T he P l ai nt i f f made no ar gu ment i n t he t r i al cour t conc er ni ng ne gl i gen ce p er s e; no r di d s he ad d res s t he 1

ca u s e of a ct i on i n h er bri ef

t o t hi s cour t ; an y i s s ue conce r ni ng t he al l ega t i on of ne gl i gen ce p er se ha s b e e n w a ive d

.
T h e t r i a l c ou r t c e r t i f

i e d t h e s u mma r y j u dg me n t i n f a v or of Gon do l i e r a s a f

i n a l j u dg me n t u n de r T e n n
. R. 2 C i v. P

. 54

. 0 2

. T he P l ai nt i f f ’ s act i o ns agai nst t he t axi cab co m p any and i t s d ri ver are p res um ab l y s t i l l pe nd i ng i n t he tria l co u rt. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE D ec embe r 2, 200 8 S es sio n EDWI NA MONTGO MERY EX REL 

### . THOMAS M. MONTGO MERY v.

KALI OREXI , LLC ET AL 

### . Appeal from t he Circuit Court for Sevier County No. 2006-0690-III Rex Henry Ogle, Judge

No. E2008-01207-COA-R 3-CV - FILED MARC H 27, 2009

In this wrongful death act i o n, Edwina Montgomery ( “the Plaintiff”) , individually and as the surviving spouse of Thomas M. Mont gomery (“the Decea sed”) , brought suit under the Tennesse e Dra m Shop Act (“the D ram Shop Act” or “the Act”) , Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57- 10-101 and 102 (2002)

. The Plaintiff a lso sue d for ne gligence and negligence pe r se
. Th e Pla int if f s ue d K a li O re xi, 1 LLC, which operates under t he trade name of Gondoli er Italian R estaurant and P izza (“G ondolier”)

. Gondolier mo v e d f

o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t, w h ic h w a s g r a n te d a s to a ll th e o r ie s o f r e c o v e r y
. We aff irm the summary judgment on what appear s to be an issue of first impression. We hold that Tenn. Cod e An n. §§ 57 -1 0- 10 1 a nd10 2 ( 20 02 ) ap ply to thi rd pa rt ie s and do no t autho ri z e a n a c tio n a ga ins t a seller of an “ alcoholic bevera ge or beer ” by or on behalf of t he supplied, or “ first” pa rty. Since the Dr a m Sho p Ac t do e s no t a dd re ss fi rs t pa rt ie s, its e na c tme nt le a ve s the la w a s to fi rs t parti es as it existed bef

ore the Act’s e nactment. I n addition, under the circ umstances of this case , the t rial court corr ectly held that the injurie s to the Dec ease d we re n o t forese eable ; thus, Gondolier owed the Dec ease d no duty. Furthe rmore, even if a duty w ere owed, it wa s not br eac hed

. T h e q uestion whether the ac tions of the Dec ease d and a ta xi dr i v er , who was paid by Gondolier to take the intoxicated De cea sed home, we re intervening and supe rseding ca uses that r el i eve G ondolier of liability are not addre ssed since w e hold that the Plaintiff had no c ause of ac tion under the Dr am Sho p A c t or

fo r c omm on la w n e gli ge nc e . A c c or din gly , w e a ff ir m. 2 Tenn. R. App . 3 Appeal as of Right ; Judgment of the C ircuit Court

Af fi r me d; Ca se Re ma nde d
C H A RL ES D. S US ANO , J R ., J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER S CHEL P. F R ANKS , P.J., and D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , J., joined.2

Bryan E. De lius and Richard L. Burne tte, Se v i er v i l l e, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Edwina Montgomery.
Dana C. H oll ow a y a nd Jo sh ua A. W olf e , K no xv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e , K a li O re xi, LL C.

OP IN ION
I.
Vi e wi ng thee vid e nc e , a nda ll r e a so na ble inf e re nc e s to be dr a wn fro m it , in the lig ht m os t favor able to the nonmoving party, i.e. , the Plaintiff, w e state the fa cts that are pertinent to this appea l by qu oti ng thePla int if

f, a s f oll ow s: OnJu ne 24 , 2 006, [the De c e a se d] wa s a c us tom e r at [ Go nd oli e r] in Gatlinburg, Tenne ssee. W hile at [Gondolier ], [the D ece ased] was serve d alcoholic be vera ges and be came extre mely intoxicated.
Gondolier staf

f later summoned Ken Kirkland, a local taxi ca b driver, to t ake theDe c e a se d h ome fr om the re staur a nt. Upon first conta ct with [the De cea sed], Mr. Ki rkl and observed that [the De cea sed] wa s intoxicated. Mr. Kirkla nd testified that [the Dec ease d] exhibited physica l symptom s of intoxication, such as “slurre d speec h, unable to stand, very wobbly whe n he moved.” Mr. Kirkland de scribed [ the Dec ease d] as be ing “extre mely intoxicated.”
* * * Shortly after de parting fr om G ondolier, [the Dec ease d] informed Mr. Kirkland that he did not want to go home, and that he w anted Mr. Kirkland to ta

ke him ba ck to the Gondolier. As Mr. Ki rk l and continued to drive to wa rd s the ar ea [ wher e the De cea sed] r esided, [the De cea sed] grabbe d the steering whee l of the cab, causing the c ab to veer into the other lane of the roa dway. Mr. Kirkland testified that in response h e “sl apped his ha nd away” and “ hit the brake s and moved over

to the side of the r oad.”
After a brie f discussion [in which Mr. Kirkland w arne d the Dec ease d not to grab the steering wheel again], Mr. Kirkland resumed driving towards the a

rea in which [the Dec ease d] re sided. Shortly therea fter, [the De cea sed] a gain stated that he did n o t want to go t o his house, and wa nted to return to the Gondolier. At whic h time, [the De cea sed]3 grabbe d at the ca

b’s steering wheel a s ec o n d t i me. Mr. Kirkla nd testified that at that ti me he pushed [the D ece ased] back towa rds the passenge r seat and pulled the ca b over onto the side of

the roa d and turned off the vehicle ’s engine.
Mr. Kirkland e xited the ca b and we nt to the pa ssenger side to remove [the De cea sed] f

rom the vehic le.

* * *
As he wa s driving away, Mr . Kirkland plac ed a telephone call to 911, and informe d the oper ator that he had put a “very drunk” m an out of his c ab a nd lef

t hi m on the sid e of

thero a d. Th e Se vie r C ou nty She ri ff ’s D epa

rt me nt r e sp on de d to the 91 1 c a ll, bu t w a s u na ble to locate [ the Dec ease d] at the loc ation described by Mr. Kirkla nd. On June 26, 2006, [the Dec ease d’s] body wa s located by the Sevier County Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment in a river

underne ath a bridge on Highway 321 in Sevier

County. . . .
Au top sy te st r e su lts re ve a le d th a t [ the De c e a se d] wa s h e a vil y intoxicated at the time of hi s death. [The De cea sed’s] blood a lcohol content wa s measure d at .37%. The attending pathologist l isted the caus e of death as blunt forc e trauma injuries sustained by [the Dec ease d] whe n he fe ll from a bridge

. II.
Th e iss ue s p re se nte d a

re a s f oll ow s: Whethe r a c ause of

action u nder Te nn. Code Ann. § 57-10- 102 against a seller of an “alcoholic bevera ge or beer ” is available to the Dec ease d or his repr esentative, who is not a thir d p arty, but wa s him se lf thec on su me r o f the a lc oh ol.
Whethe r the e n actment of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57- 10-101 and 102 change d the common law with re spect to liability of fu rn i s h ers of alcohol or be er to a n intoxicated per son who injures himself.
Whethe r the Trial Court was corre ct i n holding as a matter of law that theDe c e a se d’ s in

jurie s w e re so un fo re se e able that no le ga l du ty a ro se on the part of Gondolier.
Whethe r the Trial Court was cor rec t in holding as a matter of law that if Go nd oli e r h a d a

du ty, it f ulf ill e d it

.4 Whethe r the Trial Court was corre ct i n holding as a matter of law that the ac tions of the Dec ease d and Mr. Kirkland c onstitut e interve ning superse ding acts that re lieved Gondolier of liability.
III

. Ou r r e vie w o f the matte rs on thi s a pp e a l is de novo

. T e n n
. R. A p p
. P. 1 3(d). See Blair v. We st T own M all , 130 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tenn. 2004) . Our inquiry under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57- 10- 101 and 102 involves a construction of those statutes. “‘[ C]onstruction of [a ] statute and a pplication of law to the fac ts [ are questions] of law.’ ” Worley v. We igels, Inc. , 919 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Beare Co. v. Te nnessee Dept. of Rev ., 85 8 S. W .2 d 906 , 9 07 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ). Th us , no pr e su mpt ionof

c or re c tne ss atta c hes to the low e r c ou rt ’s jud gme nt, a ndou r t a sk is c on fi ne d to re vie wi ng the re c or d to de te rm ine wh e the r the re qu ir e me nts of Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 ha ve be e n me t. Id. (citations omitted). Rule 56.04 provides that summary judgment is appropriate whe re: 1) the re is no genuine issue with rega rd to the materia l f

acts rele vant to the claim or de fense contained in the mot ion , a nd2) themov ing pa rty is e nti tle d to a

jud gme nt a s a

ma tte r o f l a w on the un dis pu te d f a c ts. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4; see Staples v. CBL & A ssocs., Inc. , 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000)

