1All subsequent section references are to the Internal

Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule

references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 

T.C. Summary Opinion 2001-105

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

RODNEY M. FUJIYAMA AND VICKI ANN FUJIYAMA, Petitioners v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 16533-99S. Filed July 23, 2001.

Rodney M. Fujiyama and Vicki Ann Fujiyama, pro se.

Brian M. Harrington, for respondent.

MARVEL, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the

provisions of section 7463 in effect at the time the petition was

filed.1 The decision to be entered is not reviewable by any

other court, and this opinion should not be cited as authority.
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2In his notice of deficiency, respondent determined that

petitioners are liable for a negligence penalty in the amount of

50 percent of the interest due on $13,367. Respondent conceded

in his trial memorandum that the penalty should be limited to 50

percent of the interest due on $6,479. 

Respondent determined that petitioners are liable for an

addition to tax for negligence under section 6653(a)(2) for 1982. 

The only issue for decision is whether petitioners are liable for

the addition to tax for negligence pursuant to section 6653(a)(2)

for 1982 in the amount of 50 percent of the interest due on the

underlying deficiency of $6,479,2 which respondent computed in

connection with the disallowance of research and development

expenditures deducted in 1982 by Jojoba Research Partners,

Hawaii, a limited partnership.

Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. We

incorporate the stipulation of facts by this reference. 

Petitioners resided in Honolulu, Hawaii, on the date the petition

was filed. Hereinafter, references to petitioner are to Rodney

M. Fujiyama.

Petitioner graduated from law school and has been licensed

to practice law since 1970. Petitioner’s legal practice focuses

primarily on business transaction planning. Petitioner does not

practice tax law and has very little tax experience. When one of

petitioner’s clients requires tax advice, petitioner engages the

services of a national or local accounting firm to assist him. 
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3Petitioner conceded that, even if he did review the PPM

before making his investment, he probably did not read the entire

document.

Investment in Jojoba Research Partners, Hawaii

In 1982, petitioner’s accountant, Robert Mihara, introduced

petitioner to an investment opportunity in a limited partnership 

known as Jojoba Research Partners, Hawaii (Jojoba). Jojoba had

entered into agreements with U.S. Agri-Research and Development

Corp. (Agri-Research) under which Agri-Research would provide

agricultural research and development services with respect to

the growing of jojoba plants. In connection with its activities,

Jojoba planned to deduct research and development expenditures

under section 174, which, it expected, would generate tax

benefits for its investors.

Petitioner believes, but is not certain, that he reviewed a

private placement memorandum (PPM) and a tax opinion letter in

connection with his proposed investment in Jojoba.3 He also

consulted his accountant, Mr. Mihara.

The PPM, dated October 28, 1982, stated: “THIS OFFERING

INVOLVES A HIGH DEGREE OF RISK”. The PPM also stated:

PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS ARE CAUTIONED NOT TO

CONSTRUE THIS MEMORANDUM OR ANY PRIOR OR SUBSEQUENT

COMMUNICATIONS AS CONSTITUTING LEGAL OR TAX ADVICE. 

* * * INVESTORS ARE URGED TO CONSULT THEIR OWN COUNSEL

AS TO ALL MATTERS CONCERNING THIS INVESTMENT. 

PRIOR TO THE SALE OF ANY UNITS, EACH PURCHASER

AND/OR HIS OFFEREE REPRESENTATIVE SHALL HAVE THE

OPPORTUNITY TO ASK QUESTIONS OF THE GENERAL PARTNER
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CONCERNING ANY ASPECT OF THE INVESTMENT DESCRIBED

HEREIN. EACH INVESTOR MAY OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL

INFORMATION NECESSARY TO VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF THE

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS MEMORANDUM TO THE EXTENT

THAT THE GENERAL PARTNER POSSESSES SUCH INFORMATION OR

CAN ACQUIRE IT WITHOUT UNREASONABLE EFFORT OR EXPENSE.

