20 16 UT App 218



### T HE 

### U TAH 

### C OURT O F 

### A PPEALS

J EFF P RICE AND A NN P RICE , Appell ees , v. D ANIELLE S PRAGUE , Appell ant

.
Memorandum Decision N o. 20150663

- CA Filed November 3, 2016

Second District Court, Farmington Department The Honorable David R. Hamilton No. 120701157
Danielle Sprague , Appellant Pro Se Matthew N. Evans and A.J. Green , Attorney s for Appellee s
J UDGE K ATE A. T OOMEY authored th is Memorandum Decision , in

which J UDGES J. F REDERIC V OROS J R

. and D AVID N. M ORTENSEN concurred

.

TOOMEY , Judge :

¶1 Danielle Sprague appe als the trial court’s judgment in favor of Jeff Price and Ann Price in this landlord

- tenant dispute

. Sprague’s argument is inadequately briefed and we therefore affirm

.
¶2 “It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald , 961 P.2d 305 , 313 (Utah 1998). An adequately briefed argument “contain[s] the contentions and

reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented

. . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” Utah R. App. P . 24(a)(9). “Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9)Price v. Sprague

20150663

- CA 2 2016 UT App 218 requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority.” State v. Thomas , 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998 ).

¶3 Sprague appears pro se. Parties who represent themselves are “ held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of t he bar.” Allen v. Friel , 2008 UT 56, ¶ 11, 194 P.3d 903 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted ). Nevertheless, “ appellate courts are generally lenient with pro se litigants,” Bell v. Bell , 2013 UT App 248, ¶ 27, 312 P.3d 951 (citing Lundahl v. Quin n , 2003 UT 11, ¶¶ 3

– 4, 67 P.3d 1000), and they are “entitled to every consideration that may reasonably be indulged, ” Allen , 2008 UT 56, ¶ 11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶4 But e ven applying a more lenient standard, Sprague’s brief is far from ade quate. The brief states five issues presented for our review, 1 but it does not state “the standard of appellate review with supporting authority” nor does it provide “citation to the record showing that the [issues were] preserved in the trial cou rt.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)

. And alt hough Sprague includes some citation to authority in her argument , she does not

1 . The issues raised in the brief are (1) whether the trial court erred in c oncluding Sprague terminated a lease agreement with the Prices by sending them an eviction notice, (2) whether the trial court erred in finding Sprague did not present sufficient evidence to prove the Prices caused water damage to the property they leased from Sprague, (3) whether the trial court erred in concluding Sprague breached the lease agreement by not ref unding the Prices’ security deposit, (4) whether the trial court erred in conc luding the Prices did not materially breach the lease agreement, and (5) whether the trial court erred in not concluding the Prices’ behavior was in bad faith and in breach of the implied covenant of fair dealing.Price v. Sprague

20150663

- CA 3 2016 UT App 218 develop it or explain how it applies to the particular issues. These deficiencies prevent us from understanding “what particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record those errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities, those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other relief.” State v. Lucero , 2002 UT App 135, ¶ 13, 47 P.3d 107 (citation and internal qu otation marks omitted).

¶5 For example, Sprague alleges that the Prices filed “this meritless lawsuit . . . in bad faith.” But she does not demonstrate that thi s issue was preserved at trial

— indeed, we could find no reference to bad faith anywhere in the tria l transcrip t or in the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Nor has Sprague attempted to show why this issue should be reviewed under an exception to the preservation requirement, such as plain error or exceptional circumstances

. See State v. I rwin , 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Furthermo re, after explaining the facts supporting her allegation of bad faith, Sprague cites four Utah cases without any description of their holding s or how they might apply to thi s particular issue.

¶6 Moreover, al though the initial brief and the reply brief include voluminous addenda, these addenda contain documents outside the record , which we cannot consider on appeal

. See State v. Pliego , 1999 UT 8, ¶ 7, 974 P.2d 279 (explain ing that an appellate court’s review is limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal). “ [A]lthough the record may be supplemented if anything material is omitted, it may not be done by simply including the omitted material in the party’s addendum .” Id. Sprague ’s briefs cite the addenda , but because the a ddenda are not numbered in a manner consistent with the trial court record, it is difficult t o determine which information is contained in the record and may be considered, and which is not and mus t be disregarded.

¶7 Finally , many of the facts Sprague alleged in her brief are unsupport ed by any citation to the record , and where shePrice v. Sprague

20150663

- CA 4 2016 UT App 218 includes a citation to a document included in one of the addenda, the cit ed material often does not support her factual p roposition

. To illustrate, Sprague claims that on a particular day, the Prices informed her that the dishwasher in the leased premises was leaking and demanded she clean up the leaked
water . But the portion of the addendum Sprague cites in support of this claim shows only the purchase receipt of a dishwasher and an email informing the Prices that a dishwasher would be installed. Add itionally , Sprague claims that on December 8, 2012, the Prices informed her they would leave the residence the next day, but s he cites a page in the addendum that is a copy of an email from October.

¶8 Even allowing Sp rague every consideration that may reasonably be indulged , the lack of citation to the record and development of relevant authority preclude us from reaching the merit s of her appeal

. We therefore affirm

.