. IV.
A.
The fir st issue we addr ess is whether a per son who purchases an “alc oholic bever age or beer ” a nd is inj ur e d or die s a s a re su lt o f the c on su mpt ionma y s ue the su pp lie r o f thea lc oh ol under the Dram Shop Act

. This inquiry calls upon us to inter pret the language of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57- 10- 10 1 a nd10 2, wh ic h c omp ri se thee nti re ty o f the Dr a m Sh op Ac t.
The Plaintiff conte nds that Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102 (“se ction 102”) pe rmits what she calls “f irst party causes of a ction.” She says that unde r s ec t i o n 102 “any pa rty” who ha s suffer ed pe rs on a l in

jury o r d e a th m a y b ri ng a c aus e of a c tio n a ga ins t a

c omm e rc ia l se lle r o f an “ a lc oh oli c be ve ra ge or

be e r” in c ir c ums ta nc e s inwh ic h th e a lc oh oli c be ve ra ge or be e r w a s so ld t o a n o bv iou sly intoxicated per son or a minor.
Gondolier c ontends that Tenn. Code A nn. § 57-10-101 ( “sec tion 101”) states a gener al rule, i.e. , th a t it is the c on su mpt ionof

thebe ve ra ge a nd no t the fu rn ish ing of it that is the pr ox imate c aus e of inj urie s to t

hir d p artie s by intoxicated per sons, and that section 102 states two na rrow e xceptions to the gener al rule of

non-liability to third part ies se t out i n s e c tio n 1 01 . T he se e xc e pti on s a dd re ss circ umstances in which a purveyor of the beverage sells it to 1) a person known to be a minor or 2) an “obviously intoxicated” person. Accor ding to Gondolier, on the othe r hand, se ction 102 applies only in circumstance s in which a third party is inj ured by theintoxicated per son. Se c tio n 1 01 pr ov ide s: The ge nera l a ssembly he reby finds and dec lare s that the consumption of any a lcoholic beve rage or bee r rather than the furnishing of any5 alcoholic be vera ge or be er is the proximate ca use of injuries infl icted up on an oth e r by an intoxicated pe rson.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 5 7- 10 -1 01 (2 00 2) . ( Emph a sis a dd e d. ) S e c tio n 1 02 state s:

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 57-10-101, no judge or jury may pr on ou nc e a jud gme nt aw ard ing da ma ge s to or on be ha lf of a ny pa rty who has suff

ere d persona l injury or death a gainst any per son who has sold any alcoholic be vera ge or be er, unle ss such jury of twelve (12) pe rs on s h a s f

ir st a sc e rt a ine d b e yo nd a re a so na ble do ub t tha t th e sa le by such per son of the alc oholic bever age or bee r wa s the pr ox imate cause of the persona l injury or death sustained and that such per son: (1) Sold the alcoholic be vera ge or be er t o a p erson known to be under the age of

twenty-one (21) ye ars and such per son cause d the persona l injury or death as the di rec t result of the c onsumption of the alcoholic be vera ge or be er so sold; or (2) Sold the alcoholic be vera ge or bee r to an obviously intoxicated person a nd such per son cause d the per sonal injury o r death as the dir e c t r e su lt o f the c on su mpt ion of the a lc oh oli c be ve ra ge or be e r s o sold. Tenn. Code Ann. § 57- 10-101. Interpr eting sections 101 and 102, the Supre me Court has stated:
When the words of a statute are plain and unambig u o u s , the assumption is “that the legislature intended what it wrote and me ant what it said.” The pertinent langua ge must be [a pplied] “w ithout any forc ed or subtle c onstruction extending its import.” Worley , 919 S.W.2d at 593 (quoting McClain v. Henry I. Si egel Co. , 834 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tenn. 1992) (c itations omi tted)).
The Worley Court went on to note:
These statutes are models of clarity. Construction or interpr etation of their plain langua ge would be an exer cise in obfusc ation.
Id . Section 101 states a ge nera l rule, and se ction 1 0 2 states two nar row e xceptions to the gene ral rule. In Bis c an v . Br

