United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 00-1945

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

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v. *

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Mary Rose Ziman, *

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Appellant. *

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Appeals from the United States

No. 00-1947 District Court for the 

___________ District of North Dakota

United States of America, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee, *

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v. *

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Raymond Falcon, *

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Appellant. *

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Submitted: November 14, 2000

 Filed: January 5, 2001

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1

 The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge, United States Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation.

2

 The Honorable Patrick A. Conmy, United States District Judge for the

District of North Dakota.

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Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges, and

GOLDBERG,1 Judge.

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PER CURIAM:

Following a jury trial in the district court,2 appellants Mary Rose Ziman and

Raymond Falcon ("appellants") were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 846. Falcon was also convicted of

money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). On appeal, appellants argue that under

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 the district court judge erred by refusing to exclude

evidence that Ziman's granddaughter was seen chewing on methamphetamine taken

from Ziman's purse. 

We do not agree. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

evidence because it was relevant, see United States v. O'Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 834 (8th

Cir. 2000) ("Possession of methamphetamine, even a small amount, during the period

in which [a defendant] is accused of conspiring to distribute that same drug is direct

evidence that defendant participated in the conspiracy."), and the probative value of the

evidence outweighed any potential unfair prejudice. The risk of unfair prejudice was

particularly slight as the United States did not emphasize the incident to the jury and

did not mention it in its final argument. In a previous case, we held that the trial court

acted within its discretion by admitting similar evidence. See United States v. Hester,

140 F.3d 753, 759-60 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding the admission of photographs of

defendant's minor children in the presence of narcotics and weapons). In this case,
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moreover, the other evidence of appellants' guilt was so overwhelming that we do not

believe the evidence at issue here could have improperly swayed the jury. 

Separately, Falcon also argues that the district court erred by refusing to give a

multiple conspiracies instruction to the jury. Again, we do not agree. As we have

explained before:

 

A multiple conspiracy instruction is not required just because there are a number

of sources and independent dealers if there was a shared objective to "sell large

quantities of drugs." A single conspiracy may exist even if the participants and

their activities change over time, and even if many participants are unaware of,

or uninvolved in, some of the transactions.

United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 412 (8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Because

there was more than enough evidence to support a finding of a single conspiracy, the

district court's refusal to give a multiple conspiracies instruction is not reversible error.

Id.

In conclusion, we find that the district court did not err by admitting the disputed

evidence or by refusing to submit a multiple conspiracies instruction to the jury.

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT