RENDERED: JANUARY 19, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0038-MR

THOMAS MAGINNIS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT

v. HONORABLE GINA K. CALVERT, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CI-500728

NINAMARY BUBA,

F/K/A NINAMARY B. MAGINNIS APPELLEE

AND

NO. 2022-CA-0903-MR

NINAMARY BUBA,

F/K/A NINAMARY B. MAGINNIS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT

v. HONORABLE GINA K. CALVERT, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CI-500728

THOMAS MAGINNIS APPELLEE
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AND

NO. 2022-CA-1239-MR

THOMAS MAGINNIS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT

v. HONORABLE GINA K. CALVERT, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CI-500728

NINAMARY BUBA,

F/K/A NINAMARY B. MAGINNIS APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: These consolidated appeals arise from post-judgment orders 

of the Jefferson Family Court involving matters relating to the dissolution of the 

marriage between Thomas Maginnis (“Maginnis”) and Ninamary Buba f/k/a 

Ninamary B. Maginnis (“Buba”). The first two appeals address matters that were 

the subject of this Court’s order of remand in the prior appeal. Buba challenges the 

Family Court’s calculation of marital goodwill attributable to the marital business. 

Maginnis argues that the Family Court relied on improper methods to calculate his 
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income for maintenance purposes and abused its discretion by failing to make the 

reduction of his maintenance obligation retroactive. We find no error or abuse of 

discretion in any of these matters.

In the third appeal, Maginnis challenges several rulings relating to 

matters that arose while the prior appeal was pending. He argues that the Family 

Court acted outside of its jurisdiction by allowing Buba to purchase the marital 

residence and abused its discretion by denying his request for reimbursement of 

mortgage payments he made prior to Buba’s refinancing of the residence. We 

likewise find no error or abuse of discretion in these matters. Hence, we affirm in 

all three appeals.

I. Factual and Procedural History

The underlying facts of this action were set forth in detail in the prior 

appeal. For purposes of this appeal, the following facts are relevant. Maginnis and 

Buba were married in 1986 and separated in 2017. In 1994, the parties started a 

business called Chimney Master. Maginnis performed the manual labor as a 

chimney sweep, and Buba performed some other tasks, such as bookkeeping. At 

the time of trial, Chimney Master had one other employee.

When the matter came to a bench trial in 2019, one of the primary 

issues concerned the valuation of Chimney Master and division of its marital 

interest. In her pretrial disclosure, Buba identified Chris Johnson, a certified public 
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accountant (“CPA”), to testify regarding his valuation of Chimney Master. Her 

pretrial disclosure stated that Johnson would testify as to the financial standing and 

earning potential of Chimney Master based on his analysis of the business and 

financial records from 2015 and 2016, the business’s well-being, and current 

earnings potential. Johnson was expected to testify that Chimney Master is a going 

concern with excellent future income potential, but that he believed that not all 

invoice amounts for those years are accounted for in the operating bank account, 

totaling $45,000.

At trial, Johnson’s testimony was largely consistent with his written 

report but differed in one important respect regarding the “enterprise value” as 

opposed to the “total value” of Chimney Master. In Johnson’s written report, he 

concluded Chimney Master’s “enterprise value” was $284,141, but in his 

testimony, he concluded Chimney Master’s “total value” was $284,414. In 

Johnson’s testimony and in his written report, he consistently stated that 70% of 

Chimney Master’s value was personal goodwill (deemed “personal attributes” in 

the report) and 30% was enterprise goodwill (deemed “enterprise attributes” in the 

report). However, during his testimony he clarified that the 30% “enterprise 

value” of Chimney Master calculated out to about $85,000 of the total value of 

$284,414. 
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In his pre-trial disclosure, Maginnis identified C.P.A. Melissa DeArk 

as an expert concerning the business valuation of Chimney Masters. However, his 

disclosure did not specify DeArk’s actual opinion. Consequently, when Maginnis 

attempted to call DeArk at trial as a “rebuttal witness,” the Family Court refused to 

allow her testimony.

In its post-trial order, the Family Court divided the marital property. 

Based on Johnson’s $284,141 valuation of Chimney Master, the Family Court 

awarded Chimney Master to Maginnis and ordered him to pay Buba half its value -

$142,070. The Family Court noted that “transferable goodwill” was a factor in 

determining a business’s value, but it nonetheless did not make any findings 

regarding Chimney Master’s goodwill. In its order denying Thomas’s CR1 59.05 

motion, the Family Court stated that there was no evidence that a chimney-sweep 

business generated any personal goodwill.

The Family Court further concluded that Buba was entitled to 

maintenance, noting her disability and lack of other resources. In determining 

Maginnis’s income, the Court took the average of the reported gross receipts on his 

2015, 2016, and 2017 tax returns. The Family Court also pointed to the testimony 

that Maginnis receives cash payments that he does not report, and that Chimney 

1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Master directly pays some of his expenses. Consequently, the Family Court found 

Maginnis’s average annual income to be $160,308, against expenses of $2,075 per 

month. Based on its other findings concerning Buba’s income and expenses, the 

Family Court ordered Maginnis to pay Buba maintenance in the amount of $3,300 

per month.

In addition, the Family Court calculated the marital interest in the 

residence. The Court found that the residence had a total equity of $74,924, 

subject to Maginnis’s non-marital interest of $42,886. Consequently, the Family 

Court directed that the property be sold. Maginnis would be entitled to the first 

$42,886 of the sale proceeds, and the parties would equally divide the remaining 

sale proceeds. Finally, the Family Court directed Maginnis to pay maintenance to 

Buba in the amount of $3,300 per month.

Maginnis appealed from the Family Court’s division of the marital 

interest in Chimney Master. The prior panel of this Court affirmed the Family 

Court’s exclusion of DeArk’s testimony. However, the panel reversed the Family 

Court’s calculation of the marital value of Chimney Master, holding as follows:

Thomas’s [Maginnis’s] next argument is that the 

family court’s valuation of Chimney Master is fatally 

flawed because it ignores the analysis in Johnson’s report 

and testimony that 30% of Chimney Master’s value was 

due to enterprise goodwill, a marital asset, and 70% of 

Chimney Master’s value was due to personal goodwill, a 

nonmarital asset. Pursuant to Gaskill v. Robbins, 282 

S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2009), there is a distinction between 
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enterprise goodwill, which is a marital asset and can be 

divided in a dissolution, and personal goodwill, which is 

nonmarital. We agree with Thomas that the judgment 

must be vacated on this basis.

“The valuation of a business is complicated, often 

speculative or assumptive, and at best subjective . . . . 

Nonetheless, when a business is established during a 

marriage and is thus marital property, the trial court is 

required to fix a value and divide it between the 

spouses.” Id. at 311 (paragraph break omitted). As it 

pertains to this case, quoting approvingly from Yoon v. 

Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1268-70 (Ind. 1999) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted), Gaskill instructed family 

courts to allocate personal and enterprise goodwill when 

valuing and dividing a business:

Goodwill in a professional practice 

may be attributable to the business 

enterprise itself by virtue of its existing 

arrangements with suppliers, customers or 

others, and its anticipated future customer 

base due to factors attributable to the 

business. It may also be attributable to the 

individual owner’s personal skill, training or 

reputation. This distinction is sometimes 

reflected in the use of the term “enterprise 

goodwill,” as opposed to “personal 

goodwill.”

Enterprise goodwill is based on the 

intangible, but generally marketable, 

existence in a business of established 

relations with employees, customers and 

suppliers . . . . Enterprise goodwill is an 

asset of the business and accordingly is 

property that is divisible in a dissolution to 

the extent that it inheres in the business, 

independent of any single individual’s 
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personal efforts and will outlast any person’s 

involvement in the business . . . . 

In contrast, the goodwill that depends 

on the continued presence of a particular 

individual is a personal asset, and any value 

that attaches to a business as a result of this 

“personal goodwill” represents nothing more 

than the future earning capacity of the 

individual and is not divisible . . . . 

. . . . 

In sum, to the extent a business or 

profession has goodwill (or has a value in 

excess of its net assets) it is a factual issue to 

what extent, if any, that goodwill is personal 

to the owner or employee and to what extent 

it is enterprise goodwill and therefore 

divisible property.

Gaskill, 282 S.W.3d at 314.

Gaskill does not explicitly state that all business 

valuations henceforth must contain an enterprise versus 

personal goodwill analysis. Nonetheless, we reject 

Ninamary’s [Buba’s] argument that the goodwill analysis 

in Gaskill was not mandatory here. First, as Gaskill

recognized, Kentucky law had already recognized that 

“goodwill is a factor to be considered in arriving at the 

value of a business[.]” Id. at 312. Second, the family 

court in Gaskill did not engage in an enterprise versus 

personal goodwill analysis in dividing the medical 

practice – indeed, there was no Kentucky law at the time 

authorizing it to do so. Nonetheless, our Supreme Court 

found the family court erred by failing to conduct that 

analysis, explaining: “If the value of goodwill can be 

reasonably determined at all, the amount of enterprise 

goodwill, which is all that can be considered as marital 

property, can be determined. Therefore the trial court 
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erred in failing to consider personal and enterprise 

goodwill.” Id. at 315 (paragraph break omitted). If it 

was error to not conduct an analysis which was not 

authorized under Kentucky law, it must be error to fail to 

conduct the analysis after the law has been settled.

Ninamary [Buba] also argues that Gaskill is 

inapplicable here because it dealt with valuing a 

professional business, unlike Chimney Master. 

Ninamary’s [Buba’s] argument places her in the unusual 

position of asking us to affirm the family court’s decision 

to ignore her own expert’s unrebutted testimony. 

Unfortunately, the parties have not cited, nor have we 

independently located, any binding authority definitively 

addressing whether Gaskill applies to valuing 

professional and nonprofessional business entities alike.

However, there is no explicit indication in Gaskill

that it was intended to only apply to valuing professional 

businesses. Indeed, the Indiana Supreme Court’s 

decision in Yoon, which our Supreme Court quoted at 

length and deemed “compelling” repeatedly refers to 

valuing “a business or practice” or “a self-employed 

business or professional practice” or “a business or 

profession[.]” Gaskill, 282 S.W.3d at 313-14 (quoting 

Yoon, 711 N.E.2d at 1268-70). Moreover, the practical 

effect of Ninamary’s [Buba’s] argument would be to 

permit family courts to ignore goodwill testimony when 

valuing nonprofessional businesses.

Rabe v. Rabe, No. 2011-CA-001972-MR, 2015 

WL 3505232 (Ky. App. May 29, 2015) (unpublished), 

discussed by the parties, is – in addition to being 

unpublished and therefore not binding – materially 

distinguishable. Unlike the case at hand, in Rabe “no 

testimony was offered suggesting that any of the 

business’s goodwill was personal.” Id. at *3. When 

valuing a business, ignoring unrebutted goodwill 

evidence is not the same as failing to sua sponte create 

and assign personal goodwill to a business. In short, 
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though the issue may more often arise when valuing a 

professional entity, we conclude Gaskill also applies to 

valuing nonprofessional entities.

We are left here with the question of whether the 

family court erred by accepting Johnson’s overall 

valuation while ignoring his component conclusion that 

only thirty percent of its value is marital (enterprise 

goodwill). Precedent has long held that a family court’s 

valuation will be affirmed if it “reasonably approximated 

the [entity’s] net value[,]” Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 

59 (Ky. App. 1990), and falls “within the range of the 

competent testimony[,]” Roberts v. Roberts, 587 S.W.2d 

281, 283 (Ky. App. 1979).

A finder of fact does not have to accept blindly the 

valuation testimony and conclusions of an expert, even if 

they are unrebutted. Cf. 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and 

Opinion Evidence § 245 (2021). However, the finder of 

fact must provide a legitimate explanation for rejecting 

uncontradicted evidence or it will be reversed as acting in 

an arbitrary and unsupported manner. Kroger Limited 

Partnership I v. Boyle County Property Valuation 

Administrator, 610 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Ky. App. 2020).

The family court incorrectly indicated there was no 

goodwill evidence for it to consider and justified its 

division based on this faulty understanding of the 

evidence. The family court cannot be deemed to have 

reasonably approximated the marital value of Chimney 

Master when it failed to address unrebutted evidence of 

the entity’s enterprise versus personal goodwill. Ignoring 

Johnson’s goodwill conclusions led to a roughly 

$200,000 increase in the marital portion of Chimney 

Master’s value. Therefore, we vacate the family court’s 

valuation of Chimney Master and remand with 

instructions to address Johnson’s goodwill conclusions 

by either: (1) accepting them and apportioning the value 

of Chimney Master in accordance therewith, or (2) 
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rejecting them, and providing a sufficient explanation for 

so doing.

