UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4782

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff − Appellee,

v.

DEMETRIUS DARRELL DAVIS, a/k/a Meatman,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:16-cr-00351-CCB-1)

Argued: May 9, 2019 Decided: August 2, 2019

Before DIAZ, FLOYD, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge 

Richardson joined. Judge Floyd wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.

ARGUED: Erek Lawrence Barron, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, LLP, 

Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellant. Derek Edward Hines, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael 

Lawlor, BRENNAN, MCKENNA & LAWLOR, CHTD., Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellant. Robert K. Hur, United States Attorney, Jason D. Medinger, Assistant United

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, 

for Appellee.
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

Demetrius Davis was convicted on a drug conspiracy charge and sentenced to ten 

years in prison. He filed two suppression motions before trial, one alleging an illegal 

wiretap of his phone and the other alleging an illegal search of a vehicle. The district court 

denied both motions, and Davis now appeals. We affirm the judgment.

I.

A.

Davis’s prosecution arose from a joint federal–state investigation of a cocaine 

trafficking ring on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. The investigation originally focused on 

Tarron Fletcher, Tyandre Johnson, and several of their associates. For several years, law 

enforcement agents used traditional investigative methods against those suspected 

traffickers, including controlled buys with confidential sources, pen registers, GPS 

trackers, pole cameras, trash pulls, and package searches at the Post Office. By 2016, they 

had gathered enough evidence to indict the known conspirators on drug charges. But the 

agents sought more evidence to take down “the organization as a whole.” J.A. 74.

In pursuit of that goal, they applied for a wiretap of Johnson and Fletcher’s phones. 

In their application, the agents explained why traditional investigative techniques would 

not reveal the cocaine supplier. In their estimation, confidential sources or undercover 

officers couldn’t get close to sources of supply; visual surveillance, GPS tracking, trash 

pulls, search warrants, and similar methods had failed to reveal anyone higher in the 

operation; and no one with knowledge of the conspiracy was likely to testify under oath. 
4

A federal magistrate judge agreed and approved the wiretap application under Title III of 

the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

When the wiretap was approved, agents were not aware of Davis or his role in the 

conspiracy. But through the wiretap, they captured several phone and text conversations 

involving Davis. In two calls on the same day, Davis and Fletcher used what appear to be 

coded terms (e.g., “that girl Crystal”) to discuss—as the agents interpreted it—the quality 

of certain kilograms of cocaine. In later text messages, Davis and Fletcher continued that 

discussion and arranged a meeting in which Davis would supply Fletcher with drugs.

Using that information, agents followed Davis as he drove to a meeting with Fletcher.

In another call, Johnson complained to Davis about receiving drugs at inopportune 

times and being forced to repay debts early. Soon after, Johnson sent a text message to 

Davis reading, “I’m gonna give your money cuz but don’t come around me with drugs no 

more man . . . u bad business.” J.A. 153. The agents also used pen registers and toll 

analysis to generate a list of calls between members of the conspiracy.

Suspecting that Davis was supplying cocaine to Fletcher and Johnson, agents sought 

a Title III wiretap order for Davis’s cellphone. In the affidavit supporting their wiretap

application, the agents admitted that (for the most part) they had not tried traditional 

investigative techniques against Davis. But they detailed why such techniques would likely 

fail if tried.

In the agents’ understanding, existing confidential sources had no access to Davis 

and, given his role in the conspiracy and the rural area where he lived, it wouldn’t be 

feasible to get a confidential source or undercover officer near him. Several factors would 
5

have made visual surveillance ineffective: cars or officers would stand out in a rural area, 

Davis used several different cars, and the conspirators had employed countersurveillance 

tactics to avoid being followed. The agents didn’t have enough information to know where 

Davis kept his suspected supply, so search warrants would have been ineffective. 

Interviews and subpoenas were unlikely to get anyone with knowledge of the conspiracy 

to testify (much less to testify honestly). Trash searches and pole cameras would be 

impractical at Davis’s remote house. Pen registers, toll analysis, and mail covers1 were 

unlikely to generate useful information. And neither the original wiretap nor a financial 

investigation of the conspirators was bearing further fruit.

