United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 25, 2022 

Decided October 27, 2022 

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 21-3327 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MICHAEL O. FRYER, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Western Division. 

No. 3:12-CR-50052(1) 

Philip G. Reinhard, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Michael Fryer pleaded guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and was 

sentenced to 78 months in prison and five years of supervised release. Within three 

months of leaving prison, Fryer began violating the conditions of his supervised release. 

He failed to submit a urine sample, participate in substance abuse counseling, and

timely report to his probation officer. The district judge admonished Fryer for these 

violations but did not revoke supervised release. Fryer then committed five burglaries, 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 21-3327 Page 2 

one of which resulted in a state-court conviction and prison sentence. The government 

moved for revocation of Fryer’s federal supervised release for violating the condition 

that he not commit another state or federal crime. After Fryer admitted to all five

burglaries, the district judge revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 30 

months’ reimprisonment and 24 months of additional supervised release. Fryer filed a 

notice of appeal, but his attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to 

withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Fryer does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel in revocation 

proceedings. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–91 (1973). Still, we apply the 

Anders safeguards to ensure that all potential issues receive consideration. See United 

States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Because counsel’s brief adequately 

addresses the potential issues that an appeal of this kind might involve, and Fryer did 

not respond to counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the issues 

counsel raises. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel first reports that Fryer has not said that he wants to challenge the 

revocation or the underlying admissions. But counsel does not tell us—as we require 

when counsel forgoes discussion of this issue—whether after consulting with his client

that his client confirmed he did not wish to challenge the revocation. See United States v. 

Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th 

Cir. 2010). This is an important part of the Anders process, and any time counsel omits 

discussion of a guilty plea or uncontested revocation, we expect counsel to expressly tell 

us (1) the nature of the consultation with his client and (2) his client’s informed decision. 

Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349; Wheaton, 610 F.3d at 390. 

In any event, raising such a challenge on appeal would be frivolous. We would 

review for plain error because Fryer did not seek to withdraw his admissions in the 

district court. United States v. Nelson, 931 F.3d 588, 590–92 (7th Cir. 2019). As the 

transcript of the revocation hearing shows, Fryer understood the alleged violations and 

possible penalties and was satisfied with his legal representation before he voluntarily 

waived his right to contest the allegations and freely admitted that his conduct violated 

the conditions of his release. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2); United States v. Jones, 774 

F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel next considers whether Fryer could challenge his new terms of 

imprisonment and supervised release, and rightly rejects any argument as frivolous. 

First, he spots no procedural issues in the application of the policy statements in 
No. 21-3327 Page 3 

Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines. Burglary in Illinois is punishable by a term 

of imprisonment greater than one year, see 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35, and 

thus, under the guidelines, it is a Grade B violation of Fryer’s supervised release, 

see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2). The district judge noted that the recommended guidelines 

range of reimprisonment—based on Fryer’s Grade B violations and criminal history 

category of III at the time he was originally sentenced—was 8 to 14 months. See id.

§ 7B1.4(a). And both the 30-month prison sentence and 24-month supervised-release

term, though well above the recommended range, are below the statutory maximums. 

The maximum prison sentence upon revocation was three years. See 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3583(e)(3), 2113(d), 3559(a)(2). Additional supervised release was limited to 60 

months minus the 30-month term of reimprisonment; here, the 24-month supervised 

release is less than that 30-month difference. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1), (h). 

We also agree with counsel that nothing in the record could show that either the

above-guidelines reimprisonment term or new supervised-release term is “plainly 

unreasonable.” See United States v. Dawson, 980 F.3d 1156, 1165–66 (7th Cir. 2020). The 

district judge, considering factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), explained that after he gave

Fryer “the opportunity” to remain on supervised release despite an initial spate of 

violations, Fryer committed “a list of felonies.” The judge considered Fryer’s mitigating 

arguments, including the financial, marital, and social challenges he faced. But the 

judge decided that 30 months’ reimprisonment was appropriate to “deter [Fryer] and 

protect the public.” The judge also explained that Fryer could more effectively face his 

life challenges with the “encouragement” and “help” of probation officers during a new 

term of supervised release. It would be frivolous to argue that these were unreasonable 

conclusions. 

Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.