NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DEMETRIUS L., 

Appellant, 

v.

JOSHLYNN F., D.L., 

Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0034 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County 

No. B8015SV201404004 

The Honorable Richard Weiss, Judge 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

COUNSEL 

Mohave County Legal Defender’s Office, Kingman 

By Eric Devany 

Counsel for Appellant 

Harris & Winger, Flagstaff 

By Chad Joshua Winger 

Counsel for Appellee Joshlynn F. 
DEMETRIUS L. v. JOSHLYNN F., D.L. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Demetrius L. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental 

rights to D.L. (Child). In light of this court’s opinion in Jose M. v. Eleanor J., 

234 Ariz. 13 (App. 2014), we conclude this record does not establish by a 

preponderance of evidence that terminating Father’s parental rights is in 

Child’s best interests. Accordingly, we reverse the termination order and 

remand to the juvenile court for further proceedings. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 Father is the biological father of Child and lived with Joshlynn 

F., Child’s biological mother (Mother), when Child was born in 2006. Father 

and Mother’s relationship ended in 2009. Although Father moved to 

California, Father and Mother agreed on an informal visitation schedule 

that governed Father’s contact with Child. Father’s visitation ceased in 

2010. 

¶3 Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights in 

2014, citing abandonment under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 

8-533.B.1. as grounds for termination. At the termination hearing, Mother 

testified that she stopped taking Child to California for visitation because 

Father began threatening her. Mother testified that between 2010 and 2012, 

Father’s only contact with Child was a Christmas gift Father gave Child 

through Father’s brother. Mother also stated that Father had no contact 

with Child between 2012 and 2014. Mother acknowledged, however, that 

Child saw Father during a November 2013 incident at which an altercation 

occurred between Mother and members of Father’s family. 

¶4 Father testified that Mother stopped allowing him to visit 

Child in 2010 and blocked him from any further contact thereafter. Father 

claimed he could not get in touch with Mother because Mother would not 

answer his phone calls and “blocked” his phone number and social media 

accounts. Father stated that he attempted to get in touch with Mother by 

visiting her workplace and contacting various members of her family on 
DEMETRIUS L. v. JOSHLYNN F., D.L. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

social media. Father testified that, in 2010, he sought court-ordered 

visitation in a California court but was told he had to file in Arizona. Father 

stated he filed an Arizona petition in 2011 but never had it served on 

Mother. Father filed another petition in early 2014 after the November 2013 

altercation between Mother and members of his family. Father tried 

unsuccessfully to serve Mother with that petition around the time Mother 

filed her termination petition. 

¶5 The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights. Father 

timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, 

of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S §§ 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1., and -2101.A.1. 

(West 2015),1 and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103(A). 

DISCUSSION 

¶6 Father challenges both the juvenile court’s finding of 

abandonment by clear and convincing evidence and the finding that 

termination would be in Child’s best interests. Terminating parental rights 

requires a juvenile court to: (1) find one of the grounds for termination in 

A.R.S. § 8-533.B. established by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) 

determine a preponderance of evidence establishes that termination is in 

the child’s best interests. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 

440, ¶ 13 (App. 2014). Because we reverse the termination order based on 

the juvenile court’s best interests finding, we analyze only that portion of 

the juvenile court’s decision. 

¶7 Our supreme court has noted that terminating parental rights 

“necessarily involves the consideration of fundamental, often competing, 

interests of parent and child.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 

246, 248, ¶ 11 (2000). When making a best interests determination, a 

juvenile court must balance the “unfit” parent’s rights against the child’s. 

Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 287, ¶ 37 (2005). Accordingly, a best 

interests finding in support of terminating parental rights requires proof 

that a child would either benefit from termination or be harmed by the 

relationship continuing. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 

1, 5 (1990). 

¶8 In this case, the juvenile court found that termination of 

Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests because Child was 

adoptable and “[a]s such, the stability and permanence [Child] may achieve 

 

1 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
DEMETRIUS L. v. JOSHLYNN F., D.L. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

in the home of his mother and her husband would be in [Child’s] best 

interest[s].” This conclusion was based presumably on the testimony of 

Mother and Mother’s husband, who both stated that Child enjoyed a good 

relationship with Mother’s husband. Mother’s husband also testified that 

he wanted to adopt Child. 

¶9 This court has previously recognized that a child’s 

adoptability or the presence of an adoptive plan may be evidence that 

terminating parental rights would benefit a child. See Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004). This court has noted, 

however, that these holdings occurred in the context of termination 

proceedings initiated by the State, where the child involved was in foster 

care. Jose M., 234 Ariz. at 17-18, ¶ 23. 

¶10 The distinction in Jose M. between the effect of adoptionrelated evidence in State-initiated and private termination proceedings is 

instructive here because the Jose M. court considered a termination petition 

much like the one in this case. As in Jose M., Mother’s termination petition 

cited abandonment as the statutory grounds for termination, and the 

juvenile court’s best interests analysis relied on evidence of adoptability 

and a potential adoptive plan. The Jose M. court noted that such evidence 

would be insufficient to conclude terminating parental rights was in a 

child’s best interests because the record lacked any evidence that the parent 

whose rights were terminated was harming child, incapable of parenting, 

or that adoption actually would provide further stability for the child. Id. 

at 17-18, ¶¶ 20-23. We conclude the same analysis applies to this case. 

¶11 Although Mother testified that Father began threatening her, 

she offered no evidence showing abusive or violent behavior towards her 

or Child. There is no evidence Father has characteristics or habits that make 

him unable to parent Child, and there is likewise no evidence of legal issues, 

civil or criminal, that negatively implicates Father’s ability to maintain a 

safe and meaningful parent-child relationship. Father has demonstrated a 

desire to have a relationship with Child, and Child’s current living 

arrangement will be altered only if Father can show a family court that he 

can effectively care for Child during parenting time. But whether Father’s 

parental rights are terminated will have no effect on the stability and 

permanency of Child’s current situation. Unlike situations in which 

adoption obviously benefits a child by ending the need for foster care, the 

adoptive plan in this case does not establish an increase in stability and 

permanency that necessitates terminating Father’s parental rights. As a 

result, we conclude this record does not establish a preponderance of 
DEMETRIUS L. v. JOSHLYNN F., D.L. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

evidence that terminating Father’s parental rights is in Child’s best 

interests. 

CONCLUSION 

¶12 Because the record does not establish a preponderance of 

evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in Child’s best 

interests, we reverse the termination order and remand for further 

proceedings.