[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-12826

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:03-cr-00011-DHB-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

ANTONIO W. SMITH, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

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(May 19, 2021)

Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Antonio Smith, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), as well as his motion for reconsideration. He argues his health 

conditions, including hypertension, warrant compassionate release. After careful 

consideration, we affirm.

I.

In 2003, Smith pled guilty to bank robbery, aggravated bank robbery, and 

possession of a firearm during a crime of violence. The district court sentenced 

him to a term of 346 months’ imprisonment, which was at the low end of Smith’s 

guideline range. On May 14, 2020, Smith filed a pro se motion seeking 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because of the COVID19 pandemic.1

 Smith explained that he suffers from hypertension, a thyroid tumor, 

nerve damage in his lower back, and pre-diabetes. He said these conditions put 

him at serious risk of death if he contracted COVID-19. He stated that he 

promised his family and children that he would make it back after prison but that 

the pandemic’s reach in prison meant there was a strong possibility he would die 

behind bars. He also expressed concern for his elderly mother who recently had a 

1 Smith dated his certificate of service as May 14, 2020. Because there is no evidence to the 

contrary, that date is the presumptive filing date. See Daniels v. United States, 809 F.3d 588, 

589 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“We assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that a prisoner 

delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.” (alterations adopted and 

quotation marks omitted)). 

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heart attack. Finally, Smith noted that his prior convictions would no longer 

qualify as predicate offenses for the career offender status enhancement he 

received and thus his term of imprisonment would be shorter if he were sentenced 

today.

On June 2, 2020, the district court sua sponte denied Smith’s motion. First, 

the court concluded Smith’s motion was premature because he did not show that he 

exhausted his administrative remedies as required by § 3583(c)(1)(A). Second, the 

court held Smith failed to satisfy his burden to show that he was entitled to 

compassionate release because he presented no evidence that his ailments qualified 

as a serious medical condition as described in § 3582(c)(1)(A) and its applicable 

policy statements in Guideline § 1B1.13. Third, the court found that the policy 

statements provided a catch-all category that required the Director of the Bureau of 

Prisons (“BOP”) to sanction Smith’s early release, which had not happened. The 

court noted that § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018 (“First 

Step Act”), still required it to abide by the policy statements and thus it would not 

consider circumstances outside the specific examples of extraordinary and 

compelling reasons to afford relief listed in Guideline § 1B1.13 cmt.1.

Smith moved for reconsideration. He said he properly exhausted his 

administrative remedies, and attached a message dated April 29, 2020 in which he 

asked the warden for release. The attachment also showed that on the same day, 

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the warden denied Smith’s request and stated that he could commence an appeal of 

the decision within 20 days. Smith’s motion for reconsideration also argued that 

hypertension does qualify as a serious medical condition but that, in any event, 

courts can consider extraordinary and compelling reasons outside the three listed in 

the policy statement for Guideline § 1B1.13 and that other courts had released 

prisoners suffering from hypertension. 

On July 8, 2020, the district court denied Smith’s motion for 

reconsideration. The court stated that Smith’s evidence that he properly exhausted 

was unavailing because the court had also denied Smith’s motion for 

compassionate release on the merits. The court recognized the “split of authority”

about whether the First Step Act now gives a district court discretion to grant 

compassionate release for “extraordinary and compelling” reasons under the policy 

statements in Guideline § 1B1.13 independent of BOP’s judgment, but adhered to 

its conclusion that “the catch-all category of Application Note 1(D) requires the 

recommendation of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.”2

This is Smith’s appeal.

2 As set forth below, our precedent now holds that a district court cannot grant compassionate 

release for a reason it independently determines to be “extraordinary and compelling.” See

United States v. Bryant, ___ F.3d ___, No. 19-14267, 2021 WL 1827158, at *1–2 (11th Cir. May 

7, 2021). But to the extent the district court here concluded that the BOP must recommend 

compassionate release in each individual case where a defendant asserts an “other” reason 

warranting release, our precedent does not require that.

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II.

We review de novo whether a district court had authority to modify a term 

of imprisonment. United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020). 

We review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s motion for sentence reduction 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 

989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). This standard means we cannot reverse 

simply because we may have come to a different conclusion had it been our call. 

Id. at 912. We also review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Llewlyn, 879 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018). 

Because Smith is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. Jones v. Fla. 

Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).

III.

We conclude the district court did not err when it denied Smith’s motion for 

compassionate release based on its conclusion that Smith had not established 

extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting release. Because we affirm on this 

basis, we need not (and do not) address whether Smith properly exhausted. 

A.

We begin with Smith’s argument that he suffers from a serious medical 

condition (hypertension) justifying compassionate release. Having a serious 

medical condition is one of the extraordinary and compelling reasons for 

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compassionate release explicitly listed in Guideline § 1B1.13’s application note, 

but only where that serious condition “substantially diminishes the ability of the 

defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility[.]” 

USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). Here, Smith did not present evidence showing that 

his conditions rose to this level. Therefore, because it is Smith’s burden to 

establish that he qualified for compassionate release, we cannot say the district 

court abused its discretion when it found he had not established that he suffered 

from a serious medical condition warranting compassionate release. See United 

States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328, 337 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that in the 

§ 3582(c)(2) context, defendant bears the burden of establishing that he qualifies 

for a sentence reduction). 

B.

We next address Smith’s contention that the district court had the authority 

to determine for itself that Smith’s hypertension qualified as an extraordinary and 

compelling reason justifying compassionate release separate from the enumerated 

reasons in Guideline § 1B1.13 n.1(A)–(C).3

 Our precedent forecloses this 

3 Construing Smith’s pro se brief liberally, see Jones, 787 F.3d at 1107, we understand him to 

advance this argument on appeal. In arguing that the district court should have found that his 

hypertension qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate 

release, Smith cites cases where courts have granted compassionate release in similar 

circumstances based on the understanding that district courts are not constrained by Guideline 

§ 1B1.13 in determining what can constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. 

See, e.g., United States v. Ullings, No. 1:10-cr-00406, 2020 WL 2394096, at *2, *6 (N.D. Ga. 

May 12, 2020) (granting compassionate release after “holding that section 1B1.13 . . . does not 

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argument. See Bryant, 2021 WL 1827158, at *1–2. Since the close of briefing in 

this case, a panel of this Court held that only the BOP—not district judges—can 

decide what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons” other than those 

expressly listed in Guideline § 1B1.13. Id. at *1. Guideline § 1B1.13’s application 

note lists the following extraordinary and compelling reasons: serious medical 

condition of the defendant, age, family circumstances, and “[o]ther reasons.” 

USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. 1. Our binding caselaw now says that “other reasons” are 

limited to those determined by the BOP, not the courts. See Bryant, 2021 WL 

1827158, at *1–2. 

Under this circuit’s precedent, the district court did not err in holding that 

Smith’s hypertension did not warrant compassionate release under Guideline 

§ 1B1.13’s provision of “[o]ther reasons” for establishing “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons.”

AFFIRMED.

constrain the issues a court may consider in assessing whether a defendant’s application for 

compassionate release provides ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for a sentence reduction 

under § 3582(c)(1).”). 

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