63732 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 2, 1997 / Notices

IV

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections

103, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended, and the Commission’s

regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR

Part 50, It is hereby ordered, effective

immediately, that:

1. Finis Scott Bandy is prohibited

from involvement in activities licensed

by the NRC for a period of 5 years. NRClicensed activities are those that are

conducted pursuant to a specific or

general license issued by the NRC,

including, but not limited to, those

activities of Agreement State licensees

conducted pursuant to the authority

granted by 10 CFR 150.20.

2. If Finis Scott Bandy is currently

involved with another employer in

NRC-licensed activities, he must

immediately cease such activities, and

inform the NRC of the name, address

and telephone number of the employer,

and provide a copy of this Order to the

employer.

3. For the five-year period after the

above period has expired, Mr. Bandy

will notify the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, D.C., 20555,

within 20 days of the first time he

accepts employment in NRC-licensed

activities, as defined in Paragraph IV.1

above. In the notification, he will

include a statement of his commitment

to comply with regulatory requirements

and address why the NRC should have

confidence that he will comply with

regulatory requirements, and the name,

address and telephone number of his

employer or entity where he will be

involved in licensed activities.

The Director, Office of Enforcement,

may relax or rescind, in writing, any of

the above conditions upon a showing by

Mr. Bandy of good cause.

V

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Mr.

Bandy must, and any other person

adversely affected by this Order may,

submit an answer to this Order, and

may request a hearing within 20 days of

its issuance. Where good cause is

shown, consideration will be given to

extending the time to request a hearing.

A request for extension of time must be

made in writing to the Director, Office

of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555,

and include a statement of good cause

for the extension. The answer may

consent to this Order. Unless the answer

consents to this Order, the answer shall,

in writing and under oath or

affirmation, specifically admit or deny

each allegation or charge made in this

Order and shall set forth the matters of

fact and law on which Mr. Bandy, or

any other such person adversely

affected, relies and the reasons as to

why the Order should not have been

issued. Any answer or request for a

hearing shall be submitted to the

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Chief, Docketing

and Service Section, Washington, D.C.

20555. Copies also shall be sent to the

Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555, to the

Assistant General Counsel for Hearings

and Enforcement at the same address, to

the Regional Administrator, NRC Region

IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400,

Arlington, Texas 76011, and to Mr.

Bandy. If a person other than Mr. Bandy

requests a hearing, that person shall set

forth with particularity the manner in

which his or her interest is adversely

affected by this Order and shall address

the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).

If a hearing is requested by Mr. Bandy

or a person whose interest is adversely

affected, the Commission will issue an

Order designating the time and place of

any hearing. If a hearing is held, the

issue to be considered at such hearing

shall be whether this Order should be

sustained.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr.

Bandy may, in addition to demanding a

hearing, at the time the answer is filed

or sooner, move the presiding officer to

set aside the immediate effectiveness of

the Order, on the ground that the Order,

including the need for immediate

effectiveness, is not based on adequate

evidence but on mere suspicion,

unfounded allegations, or error.

In the absence of any request for a

hearing, or written approval of an

extension of time in which to request a

hearing, the provisions specified in

Section IV above shall be final 20 days

from the date of this Order without

further order or proceedings. If an

extension of time for requesting a

hearing has been approved, the

provisions specified in Section IV shall

be final when the extension expires if a

hearing request has not been received.

AN ANSWER OR A REQUEST FOR

HEARING SHALL NOT STAY THE

IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS

ORDER.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 19th day

of November 1997.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

James Lieberman,

Director, Office of Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 97–31521 Filed 12–1–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–382]

Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of

Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

38 issued to Entergy Operations Inc.,

(the licensee) for operation of the

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit

3, located in St. Charles Parish,

Louisiana.

The proposed amendment would

increase the Spent Fuel Pool storage

capacity and increase the maximum fuel

enrichment from 4.9 w/o (nominal

weight percent) to 5.0 w/o U–235. This

proposed modification will be

accomplished by removing the existing

racks in the Spent Fuel Pool and

replacing them with higher density

racks. The neutron absorber (BORAL)

for the new racks, has been licensed by

the NRC for use in other nuclear power

plant spent fuel storage applications.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below.

1. Involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated.

In the analysis of the safety issues

concerning the expanded pool storage

capacity, the following previously

postulated accident scenarios have been

considered:

a. A spent fuel assembly drop in the

Spent Fuel Pool.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 2, 1997 / Notices 63733

b. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling

flow.

c. A seismic event.

d. An accidental drop of a fully

loaded fuel shipping cask.

The probability that any of the

accidents in the above list can occur is

not significantly increased by the

modification itself. The probabilities of

a seismic event or loss of Spent Fuel

Pool cooling flow are not influenced by

the proposed changes. The probabilities

of accidental fuel assembly or shipping

cask drops are primarily influenced by

the methods used to lift and move these

loads. The method of handling loads

during normal plant operations remains

unchanged, since the same equipment

(i.e., Spent Fuel Handling Machine and

Cask Handling Crane) and procedures

will be used. A new offset handling tool

will be required to access some storage

rack cells located adjacent to the pool

walls. The grapple mechanism,

procedures, and fuel manipulation

methods will be very similar to those

used by the standard fuel handling tool

on the Spent Fuel Handling Machine.

Therefore, this tool does not represent a

significant change in the methods used

to lift or move fuel in the Fuel Handling

Building. Since the methods used to

move loads during normal operations

remain nearly the same as those used

previously, there is no significant

increase in the probability of an

accident.

During rack removal and installation,

all work in the pool area will be

controlled and performed in strict

accordance with specific written

procedures. Any movement of fuel

assemblies required to be performed to

support the modification (e.g., removal

and installation of racks) will be

performed in the same manner as during

normal refueling operations. Shipping

cask movements will not be performed

during the modification period.

Accordingly, the proposed

modification does not involve a

significant increase in the probability of

an accident previously evaluated.

The consequences of the previously

postulated scenarios for an accidental

drop of a fuel assembly in the Spent

Fuel Pool have been re-evaluated for the

proposed change. The results show that

the postulated accident of a fuel

assembly striking the top of the storage

racks will not distort the racks

sufficiently to impair their functionality.

The resulting structural damage to a

falling assembly and/or a stored

assembly has been determined to

remain unchanged. The minimum

subcriticality margin, Keff less than or

equal to 0.95, will be maintained. The

structural damage to the Fuel Handling

Building, pool liner, and fuel assembly

resulting from a fuel assembly drop

striking the pool floor or another

assembly located within the racks

remains unchanged. The resulting

structural damage to these items

subsequent to this event is not

influenced by the proposed changes.

The radiological dose at the exclusion

area boundary will increase due to the

changes in fuel enrichment and burnup.

The previously calculated doses to the

thyroid and whole body were 0.47 and

0.11 rem, respectively. The new thyroid

and whole body doses based on the

proposed change will be 0.553 and

0.304, respectively. These dose levels

are extremely small when compared to

the levels required by 10 CFR 100.

Therefore, the increase in dose is not

considered a significant increase in

consequence. Thus, the results of the

postulated fuel drop accidents remain

acceptable and do not represent a

significant increase in consequences

from any of the same previously

evaluated accidents.

The consequences of a loss of Spent

Fuel Pool cooling have been evaluated

and found to have no increase. The

concern with this accident is a

reduction of Spent Fuel Pool water

inventory from bulk pool boiling

resulting in uncovering fuel assemblies.

This situation would lead to fuel failure

and subsequent significant increase in

offsite dose. Loss of spent fuel pool

cooling at Waterford 3 is mitigated by

ensuring that a sufficient time lapse

exists between the loss of forced cooling

and uncovering fuel. This period of time

is compared against a reasonable period

to re-establish cooling or supply an

alternative water source (such as fire

water). Evaluation of this accident

usually includes determination of the

time to boil. This time period is much

less than the onset of any significant

increase in offsite dose, since once

boiling begins it would have to continue

unchecked until the pool surface was

lowered to the point of exposing active

fuel. The time to boil represents the

onset of loss of pool water inventory

and is commonly used as a gage for

establishing the comparison of

consequences before and after a

refueling project. The heat up rate in the

Spent Fuel Pool is a nearly linear

function of the fuel decay heat load. The

fuel decay heat load will increase

subsequent to the proposed changes

because of the increase in the number of

assemblies and higher fuel burnups. The

heat up rate established for the limiting

normal heat load conditions prior to

reracking was 5.41°F per hour. This

would result in the pool temperature

increasing from the maximum normal

temperature of 140 °F to boiling in a

period of 13.3 hours. The heat up rate

established for the limiting normal heat

load conditions subsequent to the

proposed changes has been determined

as 13.6 °F per hour. This would result

in the pool temperature increasing from

the maximum normal temperature of

140 °F to boiling in a period of 5.3

hours.

