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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KYLE A.*

(AC 43377)

Elgo, Suarez and Sullivan, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of various crimes in connection with an altercation with his brother, A, the defendant appealed to this court. The

defendant called A on the phone, and, during that call, A was given

reason to believe that the defendant had been consuming alcohol. The

defendant expressed his intent to go to A’s home, where A lived with

his minor daughter. A warned the defendant that he could not come to

the home if he was intoxicated because A’s daughter was with him.

Later that day, while A and his girlfriend, T, were inside of the home,

the defendant arrived. The defendant, who did not have a key to the

home, banged on the locked front door, and then broke a window on

the locked back door and entered the home. A and T fled the home

through the front door. The defendant, brandishing a wooden baseball

bat, emerged from the home and began to strike A’s automobile, which

was parked in the driveway, with the bat. The defendant also used the

bat to damage property inside of the home. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state presented

insufficient evidence that he committed burglary in the first degree:

the state’s theory of the case, that the defendant entered or remained

unlawfully in the victim’s home, was legally viable as the defendant’s

entry into the home was unlawful because A, who was occupying the

home, testified that the defendant was not a resident of the home at

the time of the incident, that A and his daughter resided there, and that

A had communicated to the defendant that he was not permitted to

enter the home and, although the defendant claimed that he was granted

a license to enter the home by J, his mother and the undisputed owner

of the home, this claim rested entirely on the credibility of J’s testimony,

which was challenged at trial, and this court presumed that the jury,

the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses, disbelieved J’s testimony to the extent that she testified that she gave the defendant permission to enter the home; moreover, J’s familial relationship to the defendant reasonably could have given the jury reason to consider with

skepticism her testimony as, contrary to J’s testimony that the defendant

had a key to the residence, the state presented evidence that the defendant broke down a door in order to enter the home and that the defendant

wrote letters to J in which he urged her not to cooperate with the

prosecution; furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed with a dangerous

instrument as there was direct evidence, through T’s testimony, regarding the defendant’s use of a baseball bat in A’s driveway immediately

after he had illegally entered and remained in A’s home, which made it

more likely that the defendant possessed the baseball bat while he was

inside of the home and that he used the bat to cause damage to property

inside of the home, which was undamaged prior to his unlawful entry.

2. The defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court’s instruction to

the jury concerning the charge of burglary in the first degree constituted

plain error was unavailing: notwithstanding the defendant’s claim that

the court improperly omitted a necessary portion of the instruction

because, although it instructed the jury that it needed to find that the

defendant acted with the specific intent to commit either a felony or a

misdemeanor in the home, it failed to identify by name one or more

specific felony or misdemeanor offenses, the alleged error did not

involve the court’s failure to include language from a mandatory charging

statute; moreover, this court was not persuaded that allowing the alleged

error in the instruction to stand uncorrected would work a manifest

injustice, as the defendant’s argument was undermined by the fact pattern that was reflected in the evidence and expressly relied on by the

prosecutor during oral argument, which pointed to the defendant’s intent

to commit three different crimes, all of which would rise to the level

of intent required by the burglary statute; furthermore, although the
better practice would have been for the trial court to have instructed

the jury with respect to the intent to commit one or more named felony

or misdemeanor offenses, the claimed error was unlikely to have guided

the jury to an incorrect verdict in light of the evidence and arguments

advanced in the present case.

Argued October 21, 2021—officially released May 3, 2022

Procedural History

Substitute information, in the first case, charging the

defendant with the crimes of burglary in the first degree,

criminal mischief in the first degree, and threatening

in the second degree, and substitute information, in the

second case, charging the defendant with the crime of

attempt to commit criminal violation of a protective

order, and substitute information, in the third case,

charging the defendant with the crime of criminal violation of a protective order, and substitute information,

in the fourth case, charging the defendant with the

crime of tampering with a witness, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford

and tried to the jury before McShane, J.; verdicts and

judgments of guilty, from which the defendant appealed

to this court. Affirmed.

Julia K. Conlin, assigned counsel, with whom were

James Sexton, assigned counsel, and, on the brief,

Emily Graner Sexton, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, was Margaret E. Kelley, state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Kyle A., appeals from the

judgments of conviction, rendered following a jury trial,

of burglary in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1), criminal mischief in the first

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-115 (a)

(1), threatening in the second degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (2) (A), criminal violation

of a protective order in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-223, tampering with a witness in violation of General Statutes § 53a-151, and attempt to commit criminal

violation of a protective order in violation of General

Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-223.1 The defendant’s appellate claims pertain solely to his burglary conviction.

The defendant claims that, because the state did not

present sufficient evidence that he committed the burglary offense, he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal

with respect to that offense. Alternatively, the defendant claims that, because the court’s instruction concerning the burglary offense constituted plain error, the

conviction for burglary should be overturned and the

case remanded for a new trial with respect to that

offense. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

jury reasonably could have found the following facts.

On August 28, 2016, A resided with his daughter, who

was eight years old, in a single-family residence in West

Haven. A’s girlfriend, T, frequently visited him at the

home. The home was owned by J, who is the mother

of A and his brother, who is the defendant. J did not

reside in the home at that time.

The defendant had been living in Maryland, but as

of August 28, 2016, he made plans to move to Connecticut and live with his brother, A, at the West Haven

home. The defendant called A at approximately 6 a.m.

on August 28, 2016. During the call, the defendant gave

A reason to immediately become concerned about his

pending arrival. On the basis of statements made by

the defendant, A believed that the defendant had been

consuming alcohol and ‘‘partying . . . .’’ At one point

in the conversation, the defendant asked A if he could

provide him with ‘‘Adderall or something to help keep

him awake.’’ A warned the defendant that he could not

come to the home if he was intoxicated because his

daughter was at the home with him. A stated, ‘‘please

[do] not show up if you’re drinking or anything . . . .’’

A also told the defendant that if he came to the home

while intoxicated ‘‘that we probably couldn’t let you in

because my daughter was there.’’ Initially, the defendant

was upset with these restrictions, but after he spoke

with A further, he asked A for time ‘‘to sober up and

everything and do what I have to do.’’ A agreed that he

would talk to the defendant later that day.

At approximately 9 a.m., the defendant called A a
second time. A asked the defendant if he was doing

any better and again cautioned the defendant to ‘‘just

please wear it off before you make any efforts or steps

to come to the house.’’ Once again, A asked the defendant not to come to the home in light of the defendant’s

condition or state of mind, and emphasized that, under

the circumstances, the defendant could not come in

contact with A’s daughter. A offered to help the defendant, at a different location, but the defendant hung up

on him. At approximately 1 p.m., the defendant called

A a third time. He made it clear that he was coming to

the house regardless of A’s objections. Once more, A

asked the defendant not to come if he was intoxicated

and stressed that, because a child resided at the home,

the defendant had to be sober. The defendant, upset

with the restrictions being placed on him by A, sent A

a text message that stated, ‘‘Do you want to play with

fire, you are going to get burned.’’

Later that day, while A and T were inside of the home,

the defendant arrived. The defendant, who did not have

a key to the home, angrily banged on the front door,

which was locked. The defendant was screaming and

yelling. The defendant went to a locked back door,

broke a window on the door, and entered the home. A

and T, fearing for their safety, fled from the home by

means of the front door. As he left the home, A saw

the defendant entering and asked him to ‘‘please stop,

stop . . . .’’

After they exited the home, A and T stayed a safe

distance away, while seeking the aid of neighbors and

attempting to contact the police. The defendant, brandishing a wooden baseball bat, emerged from the home

and began to strike A’s automobile, which was parked

in the driveway, with the bat. The defendant used the

bat to cause significant damage to property inside of

the home as well. The police arrived on the scene a

short time later, at which point the defendant was inside

of the home. The defendant exited the home when the

police instructed him to do so and, while he was being

taken into custody, he noticed A standing nearby and

stated that he ‘‘was going to kill [him] when [he] get[s]

out of this . . . .’’ Hours later, while in police custody

at the police department and undergoing the booking

process, the defendant repeated his threat to kill A.

Following the defendant’s arrest, but prior to trial,

the court issued three separate protective orders that,

among other things, prohibited the defendant from having contact with A and A’s daughter. The orders stated,

‘‘Do not contact the protected person in any manner,

including by written, electronic or telephone contact,

and do not contact the protected person’s home, workplace or others with whom the contact would be likely

to cause annoyance or alarm to the protected person.’’

While he was bound by this provision, the defendant

called A from prison on nine separate occasions. Also,
on several occasions, the defendant mailed letters from

prison to several persons in an attempt to persuade A

not to cooperate with the prosecution of the charges

related to his conduct on August 28, 2016, and the

charges that related to his violation of a protective

order. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

First, the defendant claims that because the state did

not present sufficient evidence that he committed the

burglary offense, he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal

with respect to that offense.2 We disagree.

