In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-12-0426-CR 

________________________

Alvaro Hrgic, Appellant 

 

v. 

 

The State of Texas, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

Randall County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2012-0158-1, Honorable James W. Anderson, Presiding 

 

March 18, 2013 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Alvaro Hrgic appeals his conviction for possessing marijuana. His sole issue on 

appeal concerns the trial court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence. We 

affirm. 

The applicable standard of review is that discussed in St. George v. State, 237 

S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Furthermore, the test used in determining the 

existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion is objective, not subjective. Ford 
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v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). That is, we look to see if the 

totality of the circumstances was sufficient to create, from the viewpoint of a reasonable 

officer, reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that crime is afoot or that the 

suspects have engaged or are engaging in crime. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 

257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

The record at bar contains evidence that Deputy Ralston saw a vehicle driving in 

a field after 9 p.m. The field was privately owned by several parties, contained at least 

one “no trespassing” sign, and had portions fenced off with barbed wire. At least two of 

the property owners had also informed him that they did not want trespassers on the 

property. When Ralson drove onto the land to investigate, the vehicle hurried away. 

Ralston then informed the dispatcher of what he saw and provided a description of the 

car. Another deputy near the field heard the dispatch, saw a vehicle matching the 

description given by Ralston driving from the field onto an adjacent parking lot, and 

effectuated a stop. Eventually, drugs were discovered in the vehicle. 

Below, appellant simply attacked the legitimacy of the stop. The trial court 

overruled the motion to suppress. Appellant now questions that decision on appeal. 

One commits the crime of criminal trespass if he “. . . enters or remains on or in 

the property of another, including residential land, agricultural land, a recreational 

vehicle park, a building, or an aircraft or other vehicle, without effective consent and the 

person . . . had notice that the entry was forbidden . . . . “ TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 

30.05(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012). A reasonable officer would have been cognizant of that 

statute, given that all are imputed with knowledge of the law. Upon coupling that 

imputed knowledge with the factual circumstances mentioned above (i.e., the presence 
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of a no trespassing sign, the time of night, and the rapid departure of appellant from the 

field when Ralston engaged his high beam headlights), we conclude that a reasonable 

officer witnessing the circumstances had, at the very least, reasonable suspicion to 

believe a criminal trespass was afoot. Thus, the occupants in the vehicle were 

susceptible to being lawfully stopped or detained. 

That a deputy other than Ralston effectuated the detention matters not. The 

basis for stopping a vehicle may be provided by more than one person. Brother v. 

State, 166 S.W.3d at 257. Indeed, the detaining officer need not be personally aware of 

every fact that supports reasonable suspicion before he can detain; rather, the collective 

knowledge of the cooperating officers is determinative. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 

S.W.3d 906, 915 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 150, 181 

L.Ed.2d 67 (2011). The record at bar contains evidence that the deputy who made the 

stop relied on information imparted by Ralston, and, as concluded above, Ralston had 

lawful basis to make the stop himself.

The judgment is affirmed. 

 

Brian Quinn 

Chief Justice 

Do not publish.