### Ministry of Economy and Production Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food National Animal Health and Agrifood Quality Service
SENASA



# ANNEX

RISK ASSESSMENT FOR IMPORTATION OF FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE VIRUS
INTO NORTHERN PATAGONIA B FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE FREE ZONE
WITHOUT VACCINATION



### NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH DIRECTORATE EPIDEMIOLOGY DIRECTORATE

REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA 

### January 2007Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 1 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR IMPORTATION OF FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE VIRUS
INTO NORTHERN PATAGONIA B FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE FREE ZONE
WITHOUT VACCINATION

Introduction

In January 2005, the OIE Scientific Commission restored the status of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) free with vaccination to the area north of the Province of Chubut (Argentina) after eradication actions were adopted in response to the outbreak that occurred in August 2003, in the Province of Salta, 40 Km. from the border with Bolivia.

The remaining part of the territory of Argentina, known as Southern Patagonia and which includes the provinces of Chubut, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego, was recognised as FMD free without vaccination by the International Committee of OIE in May 2002.

The 231,695 sq. Km. zone identified as “Northern Patagonia B” (NPB) is adjacent to Southern Patagonia, has a similar epidemiological status, and is subject to the same
restrictions for FMD.

Animals in this zone were never vaccinated. The area served as a surveillance zone for Southern Patagonia, and is recognised as FMD free with vaccination.

Recognition of the health status is important for the zone and from the animal health and meat trade viewpoints as it would offer the possibility of accessing international sheep meat markets with the surplus production of the main activity in the area (sheep farming). Beef and pig meat production in the zone is insufficient to meet local demand.

The purpose of this document is to provide additional information on the risk of FMD in the area and facilitate the decision of the ad hoc Group of the Scientific Commission.

To this end, a qualitative estimate of the probability of FMD spreading (ingress) and of the exposure to FMD virus (FMDV) in the Zone (NPB) is presented based on descriptive scales that characterize the magnitude of the risk.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 2 Contents

Step 1: Description of the epidemiological characterisation and probability of presence of the virus in the zone (internal risk).

Step 2: Description of the necessary biological processes for FMDV spreading (ingress) in the zone as a result of shipments of animals or products.

Step 3: Description of the probability of the virus entering the zone and potential risks under different conditions resulting from ingress of animals or products that may carry the virus (external risk).

Step 4: Description of the necessary biological processes for FMD susceptible animals in NPB to be exposed to possible sources of infection from a specific risk source.

Step 5: Description of the probability of animals in NPB being exposed to possible sources of infection from a specific risk source.

Step 6: Assessment of the consequences of a specific exposure and estimate of their probability of occurring.

Step 7: List of risk mitigation measures adopted (as provided for in SENASA resolutions) to reduce the risk in each stage of the process.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 3 Step 1 Epidemiological characterisation and probability of presence of the virus in the

zone

1. Livestock sector

The livestock sector plays a key role in the economy of Argentina and farm exports represent 52.2% of our trade.

The main product exported by Argentina is de-boned beef. Cattle Production parameters
are included below:

National Stock, in millions 56.5

Animals slaughtered, in millions 13.2

Average slaughter weight, in Kg. 360

Annual extraction rate, as % 23.3

Production of bone-in meat, in millions of
tonnes 2.62

Meat consumption, in millions of tonnes 2.23

Exportable volume, in millions of tonnes 387

FOB price, in USD/tonne 1,420

Exported value, in millions of USD 550

The productive aptitude of the each region, which is determined by the agro-ecological quality of the soil, favours or restricts the presence of FMD.

Commercial dairy and fattening operations in the more productive regions have higher stocking rates (Pampa Region) and, as they continuously receive shipments of youngRisk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 4 cattle, favour persistence of FMD. Extensive stocking farms in NEA, NOA and Semiarid zones have lower stocking rates, but also have favourable conditions for persistence of FMD. Cattle farming in Patagonia - that includes the zones identified as Northern Patagonia B and Southern Patagonia - is restricted to small cattle breeding areas (FMD free) that have very low stocking rates, therefore the only possibility of presence of the disease is through importation of the virus into the region.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 5 Bovine Population

Pampa Region 34938756 NEA Region 12290654 NOA Region 3807705 Semiarid Region 4497374 Patagonia 1026233 TOTAL 56,560,722 

### Distribution of Bovine Population by Region

35 mill

12 mill 4 mill

5 mill

1 millRisk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 6 The Northern Patagonia region is divided into two zones. Distribution of holdings, cattle population and stocking rate are shown below:

Family holdings that keep sheep and goats and extensive beef cattle operations predominate to the West of Northern Patagonia B, in the Andes and foothills of the provinces of Neuquén and Río Negro.