This time to boil comparison was

made for limiting normal heat load

conditions. However, the end of this

period of time does not represent the

onset of any significant increase in

offsite doses. As stated above, this

consequence would result subsequent to

fuel being uncovered through

unchecked boiling and resulting water

level drop of approximately 24.5 feet

from normal surface to the top of the

fuel storage racks. This depth is

conservative, since the top of active fuel

is below this level. Subsequent to the

proposed changes under limiting

normal heat loads the time lapse

between the onset of unchecked boiling

and uncovering of the racks has been

determined to exceed 50 hours.

As stated above in the safety

assessment, subsequent to reracking, the

time to boil after loss of forced cooling

in the most severe scenario is 2.89 hours

(the ensuing rate of evaporative loss

would not result in the fuel being

uncovered until after an additional 34

hours, which is 168 hours after reactor

shutdown). However, the design basis

limiting pool heat load under these

conditions actually decreases after the

proposed modification, because of

conservatisms previously used to

determine the heat load for this

condition. Therefore, the calculated

time to boil in this most severe scenario

will increase subsequent to the

proposed modification. In the unlikely

event that all pool cooling is lost,

sufficient time will be available

subsequent to the proposed changes for

the operators to provide alternate means

of cooling (i.e., fire water) before fuel is

uncovered. Therefore, the proposed

changes represents no increase in the

consequences of loss of pool cooling.

The consequences of a design basis

seismic event are not increased. The

consequences of this accident are

evaluated on the basis of subsequent

fuel damage or compromise of the fuel

storage or building configurations

leading to radiological or criticality

concerns. The new racks have been

analyzed in their new configuration and

found safe during seismic motion. Fuel

has been determined to remain intact

and the storage racks maintain the fuel

and fixed poison configurations
63734 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 2, 1997 / Notices

subsequent to a seismic event. The

structural capability of the pool and

liner will not be exceeded under the

appropriate combinations of dead

weight, thermal, and seismic loads. The

Fuel Handling Building structure will

remain intact during a seismic event

and will continue to adequately support

and protect the fuel racks, storage array,

and pool moderator/coolant. Thus, the

consequences of a seismic event are not

increased.

The consequences of a spent fuel cask

drop into the Cask Storage Pit have been

analyzed along with the new rack

storage configuration. This evaluation

concluded that there is no increase in

consequences. Administrative controls,

appropriate changes in load paths, and

crane travel limits will continue to

preclude handling heavy loads above

stored fuel. Therefore, casks impacting

stored fuel is not a postulated event.

Potential damage to the cask and

contained fuel remain unchanged, since

the pertinent parameters for this

analysis (i.e., lift height, weight, impact

zone configurations, etc.) are not

affected by the new rack configurations.

The floor was reanalyzed to assess the

effect of the additional loading from

higher density fuel storage. It was

determined that the floor remains intact

with minor local crushing of concrete.

The liner plate would sustain limited

damage, which is repairable. Leakage

would be limited to flow through the

leak chase system and would be

collected at the sump. The Fuel

Handling Building integrity would not

be compromised; therefore, there would

be no release of contaminated pool

water outside of the building. Makeup

water from the Condensate Storage Pool

and/or the Refueling Water Storage

Tank would be adequate to offset loss of

water inventory due to any leakages.

This accident does not result in any

increase in offsite or Fuel Handling

Building doses. Thus, the proposed

changes do not represent any increase in

the consequences of a postulated spent

fuel cask drop.

Therefore, it is concluded that the

proposed changes do not significantly

increase the probability or consequences

of any accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident from any

previously analyzed.

To assess the possibility of new or

different kind of accidents, a list of the

critical parameters required to ensure

safe fuel storage was established. Safe

fuel storage is defined here as providing

an environment which would not

present any significant threats to

workers or the general public. In other

words, meeting the requirements of 10

CFR 100 and 10 CFR 20. Any new

events which would modify these

parameters sufficiently to place them

outside of the boundaries analyzed for

normal conditions and/or outside of the

boundaries previously considered for

accidents would be considered a new or

different accident. The criticality and

radiological safety evaluations were

reviewed to establish the list of critical

parameters. The fuel configuration and

the existence of the moderator/coolant

were identified as the only two

parameters which were critical to safe

fuel storage. Significant modification of

these two parameters represents the

only possibility of an unsafe storage

condition. Once the two critical

parameters were established, an

additional step was taken to determine

what events (which were not previously

considered) could result in changes to

the storage configuration or moderator/

coolant presence during or subsequent

to the proposed changes. This process

was adopted to ensure that the

possibility of any new or different

accident scenario or event would be

identified.

Due to the proposed changes, the

following events were considered as the

only events which might represent a

new or different kind of accident:

a. An accidental drop of a rack

module during construction activity in

the pool.

b. Draining the Cask Storage Pit and

Refueling Canal through the floor

drains.

c. Fuel assembly mispositioning

accident in Region 2.

A construction accident resulting in a

rack drop is an unlikely event. A new

rack lifting rig will be introduced to lift

and suspend all but one of the racks

using the existing Fuel Handling

Building Cranes. Either a new

temporary hoist or a combination of one

of the existing 15 ton cranes and a

lifting bag will be used to lift one of the

existing eighty cell racks that is adjacent

to the east wall of the Spent Fuel Pool.

The cranes, hoists and lifting rig have

been or will be designed using the

guidance of NUREG–0612 and ANSI

N14.6. The postulated rack drop event

is commonly referred to as a ‘‘heavy

load drop’’ over the pools. Heavy loads

will not be allowed to travel over any

racks containing fuel assemblies. The

danger represented by this event is that

the pool structure will be compromised

leading to loss of moderator/coolant,

which is one of the two critical

parameters identified above. However,

although the analysis of this event has

been performed and shown to be

acceptable, the question of a new or

different type of event is answered by

determining whether heavy load drops

over the pool have been considered

previously. The postulated drop of a

pool gate was previously evaluated and

represents a heavy load drop similar to

a rack drop. All movements of heavy

loads over the pool will comply with

the applicable administrative controls

and guidelines (i.e. plant procedures,

NUREG–0612, etc.). Therefore, the rack

drop does not represent a new or

different kind of accident.

The Cask Storage Pit and Refueling

Canal both have floor drains which will

be plugged (a welded closed cover plate)

prior to installation of the new storage

racks in each of the respective areas.

The plugs will preclude any water loss

through the drain system. Therefore,

draining the Cask Storage Pit and

Refueling Canal through the floor drains

is not a postulated event.

Fuel assembly mispositioning in

Region 2 is an unlikely event, since

locating assemblies which do not meet

the burnup criteria will be

administratively controlled.

Administrative controls will consist of

developing a checkerboarding storage

pattern in the Region 2 racks prior to

storage or placement of the noncompliant fuel in Region 1 racks. The

Region 2 mispositioning event

represents a change from the previously

analyzed condition, since Waterford 3

currently has only Region 1 style

storage. Therefore, a new fuel storage

configuration is possible. However, the

event does not represent a new or

different kind of accident, since fuel

assembly mispositioning is possible

with the existing racks through

controlled or uncontrolled (assembly

drop) lowering of an assembly adjacent

to the outside of the storage racks. This

condition was previously evaluated and

found to be acceptable. The new event

was evaluated using similar techniques

with similar acceptance criteria and was

shown to remain acceptable. Therefore,

due to the similarity of this new event

with that which was previously

analyzed it is not considered to

represent a new or different kind of

accident.

The proposed change does not alter

the operating requirements of the plant

or of the equipment credited in the

mitigation of the design basis accidents.

The proposed change does not affect

any of the important parameters

required to ensure safe fuel storage.

Therefore, the potential for a new or

previously unanalyzed accident is not

created.

3. Involve a significant reduction in

the margin of safety.

The function of the Spent Fuel Pool

is to store the fuel assemblies in a
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 2, 1997 / Notices 63735

subcritical and coolable configuration

through all environmental and abnormal

loadings, such as an earthquake or fuel

assembly drop. The new rack design

must meet all applicable requirements

for safe storage and be functionally

compatible with the Spent Fuel Pool.

EOI has addressed the safety issues

related to the expanded pool storage

capacity in the following areas:

a. Material, mechanical, and

structural considerations.

b. Nuclear criticality.

c. Thermal-hydraulic and pool

cooling.

The mechanical, material and

structural designs of the new racks have

been reviewed in accordance with the

applicable provisions of the NRC

Guidance entitled ‘‘Review and

Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and

Handling Applications’’. The rack

materials used are compatible with the

spent fuel assemblies and the Spent

Fuel Pool environment. The design of

the new racks preserves the proper

margin of safety during abnormal loads

such as a dropped assembly and tensile

loads from a stuck assembly. It has been

shown that such loads will not

invalidate the mechanical design and

material selection to safely store fuel in

a coolable and subcritical configuration.

The methodology used in the

criticality analysis of the expanded

Spent Fuel Pool meets the appropriate

NRC guidelines and the ANSI standards

(GDC 62, NUREG 0800, Section 9.1.2,

NRC Guidance entitled, ‘‘Review and

Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and

Handling Applications’’, Reg. Guide

1.13, and ANSI ANS 8.17). The margin

of safety for subcriticality is maintained

by having the neutron multiplication

factor equal to, or less than, 0.95 under

all accident conditions, including

uncertainties. This criterion is the same

as that used previously to establish

criticality safety evaluation acceptance

and remains satisfied for all analyzed

accidents. Therefore, the accepted

margin of safety remains the same.

The thermal-hydraulic and cooling

evaluation of the pool demonstrated that

the pool can be maintained below the

specified thermal limits under the

conditions of the maximum heat load

and during all credible accident

sequences and seismic events. The pool

temperature will not exceed 140 °F

during the worst single failure of a

cooling pump. The maximum local

water temperature in the hot channel

will remain below the boiling point. The

fuel will not undergo any significant

heat-up after an accidental drop of a fuel

assembly on top of the rack blocking the

flow path. A loss of cooling to the pool

will allow sufficient time (5.3 hours for

the limiting normal heat load) for the

operators to intervene and line up

alternate cooling paths and the means of

inventory make-up before the onset of

pool boiling. The thermal limits

specified for the evaluations performed

to support the proposed change are the

same as those which were used in the

previous evaluations. Therefore, the

accepted margin of safety remains the

same.

Thus, it is concluded that the changes

do not involve a significant reduction in

the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

licensee’s analysis and, based on this

review, it appears that the three

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff

proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public

comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received

within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be

considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not

issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period.

However, should circumstances change

during the notice period such that

failure to act in a timely way would

result, for example, in derating or

shutdown of the facility, the

Commission may issue the license

amendment before the expiration of the

30-day notice period, provided that its

final determination is that the

amendment involves no significant

hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public

and State comments received. Should

the Commission take this action, it will

publish in the Federal Register a notice

of issuance and provide for opportunity

for a hearing after issuance. The

Commission expects that the need to

take this action will occur very

infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted

by mail to the Chief, Rules and

Directives Branch, Division of Freedom

of Information and Publications

Services, Office of Administration, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, and

should cite the publication date and

page number of this Federal Register

notice. Written comments may also be

delivered to Room 6D22, Two White

Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike,

Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to

4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of

written comments received may be

examined at the NRC Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L

Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and

petitions for leave to intervene is

discussed below.