* * * * * * *

NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND ARE

INTENDED OR SHOULD BE INFERRED WITH RESPECT TO THE

ECONOMIC RETURN OR TAX ADVANTAGES WHICH MAY ACCRUE TO

THE INVESTORS IN THE UNITS.

EACH PURCHASER OF UNITS HEREIN SHOULD AND IS

EXPECTED TO CONSULT WITH HIS OWN TAX ADVISOR AS TO THE

TAX ASPECTS.

In addition to the general warnings, the PPM described the risk

factors with respect to the projected Federal income tax

consequences of an investment in Jojoba as follows:

The General Partner anticipates that a substantial

portion of the capital contributions of the Limited

Partners to the Partnership will be used for research

and experimental expenditures of the type generally

covered by Section 174 of the Code. However,

prospective investors should be aware that there is

little published authority dealing with the specific

types of expenditures which will qualify as research or

experimental expenditures within the meaning of Section

174, and most of the expenditures contemplated by the

Partnership have not been the subject of any prior

cases or administrative determinations.

* * * * * * *

No ruling by the Service has been or will be sought

regarding deductibility of the proposed expenditures

under Section 174 of the Code.

The PPM referred prospective investors to a November 8,

1992, tax opinion letter prepared by the law firm of Caplan &

Resnick and addressed to Jojoba’s general partner (Caplan
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letter). The Caplan letter discussed various Federal income tax

principles and opined regarding the application of those

principles to the Jojoba investment. Caplan & Resnick based its

opinion on the representations made by Jojoba’s general partner,

which the firm claimed it independently verified by personally

interviewing officers of Agri-Research, visiting a typical

experimental jojoba plantation, and reviewing various documents,

including the PPM, the research and development agreement, the

license agreement, and documentation concerning the acquisition

of rights to the use of real property upon which the research

would be conducted. The Caplan letter specifically addressed the

deductibility of research and development expenditures under

section 174 and concluded:

Because of the scarcity of judicial opinions and

legislative enactments regarding section 174 and

because * * * [Jojoba] may incur expenses which are not

presently contemplated, it is not possible to guarantee

the deductibility of certain expenditures as research

and development expenses. The General Partner intends

to conduct the * * * [Jojoba] business such that, to

the extent possible, substantially all * * * [Jojoba’s]

expenditures for research and development qualify under

section 174.

Before making the investment in Jojoba, petitioner discussed

with Mr. Mihara Jojoba’s profit potential and the research and

development deduction that Jojoba anticipated claiming. 

Although Mr. Mihara had no expertise regarding jojoba as a

marketable commodity, research and development expenditures

generally, or the requirements of section 174 when he brought
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4Mr. Mihara had no personal knowledge regarding the jojoba

plantation, but he did receive occasional progress letters from

Agri-Research regarding the activities allegedly being conducted

on the jojoba plantation. Petitioner may have seen some of these

progress letters but, at the time of trial, he did not recall

whether he received any specific letter. 

Jojoba to petitioner’s attention, he nevertheless assured

petitioner there would be no problem with the deduction. Mr.

Mihara relied upon representations made by Jojoba representatives

that Jojoba’s activities qualified as research and development

and that investors would “be able to take all these deductions

and get all these tax benefits.” Solely on the basis of those

representations, Mr. Mihara concluded that Jojoba was a

legitimate research and development activity. Neither he nor

petitioner did any independent research or analysis or consulted

with any experts regarding the Jojoba investment.4 

Petitioner did not inquire regarding Mr. Mihara’s

involvement with Jojoba or his qualifications to advise

petitioner competently regarding the proposed investment. In

fact, Mr. Mihara was the accountant for, and an investor in,

Jojoba.