own , a 2005 case interpr eting sections 101 and 102, the Supre me Court noted that th e sp e c if

ic e xc e pti on s inse c tio n 1 02 “ must be c on fi ne d to the ir te rm s a ndc a nn ot b e re a d to somehow limit the broad rule stated in se ction 101.” Bis c an v . Br own , 160 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tenn. 2005). Quoting Burns v . Ci ty of Na shv ill e , the Supreme Court a dded, “ ‘Whe re a gene ral rule has6

been e stablished by statute, with e xceptions, the court will not curta il the former , not a dd to the latter by implication.’ ” Id. (quoting Burns v . City of Na shv ill e , 132 Tenn. 429, 435, 178 S.W.1053, 1054 (1915))

. Th e ge ne ra l rulestate d at se c tio n 1 01 app lie s in c ir c ums ta nc e s in whi ch a thi rdpa rty is injured. The statute is silent about a circ umstance in whic h an intoxicated pe rson ( i.e ., a first pa rty) is injured. The Plaintiff asks this court, howe ver, to interpr et the gene ric langua ge, “any person,” in section 102 to bring intoxicated per sons within the covera ge of the statute.
We de cline to re ad sec tion 102 in isolation from section 101. Rather, we l ook to the statutory s cheme as a w hole. Faus t v . M e tro . Gov ’t

of Na shv ill e , 2 0 6 S. W

. 3 d 4 7 5 , 4 9 0 ( Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). As this Court has said:

The rule relative to “

pa ri m ate ria ” construction applies . . . with equa l forc e to sepa

rate provisions within a si ngle statute. The dif fer ent parts of a

statute ref

lect li g h t upon eac h other, a nd statutory pr ov isi on s a

re re ga rd e d a s in p ar i m ate ria wher e they a re pa rts of the same act. Henc e, a statute should be construed in its entirety, and as a whole. A ll p ar ts o f

th e a c t s h o u ldb e c o n s id e r e d a n d c o n s tr u ed together. I t is not permissible to rest a construction upon any one part a lon e , o r u po n is olate d w or ds , p hr a se s, c laus es, or sent e nc e s, or to give undue e ffe ct there to. The legislative int ention, as collec ted from an examination of the whole as well as the se parate parts of a statute, is n ot t o b e de fe a te d b y th e us e of pa rt ic ula r t e rm s. Id . (citations omitted). In t his case , rea ding section 101 and 102 in p ar i m ate ria , it is clear to us that the isolated phra se “any person” in section 102 should not be rea d so as t o defe at the legislative intent that is stated as the gene ral rule in section 101

. We de cline to construe section 102 in such a way as to add to the ove rall ambit of the Dr am Shop Act. The Supreme Court has previously re viewed the h i story of sec tions 101 and 102 and conclude d that the stat u t e wa s “intended to c odify the common-law rule that a n individual who furnishes a lcohol to anot h er i s n o t liable for any damage s resulting from the other ’s intoxication, even if those damage s are fore seea ble.” Biscan , 160 S

. W.3d at 473 ( citing Ce c il v . Ha rd in , 575 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. 1978) ).
Whil e re cog nizi ng the S upreme Court’s pronounce ment in Biscan and other case s, the Plaintiff, never

theless, arg ues t hat s ome s tates allow first-par ty actions, and points out case s in Texas and Florida

. The F lorida statute does not include the third-par ty languag e (“ injuries inflicted upon another by an intox icated pe rson”) of sec tion 101, however

. See F la . Stat . § 76 8. 12 5 ( 20 03 ) ( lia bil ity “for injury or damag e caused by or resulting from the intox ication of such minor or person” ). The same is true of

the Texas statute. SeeTe x. Al c o. B e v. Cod e Ann. § 2 .0 2(b)(1 ) (19 93 ) ( re fe rs to person r ece iving a lcohol who “wa s obviously intox icated to the ex t en t that he pre sented a clea r7

dang er to him se lf

and other s”) ( emphasis adde d). The F lorida and Te x as ca ses, base d on statutes with wordingdiffer ent from our own, ar e of no he lp to the Plainti ff

. Our job in interpre ting statutory provisions i s to de termine and give eff ect to the legislature’ s intent. Ky le v . W

ill iam s , 98 S.W.3d 661, 664 (Tenn. 2003) . By its cl ea r l an g u ag e sec tion 101 provides that the c onsumption of an alcoholic bever age or beer , and not the furnishing of it, “is the proximate c ause of

injuries inflicted up on an oth e r by an intoxicated per s o n.” (Empha sis added.) Th e tw o ex c e pti on s to the ge ne ra l rul e of no n- lia bil ity of fu rn ish e rs of

a lc oh ol mus t be re a d n arr ow ly and within the par ameter s set forth in sec tion 101. Since the gene ral rule stated in section 101 dea ls with circumstance s in which a thi rd pa rty is i nju re d b y a n in tox ic a te d pe rs on , thee xc e pti on s to the ge ne ra l rule lik e wi se we reint e nd e d to app ly in circumstanc es in which a third party is injured by an int oxicated person – either when a sa le was knowingly made to a minor who injure s another or when a sale is ma de to “an obviously int oxicated person” who injures anothe r. On this issue of first impression we hold that T enn. Code Ann. §§ 57- 10-101 and 102 a

pply only to thi rd parties and do n o t p er m i t an action against a seller of an “alc oholic bever age or beer ” by or on behalf of the supplied party, i.e. , a first pa rty. We thus affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to the P l ai n t i ff ’s suit predicate d upon an allege d violation of the Dram Shop Act.
B.
We now turn our attention to the Plaintiff’s suit for damage s based upon the common law.
The Ge nera l Assembly has plenary power within c onstitut ional limit s to change the common law by statute. See Sout

he rn Ry . Co . v . Sa nde rs , 193 Tenn. 409, 415, 246 S.W.2d 65, 67 (1952). The “ [r] ules of the c ommon law are not r epea led by implication, and if a statutes doe s not include and cove r such a

case , it lea ves the law as it was bef ore its ena ctment.” Monk v. Ramsey , 223 Tenn. 247, 252, 443 S.W.2d 653, 655 (1969) ( citation omitted).
The Plaintiff ar gues t hat the common law f orese eability inquiry set forth in Bro okins v . T he Roun d Table, Inc. , 624 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn. 1981), has been superse ded by the Dram Shop Act. In Bro okins , the Supreme Court stated, “ [W] hether the sale of

intoxicants is the proxim at e cause of subsequ e n t i n

ju r ie s is e s s e n ti a ll y a

q u e s ti o n o f

f o r e s e e ab il ity
. . . . ” 6 2 4 S. W

. 2 d a t 5 4 9 ( a d opting Mi t ch el l v. Ketner , 54 Tenn. App. 656, 666, 393 S.W.2d 755, 759 ( 1964)). I n Worley , the High Court explicitly stated: “Title 57, Chapter 10, of the Tenne ssee Code e ntitled ‘Alcohol-Relate d Injuries’ [ Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 57- 10-101 and 102 ( 2002)] replace d th e ru le s tate d in Br oo kin s .” Worley , 919 S.W.2d at 592. The portion of the hol ding in Bro okins that w a s r e pla c e d w a s th e ru le as to proximate c ause in third-pa rty ac tions. S ection 101 provides that it is the consumption of the bever age, not the furnishing of it, that is the proximate cause of any injury to a th i rd p ar t y , thus re je c tin g th e no tio n th a t pr ox imate c aus e is an in qu iry o f f or e se e abil ity un de r the Ac t.
In t his opinion, we have held that the Dram Shop Act does not apply to first parties, such as the Pla int if

f’ s d e c e de nt i n th is c a se . Si nc e th e st a tut e do e s n ot c ov e r f ir st p arty a c tio ns a ga ins t fu rn ish e rs of

a n a lc oh oli c bev e ra ge or be e r, it l e a ve s th e la w c on c e rn ing fi rs t- pa rty a c tio ns a s it8

existed bef

ore the Act’s e nactment. As w e have previously noted, t he common law is not repe aled by implication. Our holding regar ding the common law is furthe r bolstere d by appellate decisions since the enac tment of t he Dram Shop Act. For example, in Cook v. Spin naker’s of Rivergate, Inc. , 878 S.W.2d 934 (Tenn. 1994), which was a post-Dram Shop Act decision of the Supre me Court, the Court analyze d a ca se in which a minor sued a restaur ant that had serve d her a lcohol shortly before she drove and wa s injured in a one c ar a ccide nt. Id. at 936. There was no mention of , citation to, or dis c us sio n o f the Dr a m Sh op Ac t.
We c onclude a nd hold that the enac tment of the Dra m Shop Act did not aff ect the c ommon law rule s applicable to first-party actions aga inst a furnisher of an a lcoholic beve rage or bee r. C.
W e ho ld that the tr ia l c ou rt c or re c tly app lie d c omm on la w p ri nc ipl e s to the Pla int if f’ s c aus e of a c tio n f or ne gli ge nc e . That cou rt no te d as fo llo ws : “ Th e Cou rt a lso fi nd s th a t th e [D e c e a se d’ s] inj urie s w e re no t r e a so na bly fo re se e able a nd , as su c h, no du ty a ro se on thepa