A federal magistrate judge authorized the wiretap on Davis’s phone, finding that 

there was probable cause that he was involved in the drug conspiracy and that a wiretap 

was necessary because other methods were unlikely to succeed. Using information from 

that wiretap and from GPS tracking of Davis’s Mercedes, agents observed what they 

believed to be Davis supplying drugs to his coconspirators.2

 They also took aerial and 

ground-based photos and video of Davis’s property. With this new evidence, they obtained 

federal search warrants for Davis’s house and for his Mercedes.

 1 Federal investigators may ask the Post Office to generate a “mail cover,” which is 

a compiled list of the names and addresses on all USPS mail sent to a particular address. 

See 39 C.F.R. § 233.3.

2 The agents had state court authorization to place a GPS tracker on the Mercedes 

before they applied for a wiretap order. But they didn’t place the tracker on the car until 

after the wiretap was approved.
6

A team of agents executed the search warrants early one morning. Several agents 

entered Davis’s house, separating Davis and his girlfriend for questioning. Davis orally 

acknowledged that he had been advised of his Miranda rights, and he responded to 

questions without invoking his rights. A detective asked Davis about a white box truck 

parked in his driveway, which investigators had seen on the premises before. Davis denied 

ownership (or even knowledge) of the truck. But after questioning Davis, the detective 

found the truck’s keys in Davis’s house.

While some agents searched the house, a K9 officer walked a drug-sniffing dog 

around the back of Davis’s property and the vehicles parked there. After the detective 

found the keys, he asked the K9 officer to bring the dog to the truck parked in the driveway. 

The dog alerted to the smell of narcotics, and the agents opened the truck. Inside, they 

found a small quantity of cocaine and $625 in cash.

B.

A federal grand jury indicted Davis, Johnson, and Fletcher on one count of 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine. 

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Johnson and Fletcher pleaded guilty. Davis pleaded not 

guilty and filed two suppression motions. The first motion alleged that the wiretap of 

Davis’s phone lacked probable cause and that none of the wiretaps obtained by the agents 

were necessary. The second motion alleged that the search of the truck on Davis’s property 

violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied both suppression motions.

First, the district court addressed the wiretaps of Johnson and Fletcher’s phones. It

held that those wiretaps were necessary because they were the only way to identify the
7

conspirators’ source of supply. Then, the district court addressed the wiretap of Davis’s 

phone. It held that there was probable cause for the wiretap and that it was necessary 

because other investigative methods would have been ineffective. Last, the district court 

addressed the search of the truck, concluding that there was no Fourth Amendment 

violation because Davis had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck after denying

that he had any interest in it. As an alternative to that holding, the district court held that 

the warrant and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement each independently 

justified the search.

A jury convicted Davis of conspiracy. The district court sentenced him to ten years 

in prison followed by five years of supervised release. This appeal followed.

II.

Davis’s first ground for appeal concerns his motion to suppress conversations 

captured via the Title III wiretaps. Title III allows the government to ask a federal district 

court for a wiretap order during investigations of certain crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). To 

approve the order, the district court must make several findings. Id. § 2518(3). Three of 

the required findings are at issue in this appeal, findings that: (1) there is probable cause 

that the target individual has committed or will commit a crime enumerated in Title III; (2) 

there is probable cause that the wiretap will intercept communications about that crime; 

and (3) normal investigative procedures have failed, would be too dangerous, or reasonably 

appear unlikely to succeed. Id. § 2518(3)(a)–(c). The government must supply an affidavit 

with evidence sufficient to support these findings. Id. § 2518(1).
8

Davis contends that the government lacked probable cause to wiretap his phone and 

that neither the original wiretap of Johnson and Fletcher nor the subsequent wiretap of 

Davis was necessary. As we explain, however, we hold that the district court did not err 

by denying this suppression motion.

3

A.

Though Davis primarily challenges the wiretap of his phone, he also appears to 

contest the necessity of wiretapping Johnson and Fletcher’s phones.

4

 As he argued in the 

district court, Davis appears to contend on appeal that those wiretaps weren’t necessary 

because agents had already uncovered substantial evidence against Johnson and Fletcher 

by traditional means. The district court concluded that the wiretaps were necessary, 

however, because traditional methods had failed to reveal Johnson and Fletcher’s source 

of supply.