The present claim consists of two subclaims. First,

relying on evidence that J, who owned the home, granted

him permission to reside at the home, the defendant

argues that the state’s theory of the case, that he entered

or remained unlawfully in the home on August 28, 2016,

was not legally viable. Second, the defendant argues that

the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was armed with a dangerous instrument.

Before analyzing each subclaim, we set forth our standard of review and relevant legal principles. ‘‘When a

criminal conviction is reviewed for the sufficiency of

the evidence, we apply a well established [two part] test.

First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine

whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences

reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could

have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . [P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean

proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof

beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every

hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that,

had it been found credible by the [finder of fact], would

have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do

not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of

innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [fact finder’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fisher, 342 Conn. 239,

249, 269 A.3d 104 (2022).

‘‘Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to determining whether the inferences drawn by the [fact finder]

are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. . . . [T]he

inquiry into whether the record evidence would support

a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not

require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the

evidence . . . established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. . . . Instead, the relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘We do not sit as a [seventh] juror who may cast a

vote against the verdict based upon our feeling that

some doubt of guilt is shown by the cold printed record.

We have not had the [fact finder’s] opportunity to observe

the conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the witnesses

and to gauge their credibility. . . . We are content to

rely on the [fact finder’s] good sense and judgment.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. WhitnumBaker, 169 Conn. App. 523, 525–26, 150 A.3d 1174 (2016),

cert. denied, 324 Conn. 923, 155 A.3d 753 (2017).

Section 53a-101 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when (1)

such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building

with intent to commit a crime therein and is armed with

explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument

. . . .’’ The state bore the burden of proving the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1)

the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building, (2) he did so with the intent to commit a crime

therein, and (3) he was armed with a dangerous instrument. See State v. Weaver, 85 Conn. App. 329, 341–42,

857 A.2d 376 (setting forth essential elements of offense),

cert. denied, 271 Conn. 942, 861 A.2d 517 (2004).

A

With respect to the first essential element of the

offense, that the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building, the state’s theory of the case was

that the defendant’s entry into the home was unlawful

because A, who currently occupied the home, expressly

forbid him from entering the home. The prosecutor

argued before the jury that A was residing at the home

on August 28, 2016, that the defendant was not residing

at the home on that date, and that A communicated to

the defendant that he was not permitted to come into

the home because he was not sober. Thus, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the defendant ‘‘unlawfully

entered the home where [A] was living . . . .’’ The prosecutor acknowledged that there was testimony from J

that she had granted the defendant permission to enter

the home, which she owned. The prosecutor argued,

however, that the privilege to enter the home could

only be granted ‘‘by the person who has [a] possessory

interest in the house.’’ The prosecutor argued that A

possessed the home on August 28, 2016, and that J

was residing in Florida on that date, and, thus, the

permission that she may have granted the defendant

was ‘‘of no moment . . . .’’ Moreover, the prosecutor

argued that, for several reasons, J’s testimony that she

gave the defendant permission to enter the home was

not credible in light of other evidence presented at trial.

With respect to the ‘‘unlawful entry’’ essential element of the offense, the court instructed the jury in

relevant part: ‘‘You must . . . determine whether the
defendant unlawfully entered or remained in [a] building. A person unlawfully enter[s] or remains in a building at the time [that it] is not open to the public and

the defendant is not licensed or privileged to do so. To

be licensed or privileged, the defendant must either

have consent from the person in possession of the building or have some right to be in that building. . . . You

must determine whether the defendant unlawfully

entered or remained in a building. A person unlawfully

enters or remains in a building when the building, at

that time, is not open to the public and the defendant

is not licensed or privileged to do so. When I say not

licensed or privileged to do so, I mean the defendant

must either have had consent from the person in possession of the building or have some other right to be in

the building.’’ In this appeal, the defendant does not

raise a claim of error related to this instruction.

During her testimony, J testified that, in August, 2016,

she was not residing in the West Haven home, which

she owned since 1988. She testified that, prior to and

including August 28, 2016, A and his daughter were

residing at the home but that the defendant had been

residing with a relative in Maryland.3 She testified, however, that she gave the defendant permission to reside

at the home, that it was ‘‘our home,’’ and that she had

not placed any restrictions on his right to enter the

home. J testified that the defendant has ‘‘always had a

key’’ to the home. When asked if the defendant had a

right to damage her property, J testified that she ‘‘can’t

answer that . . . .’’

