Filed 6/18/24 P. v. Munsey CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ABATE DOLPHI MUNSEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D081269

 (Super. Ct. No. SCE408923)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Aaron H. Katz, Judge. Affirmed.

Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene 

Sevidal and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

A jury found Abate Dolphi Munsey guilty of assault with a deadly 

weapon (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(1) (count 1)); three counts of corporal 

injury to his spouse, M.M. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a) (counts 2, 4, 5); and 

one count of making a criminal threat to M.M. (Pen. Code, § 422 (count 3)).

The jury further found that as to count 1, Munsey personally used a deadly 

and dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)); as to counts 1 and 

3, that M.M. was a victim of domestic violence (Fam. Code, § 6211; Pen. Code, 

§ 1203.097, subd. (a)); as to counts 1 and 2, that Munsey personally inflicted 

great bodily injury upon M.M. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (e)); and as to 

counts 2 and 3, that Munsey personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon 

(Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). 

Munsey contends on appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred by 

excluding testimony regarding M.M.’s immigration status, specifically

references to her K-1 visa,2 under Evidence Code section 352. We conclude 

that the court did not abuse its discretion, and therefore affirm the judgment.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 During pre-trial proceedings, Munsey’s counsel also argued that 

evidence regarding “U visas” should be admitted. A U visa allows a noncitizen to remain temporarily in the United States based on their status as a 

victim of certain crimes, including domestic violence, if they assist law 

enforcement with the investigation or prosecution of the offense. (People v. 

Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1267, fn.1 (Castaneda-Prado); 

People v. Villa (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1050 (Villa); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 

et seq., as amended by Pub.L. No. 99-603 (Nov. 6, 1986) 100 Stat. 3359; 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U).) On appeal, however, Munsey concedes that the trial 

court had a valid basis for “exclud[ing] any reference to a U visa” and states 

that he “does not challenge that ruling on appeal.” In any event, we note that 

Munsey offered no concrete evidence that M.M. ever applied for or considered 

applying for a U visa—or even knew what one was. Accordingly, we limit our 

analysis to the issue Munsey has raised regarding M.M.’s K-1 visa.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

A. Domestic Abuse Allegations

Munsey was born in Ethiopia and moved to the United States (U.S.) at 

a young age to live with his adoptive parents. In 2018, Munsey went on a 

church mission trip to Ethiopia where he met M.M. After Munsey left 

Ethiopia and returned to the U.S., he and M.M. had a long-distance romantic 

relationship for about two years. During that time Munsey sent money to 

M.M. and her family in Ethiopia, and they talked frequently about marriage. 

They got engaged in 2019, M.M. arrived in the U.S. on a K-1 visa in May

2021, and they got married in July 2021. 

Around June 2021, Munsey grabbed M.M. and slapped her back and 

thighs to force her to have anal and vaginal sex with him against her will. 

Munsey’s hands left visible bruises and marks on M.M.’s shoulder, arm, and 

legs. M.M. recalled that similar incidents happened on multiple occasions. 

During an argument in September 2021, Munsey put his hands around

M.M.’s neck, making it difficult for her to breathe. Munsey eventually let go

of her neck, but his hands left visible marks and she felt discomfort in her 

neck and throat for a few days afterwards. 

One evening in October 2021, Munsey’s father and his father’s 

girlfriend, A.L., visited Munsey and M.M.’s apartment to give them marital

advice. Shortly before his father and A.L. arrived, Munsey texted M.M.,

threatening to kill her. At one point in the evening, when A.L. and M.M. 

were alone in a separate room away from Munsey and his father, M.M. cried 

and told A.L. that Munsey was controlling. 

3 Because of the limited scope of the issues on appeal, we provide an 

abbreviated summary of the relevant facts.
4

After his father and A.L. left, Munsey began questioning M.M. about 

what she told A.L. Unsatisfied with her answers, Munsey took a small knife 

from the kitchen and threatened to cut her unless she told him “the truth.” 

M.M. went to the bedroom and texted A.L. for help. Munsey came into the 

bedroom and dragged the knife across M.M.’s shoulder, chest, and neck,

threatening to kill her. He then pierced M.M.’s thigh with the knife, leaving 

a two-inch laceration. She pushed him away, ran from the apartment, and 

eventually called 911.

B. Defense Evidence 

Munsey’s friends and relatives never saw Munsey behave violently, lose 

his temper, or act in a controlling manner.

Munsey’s father, who provided counseling to M.M. and Munsey over 

the course of a few weeks, never heard M.M. mention abuse. He observed 

that she was sometimes “very sad” and “withdrawn” from Munsey. Munsey’s 

sister also observed that M.M. was “quiet,” seemed unhappy, and did not 

interact much with Munsey’s family members during gatherings. M.M. never 

mentioned abuse to Munsey’s sister. 

An emergency room physician, testifying as an expert witness,

reviewed police reports and photographs of M.M.’s injuries from October

2021. He opined that abrasions on her upper body and the cut on her thigh

could have been self-inflicted, but he also could not rule out assault. The

thigh injury was in a location “convenient” for self-infliction. 

Munsey testified in his own defense and denied ever being violent or 

aggressive towards M.M. When asked about M.M.’s abuse allegations and 

photographs of her injuries, Munsey said that any injuries must have been 

self-inflicted, including the knife wound. While their relationship was 

smooth at first and Munsey provided for M.M. financially, they began 
5

arguing more and more after they got married and M.M. grew resentful and 

distant. The night in October 2021, after Munsey’s father and A.L. left their 

apartment, M.M. went into the bedroom and asked Munsey to bring her a 

knife so she could “fix” one of her bras. A few minutes later he heard a “weird 

cough” and ran into the bedroom. M.M. pushed past him and ran out of the 

apartment, limping. He could not find her or reach her by phone, and when

he noticed the knife had blood on it, he called 911. 

C. Evidence of M.M.’s Immigration Status

The People charged Munsey with one count of assault with a deadly

weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) (count 1)); three counts of corporal 

injury to a spouse, M.M. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a) (counts 2, 4, 5); and 

one count of making a criminal threat to M.M. (Pen. Code, § 422 (count 3)). 

The People further alleged as to count 1 that Munsey personally used a 

deadly and dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)); as to 

counts 1 and 3, that M.M. was a victim of domestic violence (Fam. Code, 

§ 6211; Pen. Code, § 1203.097, subd. (a)); as to counts 1 and 2, that Munsey 

personally inflicted great bodily injury upon M.M. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, 

subd. (e)); and as to counts 2 and 3, that Munsey personally used a deadly 

and dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). 

The People filed a motion in limine to exclude any testimony regarding 

M.M.’s immigration status. The defense argued that such testimony was 

relevant to prove its theory that M.M. fabricated the abuse allegations in 

order to get out of her marriage without jeopardizing her visa status. 

At a hearing under Evidence Code section 402 to determine the 

admissibility of evidence regarding M.M.’s immigration status, M.M. testified 

that she entered the U.S. in May 2021 on a K-1 or “fiancée” visa. The K-1 

visa allowed her to enter and stay in the U.S. if she married Munsey within 
6

90 days. Soon after they married, M.M. applied for a green card. When the 

October 2021 incident happened, M.M.’s green card application was still 

pending. After the incident, M.M. applied for employment authorization and 

submitted visa paperwork with some assistance at a women’s shelter. She 

was unsure what the paperwork was for, however, and thought it had to do 

with obtaining a work permit. M.M. told someone at the shelter about her 

“situation” with Munsey and what she had “endured” in the process of filling 

out the paperwork. M.M. said she did not know whether she would be able to 

stay in the country if she was no longer married to Munsey. 

The court found that while potentially relevant, the circumstances 

surrounding M.M.’s status under either a K-1 or U visa were confusing and 

would result in “a separate mini trial to educate the jury on exactly what 

different visa statuses are.” The court observed that the implications of

various visas were confusing even to the court and counsel for the parties, 

and that allowing testimony about the visas would also be unduly 

consumptive of time. The court noted there was “no indication from [M.M.] 

that she even knew” that making false domestic violence accusations would 

allow her to remain in the country. The court therefore ruled at the end of 

the hearing that any reference to M.M.’s visa status was excluded under 

Evidence Code section 352, but the court left open the possibility that after 

hearing M.M.’s testimony, the court might give the defense an opportunity to 

cross-examine M.M. about her K-1 visa. 

After M.M.’s direct examination, the court confirmed it would exclude 

testimony about M.M.’s visa status because its “probative value is 

outweighed by the amount of time that would be consumed in trying to insure 

[sic] the jury understood the complexities of visas, why they’re obtained, how 

they’re obtained, [and] when they’re obtained. Citing Evidence Code section 
7

352, the court also found that presenting such evidence would require expert 

testimony that would “take a substantial period of time and would result in, 

more or less, a trial within a trial regarding [M.M.’s] immigration status.” 

The court noted that there was very little evidence that M.M. “even came 

close” to obtaining a U visa, and that there had been “no showing of any 

relevance as to why [M.M.] obtaining a K1 visa is material to this case[.]” 

D. Verdict and Sentencing

After several days of trial, the jury found Munsey guilty of each

charged offense and found true all special alleged circumstances. The court 

sentenced Munsey to a total of eight years in prison. Munsey timely 

appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Munsey argues on appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred by 

excluding testimony regarding M.M.’s K-1 visa under Evidence Code section 

352. We disagree.

“We review claims regarding a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility 

of evidence for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] Specifically, we will not 

disturb [a] trial court’s ruling ‘except on a showing the trial court exercised 

its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that 

resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 

59 Cal.4th 258, 266; Evid. Code, § 353.)

A party may impeach or discredit a witness during cross-examination 

by “ ‘revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness.’ 

[Citation.] ‘The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is 

“always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his 

testimony.” ’ [Citation.] However, the right to cross-examine a witness . . .

isn’t absolute [and] ‘[a] trial court may restrict defense cross-examination of 
8

an adverse witness on the grounds stated in Evidence Code section 352.’ 

[Citations.]” (Villa, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.) Evidence Code section 

352 gives the trial court discretion to “exclude evidence if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will 

(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of 

undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. 

Code, § 352.) Trial courts have broad latitude under Evidence Code section 

352 to exclude such impeachment evidence. (Villa, at p. 1051.)

As a threshold matter, the trial court reasonably concluded that M.M.’s 

status as a K-1 visa holder upon entering the U.S. was of questionable

relevance to her credibility. M.M. testified at the pre-trial hearing that the 

K-1 visa allowed her to stay in the U.S. if she married Munsey within 90 

days. They got married within the 90-day period, after which M.M. applied 

for a green card. Given that M.M. obtained a K-1 visa and met the 90-day 

marriage requirement before allegations of abuse surfaced, and that she 

applied for a green card shortly after they married, it is unclear how her K-1 

visa status was relevant to any potential motive for fabricating the abuse. 

Munsey made no offer of proof as to the expert testimony he wished to 

present regarding the K-1 visa or how it would logically establish any motive 

for M.M. to make false allegations of abuse. As the People note, Munsey 

makes no argument on appeal that the court should have admitted evidence 

regarding how the abuse allegations might impact M.M.’s pending green card 

application. And even assuming that the excluded evidence would show 

M.M. could be deported if she did not stay married to Munsey unless she 

proved abuse, there is no evidence M.M. was aware of that possibility, further 

minimizing the probative value of such testimony. 
9

The trial court also acted within the bounds of reason by concluding 

that any limited probative value of testimony about M.M.’s K-1 visa status 

was substantially outweighed by the significant probability of undue 

consumption of time. Defense counsel contended that such testimony would 

only consume 20 minutes, but it was neither arbitrary nor patently absurd

for the court to reject that contention. In addition to expert testimony, M.M. 

likely would have been called back to repeat her testimony from the Evidence 

Code section 402 hearing for the jury. The parties’ attorneys would also

potentially have had to address any prior preliminary hearing testimony on 

the subject. (See Villa, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053 [trial court’s 

concerns about admitting U visa evidence were “well founded” for similar 

reasons having to do with undue time consumption].) Furthermore, the 

parties may have decided to put on additional witnesses to testify about 

whether M.M. knew about the specific implications of the abuse allegations 

on her status. (See ibid.) Weighed against the questionable relevance of the 

evidence, the court was therefore justifiably concerned that admitting 

evidence of M.M.’s visa status would be unduly time-consuming. 

Moreover, as the court noted, the nature, requirements, and limitations 

of the K-1 visa were confusing even to the parties’ attorneys and the court. 

To properly evaluate whether the K-1 visa requirements gave M.M. a 

compelling enough reason to lie about the abuse, the parties would have had 

to educate the jurors about conditions for obtaining and maintaining a K-1

visa, the process of applying for a green card after marriage, the likelihood of 

obtaining a green card after entering on a K-1 visa, the effects M.M.’s change 

in marital status would have had on her immigration status, and the 

distinction between different types of visas. (See Villa, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 1053 [concluding that “the trial judge rightly recognized” introducing 
10

evidence on the U visa program “would have created a substantial risk of 

distracting and confusing the jury”].) The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that the jury would be unduly distracted or confused by 

these collateral issues involving federal immigration law. 

The court’s decision in Villa, which addressed the admissibility of U 

visa evidence, supports our conclusion. In Villa, the defendant argued that 

the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the domestic abuse victim 

had applied for a U visa after testifying at the preliminary hearing. (Villa, 

supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1044, 1048.) The victim in Villa learned about 

the U visa program at a shelter, went to the prosecutor’s office to inquire 

about the process of obtaining a U visa, and understood that to qualify for the 

visa, she had to be considered a victim of domestic violence. (Id. at p. 1048.)

The Court of Appeal concluded that although the evidence was relevant for 

impeachment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the minimal 

probative value of the evidence was “easily outweighed by the potential for 

wasted time and jury confusion.” (Id. at pp. 1044–1045.)

Munsey argues that Villa is distinguishable because it involved a 

U visa and not a K-1 visa. But if anything, the facts surrounding M.M.’s K-1 

visa present an even less compelling case for admitting visa status evidence 

than the circumstances in Villa. In Villa, the victim’s ability to obtain a 

U visa was dependent on her status as a victim of domestic violence. (Villa, 

supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1048.) Here, M.M. entered the country on a K-1 

visa, and there is no evidence how that visa was still tied—if at all—to her 

ability to stay in the country at the time she notified law enforcement about 

the abuse. Importantly, in Villa, the victim testified that she was at least

aware of the connection between the abuse allegations and her U visa 

application (ibid.), whereas here, M.M. expressed no knowledge of how her 
11

allegations might impact her status. Therefore, the reasoning in Villa

applies with equal, if not greater, force to the facts in this case.

Our conclusion is also consistent with Castaneda-Prado. In that case,

the defendant was convicted of sexually molesting two minor victims. 

(Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1266.) Citing Villa, the trial 

court in Castaneda-Prado excluded one victim’s preliminary hearing 

testimony that she filed a declaration accusing the defendant of sexual abuse 

to assist her mother in obtaining a U visa. (Id. at pp. 1271, 1275.) The court 

also declined to hold an Evidence Code section 402 hearing. (Id. at p. 1275.) 

It reasoned that while the U visa evidence was relevant, admitting it would 

risk confusing the jury, would cause undue prejudice, and would be unduly 

time consuming. (Ibid.) In Castaneda-Prado, there was no evidence that a 

U visa application had been submitted. (Id. at p. 1274.)

The Court of Appeal reversed the defendant’s conviction, relying on the 

fact that the victim admitted she was motivated by potential U visa benefits 

when she first gave a sworn statement accusing the defendant of abuse. 

(Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1286, 1288.) The court 

observed that because of that admission, there was less risk of undue 

consumption of time because no inquiry into U visa procedures was even 

necessary—“[w]hat mattered most was that [the victim] apparently believed 

she was furthering her mother’s interest in obtaining a U visa by giving 

damaging testimony” about the defendant. (Id. at p. 1288.) The court also 

noted that the prosecution’s case turned almost entirely on the victim’s 

credibility given the lack of corroborating evidence, and that the victim’s 

testimony had grown more detailed and more incriminating over time. (Id. at 

pp. 1287–1288.) 
12

Here, unlike in Castaneda-Prado, there is no evidence that M.M. was 

motivated by K-1 visa benefits, real or otherwise. And as the Court of Appeal 

in Castaneda-Prado recognized, absent evidence that the victim knew about 

potential visa benefits, “there would have been an inevitable contest over 

whether, in [the victim’s] mind, the [] visa process could possibly have 

influenced her testimony and to what extent.” (Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1288.) Moreover, unlike in Castaneda-Prado, the case 

against Munsey included additional corroborating evidence in the form of a 

text message, photographs of M.M.’s injuries, 911 call recordings, and 

testimony from witnesses who observed M.M. before and after the October 

2021 incident.

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not exercise its 

discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner when it 

excluded testimony about M.M.’s K-1 visa.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DO, J.