UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4379

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

THADDAEUS SNOW, a/k/a Storm,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4387

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM SYKES, a/k/a Black,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:13-cr-00350-LMB-1; 1:13-cr-00350-LMB-3)

Submitted: November 25, 2014 Decided: January 2, 2015

Before DUNCAN, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Arif, ARIF & ASSOCIATES, PC, Fairfax, Virginia; Alan 

H. Yamamoto, LAW OFFICES OF ALAN H. YAMAMOTO, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellants. Dana J. Boente, United States 

Attorney, Dennis M. Fitzpatrick, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Thaddaeus Snow and William Sykes

(collectively, “Appellants”) of various crimes relating to their 

activities in connection with a street gang known as the Nine 

Treys. Appellants raise several challenges to their 

convictions. We affirm. 

Snow raises four procedural challenges to his 

convictions. First, Snow claims that the district court erred 

by failing to order a mistrial after several Government 

witnesses allegedly violated its sequestration order. 

Sequestration orders enforce Fed. R. Evid. 615, which “requires 

that witnesses not discuss the case among themselves or anyone 

else, other than the counsel for the parties.” United States v. 

Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (plurality 

op.) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] 

trial court may employ one of three remedies when a 

sequestration order has been violated: sanction of the witness; 

instructions to the jury that they may consider the violation 

toward the issue of credibility; or exclusion of the witness’ 

testimony.” United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 363 (4th Cir. 

1997); see United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 263 (4th Cir. 

2006) (same). Because Snow did not raise this issue below, this

court reviews the district court’s decision for plain error. 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993). Although 
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there is evidence that several witnesses had the opportunity to 

violate the sequestration order, Snow presents no evidence that 

any violations actually occurred other than two statements by 

witnesses on cross-examination. These statements do not plainly 

indicate that any witnesses discussed the case after the 

district court issued its sequestration order or that any 

violations that may have occurred were sufficiently severe to 

require mistrial. Accordingly, we find that the district court 

did not plainly err in declining to order a mistrial sua sponte.

Snow also argues that the district court erred by 

allowing the jurors to access unredacted transcripts that 

contained references to the fact that Snow had been previously 

incarcerated on a misdemeanor charge. The Government asserts 

that any error was harmless. We review evidentiary rulings for 

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 

351 (4th Cir. 2010). Any errors in such rulings are harmless if

we may “say with fair assurance, after pondering all that 

happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 

that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” 

United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Government bears the 

burden of showing that such errors are harmless. United States 

v. Robinson, 460 F.3d 550, 557 (4th Cir. 2006). The evidence 

presented at trial included extensive evidence that Snow was 
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involved in a wide variety of criminal activity in his role as 

leader of the Nine Treys. Against this background, the fact 

that Snow had been incarcerated previously on a misdemeanor 

charge could not have influenced the jury’s decision. 

Accordingly, we find that any error in allowing the jury to 

access the unredacted transcripts was harmless.

Snow next argues that the jurors improperly discussed 

the case with each other prior to the close of evidence. We 

review a district court’s response to such internal

communications for abuse of discretion. See Robinson v. Polk, 

438 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gravely, 840 

F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988). Having reviewed the record, we 

find that the district court properly addressed this issue at 

trial and therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to 

order a new trial on this basis.

Finally, Snow argues that the district court’s 

supplemental jury instruction on constructive possession was 

erroneous because the examples given by the district court 

misleadingly implied that the fact of his leadership position 

was all that was required to find that he constructively 

possessed the property of his subordinates. We “review de novo

a claim that a jury instruction did not correctly state the 

applicable law.” United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 941

(4th Cir. 2014). The key issue in such review is “whether, 
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taken as a whole, the instruction fairly states the controlling 

law.” United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788-89 (4th Cir. 

1990). We conclude that any misimpressions that may have been 

created by the district court’s examples were rectified by the 

court’s express statement that constructive possession requires 

“both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise 

dominion and control over” the object in question. See United 

States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating same 

standard). Accordingly, we find that the court’s supplemental 

jury instruction, taken as a whole, fairly stated the 

controlling law.

Both Snow and Sykes argue that the evidence was 

insufficient to support certain of their convictions. We review

de novo the district court’s denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 

motion. United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 

2014), pet. for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3252 (U.S. Oct. 2, 

2014) (Nos. 14-378, 14A199). We will sustain the jury’s verdict 

“if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most 

favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United 

States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see McFadden, 753 F.3d at 444 

(defining substantial evidence). Because we resolve all 

conflicting evidence in favor of the Government, the 

uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even if the 

witness is an accomplice, a codefendant, or an informant, may be 
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sufficient evidence of guilt. United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 

1185, 1189-90 (4th Cir. 1997).

Snow challenges his convictions for possessing a 

firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and possessing a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, both in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). The Government 

can prove the possession element of this offense by establishing

that Snow “exercised, or had the power to exercise, dominion and 

control over” the firearm. United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 

267, 282 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, a defendant is liable for his coconspirators’ 

reasonably foreseeable possession of firearms in furtherance of 

the conspiracy. United States v. Min, 704 F.3d 314, 324 n.9 

(4th Cir. 2013); see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 

646-48 (1946) (stating standard for coconspirator liability). 

Having reviewed the record, we find sufficient evidence to 

support Snow’s convictions under § 924(c)(1)(A).

Sykes challenges his conviction for conspiracy to 

distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Sykes does not challenge the evidence that 

the Nine Treys trafficked in such quantities of cocaine base, 

but argues that these drugs are not attributable to him. In 

determining the applicable statutory range “in a § 846 drug 

conspiracy prosecution, the jury must determine that the 
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threshold drug quantity was reasonably foreseeable to the 

defendant.” United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 569 (4th 

Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted). The record includes sufficient 

evidence that Sykes could reasonably have foreseen that the Nine 

Treys trafficked in 280 grams or more of cocaine base.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED