*

After examining the briefs and the records, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeals are submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted March 25, 2009*

Decided March 25, 2009

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐2801

GREGORY A. WHITE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CAROL L. ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 03‐cv‐5330

Morton Denlow,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Gregory White, a detainee at a treatment facility run by the Illinois Department of

Human Services, sued various department administrators and security personnel, alleging

that the guards abused him and the higher‐ups were deliberately indifferent to his

mistreatment.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The parties agreed to proceed before a magistrate judge

and eventually settled the suit.  After some delay White received his agreed‐upon

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐2801 Page 2

compensation, but months later he insisted that he was entitled to more.  The magistrate

judge denied that additional claim.  We affirm the district court’s denial, but on the ground

that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction to hear White’s additional claim.

In early 2007 (following the 2006 settlement), the district court dismissed the case

without prejudice; the court, though, retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement until the

end of 2007.  The terms of the settlement were as follows: White would receive $10,000 and

would be assigned a less restrictive security classification, which would entitle him to keep

more personal property items in his cell; in return, White would release the defendants from

all liability.  Later in 2007, White filed several motions asking the district court to enforce the

settlement.  On March 11, 2008, after finding that White had finally received his settlement

check (on December 31, 2007), and that the defendants had, hence, discharged their

obligations, the magistrate judge denied the motions and disclaimed any further jurisdiction

over the case.

Two months later, in May 2008, White filed a second set of motions, claiming that the

settlement also entitled him to keep a Nintendo Wii gaming system (with all accessories and

25 games) in his room, to interest earned during the delay in payment, and to magnetic

resonance imaging for his injuries. He also sought a new lawyer, contending that his

appointed lawyer had inadequately pursued these claims. Rather than dismiss the new

motions for lack of jurisdiction, the district court denied them on the merits, concluding that

White’s attorney had represented him well, and that the additional items were never part of

the settlement agreement.  The court dismissed the case with prejudice.

On appeal White challenges only the denial of the motions that he filed in May 2008,

renewing here his demands for interest, an MRI, a Wii, and a new lawyer to help him get

them.  The defendants claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear those motions

and that, in any event, they were without merit.

Our analysis begins and ends with the jurisdictional issue, which we review de novo.

See Village of DePue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2008).  When a case

settles, a district court typically dismisses the suit with prejudice and relinquishes

jurisdiction; any action to enforce the settlement agreement must proceed as a state‐law

contract claim, which the district court may entertain only if there is an independent basis

for jurisdiction, such as diversity.  See Lynch, Inc. v. Samatamason, Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th

Cir. 2002) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380‐81 (1994)).

Where, however, a district court dismisses a settled suit without prejudice, it may, as here,

expressly retain ancillary jurisdiction for a time‐limited motion to enforce the settlement.

See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381; Hill v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 405 F.3d 572, 576‐77 (7th Cir.

2005); see also Shapo v. Engle, 463 F.3d 641, 643, 646 (7th Cir.  2006) (while criticizing the
No. 08‐2801 Page 3

practice of dismissing suits before settlements are implemented, acknowledging that courts

can retain jurisdiction to enforce settlements in cases that are dismissed without prejudice).

Thus, although the court had jurisdiction to consider White’s initial enforcement motions,

which he timely filed before the end of 2007, the court explicitly surrendered jurisdiction in

its March 11, 2008, order denying those motions and deeming the settlement fully

performed.  Because the parties are not diverse, White’s second set of motions to enforce the

settlement contract, filed after the March relinquishment of jurisdiction, may be pursued, if

at all, only as contract claims in state court.  See Lynch, Inc., 279 F.3d at 489.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court, as modified, for lack of

subject‐matter jurisdiction.