Filed 10/31/23 Davidyan v. Moayery CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MIKE DAVIDYAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MOHAMMAD MOAYERY et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B315222

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. 

 No. 21VECV00054)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Virginia Keeny, Judge. Affirmed.

Mike Davidyan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Dennis P. Block & Associates, Dennis P. Block and 

Vicken Hagop Karagueuzian for Defendants and Respondents.

_________________________
2

Appellant Mike Davidyan (Davidyan) was evicted from a 

property owned by respondents Mohammad Moayery (Moayery) 

and Parvaneh Moshir Afshar (Afshar) (collectively respondents). 

Two years later, Davidyan sued respondents for damages caused 

by mold exposure during his tenancy. The trial court sustained

respondents’ demurrer, finding that because Davidyan had raised 

the mold issue as a habitability defense in the unlawful detainer 

case, his claims were barred by collateral estoppel. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

I. The Unlawful Detainer Action

In February 2017, Davidyan entered into a lease for a 

residential property owned by respondents (the property). In 

October 2018, Moayery sued Davidyan for unlawful detainer. 

Davidyan’s answer alleged that the property was not habitable 

due to, among other things, “fungus” in the home. Two months 

later, the trial court entered a judgment of possession for 

Moayery and awarded him nearly $20,000 in holdover damages.

Davidyan appealed from the unlawful detainer judgment, 

arguing that the trial court ignored his testimony that the 

property had “fungus and mold and . . . is in not habitable [sic].” 

Davidyan also attached a declaration “which discussed the mold 

1 Although we granted Davidyan’s motion to augment the 

record, the appellate record is incomplete. It contains only four

documents: (1) Davidyan’s first amended complaint; 

(2) respondents’ demurrer to Davidyan’s original, inoperative 

complaint; (3) the trial court’s ruling; and (4) Davidyan’s notice of 

appeal. Our summary of the case is compiled from these 

documents.
3

and [his] health.” The appellate division of the superior court 

affirmed the unlawful detainer judgment.2

II. Davidyan’s Lawsuit and Appeal

In May 2021, Davidyan filed a first amended complaint 

suing respondents for negligence and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress.

3 Both claims arose from injuries allegedly 

caused by mold exposure during his tenancy. Respondents 

demurred, arguing, among other things, that Davidyan’s claims 

were barred by collateral estoppel. After reviewing the available 

record from the unlawful detainer case, the trial court agreed and 

sustained respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend.4

Davidyan timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“Our Supreme Court has set forth the standard of review 

for ruling on a demurrer dismissal as follows: ‘On appeal from a 

judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer 

without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled.

The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable 

2 As this document does not appear in the appellate record, 

we presume that the trial court’s order describing it is correct. 

(See Evid. Code, § 664.)

3 Davidyan’s original complaint, filed four months earlier, 

included several additional claims not repeated in his amended 

complaint.

4 Although Afshar was not a party in the unlawful detainer 

action, the trial court also sustained respondents’ demurrer as to 

her because, as Moayery’s wife and co-owner of the property, she 

was his privy and thus equally entitled to the protection of 

collateral estoppel.
4

interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material 

facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, 

assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. 

[Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed “if any one of the 

several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]” 

[Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a 

demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under 

any possible legal theory. [Citation.]’” (Payne v. National 

Collection Systems, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043–1044

(Payne).)

“Where ‘all of the facts necessary to show that an action is 

barred by res judicata are within the complaint or subject to 

judicial notice, a trial court may properly sustain a general 

demurrer. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, 

Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1076–1077.) 

II. Applicable Law

“Collateral estoppel is one aspect of the broader doctrine of 

res judicata. [Citation.] ‘Where res judicata operates to prevent 

relitigation of a cause of action once adjudicated, collateral 

estoppel operates (in the second of two actions which do not 

involve identical causes of action) to obviate the need to relitigate 

issues already adjudicated in the first action. [Citation.]” (Syufy 

Enterprises v. City of Oakland (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 869, 878.)

Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, an issue cannot be 

relitigated if it is identical to one that was litigated and 

necessarily decided in a previous proceeding, and if the party 

seeking to relitigate the issue was either a party to the prior 

proceeding or in privity with a party. (Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 

166 Cal.App.4th 871, 895–896.)
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III. Analysis

The demurrer in this case, sustained solely on collateral 

estoppel grounds, was “well taken” (Payne, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1043) and thus must be affirmed. In the unlawful detainer 

action, Davidyan argued that the property was uninhabitable due 

to, among other things, significant levels of fungus and mold. He 

reiterated this argument in his appeal from the judgment, 

explicitly connecting the mold problem to health issues. In both 

proceedings, the presiding courts ruled against him. The 

unlawful detainer judgment thus resolved the issue of the 

property’s habitability, which is central to Davidyan’s current 

claims about mold exposure.

Davidyan insists that the unlawful detainer judgment 

should not preclude this lawsuit, due to the summary nature of 

the unlawful detainer hearing. But while “a judgment in 

unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect” 

due to the “‘summary’ . . . character” of the proceedings, the “‘full 

and fair’ litigation of an affirmative defense . . . if it is raised 

without objection, and if a fair opportunity to litigate is 

provided[,] will result in a judgment conclusive upon issues 

material to that defense.” (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 

255, 256–257.) In this case, Davidyan twice argued—both at the 

unlawful detainer trial and on direct appeal—that the property 

was uninhabitable due to dangerous levels of mold; that

argument was twice rejected. Under these circumstances, 

collateral estoppel attaches to the unlawful detainer judgment

and bars Davidyan’s current claims.

Davidyan also appears to challenge the trial court’s finding

that habitability issues were fully and fairly litigated in the 

unlawful detainer proceedings. However, because he provides no
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records or transcripts from the unlawful detainer trial or appeal, 

he has not presented an adequate record to show that these 

issues were not fully adjudicated therein. (In re Marriage of Deal

(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 622 [“Under well-established rules of 

appellate procedure, . . . the appellant . . . has the burden to 

provide an adequate record on appeal and to affirmatively show 

error.”]; see also Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. 

(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 [“‘Failure to provide an adequate 

record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against 

[the] appellant. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”].)

Lastly, Davidyan argues that collateral estoppel should not 

apply because his claims are based on new evidence discovered 

after the unlawful detainer judgment.

5 But “new evidence, 

however compelling, is generally insufficient to avoid application 

of collateral estoppel.” (Direct Shopping Network, LLC v. James 

(2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561; see also Evans v. Celotex 

Corp. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 [“An exception to collateral

estoppel cannot be grounded on the alleged discovery of more 

persuasive evidence. Otherwise, there would be no end to 

litigation”].)

Even if we were to consider this new evidence, it would not 

affect our collateral estoppel analysis. Regardless of what 

evidence is used to support Davidyan’s current claims, the fact 

remains that they are premised on an issue identical to one 

decided in the unlawful detainer judgment—namely, the 

existence of significant levels of mold in the property during his 

tenancy.

5 The new evidence includes information about the level of 

mold in the property, the mold’s effect on Davidyan’s health, and 

respondents’ alleged concealment of habitability issues.
7

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

________________________, J.*

KWAN

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.