Sheep production is the main activity to the East, in the area located between the Negro River and the province of Chubut. This area is typical of the Patagonian plateau and similar to the southernmost part of the country.

Epidemiological indicators applied by PANAFTOSA (WHO) characterised the zone as an FMD free ecosystem and noted that a determining factor for this classification was the low contact rate between susceptible animals due to the very limited growth of natural forage (and explains why an FMD vaccination programme was never needed in this zone).

The area principally has integrated commercial sheep farms that seasonally send lambs and culled ewes directly to slaughter; movement of animals between holdings is infrequent.

Population of feral susceptible species (some deer, Camelidae, and pigs) is very small and their role in the FMD epidemiological chain is irrelevant.

The structure of the Veterinary Service that supports the National Epidemiological Surveillance System is summarised below: Zone No. of holdings Bovine population Stocking rate Bov/ha

Northern Patagonia A 3557 1.090.100 0.09

Northern Patagonia B 9211 200571 0.01Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 7 Results of the serological enquiry to detect infection

2003 2004 2005 Bovines sampled 0 0 2231 Holdings sampled 0 0 57 No. of positive animals 0 0 0 Ovines sampled 1020 1000 6324 Holdings sampled 104 100 211 No. of positive animals 0 1 (*) 0 (*) Complementary epidemiological studies, including enlarged complementary sampling of the farm demonstrated absence of infection.

Historical records of the disease in the zone indicate that presence has been sporadic and number of outbreaks is negligible compared to those in the cattle production area. All
cases were related to:

1. Ingress of infected bovines for slaughter or bone-in meat;

2. Active outbreaks in the cattle production area to the north of the FMD free zone;

3. Feeding of pigs with slaughter or kitchen waste (swill).

Causes may be attributed to:

1. National vaccination programmes that did not provide adequate immunity to stop viral circulation in the animal population. 1 Veterinarians 15
2 Assistant veterinarians 7
3 Clerks 7 4 Total No. of holdings 9211
5 Cattle stock 200571 6 Sheep stock 2144683 7 Pig stock 7139Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 8 2. Insufficient sensitivity of the surveillance system in the field and in slaughterhouses to detect diseased animals or animals with FMD-like symptoms.

3. Inadequate structure for official control and surveillance, and

4. Lack of official regulations to mitigate the risk of spreading of, and exposure to the virus, lack of restrictions for shipment of vaccinated animals for breeding or slaughter and of bone-in meat, offals, etc., and feeding of pigs with non-heat treated slaughter waste.

Currently, and for the reasons stated above, actions and regulations were adopted, and the control structure has been strengthened to ensure that the health status of the zone is preserved.

Conclusion

The epidemiological characterisation described above, the capacity of the FMD surveillance system and the human and material resources assigned to its implementation, and the results of clinical and serological surveillance determine that the zone is free of FMDV infection.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 9 Step 2 Description of the necessary biological processes for FMDV spreading (ingress) in the zone as a result of shipments of animals or products

Origin or routes of entry of the virus into the area include:

A) Virus is present in the country (area subject to vaccination), and 1. Non-vaccinated, diseased animals fit for slaughter are not detected or reported by the surveillance system; or 2. Infected animals fit for slaughter that are a source of infection but show no clinical signs of the disease, are not detected in the annual serological sampling. 3. These animals are selected for slaughter but no clinical signs or lesions are detected:

♦ At the time of loading;

♦ In the ante mortem inspection; or

♦ During slaughter. 4. The animals are slaughtered at an officially approved abattoir that is authorized to ship de-boned meat or thermo processed offals to the FMD free area not subject to vaccination. 5. The meat is not maturated (temperature and time), carcass pH does not reach 5.9, and pH checks do not detect it. 6. Infectious materials (ganglia, bones, etc.) are not removed during de-boning. 7. The animals described in 1) and 2) are not slaughtered under official control, or their prohibited products elude sanitary barrier checks at points of entry into Northern Patagonia
B.

