Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of 

res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the 

law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

KEVIN M. KOLBUS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana 

JOSEPH Y. HO

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

LAURA JONES, )

)

Appellant-Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1307-PC-651

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Jose Salinas, Judge

Cause No. 49G14-0905-PC-47322

April 21, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Judge
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Case Summary and Issue

Laura Jones appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition for postconviction relief, raising a single issue for our review: whether Jones received ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. Concluding Jones received adequate assistance and that the 

post-conviction court did not err in denying her petition, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 12, 2009, Officer Brad Millikan of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police 

Department responded to a report of a forgery in progress at a Fifth Third Bank branch. 

A bank employee informed the officer that Jones attempted to cash a check from an 

account belonging to someone else and that the signature on the check did not match that 

of the account holder. The branch manager informed the officer that the check had been 

reported stolen by the account holder, Elaine Jones (“Elaine”), who is Jones’s mother. 

Jones told the officer that she had a drug addiction and stole the check from her mother to 

pay a debt owed to a drug dealer. The officer also spoke with Elaine, who confirmed that 

the check had been stolen. 

On May 13, 2009, Jones was charged with forgery, a Class C felony, and theft, a 

Class D felony, and Jones hired Jackie Butler to represent her as trial counsel. Jones’s 

case was eventually transferred to the Marion County Drug Court. On April 6, 2010, 

Jones entered into a plea agreement under which her charges would be dismissed 

contingent upon successful completion of the court’s drug treatment program. However, 

Jones was terminated from the program on August 17, 2010, after she was charged with 

another criminal offense. As a result, convictions were entered against Jones for forgery 

and theft. 
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On January 18, 2012, Jones filed her petition for post-conviction relief, alleging 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court held hearings on 

November 2, 2012; February 19, 2013; and May 14, 2013. On June, 28, 2013, the postconviction court denied Jones’s petition. Jones now brings this appeal. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief bears the burden of establishing 

grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). 

A petitioner who is denied post-conviction relief appeals from a negative judgment, 

which may be reversed only if “the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and 

unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Stevens 

v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 830 (2003). We defer to 

the post-conviction court’s factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 746.

The Sixth Amendment’s “right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of 

counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. 

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). To establish a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s performance 

was deficient such that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on 

prevailing professional norms and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s 

deficient performance. Id. at 687. When considering whether counsel’s performance 

was deficient, the reviewing court begins with a “strong presumption” that counsel’s 

performance was reasonable. Id. at 689. A defendant is prejudiced if “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
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proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

When a defendant contests his guilty plea based on claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel, we apply the same two-part test from Strickland discussed above. Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). The first part, regarding counsel’s performance, is 

largely the same. Id. The prejudice requirement, however, “focuses on whether 

counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea 

process. In other words, . . . the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59. 

The two prongs of the Strickland test—performance and prejudice—are 

independent inquiries, and both prongs need not be addressed if the defendant makes an 

insufficient showing as to one of them. 466 U.S. at 697. For instance, “[i]f it is easier to 

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that 

course should be followed” without consideration of whether counsel’s performance was 

deficient. Id.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Jones asserts that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on two 

alleged deficiencies: (1) failure to investigate and (2) failure to properly advise Jones of 

her right to a jury trial.

A. Failure to Investigate

First, Jones asserts that trial counsel failed to investigate a potential defense that 

Jones had permission to use Elaine’s checks and that the check in question was not 
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stolen. After being hired as counsel, Butler spoke with Jones, who told her that she had 

her mother’s permission to use the check on the day she was arrested. Butler also met 

with Elaine, who also told Butler that she had given her daughter permission to use the 

check. Butler had several meetings with Jones, discussing her potential defense, its 

conflict with the probable cause affidavit, and Jones’s chances of success at trial. Butler 

then presented Jones and Elaine’s version of events to the State, in hopes of securing a 

favorable plea agreement.

Jones does not suggest what further investigation would be required to achieve an 

objective standard of reasonableness, other than to say “Ms. Butler failed to conduct 

depositions . . . .” Brief of Appellant at 5. The crux of any defense of Jones’s authorized 

use of the check would be testimony from Jones and Elaine, and there is no dispute that 

Butler was fully aware of what their testimony would be on the subject. When 

confronted with a claim of ineffective assistance for failure to investigate, we afford trial 

counsel a great deal of deference. Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Ind. 2002). 

“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than 

complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 

judgments support the limitation on investigation.” Id. at 1283-84 (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 690-91). We are not persuaded that trial counsel’s investigation and strategic 

decision to obtain a favorable guilty plea—after consultation with and authorization from 

Jones—fell below objective standards of reasonable performance. 
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B. Insufficient Advisement of Right to Jury Trial

Second, Jones claims her trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to 

adequately advise Jones of her right to trial by jury. In this vein, Jones highlights her 

allegation that Butler pressured Jones to enter into a plea agreement and told her that she 

would not receive a fair trial because the trial court judge was a victim of forgery. It is 

clear from the post-conviction court’s decision, however, that the court did not credit 

Jones’s contentions on this point. The post-conviction court noted that Butler was not 

questioned regarding this allegation and made a proper inference that Butler would not 

have agreed with Jones’s version of events.1 See Dickson v. State, 533 N.E.2d 586, 589 

(Ind. 1989) (stating post-conviction court may infer that trial counsel would not have 

corroborated petitioner’s allegations where trial counsel is not presented at the hearing). 

The post-conviction court also noted testimony that Butler discussed the option of a trial 

with Jones, and Jones confirmed in her plea agreement that she understood her right to a 

trial by jury. We are not in a position to reweigh the evidence or question the postconviction court’s assessment of witness credibility. We conclude Jones has failed to 

carry her burden that the post-conviction court’s decision was erroneous with respect to 

Butler’s advisement of Jones’s right to a jury trial. 

Conclusion

Concluding the post-conviction court’s denial of Jones’s petition was not error, we 

affirm. 

Affirmed.

 

1

 To clarify, Butler testified at the first post-conviction hearing, but she was not questioned regarding this 

particular allegation. 
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RILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.