alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA TO IMPROVE 

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPLIANCE AND TO IMPLEMENT FATCA 

At the signing today of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of 

America and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Improve International 

Tax Compliance and to Implement FA TCA (hereinafter the "Agreement"), the 

representatives ofthe United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wish to 

confirm their understanding of the following: 

It is understood that, in the case of securities registered in the Securities Depository 

Centre within the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) as defined by the Capital Market 

Law, that are held by or through one or more other Financial Institutions that are not 

Nonparticipating Financial Institutions, the relevant Financial Accounts would be treated 

as being held by such other Financial Institutions, and such other Financial Institutions 

would be responsible for any reporting required with respect to such Financial Accounts. 

It is understood that the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) may report on behalf of such 

other Financial Institutions in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 5 of the Agreement. 

Signed at the Ministry of Finance, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in duplicate, in the English and 

Arabic languages, this 15th day ofNovember, 2016. 

For the Government of the 

United States of America: 

Joseph W. Westphal 

Ambassador of the United States 

to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

For the Government of the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 

Dr. Hamad al-Bazai 

Vice Minister of Finance
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l unani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T J OSEP H D AN NY PR OPHET, P la in tif

f - A p p e llan t, v. D E P A R T M E N T O F C O R R E C T IO N S ; et a l., D efen d an t s - A p p el l ees. N o. 09- 15804 D. C . No . 2 : 0 6 - c v - 0 2 8 2 2 - F C DEFB ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e E a s te rn D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia F r ank C . D a m r e l l , J r . , D i s tr i c tJudge , P r e s i di ng

S ubm i tt e d M ay25, 2010 ** B e f o r e : C A N B Y , T H O M A S , an dW . F L E T C H E R , C ir c u it Ju d g e s . J os e ph D annyP r ophe t , aC a l i f orni as t a t e pr i s one r , appe a l s pr o s e f r om the di stri ctcourt ’ s j ud gm entdi sm i ss i ng hi s 42 U . S . C . § 1 98 3 act i on al l egi ng that 

# FI LED JU N 17 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS09- 15804 2 p r is o n p e r s o n n e l v io la te dh is F ir s t, E ig h th , an dF o u rte e n th A m e n d m e n t r ig h ts . W e ha ve j ur i s di c t i on unde r28 U . S . C . § 1291. W e r e vi e w de novo adi s m i s s a l unde r28 U .S .C . § 1 9 1 5 A . R es ni ck v. H ayes , 2 1 3 F. 3 d4 4 3 , 4 4 7 ( 9 th Ci r . 2 0 0 0 ) . W e a f f i rm. T he di s tr i c tc ourtpr ope r l ydi s m i s s e d P r ophe t ’ s s e c ond a m e nde d c om pl a i nt b e c au s e h e f

a ile dto s ta te ac o g n iz ab le c la im a g a in s t an yd e f e n d an t. See L ew is v . Casey , 5 1 8 U .S . 3 4 3 , 3 5 4 - 5 5 ( 1 9 9 6 ) ( ap r is o n e r ’s r ig h t to a c c e s s th e c o u rts is l i m i t e d t o the pur s ui tof anon- f r i vol ous c l a i m c onc e rni ng hi s c onvi c t i on or c o n d itio n s o f

c o n f in e m e n t) ; Farm e rv . B r e nnan, 5 1 1 U. S . 8 2 5 , 8 4 7 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ( “ [ A] pr i s on of f i c i a l m aybe he l d l i abl e unde rthe E i ghth A m e ndm e ntf orde ny i ng hu m ane c on di t i on s of c on fi nem enton l y i f he kno w s thati nm at es fa ce a s ub st ant i al ri sk of se ri ou s harm and d i sr egar ds thatri sk by fa i l i ng t o t ake r ea sonabl e m ea sure s t o abat e i t . ”) ; B arne t t

v . C e ntoni , 3 1 F. 3 d8 1 3 , 8 1 6 - 1 7 ( 9 th Ci r . 1 9 9 4 ) ( p e rc u r i a m) ( ap r is o n e r ’s a lle g a tio n s o f p r o p e rtyd e p r iv a tio n s f a ile dto s ta te adu e p r o c e s s c la im unde rs e c t i on 1983 be c aus e C a l i f orni apr ovi de s an a de qua t e pos t - de pr i va t i on r e m e d y ) . P r o p h e t’s r e m a in in g c o n te n tio n s ar e u n p e r s u a s iv e . AF F I RME D.
255 La. 914

#### Terry G. PARTA v. NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT.

No. 50494.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 20, 1970.

In re: Terry G. Parta applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 231 So.2d 574.

Writ refused. Judgment of Court of Appeal is correct.
# Summary

HAF Quarterly Report - Submissions Status - Q2 20231,2,3

# Demographics by Type

HAF Q2 2023 Quarterly Report  - Application Data Breakdown1,2,3

# Assistance by Participant

HAF Q2 2023 Quarterly Report  - Breakdown of Participant Program Assistance to households1,2

# Applications by Participant

HAF Q2 2023 Quarterly Report  - Breakdown of Applications by Participant1,2,3,4,5

# Disaggregated Demographics

HAF Q2 2023 Quarterly Report  - Approved Application Disaggregated Demographics by Participant1,2,3,4,5

# Sheet2

# image1.png
255 La. 285

#### Foster J. BROWN, individually and on behalf of his minor children v. James A. DURAND, M.D., et al.

No. 50356.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 6, 1970.

In re: Foster J. Brown applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writ refused. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6895** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. BRIAN JAMES BRONSON, a/k/a Little B , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. James C. Dever, III , Chief District Judge. ( 5:06

- cr - 00249

- D

- 1; 5:11

- cv - 00088

- D )

Submitted : November 17, 2011 Decided: November 23, 2011

Before KING, DAVIS, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismi ssed by un published per curiam opinion
. Brian James Bronson, Appellant Pro Se. William Ellis Boyle, Michael Gordon James, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in t his circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Brian James Bronson seeks to appeal the district court’s order d ismissing his 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2011 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28
U .S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (200 6 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Bronson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conte ntions are adequately presented in the materials3 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

DISMISSED
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane lunani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T GU R MAJ ORS I NG H, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 10- 70808 A ge nc yN o. A 078- 674- 062 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

an O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d J anuary17, 2012 ** B efo re: L E A V Y , T A L L M A N , an dC A L L A H A N , C i rcu i tJu d g es. G urm a j orS i ngh, ana t i ve and c i t i z e n of I ndi a , pe t i t i ons f

orr e vi e w of

the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ (“ B IA ”) order denyi ng hi s m ot i on t o reopen r e m ova lpr oc e e di ngs . W e have j ur i s di c t i on unde r8 U . S . C . § 1252. W e r e vi e w f or an abus e of

di s c r e t i on the B I A ’ s de ni a lof am ot i on t o r e ope n, and r e vi e w s de novo



# FI LED JAN 24 2 012 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS10- 70808 2 c l a i m s of due pr oc e s s vi ol a t i ons , i nc l udi ng c l a i m s of i ne f f e c t i ve a s s i s t anc e of c o u n s e l. Moh am m ed v. G on zales , 400 F . 3d 785, 791- 92 ( 9th C i r . 2005) . W e de ny th e p e titio n f

o rr e v ie w . T he B IA di d n otabuse i t s di sc re t i on i n d enyi ng S i ng h’ s m ot i on t o reopen be c aus e he f

a i l e d t o s how he w a s pr e j udi c e d bythe a l l e ge d i ne f f e c t i ve a s s i s t anc e of c o u n s e l. Se e I

tu rr i b a rr i a v . I

NS , 3 2 1 F .3 d8 8 9 , 9 0 1 - 0 3 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 0 3 ) . T h e B I A a ls o d idn o t ab u s e its d is c r e tio n in d e n y in g S in g h ’s m o tio n to r e o p e n b e c au s e it c o n s id e r e dth e r e c o r dan da c te dw ith in its b r o a dd is c r e tio n in d e te rm in in g th a t th e e v id e n c e w a s in s u f f ic ie n t to e s tab lis h p r im af a c ie e lig ib ility f o ra s y lu m , w ith h o ld in g o f r e m o v a l, o rC A T r e lie f . See T ou f i gh iv. Mukasey , 538 F .3 d9 8 8 , 9 9 6 - 9 7 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 0 8 ) ; Ferna ndezv. G on zales , 4 3 9 F .3 d5 9 2 , 6 0 3 ( 9 th C i r. 20 06 ) ( the agency i s pre sum ed t o h ave c on si dere d the ent i re re cord). F in a lly , S in g h ’s r e qu e s t f o ras tayo f

r e m o v a l u n til h is s ta tu s is a d ju s te dis de ni e d. T hi s doe s note f f e c touror de rda t e d A ugus t25, 2010, gr ant i ng S i ngh a s t ayo f r e m o v a lp e n d i n g r e v i e w. P E T I T I ON F OR RE V I E W E D D E NI E D.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Eagle Bancorp Montana, Inc.
(the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2010 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), we,
Peter J. Johnson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Clinton J.
Morrison, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that, to the undersigneds knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

|                               |  |                                                                        
|------------------------------ |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Peter J.
 Johnson          |  | /s/ Clinton
 J. Morrison                                               
|                               |  |                                                                        
|Peter J.
 Johnson              |  | Clinton J.
 Morrison                                                   
|Chief
 Executive Officer       |  | Senior VP
 and Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer
|(Principal
 Executive Officer) |  | (Principal
 Financial Officer)                                         
|September
 20, 2010            |  | September
 20, 2010                                                    

---
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls
o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :
A1 8 D0 19 2 . RANDALL YOUNG v . SCOTT W I LKES.

In 2 0 1 4 , Ran d a l l Yo u n g p l ead ed g u i l ty t o b urg l ary an d o t h er offen s es

. He t h ereaft er fi l ed a pet i t i o n fo r wri t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s

. Aft er t he t ri al co u rt d en i ed h i s p et i t i o n , Yo u ng fi l ed an ap p l i cat i o n fo r d i scret i o nary rev i ew i n t h i s Co u rt

. Th e Su p rem e Co u rt , h o wev er, h as ap p el l at e ju ri s d i ct i o n o v er al l cas es i n v o l v i n g h ab eas
co rp u s

. See Ga. Co n st

. o f 1 9 8 3 , Art

. V I, Sec. VI , P ar. III (4 ). Th i s ap p li cat i o n i s t h erefo re TRANSFERRED t o t h e Su p rem e Co u rt fo r d i s p o s it io n

.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia C le r k ’ s O f f i c e , A t la n t a ,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e is a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d th e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. November 28, 2017

11/28/2017
No. 9303.

#### Claypool et al. *v.*Claypool et al., Exrs.

(Decided October 23, 1906.)

Error to Circuit Court of Fairfield County.

*Mr. W. K. Martin*and *Mr. C. W. McCleery,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Mr. C. D. Martin*and *Mr. M. A.*Daugherty, for defendants in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Shauck, C. J., Price, Crew, Summers, Spear and Davis, JJ., concur.
October 19, 1977

Travel and Subsistence Expenses for the DirectorDesignate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

In response to your request, we have examined the question of 

whether Department of Justice funds are legally available to, pay the 

airfare and per diem for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

Director-designate’s travel to Washington, D.C., in connection with his 

confirmation hearings. We understand that he came to Washington on 

October 4, 1977, at the Attorney General’s request and intended to 

remain until his Senate confirmation hearing was to begin on October

11. In the interim, he conferred with the Attorney General and other 

officers on Department business. We further understand that he has 

returned home for reasons of health and that the confirmation hearing 

has been indefinitely postponed. After consultation with the General 

Accounting Office, we conclude that Department funds may be used to 

pay travel and subsistence expenses arising from the October 4 trip. We 

also conclude that they may be used to pay travel and subsistence at 

such time as he returns for his confirmation hearings if he consults with 

the Department oil official business at the same time.

With respect to travel and subsistence expenses incurred to attend 

Senate confirmation hearings, the Comptroller General has stated that 

these are normally “personal” and hence cannot be reimbursed. 53 

Comp. Gen. 424, 425 (1973). The same decision holds, however, that an 

agency may pay these expenses:

If official business, such as conferences with officials of your office, 

is also conducted by the nominee at the time he is in Washington, 

D.C., for his confirmation hearings, and such business is determined to be of “substantial benefit” to the [agency] . . . . Id. at 

425.

Thus, if the Director-designate consults with the Attorney General or 

other Department officers on official business during his confirmation 

hearing, and the Attorney General or his delegate determines that the

77-60 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY GENERAL

246
consultation is of “substantial benefit” to the Department, under the 

holding the payment of his travel and subsistence expenses from Department funds is permissible. As it is our understanding that he has 

consulted with Department officials in order to familiarize himself with 

his duties as FBI Director, we conclude that the travel expenses in 

question may be paid.

L e o n U l m a n

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

247
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED  PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing of this annual report on Form 10-K of DynaVox Inc. (the "Company") for the
fiscal year ended July 2, 2010, with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Kenneth D. Misch, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



Date:
September 30, 2010

/s/ KENNETH D. MISCH Kenneth D. Misch Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)


---



QuickLinks
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporationby reference in Registration Statement No. 333-166216 on Form S-8 and Registration Statement No. 333-173823 on Form S-3 of DynaVox Inc. and subsidiaries relating to the financial statements and financial statement schedules of DynaVox Inc.and subsidiaries (the “Successor”) as of July 1, 2011 and July 2, 2010 and for the fiscal year ended July 1, 2011 and the period from April 28, 2010 through July 2, 2010 and DynaVox Systems Holdings LLC (the“Predecessor”) for the period from July 4, 2009 through April 27, 2010 and the fiscal year ended July 3, 2009 (which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph regarding theSuccessor’s initial public offering transaction), appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of DynaVox Inc. for the year ended July 1, 2011. 

/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 

September 27, 2011
Exhibit 32.2.2

CERTIFICATION REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Joan S. Freilich, the Chief Financial Officer of Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (the "Company") certify that the Company's Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004, which this statement accompanies, (the "Form 10-Q") fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                   |  | /s/JOAN S. FREILICHJoan S. Freilich
|------------------ |  | -----------------------------------
|Dated: May 6, 2004 |  |                                    

---



QuickLinks
#### K. G. MULLIS, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Florida Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.

No. N-247.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 16, 1970.

K. G. Mullis, in pro. per.

SPECTOR, Judge.

Petitioner has filed an original ha-beas corpus proceeding in this court seeking to be released from prison on the primary ground that the State knowingly used false and perjured evidence against him and, further, that it suppressed evidence which was favorable to petitioner. Nowhere does petitioner tell us specifically what evidence was perjured as he contends, nor does he state what the true facts are with respect to the allegedly perjured testimony. Moreover, the petition is fatally defective because petitioner fails to allege with any degree of specificity the favorable evidence which he contends the prosecution suppressed to his detriment. Additional grounds for relief are alleged, but they are so devoid of merit that mention of them is not warranted.

Petitioner was charged and convicted of larceny as proscribed by Section 811.021, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The said conviction was the subject of this court’s consideration on direct appeal and we affirmed. See Mullis v. State, 220 So.2d 387. Subsequent to the affirmance of his conviction, petitioner filed an original habeas corpus proceeding in this court which said petition was denied after consideration on May 28, 1969. Now we have the instant and successive habeas corpus proceeding before us.

The grounds for relief alleged in the instant proceeding are substantially the same as those considered by the court in petitioner’s earlier habeas corpus case referred to above. That decision is res ad-judicata with respect to the successive contentions made herein.

In order to ascertain the factual background underlying petitioner’s contentions, we have examined the record of his case on direct appeal, and our consideration of the trial transcript persuades us that pe*372titioner was properly tried and convicted of the charges against him.

Petitioner was the operator of a collection agency in Marion County. He solicited and entered into a contract with the complaining witness whereunder he was engaged as her agent to collect a past due account in the amount of $1,500 due her from a New York resident. Pursuant to said agency contract, petitioner contacted the debtor by mail and was successful in obtaining almost immediate payment. Petitioner’s conduct to the complaining witness however was not as cooperative as that of the debtor. Instead of remitting the funds collected minus his commission, petitioner kept the entire amount and appropriated it to his own use. Such conduct falls within the definition of larceny .as defined in Section 811.021, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

The petition is denied.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.
Exhibit 32.2  CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Form 10-K of Promap Corporation, a company duly formed  under the laws of Colorado (the "Company"), for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Robert W. Carington, Jr., Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, that:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.    Date:  March 29, 2011 /s/ Robert W. Carington Robert W. Carington, Jr. Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)   This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Promap Corporation and will be retained by Promap Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.