B) Virus may cross the border and enter from infected areas in neighbouring countries
via: a) Animals that are a source of infection; b) Animals that are incubating the disease, show clinical signs, or are asymptomatic carriers; c) Mechanical transmission: vehicles / people, animal products, etc.

C) Virus may enter from more remote infected areas by mechanical transmission (people, animal products, etc.).Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 10 D) Virus may enter due to a leak from a vaccine manufacturer’s facility that manipulates
the virus.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 11 Step 3 Description of the probability of the virus entering the zone and potential risks under different conditions resulting from ingress of animals or products that may carry the virus.

External Risk:

A 1) One (1) year after the vaccination programme was suspended (in 1999) the virus entered Argentina from FMDV infected regions in neighbouring countries. Between August 2000 and January 2002, the epidemic affected 2500 holdings.

Consequences included loss of the FMD free status without vaccination, loss of international beef markets for a period of one year, and a deep crisis which led to bankruptcies in the productive and industrial farming sectors.

The bad experience taught many lessons and the sensitivity of farmers - and of the sector as a whole - to detect and notify the disease improved the surveillance system.

The new design of the vaccination programme that began in 1990 was highly effective and attained close to 100% vaccine coverage in bovines with a high-efficacy oil base vaccine that provided extended immunity and a system that preserved the cold chain.

Annual serological samplings indicate high levels of immunity in cattle therefore it is highly improbable that viral circulation still persists in the provinces, 4 years after the last outbreak of the epidemic.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 12 The following graphs show immunity levels, per zone and category, expressed in percentage of animals with Medium and High protection levels. (Compared data 2003, 2004 and 2005)

Reference: 1) Category 1: Cattle from 6 to 12 months of age. 2) Category 2: Cattle from 12 to 24 months of age. Population Inmunity Compared

2003, 2004 y 2005. Category 2 (vaccinated cattle), Virus O1.

0,00% 10,00% 20,00% 30,00% 40,00% 50,00% 60,00% 70,00% 80,00% 90,00% 100,00%

Central – M esop Fattenig Border PatagNo rteA Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005 Population Inmunity Compared 2003, 2004 y 2005. Category 2 (vaccinated cattle), Virus A2001.

0,00% 10,00% 20,00% 30,00% 40,00% 50,00% 60,00% 70,00% 80,00% 90,00% 100,00%

Central – M esop Fattenig Border PatagNorteA Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005 Population Inmunity Compared

2003, 2004 y 2005. Category 1 (vaccinated cattle), Virus O1.

0,00% 10,00% 20,00% 30,00% 40,00% 50,00% 60,00% 70,00% 80,00% 90,00% 100,00%

Central – M esop Fattenig Border PatagNo rteA Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005 Population Inmunity Compared 2003, 2004 y 2005. Category 1 (vaccinated cattle), Virus A2001.

0,00% 10,00% 20,00% 30,00% 40,00% 50,00% 60,00% 70,00% 80,00% 90,00% 100,00%

Central – M esop Fattenig Border PatagNorteA Year 2003
Year 2004
Year 2005Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 13 Table: Administered Dosis per FMD Vaccination Campaigne

Campaigne Administered Dosis

1° 2001 53.717.002 2° 2001 55.502.111 1° 2002 56.113.232 2° 2002 57.909.134 1° 2003 57.282.541 2° 2003 59.201.786 1° 2004 58.241.824 2° 2004 59.038.012 1° 2005 58.440.760 2° 2005 Data in process FMD Vaccination

See Annex III and Annex III bis – Serological Sampling 2003 – 2004.

A 2) Design of annual serological enquiries performed since 2001 to detect absence of viral activity conforms to the Guidelines of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

See Section II.2. FMD Surveillance, Item A.2. Serological Surveillance.

See Annex III and Annex III bis – Serological Sampling 2003 – 2004.

Epidemiological studies including complementary sampling of holdings with at least one positive animal demonstrated absence of viral activity. Therefore we may conclude that it is highly improbable that animals with infection exist after the epidemic of 2000 – 2001.

A (3 - 6). Bovines slaughtered in the area subject to vaccination whose meat is shipped for consumption in Northern Patagonia B represent 0.48% of all cattle slaughtered in Argentina.

A total of 5,798,537 Kg. of de-boned beef is shipped into the zone every year. Therefore, as the average slaughter weight in Argentina is 360 Kg. per animal and the carcass yield is 25% de-boned meat, 64,428 bovines of the total annual slaughter of 13,200,000, were slaughtered.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 14 Twenty per cent (20%) of bovines slaughtered are clinically inspected on the holding prior to shipment for FMD compatible lesions (bovines to slaughter for export to EU).

Slaughterhouses that supply beef to the FMD free area without vaccination must have a special approval and apply risk mitigation measures such as ante mortem clinical inspection, checking of mouth, lips and feet for FMD-like lesions, and obligatory recording of the maturation process, temperature, time and pH of carcasses sent to de-boning.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 15 B. Virus may cross the border and enter from infected areas in neighbouring
countries:
Current situation:

Brazil

Brazil Paraguay
FMD free countr y with
vaccination Brazil Outbreaks in the State of Mato
Grosso do Sul and the State of Paraná Bolivia

Border Protection Zone

Central Re g ion of the Country
FMD free with vaccination
OIE 2005 Uruguay FMD free countr y

with
vaccination OIE 2003

Northern Patagonia A
FMD free with vaccination
OIE 2005
Buffer Zone

Northern Patagonia B
FMD free without vaccination CHILE FMD free country without
vaccination
OIE A
N
D
E
A
N

R
A
N
G
E

Southern Patagonia
FMD free without vaccination OIE (2002) Atlantic OceanRisk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 16 The States of Mato Grosso do Sul and Paraná in Brazil that were affected by FMD outbreaks in the last semester, currently represent the highest risk for Argentina. These areas of Brazil are 250 Km. from the nearest border with Argentina and 1,800 Km. from Northern Patagonia B.

! The Rapid Alert System, for the whole National Territory, triggered the following preventive actions:

" Prohibition to import animals, products and other elements that may carry FMDV from the States of Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraná, San Pablo, Santa Catarina, and Río Grande do Sul, and prohibition to import products that were not subject to risk mitigation measures from the entire territory of Brazil. Initially, restrictions only applied to the State of Mato Grosso do Sul but, as the epidemiological situation developed, were extended to include
other areas.
" Strengthening of co-ordination for control, surveillance and prevention actions with provincial and municipal governments, Animal Health NGOs, and other border control bodies such as the Border Patrol Authority, Coast Guard, and the Customs Office.
" Earlier and intensified progress of the FMD vaccination campaign in all regions of the country, especially in border areas of the provinces in northern Argentina, particularly those that share a dry border with Brazil.
" Strengthening of controls at border crossings and dry borders in northern Argentina, especially in areas that share a border with Brazil.
" Strengthening of human resources assigned to control posts and border areas and of physical, documentary and identity checks to commercial cargo of animal products approved for importation into Argentina.
" Approval and follow-up of shipments of animal products originating from Brazil in transit through the National Territory, en route to third countries.
" Strengthening of checks to products subject to the Cross-border Trade Regime.
" Strengthening of checks to passengers, their luggage and means of transportation.
" Disinfection of vehicles entering Argentina through border posts in the provinces of
Misiones and Corrientes that share a border with Brazil.
" Establishment of check-points on strategic routes for prevention purposes.
" Assignment of mobile patrols to border areas.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 17 " Communication to, and active participation of other authorities involved in prevention at the borders (Border Patrol Authority, Coast Guard, Customs Office).
" Communication and operational instructions from SENASA Headquarters to border

areas.

! Strengthening of epidemiosurveillance actions:

Checks to livestock movements.
Checks at livestock concentration markets. Clinical inspection of animals. Immediate response to cases showing signs compatible with vesicular disease. Communication and awareness: Local media broadcasting of warnings in border areas explaining the risk posed by the existing epidemiological situation, and urging the population to notify suspect cases of vesicular disease.

! Strengthening of biosafety measures:

Checks to verify compliance with ban on feeding pigs with raw slaughter and/or kitchen waste (swill).

! Probability of the virus spreading from the infected area, considering the distance and preventive measures adopted by Argentina:

Existence of 3 control barriers:

a) Barrier on the border between Brazil and Argentina; b) Barrier between the Central Zone and the Buffer Zone, on the Barrancas – Colorado Rivers; and c) Barrier between the Buffer Zone and Northern Patagonia B, on the Negro River, and check points to the south of this barrier.

The virus could only spread in the area subject to vaccination if illegal movements of animals had circumvented border controls and exposed non-vaccinated susceptible animals as the Regional Reference Laboratory of OIE (PANAFTOSA) reported that theRisk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 18 actuating virus at the time was type O, sub-type O1, that is included in the vaccine used in Argentina.

C) Virus may enter from more remote infected areas by mechanical transmission (people, animal products, etc).

The risk of an exotic virus spreading is difficult to assess and may be considered equal to the risk in any zone of a country that has only one international airport with few flights and a port where the main activity is loading of fishery products.

D) Virus may enter due to a leak from a vaccine manufacturer’s facility or a diagnostic laboratory that manipulate the virus

Vaccine manufacturing facilities and the diagnostic laboratory that manipulate the virus conform to international biosafety standards, are inspected by the Veterinary Service, and are located in the City of Buenos Aires which is 1,200 Km. from the zone.

The possibility of virus spreading to Northern Patagonia B as a result of a leak from these facilities is considered highly improbable.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the absence of viral activity, the level of immunity of the population, the distance between the Zone and the area in Brazil that was affected by outbreaks, the prohibition to import animals and risk products, and the protection provided by the three control posts, viral circulation is not viable.

Therefore spreading of FMDV from infected areas in neighbouring countries is highly improbable.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 19 Step 4 Description of the necessary biological processes for FMD susceptible animals in NPB to be exposed to possible sources of infection from a specific risk source

Sources of risk in order of importance (vis à vis possibility of importation):

Source of risk 1: Products contaminated with FMDV. Historically, the main cause of FMD outbreaks in the Patagonia region of Argentina (FMD free area that was never subject to an eradication programme) was viral exposure of pigs due to feeding contaminated slaughter waste or swill.

Source of risk 2: Infected feral susceptible species. There is a small population of FMD feral susceptible Cervidae, Camelidae and pigs. These
animals would have to be in contact with animals that are sources of infection in the area subject to vaccination and then, as a result of transhumance practices, enter NPB and be in contact with susceptible farmed species.

Source of risk 3: Domestic animals that are sources of infection are in contact with susceptible animals in the free zone.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 20 Step 5 Probability of animals in NPB being exposed to possible sources of infection

Source of risk 1: Importation into the Zone of animals and products that may carry FMDV is prohibited. Contaminated products would therefore have to be illegally brought into the area for family or commercial consumption, or by tourists not informed of the restrictions and who bring them in for own consumption.

The probability of these products not being detected at the entry control posts is low.

The probability of waste from contaminated prohibited products brought into the Zone for family consumption being used as pig feed, is low.

Attempts of illegal importation of products into the Zone occur if the market offers a very significant price premium. Evidence indicates that in the holiday season, when many tourists travel to the area, prices of bone-in beef cuts (short ribs) increase and there may be attempts to bring these cuts into the area.

However, as the typical Argentine style of cooking ribs is over a wood or charcoal fire, the cooking method mitigates the risk.

The last FMD outbreak in the Zone demonstrated that the most probable source of risk was pigs on non-approved farms therefore, given that the highest risk has been characterised, main preventive actions seek to eradicate this factor (SENASA Resolution No. 225/95 and legislation on depopulation of pigs in areas adjacent to slaughterhouses).

Source of risk 2: Feral susceptible animals from other zones that are sources of infection are in contact with farmed species. This probability is very low because animals would have to travel long distances in poor health conditions, their population is small and have gregarious habits, and they would be unable to cross the rivers because of the high flow rates (Barrancas-Colorado, and Negro Rivers) that, therefore, constitute natural barriers.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 21 Source of risk 3: Shipments of FMD susceptible animals into the Zone are prohibited therefore probability is linked to illegal movement of livestock or the vulnerability of barrier control posts.

The control structure is considered very effective therefore it is highly improbable that shipments of animals may avoid controls and enter the Zone.

Conclusion

The qualitative measure of probability of occurrence (assessment of spreading and assessment of exposure) is categorized as Negligible and judged to be sufficiently small to consider that the occurrence of an FMD outbreak is not probable.

Presence of FMD in Northern Patagonia B may occur only under exceptional
circumstances.

Additionally, the capacity of the structure of the Veterinary Service, the effectiveness of control posts on the boundaries of the Zone, the preventive measures in place, the structure of the disease surveillance system, and the historical isolation of the Zone, ensure stability in time and consistency of the existing health status.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 22 Step 6 The magnitude of the consequences resulting from the entry of the disease is determined by the following factors:

1. Potential of the primary outbreak spreading. Although FMD spreads easily, stocking rates of susceptible animals, geographic features and movements of animals in the Zone, among other factors, condition spreading of the virus. For purposes of exposure probability, pigs on holdings in suburban areas are considered to be the highest risk population.

Historical cases of the disease indicate that spreading in suburban areas occurs by contact between animals and by mechanical transmission (people). Animals on holdings in the countryside were not exposed except when the virus was carried from focal or perifocal areas.

The economic impact (losses in production) caused by the last outbreaks that occurred in December 1993 and January 1994 affected 6 holdings, 4 in suburban areas and 2 in the countryside.

A total of 570 bovines, 8856 sheep and 296 pigs were exposed.

2. Time between exposure and adoption of disease containment and eradication

measures.

3. Economic impact to the Zone due to losses in production, marketing, prices of animals and animal products, and potential trade.

These three factors are considered negligible or low therefore the impact of the disease may be currently categorized as low. However, in the future, potential losses in international trade as a result of the Zone being recognized as FMD free without vaccination will be significantly different because of the adjacency of the Southern Patagonia Region that has higher production and exporting potential.Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 23 Mitigation measures adopted (SENASA regulations) with regard to actions that reduce the risk at each stage of the process

HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS TO REGIONS IN WHICH RESTRICTIONS
FOR FMD SUSCEPTIBLE ANIMALS APPLY

LEGISLATION : - SENASA Resolution No. 58/01, Joint Disposition DNFA - DNSA No. 5-18/01;
DNSA Collective Letter No. 84 of 10/08/01 - SENASA Resolution No. 139/02, Joint Disposition DNFA - DNSA No. 02-19/2002
- SENASA Resolution No. 1051/02 - Joint Disposition DNFA - DNSA No. 34-08/05
- SENASA Resolution No. 725/05

Shipments of live bovines and other FMD susceptible species

Importation from other zones is prohibited with the following EXCEPTIONS: INTRA-ZONE MOVEMENTS

1. Breeding animals registered in the Herd Book originating from Southern Patagonia, provided animals conform to requirements established by DNSA (See Annex IV- Resol.725/05) Health Certificate : DTA and General Health
Certificate 2. FMD susceptible animals shipped directly from FMD free countries or regions not subject to vaccination and recognised by OIE
Health Certificate : Import and entry permit issued by SENASA, and certificate of country of origin 3. In both cases animals may not transit through areas subject to FMD vaccination unless expressly authorized by SENASA and as determined by DNSA 1. NO HEALTH RESTRICTIONS. 2. Health Certificate : Animal Transit Document (DTA) 3. Animals may not transit throu g h areas sub j ect to FMD vaccination unless expressl y authorized
b y

SENASA and as determined b y DNSA. If movement is authorised, a Sworn Statement and Shippin g Route, as specified in Appendix C of Resol. 725/05 is requiredRisk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 24 HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS TO REGIONS IN WHICH RESTRICTIONS
FOR FARM PRODUCTS THAT MAY SPREAD FMDV APPLY

PRODUCTS NORTHERN PATAGONIA
“B”

FRESH BEEF AND SHEEP MEAT (Chilled or frozen) 1. Maturated de-boned meat, free of cartilage, ganglia and visible clots, in primary packaging, with required labelling. 2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit
FRESH PIG MEAT (Chilled or Frozen) Ingress prohibited

FRESH SAUSAGE PRODUCTS CONTAINING PIG MEAT AND BACON Ingress Prohibited

GROUND MEAT, MEAT PATTIES,
HAMBURGERS 1. Ready-prepared for marketing to consumers
2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit FRESH OFFALS Ingress Prohibited

MATURATED TRIMMINGS with fat content 1. Maturated beef trimmings 2. Acceptable fat content: Maximum 30%
3.- Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit

UNPROCESSED ANIMAL FAT Ingress Prohibited

MELTED ANIMAL FAT 1. Originating from officially approved establishments
2. Health Certificate : Restricted Transit Permit

SMALL MEATS 1. Thermo-processed at 70°C for 30minutes in the centre of the product
2. Health Certificate : Restricted Transit Permit.

DRY SAUSAGES 1. Moisture/protein ratio < 2.25:1 or pH < 5.9
2. Health Certificate : Restricted Transit Permit

RAW SALTED MEAT 1. De-boned. 2. Moisture/protein ratio: 2.25:1 3. Salt-cured for at least 30 days.
4. Health Certificate : Restricted Transit Permit

SALTED GUTS 1. Salt-cured for at least 30 days
2. Health Certificate : Restricted Transit Permit
1. Moisture content < 16%Risk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 25 DRY HIDES 2. Health Certificate : DTA and Restricted Transit Permit or DTA and Municipal Health Certificate. See Circular Letter No. 24/02

SALTED HIDES AND UNPROCESSED SKINS 1. Salt-cured for at least 28 days
2. Health Certificate : DTA and Restricted Transit Permit or DTA and Municipal Health Certificate. See
Circular Letter No. 24/02

GREASY HAIR AND WOOL 1. Stored at point of origin for at least 60 days 2. Shipped packaged and wrapped, no stops en route permitted 3. General Health Certificate
GAME TROPHIES AND SKINS OF FMD
SUSCEPTIBLE ANIMALS 1. Subject to physical or chemical treatment
2. General Health Certificate

BALES. HAY, STRAW, ROLLS,
COMPOUND FEED 1. Minimum storage: Three (3) months 2. General Health Certificate
3. Truck wash and disinfection certificate

SEMEN AND EMBRYOS 1. Originating from SENASA approved establishments 2. Health requirements: See Circular Letter No. 32/02
3. Health Certificate: General Health Certificate

THERMO-PROCESSED
ANIMAL PRODUCTS 1. Thermo-processed at 70°C for 30minutes in the centre of the product
2. Health Certificate : Restricted Transit Permit

MEAT, BONE AND BLOOD MEALS 1. Ingress permitted
2. Health Certificate : Restricted Transit Permit

FEED 1. Originating from SENASA approved mills
2. Health Certificate : Restricted Transit Permit FORRAGE, GRAINS, COMPOUND FEED AND MILL BY-PRODUCTS FOR FEED 1. Shipped in bulk or individually packaged

DAIRY PRODUCTS FOR FEED 1. Pasteurised milk products (two pasteurisations or UHT) 2. Originating from establishments approved by
SENASA 3. Commercial documents 4. Health Certificate stating required heat treatment General Health Certificate

DAIRY PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN 1. Products made from pasteurised milk 2. Originating from establishments approved byRisk Analysis Office Epidemiology Directorate National Animal Health Directorate



### 26 CONSUMPTION SENASA
3. Commercial documents 4. No Health Certificate is required

IMPORTED PRODUCTS 1. Prior authorisation of the Imports Office to enter the region is required
2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit (including certification of country or region of origin)

PRODUCTS CONTAINING IMPORTED
RAW MATERIAL 1. Prior authorisation of the Imports Office to enter the region is required
2. Health Certificate: Restricted Transit Permit (including certification of country or region of origin)
POULTRY TANKAGE 1. General Health Certificate stating origin of the birds
MANURE OF SUSCEPTIBLE SPECIES INGRESS PROHIBITED
SOIL (originating from cattle holdings located
to the north of the Barrancas / Colorado Rivers) INGRESS PROHIBITED