Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Notices 14107 

1With respect to a given amount of LEU, the 

‘‘natural uranium equivalent’’ is the amount of 

natural uranium feed that would be required to 

produce that amount of LEU. The ratio of feed to 

product is a function of the assay of the feed and 

the desired assays of the enriched product and the 

depleted tails (‘‘assay’’ refers to the ratio of the 

fissile isotope U–235 to other isotopes of uranium 

such as U–234 and U–238). The industry generally 

refers to the enriched product as ‘‘Enriched 

Uranium Product’’ or EUP and to the tails as 

‘‘depleted uranium,’’ DU, ‘‘depleted uranium 

hexafluoride’’ or DUF6. 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Excess Uranium Management: Effects 

of DOE Transfers of Excess Uranium 

on Domestic Uranium Mining, 

Conversion, and Enrichment 

Industries; Notice of Issues for Public 

Comment 

AGENCY: Office of Nuclear Energy, 

Department of Energy. 

ACTION: Request for public comment. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE) plans to issue a new 

Secretarial Determination covering 

continued transfers of uranium for 

cleanup services at the Portsmouth 

Gaseous Diffusion Plant and for downblending of highly-enriched uranium 

(HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). 

In support of this process, DOE issued 

a Request for Information that solicited 

information about the effects of 

continued uranium transfers on the 

domestic uranium industries and 

recommendations about factors to be 

considered in assessing the possible 

impacts of DOE transfers. DOE also 

commissioned an economic analysis of 

the effects of its proposed uranium 

transfers. DOE now provides for public 

review the responses received from the 

public, the economic analysis prepared 

for DOE, and a list of factors DOE has 

identified for analysis of the impacts of 

DOE transfers on the uranium mining, 

conversion, and enrichment industries. 

DOE requests comment on this list of 

factors, the information and documents 

made available through this notice, and 

the included summary of information 

considered. 

DATES: DOE will accept comments, data, 

and information responding to this 

proposal submitted on or before April 6, 

2015. 

ADDRESSES: Interested persons may 

submit comments by any of the 

following methods. 

1. Email: RFI-UraniumTransfers@

hq.doe.gov. Submit electronic comments 

in WordPerfect, Microsoft Word, PDF, 

or ASCII file format, and avoid the use 

of special characters or any form of 

encryption. 

2. Postal Mail: Mr. David Henderson, 

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of 

Nuclear Energy, Mailstop NE–52, 19901 

Germantown Rd., Germantown, MD 

20874–1290. If possible, please submit 

all items on a compact disk (CD), in 

which case it is not necessary to include 

printed copies. 

3. Hand Delivery/Courier: Mr. David 

Henderson, U.S. Department of Energy, 

Office of Nuclear Energy, Mailstop 

NE–52, 19901 Germantown Rd., 

Germantown, MD 20874–1290. Phone: 

(301) 903–2590. If possible, please 

submit all items on a CD, in which case 

it is not necessary to include printed 

copies. 

No facsimiles (faxes) will be accepted. 

Supporting documents are available on 

the Internet at http://www.energy.gov/

ne/downloads/excess-uraniummanagement. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

David Henderson, U.S. Department of 

Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, 

Mailstop NE–52, 19901 Germantown 

Rd., Germantown, MD 20874–1290. 

Phone: (301) 903–2590. Email: 

David.Henderson@Nuclear.Energy.Gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Introduction 

A. Excess Uranium Inventory 

B. Statutory Authority 

C. Procedural History 

D. Request for Information 

E. Market Analyses 

II. Analytical Approach 

A. Overview 

B. Factors for Consideration 

III. Summary of Information Under 

Consideration 

A. Uranium Mining Industry 

1. Market Prices 

2. Realized Prices of Current Operators 

3. Production at Existing Facilities 

4. Employment Levels in the Industry 

5. Changes in Capital Improvement Plans 

and Development of Future Facilities 

6. Long-Term Viability and Health of the 

Industry 

B. Uranium Conversion Industry 

1. Market Prices 

2. Realized Prices of Current Operators 

3. Production at Existing Facilities 

4. Employment Levels in the Industry 

5. Changes in Capital Improvement Plans 

and Development of Future Facilities 

6. Long-Term Viability and Health of the 

Industry 

C. Enrichment Industry 

1. Market Prices 

2. Realized Prices of Current Operators 

3. Production at Existing Facilities 

4. Employment Levels in the Industry 

5. Changes in Capital Improvement Plans 

and Development of Future Facilities 

6. Long-Term Viability and Health of the 

Industry 

IV. Request for Comments 

V. Confidential Business Information 

I. Introduction 

A. Excess Uranium Inventory 

The Department of Energy (DOE) 

holds inventories of uranium in various 

forms and quantities—including lowenriched uranium (LEU) and natural 

uranium—that have been declared as 

excess and are not dedicated to U.S. 

national security missions. Within DOE, 

the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), the 

Office of Environmental Management 

(EM), and the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) coordinate the 

management of these excess uranium 

inventories. DOE explained its approach 

to managing this inventory in a July 

2013 Report to Congress, Excess 

Uranium Inventory Management Plan 

(2013 Plan). 

Much of this excess uranium has 

substantial economic value on the open 

market. One tool that DOE has used to 

manage its excess uranium inventory 

has been to enter into transactions in 

which DOE exchanges excess uranium 

for services. This notice involves 

uranium transfers of this type under two 

separate programs. Specifically, DOE 

transfers uranium in exchange for 

cleanup services at the Portsmouth 

Gaseous Diffusion Plant and for downblending of highly-enriched uranium 

(HEU) to LEU. DOE currently transfers 

uranium for these two programs at an 

aggregate rate of approximately 2,705 

metric tons of natural uranium 

equivalent (MTU) per year.1

B. Statutory Authority 

DOE manages its excess uranium 

inventory in accordance with the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 

2011 et seq., ‘‘AEA’’) and other 

applicable law. Specifically, Title I, 

Chapters 6–7, 14, of the AEA authorize 

DOE to transfer special nuclear material 

and source material. LEU and natural 

uranium are types of special nuclear 

material and source material, 

respectively. The USEC Privatization 

Act (Pub. L. 104–134, 42 U.S.C. 2297h 

et seq.) places certain limitations on 

DOE’s authority to transfer uranium 

from its excess uranium inventory. 

Specifically, under section 3112(d)(2)(B) 

of the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 

2297h–10(d)(2)(B)), the Secretary must 

determine that the transfers ‘‘will not 

have an adverse material impact on the 

domestic uranium mining, conversion 

or enrichment industry, taking into 

account the sales of uranium under the 

Russian Highly Enriched Uranium 

Agreement and the Suspension 

Agreement’’ before DOE makes certain 

transfers of natural or low-enriched 

uranium under the AEA. Section 306(a) 

of Division D, Title III of the 

Consolidated and Further Continuing 

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14108 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Notices 

2See May 15, 2014, Secretarial Determination. 

3Some comments were marked as containing 

confidential information. Those comments are 

provided with confidential information removed. 

Appropriations Act, 2015 (Pub. L. 113– 

235), limits the validity of any 

determination by the Secretary under 

Section 3112(d)(2)(B) of the USEC 

Privatization Act to no more than two 

calendar years subsequent to the 

determination. 

C. Procedural History 

In accordance with the above statutes 

and other laws, the Secretary has 

periodically determined whether certain 

transfers of natural and low-enriched 

uranium will have an adverse material 

impact on the domestic uranium 

industries. DOE issued the most recent 

Secretarial Determination in May 2014. 

That determination covered transfers of 

up to a total of 2,705 MTU per year 

natural uranium equivalent, broken 

down as follows: Up to 650 MTU per 

year of natural uranium equivalent in 

the form of LEU transferred for 

downblending, with the balance, but not 

less than 2,055 MTU per year of natural 

uranium equivalent for cleanup services 

at the Paducah or Portsmouth Gaseous 

Diffusion Plant.2 At this time, DOE is 

conducting uranium transfers consistent 

with the May 2014 Secretarial 

Determination. 

To inform the May 2014 Secretarial 

Determination—as it had for a number 

of previous determinations—DOE 

tasked Energy Resources International, 

Inc. (ERI) with assessing the potential 

effects on the domestic uranium mining, 

conversion, and enrichment industries 

from DOE’s proposed volume of 

uranium transfers. In addition to its 

review and consideration of the report 

prepared by ERI (2014 ERI Report), DOE 

held in-person meetings and accepted 

written communications regarding the 

transfers from several entities that 

expressed an interest in DOE’s proposed 

uranium transactions. DOE staff then 

prepared a separate analysis based on 

these and other inputs and 

recommended a course of action to the 

Secretary. 

DOE plans to issue a new Secretarial 

Determination pursuant to section 

3112(d). As a preparatory step, DOE 

sought information from the public 

through a Request for Information 

published in the Federal Register on 

December 8, 2014 (79 FR 72661). DOE 

is now soliciting additional public 

input. 

D. Request for Information 

In the December 8, 2014, Request for 

Information (79 FR 72661), DOE 

solicited information from interested 

stakeholders and specifically requested 

comment on the following seven 

questions. 

(1) What factors should DOE consider 

in assessing whether transfers will have 

adverse material impacts? 

(2) With respect to transfers from 

DOE’s excess uranium inventory in 

calendar years 2012, 2013, and 2014, 

what have been the effects of transfers 

in uranium markets and the 

consequences for the domestic uranium 

mining, conversion, and enrichment 

industries relative to other market 

factors? 

(3) What market effects and industry 

consequences could DOE expect from 

continued transfers at annual rates 

comparable to the transfers described in 

the 2014 Secretarial Determination? 

(4) Would transfers at a lower annual 

rate significantly change these effects, 

and if so, how? 

(5) Are there actions DOE could take 

other than altering the annual rate of 

transfers that would mitigate any 

negative effects on these industries? 

(6) Are there actions DOE could take 

with respect to transfers that would 

have positive effects on these 

industries? 

(7) Are there any anticipated changes 

in these markets that may significantly 

change how DOE transfers affect the 

domestic uranium industries? 

In response to this request, DOE 

received comments from a diverse group 

of parties representing interests across 

the nuclear industry. DOE received 

comments from members of the 

uranium mining, conversion, and 

enrichment industries. DOE also 

received comments from trade 

associations, nuclear utilities, local 

governmental bodies, and members of 

the public. All comments are available 

at http://www.energy.gov/ne/

downloads/excess-uraniummanagement.3

E. Market Analyses 

In preparation for the May 2014 

Secretarial Determination, DOE tasked 

ERI to assess the potential effects on the 

domestic uranium mining, conversion, 

and enrichment industries of the 

introduction of DOE excess uranium 

inventory in various forms and 

quantities through sale or transfer 

during calendar years 2014 through 

2033. DOE may consider this report in 

its deliberations regarding a new 

Determination (‘‘2014 ERI Report’’). 

In preparation for the planned 

Secretarial Determination that is the 

subject of today’s notice, DOE tasked 

ERI with preparing an additional 

analysis of DOE transfers (‘‘2015 ERI 

Report’’). For this additional analysis, 

DOE tasked ERI to consider the effect of 

hypothetical DOE transfers on the 

domestic uranium industries under 

three different scenarios. Under 

Scenario 1, DOE would continue 

transfers at the current annual rate of 

2,705 MTU per year, consisting of 2,055 

MTU for cleanup work and 650 MTU as 

low-enriched uranium for 

downblending. Under Scenario 2, DOE 

would decrease transfers to a rate 

corresponding with 1,855 MTU per 

year, consisting of 1,410 MTU for 

cleanup work and 445 MTU as lowenriched uranium for downblending. 

Under Scenario 3, DOE would cease 

transfers for cleanup work and 

downblending. 

DOE also asked ERI to provide 

specific categories of information in its 

analysis, including a discussion of price 

volatility and regional differences in the 

markets. DOE tasked ERI to discuss the 

implications of changing certain 

assumptions underlying its analysis, 

specifically regarding what proportion 

of DOE material would enter the global 

as compared to the domestic market and 

regarding the share of DOE material 

delivered under long-term contracts. 

ERI’s report also includes updated 

information regarding changes in the 

market between April 2014 and 

February 2015. Both the 2014 ERI 

Report and the 2015 ERI Report can be 

found at http://www.energy.gov/ne/

downloads/excess-uraniummanagement. 

II. Analytical Approach 

DOE issues Secretarial Determinations 

pursuant to Section 3112(d) of the USEC 

Privatization Act. Section 3112(d) states 

that DOE may transfer ‘‘natural and lowenriched uranium’’ if, among other 

things, ‘‘the Secretary determines that 

the sale of the material will not have an 

adverse material impact on the domestic 

uranium mining, conversion, or 

enrichment industry, taking into 

account the sales of uranium under the 

Russian HEU Agreement and the 

Suspension Agreement.’’ After 

considering this statutory language, 

DOE has developed a set of factors that 

it proposes to consider in determining 

whether its uranium transfers will have 

an ‘‘adverse material impact’’ on the 

domestic uranium industries. 

A. Overview 

The USEC Privatization Act does not 

clearly indicate what kind or degree of 

effect or influence on an industry would 

constitute an ‘‘adverse material impact.’’ 

As discussed below, these words are 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Notices 14109 

4 In passing the USEC Privatization Act, Congress 

recognized that DOE would have a substantial 

uranium inventory after privatization. Congress 

included Section 3112(d) to ensure that DOE could 

continue to use sales or transfers from its uranium 

inventory as a management tool. See S. Rep. 104– 

173, at 16–17; see also 141 Cong. Rec. S6106–07 

(daily ed. May 3, 1995) (statement of Sen. 

Domenici).4

5Sales under the Russian HEU Agreement ceased 

at the end of 2013. 

susceptible of many meanings. 

Contextual clues provide some guidance 

in understanding the phrase, but DOE 

has not identified context (such as a 

statutory definition) that would 

unambiguously settle what an ‘‘adverse 

material impact’’ is. 

Moreover, the meaning of the phrase 

is likely to depend in part on the factual 

context in which it is to be applied. 

Uranium transactions can take myriad 

forms, and the effect of any given 

transaction on any one or all of these 

industries will depend heavily on the 

facts and circumstances at the time of 

the transaction. DOE’s inventory of 

uranium is changing over time, and 

Congress could not have anticipated the 

specific characteristics of every 

potential transaction. Thus, it would be 

unsurprising for the statute to describe 

DOE’s mandate in open-ended terms, 

leaving DOE to elaborate details as and 

when DOE applied the statute over time. 

Thus, the Secretary will need to 

exercise judgment to develop an 

understanding of ‘‘adverse material 

impact,’’ in its statutory context, as 

applicable to a given potential transfer 

or sale of uranium. Part of that task 

involves establishing an analytical 

framework to form the basis of and 

reach a determination about the impacts 

of DOE’s transfers. The Secretary is 

responsible for reviewing relevant 

information and exercising judgment to 

decide whether a particular sale or 

transfer will have an adverse material 

impact. 

DOE’s first step in developing an 

analytical framework is to elaborate 

what it means for transfers to ‘‘have’’ an 

‘‘impact.’’ DOE believes that it can 

appropriately fulfill the purpose of the 

statute by reading this phrase to refer to 

‘‘impacts’’ that have a causal 

relationship to DOE transfers. The 

overall thrust of Section 3112 is to 

permit transfers and sales of uranium to 

the degree consistent with various 

policy considerations set forth in 

various paragraphs.4 Section 3112(d) 

calls for the Secretary’s predictive 

judgment, before DOE engages in a 

transaction, whether the transaction will 

have an adverse material impact on the 

domestic uranium industries. The 

notion of causation is implicit in this 

structure. If domestic industries would 

experience a given negative condition 

regardless whether DOE made a 

particular transfer, it would ill serve the 

purposes of the USEC Privatization Act 

for 3112(d) to block the transfer. 

Thus, in assessing a given transfer, 

DOE will essentially evaluate two 

forecasts: One reflecting the state of the 

domestic uranium industries if DOE 

goes forward with the transfer, and one 

reflecting the state of the domestic 

uranium industries if DOE does not go 

forward with the transfer. DOE will then 

compare these two forecasts to 

determine the relevant impacts on the 

domestic uranium industries. It bears 

mention that not every difference in 

predicted outcomes will necessarily 

count as an impact of the transfer. For 

example, if DOE transfers would be the 

final contribution after independent 

causes have pushed an industry to a 

given adverse state, DOE might not 

regard the full scope of the adversity as 

attributable to the transfers. 

With respect to assessing whether the 

adverse impacts of a transfer would be 

‘‘material,’’ DOE observes that the word 

‘‘material’’ is used to denote situations 

‘‘of real importance or great 

consequence.’’ See Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary 31, 1392 

(1961). How large consequences must be 

to qualify as ‘‘material’’ varies in 

different legal contexts. In light of the 

overall goals and structure of the USEC 

Privatization Act, DOE believes it is 

reasonable to view material adverse 

impacts as referring to impacts that go 

beyond normal market fluctuations, 

such as those that threaten the viability 

of an industry. 

As noted above, one purpose of the 

USEC Privatization Act was that DOE 

should manage and eventually dispose 

of the large legacy inventory that the 

privatization of USEC would leave it. In 

privatizing the United States 

Enrichment Corporation, Congress 

recognized that DOE would have 

uranium inventory left over and that 

this inventory would have substantial 

economic value. By including 3112(d), 

Congress preserved the Secretary’s 

discretion to utilize uranium transfers as 

a tool in managing the uranium 

inventory, and the substantial value 

embodied therein. If Congress had not 

wanted DOE to make productive use of 

its inventory, it could have prohibited 

all sales by the Department with or 

without a determination. Indeed, the 

USEC Privatization Act explicitly 

directed DOE to transfer various 

quantities of uranium to market 

participants. 42 U.S.C. 2297h–10(b)(2) & 

(c). 

Section 3112 also provides helpful 

context that indicates the magnitude of 

industry impact that Congress 

considered acceptable. The statute 

specifically authorized material 

delivered under the Russian HEU 

Agreement to enter the U.S. market 

notwithstanding a preexisting 

suspension agreement limiting the entry 

of this material. 42 U.S.C. 2297h– 

10(b)(3), (5)–(7). The act contained 

annual limits on deliveries of the 

natural uranium component of the 

Russian material. The limits started at 2 

million pounds U3O8 equivalent in 

1998, and increased by 2 million 

pounds each year reaching a maximum 

of 20 million pounds U3O8 equivalent 

in 2009 and each year thereafter. 42 

U.S.C. 2297h–10(b)(5).5 For comparison 

purposes, this last figure represented 

over four times the volume of U3O8 

produced at U.S. mines in 1996, the 

year the statute was passed. EIA, 

Domestic Uranium Production Report 

(2005). The size of this explicit 

authorization informs DOE’s 

understanding of what impacts Congress 

would have regarded as ‘‘material.’’ It 

seems unlikely that Congress would 

have authorized in 3112(b) transfers that 

would have been inconsistent with the 

policy goals of 3112(d). 

Indeed, the structure and legislative 

history of 3112(b) confirm that the 

schedule for Russian material’s entering 

domestic markets reflects Congress’s 

balancing of concerns similar to those 

that motivated 3112(d)(2). Congress 

could have simply allowed all Russian 

material into the U.S. without 

limitation. Instead, Congress provided a 

schedule that ramped up over a period 

of 20 years. Thus, Congress was 

attempting to balance the competing 

concerns of providing a market for the 

consumption of downblended Russian 

HEU and protecting the domestic 

uranium industries from large-scale 

disruption. The schedule outlined in 

Section 3112(b) reveals the level of 

market interference that Congress 

believed struck that balance. This 

notion is further confirmed by the 

legislative history of this provision, 

which specifically states that Congress 

was trying to balance the interests in 

maintaining the Russian HEU 

Agreement with the interests of the 

domestic uranium industries. See S. 

Rep. 104–173, at 14. Further, the 

legislative history explains that the 

schedule of maximum deliveries was 

designed to protect against disruptions 

to the uranium markets by providing a 

‘‘reasonable, predictable, and measured 

introduction of this Russian material 

into the domestic uranium market.’’ Id. 

at 28. 

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6UPA refers to ‘‘uncommitted utility demand.’’ It 

appears that they are referring to UxC’s estimate of 

uncovered reactor requirements, found at UxC 

Uranium Market Outlook—Q4 2014, 61–62 (2014). 

7Commenters cite to UxC’s Q3 Uranium Market 

Outlook. In addition to UxC’s most recent estimate 

of uncovered utility uranium requirements, UxC 

Uranium Market Outlook—Q4 2014, 61–62 (2014), 

DOE has reviewed information from EIA and the 

Euratom Supply Agency. EIA, 2013 Uranium 

Marketing Report, 34 (2014); ESA, Natural Uranium 

Coverage 2014–2022, available at http://

ec.europa.eu/euratom/docs/F9-CoverageRate.xls. 

8 DOE has reviewed UxC’s most recent estimate 

of uncovered enrichment requirements found at: 

UxC Enrichment Market Outlook—Q4 2014, 39–40 

(2014). DOE also notes that UxC’s most recent 

report on the conversion market does not include 

updated numbers on uncovered utility 

requirements for conversion services. UxC 

Conversion Market Outlook—December 2014, 37 

(2014). 

9Comparing the financial statements of Uranium 

Production Corporation—a uranium investment 

fund—reveals that between November 30, 2013, and 

November 30, 2014, UPC increased its stock by 

approximately 1.5 million pounds U3O8 

equivalent—1,311,286 pounds U3O8 and 261,285 

pounds U3O8 equivalent contained within 100,000 

kgU of UF6. UPC, 2015 Third Quarter Report, 2 

(2015), available at http://www.uranium

participation.com/i/pdf/financials/2015-Q3-Reportfor-the-Three-Months-Ended-November-30.pdf; 

UPC, 2014 Third Quarter Report, 2 (2014), available 

at http://www.uraniumparticipation.com/i/pdf/

Section 3112(d)(2) confirms that 

DOE’s consideration of 3112(b) in 

interpreting 3112(d)(2) is reasonable. 

Section 3112(d)(2) explicitly directs the 

Secretary to ‘‘take into account’’ the 

sales of uranium under the Russian HEU 

Agreement and the Suspension 

Agreement. DOE believes that in 

addition to requiring the Secretary to 

consider any transfers under these 

programs that are ongoing at the time of 

DOE’s transfers, this language asks the 

Secretary to consider and take into 

account the history and context of these 

transfers and the statutory text 

authorizing them. In addition, it bears 

mention that in a 3112(d)(2) 

deliberation DOE may take account of 

the fact that the cessation of the Russian 

HEU Agreement removed a substantial 

amount of secondary supply from 

uranium markets. 

The preceding discussion is not 

intended automatically to support 

transfers of up to 20 million pounds 

under Section 3112(d). The Secretary 

must exercise his own judgment as to 

whether transfers would cause an 

adverse material impact, in light of 

market and industry conditions today. 

However, DOE believes that this 

provision provides some insight into 

what scale of market interference 

Congress considered acceptable, and 

hence would not constitute an ‘‘adverse 

material impact.’’ 

For these reasons, DOE believes that 

whether the effects of a given transfer 

constitute an ‘‘adverse material impact’’ 

should not depend on a quantitative 

bright-line test, but rather should be 

based on an evaluation of potential 

impacts by examining a number of 

factors. Accordingly, DOE proposes to 

consider the effects of DOE transfers 

using a set of factors. DOE proposes to 

analyze its transfers in light of the best 

available information, data and expert 

judgment to form the basis for the 

Secretary’s determination. 

B. Factors for Consideration 

In the December 2014 RFI, DOE 

sought comment from the public on 

what factors it should consider in 

assessing whether a given set of 

transfers would have an adverse 

material impact on the domestic 

uranium industries. After considering 

the comments received, DOE believes 

the following factors may be relevant to 

this question: 

1. Market prices 

2. Realized prices of current operators 

3. Production at existing facilities 

4. Employment levels in the industry 

5. Changes in capital improvement 

plans and development of future 

facilities 

6. Long-term viability and health of the 

industry 

These factors reflect many of those 

suggested by commenters, and DOE 

believes they reflect the types of impacts 

that a DOE transfer could in principle 

have on a domestic uranium industry. 

Not every factor will necessarily be 

relevant on a given occasion or to a 

particular industry; DOE intends this 

list of factors only as a guide to its 

analysis. DOE is open to additional 

comment on these factors. There are a 

few factors proposed by commenters 

that are not included in DOE’s list, for 

the reasons outlined below. 

One commenter suggested that DOE 

should consider the effects of its 

transfers on the profitability of the 

industries. Comment of ConverDyn, 

Encl. at 2. Another commenter 

suggested that DOE should consider the 

effect of its transfers on gross profit 

margin. TradeTech Report, 12–13. DOE 

notes that profit and profitability can 

vary depending on company-specific 

circumstances and accounting 

treatments, and therefore may not be 

reliable indicators of how a given 

market phenomenon like DOE transfers 

is affecting an industry. Moreover, for 

assessing the impact on an industry, the 

profit of participants is, in a sense, an 

indirect measure, as it is principally a 

link between market dynamics—prices 

and sales—and the ultimate reaction of 

industry in terms of increasing or 

decreasing activity. For these reasons, 

DOE proposes to look instead at factors 

which are either more directly related to 

industry impact or are more reliable 

predictors of industry impact. 

Several commenters suggested that 

DOE should consider current market 

conditions as a factor. Comment of UPA, 

at 3; comment of Uranerz, at 3. DOE 

agrees that current market conditions 

are relevant, and DOE plans to consider 

the potential effects of DOE transfers in 

light of the relevant context, which 

includes current market conditions as 

well as past and projected future 

conditions. DOE believes that 

considering broader market conditions 

in this manner will yield insight into 

how the domestic uranium industries 

can be expected to respond to DOE 

transfers. 

Some commenters suggested that DOE 

consider uncommitted utility demand 

or uncovered utility requirements 

compared to the level of DOE transfers. 

UPA and others, for example, stated that 

transfers at the rate described in the 

May 2014 Secretarial Determination 

would constitute more than 100 percent 

of global uncommitted utility demand 

in calendar year 2015 and almost 60 

percent in 2016. These commenters cite 

to a report by the Ux Consulting 

Company, LLC (UxC): UxC Uranium 

Market Outlook—Q4 2014 (2014).6

Comment of UPA, at 2–3; see also 

comment of Uranerz Energy Corp., at 2– 

3; comment of Signal Equities, at 2.7

Similarly, URENCO USA Inc. 

(URENCO)—citing UxC’s Q4 

Enrichment Market Outlook—stated that 

DOE transfers of LEU will constitute 

72% of uncovered enrichment 

requirements in 2015. Comment of 

URENCO, at 4.8 While the volume of 

uncovered requirements may be 

information relevant to the overall 

assessment, DOE is not convinced a 

particular comparison between that 

volume and the magnitude of a 

proposed transfer is reliable as an 

indication of the impacts of its transfers 

on the uranium industries. It is far from 

clear that uranium from proposed DOE 

transfers in 2015 and 2016 would be 

sold only to utilities with uncovered 

requirements in the year of transfer. The 

market involves many participants other 

than utilities seeking to fill uncovered 

requirements. For example, 

intermediaries that hold mid- or longterm contracts may need to purchase 

material on the spot market to fulfill 

contracted deliveries. As discussed 

below, some market participants—such 

as China—purchase material in excess 

of their requirements. Traders and 

investment funds may also make 

purchases independent of reactor 

requirements.9 Thus, spot demand in 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Notices 14111 

financials/2014-Q3.pdf. UPC’s stated investment 

strategy is to buy and hold uranium rather than 

actively trading in response to short-term shifts in 

prices. UPC, Investor Update Presentation, 17 (Aug. 

2014), available at http://www.uranium

participation.com/i/pdf/ppt/UPC-Investor-UpdateAugust-2014.pdf. 

10Traxys North America LLP has a contractual 

arrangement with DOE’s contractor at Portsmouth, 

Fluor-B&W Portsmouth, to purchase all uranium 

hexafluoride FBP receives from DOE. The existence 

of FBP’s contract with Traxys does not obligate DOE 

to transfer to FBP the amounts of uranium under 

consideration. 

11Traxys represented that it had already sold to 

utilities ‘‘almost 100%’’ of the material from DOE 

as early as July 7, 2014. Declaration of Kevin P. 

Smith, ConverDyn v. Moniz, Case no. 1:14-cv01012–RBW, Document 17–7 at ¶6 (July 7, 2014). 

The figures for global uncommitted utility demand 

cited by UPA were released after this date. See 

Comment of UPA, at 3 n.2. 

12The market clearing price is the price at which 

quantity supplied is equal to quantity demanded. 

13 In other words, ERI assumes that demand for 

uranium will stay the same regardless of variations 

in market price. 

14Note that the transfer rates in these scenarios 

refer only to the level of uranium transfers for 

cleanup at Portsmouth and downblending of LEU. 

They do not include transfers for three other 

programs, TVA BLEU, Energy Northwest depleted 

uranium, and a possible future sale of depleted 

uranium currently under negotiation. 2015 ERI 

Report, 21–32. The level of transfers across these 

three programs is the same in all three scenarios. 

ERI’s predictions about market price reflect these 

transfers as well as the Portsmouth and 

downblending transfers. 

any given year may substantially exceed 

uncovered requirements. At least for the 

uranium industry, this is confirmed by 

the very report that commenters cite to 

in their comments. UxC projects that 

spot demand in 2015 and 2016 will be 

significantly higher than uncovered 

requirements in both years. Compare 

Table 14 with Table 15 of UxC Uranium 

Market Outlook—Q4 2014, 62–63 

(2014). In addition, the company that 

currently distributes on the broader 

market most of the uranium that DOE is 

transferring under the 2014 Secretarial 

Determination represents that it has 

already sold almost all of this material 

to utilities under forward delivery 

contracts. Comment of Traxys, at 1.10

Therefore, the global uncommitted 

utility figures cited by UPA and others 

presumably already take account of DOE 

transfers as an element of covered 

requirements.11

Commenters also proposed share 

price and market capitalization as 

factors for consideration. E.g., Comment 

of ConverDyn, Enclosure, at 2. DOE is 

not convinced that either of these 

provides an appropriate indicator for 

whether DOE transfers will cause an 

adverse material impact, because both 

market capitalization and share price 

are too attenuated from the effects of 

DOE transfers. While share price 

certainly does influence a company’s 

decisions about investment and 

allocation of capital, it is only one 

factor. At the same time, a company’s 

share price tends to reflect myriad 

inputs besides the effects of a market 

phenomenon like DOE transfers. Other 

contributions to share price can include 

the nature of company management, 

gearing ratio (debt vs. equity), inflation, 

and the particular risks associated with 

the uranium market (such as the 

influence of political changes, like the 

shift in energy policy in Germany or 

public responses to nuclear accidents). 

Furthermore, many of the largest U.S. 

producers are part of multi-line 

companies whose share prices depend 

in part on product markets other than 

uranium. For these reasons, DOE 

believes that share price and market 

capitalization are too highly attenuated 

to serve as useful proxies for industry 

impact. 

Some commenters suggested that DOE 

should consider the ‘‘spill-over effects’’ 

across the different nuclear fuel 

industries that might cause indirect 

harm. E.g., Comment of URENCO, at 5. 

Although the commenter did not 

explain what ‘‘spill-over effects’’ it was 

referring to, DOE recognizes that as a 

general matter the interaction between 

the different uranium markets can be 

relevant, particularly the relationship 

between enrichment prices and uranium 

concentrate/conversion prices. As 

enrichment can be used to provide 

additional uranium concentrate as 

uranium hexafluoride—either through 

underfeeding or re-enrichment of tails— 

there is a potential for changes in one 

market to affect the others. However, 

DOE does not believe this should be 

considered as a separate factor. Instead, 

DOE believes these effects are better 

understood and assessed when 

considered as part of the analysis for 

each of the six market factors listed 

above. 

III. Summary of Information Under 

Consideration 

In this section, DOE summarizes for 

each industry the information that DOE 

believes to be relevant with respect to 

the above-listed factors. In addition to 

the 2014 ERI Report, the 2015 ERI 

Report, and the comments received in 

response to the RFI, in some instances 

DOE refers to additional information 

from other sources. Where available, 

DOE provides a link to where these 

documents are available on the Internet. 

A. Uranium Mining Industry 

1. Market Prices 

In preparation for the proposed 

Secretarial Determination, DOE tasked 

ERI with estimating the effect of DOE 

transfers on the market prices for 

uranium concentrates. In the 2015 ERI 

Report, as in previous reports, ERI 

estimated this effect by employing two 

different types of model that rely on 

somewhat different assumptions: A 

market clearing price model and an 

econometric model. For its market 

clearing price model, ERI constructs 

individual supply and demand curves 

and compares the clearing price with 

and without DOE transfers.12 To 

develop its supply curves, ERI gathers 

available information on the costs facing 

each individual supply source. ERI then 

uses that information to estimate the 

marginal cost of supply for each source 

using a discounted cash flow model. 

2015 ERI Report, 41 n.22. To develop its 

demand curve, ERI assumes a perfectly 

inelastic demand curve based on its 

Reference Nuclear Power Growth 

forecast.13 ERI develops this forecast by 

combining estimates of the needs and 

reload schedules for operating plants 

with projections about future reactor 

retirements and new development. 2015 

ERI Report, 17–18. 

Applying this approach to the three 

scenarios listed in Section I.E above— 

2,705 MTU per year (scenario 1), 1,855 

MTU per year (scenario 2), or zero 

transfers (scenario 3)—ERI estimates 

that DOE transfers will have the effects 

listed in Table 1. Transfers at the rate of 

2,705 MTU per year would cause the 

price of uranium concentrates to be 

lower than it would be without DOE 

transfers by, on average, $2.80 between 

2015 and 2024—with prices being $3.00 

and $2.80 lower in 2015 and 2016 

specifically. 2015 ERI Report, 45. For 

DOE transfers at a rate of 1,855 MTU per 

year, ERI estimates that prices would be, 

on average, $2.60 lower between 2015 

and 2024—with prices being $2.10 and 

$1.90 lower in 2015 and 2016 

specifically. If DOE ceased transfers 

under these two programs, ERI estimates 

that prices would be, on average, $1.30 

lower between 2015 and 2024—with 

prices being $0.30 and $0.10 lower in 

2015 and 2016 specifically.14 It is 

important to emphasize that this is not 

a prediction that prices will drop by the 

specified amount once DOE begins 

transfers following a new determination. 

A level of price suppression consistent 

with the estimate for Scenario 1 would, 

on ERI’s analysis, already be reflected in 

the current market price because DOE is 

currently transferring uranium at that 

rate. 2015 ERI Report, 44. This means 

that if DOE continued transferring at 

Scenario 1 levels, the market prices 

would not change; if DOE began 

transferring at Scenario 2 levels, the 

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14112 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Notices 

15 It is more appropriate to compare the estimated 

price effect to the forecasted market price at the 

time of the effect. ERI’s report does not provide 

specific quantifications of the forecasted market 

price in out-years. Thus, it is not possible to list the 

percentage of expected market price with 

specificity. However, DOE notes that, at least with 

respect to the later term projections, ERI predicts 

that market prices will be in the $52 to $57 range 

after 2017. 2015 ERI Report, 52; 2014 ERI Report, 

44. 

16ERI also compared those numbers to then 

current term and spot price indicators as of March 

31, 2014. At that time, the TradeTech price 

indicator was $34.00 per pound U3O8 on the spot 

market and $45.00 per pound U3O8 on the term 

market. 2014 ERI Report, 23. 

market price would be expected to rise 

by approximately $0.90; if DOE ceased 

transfers under these programs, market 

prices would be expected to rise by 

$2.70. See Table 4.1 of 2015 ERI Report, 

45. These prices represent ERI’s 

prediction of the average effect over the 

next decade, rather than for any given 

year. 

TABLE 1—ERI’S ESTIMATE OF EFFECT OF DOE TRANSFERS ON URANIUM CONCENTRATE SPOT AND TERM PRICES

IN $ PER POUND U3O8

[Market clearing approach] 

2015 ERI Report 2014 ERI Report 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2015–2024) 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2014–2023) 

Scenario 1 .................................................................................................................................................... $2.80 $2.90 

Scenario 2 .................................................................................................................................................... 2.60 ..............................

Scenario 3 .................................................................................................................................................... 1.30 ..............................

ERI then compares these numbers to 

the current spot and term price 

indicators published by TradeTech on 

January 31, 2015—i.e. $37.25 per pound 

U3O8 on the spot market, and $50.00 per 

pound U3O8 on the term market. As a 

percentage of the current prices, the 

average price effect attributable to DOE’s 

transfers over the period 2015–2024 

under Scenario 1 represents 

approximately 7.6% of the current spot 

price and 5.7% of the current term 

price. Under Scenario 2, the average 

price effect over the same period 

represents 7.1% of the spot price and 

5.3% of the term price. Under Scenario 

3, the average price effect represents 

3.6% of the spot price and 2.7% of the 

term price. 2015 ERI Report, 47, 49. 

The second model that ERI used to 

predict the effects of DOE transfers 

specifically on the spot price for 

uranium using an econometric model. A 

summary of ERI’s estimates using this 

model appears in Table 2. ERI compared 

the monthly spot and term market 

prices published by TradeTech with 

published offers to sell uranium for 

delivery within one year of publication 

and published inquiries to purchase 

uranium for delivery within one year. 

Based on this information, ERI 

developed a multivariable correlation to 

estimate how the market prices would 

respond to the availability of new 

supply from DOE. 2015 ERI Report, 50. 

Applying this econometric model, ERI 

predicts that transfers under Scenario 1 

would cause the spot price to be lower 

by about $2.40 per pound between 2015 

and 2017 than it would be in the 

absence of transfers, and by about $5.10 

between 2018 and 2024. For Scenario 2, 

ERI estimated that the spot price would 

be lower by about $1.70 per pound 

between 2015 and 2017 than it would be 

without transfers, and by about $4.80 

between 2018 and 2024. For Scenario 3, 

ERI estimated that the spot price would 

be lower by about $0.30 per pound 

between 2015 and 2017, and by $2.00 

between 2018 and 2024. 2015 ERI 

Report, 53. Again, as noted for the 

market clearing analysis, the market 

price currently takes account of the 

already ongoing transfers at the levels of 

Scenario 1. Thus, on ERI’s analysis 

prices already exhibit a level of price 

suppression similar to the level 

predicted in the near term under 

Scenario 1. 2015 ERI Report, 52–53. 

TABLE 2—ERI’S ESTIMATE OF EFFECT OF DOE TRANSFERS ON URANIUM CONCENTRATE SPOT PRICE

IN $ PER POUND U3O8

[Econometric model] 15

2015 ERI Report 2014 ERI Report 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2015–2017) 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2018–2024) 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2014–2016) 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2017–2021) 

Scenario 1 ........................................................................................................ $2.40 $5.10 $2.80 $5.50 

Scenario 2 ........................................................................................................ 1.70 4.80 ........................ ........................

Scenario 3 ........................................................................................................ 0.30 2.00 ........................ ........................

For the 2014 ERI Report, ERI had 

conducted a similar market clearing 

approach for a level of transfers that is 

equal to Scenario 1 of the 2015 ERI 

Report. Although that report used 

slightly older data, the results are very 

similar. Notably, ERI estimated that the 

price effect attributable to DOE transfers 

at the current rates is $2.90 between 

2014 and 2023—with prices being $3.00 

lower in 2014 and 2015, and $2.80 

lower in 2016.16 2014 ERI Report, 40. 

ERI also conducted a similar 

econometric analysis for a level of 

transfers that is equal to Scenario 1. 

2014 ERI Report, 42–45. The 

econometric analysis in the 2014 ERI 

Report estimated a slightly higher price 

effect compared to the 2015 Report. 

Specifically, ERI estimated that DOE 

transfers would cause the spot price to 

be lower by about $2.80 per pound 

between 2014 and 2016, and by about 

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17Figures 16–19 of the TradeTech Report show 

TradeTech’s estimates for the price impact at a 

range of different transfer rates. Although these 

charts and the related text refer to ‘‘Transfers at [25, 

50, or 75] Percent of Established 2014 Volumes,’’ it 

appears that these charts actually reflect an estimate 

for a 25%, 50%, or 75% decrease relative to current 

levels, rather than transfers at the specified 

percentage of current levels. 

18As this report was prepared in April 2014, it 

does not contain updated information on 

developments in the markets since that time. The 

level of uranium transfers that it analyzes is based 

on the levels specified in the May 2012 Secretarial 

Determination, which is roughly similar to the 

current rate of transfers. NAC Report, A–1 to A–3. 

19Additional information about the U–PRICE 

model can be found in Chapter 1 of UxC Uranium 

Market Outlook—Q4 2014, 7–21 (2014). 

$5.50 between 2017 and 2021. 2014 ERI 

Report, 44. The updated analysis in the 

2015 ERI Report produces slightly 

different figures because it relies on 

updated estimates of the amount of DOE 

material expected to affect the markets. 

Compare Table 3.4 of 2014 ERI Report, 

33, with Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 of 2015 

ERI Report, 32–34. 

Three commenters provided their 

own estimates of the price effects of 

DOE transfers. 

UPA attached to its comment a market 

analysis it commissioned from 

TradeTech, LLC, a uranium market 

consultant. Comment of UPA, 

Attachment, TradeTech, ‘‘UPA DOE 

Material Transfer Study’’ (2015) 

(hereinafter ‘‘TradeTech Report’’). A 

summary of TradeTech’s estimates 

appears in Table 3. TradeTech explains 

that it estimated the price effect of DOE 

transfers using its proprietary Dynamic 

Pricing Model. This model is an 

econometric forecasting approach to 

estimate the equilibrium between two 

dimensions TradeTech calls ‘‘active 

supply’’ and ‘‘active demand.’’ In its 

estimates, TradeTech assumes that 50 

percent of DOE transfers enters the spot 

market and 50 percent enters the term 

market. TradeTech Report, 14. Using its 

model, TradeTech estimates that DOE’s 

transfer reduced the spot price by an 

average of $3.55 per pound between 

January 2012 and December 2014. 

TradeTech Report, 15. TradeTech also 

estimates that continued DOE transfers 

at current rates would reduce the spot 

price by an average of $2.43 per pound 

between January 2015 and December 

2016. TradeTech Report, 20. 

TradeTech also provides estimates for 

the effect of DOE transfers at several 

decreased transfer rates. If DOE transfers 

decreased to 75% of current levels, 

TradeTech estimates that the spot price 

would increase by an average of $0.53 

per pound between January 2015 and 

December 2016. TradeTech Report, 

26.17 Based on TradeTech’s estimate of 

the price suppression of DOE transfers 

at current levels, it appears that 

TradeTech is estimating that price 

suppression at 75% of current levels 

would be $1.90. If DOE transfers 

decreased to 50% of current levels, 

TradeTech estimates that the spot price 

would increase by an average of $1.10 

per pound between January 2015 and 

December 2016. TradeTech Report, 25. 

This corresponds to a price suppression 

of $1.33. If DOE transfers decreased to 

25% of current levels, TradeTech 

estimates that the spot price would 

increase by an average of $1.73 per 

pound between January and 2015 and 

December 2016. TradeTech Report, 24. 

This corresponds to a price suppression 

of $0.70. 

TABLE 3—TRADETECH’S ESTIMATE OF

EFFECT OF DOE TRANSFERS ON

URANIUM CONCENTRATE SPOT

PRICE IN $ PER POUND U3O8

TradeTech report 

Transfer rate 

(compared to current) 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2015–2016) 

100% ..................................... $2.43 

75% ....................................... 1.90 

50% ....................................... 1.33 

25% ....................................... 0.70 

Fluor-B&W Portsmouth attached to its 

comment an April 2014 market analysis 

from NAC International (NAC). 

Comment of Fluor-B&W Portsmouth, 

Attachment A, NAC International, 

‘‘Impact of DOE Excess Uranium Sales 

on the U3O8 Market’’ (April 2014) 

(hereinafter ‘‘NAC Report’’).18 In its 

analysis, NAC based its production cost 

estimates on its Uranium Supply 

Analysis System (USAS). NAC updates 

this model each year based on a review 

of various published reports and 

presentations. NAC then applies cost 

models to derive specific cost estimates 

for individual properties. NAC Report, 

C–1. Specifically, NAC applies a 

discounted cash flow rate of return 

model based on both full cost (including 

sunk costs) and forward costs for each 

property. NAC Report, C–2 to C–3. NAC 

also utilized an estimate of reactor 

requirements and uncommitted demand 

developed from its Fuel-Trac database. 

NAC Report, D–1. 

NAC developed a range of estimates 

of the impact of DOE transfers utilizing 

its production cost estimates at three 

different rates: 2,800 MTU per year, 

2,400 MTU per year, and 10% of U.S. 

reactor requirements. NAC Report, 3–21 

to 3–22. First, NAC applied a 

methodology it believes approximates 

ERI’s approach to its own cost estimates. 

Specifically, NAC identified the 

incremental cost of the last property 

needed to meet demand in a given year 

based on total supply and demand. NAC 

Report, 3–22. NAC then explains that 

because long-term contracts with fixed 

pricing mechanisms have allowed some 

high-cost producers to produce ahead of 

lower cost supply, it believes a better 

approach is to base the model on 

uncommitted supply and demand. NAC 

then applies a multiplier to these 

estimates to account for additional 

incremental costs not included in its 

site forward production costs estimate. 

These additional costs include 

increased site forward costs due to 

operation at less than nominal capacity, 

taxes, corporate overhead, and 

variations in the required rate of return. 

NAC Report, 3–23. NAC also applies a 

time shift to the cost trend to account 

for the fact that producers need a price 

signal before investing in a new 

production center—i.e. producers need 

to have prices that justify an investment 

before actually making the investment. 

NAC Report, 3–24. The specific 

quantitative impact projected by NAC is 

withheld from the public version of the 

NAC Report to protect confidential 

information. 

Cameco attached to its comment a 

market analysis it commissioned from 

Ux Consulting Company, LLC (UxC), 

another uranium market consultant. 

Comment of Cameco Corp., Attachment, 

UxC Special Report, ‘‘Impact of DOE 

Inventory Sales on the Nuclear Fuel 

Markets’’ (January 2015) (hereinafter 

‘‘UxC Report’’). A summary of UxC’s 

estimates of the effect of DOE transfers 

on future prices appears in Table 4. UxC 

explains that it estimated the price 

effect of DOE transfers using two 

proprietary econometric models: The U– 

PRICE model and the SWU–PRICE 

model. UxC explains that these models 

were developed using historical data on 

the nuclear fuel markets collected and 

compiled by UxC. These two models 

take into account and quantify the 

impact of ‘‘key factors influencing the 

markets.’’ UxC also explains that the 

two models can be linked to simulate 

the interrelationship between uranium 

concentrates and enrichment. UxC 

Report, 3.19

Using these two models, UxC 

estimates the effects of DOE transfers 

using two slightly different 

methodologies. For the first approach, 

what UxC calls the ‘‘incremental 

approach,’’ UxC does not include the 

cumulative impact of previous years’ 

transfers. The second approach, which 

UxC calls the ‘‘total impact approach,’’ 

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20Enrichers can change the amount of natural 

uranium needed as input (‘‘feed’’) by applying a 

greater or lesser amount of enrichment work to a 

given amount of feed. ‘‘Underfeeding’’ refers to 

when enrichers ply a greater amount of enrichment 

work to an amount of feed, thus requiring less feed 

to achieve the same amount of enriched product. 21 In addition to ‘‘underfeeding,’’ enrichers can 

apply additional enrichment work to existing 

depleted uranium from past enrichment processes 

by feeding them back into the enrichment process. 

This process is often called ‘‘re-enrichment’’ of 

tails. 22ERI’s market clearing price analysis, for 

example, includes material from underfeeding as 

‘‘Secondary Supply.’’ However, ERI does not 

consider how a change in uranium concentrate and/ 

or conversion prices would affect the price of SWU 

or the level of underfeeding present in secondary 

supply. 

includes sales from previous years. UxC 

argues that previous years’ sales should 

be included because ‘‘such sales have a 

longer-term effect on market perceptions 

among both buyers and sellers. In 

particular, the increased supplies from 

DOE’s sales and transfers removed 

market opportunities available to other 

uranium suppliers.’’ UxC Report, 5. 

Using its incremental approach, UxC 

estimates that between 2012 and 2014 

DOE’s transfer reduced the spot price by 

an average of $4.50 per pound and the 

term price by an average of $2.88 per 

pound. Using its total impact approach, 

UxC estimates that between 2008 and 

2014 DOE’s transfers reduced the spot 

price by an average of $7.11 per pound 

and the term price by an average of 

$5.10 per pound. UxC Report, 6–7. 

UxC also estimates the effect of DOE 

continued transfers at current rates for 

the period 2015 to 2030. UxC estimates 

that DOE transfers in the near and 

medium terms would reduce the spot 

price by an average of $5.78 per pound. 

UxC projects that this effect will change 

slightly in the medium term as market 

prices start to recover. Specifically, DOE 

transfers will reduce the spot price 

between 2018 and 2030 by an average of 

$4.47 per pound. UxC also notes that 

the former number is larger relative to 

the expected price of uranium than the 

latter number (14.1% versus 7.1%). UxC 

Report, 10. UxC estimates that DOE 

transfers in the near and medium terms 

would reduce the term price by an 

average of $4.86 per pound. Between 

2018 and 2030, DOE transfers are 

estimated to reduce the term price by an 

average of $5.30 per pound. Again, the 

near and medium term impact is larger 

in relation to the expected price (9.0% 

versus 7.1%). UxC Report, 11. 

TABLE 4—UXC’S ESTIMATE OF EFFECT OF DOE TRANSFERS ON URANIUM CONCENTRATE SPOT AND TERM PRICES IN $ 

PER POUND U3O8

UxC Report 

Near- & midterm price 

effect 

Percent of 

expected price 

Long-term 

price effect 

Percent of 

expected price 

Spot Price ........................................................................................................ $5.78 14.1 $4.47 7.1 

Term Price ....................................................................................................... 4.86 9.0 5.30 7.1 

UxC puts particular focus on the 

interrelationship between the uranium 

and enrichment markets. UxC states that 

uranium and SWU are ‘‘substitutes.’’ 

Thus, UxC uses enrichment prices as an 

input into its uranium concentrate price 

forecast, and vice versa. UxC Report, 5, 

8, 17. DOE understands that this 

interplay can take several forms. First, 

to the extent that enrichers have unsold 

enrichment capacity, they may apply 

that excess capacity to underfeeding 20

and/or re-enriching DUF6 tails.21 This 

essentially allows enrichers to produce 

additional natural uranium 

hexafluoride, which could then be sold 

on the open market. Second, if the price 

of enrichment decreases relative to the 

price of uranium concentrates, the 

optimum tails assay decreases, requiring 

customers to deliver less natural 

uranium feed to get the same amount of 

enriched uranium output. 

The other market analyses do not 

appear to take these interplays into 

account.22 But DOE believes the price 

interplay would be small, and the two 

effects may potentially offset. Since only 

some of DOE inventories contain an 

enrichment component, DOE materials 

can be expected to have a larger 

proportional effect on the uranium 

concentrates and conversion markets as 

compared to the enrichment market. At 

current rates, ERI estimates that DOE 

transfers in 2015 under Scenario 1 

would represent 4%, 5%, and 2% of 

that year’s global requirements for 

uranium, conversion, and enrichment, 

respectively. Since DOE inventories are 

a greater proportion of uranium and 

conversion requirements, it seems likely 

that the effect of DOE transfers would be 

to slightly increase the ratio of SWU 

price to UF6 price. This would increase 

the optimum tails assay, which may 

actually increase demand for uranium 

concentrates slightly. In addition, 

practices in the industry suggest that the 

enrichment component of DOE material 

does not displace primary production at 

existing facilities. Enrichers typically do 

not increase centrifuge capacity without 

long-term contracts in place to purchase 

the output. Comment of URENCO, Inc., 

at 2. Also, some in the market have 

chosen to allow older centrifuges to 

retire without being replaced instead of 

retaining excess capacity. 2015 ERI 

Report, 16; UxC Enrichment Market 

Outlook—Q4 2014, 11 (2014). Thus, it is 

far from clear that for every SWU 

contained within DOE material, a 

corresponding amount of primary 

production becomes excess capacity 

available for tails re-enrichment or 

underfeeding. Considering this 

information as a whole, it does not 

appear that the interrelationship 

between the enrichment and uranium 

markets will significantly affect how 

DOE’s material affects uranium market 

prices. 

2. Realized Prices of Current Operators 

ERI states that realized price varies 

from one company to another. To 

estimate the realized prices for U.S. 

producers, ERI gathered information 

from public filings representing 

approximately 95% of U.S. production. 

2015 ERI Report, 60–61. ERI does not 

list the specific dollar figures, but it 

provides a graph of how realized 

uranium prices have changed over time 

for several U.S. producers. This graph 

shows that realized prices declined for 

most primary producers in 2014. Even 

with this decline, ERI estimates that 

several producers achieved realized 

prices in 2014 well above the average 

spot price over the course of the year. 

At least one producer achieved a 

realized price well above the average 

term price for 2014. 2015 ERI Report, 

61. 

ERI reports that some mining 

companies have negotiated contracts 

that base the price paid at least partially 

on a fixed or base-escalated pricing 

mechanism. As an example, ERI reports 

that Cameco has reported that the price 

sensitivity of its current contract 

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23These two figures do not differentiate between 

U.S.-origin versus foreign material. However, EIA 

reports that the weighted average price of U.S. 

origin material is higher than the average for all 

foreign material. EIA, 2013 Uranium Marketing 

Report, 20 (2014). 

24As calculated according to monthly price 

indicator data from UxC. 

25Note that EIA’s figure includes purchases of 

U.S.-origin uranium as well as purchases from a 

firm located in the United States. Therefore, this 

number includes uranium from sources other than 

the domestic uranium industry. EIA reports that 

approximately 9.5 million pounds of U.S. origin 

uranium was delivered to U.S. reactor operators in 

2013. EIA, Uranium Marketing Report, 20 (2014). 

portfolio is about 50% of any change in 

spot market price. ERI estimates that 

less than 30% of U.S. production 

currently comes from companies that 

are effectively unhedged against 

changes in spot price. 2015 ERI Report, 

60–61. 

TradeTech also provides its estimates 

of the decline in realized price for 

several producers—both U.S. and 

foreign. Although TradeTech does not 

provide specific figures, it provides 

information on several firms in chart 

form. It appears from the chart that 

among the firms for which TradeTech 

provides estimates, realized prices in 

2013 varied from as low as about $38 to 

as high as about $57. For most 

producers, there was a decline in 

realized price between 2011 and 2013. 

The magnitude of that decline ranges 

from approximately $12 to as low as $2 

or $3. TradeTech Report, 13. TradeTech 

notes that one reason for declining 

realized prices is the expiration of longterm contracts signed when prices were 

substantially higher. TradeTech Report, 

12. 

NAC similarly notes that some higher 

cost suppliers have locked in higher 

prices through fixed price contracts that 

allow them to realize prices greater than 

current market prices. NAC Report, 3– 

22. NAC also provides its estimated 

supply capability broken down by 

production cost. The specific figures are 

withheld from the public version of the 

NAC Report to protect confidential 

information. NAC Report, 3–9 to 3–11. 

Although NAC estimates the effect of 

DOE transfers on market price, as 

described above, NAC does not provide 

specific estimates of the effect on the 

price realized by individual producers. 

EIA reports several figures that are 

relevant to the prices realized by current 

production facility operators. EIA 

reports that the weighted average price 

in sales directly from U.S. producers in 

2013 was $44.65. EIA, 2013 Uranium 

Production Report, 7 (2014). Similarly, 

EIA reports that the weighted average 

price paid by U.S. reactor operators in 

2013 was $51.99 per pound U3O8

equivalent (per lb U3O8). EIA, 2013 

Uranium Marketing Report, 4 (2014). 

EIA provides comparatively more 

information on the price paid by U.S. 

reactor operators. Although EIA does 

not provide a complete range of prices, 

it does report that the bottom 7.1 

million pounds U3O8 equivalent 

(approximately 1⁄8th of uranium 

delivered in 2013) purchased by U.S. 

operators had a weighted average price 

of $34.34. The top 7.1 million pounds 

had a weighted average price of 

$72.62.23 EIA, 2013 Uranium Marketing 

Report, 26. EIA also provides average 

prices broken down by origin—foreign 

vs. U.S.—and by seller—U.S. producer, 

U.S. brokers and traders, other U.S. 

suppliers (i.e. other reactor operators, 

converters, enrichers, or fabricators), 

and foreign suppliers. The weighted 

average price in 2013 for U.S. origin 

uranium was $56.37 per lb U3O8. The 

weighted average price in 2013 from 

U.S. brokers and traders was $50.44. For 

2013, EIA does not report the weighted 

average price of uranium purchased by 

U.S. reactor operators directly from U.S. 

producers to avoid disclosure of 

individual company data. However, in 

recent years when that value is reported, 

it has been above the average price paid 

for U.S. origin uranium. EIA, 2013 

Uranium Marketing Report, 4 (2014). 

For comparison, DOE notes that the 

2013 average spot price was around 

$39.00 and the average term price was 

around $54.00.24

EIA provides data about sales using 

different pricing mechanisms. EIA 

reports that of the approximately 23.3 

million pounds U3O8 equivalent 

purchased by U.S. reactor operators 

from domestic sources 25 and delivered 

in 2013, 14.5 million pounds were 

purchased based on fixed or baseescalated pricing—approximately 

62.3%—with a weighted-average price 

of $54.95. Approximately 3.6 million 

pounds were purchased based purely on 

spot-market pricing—approximately 

15.6%—with a weighted-average price 

of $42.55. The remaining 5.1 million 

pounds—approximately 22%—was sold 

based on some other pricing mechanism 

with a weighted average price of $52.68. 

EIA, Uranium Marketing Report, 24 

(2014). 

3. Production at Existing Facilities 

ERI reports that U.S. production has 

risen since the DOE uranium inventory 

transfers in December 2009. In 2014, 

production was 5% higher compared to 

the previous year. However, ERI reports 

that production in 2015 is expected to 

decline to 2013 levels. 2015 ERI Report, 

58. Since 2009, four new operations 

have begun production: Willow Creek in 

2010, Hobson/Palangana in late 2010/

early 2011, Lost Creek in 2013, and 

Nichols Ranch in 2014. ERI also reports 

that one additional production center is 

expected to begin operations in 2015. 

Despite these new operations, ERI notes 

that several conventional and in-situ 

leach operations have scaled back 

operations. 2015 ERI Report, 57. 

After reporting this information, ERI 

presents a chart showing the price levels 

at the time cutbacks were announced at 

various U.S. suppliers. ERI reports price 

points for four operations: $45 per 

pound in the spot market for 

conventional mines in Utah; $40 per 

pound in the spot market for two insitu-leach operations; and $35 per 

pound in the spot market for additional 

conventional mines and a uranium mill. 

2015 ERI Report, 62. 

ERI then estimates average production 

costs for existing mines by referring to 

EIA’s published data on production 

expenditures across the uranium 

industry. Using a three year average to 

smooth out year-to-year differences, ERI 

notes that average production costs have 

remained fairly constant since 2009 at 

about $40 per pound. 2015 ERI Report, 

63. ERI further reports that it estimates 

production costs at U.S. in-situ-leach 

facilities to range from the low $30s to 

the mid $40s per pound. ERI concludes 

that the pattern of cutbacks and 

estimated production costs ‘‘do not 

seem to indicate that adding back the $3 

per pound price effect attributed to all 

DOE inventory material for Scenario 1 

would move current prices enough to 

cause U.S. producers to ramp well field 

development and production activities 

back up.’’ 2015 ERI Report, 64. ERI 

further notes that the spot price would 

remain near $40 per pound and ‘‘may 

still not be sufficient for higher cost ISL 

producers to restart well field 

development or higher cost 

conventional mines to resume mining 

activities, and likely would not have 

prevented the decisions to cut back 

when prices declined to $35/lb in mid 

2013 and then below $30/lb in mid 

2014.’’ 2015 ERI Report, 64. 

The 2014 ERI Report came to similar 

conclusions using similar methodology. 

That report noted that despite the 

overall increase in uranium production 

in recent years, there have been 

production cuts at several operations. 

2014 ERI Report, 49. ERI also provided 

a chart of production cut 

announcements and the then-current 

spot and term prices. 2014 ERI Report, 

58. ERI noted that some uranium 

producers report costs in public filings, 

but these costs are not reported 

consistently across firms and generally 

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26This figure includes information on some 

projects that are not part of the domestic uranium 

mining industry, such as Uranium One’s Kazakh 

projects. 

27NAC defines ‘‘under development’’ as a 

property for which ground breaking has begun. 

Note that NAC considers ten properties worldwide 

to be ‘‘under development’’; they are not limited to 

U.S. properties. NAC Report, 3–11. 

do not include royalties and severance 

taxes or the cost of ongoing wellfield 

development at in-situ-leach operations. 

ERI’s estimate of average industry-wide 

production costs is the same as in the 

2015 ERI Report—i.e. approximately 

$40 per pound. 2014 ERI Report, 59. 

TradeTech predicts a ‘‘potential 

reduction in the number of market 

participants.’’ TradeTech Report, 21. It 

then applies the price effect it estimates 

for DOE transfers to a hypothetical 

uranium producer with a production 

cost of $47.41 per pound. See Figure 15 

of TradeTech Report, 22. TradeTech 

does not apply its estimate to any 

particular producer. TradeTech does, 

however, provide estimates for the 

production costs of several firms in both 

2011 and 2013.26 Although TradeTech 

does not provide specific cost data, it 

does provide information on several 

firms in chart form. It appears from the 

chart that among the firms TradeTech 

provides estimates for, production costs 

in 2013 varied from as low as $30 to as 

high as $50. TradeTech also notes that 

many producers have been able to 

reduce or stabilize costs in recent years. 

This is also reflected in the difference 

between the producers’ costs in 2011 

and in 2013. TradeTech Report, 13. 

As noted above, NAC provides 

estimated production cost ranges for 

segments of current supply, but it does 

not directly estimate the effect of DOE 

transfers on production levels. NAC 

Report, 3–9 to 3–11. 

UxC does not provide any specific 

estimates of production levels or costs at 

currently operating facilities. However, 

in other reports, UxC outlines detailed 

estimates for individual mines. UxC 

Uranium Market Outlook—Q4 2014, 76– 

78 (2014); UxC Uranium Production 

Cost Study, 80–84 (Aug. 2013). 

In addition to the information 

described above, DOE has considered 

information from EIA reports. EIA 

reports on production in the domestic 

uranium industry on a quarterly and 

annual basis. EIA’s most recent 

quarterly report provides preliminary 

data for 2014. U.S. primary production 

in 2014 stood at 4.9 million pounds 

U3O8. This is about 5% higher than in 

2013 and 15% higher than in 2012. In 

fact, this represents the highest 

production total in any calendar year 

since 1997. EIA, Domestic Uranium 

Production Report Q4 2014, 2 (January 

2015). The same number of uranium 

concentrate processing facilities— 

seven—operated in 2014 as in 2013. EIA 

reports that the White Mesa 

conventional mill halted production in 

the fourth quarter of 2014 and that the 

Nichols Ranch in-situ-leach plant began 

operation in the second quarter of 2014. 

EIA Domestic Uranium Production 

Report Q4 2014, 3–6 (January 2015). 

4. Employment Levels in the Industry 

DOE has considered information 

contained from EIA reports relating to 

employment in the domestic uranium 

production industry. EIA’s most recent 

Uranium Production Report states that 

employment stood at 1,156 person-years 

in 2013, 1,196 person-years in 2012, and 

1,191 person-years in 2011. EIA, 2013 

Uranium Production Report, 10 (May 

2014). 

In its analysis, ERI compared EIA’s 

employment figures with changes in 

uranium spot and term prices. Based on 

a statistical correlation, ERI infers that 

employment responds to changes in 

price. 2015 ERI Report, 73. ERI then 

uses this correlation to estimate that the 

decrease in uranium prices over the 

course of 2014 resulted in a loss of 114 

person-years from the 2013 value of 

1,156. 2015 ERI Report, 55. ERI then 

estimates that the price effect it 

attributes to DOE transfers lowered 

employment by 41 person years in 2013, 

and 44 person years in 2014. 2015 ERI 

Report, 56. ERI further estimates that 

price effects due to DOE transfers at the 

levels described in Scenario 1 would 

result in an average employment loss of 

42 person years over the next 10 years. 

For Scenario 2 and 3, ERI estimated that 

the average employment loss would be 

39 and 21 person years, respectively. 

Again, it is important to note that this 

estimate is not a prediction that the 

uranium production industry under 

Scenario 1 would shed 42 jobs in 2015 

and each subsequent year. Instead, this 

figure reflects ERI’s estimate that total 

employment in the industry would be 

higher by an average of 42 person-years 

without DOE transfers compared to with 

DOE transfers. 

For the 2014 ERI Report, ERI 

conducted a similar analysis and came 

to broadly similar conclusions. It 

estimated an employment loss of 50 

person-years for 2013, and an average 

loss of 44 person years over the course 

of 2014–2023. 2014 ERI Report, 48. 

Though no commenter provided 

specific numbers, several referred to 

decreases in employment in recent years 

caused by decreases in uranium prices. 

E.g., Comment of Mark S. Pelizza, at 1. 

Some commenters stated that the 

uranium production industry has lost 

half its workforce since May 2012 

without providing supporting data. 

Comment of UPA, at 2; comment of 

Uranerz, at 2. Although several stated 

that DOE transfers were causing a 

portion of these losses, no commenter 

estimated the proportion of recent 

employment decreases attributable to 

DOE transfers. TradeTech Report, 21– 

22; UxC Report, 5. 

5. Changes in Capital Improvement 

Plans and Development of Future 

Facilities 

As stated above, ERI reports that four 

new production centers began operation 

since 2009: one in 2010, one in late 

2010/early 2011, one in 2013, and one 

in 2014. In addition, one new 

production center—Peninsula’s Lance— 

is expected to begin operations in 2015. 

2015 ERI Report, 57. ERI explains that 

the new production centers may have 

been able to begin operations only 

because they were supported by fixed 

price term contracts that were signed 

when prices were substantially higher 

than they are currently—i.e. $55 to $70 

per pound term price. At least one of 

these companies has directly stated that 

its project would not have been able to 

proceed at current price levels—$45 to 

$50 per pound term price. ERI also 

reports that some owners of proposed 

conventional mines outside the U.S. 

have stated that prices in the range of 

$60 to $70 per pound would be 

necessary for further development. 2015 

ERI Report, 61. 

Based on the above, ERI concludes, 

‘‘[i]t does not appear that removing the 

DOE inventory from the market and 

adding back the $2 to $3 per pound 

price effect attributed to the DOE 

inventory material . . . would 

necessarily increase current prices 

enough to change the situation 

regarding the viability of new 

production centers in the U.S.’’ 2015 

ERI Report, 62. However, ERI reports 

that some lower cost ISL projects in the 

U.S. may be able to move forward at 

current prices. 2015 ERI Report, 62. 

The 2014 ERI Report came to similar 

conclusions. 2014 ERI Report, 57. It 

noted that despite the overall increase 

in uranium production in recent years, 

there have been production cuts at 

several operations. 2014 ERI Report, 49. 

ERI also reported the same prices that it 

believed would be required to motivate 

further development as it reports the 

2015 report. 2014 ERI Report, 57. 

NAC provides estimates of the site 

forward cost including rate of return for 

ten properties it considers to be under 

development.27 The specific figures are 

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28ERI assumes that China’s discretionary strategic 

inventory building will taper off by 2023. 2015 ERI 

Report, 10. 

29 DOE notes that uranium ‘‘demand’’ and reactor 

‘‘requirements’’ are different. Requirements refers to 

an estimate of the amount of uranium needed to 

support operating reactors in a particular year. 

Demand includes additional purchased quantities 

for strategic or discretionary purposes. For example, 

in recent years China has purchased quantities of 

uranium far in excess of its reactor requirements. 

2015 ERI Report, 10–11; TradeTech Report, 41–42; 

NAC Report, 3–2 to 3–5. 

30TradeTech’s charts appear to assume China’s 

stock building purchases will cease to outpace 

Chinese requirements around 2023. TradeTech 

Report, 41–42. 

31Converted from metric tons uranium in U3O8

(MTU) using a conversion rate of 2,599.79 pounds 

U3O8 per MTU. 

32This represents OECD–IAEA’s low growth 

scenario. The high growth scenario anticipates 

growth of almost 90 million pounds, approximately 

50% above the high-growth scenario for 2015. Id. 

withheld from the public version of the 

NAC Report to protect confidential 

information. NAC Report, 3–11 to 3–12. 

NAC does not directly apply its estimate 

of the price effect of DOE transfers to the 

production costs for these specific 

properties. 

EIA reports that production 

expenditures were $168.8 million in 

2011, $187 million in 2012 and $168 

million in 2013—when spread across 

annual production, these numbers 

represent approximately $41 per pound 

in 2011, $43 per pound in 2012 and $36 

per pound in 2013. EIA, 2013 Domestic 

Uranium Production Report, 7, 11 

(2014). Including costs related to 

drilling between 2009 and 2013 raises 

this figure by about $10–15 per pound, 

and including land, exploration, and 

reclamation costs in those years 

increases these figures by a further $19– 

24 per pound. EIA, 2013 Domestic 

Uranium Production Report, 7, 11 

(2014). 

EIA also provides a table of different 

facilities and their operating statuses. 

EIA reports one uranium mill in 

development as of the 4th quarter 

2014—in the ‘‘permitted and licensed’’ 

stage. EIA, Domestic Uranium 

Production Report Q4 2014, 4 (January 

2015). EIA reports eight in-situ-leach 

plants under development—two in the 

‘‘developing’’ stage, three that are 

‘‘partially permitted and licensed,’’ two 

that are ‘‘permitted and licensed,’’ and 

one that is ‘‘under construction.’’ EIA, 

Domestic Uranium Production Report 

Q4 2014, 5–6 (January 2015). 

6. Long-Term Viability and Health of the 

Industry 

As described above, ERI notes that US 

industry production has risen since the 

start of DOE uranium inventory barters 

in December 2009. ERI also notes that 

four new operations began production 

since 2009, and one additional 

production center is expected to begin 

operations in 2015. 2015 ERI Report, 57. 

ERI also presents its future 

expectations regarding demand for 

uranium. ERI’s most recent Reference 

Nuclear Power Growth forecasts project 

global requirements to grow to 

approximately 182 million pounds 

annually between 2018 and 2020, 

approximately 15% higher than current 

requirements. Global requirements are 

expected to continue to rise to a level 

of 203 million pounds in 2025, 

approximately 28% higher than current 

requirements. 2015 ERI Report, 6–7. ERI 

presents a graph comparing global 

requirements, demand, and supply from 

2013—2035. That graph shows that 

global secondary supply and supply 

from current mines will continue to 

exceed global reactor demand until 

approximately 2018. However, if 

China’s practice of purchasing amounts 

of uranium well in excess of its current 

reactor demand is included—what ERI 

terms ‘‘Discretionary Strategic’’ 

demand—global demand approximately 

equals supply from secondary supply 

and currently operating mines. 2015 ERI 

Report, 9–10. If planned expansions and 

new mines under development are 

included, supply is expected to exceed 

demand until approximately 2024, 

regardless of whether ‘‘Discretionary 

Strategic’’ demand is included.28 In the 

time period following 2025, ERI’s graph 

shows demand significantly 

outstripping supply. 2015 ERI Report, 9. 

In order to meet this demand, ERI 

anticipates that mines it terms 

‘‘planned’’ and ‘‘prospective’’ will need 

to begin operations. 2015 ERI Report, 

11. 

A variety of other sources predict 

substantial increases in reactor 

requirements and/or demand.29

TradeTech reports reactor-only growth 

at 3.52% per year through 2024. Total 

uranium requirements growth is much 

slower during this period due to stock 

building purchases which taper 

downward.30 TradeTech Report, 34. The 

OECD and IAEA report that reactor 

requirements are expected to grow by at 

least 35.4 million pounds 31 by 2025— 

representing approximately 21% of 

2015 requirements.32 OECD–IAEA, 

Uranium 2014: Resource, Production, 

and Demand, 105 (2014). In its Uranium 

Market Outlook for the 4th quarter of 

2014, UxC similarly predicts significant 

increases in both requirements and 

demand in the long-term. UxC Uranium 

Market Outlook—Q4 2014, 56–60 

(2014). 

In addition to a predicted increase in 

demand, several sources predict a 

recovery in either spot or term uranium 

prices—or both. ERI notes that term 

prices are expected to increase in the 

future, but does not provide a specific 

forecast. 2015 ERI Report, 46. ERI’s 

econometric model, however, does 

show an increase in the spot price. 

Specifically, ERI’s chart forecasts that 

spot prices will recover over the course 

of 2015–2018 eventually settling in the 

$52–57 range after 2019. 2015 ERI 

Report, 52. TradeTech’s forecasted 

Exchange Value predicts an increase in 

spot price to approximately $50 as early 

as June 2016, even with DOE transfers. 

TradeTech Report, 20. UxC’s estimates 

of the effect of DOE transfers assume 

that market conditions will improve in 

the medium term. Specific price levels 

are withheld from Figures 5 and 6 of the 

public version to protect confidential 

information. UxC Report, 10–11. In its 

annual Uranium Market Outlook, UxC 

provides a more detailed explanation of 

its price forecast, which generally 

predicts an increase in price over the 

next 10 years. UxC Uranium Market 

Outlook—Q4 2014, 111–19 (2014). 

Finally, DOE recognizes that the 

predictability of transfers from its excess 

uranium inventory over time is 

important to the long-term viability and 

health of the uranium industries. ERI 

has noted the importance of 

predictability ‘‘for long-term planning 

and investment decisions by the 

domestic industry.’’ 2015 ERI Report, 

100; 2014 ERI Report, 60–61. Some 

commenters also stated that DOE 

transfers should be predictable. 

Comment of UPA, at 2; comment of 

Cameco, at 2. DOE notes that the upper 

scenario considered by ERI would 

represent continued transfers at rates 

consistent with the May 2014 

determination and roughly similar to 

the May 2012 determination. Compare 

2015 ERI Report, 25, with 2014 ERI 

Report, 28. 

B. Uranium Conversion Industry 

1. Market Prices 

In its analysis, ERI estimates the effect 

of DOE transfers on the market prices 

for conversion services. To estimate this 

effect, ERI employed a market clearing 

price model very similar to what is 

described above for the uranium market. 

As with uranium concentrates, ERI 

constructed individual supply and 

demand curves for conversion services 

and estimated the clearing price with 

and without DOE transfers. 2015 ERI 

Report, 44. A summary of ERI’s 

estimates of the effect of DOE transfers 

on the conversion price appears in 

Table 5. 

Applying this approach to the three 

scenarios listed above, ERI estimates 

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33As noted above, the transfer rates for these 

scenarios refer only to the level of uranium transfers 

for cleanup at Portsmouth and downblending of 

LEU. The level of transfers for other DOE programs 

is the same in all three scenarios. 

34ERI also compared those numbers to then 

current term and spot price indicators as of March 

31, 2014. At that time, the TradeTech price 

indicator was $7.50 per kgU as UF6 on the spot 

market and $16.00 per kgU as UF6 on the term 

market. 2014 ERI Report, 23. 35Figures 21–24 of the TradeTech Report show 

TradeTech’s estimates for the price impact at a 

range of different transfer rates. Although these 

charts and the related text refer to ‘‘Transfers at [25, 

50, or 75] Percent of Established 2014 Volumes,’’ it 

appears that these charts actually reflect an estimate 

for a 25%, 50%, or 75% decrease relative to current 

levels, rather than transfers at the specified 

percentage of current levels. 

that DOE transfers at the rate of 2,705 

MTU per year would cause the price of 

conversion services to be, on average, 

$0.90 lower between 2015 and 2024— 

with prices being $0.90 lower in 2015 

and 2016 specifically. 2015 ERI Report, 

45. For DOE transfers at a rate of 1,855 

MTU per year, ERI estimates that prices 

would be, on average, $0.80 lower 

between 2015 and 2024—with prices 

being $0.70 and $0.60 lower in 2015 and 

2016, respectively. If DOE ceased 

transfers under these two programs, ERI 

estimates that prices would be, on 

average, $0.40 lower between 2015 and 

2024—with prices being $0.10 and 

$0.00 lower in 2015 and 2016, 

respectively.33 As with uranium 

concentrates, this is not a prediction 

that prices will drop by the specified 

amount once DOE begins transfers. 

According to ERI’s analysis, a level of 

price suppression consistent with the 

estimate for Scenario 1 is already 

reflected in the current market price for 

conversion services. 2015 ERI Report, 

44. If DOE continues transferring at 

Scenario 1 levels, the market prices 

would not change; if DOE began 

transferring at Scenario 2 levels, the 

market price would be expected to rise 

by approximately $0.20; if DOE ceased 

transfers under these programs, market 

prices would be expected to rise by 

$0.80. See Table 4.2 of 2015 ERI Report, 

45. 

ERI compares these numbers to the 

current spot and term price indicators 

published by TradeTech on January 31, 

2015—i.e. $8.50 per kgU as UF6 on the 

spot market, and $16.00 per kgU as UF6

on the term market. As a percentage of 

the current prices, the average price 

effect attributable to DOE’s transfers 

over the period 2015–2024 under 

Scenario 1 represents approximately 

10.6% of the current spot price and 

5.6% of the current term price. Under 

Scenario 2, the average price effect over 

the same period represents 9.9% of the 

spot price and 5.2% of the term price. 

Under Scenario 3, the average price 

effect represents 5.0% of the spot price 

and 2.7% of the term price. 2015 ERI 

Report, 47, 49. 

For the 2014 ERI Report, ERI 

conducted a similar market clearing 

approach for a level of transfers that is 

equal to Scenario 1 of the 2015 ERI 

Report. Although that report used 

slightly older data, the results are very 

similar. Notably, ERI estimated that the 

price effect attributable to DOE transfers 

at the current rates is $0.90 between 

2014 and 2023—with prices being $0.90 

lower in 2014, 2015, and 2016.34 2014 

ERI Report, 40. 

TABLE 5—ERI’S ESTIMATE OF EFFECT OF DOE TRANSFERS ON CONVERSION SPOT AND TERM PRICES

IN $ PER kgU AS UF6

2015 ERI Report 2014 ERI Report 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2015–2024) 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2014–2023) 

Scenario 1 .................................................................................................................................................... $0.90 $0.90 

Scenario 2 .................................................................................................................................................... 0.80 ..............................

Scenario 3 .................................................................................................................................................... 0.40 ..............................

In addition to its estimate of the price 

effect of DOE transfers on the uranium 

concentrate market, TradeTech 

estimates the effect on the price of 

conversion services. A summary of 

TradeTech’s estimates appears in Table 

6. It appears that TradeTech developed 

this estimate using its econometric 

Dynamic Pricing Model. TradeTech 

Report, 14. Using its model, TradeTech 

estimates that DOE’s transfer reduced 

the spot price by an average of $2.13 per 

kgU as UF6 between January 2012 and 

December 2014. TradeTech Report, 17. 

TradeTech also estimates that continued 

DOE transfers at current rates would 

reduce the spot price by an average of 

$0.91 per kgU as UF6 between January 

2015 and December 2016. TradeTech 

Report, 21. 

TradeTech also provides estimates for 

the effect of DOE transfers of several 

decreased transfer rates. If DOE transfers 

decreased to 75% of current levels, 

TradeTech estimates that the spot price 

would increase by an average of $0.21 

per kgU as UF6 between January and 

2015 and December 2016. TradeTech, 

31.35 Based on TradeTech’s estimate of 

the price suppression of DOE transfers 

at current levels, it appears that 

TradeTech is estimating that price 

suppression at 75% of current levels 

would be $0.70. If DOE transfers 

decreased to 50% of current levels, 

TradeTech estimates that the spot price 

would increase by an average of $0.43 

per kgU as UF6 between January and 

2015 and December 2016. TradeTech, 

30. This corresponds to a price 

suppression of $0.48. If DOE transfers 

decreased to 25% of current levels, 

TradeTech estimates that the spot price 

would increase by an average of $0.66 

per kgU as UF6 between January and 

2015 and December 2016. TradeTech, 

29. This corresponds to a price 

suppression of $0.25. 

TABLE 6—TRADETECH’S ESTIMATE OF

EFFECT OF DOE TRANSFERS ON

CONVERSION SPOT PRICE IN $ PER

kgU AS UF6

TradeTech report 

Transfer rate 

(compared to current) 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2015–2016) 

100% ..................................... $0.91 

75% ....................................... 0.70 

50% ....................................... 0.48 

25% ....................................... 0.25 

UxC’s U–PRICE and SWU–PRICE 

econometric models predict the 

markets’ reaction to changes in supply 

for the uranium concentrate and 

enrichment industries. UxC does not 

directly model the conversion services 

market. Instead, UxC relies on other 

evidence to conclude that the price 

effect of DOE transfers on spot 

conversion prices have been ‘‘at least 

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36 It appears that ERI developed this assumption 

based on its estimate of ConverDyn’s production 

costs of $15 per kgU. Since ConverDyn claims to be operating at a loss, ERI assumes that its realized 

price must be lower. 2015 ERI Report, 70. 

equal to, if not greater than, the impact 

on spot uranium prices.’’ Specifically, 

UxC notes that much of the world’s spot 

conversion is sold in conjunction with 

uranium through contracts for UF6. UxC 

also notes that over the past few years 

the UF6 price has fallen as much as the 

U3O8 price has on a percentage basis. 

Finally, UxC notes that the Ux North 

American UF6 Price has been below the 

Ux NA UF6 value (i.e. the sum of spot 

uranium and spot conversion prices for 

a given quantity of UF6) over most of the 

period of DOE transfers. UxC Report, 15. 

With respect to the future effect of DOE 

transfers, UxC expects that DOE 

transfers will continue to have a similar 

effect on spot conversion prices and a 

somewhat less but still ‘‘noticeable’’ 

effect on term conversion prices. UxC 

Report, 16. 

2. Realized Prices of Current Operators 

ERI does not provide in either report 

a specific estimate of the change in 

ConverDyn’s realized price due to DOE 

transfers. However, ERI does note that 

ConverDyn’s realized price is believed 

to have increased over the past decade, 

although ERI says unit costs have 

increased as well. ERI bases its sales 

revenue assumptions on a sale price of 

$14 per kgU. This estimate appears to be 

based predominately on claims by the 

company that it is operating at a loss. 

2015 ERI Report, 70; 2014 ERI Report, 

70.36

No commenter provides specific 

information about the current realized 

prices achieved in the conversion 

industry, and no commenter directly 

estimates the effect of DOE’s transfers 

on realized prices. However, some 

information relevant to ConverDyn’s 

realized price is publicly available. 

ConverDyn has stated in the past that 

the conversion market generally relies 

on long-term contracts. Declaration of 

Malcolm Critchley, Converdyn v. Moniz, 

Case no. 1:14-cv-01012–RBW, 

Document 7–3, at ¶ 37 (June 23, 2014); 

see also UxC Conversion Market 

Outlook—December 2014, 27–28, 32 

(2014). Traxys has stated that 

ConverDyn specifically sells conversion 

services ‘‘almost exclusively’’ on longterm contracts. Declaration of Kevin P. 

Smith, ConverDyn v. Moniz, Case no. 

1:14-cv-01012–RBW, Document 17–7, at 

¶ 16 (July 7, 2014). Traxys has also 

stated that ConverDyn exercises 

significant pricing power in the market. 

Traxys refers to a 2011 letter from 

ConverDyn to its customers notifying 

them that it would not sell conversion 

services for less than $16.50 per kgU. Id. 

Since then, the term price indicator for 

conversion services has remained 

remarkably stable, even as spot prices 

for conversion have fluctuated. 2015 ERI 

Report, 12. 

DOE does not have complete 

information regarding the pricing 

structure of conversion services 

contracts. ConverDyn has stated in the 

past that the conversion market 

generally relies on long-term contracts 

that are ‘‘linked, at least in part, to 

market prices at the time of the 

contract.’’ Declaration of Malcolm 

Critchley, Converdyn v. Moniz, Case no. 

1:14-cv-01012–RBW, Document 7–3, at 

¶ 37 (June 23, 2014). Although it is 

common practice for long-term contracts 

for U3O8 to include a non-fixed element 

that depends on market prices at the 

time of delivery, it is unclear to what 

extent this practice is prevalent in the 

conversion industry. 

In addition to the above, ConverDyn’s 

comment also refers to a document it 

submitted to DOE in March 2014 that 

provides some additional information 

on ConverDyn’s contracting practices. 

Comment of ConverDyn, Enclosure, at 5 

n.12. That document was submitted 

with a request that it be treated as 

containing proprietary information. 

Letter from Malcolm Critchley, 

ConverDyn, to Peter B. Lyons, DOE 

(March 10, 2014). DOE may consider 

this document in its deliberations. 

3. Production at Existing Facilities 

There is only one existing conversion 

facility in the United States, the 

Metropolis Works facility (MTW) 

operated by Honeywell International. 

ConverDyn is the exclusive marketing 

agent for conversion services from this 

facility. Comment of ConverDyn, at 1; 

2015 ERI Report, 64. The nominal 

capacity of the Metropolis Works 

facility is 15 million kgU as UF6. 

However, the facility generally operates 

below that level. 2015 ERI Report, 65. 

Based on statements from ConverDyn, 

ERI estimates that production at this 

facility was approximately 11 million 

kgU as UF6 per year prior to the loss of 

sales associated with Fukushima. 

Because ConverDyn has stated that this 

volume loss was approximately 25%, 

ERI estimates current sales volume at 

8.25 million kgU as UF6. 2015 ERI 

Report, 65. 

In estimating the effect of DOE 

transfers on ConverDyn’s sales volume, 

ERI assumes that 50% of the material 

used for cleanup at Portsmouth and 

100% of all other DOE material enters 

the U.S. market. 2015 ERI Report, 65– 

66. Based on statements from 

ConverDyn, ERI assumes that 

ConverDyn’s share of the U.S. market 

for conversion services is 25% and that 

its share of the international market is 

16%. 2015 ERI Report, 68. A summary 

of ERI’s estimates of the effect of DOE 

transfers on ConverDyn’s sales volume 

appears in Table 7. Using the 

assumptions described above, ERI 

estimates that under Scenario 1, DOE 

transfers decrease ConverDyn’s market 

volume by 0.67 million kgU, or 7.5%. 

Under Scenario 2, ERI estimates that 

DOE transfers decrease ConverDyn’s 

market volume by 0.46 million kgU, or 

5.3%. Under Scenario 3, ERI estimates 

that DOE transfers decrease 

ConverDyn’s market volume by 0.08 

million kgU, or 1%. 2015 ERI Report, 

69–70. As with ERI’s price estimates 

discussed above, these estimates do not 

suggest that were DOE to transfer 

uranium in accordance with Scenario 1, 

ConverDyn would lose the predicted 

volume of sales. DOE has been 

transferring at or above the rate of 

Scenario 1 for nearly three years. On 

ERI’s analysis, the estimated effect has 

already occurred. Transfers in 

accordance with Scenario 1 would 

continue the effect, and transfers in 

accordance with Scenario 2 or 3 would 

lead to an increase in ConverDyn’s sales 

volume, of the amount ERI predicts. 

TABLE 7—ERI’S ESTIMATE OF DECREASE IN CONVERDYN’S SALES VOLUME

Volume 

(million kgU) 

Percent 

change 

Scenario 1 ................................................................................................................................................................ 0.67 7.5 

Scenario 2 ................................................................................................................................................................ 0.46 5.3 

Scenario 3 ................................................................................................................................................................ 0.08 1 

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Based on its estimate of the effect on 

ConverDyn’s sales volume, ERI also 

estimates the change in production costs 

at Metropolis Works due to DOE 

transfers. A summary of ERI’s estimates 

of the effect of DOE transfers on 

ConverDyn’s production costs appears 

in Table 8. ERI analyzes two scenarios 

based on slightly different assumptions 

about the amount of ConverDyn’s costs 

that are variable. Specifically, ERI 

calculates production costs based on 

80% and 100% fixed costs. 2015 ERI 

Report, 70. 

ERI assumes that ConverDyn’s 

production cost would be $15 per kgU 

if DOE material was not being 

introduced into the market. Assuming 

100% of Metropolis Works’ costs are 

fixed, DOE transfers would not affect 

total production costs, but they would 

increase per unit costs. Specifically, ERI 

estimates that DOE transfers at the level 

under Scenario 1 increase production 

costs to $16.2 per kgU, about 8% higher 

than without DOE transfers. Transfers at 

the level under Scenario 2 would cause 

Metropolis Works production costs to be 

$15.84, about 5.6% higher than without 

DOE transfers. Under Scenario 3, 

production costs would be $15.15, about 

1% higher than without DOE transfers. 

2015 ERI Report, 70. If 80% of 

Metropolis Works’ costs are fixed, total 

production costs would be lower with 

DOE transfers, but per unit production 

costs would also be lower. Under 

Scenario 1, production costs would be 

$15.97, about 6.5% higher than without 

DOE transfers. Under Scenario 2, 

production costs would be $15.68, about 

4.5% higher than without DOE 

transfers. Under Scenario 3, production 

costs would be $15.12, about 1% higher 

than without DOE transfers. 2015 ERI 

Report, 71. 

TABLE 8—ERI’S ESTIMATE OF INCREASE IN CONVERDYN’S PRODUCTION COST

80% fixed 100% fixed 

Cost 

(per kgU) 

Percent 

change 

Cost 

(per kgU) 

Percent 

change 

Scenario 1 ........................................................................................................ $15.97 6.5 $16.20 8 

Scenario 2 ........................................................................................................ 15.68 4.5 15.84 5.6 

Scenario 3 ........................................................................................................ 15.12 1 15.15 1 

The 2014 ERI Report conducted a 

similar analysis using slightly different 

assumptions regarding ConverDyn’s preFukushima production and current 

market share. Specifically, ERI 

calculated the effect of DOE transfers 

assuming two different pre-Fukushima 

production levels: 10 million kgU and 

12 million kgU. With these 

assumptions, ERI estimated 

ConverDyn’s current sales volume at 

7.50 million kgU and 9.00 million kgU 

respectively. 2014 ERI Report, 66, 68. 

ERI also calculated the effect of DOE 

transfers assuming two different 

assumptions about ConverDyn’s share of 

the U.S. Market: 25% and 30%. 2014 

ERI Report, 65–66. Based on these 

assumptions ERI estimates that DOE 

transfers decrease ConverDyn’s market 

volume by between 0.60 and 0.72 

million kgU. 2014 ERI Report, 66, 68. 

This represents between 6.9% and 8.1% 

of ConverDyn’s estimated sales volume. 

2014 ERI Report, 67, 69. 

On production cost, ERI similarly 

estimates based on 80% and 100% fixed 

costs. As with sales volume, ERI 

conducts this calculation twice: once 

assuming a volume of 7.50 million kgU, 

and once assuming a volume of 9.00 

million kgU. For the 7.50 million kgU 

scenario, ERI estimates that if 

production costs are 100% fixed, DOE 

transfers cause unit production costs to 

increase about 8% to $16.20 per kgU. If 

production costs are 80% fixed, DOE 

transfers cause unit production costs to 

increase about 6.4% to $15.96 per kgU. 

For the 9.00 million kgU scenario, ERI 

estimates that production costs would 

increase by 7.8% for 100% fixed costs 

and 6.2% for 80% fixed costs. 2014 ERI 

Report, 70–71. 

ConverDyn’s comment in response to 

the RFI does not provide a separate 

estimate of the effect of DOE transfers 

on its sales volume. ConverDyn refers to 

the relevant sections of the 2014 ERI 

report regarding its sales volume and 

production costs. Comment of 

ConverDyn, Enclosure, at 5. With 

respect to the 2014 ERI Report, 

ConverDyn does not refute or confirm 

the assumptions ERI used in its analysis 

regarding ConverDyn’s sales volume, 

market share, or production costs. 

ConverDyn’s comment also refers to a 

document it submitted to DOE in March 

2014. Comment of ConverDyn, 

Enclosure, at 5 n.12. That document was 

submitted with a request that it be 

treated as containing proprietary 

information. Letter from Malcolm 

Critchley, ConverDyn, to Peter B. Lyons, 

DOE (March 10, 2014). That document 

provides estimates of the effect of DOE 

transfers on ConverDyn’s sales volume 

and profits, but it does not provide 

financial information demonstrating 

that those effects have occurred or 

supporting analysis explaining why a 

given change in ConverDyn’s sales or 

revenue should be attributed to DOE 

transfers. Id. DOE may consider this 

document in its deliberations. 

In addition to the above, ConverDyn 

notes in its comment that the Metropolis 

Works facility ceased production 

beginning in January 2015 for a period 

of approximately three months—two 

months longer than usual. ConverDyn 

states that this was necessitated by ‘‘the 

continued depressed state of the 

conversion market.’’ Although 

ConverDyn refers to the displacement of 

conversion sales by DOE’s transfers, it 

acknowledges that DOE’s transfers are 

not the sole cause of the lengthening of 

Metropolis Works facility’s annual 

shutdown. ConverDyn does not include 

supporting data or otherwise provide a 

proportionate breakdown of the impact 

of DOE material versus other factors in 

causing this shutdown. Comment of 

ConverDyn, Enclosure, at 4. 

The UxC Report does not provide 

estimates for production levels or 

production costs at individual facilities, 

but its report does note that the cost for 

primary producers is ‘‘known to be in 

the range of $10–$15/kgU.’’ UxC Report, 

15. In a separate publication, UxC 

provides more detailed estimates of both 

current production levels and projected 

future production for individual 

facilities. Market share can be 

determined by comparing production 

levels to those of other primary 

producers and secondary sources. UxC 

Conversion Market Outlook—December 

2014, 45–47 (2014). 

Traxys provides some information 

relevant to DOE’s analysis of the 

assumptions ERI uses in its calculations. 

Traxys explains that in selling material 

obtained from Fluor-B&W Portsmouth, 

it pursues a goal to sell at least 50% of 

the material to non-U.S. customers. 

Traxys states that it has consistently met 

this goal. Comment of Traxys, at 1. 

Traxys further explains that in 2014 no 

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37Letters from Honeywell management include 

similar numbers. A November 20, 2014, letter 

included identical figures. Jim Pritchett, Honeywell 

Metropolis Works, Letter to Employees (Nov. 20, 

2014), available at http://www.honeywellmetropolisworks.com/?document=letter-toemployees-23&download=1. Older letters provided 

slightly different figures. Jim Pritchett, Honeywell 

Metropolis Works, Letter to Community (Dec. 19, 

2013), available at http://www.honeywellmetropolisworks.com/?document=letter-to-thecommunity-from-new-metropolis-works-plantmanager&download=1. 

more than 40% of DOE-derived material 

was sold in the U.S. market. Comment 

of Traxys, at 2. This is similar to the 

amount of conversion that Traxys has 

separately stated went to the U.S. 

market in prior years. Traxys stated in 

July 2014 that 42% of DOE-derived 

conversion entered the U.S. marketplace 

during calendar year 2013. Declaration 

of Kevin P. Smith, ConverDyn v. Moniz, 

Case no. 1:14-cv-01012–RBW, 

Document 17–7 at ¶11 (July 7, 2014). 

4. Employment Levels in the Industry 

ERI notes that Metropolis Works 

restarted after an extended shutdown in 

summer 2013 with approximately 270 

employees. Prior to the 2012–2013 

shutdown, ERI estimates that the facility 

employed approximately 334 people. As 

this change coincided with a change in 

long-term production volume, ERI 

concludes that is unlikely that 100% of 

Metropolis Works’ production costs are 

fixed. 2015 ERI Report, 72–73; 2014 ERI 

Report, 71. Although it does not provide 

specific estimates, ERI states that ‘‘[a] 

portion of the reduction in work force 

at Metropolis Works may be associated 

with the introduction of DOE inventory 

into the market.’’ However, ERI also 

notes that several other factors likely 

played a part as well. 2015 ERI Report, 

73; 2014 ERI Report, 72. ConverDyn 

does not provide a separate estimate of 

decreased employment levels due to 

DOE transfers; instead ConverDyn 

referred to the relevant sections of the 

2014 ERI Report. Comment of 

ConverDyn, Enclosure, at 5. 

5. Changes in Capital Improvement 

Plans and Development of Future 

Facilities 

Neither ERI nor any of the 

commenters provide an estimate of the 

effect of DOE transfers on new facility 

development or capital improvement 

plans. However, DOE understands that 

several conversion services companies 

are undertaking these or related 

activities. 

Although there are several large-scale 

development projects currently planned 

or underway outside the United States— 

namely AREVA’s COMURHEX II 

modernization project and TVEL’s plan 

for a new facility at SCC—DOE is not 

aware of any such plans in the United 

States. See Eileen Supko & Thomas 

Meade, ‘‘New facilities are on the 

horizon,’’ Nuclear Engineering 

International (Oct. 6, 2014), available at 

http://www.neimagazine.com/features/

featurenew-facilities-are-on-the-horizon4394892; UxC Conversion Market 

Outlook—December 2014, 50, 56–57, 73 

(2014). 

Metropolis Works has, however, 

undertaken substantial capital 

expenditures at its existing facility in 

recent years. Honeywell has stated that 

it has invested ‘‘nearly $177 million 

over the past 10 years in capital 

improvements, including $50 million in 

safety projects.’’ ‘‘About Us,’’ 

Honeywell, http://www.honeywellmetropolisworks.com/about-us.37 Some 

of these upgrades came during an 

extended shutdown in 2012 and 2013, 

in which Metropolis Works made 

upgrades to ensure the facility could 

withstand extreme natural disasters. 

These changes were made under an 

agreement with NRC in response to an 

inspection NRC conducted in the wake 

of the Fukushima disaster in Japan. 

‘‘Honeywell and U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission Reach 

Agreement on Necessary Upgrades to 

Metropolis Nuclear Conversion 

Facility,’’ News Release (Oct. 16, 2012), 

available at http://www.honeywellmetropolisworks.com/?document=oct16-2012-press-release-honeywell-and-us-nuclear-regulatory-commission-reachagreement-on-necessary-upgrades-tometropolis-nuclear-conversionfacility&download=1. 

In terms of future plans, Metropolis 

Works announced in November 2014 

that it would be shutting down for 

approximately 90 days beginning in 

early January 2015. Honeywell noted 

that it would use the extended 

shutdown to make updates and capital 

improvements. Jim Pritchett, Honeywell 

Metropolis Works, Letter to Employees 

(Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://

www.honeywell-metropolisworks.com/

?document=letter-to-employees23&download=1; see also Comment of 

ConverDyn, Enclosure, at 4. Honeywell 

has further stated that the company 

plans to spend $17.5 million in 

improvements during 2015. Jim 

Pritchett, Honeywell Metropolis Works, 

Letter to Employees (Jan. 30, 2014), 

available at http://www.honeywellmetropolisworks.com/?document=letterto-employees-24&download=1. 

6. Long-Term Viability and Health of the 

Industry 

ERI’s most recent Reference Nuclear 

Power Growth forecasts project global 

requirements to grow to approximately 

67.2 million kgU by 2020, 

approximately 20% higher than current 

requirements. Global requirements are 

expected to continue to rise to a level 

of 91.4 million kgU by 2035, 

approximately 63% higher than current 

requirements. 2015 ERI Report, 13. ERI 

presents a graph comparing global 

requirements, demand, and supply from 

2013—2035. That graph forecasts that 

global secondary supply and supply 

from primary converters will continue 

to exceed global demand until at least 

2025. Beyond that point, supply 

generally keeps pace with growth in 

requirements. 2015 ERI Report, 14. 

Although not focused on conversion, 

the requirements forecasts noted above 

in section III.A.6 are also relevant to the 

conversion industry. In general, 

requirements and/or uranium 

concentrate demand forecasts should 

also apply to demand for conversion 

services. However, there may be some 

small differences due to strategic and 

discretionary inventory building. For 

example, China has been purchasing 

strategic supply well in excess of its 

requirements. Those purchases have 

come in the form of U3O8. 2015 ERI 

Report, 13. Thus, these purchases affect 

near-term uranium concentrate demand, 

but do not affect near-term conversion 

demand. 

No other commenter provided 

specific projections about future 

conversion requirements, demand, or 

prices. However, DOE has some 

additional information not submitted in 

response to the RFI. In its December 

2014 Conversion Market Outlook, UxC 

predicts significant increases in both 

requirements and demand in the longterm. UxC Conversion Market Outlook— 

December 2014, 40, 44 (2014). UxC also 

provides a more detailed explanation of 

its price forecast, which generally 

predicts an increase in price over the 

next 10 years. UxC Conversion Market 

Outlook—December 2014, 82, 85 (2014). 

Finally, as with uranium 

concentrates, DOE recognizes that the 

predictability of transfers from its excess 

uranium inventory over time is 

important to the long-term viability and 

health of the uranium conversion 

industry. Again, DOE notes that the 

upper scenario considered by ERI would 

represent continued transfers at rates 

consistent with the May 2012 and May 

2014 determinations. Compare 2015 ERI 

Report, 25, with 2014 ERI Report, 28. 

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38As noted above, the transfer rates for these 

scenarios refer only to the level of uranium transfers 

for cleanup at Portsmouth and downblending of 

LEU. The level of transfers for other DOE programs 

is the same in all three scenarios. 

39ERI also compared those numbers to then 

current term and spot price indicators as of March 

31, 2014. At that time, the TradeTech price 

indicator was $96.00 per SWU on the spot market 

and $99.00 per SWU on the term market. 2014 ERI 

Report, 23. 

C. Enrichment Industry 

1. Market Prices 

In its analysis, ERI also estimated the 

effect of DOE transfers on the market 

prices for enrichment services. To 

estimate this effect, ERI employed a 

market clearing price model similar to 

what is described above for the uranium 

market. As with uranium concentrates 

and conversion, ERI constructed 

individual supply and demand curves 

for enrichment services and estimated 

the clearing price with and without DOE 

transfers. 2015 ERI Report, 44. A 

summary of ERI’s estimates of the effect 

of DOE transfers on the market price for 

SWU appears in Table 9. 

Applying this approach to the three 

scenarios listed above, ERI estimates 

that DOE transfers at the rate of 2,705 

MTU per year would cause the price of 

enrichment services to be, on average, 

$4.50 lower between 2015 and 2024— 

with prices being $5.90 and $3.80 lower 

in 2015 and 2016 specifically. 2015 ERI 

Report, 46. For DOE transfers at a rate 

of 1,855 MTU per year, ERI estimates 

that prices would be, on average, $3.60 

lower between 2015 and 2024—with 

prices being $5.10 and $3.00 lower in 

2015 and 2016 specifically. If DOE 

ceased transfers under these two 

programs, ERI estimates that prices 

would be, on average, $1.70 lower 

between 2015 and 2024—with prices 

being $3.20 and $1.70 lower in 2015 and 

2016 specifically.38 As with uranium 

concentrates, this is not a prediction 

that prices will drop by the specified 

amount once DOE begins transfers 

pursuant to a new determination. 

According to ERI’s analysis, a level of 

price suppression consistent with the 

estimate for Scenario 1 is already 

reflected in the current market price for 

conversion services. If DOE continued 

transferring at Scenario 1 levels, the 

market prices would not change; if DOE 

began transferring at Scenario 2 levels, 

the market price would be expected to 

rise by approximately $0.80; if DOE 

ceased transfers under these programs, 

market prices would be expected to rise 

by $2.70. See Table 4.3 of 2015 ERI 

Report, 46. 

ERI compares these numbers to the 

current spot and term price indicators 

published by TradeTech on January 31, 

2015—i.e. $88.00 per SWU on the spot 

market, and $90.00 per SWU on the 

term market. As a percentage of the 

current prices, the average price effect 

attributable to DOE’s transfers over the 

period 2015–2024 under Scenario 1 

represents approximately 5.1% of the 

current spot price and 5.0% of the 

current term price. Under Scenario 2, 

the average price effect over the same 

period represents 4.1% of the spot price 

and 4.0% of the term price. Under 

Scenario 3, the average price effect 

represents 1.9% of the spot price and 

1.9% of the term price. 2015 ERI Report, 

48, 50. 

For the 2014 ERI Report, ERI 

conducted a similar market clearing 

approach for a level of transfers that is 

equal to Scenario 1 of the 2015 ERI 

Report. Although that report used 

slightly older data, the results are 

similar. Notably, ERI estimated that the 

price effect attributable to DOE transfers 

at the current rates is $4.00 between 

2014 and 2023—with prices being 

$5.20, $5.70, and $3.60 lower in 2014, 

2015, and 2016, respectively.39 2014 ERI 

Report, 40. 

TABLE 9—ERI’S ESTIMATE OF EFFECT OF DOE TRANSFERS ON ENRICHMENT SPOT AND TERM PRICES IN $ PER SWU 

2015 ERI Report 2014 ERI Report 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2015–2024) 

Estimated 

price effect 

(2014–2023) 

Scenario 1 .................................................................................................................................................... $4.50 $4.00 

Scenario 2 .................................................................................................................................................... 3.60 ..............................

Scenario 3 .................................................................................................................................................... 1.70 ..............................

In addition to its estimate of the price 

effect of DOE transfers on the uranium 

concentrate market, UxC estimates the 

effect on the price of enrichment 

services using its proprietary U–PRICFE 

and SWU–PRICE models. UxC Report, 

5. As with its uranium concentrate 

estimates, UxC estimates the impact 

using two different methodologies, an 

‘‘incremental approach’’ and a ‘‘total 

impact approach.’’ 

Using its incremental approach, UxC 

estimates that between 2012 and 2014 

DOE’s transfers reduced the spot price 

by an average of $7.49 per SWU and the 

term price by an average of $5.37 per 

SWU. Using its total impact approach, 

UxC estimates that between 2008 and 

2014 DOE’s transfers reduced the spot 

price by an average of $9.19 per SWU 

and the term price by an average of 

$6.96 per SWU. UxC Report, 8–9. 

UxC also estimates the effect of DOE 

continued transfers at current rates for 

the period 2015 to 2030. A summary of 

UxC’s estimates of the effect of DOE 

transfers on future enrichment prices 

appears in Table 10. UxC estimates that 

DOE transfers in the near and medium 

terms would reduce the spot price by an 

average of $5.31 per SWU. UxC projects 

that this effect will change slightly in 

the medium term as market prices start 

to recover. Specifically, DOE transfers 

will reduce the spot price between 2018 

and 2030 by an average of $4.86 per 

SWU. UxC also notes that the former 

number is larger relative to the expected 

price of enrichment than the latter 

number (5.9% versus 3.8%). UxC 

Report, 12. UxC estimates that DOE 

transfers in the near and medium terms 

would reduce the term price by an 

average of $5.50 per SWU. Between 

2018 and 2030, DOE transfers are 

estimated to reduce the term price by an 

average of $5.00 per SWU. Again, the 

near and medium term impact is larger 

in relation to the expected price (5.6% 

versus 3.6%). UxC Report, 11. 

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40 DOE notes that URENCO’s financial statements 

have referred to its order book as ‘‘extending up to 

and beyond 2025’’ at least since 2010. See 

URENCO, Annual Report & Accounts 2010, at 3 

(2010), available at http://media.urenco.com/corpwebsite/298/annualreportandaccounts2010_1.pdf. 

41On May 22, 2014, URENCO submitted an 

application to the U.S. NRC to amend its license for 

the facility to allow it to use high assay tails 

(approximately 0.4% U235) as feed material. See 79 

FR 43099 (July 24, 2014); ‘‘Redacted—Supplement 

to License Amendment Request for Capacity 

Expansion of URENCO USA Facility (LAR–12–10),’’ 

Letter from URENCO to U.S. NRC, LES–14–00071– 

NRC (June 17, 2014). 

TABLE 10—UXC’S ESTIMATE OF EFFECT OF DOE TRANSFERS ON ENRICHMENT SPOT AND TERM PRICES IN $ PER SWU 

UxC Report 

Near- & mid-term 

price effect 

Long-term 

price effect 

Spot Price .................................................................................................................................................... $5.31 $4.86 

Term Price ................................................................................................................................................... 5.50 5.00 

As mentioned above, a change in 

market prices for uranium concentrates 

and conversion services may also affect 

enrichers. URENCO has stated that at a 

small amount of its capacity is devoted 

to underfeeding. Comment of URENCO, 

at 3. ERI notes that URENCO estimates 

it is using 10–15% of its capacity for 

underfeeding. 2015 ERI Report, 75. 

Thus, to the extent that URENCO 

utilizes or resells the natural uranium 

hexafluoride that results from 

underfeeding, the market prices for 

uranium and conversion could be 

relevant to its business decisions. 

2. Realized Prices of Current Operators 

There is only one currently operating 

enrichment facility in the United States, 

the URENCO USA (UUSA) gas 

centrifuge facility in New Mexico. No 

commenter provides information about 

the realized price achieved by URENCO 

or the effect of DOE transfers on that 

price. However, other sources provide 

some relevant information. 

In recent years, the vast majority of 

SWU has been sold on the term market. 

UxC Enrichment Market Outlook—Q4 

2014, 17, 20 (2014). ERI estimates that 

more than 95% of enrichment 

requirements are covered under longterm contracts. 2015 ERI Report, 74. 

Even in the term market, contracting 

volume is down compared to levels 

prior to 2010. UxC Enrichment Market 

Outlook—Q4 2014, 9, 21 (2014). Longterm contracts for SWU last for 10 or 

more years, in some cases and in some 

cases 15 or more years. UxC Enrichment 

Market Outlook—Q4 2014, 100 (2014). 

EIA reports that in 2013, the average 

price paid for SWU was $142.22. EIA, 

Uranium Marketing Report, 7 (2014). 

This is well above the average market 

prices for 2013, approximately $110 in 

the spot market and $120 in the term 

market according to UxC. 

URENCO’s most recent financial 

statements indicate that at least a 

portion of its contract portfolio ‘‘extend 

beyond 2025.’’ URENCO Limited, 

Interim Financial Statements for the 6 

Months Ended 30 June 2014, at 6, 

available at http://www.urenco.com/_/

uploads/content-files/Urenco_Group_

Interim_Accounts_to_30_June_2014- 

final-02092014.pdf.40 URENCO has also 

stated that its enrichment contracts are 

usually fixed base price with escalation 

leaving URENCO with ‘‘no direct 

exposure to uranium prices.’’ URENCO 

Investor Update, 4 (Sept. 9, 2014), 

available at http://www.urenco.com/_/

uploads/results-and-presentations/

URENCO_Bond_Investor_Presentation_

2014.pdf. Given the above 

considerations, it seems likely that 

URENCO’s realized price based on its 

current contract portfolio is as much as 

50% higher than the current spot and 

market prices. Since many of URENCO’s 

contracts appear to have been entered 

before DOE began transfers comparable 

to the current levels, it is unlikely that 

continued DOE transfers will have an 

impact on the realized price achieved 

for enrichment services from existing 

capacity at UUSA during the period 

contemplated for the planned 

determination. 

As noted above, URENCO has stated 

that a small amount of its capacity is 

devoted to underfeeding. Comment of 

URENCO, at 3.41 ERI notes that 

URENCO estimates it is using 10–15% 

of its capacity for underfeeding. 2015 

ERI Report, 75. To the extent that 

URENCO sells the natural uranium 

hexafluoride yielded from underfeeding, 

DOE transfers could affect its revenues 

to the extent the transfers cause 

decreases in the prices for uranium 

concentrates and conversion services. 

3. Production at Existing Facilities 

URENCO reports that the nameplate 

capacity for the UUSA facility is 3.7 

million SWU. Comment of URENCO, at 

1. URENCO has also stated that 

construction of additional centrifuges 

will continue until the facility reaches 

5.7 million SWU. ‘‘About Us, URENCO 

USA,’’ URENCO, http://

www.urenco.com/about-us/companystructure/urenco-usa (accessed Feb. 21 

2015). 

Due to the nature of gas centrifuges, 

it is highly unlikely that UUSA will 

decrease production of SWU. As 

URENCO states, due to the low level of 

electricity required to run the 

centrifuges, slowing production would 

have almost no effect on operating 

expenses. Furthermore, stopping and 

restarting a centrifuge may damage the 

equipment. Comment of URENCO, at 3. 

4. Employment Levels in the Industry 

ERI does not provide an estimate of 

the change in employment due to DOE 

transfers in the enrichment industry. No 

commenter references changes in 

employment in the enrichment 

industry. URENCO states that its 

business is essentially fixed-cost and 

makes no reference to changes in 

employment. 

5. Changes in Capital Improvement 

Plans and Development of Future 

Facilities 

URENCO recently completed ‘‘Phase 

II’’ of its expansion plans, bringing the 

capacity of its facility to 3.7 million 

SWU. ‘‘Phase II Completion,’’ URENCO 

(Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.urenco.com/ 

news/detail/phase-ii-completion 

(accessed Feb. 22, 2014). URENCO is 

continuing to move forward with 

‘‘Phase III’’ expansion, which will bring 

plant capacity to approximately 5.7 

million SWU. URENCO notes that it has 

slowed its plan for construction of 

additional capacity. Comment of 

URENCO, at 3. URENCO expects to 

reach 5.7 million SWU capacity by 

2023. URENCO Investor Update, 31 

(Sept. 9, 2014). Although the company 

has requested a license amendment that 

would allow it to expand capacity to 10 

million SWU per year, URENCO states 

that this move is ‘‘to provide for future 

licensing flexibility should the market 

recover.’’ URENCO notes that it 

cancelled construction of ‘‘Phase IV’’ in 

2013. Comment of URENCO, at 3. 

DOE is aware of several other planned 

or proposed enrichment facilities in the 

U.S., namely, AREVA’s Eagle Rock 

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14124 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Notices 

42Although not the subject of this determination, 

DOE notes that ERI analyzed the possible future 

transfer to GLE of high-assay depleted uranium. 

2015 ERI Report, 27–28. As this transaction would 

involve reenrichment of depleted tails, it would 

tend to support additional demand for enrichment 

services. 

43Again, DOE notes that although it is not 

included in ERI’s chart of enrichment supply, GLE’s 

proposed Paducah Laser Enrichment Facility would 

represent additional enrichment supply that is not 

intended to be devoted to producing LEU. Compare 

2015 ERI Report, 16, with 2015 ERI Report, 27–28. 

Enrichment Facility in Idaho, Centrus 

Energy’s—formerly USEC Inc.— 

American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, 

OH, and Global Laser Enrichment’s 

facility in Wilmington, NC.42

Development of each of these facilities 

has been put on hold or slowed until 

market prices improve. 

The Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility 

would use gas centrifuge technology 

and would have a capacity of 

approximately 3.3 million SWU. ‘‘Eagle 

Rock Enrichment Facility,’’ AREVA, 

http://us.areva.com/EN/home-203/

eagle-rock-enrichment-facility.html 

(accessed Feb. 21, 2015). After 

announcing several delays in 

construction, AREVA stated in May 

2013 that it was no longer projecting a 

start date for building the facility. 

‘‘French company won’t set date for 

Idaho nuclear facility,’’ The Oregonian 

(May 23, 2013), http://

www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestnews/index.ssf/2013/05/french_

company_wont_set_date_f.html 

(accessed Feb. 21, 2015). At the time of 

this announcement, the term market 

price for SWU was approximately $130, 

according to UxC’s monthly price 

indicator. 

The proposed American Centrifuge 

Plant would use gas centrifuge 

technology and would have a capacity 

of approximately 3.8 million SWU. 

‘‘USEC Inc. Gas Centrifuge,’’ U.S. NRC, 

http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuelcycle-fac/usecfacility.html (accessed 

Feb. 22, 2015). Active construction of 

new centrifuges has ceased. In a 

November 2013 quarterly filing with the 

SEC, Centrus Energy, then known as 

USEC, stated, ‘‘[a]t current market prices 

USEC does not believe that its plans for 

American Centrifuge commercialization 

are economically viable without 

additional government support.’’ USEC 

Form 10–Q, Securities and Exchange 

Commission, at 10 (Nov. 5, 2013) 

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/

data/1065059/000106505913000049/

usu-2013930x10q.htm (accessed Feb. 

22, 2015). When this form was 

submitted to the SEC, the term market 

price for SWU was approximately $115, 

according to UxC’s monthly price 

indicator. 

Global Laser Enrichment, a venture of 

GE-Hitachi and Cameco, has proposed 

an enrichment plant that would use 

laser enrichment technology developed 

by Silex Systems, an Australian 

company. The proposed facility in 

Wilmington, NC would have a capacity 

of about 6 million SWU. GLE License 

Application, Rev. 7, U.S. NRC, Docket 

70–7016, at 1–16 (August 20, 2012), 

available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/

docs/ML1224/ML12242A227.pdf. In July 

2014, GLE announced that it would 

slow continued development of the 

facility ‘‘in line with current and future 

market realities.’’ ‘‘Global Laser 

Enrichment,’’ GE-Hitachi, https://

nuclear.gepower.com/fuel-a-plant/

products/gle.html (accessed Feb. 22, 

2015). At the time of GLE’s 

announcement, the term market price 

for SWU was approximately $95, 

according to UxC’s monthly price 

indicator. 

6. Long-Term Viability and Health of the 

Industry 

ERI’s most recent Reference Nuclear 

Power Growth forecasts project global 

requirements to grow to approximately 

59 million SWU between 2021 and 

2025, approximately 31% higher than 

current requirements. Global 

requirements are expected to continue 

to rise to a level of 74 million SWU 

between 2031 and 2035, approximately 

64% higher than current requirements. 

2015 ERI Report, 13. ERI presents a 

graph comparing global requirements, 

demand, and supply from 2013–2035. 

That graph shows that global supply 

will continue to significantly exceed 

global demand over the long term. 2015 

ERI Report, 16. 

Although not focused on enrichment, 

the requirements forecasts noted above 

in section III.A.6 are also somewhat 

relevant to the enrichment industry. In 

general, requirements and/or uranium 

concentrate demand forecasts should 

also apply to demand for low enriched 

uranium. As with conversion, there may 

be some small differences due to 

strategic and discretionary inventory 

building. For example, China has been 

purchasing strategic supply well in 

excess of its requirements. Those 

purchases have come in the form of 

U3O8. 2015 ERI Report, 13. Thus, these 

purchases affect near-term uranium 

concentrate demand, but do not affect 

near-term demand for LEU. 

In addition to demand for LEU, higher 

demand for uranium concentrates can 

affect demand for enrichment because of 

the relationship described above 

between natural uranium and 

enrichment as inputs for producing 

enriched uranium product. In the 

medium to long term, supply from 

current mines will cease to exceed 

demand. Meanwhile, requirements for 

LEU will continue to significantly 

exceed enrichment supply. As prices for 

uranium concentrates and conversion 

increase relative to SWU prices, it may 

become more economical to re-enrich 

high-assay tails. In this vein, ERI 

suggests that enrichers will continue to 

redirect capacity to underfeeding and 

that Rosatom will continue to re-enrich 

tails. 2015 ERI Report, 16.43

No other commenter provides specific 

projections about future enrichment 

requirements, demand, or prices. In its 

Uranium Enrichment Outlook for the 

4th quarter of 2014, UxC predicts 

significant increases in both 

requirements and demand in the longterm. UxC Enrichment Market 

Outlook—Q4 2014, 36, 38 (2014). UxC 

also provides a more detailed 

explanation of its price forecast, which 

generally predicts an increase in price 

over the next 10 years. UxC Enrichment 

Market Outlook—Q4 2014, 91–94 

(2014). 

Finally, as with uranium concentrates 

and conversion services, DOE 

recognizes that the predictability of 

transfers from its excess uranium 

inventory over time is important to the 

long-term viability and health of the 

uranium enrichment industries. Again, 

DOE notes that the upper scenario 

considered by ERI would represent 

continued transfers at rates consistent 

with the May 2012 and May 2014 

determinations. Compare 2015 ERI 

Report, 25, with 2014 ERI Report, 28. 

IV. Request for Comments 

DOE believes it will be possible to 

identify a rate of transfers that will not 

have an adverse material impact on 

domestic uranium industries. DOE 

therefore proposes to issue a new 

Secretarial Determination, pursuant to 

3112(d) of the USEC Privatization Act, 

that transfers of uranium for cleanup 

services at the Portsmouth Gaseous 

Diffusion Plant and for down-blending 

of HEU to LEU will not have an adverse 

material impact on the domestic 

production, conversion, or enrichment 

industry. In preparing this 

determination, DOE may use the six 

factors proposed above as an analytical 

framework for assessing the potential 

impacts of DOE transfers for each 

industry. 

DOE continues to deliberate over 

what rate of transfers would be 

appropriate for such a determination. 

Commenters suggested a range of 

options. Many commenters indicated 

that a rate of 5 million pounds total of 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 52 / Wednesday, March 18, 2015 / Notices 14125 

natural uranium equivalent per year 

would be acceptable. Some commenters 

favored a rate of 5 million pounds but 

suggested DOE should cease transfers 

for some period and then ramp up 

transfers to the 5 million pounds per 

year rate. One commenter focused on 

transfers of uranium hexafluoride, as 

opposed to uranium concentrates, and 

asked DOE to ensure that its transfers 

are market-neutral with respect to 

conversion. DOE is also considering 

whether to continue transfers at the rate 

covered by the 2014 determination, 

2,705 metric tons per year of natural 

uranium equivalent. 

DOE is also considering whether to 

include additional features in a 

determination that might change how a 

given set of transfers affects domestic 

industries. Some commenters proposed 

a scheme of matched sales, in which 

DOE would transfer a given tranche of 

uranium only after ensuring that a buyer 

had bought an equivalent quantity, at a 

comparable price, from U.S. producers. 

Other commenters asked that DOE 

transfer uranium in such a way that the 

uranium appears on markets only in the 

long term. The commenters do not 

appear to be suggesting that DOE simply 

not transfer uranium until some future 

date; rather, they contemplate that DOE 

would transfer uranium in the near term 

but with some restriction on use or 

availability that prevents the uranium 

from displacing other supply sources for 

some number of years. Yet the transfers 

DOE is considering would be part of 

barter transactions in exchange for 

services obtained essentially 

contemporaneously. In considering 

commenters’ suggestions about longterm as compared to short-term 

availability of DOE-sourced uranium, 

DOE will need to assess whether the 

markets could support the provision of 

services in the near term to be 

compensated by uranium available only 

in the long term. In light of the forecast 

increases in the price of uranium 

concentrates, it is conceivable that 

transactions to bridge the gap from nearto long-term could be financially 

justifiable for some entities. DOE will 

continue to analyze this possibility. 

To enable the Secretary to make a 

determination as expeditiously as 

possible, DOE is setting a deadline of 

April 6, 2015, for all comments to be 

received. DOE invites all interested 

parties to submit, in writing, comments 

and information on the factors described 

above, the information and documents 

made available through this notice, and 

the summary of information considered. 

DOE intends to make all comments 

received publicly available. Any 

information that may be confidential 

and exempt by law from public 

disclosure should be submitted as 

described below. 

V. Confidential Business Information 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 1004.11, any 

person submitting information he or she 

believes to be confidential and exempt 

by law from public disclosure should 

submit via email, postal mail, or hand 

delivery/courier two well-marked 

copies: One copy of the document 

marked ‘‘confidential’’ including all the 

information believed to be confidential, 

and one copy of the document marked 

‘‘non-confidential’’ with the information 

believed to be confidential deleted. 

Submit these documents via email or on 

a CD, if feasible. DOE will make its own 

determination about the confidential 

status of the information and treat it 

according to its determination. Factors 

of interest to DOE when evaluating 

requests to treat submitted information 

as confidential include: (1) A 

description of the items; (2) whether 

and why such items are customarily 

treated as confidential within the 

industry; (3) whether the information is 

generally known by or available from 

other sources; (4) whether the 

information has previously been made 

available to others without obligation 

concerning its confidentiality; (5) an 

explanation of the competitive injury to 

the submitting person which would 

result from public disclosure; (6) when 

such information might lose its 

confidential character due to the 

passage of time; and (7) why disclosure 

of the information would be contrary to 

the public interest. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on March 13, 

2015. 

John Kotek, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Nuclear Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06189 Filed 3–17–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Project No. 1888–030—Pennsylvania, 

Project No. 2355–018—Pennsylvania/

Maryland, Project No. 405–106—Maryland] 

York Haven Power Company, Exelon 

Generation Company; Notice of 

Availability of the Final Environmental 

Impact Statement for the Susquehanna 

River Hydroelectric Projects 

In accordance with the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and 

the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission (Commission or FERC) 

regulations contained in the Code of 

Federal Regulations (CFR) (18 CFR part 

380), the Office of Energy Projects has 

reviewed the applications for license for 

the York Haven Hydroelectric Project 

(FERC No. 1888), the Muddy Run 

Pumped Storage Project (FERC No. 

2355), and the Conowingo Hydroelectric 

Project (FERC No. 405) and prepared a 

final multi-project environmental 

impact statement (EIS). 

The existing York Haven Project is 

located on the Susquehanna River at 

river mile (RM) 55 in the city of York, 

in York, Dauphin, and Lancaster 

Counties, Pennsylvania. The project 

does not occupy any federal lands. The 

Muddy Run and Conowingo Projects are 

located on the Susquehanna River at RM 

22 and RM 10, respectively, in Lancaster 

and York Counties, Pennsylvania, and 

Cecil and Harford Counties, Maryland. 

Conowingo Pond, the reservoir for the 

Conowingo Project, acts as the lower 

reservoir for the Muddy Run Project. 

The Muddy Run Project also includes 

an upper reservoir for pumped storage 

operation. The projects do not occupy 

any federal lands. 

The final EIS contains staff’s analysis 

of the applicants’ proposals and the 

alternatives for relicensing the York 

Haven, Muddy Run, and Conowingo 

Projects. The final EIS documents the 

views of governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, affected 

Indian tribes, the public, the license 

applicants, and Commission staff. 

A copy of the final EIS is available for 

review at the Commission or may be 

viewed on the Commission’s Web site at 

http://www.ferc.gov, using the ‘‘eLibrary’’ link. Enter one of the docket 

numbers, excluding the last three digits, 

to access the document. For assistance, 

contact FERC Online Support at 

FERCOnlineSupport@ferc.gov or tollfree at (866) 208–3676, or for TTY, 

contact (202) 502–8659. 

You may also register online at 

http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/

esubscription.asp to be notified via 

email of new filings and issuances 

related to this or other pending projects. 

For assistance, contact FERC Online 

Support. 

For further information, please 

contact Emily Carter at (202) 502–6512 

or at emily.carter@ferc.gov. 

Dated: March 11, 2015. 

Kimberly D. Bose, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2015–06077 Filed 3–17–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

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