billion in charitable bequests annually, the 

implications of public policy for these sizeable transfers are worthy of study. 

Much of the literature, reflecting the uniqueness of death, has relied on crosssectional data in exploring the sensitivity of bequests to the estate tax. Individuals are 

assumed to choose between bequests to charity and bequests to children (and other heirs) 

by implicitly setting the marginal rate of substitution between the two to equal the relative 

price of charitable bequests. The price of spousal bequests is ignored and the estate tax is 

2
assumed, implicitly or explicitly (Joulfaian, 2000a), not to affect the choice between 

spousal and charitable bequests.1 

Many of the existing studies find large tax price elasticities suggesting that the 

deductibility is a significant stimulant to giving.

 2 Many also find large wealth elasticities, 

which suggests that the estate tax, by lowering “bequeathable” or disposable wealth, has a 

dampening effect on giving. These estimates are not without their critics. Identifying the 

effects of progressive estate tax rates separately from wealth (Feenberg, 1987), for 

instance, may represent a serious challenge in evaluating the effects of estate taxation 

especially as only cross sectional data are available, again reflecting the uniqueness of 

death (Poterba, 1998). Joulfaian (2000a) employs variations in state tax rates to address 

this concern. Others, however, such as Barthold and Plotnick (1984), the only study to date 

to have employed longitudinal micro data, and more recently Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) 

and Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod (2003), resort to pooling cross sectional or aggregated time 

series data over a long period where numerous changes in tax regimes have taken place. 

Generally, it is difficult to draw inferences from the observed trend in aggregate 

bequests (Auten, Clotfelter, and Schmalbeck , 2000, Table 12-7). Kopczuk and Slemrod 

(2003), hereafter KS, resort to time series analysis of such aggregate data to discern how 

variations in tax regimes over time influenced the observed trend in giving. KS conclude 

that the effect of the estate tax can be larger than what has been reported earlier, an implicit 

reference to the predicted 12 percent reduction in bequests reported in Joulfaian (2000a), 

but do not report estimates of this effect. More recently, Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod (2003), 

1 This assumption reflects the full deductibility of spousal and charitable bequests (tax price of one), an 

assumption that may not be appropriate when using pre-1982 data as the tax treatment diverged. 

2 See McNees (1973), Boskin (1976), Feldstein (1977), Clotfelter (1985), Joulfaian (1991, 2000a, 2001), 

Auten and Joulfaian (1996), Greene and McClelland (2001), and McClelland (2004). 

3 
hereafter BGS, refine the work of KS and employ “pooled” grouped data. BGS exclude the 

estates of married decedents, and report results that suggest charitable bequests would 

seize to take place in the aftermath of estate tax repeal. 3 Using parameters from BGS, 

Bakija and Gale (2003) report estate tax repeal would reduce charitable bequests by 37 

percent. In contrast, Barthold and Plotnick (1984), who employ pooled Connecticut 

probate records for the 1930s and 1940s, a period characterized by frequent changes in tax 

regimes, find taxes to have virtually no effect on giving.4 

Large donors are likely to be very wealthy who may also face high tax rates by 

virtue of the progressive tax rate schedule. Thus it is difficult to disentangle the effects of 

wealth separately from those of high tax rates on giving. Resorting to pooled cross 

sectional or time series aggregate data is one way to address this identification problem as 

they exploit variations in statutory tax rates, changes that are independent of wealth 

variations. But this may also introduce a number of other biases, or at the very least 

exacerbate them. As Clotfelter (1985, pp. 240) points out, the price term is likely to be 

measured with error during periods of frequent changes in tax rates because it is not clear 

whether reported charitable bequests are influenced by current or past tax rates. 

Furthermore, there is also the question of whether planned bequests reflect future taxes, as 

estate planning by its very nature is forward looking. Indeed, the swift adjustment in 

spousal bequests documented in Bernheim (1987) highlights the importance of 

expectations. 

3 More specifically, BGS employ IRS data for select years grouped into five wealth categories expressed in 

1996 dollars; $400,000 to $750,000; $750,000 to $1.25 million; $1.25 to $2 million; $2 to 5 million; and over 

$5 million. BGS report price and wealth elasticities of -2.1 and 1.55, respectively, and state that “eliminating 

estate and inheritance taxes would have raised the price of charitable bequests by 77 percent, on average, 

while raising disposable wealth by an average of only 24 percent” in 1998. 

4 Using evidence from a recent survey, Schervish and Havens (2003) report charitable bequests to increase 

in the aftermath of estate tax repeal. 

4 
Furthermore, studies typically assume that individuals face a tax price for charity 

measured relative to the price of bequests to children (and other heirs). But married 

individuals, for instance, may leave their estates to their children, charity, as well as to 

their spouses. If transfers to these three recipients face different tax regimes, then the price 

of spousal bequests also needs to be considered, as well as the implications for the 

measured after-tax wealth. This omitted variable problem, as well as the ensuing errors in 

measuring the budget constraint, may have motivated BGS to exclude married decedents 

from their study. However, excluding married individuals may not adequately solve these 

problems. 

Bernheim (1987) document how spousal bequests increased in the aftermath of 

introducing the unlimited marital deduction in 1982. The change in tax regimes, by setting 

a tax rate of zero for spousal transfers, seems to have stimulated additional transfers to 

spouses very likely at the expense of transfers to charity. Cognizant of these effects, BGS 

exclude married decedents. But because spousal bequests increase the wealth of the 

surviving spouse, they may also influence giving in the future. Consequently, the omitted 

tax price of spousal bequests and errors in measuring the budget constraint and the tax 

price faced by widowed decedents don’t go away. In a more recent paper, Bakija, Gale, 

and Slemrod (2005), expand their earlier work and attempt to control for the price of 

spousal bequests. 

Data on the never married singles and those divorced or separated are immune from 

measurement errors and specification bias caused by changes in the treatment of spousal 

bequests over time. But findings from such longitudinal data, that is yet to be explored, 

may not be viewed as very meaningful in explaining the pattern of giving and the estate tax 

5
effects as widowed (and married) decedents account for the bulk of giving. Indeed, the 

latter group accounts for much of the wealth held by the super rich as well. Thus, the 

challenge is to find periods or tax regimes where wealth is consistently measured over time 

and less susceptible to measurement errors. 

In this paper I explore the effects of the estate tax on charitable bequests using 

estate tax data on widowed, as well as divorced and never married single decedents. 

However, and in order to minimize measurement related problems, I examine data on 

decedents in 1976 and 1982, two regimes that embody substantially different tax rate 

schedules but where the measurement of wealth and charitable bequests is virtually 

identical.5 Descriptive statistics on the pattern of giving in 1976 and 1982 show that 

giving to charity did not decline in the aftermath of tax rate reductions in 1982, and suggest 

that estate taxation may have little effect on bequests. This is a finding that is further 

confirmed by multivariate analysis. 

The paper is organized as follows. Section II explores issues related to modeling 

the effects of estate taxation on charitable bequests for married couples. Section III 

describes the data and presents some basic results, while section IV provides some 

econometric findings. Section V concludes. 

II. Modeling Charitable Bequests 

A married individual faces at least three options in disposing of terminal wealth 

accumulated over a lifetime. He may bequeath his wealth to his surviving spouse, transfer 

5 In 1976, spousal bequests were deductible to the extent they did not exceed one half the estate. These 

bequests became fully deductible in 1982. As such, post 1982 data on widowed decedents grow less 

compatible over time depending on the size of spousal bequest and the remaining life expectancy of the 

surviving spouse (see Joulfaian, 1998, Table 19). Available pre-1970 data is also not compatible given the 

dramatic changes in the tax treatment of charities introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 

6 
it to his children (and other relatives and friends), or donate it to charity. If the estate tax 

treats these transfers differentially, then this may influence the allocation of bequests 

amongst the survivors. As such, an individual’s objective is then to determine how to 

allocate this terminal wealth among the three potential donees. 

More formally, and in a very simple model, an individual's utility is determined by 

charitable bequests (C), bequests to heirs (B), and spousal bequests (S) at death in period 1, 

or: 

(1) U1 = C1 

α B1 β S γ

The individual maximizes his utility subject to a budget constraint which requires that 

expenditures on charitable and non-charitable bequests not exceed the individual's terminal 

wealth W, or: 

(2) PCC1 + PB B1 + PS S ≤ W1 

where PC denotes the tax price of charitable bequests, PS for spousal bequests, PB for 

bequests to children and others defined as PB =1/(1-T’). At a marginal tax rate T’ of 0.55, it 

will cost the donor $2.22 for every $1 in bequests (B). In contrast, bequests to charity are 

exempt from taxation as they are deductible in computing the estate tax. Similarly, spousal 

bequests are fully deductible. Thus, PC = PS =1, or the more familiar 1-T’ when stated 

relative to the price of bequests to heirs. Before 1982, however, spousal bequests were 

deductible only to the extent that they did not exceed 50 percent of the estate. Thus, the 

7
price of spousal bequests was one when these bequests were less than one half the gross 

estate (PS =1), and PS =1/(1-T’) when they exceeded this threshold. 

Solving for the first-order conditions, not surprisingly spousal bequests decline 

with its tax price, or: 

γ W1 (3) S = PS (α + β + γ ) 

∂S such that < 0 

∂PS 

This is consistent with the experience in the aftermath of the introduction of the unlimited 

marital deduction, i.e., T’=0, in 1982 (Bernheim, 1987). Spousal bequests reported in 1982, 

when measured relative to the wealth of the estates, were 60 percent larger than the amount 

that is likely to have been reported under the law in effect in 1976 (Joulfaian, 2000b). 

The surviving spouse is also faced with a similar, albeit limited, set of choices at 

death in period 2. More specifically, her choice is how to allocate her own accumulated 

wealth (WS) plus wealth inherited from her spouse (S) between bequests to her children 

(B) and charity (C). More specifically, she maximizes her utility:6 

(4) U 2 = C2 

a

B2 

b 

subject to the budget constraint that her transfers do not exceed her terminal wealth W2: 

6 I ignore discounting to simplify the exposition. 

8 
(5) PCC2 + PB B2 ≤ W2 

where her terminal wealth consists of her own accumulated wealth plus bequests from her 

∂W2 spouse, or W2 = WS + S such that 

∂PS 

< 0 from (3), for a given WS; the terminal wealth 

of the spouse in period 2 is influenced by the tax regime in period 1. Equally important is 

the influence of spousal bequests on the observed tax price of giving to charity in period 2; 

T2 = T(WS+S). 

Solving for the first order conditions yields, 

PB a (6) C2 = (WS + S ) 

PC (PB −1) b 

or, after some substitutions, 

 γW1  aPB (7) C2 = 



WS +

PS (α + β + γ ) 

 bPC (PB −1) 

such that ∂C2 < 0 

∂PS 

which suggests that charitable bequests by the surviving spouse in period 2 are influenced 

by the terminal wealth of the first to die, W1, and the price of spousal bequests PS in period 

1.7 In other words, we cannot ignore the effects of the tax regime in period 1 on giving and 

wealth in period 2 for widowed individuals. 

7 In an alternative treatment, husband and wife may maximize joint utility subject to a common budget 

constraint in deciding how to allocate charitable bequests between the two. 

9 
III. Preliminary Look at Estate Tax Data 

In moving away from the reliance on cross sectional estate tax data, the challenge 

in using longitudinal data is to control for the tax treatment of transfers to various donees 

as well as the frequently changing tax regimes. In particular, and as demonstrated above, 

the treatment of spousal transfers is the most problematic and commonly ignored in the 

literature. One approach to addressing this problem is to simply exclude married 

decedents. As eluded to earlier, however, this continues to overlook the influence of 

spousal bequests on the observed wealth of the surviving spouse (the second to die), which 

itself can be determined by past tax regimes. 

In this paper, I resort to estate tax data for decedents in 1976 and 1982, years when 

the data on widowed decedents is the least tainted by tax induced changes in spousal 

bequests.8

 The tax Code in effect in 1976 had been in place virtually unaltered since 1954, 

except for the restrictions on gifts to certain charities, private foundations in particular, 

introduced by the 1969 Tax Reform Act. The intent of this act was to effectively reduce 

transfers to beneficiaries disguised as charitable gifts. The tax rate schedules in effect in 

1982 were ushered by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81), enacted on 

August 13, 1981, and are markedly lower than those in effect in 1976. These rate 

reductions had been in part anticipated as early as November 1980, following the outcome 

of the Presidential elections. Equally important, the wealth reported by widowed decedents 

in the two periods reflects the 1976 tax treatment of spousal bequests, as the full marital 

deduction took effect for married decedents in 1982. Thus, we observe the pattern of 

giving to charity in the presence of exogenous variations in tax rates, as well as wealth 

8 Comprehensive data for the years 1977 through 1981 do not exist. 

10 
measures for widowed decedents that are not influenced by changes in the marital 

deduction. 

The maximum tax rate in effect in 1976 was 77 percent. ERTA81 reduced the 

maximum tax rate in steps to 50 percent by 1985. The enabling legislation also introduced 

a “unified” tax credit which effectively exempted the first $225,000 in taxable estate in 

1982, set to gradually increase to $600,000 by 1987. The tax rate schedule in effect in the 

intervening years is illustrated in Table 1. 

Data on estate tax decedents in 1976 is available only for returns filed in 1977; 

returns filed in 1976 and after 1977 are not available. Returns with gross estates in excess 

of $500,000 are sampled at 100 percent; at 20 percent for those under $500,000. In 

contrast, population data for 1982 decedents is available for returns filed in 1982 through 

1984, but only for those with estates in excess of $1 million; the less wealthy are sampled 

at an average rate of 30 percent. While estate tax returns are required to be filed within 9 

months of the date of death, some are filed much later. 9 Anecdotal evidence suggests that 

late filers are likely to be distinctly different in terms of wealth and sophisticated estate 

planning.10 Thus, to enhance the comparability of the two data sets, I limit the data on 

decedents in 1982 to estate tax returns filed in 1983, and discard those filed in 1982 and 

1984. In addition, only estates in excess of $300,000 in 1982 dollars, the SOI sampling 

threshold for returns filed in 1983, are considered.11 

9 Typically, some 15 percent of estate tax returns of decedents in a given year are filed in the year of death; 

80 percent during the following year, and the remainder in later years. 

10 Indeed, regressing the log of wealth of decedents in 1982 on the year an estate tax return is filed yields a 

coefficient of 0.13 (se=0.01), implying that reported wealth is on average 13 percent higher for each year 

returns are filed late. 

11 The filing requirement was $225,000 for decedents in 1982. 

11 
To motivate the analysis, I first restrict the sample to widowed and married 

decedents. Their pattern of charitable bequests over the two periods is summarized in 

Figure 1A-B. Figure 1A shows the probability of giving to rise with wealth. Similarly, 

Figure 1B shows the share of wealth transferred to also rise with wealth. But given the 

progressive tax rate schedules in Table 1, this may also suggest that giving rises with tax 

rates as well. The fraction of estates giving as well as the share of wealth transferred is 

generally lower for estates in 1982 than their counterparts in 1976 when tax rates were 

higher, particularly for the wealthiest of estates. This may lead us to conclude that lower 

tax rates depressed giving in 1982. 

However, and as demonstrated in Figure 2, much of the trend observed in Figure 1 

is reversed when married decedents are excluded and the focus is restricted to widowed 

decedents. Indeed, in the case of the wealthiest of estates, those in excess of $20 million, 

the share of wealth transferred almost doubles.12 Despite the tax rate reductions, the 

“generosity” of the very wealthy seems to have increased. 

Figure 3 sheds some light on the diverging trends observed above. Married 

decedents, virtually across all wealth cohorts, seem to leave smaller bequests to charity in 

1982 compared to the trend observed for 1976. In contrast, and more interestingly, Figure 

4 exhibits a surge in spousal bequests for all wealth categories, which is very likely to have 

taken place at the expense of charitable bequests. Figures 3 and 4, combined, make the 

case that potential findings from longitudinal data on the effects of estate taxation can be 

biased if spousal bequests and their consequences for the evolution of wealth are not 

properly controlled for. 