We review a district court’s determination of necessity under Title III for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007). Though the 

 3 As an alternative ground for affirming, the government contends that suppression 

is unwarranted because agents relied on the wiretap orders in good faith. Because we hold 

that the orders satisfy Title III’s requirements, we don’t address whether the good faith 

exception applies to statutory suppression under Title III.

4 A criminal defendant must be an “aggrieved person” to move to suppress under 

Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a), defined as “a person who was a party to any intercepted 

wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was 

directed,” id. § 2510(11). Davis says he is an aggrieved person because his 

communications were intercepted during the wiretap of Johnson and Fletcher. The 

government does not dispute that characterization, so we will assume it to be true for 

purposes of this appeal.
9

government must provide specific facts—not boilerplate—showing necessity, we owe 

“considerable deference” to the district court’s determination. United States v. Oriakhi, 57 

F.3d 1290, 1298 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Smith, 31 F.3d 1294, 1298 (4th 

Cir. 1994)). It is appropriate to consider necessity “in a practical and commonsense fashion 

that does not hamper unduly the investigative powers of law enforcement agents.” Wilson, 

484 F.3d at 281 (quoting Smith, 31 F.3d at 1297). The government’s burden to prove 

necessity therefore “is not great.” Id. at 281 (quoting Smith, 31 F.3d at 1297).

It is true that even before the wiretaps, agents likely had enough evidence to support 

charges against Johnson and Fletcher. But the agents’ goal was to find Johnson and 

Fletcher’s supplier and to uncover the full trafficking conspiracy. In their affidavit, the 

agents sufficiently demonstrated that the methods they had tried—confidential sources, 

trash pulls, visual surveillance, package searches, etc.—didn’t reveal Johnson and 

Fletcher’s source of supply.

In many other cases, we have affirmed wiretaps intended to reveal the higher levels 

of a conspiracy when ordinary investigative methods could not reach them. See, e.g.,

United States v. Galloway, 749 F.3d 238, 242–43 (4th Cir. 2014); Smith, 31 F.3d at 1297–

98; United States v. Leavis, 853 F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Clerkley, 

556 F.2d 709, 714–15 (4th Cir. 1977). As in those precedents, the wiretap order was 

appropriate in this case because the government demonstrated that ordinary methods had 

failed or would likely fail to reveal the source of Johnson and Fletcher’s supply.

B.
10

We turn next to Davis’s challenge to the wiretap of his own phone. Davis gives two 

reasons for why the district court erred. First, he says that the wiretap application did not 

sufficiently allege probable cause. Second, he says that the application did not sufficiently 

allege that a wiretap was necessary. We disagree with Davis on both issues.

1.

The probable cause standard for a Title III wiretap order is the same as the probable 

cause standard for a warrant. United States v. Talbert, 706 F.2d 464, 467 (4th Cir. 1983). 

Probable cause for a wiretap order thus exists when the facts warrant a person “of 

reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Berger v. 

New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). On appeal, we afford “[g]reat deference” to the 

magistrate judge’s assessment of the facts and ask only “whether the magistrate had a 

substantial basis for his conclusion that probable cause existed.” United States v. Williams, 

974 F.2d 480, 481 (4th Cir. 1992).

We agree with the district court that the magistrate judge had a substantial basis for 

concluding that there was probable cause to support the wiretap of Davis’s phone. The 

calls and texts intercepted through the wiretaps of Fletcher and Johnson’s phones strongly 

suggested that Davis was involved in drug trafficking. For example, the agents captured 

calls between Fletcher and Davis in which the men used a fairly transparent code word—

“crystal”—to discuss concerns about the quality of cocaine in their possession. The 

conversations suggested that Davis supplied cocaine to Fletcher, and in one call, Davis 

appeared to reiterate trafficking-related conversations he’d had with other people. After 

that, text messages between Davis and Fletcher appeared to describe (in coded language) 
11

an arrangement in which Davis would supply narcotics to Fletcher. In another call, 

Johnson complained that Davis was requiring Johnson to receive drugs without notice and 

asking for repayment of drug debts at inopportune moments. And in a subsequent text, 

Johnson told Davis that he would repay his debts but didn’t want to receive any further 

supplies of drugs. These conversations would lead a reasonable person to believe that 

Davis was participating in the drug crimes under investigation, which suffices to establish 

probable cause to wiretap his phone. 