By January 2, 1998, the licensee may

file a request for a hearing with respect

to issuance of the amendment to the

subject facility operating license and

any person whose interest may be

affected by this proceeding and who

wishes to participate as a party in the

proceeding must file a written request

for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a

petition for leave to intervene shall be

filed in accordance with the

Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for

Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10

CFR Part 2. Interested persons should

consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714

which is available at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room located at the

University of New Orleans Library,

Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New

Orleans, LA 70122. If a request for a

hearing or petition for leave to intervene

is filed by the above date, the

Commission or an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board, designated by the

Commission or by the Chairman of the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, will rule on the request and/or

petition; and the Secretary or the

designated Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board will issue a notice of hearing or

an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a

petition for leave to intervene shall set

forth with particularity the interest of

the petitioner in the proceeding, and

how that interest may be affected by the

results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted

with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the

petitioner’s right under the Act to be

made party to the proceeding; (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioner’s

property, financial, or other interest in

the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner’s interest. The petition should

also identify the specific aspect(s) of the

subject matter of the proceeding as to

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

Any person who has filed a petition for

leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the

petition without requesting leave of the

Board up to 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, but such an amended
63736 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 2, 1997 / Notices

petition must satisfy the specificity

requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, a petitioner shall file a

supplement to the petition to intervene

which must include a list of the

contentions which are sought to be

litigated in the matter. Each contention

must consist of a specific statement of

the issue of law or fact to be raised or

controverted. In addition, the petitioner

shall provide a brief explanation of the

bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert

opinion which support the contention

and on which the petitioner intends to

rely in proving the contention at the

hearing. The petitioner must also

provide references to those specific

sources and documents of which the

petitioner is aware and on which the

petitioner intends to rely to establish

those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner

must provide sufficient information to

show that a genuine dispute exists with

the applicant on a material issue of law

or fact. Contentions shall be limited to

matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, by the above date. A

copy of the petition should also be sent

to the Office of the General Counsel,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, and to

N.S. Renolds, Esq., Winston & Stran,

1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20005–3502, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

The Commission hereby provides

notice that this a proceeding on an

application for a license amendment

falling within the scope of section 134

of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982

(NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 10154. Under

section 134 of the NWPA, the

Commission, at the request of any party

to the proceeding, must use hybrid

hearing procedures with respect to ‘‘any

matter which the Commission

determines to be in controversy among

the parties.’’ The hybrid procedures in

section 134 provide for oral argument

on matters in controversy, preceded by

discovery under the Commission’s

rules, and the designation, following

argument, of only those factual issues

that involve a genuine and substantial

dispute, together with any remaining

questions of law, to be resolved in an

adjudicatory hearing. Actual

adjudicatory hearings are to be held on

only those issues found to meet the

criteria of section 134 and set for

hearing after oral argument.

The Commission’s rules

implementing section 134 of the NWPA

are found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K,

‘‘Hybrid Hearing Procedures for

Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear

Power Reactors’’ (published at 50 FR

41670, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR

2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any

party to the proceeding may invoke the

hybrid hearing procedures by filing with

the presiding officer a written request

for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109.

To be timely, the request must be filed

within 10 days of an order granting a

request for hearing or petition to

intervene. (As outlined above, the

Commission’s rules in 10 CFR Part 2,

Subpart G, and 2.714 in particular,

continue to govern the filing of requests

for a hearing or petitions to intervene,

as well as the admission of contentions.)

The presiding officer shall grant a

timely request for oral argument. The

presiding officer may grant an untimely

request for oral argument only upon

showing of good cause by the requesting

party for the failure to file on time and

after providing the other parties an

opportunity to respond to the untimely

request. If the presiding officer grants a

request for oral argument, any hearing

held on the application shall be

conducted in accordance with the

hybrid hearing procedures. In essence,

those procedures limit the time

available for discovery and require that

an oral argument be held to determine

whether any contentions must be

resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no

party to the proceedings requests oral

argument, or if all untimely requests for

oral argument are denied, then the usual

procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G,

apply.

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated March 27, 1997, as

supplemented on April 3, and

November 13, 1997, which is available

for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room located at the

University of New Orleans Library,

Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New

Orleans, LA 70122.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day

of November 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Chandu P. Patel,

Project Manager, Project Directorate IV–1,

Division of Reactor Projects—III/IV, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–31517 Filed 12–1–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–245]

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company;

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit

No. 1, Environmental Assessment and

Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an exemption

from Facility Operating License No.

DPR–21, issued to Northeast Nuclear

Energy Company (NNECO or the

licensee), for operation of the Millstone

Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1

(Millstone Unit 1), located in New

London County, Connecticut.