rt of Go nd oli e r t o protec t against them.” To establish a negligence claim at t rial a plaintiff m ust show the following elements: (1) a duty of c are owed by the de fendan t t o t h e plainti ff; (2) conduct by the de fendant falling below the a

pplicable standa

rd of c are that amounts to a brea ch of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate, or le gal cau s at i o n. See Whit e v. L awrence , 975 S.W .2 d 5 25 , 5 29 (T e nn . 1 99 8) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; McCall v. Wilder , 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995) (c itations omi tted).
At early common law there was no c ause of action for

first-party c laims. For example in a 1940 case , the Supreme Court said:

It was not a tort at common law to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to a strong and a

ble-bodied ma n, and it c an be said safely that it i s n ot any wh e re la id do wn in the bo ok s that su c h a c t w a s e ve n h e ld at co m m o n law to be c ulpable negligenc e that would impose lega l liability for damages upon the vendor or donor of suc h liquor.
Tarwater v. Atlan tic Co. , 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746 (1940) (quoting Crus e v. Aden , 1 27 Il l. 23 1, 23 3, 20 N. E. 73 ,7 4 ( 18 89 )) . Re fu sa l to imp os e lia bil ity on the fu rn ish e r o f an a lc oh oli c be ve ra ge or beer was fo un d o n tw o b a se s. On e wa s th at th e pe rs on wh o v olu nta ri ly b e c a me intoxicated wa s the proximate c ause of the injury. Id. at 176 Tenn. at 513, 144 S.W.2d at 748. The second ba sis was that the intoxicated pe rson’s ac cepta nce of the a l co h o l was a n independe nt intervening c ause that cut off liability. Tarwater , 176 Tenn. at 511-12, 144 S.W.2d at 747. This bright-line approa ch began to change with the decision in Mitchell v . Ketner , 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1964). In Mit c he ll , this cou rt s t at ed t h at it was

“ un wi lli ng to h oldthat, n o matte r w hat th e c ir c ums ta nc e s, the a c t of the pu rc ha se r a ndno t th e sa le c on sti tut e the pr ox imate c aus e of inj ury to thi rd pers on s or th a t c on su mpt ionof the int ox ic a nt i s always an independe nt, intervening act which breaks the chain of causation.” 54 Tenn. App. at 665, 393 S.W.2d at 759 (c itation omit ted). Some ye ars late r, in Bro okins , the Supreme Court a doptedT h e c o u rts tre a t m ino rs d iff e re n tly. See Jor dan , 1986 W L 11218, a t * 3. 3

Jor dan was deci ded p r e- M cI nt yr e v. Bal en t i ne , 83 3 S.W

. 2 d 52 (T enn. 19 9 2 ). 4
9 the ana lysis of Mit

c he ll , q uo tin g th a t dec isi on a nd c on c lud ing that whe the r the sa le of int ox ic a nts is the proxim ate cause of subsequent inj uries is essentially a que stion of forese eability. Bro okins , 624 S.W.2d at 549. In 1986, the legislature expresse d its concer n that the courts had moved aw ay fr om the tr a dit ion a l c omm on la w a pp ro a c h; a s a

c on se qu e nc e , it

pa sse d th e Dr a m Sh op Ac t.
Our re view of the case law lea ds us to conclude that no Te nnessee case has alter ed the common law rule in relation to first-pa rty claims by adults who ar e injured w hile intoxicated and 3 seek to re cover

damage s directly fr om the furnisher of t he bevera ge. Indee d, in the s ame year the Dr a m Sh op Ac t w a s p a sse d, thi s cou rt c on sid e re d a c a se in w hic h a “ gr os sly int ox ic a te d” 27 -y e ar- old plaintiff was injure d in a si n g l e-c ar a ccide nt after drinking at the def

endant’ s bar. Jo rd

an v . T he K r yst al Co. , 1 9 8 6 W L 1 1 2 1 8 , a t * 1 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. W

. S. , f il e d O c to b e r 7 , 1 9 8 6 ). This court aff irmed the trial c ourt’s dismiss al of the c ase f or failure to state a c laim for which r elief c an be grante d, noting that “one cannot r ec o v er damage s when he actively c ontributes to his own intoxication, which is the proximate c ause of his injury.” Id