Davis urges us not to rely on the agents’ understanding of the coded terms. But the 

agents’ interpretation of the coded terms—which ties the wiretapped conversations to 

cocaine trafficking—was reasonable. The coded language was fairly transparent, after all. 

See, e.g., J.A. 141 (“She’s just straight like Crystal. She ain’t really got too much smell to 

her at all. . . . I picked one up and put it on my tongue . . . she took a while just to you know, 

to numb it.”). And we agree that the wiretapped conversations suggest that Davis was 

involved in drug trafficking.

2.

Davis also challenges the district court’s conclusion that the wiretap of his phone 

was necessary. The government concedes that it didn’t perform a traditional investigation 

of Davis before seeking a wiretap for his phone. So, the question is whether the 

government proved that normal investigative methods reasonably appeared unlikely to 

succeed. As noted, our review of the necessity determination is deferential. See Wilson, 

484 F.3d at 280; Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1298.
12

The government made a sufficient showing that ordinary methods would have been

ineffective against Davis. Because of where Davis lived, and his suspected role as a 

supplier for the conspiracy, getting a confidential source or undercover officer near him 

would not have been feasible. Visual surveillance, cameras, and trash pulls would likely 

have been ineffective and risky because of the remote location of his house. Interviews 

and subpoenas were unlikely to yield honest testimony. And agents lacked enough 

information to use search warrants effectively.

Davis contends that because some ordinary investigative methods were successful 

against Johnson and Fletcher, who lived in the same area as Davis, they likely would have 

been successful against Davis too. True, ordinary methods had revealed small-scale drug 

dealing by Johnson and Fletcher. But they had not led agents to their source of supply, and 

the agents reasonably concluded that they would not have revealed anything useful about

Davis, who appeared (based on the wiretapped conversations) to be the supplier. To the 

extent that other methods, such as visual surveillance or GPS tracking, were useful later in 

the investigation of Davis, it was only because of information obtained from the wiretap.5

 5 Davis points to a case in which the Ninth Circuit held that the government failed 

to prove necessity when it applied for a wiretap order after only minimal investigation. 

United States v. Gonzalez, Inc., 412 F.3d 1102, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2005). But there, the 

Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the wiretap application complied with Title III de novo, 

id. at 1111, and it considered several unused investigative methods to be promising, id. at 

1114–15. We (on the other hand) apply a deferential standard of review to the question of 

necessity. And, unlike in Gonzalez, none of the unused investigative methods in this case 

appear to have been promising.
13

The government supported its need for a wiretap of Davis’s phone with specific 

facts showing why other investigative methods reasonably appeared unlikely to succeed. 

As a result, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in finding that the wiretap was 

necessary.

III.

Davis next argues that the search of the truck on his property violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights. The district court held (and we agree) that Davis’s Fourth Amendment 

challenge fails because he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck.6

A district court may only suppress evidence on the basis that a search was 

unconstitutional if the search “infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth 

Amendment was designed to protect.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). In this 

threshold inquiry (sometimes called Fourth Amendment standing), the defendant has the 

“burden of establishing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy” in the area or 

object searched. United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 547 (4th Cir. 2005); see Byrd 

v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018) (“[A] person must have a cognizable Fourth 

Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional 

search . . . .”).

 6 Given our holding on this issue, we don’t reach the government’s alternative 

arguments that the warrant covered the truck, that the search fell within the automobile 

exception, or that the officers relied in good faith on the warrant or on judicial precedents.
14

If the defendant lacked (or abandoned) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 

area or object searched, a motion to suppress evidence from that search fails as a matter of 

law. See United States v. Williams, 538 F.2d 549, 550–51 (4th Cir. 1976). We review the 

district court’s legal conclusions about expectations of privacy de novo and its factual 

findings for clear error. Han, 74 F.3d at 541, 544–45.

