Office of Tax Analysis 

Working Paper 124

January 2024

Marriage Penalties and Bonuses by Race 

and Ethnicity: An Application of Race and 

Ethnicity Imputation

Rachel Costello, Portia DeFilippes, Robin Fisher,

Ben Klemens, and Emily Y. Lin

The OTA Working Papers Series presents original research by the staff of the Office of Tax 

Analysis. These papers are intended to generate discussion and critical comment while 

informing and improving the quality of the analysis conducted by the Office. The papers are 

works in progress and subject to revision. Views and opinions expressed are those of the 

authors and do not necessarily represent official Treasury positions or policy. Comments are 

welcome, as are suggestions for improvements, and should be directed to the authors. OTA

Working Papers may be quoted without additional permission.
Marriage Penalties and Bonuses by Race and Ethnicity: An Application of Race and 

Ethnicity Imputation

Rachel Costello, Portia DeFilippes, Robin Fisher, Ben Klemens, and Emily Y. Lin* 

January 2024 

Abstract 

The Office of Tax Analysis imputes race and ethnicity information to its tax 

microsimulation model to facilitate equity analysis in taxation. Applying the imputed 

race and ethnicity information to the calculation of marriage penalties and bonuses 

for married couplesfiling joint returns, this paper finds differences in the probability 

that such couples face a penalty or bonus, and the amount of the penalty or bonus, 

among couples of different races and ethnic backgrounds. Moreover, these group 

differences vary by income. White couples are more likely to face a marriage penalty 

than Black and Hispanic couples in several income classes below $100,000, but 

Black and Hispanic couples are more likely to face a penalty than White couples in 

higher-income classes. These findings differ from other recent studies using different 

data sources. The estimated Black-White differences in penalty rates by income are 

consistent with the patterns of spousal income splits in the underlying data sources, 

suggesting that examination of the differences in these splits in different data sources 

is an important avenue for further research. 

This research was conducted while the authors were employees at the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 

of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or the official positions of the U.S. 

Department of the Treasury or the Office of Tax Analysis. Any taxpayer data used in this research 

was kept in a secured Treasury or IRS data repository. 

*All the authors are with the Office of Tax Analysis, the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 

Corresponding author: Emily Lin, Emily.Lin@treasury.gov
I. Introduction

Tax law can have different impacts on individuals in different racial and ethnic groups

because individuals’ tax return characteristics—e.g., marital status, number of children, the level 

and sources of income, household expenses, etc.—vary across groups. While no tax rule depends

on race or ethnicity, group differences in characteristics and choices can result in favorable tax 

consequences for some groups while disadvantaging others. However, because tax forms do not 

collect information about individual race or ethnicity, it has been challenging to use 

administrative tax data to analyze tax differentials across race and ethnicity groups. To facilitate a 

better understanding of tax outcomes by race and ethnicity, the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) 

imputes information about race and Hispanic origin to a stratified random sample of taxpayers on 

its individual tax microsimulation model. In this paper, we use the imputed information to 

estimate marriage penalties and bonuses in the federal individual income tax by race and 

ethnicity. 

Marriage penalties and bonuses measure the tax consequence of filing a joint return upon 

marriage, by comparing the couple’s tax liability on the joint return to the combined liability of 

the two partners if they were to file separate returns as unmarried individuals using single or 

head-of-household status. Married couples generally file jointly, where the couple pools their 

income and deducts combined allowable expenses. Joint filing causes some married couples to 

pay more federal income tax than they would if they were unmarried and filed separate returns. 
2

These couples face a marriage penalty. However, for married couples who pay less federal 

income tax by filing jointly, the couples have a marriage bonus. Two married couples who have 

the same family income and pay the same amount of federal income tax could have different 

marriage penalty or bonus outcomes, depending on the taxes they would face on the separate 

returns. The estimation results show that marriage bonuses are more common than marriage 

penalties under 2023 tax law and population: 37 percent of married-filing-jointly couples face a 

marriage penalty and 53 percent face a marriage bonus.

One key factor for a couple’s marriage penalty or bonus is the income division between 

the two spouses. In general, couples with one working spouse are likely to have marriage bonuses 

whereas dual-earner couples with similar incomes are likely to face marriage penalties. Under a 

progressive tax system, when the partners have similar incomes, joint filing may push the 

couple’s combined income into a higher rate bracket than the bracket each spouse would face on 

the separately filed return if unmarried. In contrast, when one spouse earns all, or almost all, the 

family’s income, the couple may enjoy a lower tax rate by filing jointly because the bracket 

widths for married-filing-jointly status are longer than those for single or head-of-household 

status. Similarly, depending on the couple’s division of income, phaseouts of tax benefits may 

cause a marriage bonus or penalty when the benefit phases out over a higher income range for

joint filers than for unmarried filers but the income levels of the phaseout schedule for joint filers 

are less than twice the levels for unmarried filers. Tables A-1 and A-2 of the Appendix show the

rate brackets and the phase-out schedule of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for tax year 

2023. In fact, marriage penalties and bonuses are unavoidable under a progressive tax system that

treats married couples with equal income equally regardless of how similar or disparate the two 

spouses’ incomes are.
3

A consequence of this marriage non-neutrality is that it may distort the marriage and labor 

supply decisions. Many studies, including Alm and Whittington (1995, 1997, and 1999) and Sjoquist 

and Walker (1995), find a small effect of the marriage penalty on the marriage rate or the timing of 

marriage. LaLumia (2008) finds that changing the unit of taxation from individuals to families in 

1948 reduced married women’s labor supply among highly educated taxpayers but did not affect 

married men’s labor supply. Lin and Tong (2014) estimate the change in the marginal tax rate 

faced by cohabiting individuals if they were to get married and file joint returns. The authors 

show that over 60 percent of secondary earners would face an increase in the marginal tax rate 

under joint filing. In addition, when certain groups have characteristics that result in marriage 

penalties, married couples in these groups are treated unfavorably by the joint-filing system 

relative to individual-based filing. This paper focuses on group differences in the marriage 

penalty and bonus outcomes in the context of race and ethnicity. 

To facilitate the analysis of marriage penalties and bonuses by race and ethnic 

background, OTA imputes race and Hispanic origin to the population represented in its 

microsimulation model. Built on a Bayesian inference model, this imputation uses family income, 

filing status, age, number of dependents, gender,1 first name and last name of the primary 

taxpayer, and the ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) based on the taxpayer’s address shown on 

the return as the explanatory variables to make inferences about the race and Hispanic origin 

category of the primary taxpayer on a tax return. Cronin et al. (2023) and Fisher (2023) describe 

the methodology and estimation of this imputation in detail. 

Using this race and Hispanic origin (RH) information, the marriage penalty and bonus 

outcomes are estimated for the four groups of married-filing-jointly couples—White, Black, 

1 This information is the individual’s gender assigned at birth recorded in the Social Security Administration’s 

database.
4

Asian and Pacific Islander (API), and Hispanic—for tax year 2023.

2 The results show that 38

percent of White married-filing-jointly couples have a marriage penalty. The penalty rate is 35

percent for API couples, 34 percent for Hispanic couples, and 32 percent for Black couples. Of 

couples with penalties, the average penalty amount ranges from $1,633 for Black joint filers to 

$2,191 for API joint filers. For context, the penalties represent 17 percent of the tax liability for 

Hispanic couples, 11 percent for Black couples, 8 percent for White couples, and 7 percent for 

API couples. For the bonus outcomes, 56 percent of Hispanic married-filing-jointly couples have 

a marriage bonus, compared to 53 percent for White and API couples and 52 percent for Black 

couples. Of couples with marriage bonuses, the average bonus amount is much higher for White 

and API joint filers, over $5,000, compared to $3,628 for Black joint filers and $3,050 for 

Hispanic joint filers. However, in terms of the share of tax liability, the bonus represents only 14 

and 16 percent of the tax liability for, respectively, White and API couples, relative to 24 percent 

for Black couples and 28 percent for Hispanic couples.

When comparing the estimated results between Black and White couples and between 

Hispanic and White couples by income, we find positive and negative differences between the

groups’ penalty and bonus rates and amounts over the entire range of the income distribution. For 

example, for joint filers with income above $100,000, Black couples and Hispanic couples 

generally face a marriage penalty at higher rates, and a marriage bonus at lower rates, than White 

couples in the same income category. In contrast, the opposite results are shown for several lower 

income categories, for which White couples have a higher marriage penalty rate. For the penalty 

and bonus amounts, Hispanic couples have a higher penalty amount compared to White couples 

2 The imputation results in six mutually exclusive race and ethnicity categories—White, Black, American Indian or 

Alaska Native (AIAN), Asian or Pacific Islander (API), multiple-race, and Hispanic. Estimates of marriage penalties 

and bonuses for AIAN and multiracial married couples are imprecise due to large sampling and estimation errors. 
5

for most income classes, but the directions of the other comparisons generally do not follow any 

notable pattern over the income distribution. 

Studies by legal scholars, including Moran and Whitford (1996) and Brown (1997, 2021),

suggest that Black couples likely face the marriage penalty at higher rates than White couples 

because survey data show that dual income is more common for Black families than White 

families. In contrast, this paper shows that whether marriage penalties are more prevalent among 

Black couples depends on the family’s income. Further analysis reveals that the finding in this 

paper is consistent with the spousal income splits by race for joint filers in the tax data, which, in 

turn, differ from the income split patterns estimated based on the survey data from the Current 

Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement. As discussed in 

greater detail below, income data in the tax model likely provides higher quality information than 

survey data, but the reliance on imputation of race and Hispanic origin has limitations unique to 

the tax model. 

The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of the literature. Section 

III introduces the marriage penalty and bonus calculator in the Treasury’s individual tax 

microsimulation model and presents the penalty and bonus consequences for all joint filers in 

2023. The section also shows the effects of family income and non-income factors, including the 

spousal income split and the presence of dependents. Section IV presents the distribution of joint 

filers by income, spousal income splits, and the presence of dependents for each RH group, and 

compares the marriage penalty and bonus between Black and White couples and between 

Hispanic and White couples. Section V contains additional analysis on the spousal division of 

income and discusses differences between the tax data and survey data that could affect 

estimation results. Section VI concludes. 
6

II. Literature Review 

A marriage penalty or bonus measures the tax consequence of filing a joint return upon 

marriage based on the couple’s combined income and total expenses. There are different ways to 

define and measure this tax consequence. Many studies estimate the potential change in tax 

liability if a married couple filed two separate returns as unmarried persons. A married couple 

incurs a marriage penalty (or bonus) if they pay more (or less) tax on the joint return than if they 

were unmarried and filed separate returns. Bull et al. (1999) discuss methodologies and 

assumptions that can be adopted concerning the allocations of dependents, joint income, and total 

family expenses between the two spouses for estimating the tax liability on the separate returns. 

Alm and Whittington (1996) demonstrate that the outcomes of marriage penalties and bonuses are 

sensitive to the methodologies and assumptions. Other studies estimate the marriage penalty or 

bonus between alternative laws, given chosen methodologies and assumptions. These include 

Holtzblatt and Rebelein (2000), Alm and Whittington (2001) and Gillette et al. (2005, 2006). 

Researchers also take the approach of “marrying” single individuals and estimating their 

additional taxes or tax savings resulting from marriage. These studies focus on the marriage 

penalty facing low- and moderate-income single mothers. The challenge for this approach is to 

impute the income of a potential spouse. For example, Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1998) estimate 

the tax cost of marriage for low-income single women, where the potential spouse’s income is 

predicted based on the spouse’s income of comparable married women. In contrast, some studies,

including Maag (2005) and Lin and Tong (2012), examine the marriage cost for cohabiting 

couples, taking advantage of the known income of the potential spouse, i.e., the income of the 

cohabitant. 
7

The marriage penalty was first discussed in the context of race in Moran and Whitford

(1996) and Brown (1997). Both present this syllogism: married Black couples are more likely to 

live in households where both spouses work, joint filers with similar incomes from the spouses 

are more likely to face a marriage penalty, and therefore Black families face a greater marriage 

penalty. When confronting the question of what constitutes a fair comparison, both works focus 

on horizontal equity, meaning that households with comparable incomes and relevant factors 

should be treated equally. 

Using the 2010 Census data, Brown (2021) shows that, relative to White married couples, 

Black married couples are less likely to have only one primary earner in the family and more 

likely to have two spouses earning similar incomes, and such racial difference in spousal income 

splits persists over a wide range of income levels. Following this finding, Brown (2021) draws the 

conclusion that, other things equal, Black couples are less likely than White couples to have the 

marriage bonus and more likely to have the marriage penalty. Quantifying this racial difference, 

Alm et al. (2023) use data from the Current Population Survey for years 1992 to 2019 and find

that Black married couples face a higher average marriage penalty compared to White married 

couples, with the difference ranging approximately from $200 to $800 by year. Using data from 

the Survey of Consumer Finances, Holtzblatt et al. (2023) find that marriage penalties are more 

frequent and larger for Black couples than for White couples when the analysis controls for 

income. 

III. Marriage Penalties and Bonuses in 2023

This paper uses the individual tax microsimulation model developed by the Office of Tax 

Analysis (OTA) of the Treasury Department, referred to as the Individual Tax Model (ITM), to 
8

estimate marriage penalties and bonuses for couples filing married-filing-jointly returns. 

Specifically, it uses the 2019-based tax model and macroeconomic forecasts that underlie the 

Fiscal Year 2024 Budget to estimate marriage penalties and bonuses for joint filers for tax year 

2023. A couple incurs a marriage penalty (bonus) if they pay more (less) federal income tax filing 

jointly than they would if they were unmarried and each filed a single or head-of-household 

return. The calculator employs a $5 threshold, and therefore a couple whose combined tax 

liability changes by no more than $5 if filing individually incurs neither a marriage penalty nor a 

marriage bonus. 

For the spouse’s income, the Treasury’s marriage penalty calculator uses information on 

Form(s) W2 to assign individual wages and salaries, Schedule(s) SE to assign non-farm and 

farming sole proprietorship income, Schedule(s) K-1 for Form 1120-S and Form 1065 to allocate 

Schedule E income, Form(s) 1099-G to assign unemployment compensation, and Form(s) 1099-

SSA to assign Social Security income. The sum of individual wages, self-employment earnings, 

Social Security income, and unemployment compensation is then computed to construct initial 

spousal income shares to proportionately allocate the couple’s other sources of income, including

interest income, capital gains, pension, retirement account distributions, etc. If neither spouse 

receives any earned income, Social Security income, or unemployment compensation, then 

income from the other sources is assigned to the primary taxpayer. Alimony is assigned to the 

lower earner and state tax refunds are allocated in proportion to the spousal shares of total 

income. To allocate deductions, the calculator uses individual information reports and schedules, 

where available, such as those for the deductible retirement account contributions and deductible 

self-employment taxes. It then allocates other deductions in proportion to the couple’s earned, 

unearned, or total income shares, depending on the nature of the expenses. 
9

To determine the filing status on individual returns, the calculator assigns the dependents, 

if any, to the spouse with the higher income. Hence, the higher-income spouse would claim headof-household filing status, and the lower-income spouse would claim single filing status. This 

treatment is consistent with the tiebreaker rules for dependent-related tax credits where a 

dependent meets all of the qualifying child tests with respect to both parents.

3 Credits associated 

with dependents, if the taxpayer is eligible, will therefore go to the higher-income spouse. These 

credits include the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) with qualifying children, the Child Tax 

Credit, the Credit for Other Dependents, and the American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC). The 

lower-income spouse may claim the EITC for childless workers, if eligible. For a couple that 

claims the premium tax credit (PTC) on the joint return, the calculator splits the total premium 

payment in proportion to the spouses’ earned income and allows both spouses to claim the PTC 

on individual returns. This treatment is consistent with the PTC rules for divorced couples. 

Table 1 shows that 37 percent of joint filers in 2023 are estimated to have a marriage 

penalty with an average amount of $1,820, representing 8 percent of these filers’ joint tax 

liability. Fifty-three percent of joint filers in 2023 are estimated to have a marriage bonus with an 

average amount of $4,911, representing 15 percent of these filers’ joint tax liability. Only 10

percent of joint filers would face the same federal income tax if they were unmarried and filed 

returns claiming the single or head-of-household status. The last three columns show results for 

all joint filers, regardless of the filer’s penalty or bonus status. For all joint filers, on average, the 

marriage bonus is $1,942, representing 8 percent of the tax liability. 

3 Under the tiebreaker rules, if the parents do not file a joint return but live with the child for the same amount of time

and longer than six months during a year, a child is treated as a qualifying child of the parent with the highest 

adjusted gross income (AGI).
10

The penalty and bonus results vary by income. The penalty rate increases with income 

initially, rising above the average level for the income class of $40,000-$50,000 and reaching a

maximum of 49 percent for the income class of $75,000-$100,000. The penalty rate then declines 

as income rises, decreasing to the below-average level as income exceeds $500,000. Conversely, 

the bonus rate is higher than average for the income ranges $15,000 to $60,000 and $100,000 or 

above, with it being the highest for the top two groups. 

Table 1: Marriage Penalties and Marriage Bonuses for 2023

Adjusted Gross 

Income ($)

Joint Filers with Marriage 

Penalties (MP) Neutral Joint Filers with Marriage 

Bonuses (MB) All Joint Filers

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave.

MP 

($)

MP as 

Share 

of Tax 

(%)

Share of 

Filers 

(%)

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MB 

($)

MB as 

Share 

of Tax 

(%)

Ave. 

MP(-) 

or

MB(+) 

($)

MP or 

MB as 

Share of 

Tax 

(%)

Ave.

Joint 

Tax 

($)

<0 7 -979 13 75 18 20,204 -537 3,521 -124 -2,845

0 < 15000 6 -761 10 78 16 1,252 -24 155 -6 -2,599

15000 < 30000 11 -1,036 14 35 54 979 -18 417 -9 -4,706

30000 < 40000 26 -724 16 6 68 1,355 -30 728 -17 -4,383

40000 < 50000 39 -1,151 40 3 58 1,650 -58 517 -19 -2,795

50000 < 60000 42 -1,592 160 3 56 1,561 -133 211 -20 -1,047

60000 < 75000 45 -1,587 -217 5 50 1,613 2,959 88 18 491

75000 < 100000 49 -1,352 -38 7 43 2,450 62 393 10 3,859

100000 < 200000 39 -1,573 -12 4 57 3,540 28 1,384 11 12,751

200000 < 500000 42 -2,462 -6 1 56 9,325 19 4,215 9 44,677

500000 <1000000 27 -5,123 -3 0 73 20,607 14 13,592 9 154,014

>=1000000 29 -14,335 -2 0 71 34,821 4 20,726 2 888,182

Total 37 -1,820 -8 10 53 4,911 15 1,942 8 25,798

The average marriage penalty amount, for those with a penalty, ranges from below $1,000 

in low-income groups to just below $15,000 in the top income group. In terms of the share of tax 

liability, however, the penalty amount is relatively high in the middle-income classes due to the 

low tax liability for these groups. In contrast, while the penalty amount is higher in dollar terms in 
11

the top two income groups, it represents only 2 or 3 percent of the groups’ tax. Among those with 

a bonus, there is a wide range of the average bonus amount by income, from $1,000 to $35,000. 

Measured as a share of tax, the bonus is particularly high for those with negative AGI and with 

income $40,000 to $100,000 due to the low tax liability for these groups. Finally, considering all 

couples in the same income class without regard to the penalty or bonus status, joint filers in all 

income groups show an average marriage bonus ranging from $88 to $20,726. Except for those 

with negative income, the bonus represents up to 20 percent of the joint filers’ tax liability. 

In summary, our model adopts an intuitive way to establish the spouses’ tax liability on 

their returns if they filed as unmarried individuals. Other assumptions exist that can be used to 

split the couple’s joint income and assign dependents to the spouse(s). For reference, Table B-1 of 

the Appendix shows results under an alternative assignment of dependents, in which dependents 

are assigned to the lower-income spouse with earnings (including wages, salaries, and selfemployment income). Accordingly, this spouse would claim the head-of-household status and 

child-related credits on the individual return. This assumption is consistent with the creditmaximization approach but inconsistent with the tie-breaker rules. Using this assumption 

decreases the marriage penalty rate, and increases the marriage bonus rate, for joint filers with 

income $15,000 to $60,000, but has a modest effect on the total. It also does not affect the paper’s 

conclusions about marriage penalties and bonuses by race and ethnicity. 

In addition to income, family characteristics affect a couple’s marriage penalty and bonus 

outcomes. Table 2 presents results by the number of earners, defined as those who report wages 

and salaries or self-employment income. As expected, dual-earner couples, especially those where 

spouses earn similar incomes, are much more likely to incur the marriage penalty, whereas oneearner couples are much more likely to have the bonus. For this analysis, a couple is defined as 
12

having two equal earners if both spouses are earners and the higher-earning spouse receives no 

more than 60 percent of the couple’s income.4

Breaking down the results by the presence of dependents, Table 2 shows that couples who 

claim dependents are much more likely to face the marriage penalty than couples without 

dependents. Certain designs of dependent-related tax benefits, such as the head-of-household 

status and the phase-out schedule of a credit, cause married couples with children to have a higher 

tax liability and receive a smaller tax benefit than they would if they were to claim single or headof-household status on separately filed returns. Studying the marriage tax cost for cohabiting 

couples, Lin and Tong (2012) explore the specific designs of dependent-related tax provisions 

that lead to the marriage penalty.

Table 2 Marriage Penalties (MP) and Bonuses (MB) by Family Characteristics

Family 

Characteristics

Joint Filers with 

MP Neutral Joint Filers with MB

All Joint 

Filers

Share

(%)

Average

($)

Share

(%)

Share

(%)

Average

($)

Average

($)

No Earner 34 -1,353 34 32 3,467 657

One Earner 3 -2,864 11 86 3,524 2,952

Two Earners 50 -1,725 7 43 2,496 212

Equal Earners 68 -2,169 13 19 1,680 -1,142

No Dependent 21 -1,144 16 63 3,019 1,659

Have Dependent(s) 41 -1,903 7 52 3,072 821

IV. Marriage Penalties and Bonuses by Race and Ethnicity

In this section, we present the marriage penalty results using the race and Hispanic origin

(RH) weights imputed to the tax model (Fisher (2023)). We assign couples the RH category of the 

4 Spousal income shares are calculated based on information of individual-level income. As described above, we use 

these ratios to allocate the couple’s other sources of income for which individual-level information is not available. 
13

primary filer and tabulate couples’ marriage penalty and bonus outcomes based on the imputed 

RH weights of the primary filer.

5

A. Averages Across All Members in a Race or Ethnicity Category

Table 3 shows the results for the total as well as by income for four RH categories—

White, Black, API, and Hispanic couples. In this sub-section, we focus on the averages across all 

members in an RH category, leaving the discussion of within-income differences in sub-section 

C. The total rows in Table 3 show that 38 percent of White married-filing-jointly couples have a 

marriage penalty, compared to 35 percent for API couples, 34 percent for Hispanic couples, and 

32 percent for Black couples. Of those with penalties, API joint filers have the highest average 

penalty amount of $2,191 whereas Black joint filers have the lowest average penalty amount of 

$1,633. However, measured as the share of tax liability, the penalty is relatively large for 

Hispanic couples (17 percent of tax) and Black couples (11 percent of tax), compared to White 

couples (8 percent of tax) and API couples (7 percent of tax). 

On the bonus results, 56 percent of Hispanic couples have a marriage bonus whereas the 

other three RH groups have relatively similar fractions of joint filers with a marriage bonus, 53

percent for White and API couples and 52 percent for Black couples. For those with bonuses, the 

average bonus amount is much higher for White and API joint filers, over $5,000, than for Black 

joint filers ($3,628) and Hispanic joint filers ($3,050). However, in terms of the share of tax 

liability, the bonus is relatively large for Black and Hispanic couples, representing about one 

quarter of the tax, compared to White and API couples, for whom the bonus represents about 15 

percent of the tax. 

5 One potential extension of the current work is to estimate the RH weights for both primary and secondary filers on a 

joint return and tabulate the marriage penalty and bonus results, taking account of both spouses’ race and ethnicity.

Clark et al. (2023) define the race and ethnicity of a tax unit based on the race and ethnicity of both the primary and 

secondary filers when studying the demographics of the recipients of the first Economic Impact Payments (EIPs). 
14

Table 3 Marriage Penalties (MP) and Marriage Bonuses (MB) by Race and Ethnicity for 2023

White Couples

Adjusted Gross 

Income ($)

Joint Filers with Marriage 

Penalties (MP) Neutral Joint Filers with Marriage 

Bonuses (MB) All Joint Filers

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MP ($)

MP as 

share 

of Tax 

(%)

Share of 

Filers 

(%)

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MB 

($)

MB as 

Share 

of Tax 

(%)

Average 

MP (-) 

or MB 

(+) ($)

MP or 

MB as 

Share of 

Tax (%)

Ave.

Joint 

Tax ($)

<0 7 -1,039 13 75 18 22,060 -638 3,915 -142 -2,753

0 < 15000 6 -823 10 79 14 1,459 -25 161 -6 -2,494

15000 < 30000 9 -901 12 39 52 946 -18 409 -10 -4,075

30000 < 40000 27 -619 19 7 67 1,287 -31 693 -18 -3,755

40000 < 50000 40 -1,063 52 3 57 1,660 -78 519 -25 -2,042

50000 < 60000 44 -1,481 339 3 54 1,617 -158 216 -30 -718

60000 < 75000 47 -1,533 -127 5 48 1,670 -1350 88 14 642

75000 < 100000 51 -1,348 -36 8 42 2,495 62 362 9 4,006

100000 < 200000 39 -1,563 -12 4 57 3,475 27 1,348 10 12,908

200000 < 500000 42 -2,423 -6 1 57 9,251 19 4,231 9 44,604

500000 <1000000 26 -5,148 -3 0 74 20,710 14 13,883 9 153,754

>=1000000 27 -14,689 -2 0 72 34,524 4 20,945 2 900,081

Total 38 -1,819 -8 9 53 5,224 14 2,073 7 28,664

Black Couples

Adjusted Gross 

Income ($)

Joint Filers with Marriage 

Penalties (MP) Neutral Joint Filers with Marriage 

Bonuses (MB) All Joint Filers

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MP ($)

MP as 

share 

of Tax 

(%)

Share of 

Filers 

(%)

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MB 

($)

MB as 

Share 

of Tax 

(%)

Average 

MP (-) 

or MB 

(+) ($)

MP or 

MB as 

Share of 

Tax (%)

Ave.

Joint 

Tax ($)

<0 2 -840 17 83 15 13,477 -231 1,964 -58 -3,366

0 < 15000 4 -188 3 80 16 1,068 -22 162 -6 -2,891

15000 < 30000 12 -732 8 37 51 1,056 -24 455 -10 -4,628

30000 < 40000 22 -682 16 5 73 1,463 -45 924 -27 -3,394

40000 < 50000 41 -959 55 2 57 1,665 -72 552 -27 -2,026

50000 < 60000 39 -1,543 116 2 59 1,489 425 267 -92 -291

60000 < 75000 42 -1,612 -167 4 54 1,811 90 314 20 1,592

75000 < 100000 46 -1,293 -35 7 47 2,867 62 766 18 4,259

100000 < 200000 39 -1,643 -13 3 58 3,765 30 1,529 12 12,855

200000 < 500000 45 -2,576 -6 2 53 9,030 19 3,614 8 43,356

500000 <1000000 28 -4,925 -3 0 72 21,099 15 13,847 10 144,540

>=1000000 34 -14,588 -2 0 66 42,344 5 22,783 3 837,268

Total 32 -1,633 -11 16 52 3,628 24 1,362 11 12,470
15

API Couples

Adjusted Gross 

Income ($)

Joint Filers with Marriage 

Penalties (MP) Neutral Joint Filers with Marriage 

Bonuses (MB) All Joint Filers

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MP ($)

MP as 

share 

of Tax 

(%)

Share of 

Filers 

(%)

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MB 

($)

MB as 

Share 

of Tax 

(%)

Average 

MP (-) 

or MB 

(+) ($)

MP or 

MB as 

Share of 

Tax (%)

Ave.

Joint 

Tax ($)

<0 8 -858 19 74 18 15,638 -384 2,723 -102 -2,677

0 < 15000 4 -1,321 21 82 14 1,043 -42 82 -4 -1,961

15000 < 30000 17 -898 12 24 59 1,037 -15 459 -7 -6,324

30000 < 40000 33 -971 11 5 63 1,505 -24 627 -9 -6,852

40000 < 50000 49 -1,494 29 2 49 1,668 -43 95 -2 -4,704

50000 < 60000 43 -2,167 58 3 54 1,551 -80 -97 4 -2,628

60000 < 75000 42 -1,943 103 4 54 1,658 210 72 -23 -313

75000 < 100000 40 -1,314 -56 6 54 2,534 60 841 24 3,529

100000 < 200000 36 -1,677 -13 2 61 4,427 37 2,101 17 12,402

200000 < 500000 45 -2,750 -6 1 53 10,398 21 4,316 9 47,917

500000 <1000000 36 -5,008 -3 0 64 19,357 12 10,497 7 159,940

>=1000000 39 -11,976 -2 0 61 36,214 4 17,217 2 765,450

Total 35 -2,191 -7 12 53 5,628 16 2,228 8 29,368

Hispanic Couples

Adjusted Gross 

Income ($)

Joint Filers with Marriage 

Penalties (MP) Neutral Joint Filers with Marriage 

Bonuses (MB) All Joint Filers

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MP ($)

MP as 

share 

of Tax 

(%)

Share of 

Filers 

(%)

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MB 

($)

MB as 

Share 

of Tax 

(%)

Average 

MP (-) 

or MB 

(+) ($)

MP or 

MB as 

Share of 

Tax (%)

Ave

Joint 

Tax ($)

<0 8 -716 15 76 16 10,231 -186 1,628 -51 -3,189

0 < 15000 7 -492 9 69 24 826 -19 166 -5 -3,372

15000 < 30000 13 -1,507 20 28 59 1,018 -16 409 -7 -6,084

30000 < 40000 23 -1,001 15 6 71 1,480 -25 815 -14 -5,875

40000 < 50000 33 -1,412 26 1 66 1,613 -35 594 -12 -4,878

50000 < 60000 33 -1,950 71 2 65 1,404 -76 275 -13 -2,073

60000 < 75000 40 -1,772 160 5 55 1,348 1187 39 -16 -241

75000 < 100000 45 -1,402 -58 5 49 2,084 65 386 13 2,961

100000 < 200000 41 -1,625 -15 3 55 3,770 33 1,418 13 11,278

200000 < 500000 44 -2,714 -7 1 55 9,603 21 4,086 9 43,090

500000 <1000000 27 -5,023 -3 1 72 20,217 13 13,255 9 152,565

>=1000000 33 -12,200 -2 0 67 37,046 4 20,580 2 837,820

Total 34 -1,729 -17 10 56 3,050 28 1,134 12 9,477
16

B. Distribution of Joint Filers by Family Income, Spousal Income Split, and Dependents

To shed light on the group differences in the marriage penalty and bonus outcomes, 

Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the distribution of White, Black, API, and Hispanic joint filers by

AGI, spouses’ income split, and the presence of dependents in the family. In these figures, the 

AGI breakdowns for the 12 income classes are those listed in Tables 1 and 3. The five incomesplit categories are defined based on the share of the family’s income received by the higherincome spouse, 50-60 percent for category 1, 60-70 percent for category 2, 70-80 percent for

category 3, 80-90 percent for category 4, and 90-100 percent for category 5. Hence, couples with 

two similar earners are in category 1, couples with one dominant earner are in category 5, and 

other dual-income couples are in categories 2, 3 and 4.6 These figures point to the various income 

and non-income influences on the marriage penalty and bonus for couples in each RH category. 

While many noticeable differences emerge across the distributions, these differences do not 

uniformly suggest a higher or lower marriage penalty rate or amount for couples in a particular

RH group relative to others.

A considerably large fraction of White joint filers are in income categories 8 through 10, 

corresponding to $75,000 to $500,000 in AGI. Joint filers in these income classes, as shown in 

Table 1, have a relatively high marriage penalty rate. In contrast, Black and Hispanic couples are 

more likely than White couples to be present in the lower- and middle-income categories, for 

which, according to Table 1, the marriage penalty rate is either low or high. API couples with 

dependents have a large presence in high-income categories 9 through 11, but the fraction of API 

couples without dependents in low-income categories 2 and 3 are nontrivial, comparable to the 

fraction for Black families.

6 We loosely refer to an income recipient as an earner. 
17 

 For spouse income splits, White couples in income categories 8 through 10 are distributed 

across all income-split categories. That is, although families with one dominant earner are 

prevalent among these families, most families have two earners and a significant proportion have 

two similar earners.7

 For the other income classes, White couples with dependents generally have 

one dominant earner in the family. In comparison, Black, API, and Hispanic families with 

dependents are more broadly distributed across the five income-split categories. However, a 

significant proportion of Black, API, and Hispanic couples, with or without dependents and over a 

wide range of income, are in category 5 with one dominant earner. Finally, Hispanic and API 

couples are much more likely than White and Black couples to have dependents and live in

families with one dominant earner. 

Figure 1. Distribution of White Joint Filers by Income, Spousal Income Split, and Dependent Status 

Notes: The AGI thresholds are below $0 for category 1, $0-$15,000 for category 2, $15,000-$30,000 for category 3, 

$30,000-$40,000 for category 4, $40,000-$50,000 for category 5, $50,000-$60,000 for category 6, $60,000-$75,000 

for category 7, $75,000-$100,000 for category 8, $100,000-$200,000 for category 9, $200,000-$500,000 for category 

10, $500,000-$1,000,000 for category 11, and above $1,000,000 for category 12. The spousal income split categories 

are defined by the fraction of joint income received by the higher-income spouse, where 50-60% is for category 1, 

60-70% is for category 2, 70-80% for category 3, 80-90% for category 4, and 90-100% for category 5. 

7 Of White couples with income $75,000-$500,000, the fraction with one dominant earner is roughly equal to the 

fraction with two similar earners, both at around 17 percent. 

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

No Dependent Have Dependents

5.5

4.9

4.5

4.1

3.7

3.3

2.9

2.5

2.1

1.7

1.3

.9

.5

.1

%

Income Split Category

AGI Category
18 

Figure 2. Distribution of Black Joint Filers by Income, Spousal Income Split, and the Dependent Status 

Notes: The AGI thresholds are below $0 for category 1, $0-$15,000 for category 2, $15,000-$30,000 for category 3, 

$30,000-$40,000 for category 4, $40,000-$50,000 for category 5, $50,000-$60,000 for category 6, $60,000-$75,000 

for category 7, $75,000-$100,000 for category 8, $100,000-$200,000 for category 9, $200,000-$500,000 for category 

10, $500,000-$1,000,000 for category 11, and above $1,000,000 for category 12. The spousal income split categories 

are defined by the fraction of joint income received by the higher-income spouse, where 50-60% is for category 1, 

60-70% is for category 2, 70-80% for category 3, 80-90% for category 4, and 90-100% for category 5. 

Figure 3. Distribution of API Joint Filers by Income, Spousal Income Split, and the Dependent Status 

Notes: The AGI thresholds are below $0 for category 1, $0-$15,000 for category 2, $15,000-$30,000 for category 3, 

$30,000-$40,000 for category 4, $40,000-$50,000 for category 5, $50,000-$60,000 for category 6, $60,000-$75,000 

for category 7, $75,000-$100,000 for category 8, $100,000-$200,000 for category 9, $200,000-$500,000 for category 

10, $500,000-$1,000,000 for category 11, and above $1,000,000 for category 12. The spousal income split categories 

are defined by the fraction of joint income received by the higher-income spouse, where 50-60% is for category 1, 

60-70% is for category 2, 70-80% for category 3, 80-90% for category 4, and 90-100% for category 5. 

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

No Dependent Have Dependents

5.5

4.9

4.5

4.1

3.7

3.3

2.9

2.5

2.1

1.7

1.3

.9

.5

.1

%

Income Split Category

AGI Category

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

No Dependents Have Dependents

5.5

4.9

4.5

4.1

3.7

3.3

2.9

2.5

2.1

1.7

1.3

.9

.5

.1

%

Income Split Category

AGI Category
19 

Figure 4. Distribution of Hispanic Joint Filers by Income, Spousal Income Split, and the Dependent Status

Notes: The AGI thresholds are below $0 for category 1, $0-$15,000 for category 2, $15,000-$30,000 for category 3, 

$30,000-$40,000 for category 4, $40,000-$50,000 for category 5, $50,000-$60,000 for category 6, $60,000-$75,000 

for category 7, $75,000-$100,000 for category 8, $100,000-$200,000 for category 9, $200,000-$500,000 for category 

10, $500,000-$1,000,000 for category 11, and above $1,000,000 for category 12. The spousal income split categories 

are defined by the fraction of joint income received by the higher-income spouse, where 50-60% is for category 1, 

60-70% is for category 2, 70-80% for category 3, 80-90% for category 4, and 90-100% for category 5. 

 

C. Within-Income Differences Between Race and Ethnicity Categories 

 In addition to the group average differences, Table 3 reveals differences in the marriage 

penalty and bonus across RH groups within an income class. To see this, Table 4 presents the 

within-income differences in the results between Black and White joint filers and between 

Hispanic and White joint files. The differences are calculated as 

xx(oooooooooooooo|iiii , RRRR = mm mm) − xx(oooooooooooooo|iiii , RRRR = WWhii ), where x indicates 

either the share of filers having the penalty or bonus, or the conditional mean of the penalty or 

bonus. For probabilities, positive (negative) values indicate that the minority RH group has a 

higher (lower) likelihood of incurring the penalty or bonus compared to White couples. For the 

penalty amount, because penalties are expressed in negative values, a larger penalty for the 

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

No Dependent Have Dependents

5.5

4.9

4.5

4.1

3.7

3.3

2.9

2.5

2.1

1.7

1.3

.9

.5

.1

%

Income Split Category

AGI Category
20

minority RH group than for White couples is shown as a negative figure whereas a smaller 

penalty for the minority group is shown as a positive figure. For the bonus amount, a larger bonus 

for the minority group is shown as a positive value and vice versa.

Table 4 Relative Marriage Penalties and Bonuses by Income

Adjusted Gross Income

($)

Marriage Penalty Marriage Bonus

Rate Difference

(ppt)

Ave. Amount

Difference

($)

Rate 

Difference

(ppt)

Ave. Amount 

Difference 

($)

Black Couples Relative to White Couples

0 < 15000 -2 634 1 -391

15000 < 30000 3 169 -1 109

30000 < 40000 -5 -63 7 176

40000 < 50000 1 104 0 6

50000 < 60000 -4 -62 5 -128

60000 < 75000 -5 -79 6 141

75000 < 100000 -5 54 6 373

100000 < 200000 0 -80 1 289

200000 < 500000 3 -153 -4 -220

500000 < 1000000 2 223 -1 389

>=1000000 7 101 -7 7,820

Total -6 186 -1 -1,596

Hispanic Couples Relative to White Couples

0 < 15000 1 331 10 -633

15000 < 30000 4 -606 7 72

30000 < 40000 -3 -382 4 193

40000 < 50000 -7 -348 9 -47

50000 < 60000 -11 -469 11 -213

60000 < 75000 -7 -239 7 -322

75000 < 100000 -5 -55 7 -411

100000 < 200000 2 -62 -1 295

200000 < 500000 2 -291 -2 352

500000 < 1000000 1 124 -1 -492

>=1000000 6 2,489 -6 2,522

Total -4 91 3 -2,174
21

For any of the eight comparisons in the penalty or bonus rate or amount in Table 4, 

whether the within-income group difference is positive or negative depends on income. That is, 

the direction of the difference is not uniform over the full range of the income distribution. 

Looking at the Black-White comparisons, we find that Black joint filers in several low- and 

middle-income classes, such as $30,000-$40,000 and $50,000-$100,000, face a marriage penalty 

at lower rates, and a marriage bonus at higher rates, than White joint filers. In contrast, for income 

above $200,000, the marriage penalty is more prevalent among Black joint filers than White joint 

filers. For the average penalty or bonus amount, there is no clear positive or negative pattern over 

the 12 income classes.

Looking at the Hispanic-White comparisons, we find that Hispanic joint filers are 

generally less likely to have a penalty and more likely to have a bonus over the low- and middleincome range relative to White joint filers. In contrast, Hispanic joint filers are more likely to 

incur a penalty and less likely to have a bonus for income levels above $100,000. As for the dollar 

amount of the penalty, Hispanic couples with a penalty incur a larger penalty relative to White 

couples over a wide range of income levels. Because Hispanic couples have a lower tax liability 

relative to White couples with comparable income, the higher penalty for Hispanic couples may

represent a smaller or greater share of their tax, depending on whether the tax liability is positive 

or negative for the income class, as indicated in Table 3. Finally, the series on the bonus amount

generally shows a smaller bonus for Hispanic joint filers in the income classes between $40,000 

and $100,000.

V. Spousal Income Splits and Data Source
22

The results reported in Section IV show a lower penalty rate and higher bonus rate for 

Black joint filers relative to White joint filers for several income categories below $100,000. This 

result differs from the findings in several recent studies based on survey data. In this section, we 

explore the estimates of spousal income splits and discuss the differences between the tax data 

and survey data that can lead to disparate estimation results. 

Using the 2010 Census data, Brown (2021) shows that, compared to White married 

couples in the same income class, Black married couples are less likely to have only one primary 

earner in the family and more likely to have two spouses earning similar incomes. Hence, the 

marriage penalty is expected to be more prevalent among Black families than White families. 

Using micro-level data from household surveys to estimate marriage penalties, two recent studies 

by Alm et al. (2023) and Holtzblatt et al. (2023) also show that spouses’ earnings are more equal 

for Black couples than White couples, and this difference is associated with the higher estimated 

marriage penalty rate and penalty amount for Black families. 

We examine the spousal income splits in the tax model and find that the patterns of 

income splits in the tax data differ from those in survey data. Following Brown (2021), for 

couples of each race within each income class, we compute the proportion where one spouse 

receives almost all the couple’s total income and the proportion where spouses receive similar 

incomes. We then compute two income-split ratios for Black couples relative to Whites couples 

within each income class. The first ratio measures the relative share of couples having one 

dominant earner in the family, defined as PP(sshaaaaaa>0.9|iiiiiiiiii ,RRRR=BBBB BB)

PP(sshaaaaaa>0.9|iiiiiiiiii ,RRRR=WWhiiii )

, and the second ratio 

measures the relative share of couples having two equal or similar earners, defined as

PP(sshaaaaaa ∈[0.5,0.6]|iiiiiiiiii ,RRRR=BBBB BB)

PP(sshaaaaaa ∈[0.5,0.6]|iiiiiiiiii ,RRRR=WWhiiii )

, where share is the share of the couple’s total income received by 

the higher-income spouse or 0.5 if the spouses have the same amount of income. 
23

Table 5 shows the results for the base year of the microsimulation model, 2019. As 

indicated in Table 5, the Black-White relative ratios on spousal income splits are generally 

compatible with the tax microsimulation results. Columns (1) and (2) presents the ratios in the 

baseline RH imputation. Black joint filers are more likely to have two similar earners than White 

joint filers for those families with income above $200,000. Black joint filers in income classes 

below $200,000 are more likely to live in families with one dominant earner relative to White 

joint filers in the same income class and, for all but one of these income classes, are less likely to 

live in families with two similar earners.

Because the relative ratios in columns (1) and (2) depend on the race and Hispanic origin 

imputation, a question arises of whether the relative ratio estimates are robust with respect to 

different approaches to the imputation. The baseline imputation is an extended BIFSG model, 

which uses total income, filing status, age, number of dependents, sex, first name, last name, and 

the ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) as the explanatory variables to make inferences about the 

race and Hispanic origin category of the primary taxpayer of a filing unit or family (Fisher, 2023). 

We conduct a sensitivity check by re-calculating the relative ratios based on alternative 

imputations. Two models are considered. One is BIFSG described in Fisher (2023), which is a 

model free from the effects of additional tax variables on the predicted RH probabilities, and the 

other is the baseline model expanded by the primary taxpayer’s income share. Note that, in the 

baseline RH imputation, spousal income shares do not enter the model directly. The purpose of 

this omission is to avoid overfitting, given our expectation that the couple’s income shares can be 

reasonably predicted based on the selected tax variables and the BIFSG variables on names and 

geographic locations. As shown in columns (1) through (6), while the relative ratios differ 
24

quantitatively across the three RH imputations, the qualitative results regarding the patterns of the 

spousal income division over the income distribution are generally unchanged. 

Table 5 Shares of Black Couples Relative to White Couples for Two Types of 

Spousal Division of Income, 2019

Baseline RH Imputation:

Extended BIFSG 

Estimation

BIFSG Estimation

Baseline RH 

Estimation Expanded 

by Spousal Income 

Shares

Adjusted Gross 

Income ($) One 

Dominant 

Earner 

(1)

Two 

Similar

Earners

(2)

One 

Dominant 

Earner 

(3)

Two 

Similar 

Earners

(4)

One 

Dominant 

Earner 

(5)

Two 

Similar

Earners

(6)

<= 0 1.108 0.474 1.219 0.362 1.110 0.331

0 < 15000 1.506 0.841 1.576 0.783 1.541 0.659

15000 < 30000 1.165 0.909 1.235 0.854 1.113 0.949

30000 < 40000 1.220 1.117 1.277 1.005 1.138 0.839

40000 < 50000 1.116 0.581 1.173 0.595 1.131 0.842

50000 < 60000 1.086 0.787 1.143 0.783 0.992 0.854

60000 < 75000 1.095 0.951 1.172 0.923 1.017 0.863

75000 < 100000 1.203 0.889 1.246 0.923 1.201 0.855

100000 < 200000 1.053 0.973 1.086 0.977 0.945 0.988

200000 < 500000 0.914 1.251 0.921 1.247 0.827 1.414

500000 < 1000000 0.792 1.630 0.857 1.429 0.654 1.973

>=1000000 0.871 1.462 0.901 1.350 0.800 1.591

Notes: The relative ratios for one dominant earner are calculated as PP(sshaaaaaa>0.9|iiiiiiiiii ,RRRR=BBBB BB)

PP(sshaaaaaa>0.9|iiiiiiiiii ,RRRR=WWhiiii )

, and the relative

ratios for two similar earners are calculated as PP(sshaaaaaa ∈[0.5,0.6]|iiiiiiiiii ,RRRR=BBBB BB)

PP(sshaaaaaa ∈[0.5,0.6]|iiiiiiiiii ,RRRR=WWhiiii )

, where share is the share of the couple’s total 

income received by the higher-income spouse or 0.5 if the spouses have the same amount of income. In this analysis, the 

term “earner” is used interchangeably with an income recipient.

Income and marital status recorded in the survey data can differ from the income and 

filing status reported on tax returns, consequently affecting the estimates of spousal income splits. 

Unlike survey data in which respondents’ income is recorded on a questionnaire or else imputed, 
25

the tax model relies on tax forms and third-party information returns, supplemented with 

allocation assumptions, to split a married couple’s joint income and arrive at individual-level 

income. We conduct a simple check on the difference in the estimates of spousal income shares 

between the tax data and the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic 

(ASEC) Supplement. Table 6 shows the relative proportions between Black and White married 

couples who derive equal or similar incomes from the sources for which the tax model has 

definite individual-level information from tax forms or third-party reports. These relative ratios, 

defined in the similar fashion to those for Table 5, are equal to PP(sshaa ∈[0.5,0.6]iiii ,RRRR=BBBB BB)

PP(sshaa ∈[0.5,0.6]|iiii ,RRRR=WWhii )

, where 

share is the share of the specific sources of income received by the spouse who has more of this 

income or 0.5 if the spouses have the same amount of income. 

Table 6 Share of Black Married Couples Relative to White Married Couples with Similar Incomes 

by Sources of Income

Data and Adjusted Gross 

Income ($)

Wages and Salaries

(1)

(1) + Self-Employment

Income

(2)

(2) + Social Security 

Income

(3)

2020 ASEC

 0<= 50000 1.93 1.82 1.06

 50000<= 100000 1.67 1.59 1.38

 100000<= 200000 1.35 1.29 1.24

 >200000 1.37 1.35 1.31

2023 Tax Model

 0<= 50000 0.90 0.98 0.94

 50000<= 75000 1.06 1.01 0.90

 75000<= 100000 0.84 0.80 0.84

 100000<= 200000 0.83 0.82 0.96

 200000<= 500000 1.15 1.18 1.23

 >500000 1.07 1.13 1.28

Notes: The ratios for the ASEC data are calculated based on person-level income for married couples, and the race is 

that of the reference person. The ratios for the tax model are calculated based on income reported on joint returns

filed by married couples and income reported on third-party information returns with respect to these taxpayers.

Negative self-employment income for a spouse is treated as zero. 
26

The results confirm that substantial differences exist in spousal income splits between the 

ASEC and tax data. For low-, middle-, and middle-high-income families, the relative Black-toWhite ratios for the proportion of married couples with similar incomes are considerably higher in

the Census data than those calculated based on tax data. For the income sources shown in Table 6, 

no assumption is made in our analysis about the income split between spouses. Individual-level 

self-employment income is assigned based on the taxpayer’s Schedule SE and individual-level 

wages and Social Security income come from third-party information reports. Given that wages 

and Social Security income are not subject to self-reporting errors, and they represent a 

substantial share, approximately 70 percent, of the aggregate total income for joint filers in our 

model, income data in the tax model should provide a higher quality information than income in 

survey data for estimating marriage penalties and bonuses. 

There are known differences in filing status and the assignment of children between tax 

return data and tax units constructed with CPS data. Using linked tax return and Census data, 

Mok (2017) finds that about 13 percent of married tax units constructed with the CPS data, or 8 

million out of the total 62.1 million units, claimed single or head-of-household status on the tax 

returns in tax year 2006. These persons would be included in the assessment of marriage penalties 

based on the CPS data but not in the tax data analysis on joint filers. Using the CPS data, Jones 

and O’Hara (2016) and Splinter et al. (2017) show evidence that taxpayers engage in tax 

minimization strategies to assign children among taxpayers within the same household when 

more than one taxpayer in the household is eligible to claim child-related credits. Consequently, 

estimates about tax units with dependent children will differ between the two data files. 

In addition to income, filing status, and the allocation of children, tax data and survey data 

differ in how information about race and ethnicity is recorded. The use of imputed race and 
27

ethnicity information in the current analysis is a distinct approach from self-reporting of race and 

ethnicity in survey data. To what extent this data difference affects the analysis results is an area 

of ongoing research. 

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, we use the race and Hispanic origin (RH) information imputed to the 

Treasury’s tax model to estimate marriage penalties and bonuses for married-filing-jointly

couples in four RH categories. The microsimulation results show that, for married couples in 

higher income categories, the marriage penalty rate is higher, and the marriage bonus rate is 

lower, for Black and Hispanic couples than for White couples. In contrast, White couples in 

several lower income categories face a higher penalty rate and a lower bonus rate. Further 

analysis shows that differences in the distribution of income and differences in non-income

characteristics across groups contribute to these results. In addition, the Black-White differences 

in penalty rates are consistent with the patterns of spousal income splits in the underlying data. 

Unlike survey data, the tax model does not suggest a higher prevalence of two equal-earning 

spouses among Black families throughout the entire range of the income distribution. Because the 

conclusions about group differences in the marriage penalty and bonus outcomes for certain 

income categories depend on whether tax data or survey data is used for the analysis, further 

investigation regarding the data differences should be pursued. 
28

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30

Appendix A: Tax Parameters for Tax Year 2023

Table A-1 Rate Brackets by Filing Status

Tax 

Rate

Taxable Income

Married-FilingJointly and Surviving 

Spouse

Married-FilingSeparately Head-of-Household Single

over not over over not over over not over over not over

10% $0 $22,000 $0 $11,000 $0 $15,750 $0 $11,000

12% $22,000 $89,450 $11,000 $44,725 $15,750 $59,850 $11,000 $44,725 

22% $89,450 $190,750 $44,725 $95,375 $59,850 $95,350 $44,725 $95,375 

24% $190,750 $364,200 $95,375 $182,100 $95,350 $182,100 $95,375 $182,100

32% $364,200 $462,500 $182,100 $231,250 $182,100 $231,250 $182,100 $231,250 

35% $462,500 $693,750 $231,250 $346,875 $231,250 $578,100 $231,250 $578,125

37% $693,750 - $346,875 - $578,100 - $578,125 -

Data source: IRS Revenue Procedure 2022-38.

Table A-2 Earned Income Tax Credit

Item

Number of Qualifying Children 

Zero One Two Three or 

More

Maximum earned income amount for 

maximum credit

$7,840 $11,750 $16,510 $16,510

Credit rate (%) 7.65 34 40 45

Maximum amount of credit $600 $3,995 $6,604 $7,430

Phaseout rate (%) 7.65 15.98 21.06 21.06

Income range over which credit phases out

for single, head-of-household, surviving 

spouse, and married-filing-separately*:

 Beginning amount $9,800 $21,560 $21,560 $21,560

 Completed amount $17,640 $46,560 $52,918 $56,838

Income range over which credit phases 

out for married-filing-jointly:

 Beginning amount $16,370 $28,120 $28,120 $28,120

 Completed amount $24,210 $53,120 $59,478 $63,398

*For married taxpayers who claim married-filing-separately status and satisfy special rules. 

Data source: IRS Revenue Procedure 2022-38.
31

Appendix B: Lower-Income Spouse Claims Dependents on the Individual Return

Table B-1 Marriage Penalties (MP) and Marriage Bonuses (MB) in 2023

Adjusted Gross 

Income ($)

Joint Filers with Marriage 

Penalties (MP) Neutral Joint Filers with Marriage 

Bonuses (MB) All Joint Filers

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MP ($)

MP as 

Share 

of Tax 

(%)

Share of 

Filers 

(%)

Share 

of 

Filers 

(%)

Ave. 

MB 

($)

MB as 

Share 

of Tax 

(%)

Ave.

MP(-) 

or 

MB(+) 

($)

MP or 

MB as 

Share of 

Tax (%)

Ave. 

Joint 

Tax ($)

<0 7 -1,751 29 75 18 19,838 -459 3,527 -124 -2,845

0 < 15000 6 -809 11 78 16 1,712 -33 231 -9 -2,599

15000 < 30000 8 -1,331 18 34 58 1,851 -32 977 -21 -4,706

30000 < 40000 19 -676 25 6 75 2,000 -40 1,370 -31 -4,383

40000 < 50000 33 -1,136 53 3 65 2,236 -70 1,078 -39 -2,795

50000 < 60000 37 -1,838 295 2 60 2,023 -145 529 -51 -1,047

60000 < 75000 43 -2,271 -254 5 53 2,012 -4,651 97 20 491

75000 < 100000 48 -2,277 -63 7 45 2,875 76 197 5 3,859

100000 < 200000 40 -1,593 -12 4 56 3,848 31 1,539 12 12,751

200000 < 500000 44 -2,600 -6 1 55 9,257 20 3,958 9 44,677

500000 <1000000 30 -5,644 -4 0 70 20,757 14 12,723 8 154,014

>=1000000 30 -14,470 -2 0 70 34,883 4 20,163 2 888,182

Total 36 -2,149 -9 10 54 5,110 17 2,011 8 25,798