Maginnis v. Maginnis, No. 2019-CA-1090-MR, 2021 WL 2483877, at *5-7 (Ky. 

App. Jun. 18, 2021) (unpublished), discretionary review denied (Jan. 11, 2022).

In light of its decision to vacate and remand the holding concerning 

the division of marital property, the prior panel also directed the Family Court to 

re-evaluate its maintenance award to Buba. Id. at *7. The Court further noted that 

the Family Court failed to set out how it calculated Maginnis’s net income. Thus, 

this Court held that “on remand the family court must ensure its findings are 

supported by substantial evidence and its mathematical computations are 

sufficiently explained.” Id. at *8.

On remand, the Family Court advised the parties that it would review 

the trial recording to render its new decision. On June 29, 2022, the Family Court 

entered its findings on the remanded issues. With respect to its calculation of 

Chimney Master’s enterprise and personal goodwill, the Family Court found as 

follows:

Ninamary [Buba] testified that she and Thomas 

[Maginnis] started the business together. She testified 

[that] she managed the business’s collection efforts, 

handled the marketing, and performed other secretarial 

functions throughout the marriage until she was 

diagnosed with cancer. She acknowledged that Thomas 

[Maginnis] handled the client relations, labor, and the 

business’s accounting outside of collections. Thomas 

[Maginnis] testified that Ninamary [Buba] was a stay-at-
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home mother and primarily raised the parties’ minor 

children in the business’s early years. He acknowledged 

she managed some of the collection accounts, and that 

her contributions in the home allowed him to work fulltime outside the home.

Ninamary’s [Buba’s] expert witness, Chris 

Johnson, CPA, testified he used a cash flow analysis 

approach to value Chimney Masters at $284,414. He 

extrapolated Chimney Master’s earning potential over ten 

years, then discounted it for present value. He also stated 

he reviewed the company’s 2017 draft tax return, which 

reflected a higher gross income and supported his 

calculation that the business would continue to increase 

in revenue. He based the bulk of his valuation on the 

company’s 2015 and 2016 tax returns, customer invoices, 

bank statements, assets, and accounts receivable. He 

noted that he found discrepancies in Chimney Master’s 

total invoiced amount and total income reported, which 

he testified reflected that Chimney Masters may not 

report all of its cash payments. However, on cross

examination, he admitted that may be partially due to the 

business’s inability to collect all outstanding invoiced 

accounts. Thomas’ [Maginnis’s] testimony was that he is 

not able to collect payment on all jobs performed. He 

testified his valuation did not deduct the business’s 

liabilities because they were so egregiously comingled 

with personal debts.

Ultimately, he assigned a personal goodwill value 

of seventy percent (70%) and an enterprise goodwill

value of thirty percent (30%). He attributed Thomas’s 

[Maginnis’s] skills as a chimney sweep, his reputation in 

the community, his health and age, to personal goodwill. 

He attributed the business’s branding, its name, its repeat 

clients, and its one employee to enterprise goodwill. 

While Mr. Johnson’s testimony did not provide ample 

examples, his report, which was admitted into evidence 

listed several applicable categories and rated each 

category on a scale of one to five in importance and zero 
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to five in existence within the company, which 

adequately supported his goodwill calculations. Thomas 

[Maginnis] also testified to his skill level, the type of 

work he performed, the impact gas fireplaces have taken 

on his business, and the personal relationships he has 

with the 1099 workers[2] he utilizes for bigger jobs. 

Thomas’s [Maginnis’s] testimony supported Mr. 

Johnson’s goodwill calculations.

Thus, the Court accepts Mr. Johnson’s valuation of 

$284,414, and divides the marital portion of that 

valuation, i.e., the enterprise goodwill of $85,324.3 

Thomas [Maginnis] shall pay Ninamary [Buba] $42,662, 

which is half of the business’s marital value. Thomas 

[Maginnis] is awarded Chimney Masters.

With respect to the maintenance award, the Family Court noted that 

Buba has been unable to work since 2017. Buba’s illness and actions taken by 

Maginnis have harmed her ability to earn money as an attorney. She earns 

approximately $479 per month in residual income from her legal practice, plus 

$1,529 in Social Security Disability, for a total income of $2,008 per month. 

Against this income, Buba reported reasonable expenses of $5,189, leaving a 

shortfall of $3,182. 

The Family Court next addressed the conflicting evidence concerning 

Maginnis’s income, ultimately adopting the amount set forth on his 2017 tax return 

2 A “1099 worker” refers to an independent contractor or other self-employed worker who 

completes particular jobs or assignments but is not an employee of the company. The name 

derives from IRS Form 1099, on which payments to such workers are reported.

3 Enterprise value was 30% of $284,414, which equals $85,324. 
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- $107,200 per year or $8,933 per month. The Family Court also noted the 

evidence that Chimney Master pays many of his personal expenses, leaving him 

with monthly expenses of $2,075 per month. Thus, the Family Court found that 

Maginnis has a surplus of $6,858 per month. Based on these calculations and the 

adjusted allocation of marital property, the Family Court directed Maginnis to pay 

maintenance to Buba in the amount of $3,100 per month. Both parties separately 

appealed from this order. Additional facts will be set forth below as necessary.

II. Appeal No. 2022-CA-0903-MR

In her appeal, Buba challenges the Family Court’s calculation of the 

enterprise and personal goodwill business attributable to Chimney Master. 

Because this Court previously remanded the matter for additional findings on this 

question, the Family Court must strictly follow the mandate given in that case. 

Buckley v. Wilson, 177 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Ky. 2005). In a subsequent appeal 

following a retrial after remand, this Court’s role is limited to whether the Trial 

Court properly construed and applied the mandate. Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 

847, 849 (Ky. 1982). We review that question de novo. See Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc. 

v. Beglin, 432 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Ky. App. 2014). But where the Family Court has 

complied with this Court’s mandate for remand, its factual findings will only be 

disturbed if clearly erroneous. CR 52.01; Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 

(Ky. 1982).
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Buba complains that the Family Court’s allocation of goodwill was 

not in accordance with the holding of Gaskill v. Robbins, supra. She maintains 

that the Family Court’s 2019 judgment properly concluded that Chimney Master 

has no personal goodwill. However, this Court’s prior opinion held otherwise, 

specifically holding that the goodwill analysis in Gaskill is applicable to 

professional and non-professional businesses alike. Right or wrong, that holding is 

now law of the case, and is binding on all parties, the Family Court, and this Court 

on subsequent appeal. Williamson v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Ky. 

1989) (citing Martin v. Frasure, 352 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky. 1961)). Consequently, 

the Family Court could not simply ignore Johnson’s uncontested testimony about 

the personal goodwill attributable to the value of Chimney Master. 

The Family Court clearly complied with this Court’s directive on 

remand. The Family Court noted Johnson’s uncontested testimony assigning 70% 

of the business’s value to personal goodwill and 30% to enterprise goodwill. The 

Family Court also pointed out that Johnson gave specific reasons for these 

assignments – most notably Maginnis’s skills as a chimney sweep, his reputation in 

the community, his health, and age. In compliance with this Court’s mandate, the 

Family Court found no basis to reject his uncontested testimony. Although Buba 

points to other testimony that may have afforded a basis to reach a different result, 

we cannot say that the Family Court was compelled to reject Johnson’s testimony. 
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Therefore, we will not disturb the Family Court’s judgment dividing the marital 

equity of Chimney Master.

III. Appeal 2022-CA-1239-MR

In his first appeal, Maginnis argues that the Family Court abused its 

discretion in awarding maintenance to Buba. We review the Family Court’s 

determination of maintenance for abuse of discretion in accordance with the 

standards set forth in KRS4 403.200. Stipp v. St. Charles, 291 S.W.3d 720, 727 

(Ky. App. 2009). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s 

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal 

principles.” Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581

(Ky. 2000). More specifically, a court abuses the discretion afforded it when “(1) 

its decision rests on an error of law . . . or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) 

its decision . . . cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” 

Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 n.11 (Ky. 2004) (cleaned up).

KRS 403.200 sets out a two-part test to award maintenance. First, the 

Family Court must first find that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient 

property, including marital property, to provide for her reasonable needs. KRS 

403.200(1)(a). Second, the Family Court must find that the spouse is unable to 

support herself through appropriate employment according to the standard of living 

4 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-17-

established during the marriage. KRS 403.200(1)(b). Once that two-part 

determination is made, the Trial Court considers various factors in setting the 

“just” amount and duration of maintenance. KRS 403.200(2). Maginnis does not 

challenge the Family Court’s findings under the first part of the statute. 