Shortly after petitioner discussed Jojoba with Mr. Mihara,

petitioner made the minimum investment in Jojoba. Petitioner

paid $5,000 by check and signed a promissory note for $9,250 with

10 percent interest per year in exchange for five limited

partnership units. Petitioner also executed a limited guaranty
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agreement with Agri-Research and Jojoba guaranteeing, to the

extent of the promissory note balance, Jojoba’s liability to

Agri-Research under the research and development agreement. 

Petitioners’ 1982 Federal Income Tax Return

For the taxable year 1982, Jojoba allocated an ordinary loss

of $12,971 to petitioner, as reflected in his 1982 Schedule K-1,

Partner’s Share of Income, Credits, Deductions, Etc., issued by

Jojoba, which petitioners deducted on their 1982 joint Federal

income tax return. 

On October 18, 1993, the tax matters partner of Jojoba

entered into a stipulation with respondent agreeing to be bound

by this Court’s decision in Utah Jojoba I Research v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-6. The facts regarding the

underlying deficiency in Utah Jojoba I Research are substantially

identical to those in this case. In Utah Jojoba I Research, we

held that the partnership was not entitled to deduct its losses

for research and development expenditures under section 174. On

June 17, 1998, we entered a decision against Jojoba, the

partnership involved in this case, disallowing the research and

expense deduction claimed for 1982. 

On August 6, 1999, respondent issued a notice of deficiency

to petitioners for 1982 in which he determined that petitioners

are liable for an addition to tax for negligence pursuant to 
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section 6653(a)(2) in connection with a research and development

deduction disallowed at the partnership level. 

Discussion

Section 6653(a)(2) imposes an addition to tax equal to 50

percent of the interest payable with respect to the portion of

underpayment attributable to negligence or intentional disregard

of rules and regulations for the period beginning on the last day

prescribed by law for payment of such underpayment (determined

without regard to any extension) and ending on the date of the

assessment of the tax. For purposes of section 6653, negligence

is defined as “lack of due care or failure to do what a

reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the

circumstances.” Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985)

(quoting Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir.

1967), affg. in part and remanding in part 43 T.C. 168 (1964));

see Allen v. Commissioner, 925 F.2d 348, 353 (9th Cir. 1991),

affg. 92 T.C. 1 (1989); Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417,

1422 (9th Cir. 1984), affg. 79 T.C. 714 (1982). Negligence is

determined by testing a taxpayer’s conduct against that of a

reasonable, prudent person. Zmuda v. Commissioner, supra.

The Commissioner’s decision to impose the negligence penalty

is presumptively correct. Collins v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d

1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988), affg. Dister v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 1987-217; Hansen v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1464, 1469 (9th
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5The parties agreed not to submit posttrial briefs in this

case. After the trial, petitioner presented a closing argument,

and respondent submitted a memorandum of authorities with the

consent of petitioner.

6Petitioners also argued that we should abate the interest

accrued on the 1982 deficiency. See sec. 6404(e). Petitioners,

however, have not complied with the statutory requirements for

abatement. Whether petitioners are entitled to abatement of

interest is not properly before us. See id.

Cir. 1987). The taxpayer has the burden of proving that the

Commissioner’s determination is erroneous and that he did what a

reasonably prudent person would have done under the

circumstances. Rule 142(a); Hansen v. Commissioner, supra; Hall

v. Commissioner, 729 F.2d 632, 635 (9th Cir. 1984), affg. T.C.

Memo. 1982-337; Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 791 (1972). 

At trial,5 petitioner claimed that he reasonably relied on

representations made in the offering materials and on his

accountant, whom he described as a knowledgeable and experienced

tax adviser. Petitioner argued that he did not need to

independently investigate the investment because, as an investor

of moderate means, he was entitled to rely upon the offering

materials and the expertise of his accountant,6 citing Heasley v.

Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380, 383-384 (5th Cir. 1990), revg. T.C.

Memo. 1988-408. In support of his position, petitioner also

cited United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 250-251 (1985), in

which the United States Supreme Court stated:

When an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer

on a matter of tax law, such as whether a liability
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7The PPM did not make any affirmative statements indicating

that the research and development deduction would be allowed by

the IRS and, in fact, warned against misconstruing the document

(continued...)

exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on

that advice. Most taxpayers are not competent to

discern error in the substantive advice of an

accountant or attorney. To require the taxpayer to

challenge the attorney, to seek a “second opinion,” or

to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code

himself would nullify the very purpose of seeking the

advice of a presumed expert in the first place. 

“Ordinary business care and prudence” do not demand

such actions. [Citation omitted.]

Respondent argued that petitioner was negligent and that

petitioner did not have a reasonable basis for his reporting

position regarding Jojoba. We agree that petitioner’s reliance

on the offering materials and on the advice of his accountant is

not an adequate defense. 

It is well settled that a taxpayer’s reliance upon offering

materials prepared in connection with the sale of an investment

or upon the representations of investment insiders and promoters

is not reasonable. Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 402 (2d Cir.

1994) (reliance on representations by insiders, promoters, or

offering materials is an inadequate defense to negligence), affg.

T.C. Memo. 1993-480; Becker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-538. 

In this case, not only was petitioner’s reliance on the offering

materials not reasonable, but petitioner ignored provisions in

the PPM warning him to consult a competent and independent

adviser.7
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7(...continued)

as indicating the deduction would be proper. Likewise, the

Caplan letter stated that the deduction might be subject to

attack by the IRS and that “Several commentators have discussed

the potential that the IRS may attack a research and development

partnership on the basis that it constitutes a material

distortion of income.” The Caplan letter also pointed out the

lack of judicial opinions and legislative enactments regarding

sec. 174 and stressed “it is not possible to guarantee the

deductibility of certain expenditures as research and development

expenses.” 

It is equally well settled that, although a taxpayer may

avoid liability for the addition to tax under section 6653(a)(2)

if he reasonably relies in good faith on a competent

professional, United States v. Boyle, supra, “Reliance on

professional advice, standing alone, is not an absolute defense

to negligence, but rather a factor to be considered”, Freytag v.

Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 888 (1987), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th

Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). In order to successfully

claim he reasonably relied on professional advice, petitioner

must demonstrate that the professional on whom he relied had

sufficient expertise and knowledge of the pertinent facts to

provide informed advice on the subject matter. Id.; Becker v.

Commissioner, supra; Sacks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-217,

affd. 82 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1996); Kozlowski v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1993-430, affd. without published opinion 70 F.3d 1279

(9th Cir. 1995). Petitioner has not demonstrated that Mr. Mihara

had either the necessary expertise or the knowledge of pertinent

facts to render informed advice on the investment. To the
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contrary, Mr. Mihara admitted at trial that he did not know much

about research and development at the time of the initial

investment in Jojoba but, nevertheless, assured petitioner there

would not be a problem with the research and development

deduction. See Hansen v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.

1987); Glassley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-206.

 Petitioner’s reliance on Heasley v. Commissioner, supra, is

misplaced. Although an investor “need not pore over every word

in a prospectus or in closing documents” before making an

investment, he must exercise reasonable care in ascertaining

basic information regarding his investment. Id. at 384. Unlike

the taxpayer in Heasley, petitioner made no effort to verify even

the most basic information regarding his investment or to ensure

that a competent and independent professional had done so on his

behalf. Moreover, after he made his investment in Jojoba,

petitioner failed to monitor his investment. 

We find that petitioner’s failure to exercise reasonable

care in determining whether to invest in Jojoba was negligent and

that petitioner’s reliance on Mr. Mihara for advice regarding the

Jojoba investment was not reasonable. Accordingly, we hold that

petitioners are liable for the addition to tax for negligence 

under section 6653(a)(2) with respect to a deficiency for 1982 of

$6,479. 
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To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered

under Rule 155.