12 Note that this group accounts from one half the bequests reported in the sample, weighted or otherwise. 

12 
Controlling for spousal bequests and their ultimate disposition is rather a difficult 

task, particularly as it requires the tracking of married couples across time and tax regime. 

As such, I focus only on widowed, never married singles, and divorced/separated 

decedents. The resulting sample consists of 14,051 estates, with about 55 percent 

representing decedents in 1976. Table 2 provides summary statistics for select variables, 

with all amounts stated in $1982. The mean charitable bequest CB is $287,300, with about 

one third giving to charity. Net of the tax savings from its deductibility, the mean after-tax 

bequest is $114,900, measured as CB-(T 0 -T), where T is actual tax paid and T0 is the tax

liability computed by setting charitable bequests to zero; T=T(W-CB) and T0=T(W). These 

estates are large with mean wealth W of about $1.6 million, and standard error of $17 

million. Net of taxes paid, as well as the tax savings from deducting charitable bequests, 

i.e. W-T 0, disposable wealth is $886,500. This represents the maximum amount that can be 

transferred to the heirs. The average tax price P=(1-T’) is 0.65. When evaluated using fully 

phased-in tax law, the after-tax wealth and charitable bequests, as well as the tax price, are 

higher. 

Comparing those who give to those who don’t give, and as illustrated in columns 2 

and 3 of Table 2, we find that the sample of donors are wealthier with mean wealth of $2.6 

million compared to $1 million for non-donors. They are also older with mean age of 81 

years compared to 76 years for non-donors, and more likely to have never married. 

However, there seems to be very little difference in observed tax prices particularly when 

the fully phased-in tax law is used. 

IV. Multivariate Analysis 

13
I employ multivariate analysis to further gauge the effects of estate taxation, and 

control for the other determinants of charitable bequests. The latter include demographic 

variables such as age, gender, and marital status, as well as bequeathable or disposable 

wealth. Of particular interest is how these variables, the tax price and wealth in particular, 

influence the observed budget share (ω) allocated to charity. More specifically, I estimate 

the following equation for estate i in period t, where w is disposable wealth, W-T0, or the 

maximum amount that can be transferred to the heirs, and Z is a vector of demographic 

attributes, or: 

(8) ωi,t = α ln pi,t +θ ln wi,t + γZi,t + ε i,t 

Two measures of the budget share are considered. One measure defines the budget 

share as [CB-(T0–T)]/(W- T0) consistent with Joulfaian (2000).13 Another is the linear 

variant CB(1–T’)/(W- T0) explored in Randolph (1995). Under a proportional tax system, 

the two would be identical except when the entire estate is left to charity; T’=0 but T0-

T>0.14 Beginning with the latter, a critical variable in explaining charitable giving is the 

tax price. This price, however, is likely to be endogenous to the size of bequests, as they 

reduce the size of the taxable estate; T=T(W-CB). Consequently, the tax price is 

instrumented using the first dollar tax price on charity. This marginal tax rate is derived by 

setting charitable bequests to zero and assuming $1,000 in gifts for all estates. As with all 

previous longitudinal studies on charitable bequests, the tax price is measured using the tax 

n 

13 The numerator may be restated as ∑CB jPj which reflects the convexity of the tax rate schedule and 

j=1 

captures the various j kinks in the budget constraint. 

14 This is less of a concern under the income tax, as in Randolph (1995), where the deduction is limited to 50 

percent or less of AGI. 

14 
law in effect in the year of death even though changes in tax regimes are known in 

advance. This restriction is relaxed later on, where the future tax price is employed. 

Reflecting the censored nature of the data, FIML Tobit is employed in estimating 

(8) with results reported in Table 3. Beginning with demographic variables, the never 

married singles, as well as those divorced or separated bequeath more than their widowed 

counterparts. Gender seems to have some effect on giving, with male decedents leaving 

behind smaller bequests. Bequests rise with age, but at a declining rate. Those from the 

west or the south seem to be less generous. 

Turning to the key variables of interest, and beginning with wealth, the estimated 

coefficient is 0.094 with a standard error of 0.009. In contrast, the coefficient on the tax 

price is negative with an estimated value of -0.124 and standard error of 0.057. Using 

these estimated parameters, the predicted change in bequests is approximated for each 

estate i in period t by first deriving the expected or fitted value for bequests from (8), or: 

CB = (W − T0 ){Φ[α ln P +θ ln(W −T0 )+ γZ ]+ φσ}P −1 

and comparing it to the value predicted after setting all the tax values to zero, i.e. T=T’=0, 

or: 

CB = W [Φ(θ lnW + γZ ) + φσ ]

where Φ=Φ(β’x/σ) and φ=φ(β’x/σ) are the distribution and density functions of the 

standard normal which vary with the tax regime embodied in the regressors x. 

Other things equal, these estimates suggest that in the absence of the estate tax, 

charitable bequests would decline by 3 percent, from a predicted weighted mean bequest of 

15
$87,600 down to $84,300 (see bottom of Table 3).15 At the same time, the probability Φ of 

making such bequests declines from a predicted 33 percent to 28 percent. Charitable 

bequests are predicted to decline by about 65 percent to $30,600 (sd=861,500) if only their 

deductibility were to be repealed. 

The above measures of wealth and price reflect the year of death consistent with the 

convention employed in earlier longitudinal studies. However, given the phased in 

reductions in tax rates from 65 to 50 percent over the period 1982 and 1985, as well as the 

gradual expansion in the effective exemption from $225,000 in 1982 to $600,000 by 1987, 

the calculated tax rates in effect in the year of death may not reflect the true margin at 

which decisions are made. Indeed, and unless death in 1982 was perfectly anticipated, wills 

drawn or amended in 1981 and 1982, may very well reflect the fully phased-in law. The 

phased-in tax regime has implications for the measured budget share, after tax wealth, as 

well as the tax price. 

To gauge the sensitivity of the above estimates to this possibility, the parameters in 

column one of Table 3 are re-estimated using the fully phased-in law. In other words, the 

maximum tax rate in effect is now 50 percent, and not the 65 percent in effect in 1982. 

Similarly, the size of the exempted estate is $600,000 instead of $225,000. The results are 

reported in column 2. Most of the coefficients estimated for the fully phased-in regime are 

somewhat different from those reported earlier. More specifically, the wealth coefficient is 

estimated with a value of 0.133 (se=0.007), significantly larger than the earlier estimate. 

The tax price coefficient is now positive, with a value of 0.06 (se=0.03). Combined, the 

estimates point to a much higher wealth effect. Repealing the estate tax increases predicted 

15 This represents a decline of 32 percent when compared to the initial amount of $124,000 in reported 

charitable bequests (column 2, Table 2). Such comparison, however, would be inappropriate. See McClelland 

(2004, p. 8). 

16 
bequests by about 62 percent, from a mean of $85,100 to $139,100, while repealing only 

the deductibility of charitable bequests would reduce it by a third down to $59,300 

(sd=1,332,400). 

For presentational purposes, wealth and price elasticity coefficients are calculated 

for each observation. The wealth elasticity is estimated as: 

1

η w = β

ω

Φ(z) +1 

and price elasticity as: 

1 

P η α= z

ω

Φ ( )−1

Using the actual budget share for each observation, the overall charitable bequest weighted 

wealth elasticity is 1.16, with a price elasticity of -1.21. In contrast, the wealth and price 

elasticity coefficients become 1.2 and -0.9, respectively, when future law is considered. 

Now, had the budget share measure been defined as in Joulfaian (2000), the 

estimated effects would have changed significantly. As shown in Table 4, the wealth and 

price estimated coefficients are consistent with those reported earlier in Table 3. In the 

absence of the estate tax, bequests decline by 13 percent, from a predicted weighted mean 

of $104,200 to $90,800. On the other hand, and using the future tax regime, the predicted 

bequests rise by three percent, from a mean of $105,300 to $108,500. The predicted or 

expected bequest for each observation is derived from: 

CB = (W − T0 ){Φ[α ln P +θ ln(W − T0 ) + γZ ]+φσ}+ (T0 − T )

and contrasted with that predicted in the absence of an estate tax, or: 

CB = W [Φ(θ lnW + γZ ) + φσ ]

17
The divergent, though qualitatively similar, results highlight the importance of the 

specification employed in gauging the effects of estate taxation. The predicted change in 

bequests in case of repeal of the estate tax ranges from -13 to +3 percent when the latter 

specification is employed as in Table 4, compared to -3 to +62 percent in case of the earlier 

specification which employs a linear measure of the budget share. The specification in 

Table 4, however, has a greater predictive power. It predicts an average bequest of 

$104,200 compared to $87,600 in the alternative specification; the actual is $124,000. In 

addition, it predicts a maximum bequest well over $1 billion, pretty close to the actual, 

compared to a maximum under $300 million using the specification in Table 3. 

The above estimated effects change considerably, but not qualitatively, when 

estates with wealth in excess of $20 million are excluded.16 In case of estate tax repeal, and 

using the specification in Table 3, bequests decline by 20 percent using the year of death 

law and increase by 18 percent using future law. In contrast, bequests increase by 13 and 

15 percent, respectively, using the specification in Table 4. The gap in the estimated effects 

highlights the importance of the presence of the wealthiest group, and points to the 

potential aggregation bias common to grouped and aggregated time series data. 

It is interesting to note that there is little change in the qualitative results when the 

data is limited to the never-married singles. Using the specification in Table 3, charitable 

bequests by this group would decline by 12 percent if the estate tax were repealed. 

However, they would increase by 18 percent using future law measure of the tax price. 

16 This reduces the sample size to 14,010 observation with mean bequests of 65,900 and sd=399,600. The 

excluded observations number 41, with mean 54,046,100 and sd=215,371,400, and account for about half the 

bequests. 

18 
Using the specification in Table 4, bequests would increase by 31 percent, or by 18 percent 

using future law.17 

V. Conclusion 

This paper explores the effects of the estate tax on charitable bequests using two tax 

regimes where wealth is less susceptible to measurement errors. More specifically, I 

employ estate tax data for decedents in 1976 and 1982 and exclusively focus on widowed 

and unmarried decedents. 

Tax rates were significantly reduced in 1982 and later years, yet descriptive 

statistics show that higher charitable bequests, relative to wealth, were observed in 1982 

compared to the trend in 1976 when tax rates were higher. This trend suggests that estate 

taxation has little effect on bequests. Except for the stimulating effect of the deductibility 

of bequests, a similar conclusion is arrived at using multivariate analysis. 

Notwithstanding the above findings, some may arrive at different conclusions using 

the very same estimated parameters. This paper assumes that estate tax repeal increases 

disposable wealth from W-T0 to W. In contrast, McClelland (2004, p. 4) advocates that 

wealth should increase only by the tax liability below an estate’s marginal tax rate. As an 

illustration, consider a taxable estate of $100 million which pays $55 million in estate 

taxes, facing a maximum tax rate of 55 percent under current (fully phased-in) law. Estate 

tax repeal in this paper is assumed to increase wealth by $55 million, from $45 to $100 

million, which can be used to increase bequests to heirs as well gifts to charity. On the 

other hand, and using the assumptions in McClelland (2004), wealth will increase by less 

than $2 million. 

17 Note that no observation in 1976 reported wealth in excess of $20 million. 

19 
This paper also highlights the sensitivity of estimates to the expected tax regime in 

effect at death. The estimated effects of estate taxation vary considerably depending on 

whether behavior and estate planning reflect the current or expected tax regimes. If donors 

are assumed to respond to the tax regime in place at the date of death, then estate tax repeal 

would lead to a small reduction in bequests. On the other hand, if donors plan with the 

future tax regime in mind, then estate tax repeal may lead to a small increase in gifts. 

However, given the lack of data on when wills are drafted or amended, it is difficult to 

determine which tax regime is binding. This suggests that we should be cautious in 

employing longitudinal data, as well as interpreting results obtained from studies using 

such data. 

20
References 

Auten, Gerald and David Joulfaian, "Charitable Contributions and Intergenerational 

Transfers," Journal of Public Economics 59:1, January 1996, 55-68. 

Auten, Gerald, Charles T. Clotfelter, and Richard L. Schmalbeck, “Taxes and Philanthropy 

among the Wealthy,” in Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the 

Rich, edited by Joel Slemrod, Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University Press, 

2000. 

Bakija, Jon and William Gale. “Effects of Estate Tax Reform on Charitable Giving.” Tax 

Policy Issues and Options, No. 6. Washington, D.C.: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, 

July, 2003. 

Bakija, Jon, William Gale, and Joel Slemrod, “New Evidence on the Effects of Taxes on 

Charitable Bequests,” paper presented at the January 2005 AEA meetings. 

Bakija, Jon, William Gale, and Joel Slemrod. “Charitable Bequests and Taxes on 

Inheritance and Estates: Aggregate Evidence from across States and Time,” American 

Economic Review, May 2003, v. 93, no. 2, 366-70 

Barthold, Thomas and Robert Plotnick. “Estate Taxation and Other Determinants of 

Charitable Bequests,” National Tax Journal 37, June 1984, 225-37. 

Bernheim, B. Douglas. "Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?" Tax Policy and the 

Economy, Vol. 1, 113-138. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987. 

Boskin, Michael J. “Estate Taxation and Charitable Bequests,” Journal of Public 

Economics 5, January-February, 1976, 27-56. 

Clotfelter, Charles T. Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving, University of Chicago 

Press, Chicago, 1985. 

Feenberg, Daniel. "Are Tax Price Models Really Identified: The Case of Charitable 

Giving," National Tax Journal 40 No. 4, December, 1987, 629-633. 

Feldstein, Martin. “Charitable Bequests, Estate Taxation, and Intergenerational Wealth 

Transfers,” in Research Papers, sponsored by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and 

Public Needs, vol. III, Special Behavioral Studies of Foundations and Corporations, U.S. 

Department of the Treasury, 1485-1500, 1977. 

Greene, Pamela, and Robert McClelland. “The Effects of Federal Estate Tax Policy on 

Charitable Contributions.” Working Paper, Congressional Budget Office, March, 2001. 

21
Joulfaian, David. “Gift Taxes and Lifetime Transfers: Time Series Evidence," Journal of 

Public Economics, 88:9-10, August, 2004, 1917-1929. 

Joulfaian, David. "Charitable Giving in Life and at Death," in Rethinking Estate and Gift 

Taxation, Brookings Institution, edited by William G. Gale, James R. Hines Jr., and Joel 

Slemrod, Brookings Institution Press, 2001, 350-374. 

Joulfaian, David. "Taxing Wealth Transfers and its Behavioral Consequences," National 

Tax Journal 53:4, Part 1, December 2000b, 933-957. 

Joulfaian, David. "Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests by the Wealthy," National Bureau 

of Economic Research Working Paper no. 7663, April 2000a. 

Joulfaian, David. "The Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Description, Profile of Taxpayers, and 

Economic Consequences," U.S. Department of the Treasury, OTA Paper 80, December 

1998. 

Joulfaian, David. "Charitable Bequests and Estate Taxes," National Tax Journal 44:2, June 

1991, 169-180. 

Kopczuk, Wojciech, and Joel Slemrod. “Tax Impacts on Wealth Accumulation and 

Transfers of the Rich.” In Death and Dollars: The Role of Gifts and Bequests in America, 

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Institution Press, 2003. 

McClelland, Robert. “Charitable Bequests and the Repeal of the Estate Tax,” Technical 

Working Paper 2004-8, Congressional Budget Office, July, 2004. 

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March, 1973, 79-98. 

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Schervish, Paul G., and John J. Havens. 2003. “Gifts and Bequests: Family or 

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Steuerle, C. Eugene. Charitable Giving Patterns of the Wealthy, in T. Odendahl, ed., 

America's Wealthy and the Future of Foundations, The Foundation Center, New York, 

1987. 

22
Table 1 

Estate Tax Rate Schedule, by Year and Size of Taxable Estate (amounts in $000s)

Taxable Estate Range 1976 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 

- 5 3 18 18 18 18 18 18 

5 10 7 18 18 18 18 18 18 

10 20 11 20 20 20 20 20 20 

20 30 14 22 22 22 22 22 22 

30 40 18 22 22 22 22 22 22 

40 50 22 24 24 24 24 24 24 

50 60 25 24 24 24 24 24 24 

60 80 28 26 26 26 26 26 26 

80 100 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 

100 150 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 

150 200 30 32 32 32 32 32 32 

200 225 30 32 32 32 32 32 32 

225 250 30 32 32 32 32 32 32 

250 275 32 34 34 34 34 34 34 

275 325 32 34 34 34 34 34 34 

325 400 32 34 34 34 34 34 34 

400 500 32 34 34 34 34 34 34 

500 600 35 37 37 37 37 37 37 

600 750 35 37 37 37 37 37 37 

750 800 37 39 39 39 39 39 39 

800 1,000 37 39 39 39 39 39 39 

1,000 1,250 39 41 41 41 41 41 41 

1,250 1,500 42 43 43 43 43 43 43 

1,500 2,000 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 

2,000 2,500 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 

2,500 3,000 53 53 53 53 50 50 50 

3,000 3,500 56 57 57 55 50 50 50 

3,500 4,000 59 61 60 55 50 50 50 

4,000 4,500 63 65 60 55 50 50 50 

4,500 5,000 63 65 60 55 50 50 50 

5,000 6,000 67 65 60 55 50 50 50 

6,000 7,000 70 65 60 55 50 50 50 

7,000 8,000 73 65 60 55 50 50 50 

8,000 10,000 76 65 60 55 50 50 50 

10,000 and over 77 65 60 55 50 50 50 

Exemption 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Exempted Estate* 0 225 275 325 400 500 600 

* Size of estate ($000s) exempt from federal estate tax by virtue of the unified credit which 

reduces the infra marginal tax rates in the shaded area to zero. The taxable estate is not 

reduced by any exemption. Note that the sample excludes observations with wealth under 

$300,000. 

23
Figure 1A. raction of Estates Reporting Charitable Bequests 

0.10 

0.20 

0.30 

0.40 

0.50 

0.60 

0.70 

0.80 

0.90 

300 

400 

500 

600

750 

800

 1,000

 1,250

1,500

 2,000

 2,500

3,000

 3,500

4,000

 4,500

5,000

 6,000

 7,000

8,000 

10,000 

>20,000 

Wealt h ($000s) 1976 1982 

F

Figure 1B. haritable Bequests as Percent of Wealth 

0.00 

0.05 

0.10 

0.15 

0.20 

0.25 

0.30 

0.35 

0.40 

0.45 

0.50 

300 

400

 500 

600 

750

 800

1,000

 1,250

 1,500

2,000

 2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

 4,500

5,000

 6,000

 7,000

8,000 

10,000 

>20,000 

Wealt h ($000s) 1976 1982 

C

Amounts in $1982 

24
Figure 2A. raction of Estates Reporting Charitable Bequests 

(Widowed Decedents) 

0.10 

0.20 

0.30 

0.40 

0.50 

0.60 

0.70 

0.80 

0.90 

1.00 

300 

 400 

500 

 600 

750 

 800

1,0001,250

1,500

2,000

2,500

 3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000 

10,000 

>20,000 

1976 1982 Wealth ($000s )

F

Figure 2B. haritable Bequests as Percent of Wealth 

(Widowed Decedents) 

0.00 

0.10 

0.20 

0.30 

0.40 

0.50 

0.60 

0.70 

0.80 

 300 

400 

 500 

600 

 750 

800

1,000

1,250

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000 

10,000 

>20,000 

1976 1982 Wealth ($000s)

C

Amounts in $1982 

25
Figure 3A. raction of Estates Reporting Charitable Bequests 

(Married Decedents) 

0.00 

0.10 

0.20 

0.30 

0.40 

0.50 

0.60 

0.70 

0.80 

0.90 

1.00 

300 

400 

500 

600 

750

800

1,000

1,250

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000 

10,000

>20,000 

1976 1982 Wealth ($000s )

F

Figure 3B. Charitable Bequests as Percent of Wealth 

(Married Decedents) 

0.00 

0.05 

0.10 

0.15 

0.20 

0.25 

0.30 

300 

400 

500 

600 

750

 800

1,000

1,250

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

6,000

7,000

 8,000 

10,000 

>20,000 

1976 1982 Wealth ($000s )

Amounts in $1982 

26
Figure 4A. Fraction of Estates Reporting Spousal Bequests

(Married Decedents)

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

 300 

400

 500 

 600  750 

 800 

1,000

1,250

1,500

2,000

2,5003,000

3,500

 4,000

4,500

5,000

 6,000

7,000

8,000

10,000

>20,000

1976 1982 Wealth ($000s)

Figure 4B. Spousal Bequests as Percent of Wealth

(Married Decedents)

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

 300 

 400

 500 

 600 

 750 

800

 1,000 

 1,250 

 1,500 

 2,000 

2,500

 3,000 

 3,500 

 4,000 

 4,500 

 5,000 

 6,000 

 7,000

 8,000 

 10,000

>20,000

1976 1982 Wealth ($000s)

Amounts in $1982 

27
Table 2. Sample Means for Select Variables (standard errors in parentheses) 

Variable All Donors Others 

Charitable Bequests (CB) 287,326 892,202 -

(11,872,300) (20,909,468) -

After-tax Bequests – Year of death law 

CB(1-T’) 222,947 692,294 -

(10,397,453) (18,314,436) -

CB-T0 114,874 356,700 -

(2,776,766) (4,884,600) -

After-tax Bequests – Phased-in law 

CB(1-T’) 228,732 710,257 -

(10,403,083) (18,323,895) -

CB-T0 126,124 391,638 -

(2,835,278) (4,986,157) -

Wealth (W) 1,456,628 2,226,355 1,090,996 

(12,253,134) (21,424,701) (1,742,053) 

After-tax Wealth – Year of death law 886,467 1,189,111 742,707 

W-T0 (2,960,171) (5,101,403) (707,620) 

After-tax Wealth – Phased-in law 950,900 1,277,112 795,983 

W-T0 (3,041,600) (5,222,643) (785,268) 

Share of Wealth – Year of death law 

CB(1-T’)/ (W-T0) 0.0889 0.2761 -

(0.2902) (0.4581) -

[CB-(T0-T)]/(W-T0) 0.0687 0.2134 -

(0.2066) (0.3188) -

Share of Wealth – Phased-in law 

CB(1-T’)/ (W-T0) 0.0858 0.2666 -

(0.2758) (0.4337) -

[CB-(T0-T)]/(W-T0) 0.0694 0.2155 -

(0.2083) (0.3213) -

Tax Price – Year of death law 0.6503 0.6758 0.6382 

1-T’ (0.1029) (0.1522) (0.0646) 

Tax Price – Phased-in law 0.7184 0.7218 0.7168 

1-T’ (0.1656) (0.1781) (0.1593) 

Age 78.66 81.63 77.24 

Male 0.37 0.33 0.39 

Widowed 0.76 0.71 0.78 

Single 0.16 0.22 0.13 

Divorced/Separated 0.08 0.07 0.09 

Dummy 1976 0.55 0.56 0.54 

Observations 14,051 4,525 9,526 

28
Table 3 

FIML Tobit Estimates of Charitable Bequests in 1976 and 1982 

Dependent Variable: CB(1-T’)/(W-T0) 

Year of Death Law Fully Phased-in Law 

Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e 

Constant -1.8535 0.1423 -2.4979 0.1426 

Male -0.0370 0.0068 -0.0428 0.0072 

Single 0.1875 0.0085 0.2013 0.0089 

Divorced/separated 0.0695 0.0123 0.0780 0.0131 

Age 0.0083 0.0028 0.0109 0.0029 

Age2

 /100 -0.0025 0.0018 -0.0039 0.0019 

Midwest -0.0084 0.0051 -0.0095 0.0074 

South -0.0205 0.0052 -0.0203 0.0074 

West -0.0265 0.0055 -0.0360 0.0079 

Dummy 1976 -0.0062 0.0083 0.0094 0.0085 

ln After-tax wealth 0.0940 0.0093 0.1334 0.0075 

ln Tax Price -0.1237 0.0573 0.0645 0.0373 

ψ* 2.7974 0.0622 2.5219 0.0488 

σ 0.1632 0.0015 0.2270 0.0018 

Observations 14,051 14,051 

Log Likelihood 33,149 32,045 

Φ(z) 0.395 0.337 

Charitable Bequests Wtd. Mean s.d Wtd. Mean s.d 

Actual 124,000 7,210,600 124,000 7,210,600 

Predicted 87,600 1,190,400 85,100 1,563,700 

Predicted w/out tax 84,300 4,686,700 139,100 7,052,000

* Tax price is endogenous to bequests. 

29 
Table 4 

FIML Tobit Estimates of Charitable Bequests in 1976 and 1982 

Dependent Variable: [CB-(T0-T)]/(W-T0) 

Year of Death Law Fully Phased-in Law 

Variable Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e 

Constant -1.6690 0.1259 -2.0444 0.1271 

Male -0.0336 0.0056 -0.0403 0.0063 

Single 0.1571 0.0071 0.1767 0.0078 

Divorced/separated 0.0508 0.0105 0.0603 0.0118 

Age 0.0080 0.0022 0.0102 0.0024 

Age2

 /100 -0.0027 0.0014 -0.0037 0.0016 

Midwest -0.0092 0.0056 -0.0084 0.0072 

South -0.0200 0.0058 -0.0194 0.0074 

West -0.0288 0.0060 -0.0367 0.0078 

Dummy 1976 -0.0081 0.0072 0.0033 0.0073 

ln After-tax wealth 0.0849 0.0088 0.1028 0.0072 

ln Tax Price 0.0068 0.0506 0.0635 0.0328 

ψ* 1.8863 0.0530 1.8393 0.0421 

σ 0.1800 0.0015 0.2263 0.0018 

Observations 14,051 14,051 

Log Likelihood 32,609 31,974 

Φ(z) 0.340 0.316 

Charitable Bequests Wtd. Mean s.d Wtd. Mean s.d 

Actual 124,000 7,210,600 124,000 7,210,600 

Predicted 104,200 6,314,000 105,300 6,448,800 

Predicted w/out tax 90,800 4,268,700 108,500 5,134,200

* Tax price is endogenous to bequests. 

30