Rather, Maginnis argues that the Family Court relied on improper 

methods to calculate his income, thus reaching an incorrect conclusion regarding 

his ability to meet his own needs while also meeting Buba’s needs. KRS 

403.200(2)(f). Maginnis focuses on the Family Court’s reliance on the gross 

receipts reported on his 2017 tax returns. He contends that the use of gross 

receipts substantially overstates his actual income. Maginnis also argues that the 

Family Court improperly considered Buba’s allegations that he collected 

unreported cash payments from the business.

We find no error or abuse of discretion. In our prior opinion, this 

Court directed the Family Court to explain how it calculated Maginnis’s income 

for maintenance purposes. On remand, the Family Court noted that there was very 

little definitive evidence on that issue. Maginnis does not dispute that Chimney 

Master pays some of his personal expenses directly. The Family Court found 

Maginnis’s testimony regarding the invoice discrepancies to be not credible. The 

Family Court found that the gross receipts reported on the 2017 tax returns were

likely conservative, but still less than what Johnson estimated Maginnis’s earning 
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potential to be. The Family Court further found that Maginnis has a surplus of 

$6,858 per month in excess of his reasonable expenses, and he is therefore able to 

pay maintenance to Buba. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the 

Family Court clearly erred by adopting that amount as Maginnis’s income.

Maginnis also contends that the Family Court abused its discretion 

when it refused to modify maintenance retroactively to the date of the 2019 decree. 

He asserts that Buba was unjustly enriched by the Family Court’s failure to make 

the modified award retroactive. The Family Court has discretion to grant a 

retroactive award of maintenance from the filing of the motion to the entry of 

judgment. Mudd v. Mudd, 903 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Ky. App. 1995). However, the 

maintenance statutes generally contemplate prospective relief. Pursley v. Pursley, 

144 S.W.3d 820, 828-29 (Ky. 2004). Thus, retroactive relief is usually appropriate 

only when circumstances delay a case from being submitted for decision. Mudd, 

903 S.W.2d at 534 (citing Ullman v. Ullman, 302 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Ky. 1957)).

Such circumstances are not present in this case. In its prior opinion, 

this Court did not hold that the Family Court abused its discretion by awarding 

maintenance in the 2019 judgment. Rather, the prior panel merely held that the 

award must be reconsidered in light of the more specific findings regarding 

Maginnis’s income and the new division of marital property. The Family Court’s 

findings in its 2022 judgment marginally reduced Buba’s maintenance award based 
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on these new findings. But the Family Court’s determination was based mainly on 

new or more detailed evidence concerning the parties’ income in 2019. 

Furthermore, in its October 7, 2022, order denying Maginnis’s CR 59.05 motion, 

the Family Court explained that the reduction in maintenance was caused by 

Maginnis’s failure to produce accurate and reliable income documentation. We 

conclude the Family Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to modify 

maintenance retroactively. See Higbee v. Higbee, 89 S.W.3d 409, 410 (Ky. 2002).

IV. Appeal No. 2022-CA-0038-MR

Finally, Maginnis appeals from several post-judgment orders relating 

to the marital residence. Some additional facts and procedural history are 

necessary at this point. As discussed above, the Family Court’s 2019 judgment 

calculated the equity in the residence, awarded Maginnis his non-marital interest, 

directed the sale of the residence, and ordered that the proceeds of the sale be 

divided accordingly. However, that sale never occurred. 

After entry of the judgment on April 10, 2019, Buba filed a CR 59.05 

motion asking the Family Court to vacate its ruling that the residence be sold, 

stating that she “lacked the stamina, mental and emotional strength, or physical 

ability to relocate.” The Family Court denied the motion on July 2, 2019. Neither 

party appealed from this portion of the judgment.
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Nevertheless, the parties were unable to agree on how to list the 

residence for sale. On August 1, 2019, Maginnis filed a motion to compel sale of 

the residence. Buba responded that she was taking the necessary steps, but the 

property required extensive repairs. Buba also filed a motion to hold Maginnis in 

contempt because he deducted the mortgage payments from his maintenance 

payments. Maginnis then requested a “clarification” of the April 10, 2019, 

judgment concerning his responsibility for the mortgage payments. Maginnis also 

requested orders directing Buba to reimburse him for mortgage payments made 

and to cease any further repairs of the property. The parties continued to have 

disputes over the choice of a real estate agent.