. at *3. 4
We r ecogniz e that if a

person drives while intoxicated the re i s a foreseea ble risk that acc idents, injuries and deaths may result. See West v. East Tenn. Pion eer O il Co. , 172 S.W.3d 545, 552 (Tenn. 2005) (common knowledge that drunk driving direc tly results in acc idents, injuries, and deaths). I n this case , howeve r, t he Decea sed di d not drive. Rather, a Gondolier staf f per son called a taxi, assisted the D ece ased into the t axi and paid for the Decea sed’s trip home. She also moved the Dec ease d’s ca

r, which w as not parke d on Gondolier’s premises, so that it would not be towed. These f acts a re undisputed.
The Plaintiff re fer s this court to McClenahan v. Cooley , 806 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1991) . The Pla int if f q uo tes McC len aha n, a s st a tin g th a t “ [t ]h e fo re se e abil ity re qu ir e me nt i s n ot s o s tr ic t a s to require the t ortfea sor t o fore see the exac t manner in which the injury takes place . . . .” Id

. at 775. The Plaintiff omits an important qualification to the rule stated, howe ver. The complete se ntence rea ds, “The f

orese eability require ment is not so strict as t o require the t ortfea sor t o fore see the exac t manner in which the injury take s place , provided it is determined that the t ortfea sor could for esee , or t hrough t he exerc ise of reasonable diligence should have f orese en, the ge nera l manner in whic h the injury or loss occur

red.” Id. Questions rega

rding fore seea

bility are ordinarily questions of fact for a jury. Howe ver, e ven this question may be decide d at the summary judgment sta ge if the e vidence is uncontroverted and if thefa c ts andthe inf

e re nc e s r e a so na

bly dr a wn fr om the m pe rm it r e a so na ble pe rs on s to r e a c h o nly one conc lusion. See Mc Cal l , 9 13 S.W. 2d

a t 15 3; C

a r v e l l v . B o t t o ms , 900 S.W

. 2 d 2 3 , 26 (Tenn. 19 95 ); Staples , 15 S.W .3d at 89. This is such a ca se. Based on the f

acts, a nd considering the infere nces to be draw n from the fac ts f avora ble to the Pla i n t i ff, we hold that a re asonable person c an re ach only one conclusion and it is that GondolierT he penal t y f or s er vi ng an “ ob vi ous l y i nt oxi cat ed” per s on i s s et f ort h a t T enn
. Co de Ann. § 57

- 4- 20 3(c) 5 ( Su pp. 2008)

. A v i ol at i on i s a Cl as s A mi s deme an or
. I n a ddi t i on , a v en dor ’ s pe r mi t or l i ce n s e ca n be s u s pen ded or re v o k e d

. See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 5 7

- 5

- 1 0 8 (c) (Sup p
. 20 0 8 ). 10 could not have f

orese en the ge nera l manner in whic h the Dec ease d’s injuries occ urre d; nor through the e xe rc ise of

re a so na blec are sh ou ld G on do lie r h a ve fo re se e n that on c e the De c e a se d w a s sa fe ly in a taxi to be drive n home, he would gr ab the stee ring whee l of the taxi turning it into the oncoming lane, be warned, re peat the same conduc t, and be put out of the ta xi on t o t h e ro ad s i de by the taxi driver, f ollowing which he would fa ll off a bridge to his death.
W e a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s ho ldi ng that th e De c e a sed’s inj urie s w e reno t r e a so na bly fore seea ble and, a s such, no duty arose o n t h e part of G ondolier to protec t against them. Gi gg e rs v . M e mph is H

ous ing Auth ., __

S.W .3 d _

_, 20 09 W L 2 49 74 2, a t *6 (T e nn . 2 00 9) ; Satterfield v. Br e e ding In sulat ion C

o. , 266 S.W.3d 347, 366 (Tenn. 2008) . Given the undisputed fa cts, Gondolier ne gate d a n e le me nt of

thePla int if

f’ s prima facie casefor ne gligence, i.e. , that the def endant owe d a duty to the Dec ease d. Summary judgment was thus properly granted on the basis that Gondolier did not owe the De cea sed a duty.
D.
When a risk of injury is not genera lly forese eable , no duty arises. If no duty arises, ther e can be no bre ach of d u t y
. T h e t ri al court he ld that even if the re ha d been a duty, however , Gondolier fulfilled that duty as a matter of law . We a gree
. The Plaintiff ana lyzes the issue of brea ch of duty with ref

ere nce to the D ram Shop Act. The Plaintiff asserts that Gondolier had a duty not to serve a lcohol to an obviously intoxi cate d person, but the only law t he P laintiff cites is section 102 of t he Dram Shop Act. Since we ha ve held that 5 sections 101 and 102 a

re not a pplicable to a f

irst-party a ction such as the one the Plaintiff has br ou gh t, this a na lys is i s in app os ite . Goi ng be yo nd the Ac t, w e ho ld that th e Pla int if f’ s p os iti on is at odds with the common law.

