NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR., 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2010-7123 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in case No. 08-1511, Judge William A. 

Moorman. 

__________________________ 

Decided: December 9, 2010 

__________________________ 

WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR., New York, New York, pro 

se. 

SARAH A. MURRAY, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. 

With her on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and MARTIN 
CAMPBELL v. DVA 2

F. HOCKEY, Assistant Director. Of counsel was J. HUNTER 

BENNETT, Attorney. Of counsel on the brief was MICHAEL 

J. TIMINSKI, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, United 

States Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

__________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, BRYSON, and LINN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

William L. Campbell (“Campbell”) appeals from the 

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“the Veterans Court”) affirming a decision of 

the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“the Board”) denying him 

entitlement to an effective date earlier than September 7, 

2002, for a right shoulder disability with bursitis. Campbell v. Shinseki, No. 08-1511 (Vet. App. June 30, 2010). 

Because Campbell appeals only factual determinations 

and the application of law to the facts of his case, this 

court lacks jurisdiction to consider his claims and dismisses the appeal. 

BACKGROUND

Campbell served in the United States Army from 

January 1968 to December 1969 and from September 

1972 to May 1979. On May 16, 1979, Campbell filed a 

claim for service connection for, among other things, 

“Hurt back [in] 1974, and shoulder[.] Re[-]injury back, 

knee, and shoulder [in] 1976. Bursitis left shoulder.” 

Based on a VA medical examination, the regional office 

(“RO”) denied service connection for the left shoulder 

disability in October 1979. Campbell submitted a notice 

of disagreement. 

In September 2002, Campbell filed a claim for service 

connection for both shoulders retroactive to his original 

claim filed in May 1979. The RO granted service connec-
3 CAMPBELL v. DVA

tion for bursitis of the left and right shoulders, with each 

shoulder receiving a 20 percent disability rating effective 

September 7, 2002. In response to a notice of disagreement, the RO granted entitlement to an earlier effective 

date for service connection for the left shoulder, but not 

the right. Service connection for Campbell’s left shoulder 

was made effective May 17, 1979, with a noncompensable 

evaluation assigned from that date up until September 7, 

2002, when the 20 percent rating was assigned. In denying an earlier effective date for Campbell’s right shoulder 

injury, the RO found no evidence showing that a claim for 

service connection for a right shoulder condition was filed 

at any time prior to September 2002. 

Campbell appealed the RO’s decision to the Board in 

March 2006. Regarding Campbell’s right shoulder, the 

Board concluded that even upon reading his May 1979 

application for benefits and his medical records sympathetically, there was no claim pending prior to September 

2002 for which service connection for a right shoulder 

disability could have been granted. The Board explained 

that Campbell could not collaterally attack the October 

1979 decision regarding a right shoulder disability because that decision, and the May 1979 application, dealt 

solely with his left shoulder disability. Accordingly, the 

Board denied an effective date prior to September 2002 

for the grant of service connection for a right shoulder 

disability with bursitis. 

Campbell appealed the Board’s decision to the Veterans Court, which affirmed. Campbell v. Shinseki, No. 08-

1511 (Vet. App. June 30, 2010) Campbell appeals from 

the judgment of the Veterans Court. This court has 

jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). 
CAMPBELL v. DVA 4

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), 

this court has jurisdiction over rules of law or the validity 

of any statute or regulation, or an interpretation thereof 

relied on by the Veterans Court in its decision. In appeals 

from the Veterans Court not presenting a constitutional 

question, this court “may not review (A) a challenge to a 

factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or 

regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). In other words, this court generally 

has no jurisdiction to review challenges to the Board’s 

factual determinations. See, e.g., Johnson v. Derwinski, 

949 F.2d 394, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

Campbell raises a number of issues on appeal. Specifically, Campbell alleges “(1) The [Veterans] Court 

accepted incorrect Volume 1 medical records; (2) failed to 

take into consideration relevant medical records; (3) did 

not meet its duty to assist me; (4) failed to give me the 

benefit of the doubt in light of missing and incomplete 

records; (5) failed to apply VA Adjudication Manual M21-

1, Part IV, Paragraph 3.09(a); (6) continues to discredit 

evidence suggesting [clear and unmistakable error]; (7) 

refuses to address the fact that the New York regional 

office was found guilty of shredding, destroying, mishandling and losing the benefits claims of veterans.” App. Br. 

at 1, 3. This court concludes that all of these issues relate 

to factual determinations made by the Board or the 

Veterans Court or the application of law to the facts 

presented, over which we have no jurisdiction. 

Regarding Campbell’s contentions that the Veterans 

Court accepted incorrect evidence or failed to consider 

relevant medical records, these unsubstantiated challenges present factual matters outside this court’s juris-
5 CAMPBELL v. DVA

diction. See Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298, 1302 

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the VA is presumed to have 

considered all evidence of record). Campbell also argues 

that the court failed to satisfy its duty to assist. Whether 

the VA satisfied its duty to assist is a factual matter 

outside this court’s jurisdiction. Glover v. West, 185 F.3d 

1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Similarly, whether the VA 

properly applied the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is a 

matter of application of law to fact and is outside this 

court’s jurisdiction. See Ferguson v. Principi, 273 F.3d 

1072, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Campbell also contends that 

the Veterans Court failed to apply a VA Manual provision 

directing VA adjudicators to reasonably infer issues from 

the “facts of circumstance of the claim.” App. Br. at 3. 

“[T]he interpretation of the contents of a claim for benefits 

[is] a factual issue over which we [do] not have jurisdiction.” Ellington v. Peake, 541 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). Campbell also contends that the Veterans Court 

discredited evidence suggesting clear and unmistakable 

error. Campbell’s challenge regards the weighing of the 

evidence in his case, a factual matter entirely outside this 

court’s jurisdiction. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 

(Fed. Cir. 2000). Campbell’s argument that the Veterans 

Court refused to address his assertion regarding the New 

York RO is without merit because the Veterans Court in 

fact addressed Campbell’s assertion, yet found it “unsupported by the evidence.” Further, whether records were 

missing from Campbell’s file also presents a question of 

fact outside this court’s jurisdiction. 

Finally, while Campbell acknowledges that the Veterans Court did not decide any constitutional issues, App. 

Br. at 1, Campbell nonetheless also argues that his “constitutional rights under the Privacy Act were violated as a 

result of the New York Harbor VA Medical Center losing 

my Volume 1 medical records which contained my per-
CAMPBELL v. DVA 6

sonal and confidential information.” Id. While the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, Public Law No. 93-579, 

(Dec. 31, 1974), contains provisions for civil actions in the 

district courts, it does not create a constitutional cause of 

action. The Veterans Court did not decide any constitutional issues or rely on constitutional principles in finding 

Campbell was not entitled to an earlier effective date. 

Nor has Campbell shown that the VA violated any of his 

constitutional rights. Accordingly, Campbell’s arguments 

are constitutional in name only and inadequate to give 

this court the jurisdiction it otherwise would not have. 

See, e.g., Flores v. Nicholson, 476 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007). 

Because Campbell’s appeal raises challenges to factual determinations and the Veterans Court’s application 

of laws and regulations to the facts of this case, this court 

lacks jurisdiction to review his appeal. Accordingly, 

Campbell’s appeal is dismissed. 

DISMISSED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.