In an order entered on July 22, 2020, the Family Court held that 

Maginnis was not entitled to deduct the mortgage payments from maintenance. 

However, the Family Court directed that, rather than listing the property for sale, 

Buba should be permitted to buy Maginnis’s interest. Therefore, the Court 

directed Buba to start making the mortgage payments and gave her 90 days to seek 

refinancing of the property. The Family Court’s order also stated that, if Buba did 

not refinance the property within that time, the property shall be listed for sale. 

The Family Court then passed the remaining motions for a later hearing.

On August 3, 2020, Buba filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the 

July 22, 2020, order to allow her more time to refinance. The Family Court denied 
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the motion on September 28, 2020. That order was designated as final and 

appealable pursuant to CR 54.02.

Thereafter, the remaining motions came before the Family Court at a 

hearing on October 1, 2020. Thereafter, on October 8, 2020, the Family Court 

issued an order addressing those matters. In pertinent part, the Family Court first 

held that, under the April 10, 2019, judgment, Maginnis remained responsible for 

the mortgage payments until the property was sold. In addition, the Family Court 

noted that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic stimulus, the mortgage payment was in 

forbearance through much of 2020. Consequently, the Family Court concluded 

that Maginnis was not entitled to deduct the mortgage payments from his 

maintenance obligation and was not entitled to reimbursement of his mortgage 

payments. The Family Court’s order did not address either refinancing or listing 

the property for sale.

On October 13, 2020, Buba moved the Family Court for an additional 

90 days to secure refinancing of the property. In the alternative, she requested an 

order directing Maginnis to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the property to her. 

On October 16, 2020, Maginnis filed motions under CR 59.05, 60.01, and 60.02 to 

vacate the October 8, 2020, order with respect to the denial of his request for 

reimbursement of the mortgage payments.
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On October 26, 2020, the Family Court entered an order directing 

Maginnis to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the residence to Buba within seven 

days. Maginnis signed the quitclaim deed on November 2, 2020, and Buba 

recorded the deed on November 10. Buba refinanced the property near the end of 

November 2020.

On December 8, 2021, the Family Court entered an Order denying 

Maginnis’s October 16, 2020, motions. Among other things, the Family Court 

concluded that Maginnis’s motion to compel the sale of the residence was moot 

because the property had already been transferred and refinanced. The Family 

Court also denied Maginnis’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate the October 8, 

2020, order denying his request for reimbursement of mortgage payments. The 

Family Court designated this order as final and appealable pursuant to CR 54.02. 

Maginnis filed his notice of appeal from this order on January 5, 2022.

Maginnis argues that the Family Court acted outside its particularcase jurisdiction when it altered the terms of its July 22, 2020, order giving Buba 

90 days to obtain refinancing of the property. He correctly notes that the Family 

Court denied Buba’s motion to allow her more time to refinance on September 28, 

2020. Because CR 59.05 provides that a final judgment may be altered, amended,

or vacated only within ten days after entry of the final judgment, Maginnis 

contends that the Family Court acted outside of its particular-case jurisdiction 
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when it subsequently allowed her additional time to refinance and ordered him to 

quitclaim the property. We disagree.

Even if the Family Court acted outside its particular-case jurisdiction, 

that issue may be waived if not timely raised. Goodlett v. Brittain, 544 S.W.3d 

656, 660 (Ky. App. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 

724-25 (Ky. 2013)). Here, Maginnis did not raise any objection to the refinancing 

other than it was beyond the 90 days allowed in the July 22, 2022, order. He did 

not appeal or seek a writ from the order requiring him to sign the quitclaim deed. 

As noted above, the property was transferred to Buba in November of 2020. 

Moreover, while the September 28, 2022, order included finality 

language, it was not a final and appealable order. Specifically, neither the July 22, 

2022, order nor the September 28, 2022, order conclusively determined the rights 

of the parties in regard to that particular phase of the proceeding. Francis v. 

Crounse Corp., 98 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Ky. App. 2002) (citing Hale v. Deaton, 528 

S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1975)). The July 22, 2022, order merely commanded the 

property to be listed for sale if Buba failed to secure financing within the 

prescribed time. The September 28, 2022, order denied Buba’s request for 

additional time for refinancing. Under both orders, matters concerning that sale 

were reserved for later adjudication. Consequently, the Family Court retained the 
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authority to allow Buba to purchase the property as part of its continuing 

jurisdiction to enforce its orders. 

As directed in the prior judgments, the property was sold and the 

proceeds divided. Maginnis does not ask this Court to vacate the transfer to Buba 

and direct the Family Court to order a sale of the property. Morgan v. Getter, 441 

S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Ky. 2014). In addition, Maginnis does not claim that he did not 

receive his allotted share of the sale proceeds. Thus, the matter is now moot.

Separately, Maginnis argues that the Family Court erred by denying 

his motion for reimbursement of mortgage payments that he made between the 

April 10, 2019, judgment and the July 22, 2022, order directing Buba to assume 

the mortgage payments until the property was sold. The Family Court repeatedly 

denied Maginnis’s motion for reimbursement, concluding that he waived the issue 

by voluntarily making payments on the mortgage after the April 10, 2019,

judgment and by failing to raise the issue until nearly a year later. We agree with 

Maginnis that he adequately reserved this issue in his October 16, 2020, motion. 

However, this merely returns us to the underlying question – was 

Maginnis entitled to reimbursement of mortgage payments made between the April 

10, 2019, judgment and the July 22, 2020, order directing Buba to assume 

responsibility for the payments? Maginnis argues that Buba has been unjustly 

enriched by these payments. Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine that serves 
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as a basis of restitution to prevent one person from keeping money or benefits 

belonging to another. Haeberle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 769 S.W.2d 

64, 67 (Ky. App. 1989) (citing Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Glasscock, 270 Ky. 

750, 110 S.W.2d 681 (1937)). “There are three elements that a party must meet in 

order to prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment: (1) benefit conferred upon 

defendant at plaintiff’s expense; (2) a resulting appreciation of benefit by 

defendant; and (3) inequitable retention of benefit without payment for its value.” 

Collins v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 399 S.W.3d 449, 455 (Ky. App. 2012).

As the Family Court recognized in its October 8, 2020, order, 

Maginnis did not show any compelling grounds for reimbursement. The mortgage 

was originally in Maginnis’s sole name. Since the April 10, 2019, judgment did 

not address assignment of the mortgage, he was ultimately responsible for the 

payments until the property was sold. Maginnis unilaterally elected to withhold 

the mortgage payments from Buba’s maintenance. But he did not elect to seek a 

credit for those payments until well into 2020. Furthermore, both parties were 

responsible for the delays in listing the property for sale in 2019, and the COVID19 pandemic created additional obstacles to listing the property. And as the 

Family Court noted, the mortgage was in forbearance through much of 2020. 

Arguably, Maginnis showed that his mortgage payments conferred a 

benefit. But since the property was to be sold, that benefit accrued to both parties. 
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Had the property been sold to a third party as planned, Maginnis would not have a 

right to any additional proceeds because he never requested that relief. Therefore, 

the fact that Buba ultimately obtained the benefit of those payments was not 

inequitable. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the Family Court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying his request for reimbursement or an offset for those 

payments.

Finally, Maginnis raises several issues relating to the Family Court’s 

rulings on his discovery motions. Buba responds that these discovery issues relate 

to the issue of temporary maintenance, which is not appealable. Maginnis states 

that he is not appealing the issue of temporary maintenance, but he does not 

identify what those discovery matters concerned. Maginnis merely asserts that 

“[h]e is merely challenging the propriety of the [Family Court’s] demonstratable 

bias by allowing one party to conduct discovery while prohibiting the other party 

from the same.”

The orders at issue specifically related to discovery of records 

concerning Maginnis’s income and Buba’s ability to work. Furthermore, the 

orders referenced Buba’s claim for pendente lite maintenance. This Court could 

only grant potential relief on these discovery issues by remanding the temporary 

maintenance issues for further proceedings. But as this Court’s motion panel 

recognized, temporary maintenance orders are interlocutory in nature and generally 
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are not subject to appeal. Atkisson v. Atkisson, 298 S.W.3d 858, 864 (Ky. App. 

2009). Maginnis does not request any other relief, such as recusal of the Trial 

Judge due to bias. Since the subject of the discovery orders is beyond the 

jurisdiction of this Court, we decline to address the issue further.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the Jefferson Family Court in all 

three appeals.

ALL CONCUR. 

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:

Allison S. Russell

Shanna R. Ballinger

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:

Robert Frederick Smith

Louisville, Kentucky