Under our precedent, a person abandons any reasonable expectation of privacy in 

certain property for Fourth Amendment purposes when his words or actions can reasonably 

be understood to disclaim any privacy interest in that property. See United States v. Leshuk, 

65 F.3d 1105, 1111 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[A] person who voluntarily abandons property loses 

any reasonable expectation of privacy in the property and is consequently precluded from 

seeking to suppress evidence seized from the property.”). In United States v. Han, for 

example, we concluded that a defendant abandoned any privacy interest in a suitcase found 

next to him in his home by denying that the bag was his. 74 F.3d 537, 540, 544–45 (4th 

Cir. 1996). In a similar case, we determined that a defendant abandoned his privacy interest 

in a briefcase and a typewriter case found in his hotel room when he claimed that they “did 

not belong to him and that he had no idea to whom [they] belonged.” Williams, 538 F.2d 

at 550–51. We have reached the same conclusion in cases where defendants have 

disclaimed ownership of bags that otherwise appeared to belong to them.7

 7 See Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1110–11 (backpack and garbage bags found by defendant); 

United States v. Clark, 891 F.2d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 1989) (suitcase found at airport baggage 

claim which matched defendant’s baggage claim check); United States v. Washington, 677 

F.2d 394, 395–96 (4th Cir. 1982) (suitcase in defendant’s possession at the airport); cf. 

United States v. McNeil, No. 92-5421, 1993 WL 347524, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1993)
15

In this case, Davis expressly disclaimed possession (or even knowledge) of the 

truck. J.A. 427 (“It’s not my white box truck. I don’t know anything about it.”). His words 

mirror the language we have found to constitute abandonment of a privacy interest in an 

object. See, e.g., Han, 74 F.3d at 540 (“Han responded that it was not his bag . . . .”); 

Williams, 538 F.2d at 550 (“Defendant informed the agents that [the typewriter case] did 

not belong to him and that he had no idea to whom it belonged.”); Washington, 677 F.2d 

at 395 (“It’s not my bag. I don’t care what you do . . . .”). While these precedents

concerned bags, the same principle should apply to cars. Vehicles are chattel possessions 

like bags, and individuals generally don’t have greater privacy interests in vehicles than in 

other possessions.

Davis contends that this court uses a multifactor test to determine if a defendant had 

a reasonable expectation of privacy. In his view, relevant factors include the location of 

the truck, the fact that investigators had seen it on Davis’s property before, and the key 

found inside Davis’s house. As a general principle, we do employ a multifactor test. See, 

e.g., United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828, 833–34 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. 

Horowitz, 806 F.2d 1222, 1225 (4th Cir. 1986). But we have not done so when a defendant 

disclaims any interest in an object. See, e.g., Han, 74 F.3d at 544–45; Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 

1110–11; Williams, 538 F.2d at 550. Instead, we have found the disclaimer dispositive, 

even if agents have reason to know that the defendant does in fact own the property to be 

 

(driver and passengers had no privacy interest in a motel key found in a search of the car 

they were in because they all said the key wasn’t theirs).
16

searched.8

 See Han, 74 F.3d at 544–45. Because Davis disclaimed any interest in the box 

truck, the district court correctly denied his motion to suppress the drugs seized from the 

truck.

IV.

For the reasons given, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED

 8 Davis also makes a brief argument that he didn’t disclaim ownership of the truck. 

As Davis would have it, the detective asked him about a white box truck in his driveway 

when, in Davis’s view of the facts, the truck was actually parked on the property of the 

neighboring lot. Thus, Davis says his refusal to admit ownership of a truck in his driveway 

didn’t extend to a truck that agents found on the adjoining parcel. The problem for Davis 

is that the district court found that the “white box truck was parked such that it was at least 

partly on the gravel driveway” of Davis’s property. J.A. 624. The court’s finding is not 

clearly wrong, so we will not disturb it. See Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1111.
17

FLOYD, J., concurring in the judgment:

I agree that we must, in accordance with our precedent, affirm the district court’s denial 

of Davis’s motion to suppress. But with great respect for my good colleagues, I am not 

convinced that our precedent requires us to hold that a person categorically abandons her 

interest in her property when she disclaims ownership of the property prior to a search by 

law enforcement, such that no circumstances other than the person’s verbal disclaimer are 

relevant to the abandonment analysis. While broad wording in some of our cases points in

that direction, it seems to me that we have not subjected the question to a thorough analysis 

or made it an explicit holding. Nor, in my view, does the case at hand require us to do so: 

the parties have briefed the question only scantily, and even under a totality-of-thecircumstances approach, I believe we would affirm the district court’s conclusion that 

Davis abandoned his truck before it was searched. That being said, I concur in the 

judgment.