“ At c omm on la w, a n ind ivi du a l wh o so ld or fu rn ish e d a lc oh ol to a no the r ge ne ra lly wa s h e ld not to be liable for damages re sulting from the other’s intoxication, eve n if those damage s were fore seea ble . . . .” Bro okins , 624 S.W.2d at 549 (citations omitted). For example, the Supreme Court has spec ifically dec lined to impose a duty on a commer cial business to physically control a n intoxicated drive r by pre venting him or her from leaving the premises. East Tenn . Pioneer Oil Co. , 17 2 S. W .3 d at 52 2 ( “ [W ]e do no t ho ld that con ve nie nc e sto re e mpl oy e e s hav e a du ty t o p hy sic a lly re str a in o r o the rw ise pr e ve nt in to xi c a te d p e rs on s f ro m drivi ng .” ); Biscan , 160 S.W.3d at 482 (“ Re a so na

ble c are [o f a du lt so c ia l ho st] un de r the c ir c ums ta nc e s ma y no t ha veinc lud e d p hy sic a lly re str a ini ng his gu e sts ” ).
In Col lins , this court noted that the r ea s o n ing of Biscan “is consistent with the g ener al principle that a

defe ndant’s duty

to control the conduct of anothe r depe nds in part on the def endant havingthe means and ability to control the third par ty .” Col lins v . Ar nol d , No. M2004-02513-COA-11

R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 7 W L 4 1 4 6 0 2 5 , at* 1 1 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. M

. S

. , fi l edNo v em b er 2 0 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Biscan , 16 0 S.W.3 d at 48 1; Puckett v. Roberson , 1 83 S.W. 3d 64 3, 65 2 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 5) ). In th is c a se Gondolier c ontrolled the De cea sed’s c onduct to the extent of seeingthat he d i dnot pose a da ng er by driving while i ntox icated. But just as i n the cases where the courts have found no duty to control an intox icated pe rson who choose s to drive, so Gondolier ha d no means a nd no ability to control the Dec ease d once he left the re staurant in a tax i.
The P l ai ntiff ar g ues that the seller is not relieved of

its duty to an intox icated patron by c a lli nga ta xi or oth e rw ise re mov ing the ind ivi du a l f ro m th e pr e mis e s. Ho we ve r, “ [t]he g e ne ra l duty of ca re doe s not include an aff irmative duty to a ct for the protec tion of another

. . . .” Biscan , 160 S.W .2d at 478. In the circ umstances of this case, if G ondolier ca n be said to have a

ny duty to the Dec ease d, which we asser t it did not , it did not breach it as a matter of law. The f

acts a nd the infere nces f

rom the fa cts in this case a re suc h that a re asonable person ca n re ac h only one conclusion : b y ca l l i n g a ca b, seeingthe Dec ease d safe ly into it as a passeng er a

nd paying the Dec ease d’s fa

re, G ondolier fulfilled a

ny duty it mig ht ha

ve. Gondolier ne g ated a

second ne cessa

ry element ( b r e a c ho f

d u ty ) o f th e Pl a inti f

f ’ s c o mm o nla

wc la im o f n e g li g e n c e
. Summ ar

y ju d g ment was thus appr opriate.12 E.
In the J udg ment, the trial cour t also found that “the actions of the [Dec ease d] and Mr. Kirkland c onstitut e interve ning [superse ding] ac ts in this case .” We have held that the Plaintiff has no cause of action under Tenn. C ode Ann. §§ 57-10-101 and 102 (2002) and that she ca nnot proce ed under a common law theor

y of neg lige nce. T hus, whether interveningactions by

the Dec ease d and/or Mr. K irkland we re supe rsedingcause s that relieve d Gondolier of liability nee d n o t b e d e cided.
V.
Th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

is a ff ir me d. Cos ts o n a

pp e a l are ta xed to th e a

pp e lla nt, E d wi n a Mont g omery . This case is remande d to the trial court f or fur ther proc eeding s, consistent with this opi nion.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE