[Cite as Pula v. Pula-Branch, 129 Ohio St.3d 196, 2011-Ohio-2896.]

P ULA ET AL ., A PPELLANTS , v . P ULA -B RANCH , A PPELLEE . [Cite as Pula v. Pula-Branch, 129 Ohio St.3d 196, 2011-Ohio-2896.] Uniform Interstate Family Support Act — R.C. Chapter 3115 — Domestic relations courts are authorized to decide cases brought under UIFSA — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded. (No. 2010-0985

— Submitted April 6, 2011

— Decided June 22, 2011.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 93460,
2010-Ohio-912.

__________________ P FEIFER , J. {¶ 1} This case concerns which courts have jurisdiction to address interstate petitions of ch ild support brought under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), R.C. Chapter 3115. The specific issue is whether the domestic relations division of the Cuya hoga County Common Pleas Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over an inters tate support order when the order is unrelated to a divorce, dissolution of ma rriage, legal separation, or annulment. We hold that the Cuyahoga County Domes tic Relations Court does have subjectmatter jurisdiction in this case. Factual and Procedural Background {¶ 2} Appellant Ruby K. Pula is a resi dent of Hawaii and the custodian and maternal grandmother of K.G.P., a mi nor child born out of wedlock. K.G.P. resides with Pula; appellee, Adrienne Haunani Pula-Branch, K.G.P.’s birth mother, lives in Cleveland. On Novemb er 18, 2008, on Pula’s behalf, appellant Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency (“CS EA”) filed in the domestic relations court a petition for child support and me dical coverage against Pula-Branch.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 {¶ 3} On May 15, 2009, the trial court issued a child-support order, but CSEA timely appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, challenging the
trial court’s calculation of child-support obligations. On January 20, 2010, the appellate court sua sponte raised the issue of the domestic cour t’s jurisdiction over the underlying action and ordered briefing . The court ultimately concluded that the domestic relations court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition. The court held that the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court’s jurisdiction was limited by R.C. 2301.03(L)(1) to matters involving “a divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or annulment” and reasoned that since this case
involved none of the actions set fort h in R.C. 2301.01(L)(1), the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court had no jurisdiction to address a UIFSA support
order. Pula v. Pula-Branch , Cuyahoga App. No. 93460, 2010-Ohio-912, ¶ 8. The court noted that the case would be prope rly brought in juvenile court pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(B)(3), which states that the juvenile court has original jurisdiction under the UIFSA. Id. at ¶ 14, f n. 4. The appellate court ordered the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations C ourt to vacate its order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Pula at ¶ 14. {¶ 4} CSEA appealed. The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a discretionary appeal. Pula v. Pula-Branch 126 Ohio St.3d 1581, 2010-Ohio-4542, 934 N.E.2d 354. Law and Analysis {¶ 5} The UIFSA is codified in Ohio in R.C. Chapter 3115. Pursuant to R.C. 3115.16(B)(1), a “responding tribunal” that receives a complaint from an initiating state may issue or enforce a support order “to the extent otherwise authorized by law.” R.C. 3115.01(R) de fines “[r]esponding tribunal” as “the authorized tribunal in a responding state”; the definition of “[t]ribunal” in R.C. 3115.01(X) includes “any trial court of record of this state.” There is no dispute
that the domestic relations court is a tri bunal under the statute. The central issueJanuary Term, 2011

3 of this case is whether that court is “authorized”; the appellate court held that the Cuyahoga County Domestic Re lations Court is authorized to hear and decide only cases that relate to a divorce, dissolu tion, legal separation, or annulment of a marriage. Pula , 2010-Ohio-912, ¶ 14. We disagree with the determination that the court’s jurisdiction is so limited and therefore reverse the judgment of court of appeals. {¶ 6} The General Assembly defines the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas and their respective divisions. Sections 4(A) and (B), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. R.C. 2301.03 establishes the jurisdiction of the state's domestic relations courts in separate subsections; their jurisdiction can vary by county. R.C. 2301.03(L)(1) applies specifically to the judges of Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court. That stat ute sets forth that the judges of that
domestic relations court “sha ll * * * exercise the same powers and jurisdiction * * * as other judges of the court of comm on pleas of Cuyahoga county and shall be elected and designated as judges of the court of common pleas, division of domestic relations. They shall have all the powers relating to all divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation, and annulment cases, except in cases that are assigned to some other judge of the court of common pleas for some special reason.” R.C. 2301.03(L)(1) grants all the power in marriage-related cases to the domestic relations division, thus limiting the ability of other common pleas judges to preside over those cases. Conversely, there is no limiting language preventing domestic relations judg es from having jurisdiction over other cases – they retain “the same powers and jurisdiction * * * as other judges of the court of common pleas.” Thus, R.C. 2301.03(L)(1) is not a limiting provision, but rather a specific grant of authority. {¶ 7} The appellate court held that Pula ’s petition should have been filed in juvenile court. Pula, 2010-Ohio- 912, ¶ 14, fn. 4. R.C. 2151.23(B), which deals with the original jurisdiction of juvenile courts, states that juvenile courts haveS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 original jurisdiction “[u]nder the uniform interstate family support act in Chapter 3115. of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2151.23(B)(3 ). But that jurisdiction is not exclusive. R.C. 2151.23(A) sets forth the exclusive original jurisdiction of juvenile courts, and UIFSA cases are not listed among the matters over which juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction. This court has held that the distinction between exclusive original jurisdiction and nonexclusive original jurisdiction is
crucial. In Brookbank v. Gray (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 279, 658 N.E.2d 724, paragraph three of the syllabus, this court held that the issue of an illegitimate child's paternity may be litigated in a wrongful-death case in the court of common pleas. We held that although the “juvenile court has been given ‘original jurisdiction’ to determine the paternity of children born out of wedlock[,] * * *[t]his is in contrast to the ‘exclusive original jurisdiction’ given to the juvenile
court over other matters.” Brookbank at 293, quoting R.C. 2151.23(A) and (B)(3). {¶ 8} Indeed, cases brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3115 are explicitly excluded from the juvenile court’s excl usive jurisdiction. R.C. 2151.23(A)(11) grants exclusive jurisdiction to juvenile courts to “hear and determine a request for an order for the support of any child if the request is not ancillary to an action for divorce, dissolution of marriage, annulment, or legal separation, * * * or an action for support brought under Chapter 3115. of the Revised Code .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, if the sought-after support order arises in a domestic relations case or an R.C. Chapter 3115 case, the j uvenile court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over support orders. Since j uvenile courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction under R.C. Chapter 3115 claims , other courts may hear those cases. {¶ 9} The UIFSA is remedial legislati on and as such, pursuant to R.C. 1.11, must be “liberally cons trued in order to promote [its] object and assist the parties in obtaining justice.” The fac ilitation of interstate support orders would not be promoted by foreclosing the Cu yahoga County Domestic Relations Court from considering UIFSA cases that do not arise from a marriage. The CuyahogaJanuary Term, 2011

5 County Domestic Relations Cour t is a trial court of record in Ohio, one attuned to crafting support orders. The jurisdiction of the domestic relations division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court is not limited by statute to cases involving marriage, divorce, separation, or annulment; those judges “exercise the same powers and jurisdiction * * * as other judges of the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county.” R.C. 2301.03(L)(1). Finally, jurisdiction over an action for support brought under R.C. Chapter 3115 is not exclusive to juvenile courts. R.C. 2151.23(A)(11). {¶ 10} Therefore, we hold that the Cuya hoga County Domestic Relations Court does have jurisdicti on over an action for support brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3115, even if the action does not arise from a divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or annulment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the appellate court for further
determination consistent with this opinion. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and L UNDBERG S TRATTON , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER , C UPP , and M C G EE B ROWN , JJ., concur.

__________________ William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Pr osecuting Attorney, and Kestra Smith and Joseph Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency. Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, Alexandra Schimmer, Solicitor General, Emily S. Schlesinger, Deputy Solicitor, and Alana R. Shockey, Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General.

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