The defendant, relying on the testimony of J, asserts

that, ‘‘to the extent that [he] needed an express license

or privilege to be in the home, the homeowner had

granted it to him, so the evidence was insufficient to

establish that he entered or unlawfully remained in the

house.’’ The defendant also argues that ‘‘[he] did not

‘remain unlawfully’ in the house as his license to be

there never was extinguished by the licensor, i.e., his

mother; nor did she place any limitations on the scope

of that license.’’ The defendant asserts that the state’s

theory of the case was not legally viable because it

rested on the flawed premise that ‘‘one can burglarize

one’s own residence . . . .’’ The defendant argues that

‘‘[w]hile [his] conduct at the home could have potentially given rise to other criminal charges, it strains

the bounds of logic that [he] was charged with and

convicted of burglary of his own home.’’ The defendant

argues that he neither unlawfully entered nor unlawfully

remained in the home because the evidence reflects

that, after he entered the home, he did not interact with

anyone therein.

Although the defendant’s claim is couched in terms

of the sufficiency of the evidence, he purports to challenge the viability of the legal theory advanced by the

state. In other words, he questions whether his conduct
in entering or remaining in the home could be unlawful

in light of the evidence that the owner of the home, J,

granted him permission to reside there. We conclude

that the state’s theory was legally viable and that the

evidence sufficiently supported the jury’s guilty verdict

with respect to the burglary offense.

Because we must examine one of the essential elements of burglary in the third degree, related to unlawful entry and remaining in the home, we note that this

issue presents an issue of law that we review under the

plenary standard of review. As we stated previously,

§ 53a-101 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of burglary in the first degree when (1) such

person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with

intent to commit a crime therein and is armed with

explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument

. . . .’’ ‘‘A person ‘enters or remains unlawfully’ in or

upon premises when the premises, at the time of such

entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when

the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do

so.’’ General Statutes § 53a-100 (b).

‘‘To enter unlawfully means to accomplish an entry

by unlawful means, while to remain unlawfully means

that the initial entering of the building . . . was lawful

but the presence therein became unlawful because the

right, privilege or license to remain was extinguished.

When either of these situations is established, the

threshold element of burglary is present.’’ State v.

Edwards, 10 Conn. App. 503, 511, 524 A.2d 648, cert.

denied, 204 Conn. 808, 528 A.2d 1155 (1987).

‘‘A license in real property is defined as a personal,

revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either

by writing or parol, to do one or more acts on land

without possessing any interest therein. . . . Generally, a license to enter premises is revocable at any time

by the licensor. . . . It is exercisable only within the

scope of the consent given. . . . The term, privilege,

is more general. It is a right or immunity granted as a

peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor; special enjoyment

of a good or exemption from an evil or burden; a peculiar or personal advantage or right esp. when enjoyed

in derogation of common right; prerogative. . . . The

phrase, licensed or privileged, as used in [our burglary

statutes], is meant as a unitary phrase, rather than as

a reference to two separate concepts.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsan,

192 Conn. App. 49, 56, 216 A.3d 818, cert. denied, 333

Conn. 939, 218 A.3d 1049 (2019).

The state’s theory of the case was that, on August

28, 2016, the defendant lacked a license or privilege to

enter or remain in the home in which he was not a

resident and which was occupied by A and his daughter.

The prosecutor argued that, in the absence of any credible evidence that the defendant was licensed or privileged to enter or remain in the home, his forcible entry
into the home and his remaining in the home were,

for purposes of § 53a-103 (a), unlawful. In light of the

foregoing authorities, we conclude that the state’s theory of the case, which focused on a lack of a license

or privilege to enter and remain, was legally viable.

It cannot be disputed that the defendant’s arguments

concerning the license or privilege that was allegedly

granted to him by the undisputed owner of the home,

J, rest entirely on the credibility of J’s testimony that

she had granted the defendant license or privilege with

respect to entering the home. The legal flaw in the

defendant’s argument is that he treats the challenged

testimony of J as if it constituted an unassailable fact.

As we have stated previously in this opinion, this court

evaluates sufficiency of the evidence claims by viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See State v. Fisher, supra, 342 Conn. 249. Accordingly, we presume in this case that the jury, the sole

arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses, disbelieved

the testimony of J to the extent that she testified that

she gave the defendant a license or privilege to enter

or to remain in the home. We do so mindful that the state

presented ample fodder for the jury’s consideration that

supported a determination that J, in an attempt to assist

the defendant, testified untruthfully in this regard. J’s

familial relationship to the defendant reasonably could

have given the jury reason to consider with skepticism

her testimony. We note that, contrary to J’s testimony

that the defendant had a key to the residence, the state

presented evidence that the defendant, armed with a

baseball bat, broke down a door in order to gain entry

into the home on August 28, 2016. Moreover, the state

presented evidence that, while he was awaiting trial,

the defendant wrote letters to J in which he urged her

not to cooperate with the prosecution and to create

an untruthful narrative that would assist his defense,

including suggesting that she inform ‘‘the judge’’ that

he ‘‘[had] permission to be there . . . .’’

The jury, having discredited the testimony of J, reasonably could have found that there was no other evidence that the defendant had a license or a privilege

to enter the home or to remain in the home. Certainly,

the testimony of A, which we presume the jury found

persuasive, reflects that, as of August 28, 2016, the

defendant was not a resident of the home, A and his

daughter resided at and were the occupants of the

home, and A had communicated to the defendant that

he was not permitted to enter the home. The evidence

also supported a finding that the defendant’s conduct

on his arrival at the home was that of someone who

lacked a license or a privilege to enter. Specifically, the

defendant did not use a key to enter the home, he did

not wait for an occupant of the home to let him in,

and he did not contact J, who presumably could have

spoken with A to resolve any dispute concerning the

defendant’s arrival, for her assistance to gain entry to
the home. Rather, the evidence reflects that the defendant forcibly entered the home and caused substantial

damage to the property.

In light of the foregoing, we reject the defendant’s

claim that the jury could not reasonably have concluded

that his entry of or remaining in the home was unlawful.

B

With respect to the third element of the offense, that

the defendant was armed with a dangerous instrument,

the prosecutor argued that the evidence demonstrated

that the defendant used a bat inside of the home after

his illegal entry therein. With respect to this essential

element, the prosecutor argued that the defendant used

a wooden baseball bat during the commission of the

offense. The defendant argues that although the evidence demonstrated that he used a baseball bat outside

of the home to damage A’s automobile that was parked

in the driveway, the state did not present any evidence

to support a finding that he was armed with a baseball

bat while he was inside of the home.

General Statutes § 53a-3 (7) defines ‘‘[d]angerous

instrument’’ in relevant part as ‘‘any instrument, article

or substance which, under the circumstances in which

it is used or attempted or threatened to be used, is

capable of causing death or serious physical injury

. . . .’’ Although the defendant disputes that he used a

wooden baseball bat inside of the home on August 28,

2016, he does not dispute that a wooden baseball bat

could constitute a dangerous instrument.

We now turn to the evidence. A testified that when

the defendant arrived at the home, he heard a bang on

the front door and then, shortly thereafter, he heard

the sound of glass breaking at the back door. A testified

that, as he fled from the home by means of the front

door, he saw the defendant entering the home. T, who

fled the home with A as the defendant was entering

through the back door, testified that while she was

exiting through the front door, she heard ‘‘a bat or a

kick’’ and ‘‘things smashing . . . .’’ There was photographic evidence presented that the glass on the rear

door was broken, and A testified that the glass on the

rear door was not broken prior to the defendant’s

arrival. A and T testified that, after they exited the home,

they remained nearby while attempting to summon

assistance. The state presented photographic evidence

of damage inside of the home, including a damaged

table with a ceramic or marble top in the kitchen, pieces

of which were cracked and strewn about the kitchen

floor, as well as a damaged television set in the living

room. T testified that neither the table nor the television

set were damaged prior to the defendant’s entry into

the home. As he was being questioned about the damage

in the home, A, without objection, identified the television set in the living room as ‘‘the TV that was hit with
a baseball bat.’’

T testified about what she observed after she exited

the home. In relevant part, she testified that as she and

A were running from the home, she stopped and turned

around. She saw the defendant near A’s automobile,

‘‘[h]itting the car with a bat.’’ Photographic evidence

presented by the state depicted damage to multiple

windows on the automobile. A testified that this damage

did not exist prior to that time.4

As the defendant acknowledges, the state did not

need to prove that the defendant was armed with a

dangerous instrument on his entry into the home. It

was sufficient for the state to prove that, at some point

while he remained unlawfully in the home, the defendant armed himself with a dangerous instrument. See,

e.g., State v. Belton, 190 Conn. 496, 505, 461 A.2d 973

(1983). The gist of the defendant’s argument is that the

state did not satisfy its burden of proof with respect to

his being armed with a baseball bat inside of the home

because there was no direct evidence of this fact, and

there were no ‘‘ ‘proven facts’ ’’ on which the jury reasonably could have inferred this fact.

‘‘It is axiomatic that the burden in criminal cases is

on the prosecution to prove each essential element of

the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that

there is no burden on the defendant to prove his innocence. . . . In finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

a jury may not resort to speculation and conjecture but

it is clearly within the province of the jury to draw

reasonable, logical inferences from the facts proven.’’

(Citations omitted.) State v. Morrill, 193 Conn. 602, 608,

478 A.2d 994 (1984). We emphasize that ‘‘the probative

force of the evidence is not diminished because it consists, in whole or in part, of circumstantial evidence

rather than direct evidence. . . . It has been repeatedly

stated that there is no legal distinction between direct

and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force

is concerned. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative

impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt

in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sanchez,

50 Conn. App. 145, 149, 718 A.2d 52, cert. denied, 247

Conn. 922, 722 A.2d 811 (1998).

‘‘The law regarding inferences . . . is clear. Due process does not . . . require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from evidence, or

even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We have regularly held that a jury’s factual

inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be

reasonable. . . . Equally well established is our holding that a jury may draw factual inferences on the basis

of already inferred facts. . . .

‘‘It is axiomatic that the state’s burden of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt applies to each and every
element comprising the offense charged. But this burden of proof does not operate upon each of the many

subsidiary, evidentiary, incidental or subordinate facts

. . . upon which the prosecution may collectively rely

to establish a particular element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. . . . Where the prosecution must

rely upon circumstantial evidence, either in part or in

whole, each link in the chain of circumstantial evidence

need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Hersey, 78 Conn. App. 141, 167, 826 A.2d 1183,

cert. denied, 266 Conn. 903, 832 A.2d 65 (2003).

In the present case, there was direct evidence, by

means of the testimony of T, of the defendant’s violent

use of a baseball bat in A’s driveway immediately after

he had illegally entered and remained in the A’s home.

This evidence made it more likely that the defendant

possessed the baseball bat while inside of the home. It

also supported a finding that the defendant, who was

the only person inside of the home after A and T fled,

used the baseball bat to cause the damage that was

discovered inside of the home. Moreover, the photographic and testimonial evidence concerning the nature

and extent of the damage to items inside of the home

that were undamaged prior to the defendant’s unlawful

entry into the home, including damage to the kitchen

table and the television set, was entirely consistent with

damage that would have been caused by a baseball bat.

On the basis of the evidence as a whole and the rational

inferences to be drawn therefrom, the jury could have

reasonably concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant either entered the home with a baseball

bat or that he armed himself with a baseball bat while

inside of the home.

II

Next, the defendant claims that the court’s instruction concerning the burglary offense constituted plain

error and that the conviction for burglary should be

overturned and the case remanded for a new trial with

respect to that offense. We disagree.

We begin our analysis of this claim by setting forth

the relevant procedural history. The court distributed

to the parties a written draft of its jury instructions and,

after affording the parties a meaningful opportunity

to review the instructions, held a charging conference

during which defense counsel did not raise any objections to the court’s burglary charge. Defense counsel

submitted a written request to charge but it did not

include a burglary instruction.

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued to

the jury that, with respect to the second essential element of the offense, that the defendant intended to

commit a crime in the home; see General Statutes § 53a101 (a) (1); the evidence supported a finding that the
defendant acted with the requisite mental state required

for the commission of the crime. The prosecutor suggested that the crime that the defendant intended to

commit was criminal mischief.5 The state charged the

defendant with criminal mischief in the first degree in

violation of § 53a-115 (a) (1), a felony, and in connection

with this offense, it relied on evidence that he caused

damage to tangible personal property inside of the

home. The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty

of this offense as well. In her arguments, the prosecutor

also focused on the evidence of the defendant’s comments concerning A, made before and after he arrived

at the home. The prosecutor argued, ‘‘[i]ntent to commit

a crime, the criminal mischief, crime of violence and

assault, a threatening, an intent to commit a crime. The

threatening threatens to commit a crime of violence

with an intent to terrorize another. . . . I ask you to

remember the words that were spoken by the defendant

and the substance of the text messages, how could that

be anything other than to terrorize . . . .’’

Later, the court instructed the jury concerning the

burglary offense: ‘‘The statute defining this offense

reads in pertinent part as follow[s]: A person is guilty

of burglary in the first degree when he unlawfully enters

or remains in a building with the intent to commit a

crime therein and he is armed with a dangerous instrument.’’ After discussing the first essential element of

the offense, that the defendant unlawfully entered or

remained in a building, the court addressed the second

element of the offense: ‘‘The second element is that

the defendant unlawfully entered or remained in the

building with the intent to commit a crime in that building. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result

when his conscious objective is to cause such result.

Even if the defendant never actually committed a crime

in the building, if the evidence establishes beyond a

reasonable doubt that there was such an intention, this

is sufficient to prove the defendant unlawfully entered

or remained in the building with the intent to commit

a crime therein. Furthermore, the necessary intent to

commit a crime must be an intent to commit either a

felony or a misdemeanor in addition to the unlawful

entering or remaining in the building.’’ The court then

addressed the third essential element of the offense,

that the defendant be armed with a dangerous instrument in the building. Following the court’s charge,

defense counsel did not take an exception related to

the burglary instruction.

The defendant, acknowledging that he failed to preserve the present claim of instructional error at trial,

argues that he is entitled to relief under the plain error

doctrine. ‘‘It is well known that the plain error doctrine,

codified at Practice Book § 60-5, is an extraordinary

remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpreserved [and nonconstitutional in nature], are of such monumental propor-
tion that they threaten to erode our system of justice and

work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved

party. [T]he plain error doctrine . . . is not . . . a rule

of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. That is, it

is a doctrine that this court invokes in order to rectify

a trial court ruling that, although either not properly

preserved or never raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal of the trial court’s judgment

. . . for reasons of policy. . . . In addition, the plain

error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of the error is so obvious

that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public

confidence in the judicial proceedings. . . . Plain error

is a doctrine that should be invoked sparingly. . . .

Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion

. . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is

reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the

judgment under review. . . .

‘‘An appellate court addressing a claim of plain error

first must determine if the error is indeed plain in the

sense that it is patent [or] readily [discernible] on the

face of a factually adequate record, [and] also . . .

obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . . This determination clearly requires a review of the plain error

claim presented in light of the record. . . .

‘‘Although a complete record and an obvious error

are prerequisites for plain error review, they are not,

of themselves, sufficient for its application. . . . [I]n

addition to examining the patent nature of the error,

the reviewing court must examine that error for the

grievousness of its consequences in order to determine

whether reversal under the plain error doctrine is appropriate. A party cannot prevail under plain error unless

it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will

result in manifest injustice.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 210 Conn.

App. 249, 271–72, 269 A.3d 870 (2022).

The gist of the defendant’s argument is that the court

improperly omitted a necessary portion of the instruction because, although it instructed the jury that it

needed to find that the defendant acted with the specific

intent to commit either a felony or a misdemeanor in

the home, it failed to identify by name one or more

specific felony or misdemeanor offenses. The defendant

argues that the court deviated from the model criminal

jury instruction6 and that ‘‘[t]he court’s failure to include

this portion of the charge impermissibly permitted the

jury to craft its own understanding of what constitutes

a felony or misdemeanor, resulting in patent and readily

discernible error.’’ The defendant asserts that, in light

of the evidence before the jury, ‘‘the jury could have

believed any host of morally offensive behaviors, such

as angrily attempting to confront his brother, to constitute a ‘crime,’ thereby using its own, incorrect interpretation of criminal conduct as support for the intent
element.’’

Because the present claim of plain error arises in the

context of a claim of instructional error, we are mindful

that, ‘‘[a]lthough, on rare occasions, [our Supreme

Court has] granted plain error review for claims of

improper jury instructions . . . [it has] done so only

when the instruction in question either failed to include

language from a mandatory charging statute, or when

the instruction was so patently improper that to allow it

to stand uncorrected would work a manifest injustice.’’

(Citations omitted.) State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 58 n.18,

770 A.2d 908 (2001).

For several reasons, we disagree that the alleged

instructional error rises to the level of plain error. First,

it cannot be disputed that the alleged error does not

involve the court’s failure to include language from a

mandatory charging statute.

Second, we are not persuaded that allowing the alleged

error in the instruction to stand uncorrected would

work a manifest injustice. In State v. Zayas, 195 Conn.

611, 612, 616–18, 490 A.2d 68 (1985), our Supreme Court

rejected a similar claim, albeit one of constitutional

magnitude, which was raised by a defendant who was

convicted of attempted burglary in the second degree

in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 53a102 and § 53a-49. In Zayas, ‘‘[t]he [trial] court charged

the jury that in order to convict the defendant they

must find that he intended to commit a crime inside

the dwelling. The court did not instruct the jury on any

particular crime regarding this element of attempted

burglary. The defendant argue[d] that this lack of specificity in the jury instructions deprived him of due process of law because it allowed the jury to find him

guilty without necessarily finding all of the elements

of attempted burglary to have been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.’’ Id., 616. Our Supreme Court noted

that it did not approve of the court’s instruction and

that ‘‘[t]he better practice would have been to instruct

the jury on the statutory names and definitions of specific crimes for which there was sufficient evidence of

an intent to commit.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 618. Nonetheless, the court rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge and concluded that it

was not possible that the jury was misled because (1)

the trial court instructed the jury that it must find that

the defendant acted with the intent to commit a felony

or a misdemeanor offense in the home that he entered

unlawfully, and (2) the fact pattern, presented by the

evidence, was such that it was not likely that the jury

would have viewed noncriminal conduct to constitute

a felony or a misdemeanor offense. Id., 617–18. The

court stated: ‘‘If the fact pattern, presented by the evidence, was such that it was capable of varying interpretations, some criminal but others noncriminal though

perhaps morally offensive, we would find persuasive
the defendant’s assertion that, by failing to specify the

crime or crimes which the evidence suggested, the court

impermissibly allowed the jury to define criminal conduct. . . . But on the record before us we cannot conclude that, taken as a whole and specifically related to

the facts of this case, the trial court’s instructions failed

to guide the jury to a clear understanding of the

offense.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 618.

In the present case, the defendant’s attempt to demonstrate that the alleged error resulted in a manifest

injustice is undermined by the fact pattern that was

reflected in the evidence and expressly relied on by

the prosecutor during oral argument. This fact pattern

points to the defendant’s intent to commit three different crimes, all of which would rise to the level required

by the burglary statute. The defendant was charged

with and convicted of criminal mischief based on his

destructive conduct inside of the home. As the prosecutor stated during oral argument, there was evidence

that the defendant had made threatening statements

to A prior to his arrival at the home and after the police

arrived at the scene. The jury reasonably could have

viewed the defendant’s statements, made in the presence of the police, in which he expressed an intent to

‘‘kill’’ A, combined with the evidence of the defendant’s

violent entry into the home and his destructive use of

a baseball bat while he was inside of the home, as

reflecting an intent to assault A. Against this factual

backdrop, we do not conclude that, taken as a whole

and specifically related to the facts of this case, the

court’s instructions did not guide the jury to a clear

understanding of the offense.

Third, in light of the foregoing, the defendant has not

demonstrated that the claimed error is of such monumental proportion that it threatens to erode our system

of justice and result in a serious and manifest injustice.

Although we do not approve of the instruction provided

and note that the better practice would have been for

the trial court to have instructed the jury with respect

to the intent to commit one or more named felony or

misdemeanor offenses, the claimed error was unlikely

to have guided the jury to an incorrect verdict in light

of the evidence and arguments advanced in the present

case. The claimed error is not patently unjust nor does

it threaten to erode our system of justice. In short, the

defendant has raised an unpreserved instructional error

claim that does not give rise to concerns of manifest

injustice in this case, let alone concerns that affect our

system of justice generally. Thus, the defendant’s claim

of plain error is not persuasive.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as

amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,

Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49; we decline to identify any person

protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through

whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.

1 The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years of

imprisonment, execution suspended after nine years, followed by five years

of probation.

2 Although it is not a prerequisite to our review of this claim, we note

that, at the conclusion of the state’s case-in-chief, defense counsel moved

for a judgment of acquittal, asserting, in general terms, that the state ‘‘failed

to make out a prima facie case, warranting submission of the case to the

jury.’’ The court denied the motion. After defense counsel rested his case,

he renewed the motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the court again

denied.

3 A testified that he was residing at the home with J’s permission.

4 The state also presented evidence that the police officers who responded

to the scene located shards of a wooden baseball bat in various places

outside of the home, including near the rear door.

5 General Statutes § 53a-115 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause

damage to tangible property of another and having no reasonable ground

to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages

tangible property of another in an amount exceeding one thousand five

hundred dollars . . . .’’

6 See Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 9.2-1, available at https://

jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited April 18, 2022); see also State

v. Gomes, 337 Conn. 826, 853 n.19, 256 A.3d 131 (2021) (cautioning that

model jury instructions are to be used as ‘‘ ‘guide’ ’’ and are for instructive

purposes).