65478 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 243

[FRA Docket No. HST–1]

RIN 2130–AB14

FOX High Speed Rail Safety Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

for rule of particular applicability

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: FRA is proposing a rule of

particular applicability that establishes

safety standards for the Florida

Overland eXpress (FOX) high speed rail

system. The proposed standards are not

intended for general application in the

railroad industry, but would apply only

to the FOX system that is planned for

development in the State of Florida. The

FOX system will operate from Miami to

Tampa, via Orlando on dedicated track,

with no grade crossings, at a maximum

speed of 200 mph. The FOX equipment

and track are patterned after the French

TGV high speed rail system, and will be

used exclusively for passenger service.

The proposed rule of particular

applicability takes a systems approach,

and so includes standards that address

all aspects of the FOX high speed

system, including system description,

system safety, signal, track, rolling

stock, operating practices, system

qualification tests, personnel

qualifications, and power distribution.

In addition, the proposed rule adopts

and incorporates by reference many

existing standards that apply to all

railroads, which are appropriate for

application to FOX, such as alcohol and

drug standards, hours of service

requirements, and locomotive engineer

qualifications.

DATES: (1) Written comments: Written

comments must be received on or before

February 10, 1998. Comments received

after that date will be considered only

to the extent possible without incurring

substantial expense or delay.

(2) Public hearing: A public hearing

will be held if one is requested by

January 2, 1998. Anyone requesting a

hearing must notify FRA’s Docket Clerk,

Renee Bridgers, in writing and provide

her with the requesting party’s name,

telephone number, and address. If a

hearing is requested, FRA will notify the

public of the date, time, and location of

the hearing, and provide instructions for

those who wish to make an oral

statement at the hearing.

ADDRESSES: Written comments must

identify the docket number and be

submitted in triplicate to the Docket

Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal

Railroad Administration, Stop 10, 400

Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.

20590. Persons desiring to be notified

that their comments have been received

by FRA should submit a stamped, selfaddressed postcard with their

comments. The Docket Clerk will

indicate on the postcard the date on

which the comments were received and

will return the card to the addressee.

Written comments will be available for

examination, both before and after the

closing date for written comments,

during regular business hours on the

seventh floor of 1120 Vermont Avenue,

NW, in Washington, D.C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Bill

Goodman or Mark Jones, Signal

Division, Office of Safety Assurance and

Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh St.,

S.W., Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590,

(telephone: 202–632–3353); Bill

O’Sullivan or Dave Jamieson, Track

Division, at the same address,

(telephone: 202–632–3341); Ed

Pritchard, Motive Power and Equipment

Division, at the same address,

(telephone: 202–632–3348); Doug Taylor

or Laura Mizner, Operating Practices

Division, at the same address,

(telephone: 202–632–3346); Bob Dorer,

Volpe National Transportation Systems

Center, Kendall Square, Cambridge, MA

02142, (telephone: 617–494–3481); or

Christine Beyer, Trial Attorney, Office

of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh St.,

S.W., Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590

(telephone: 202–632–3177).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background and Regulatory Structure

The State of Florida plans to develop

a high speed rail system that will run

from Miami to Tampa, via Orlando. The

system’s trains will travel on dedicated

rail, with no public grade crossings, in

exclusive passenger service, at speeds

not to exceed 200 mph. These

operational characteristics and the

equipment that the State plans to use

mark a dramatic step forward for the

development of regional high speed

passenger rail service in the United

States. FRA announces in this notice

proposed safety standards for the system

that will be developed in Florida.

Through a public bid process, Florida

has selected the Florida Overland

eXpress (FOX) to build and operate the

high speed rail system. FOX is a

consortium of engineering and rail

design and construction entities. The

system FOX proposes to build in Florida

utilizes the high speed technology and

equipment currently in use in France,

Holland, Spain, and Belgium, which

was developed in France and is known

as the French TGV (train a grande

vitesse, or very high speed train). The

French TGV has been in service in

Europe since 1981 and has safely

carried 450 million passengers. This is

a traditional rail system, in the sense

that steel wheels operate over steel rails,

powered by electrical power that is

carried and transferred to the equipment

through an overhead catenary system.

However, the TGV equipment is

generally lighter than conventional rail

vehicles, and utilizes advanced

computer and aerodynamic technology

that facilitates travel at very high speeds

with minimal track and equipment

degradation. (The trainsets travel at

maximum speeds of 186 mph in

France.) In addition, the TGV high

speed trainsets are articulated into one

long unit that resists buckling or rolling

in the event of an accident, which

greatly reduces the likelihood of serious

injury for passengers. The lightweight

design of the equipment permits high

speed travel, but also lends itself to

grave damage if involved in a train-totrain collision, particularly where heavy

freight vehicles are present. To counter

this aspect of the design, the TGV is

operated with a focus on collisionavoidance, in addition to collisionmitigation, a systems approach to safety

that has proven to be quite successful.

(It is also important to note here that the

Florida system will not include any

freight traffic.) Newer generations of the

TGV system include in-cab signal

systems and passenger stations that are

customized to service high speed

trainsets only. The French TGV system

has an exceedingly safe record, which is

discussed in greater detail below.

The federal railroad statutes apply to

all railroads, as defined in 49 U.S.C.

20102, including the FOX system

proposed to be built in Florida. The

only railroads excluded from FRA’s

jurisdiction are urban rapid transit

railroads that are not connected to the

general railroad system. The

contemplated FOX system will clearly

be intercity passenger rail, not urban

rapid transit. Accordingly, the Florida

system will be subject to FRA

jurisdiction whether or not it is

connected to the general railroad

system. Moreover, FRA would consider

a stand-alone intercity railroad line to

be part of the general system, even

though not physically connected to

other railroads (as FRA has previously

stated with respect to the Alaska

Railroad; see 49 CFR part 209,

Appendix A).
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65479

FRA has a regulatory program in

place, pursuant to its statutory

authority, to address equipment, track,

operating practices, and human factors

in the existing, conventional railroad

environment. However, significant

operational and equipment differences

exist between the system proposed for

Florida and existing passenger

operations in the United States. In many

of the railroad safety disciplines, FRA’s

existing standards of general

applicability do not address the safety

concerns and operational peculiarities

of the proposed FOX system. Therefore,

in order to assure the public that this

new system will operate safely,

minimum federal standards must be in

place when FOX commences

operations.

FOX and FDOT discussed their plans

for the system in a series of meetings

with FRA held throughout 1996. The

purpose of the discussions was to

explain to FRA the system that they

plan to build in Florida, and for FOX

and FDOT to understand more fully the

applicable regulatory framework that

would govern their operations. On

February 18, 1997, FOX filed a petition

for rulemaking (Petition) with FRA,

which proposes standards that would

apply to their system safety program,

track, rolling stock, signal, operating

practices, personnel qualifications, and

power distribution. Since February,

FOX has supplemented the Petition

with additional information that is

pertinent to the existing French

operation or the one planned for

Florida. (A copy of the Petition and

supplemental submissions are available

for public review in the docket of this

matter, which is docket number HST–1,

previously identified as docket number

RM Pet. 97–1.) The FOX Petition

attempts to incorporate the French

practice in each safety discipline listed

in the Petition, but also contains

proposed standards that differ from

practices in France. FRA understands

these differences to reflect operational

and environmental deviations between

the system proposed for Florida and the

TGV lines in operation in France.

FRA analyzed the Petition and

supporting documentation, gathered

background data that describe the

French system, and now publishes this

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(NPRM), based on consideration of the

available information and the expertise

of the Agency’s safety specialists. This

NPRM constitutes FRA’s initial

response to the Petition and includes

standards that are similar, but not

identical, to those in the FOX Petition.

It is important to note at this juncture

that any new standards which FRA

adopts to address safety on the FOX

high speed rail system would apply

only to that system, and therefore will

be issued in the form of a rule of

particular applicability, rather than one

of general applicability. Such a rule of

particular applicability would not

displace existing safety standards that

apply to all other entities in the railroad

industry, and would be enforced only

against the FOX system. Also, it should

be noted that FRA plans at this time to

publish any final standards that pertain

to the FOX system in the Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR). For that

reason, these proposed standards have

been assigned Part number 243, and are

organized into Subparts for each safety

discipline.

Safety Characteristics of the French

TGV System

As part of the process for determining

appropriate rules for those aspects of the

FOX system that will duplicate the

French TGV system, it is logical to

consider the safety record of the French

high speed rail system.

In preparation for filing the Petition,

FOX and the Florida Department of

Transportation (FDOT) commissioned

DLSF Systems, Inc. to complete a risk

assessment to evaluate the relative

safety of the FOX system vis-a-vis the

French TGV system, and that predicted

for the Amtrak 150-mph trainsets in the

northeast corridor (NEC). (A copy of the

Florida Overland eXpress Risk

Assessment is available for public

review in the docket of this matter,

docket number HST–1.) The analysis set

forth in the risk assessment provides a

fairly extensive discussion of the safety

of TGV high speed rail in France, and

the numbers indicate an admirable

safety record.

The risk assessment divides the

analysis of the TGV system into two

categories: those that are exclusive high

speed lines, which include in-cab

signaling, and passenger stations

designed to service only high speed

trains; and those that consist of a mixed

high speed/conventional system in

which high speed trains service

conventional passenger stations, and

use conventional trackside signaling.

For the most part, the risk assessment

deals with incidents that occurred

between January 1, 1990 and June 30,

1996. The numbers are limited to post1989 data because the Societe Nationale

des Chemins de Fer Francais (SNCF),

the quasi-governmental agency in

France that oversees and operates TGV,

does not have computerized records

concerning events prior to 1990.

It is important to note that the

accident figures discussed below

occurred in a system that maintains

high traffic density and passenger

service: train-miles for this period

totaled 204 million for all TGV service

and 111 million for the exclusive high

speed lines; passenger-miles on the high

speed lines totaled 43,316,000; and the

number of passengers served on TGV

trains totaled 249,696. The TGV system

operates at a maximum speed of 186

mph and runs approximately 184 trains

per day.

On the exclusive high speed lines,

only thirteen incidents have been

recorded from January 1, 1990 through

June 30, 1996. There have been no

fatalities and no collisions between

trains during this period. Of the thirteen

recorded incidents, only three resulted

in passenger injury. The first incident

that caused injury did not involve

casualties on board a TGV trainset. This

incident, which caused 27 of the 30

total injuries, occurred when passengers

waiting on a loading platform were

sprayed with ballast that was kicked up

by a derailed truck. The truck in this

incident derailed due to a wheel slide

failure that resulted in a flat wheel. The

second incident that resulted in casualty

involved two passengers who were

slightly injured when a trainset

derailed. The derailment occurred while

traveling at 150 mph, due to track

subsidence that was caused by heavy

rains and a previously unknown World

War I trench. The third event, in which

one passenger was injured, was caused

by human error. Fasteners were

incorrectly tightened after a

maintenance procedure, which caused a

fairing to fall and break a window in a

passenger coach.

The remaining ten incidents on the

exclusive high speed lines did not

involve passenger injuries. Five of the

incidents recorded involved trainsets

that struck an animal in the right-ofway. Two of the incidents consisted of

fire on moving equipment: In one event

the fire was located in the baggage

compartment, cause unknown; and in

the other it was located in the rear

locomotive, due to rolling stock failure.

Two of the thirteen incidents involved

the operation of the passenger

compartment doors. In one of these

events, a trainset door opened and was

pulled away by the force of the wind

while the conductor was checking an air

leak, and in the second event a

passenger compartment door opened

while the train was moving, due to

rolling stock failure. Finally, in the last

incident a trainset hit concrete covers of

electrical cable conduits, which was

attributed to vandalism.

In the second category, which

includes all mixed high speed/
65480 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

conventional lines, eight incidents have

been recorded from January 1, 1990 to

June 30, 1996. In this group of

accidents, two fatalities occurred. The

first involved a passenger who boarded

the trainset, and then subsequently

disembarked after departure was

underway, and fell under the train. The

second fatality occurred when a

conductor attempted to board after train

departure and fell between the train and

platform. In another incident reported

in this group, ten injuries occurred

when a high speed trainset passed an

absolute stop signal during a switching

movement and hit a local train. The

injuries occurred on the local,

conventional train. In the final incident

which involved injuries, a passenger

standing on a platform was injured

when a shock absorber between two

passenger cars broke and kicked up

ballast.

The remaining four incidents on the

mixed lines occurred due to human

error. In two instances, the locomotive

engineer forgot to apply an

immobilization brake after a switching

movement, and in each case the trainset

slowly hit another rail car. In one case,

an engineer was distracted by another

individual in the cab and released the

brakes. The trainset slowly hit a

bumper. In the last incident, a trainset

rolled from a rolling stock repair facility

unattended and hit a loading ramp.

Prior to 1990, one significant accident

involving TGV equipment is noted, in

which two fatalities and forty-four

injuries occurred. A highway vehicle at

a public grade crossing entered the

railroad right-of-way and was struck by

a TGV trainset. The TGV engineer and

a passenger were killed and forty-four

people were injured. (It is important to

note here that the FOX high speed rail

system will not contain any public

grade crossings.) A second event is

noted in the risk assessment concerning

a terrorist attack in 1983 in which

fatalities occurred, but no description of

the incident is provided.

In summary, four fatalities have

occurred on the TGV system from 1981

through June 1996, and none of these

occurred on the exclusive high speed

lines. FRA and, undoubtedly, the SNCF

believe that any loss of life is one too

many. However, given the traffic

density, speed of travel, and passenger

load that the TGV system supports,

these figures are exceptional. The risk

assessment calculates a TGV passenger

risk of less than 0.99 per billion

passenger-miles traveled.

It is difficult to make many

meaningful comparisons between the

French TGV system and existing

passenger service in the United States

because the operating environment,

technology, data collection, and

equipment differ in a variety of ways.

However, the risk assessment computes

fatality rates based on available

information for the TGV system in

France and the NEC, and those rates

provide some context to the accident

data. According to the risk assessment,

the normalized passenger risk

calculated in per billion passenger-miles

for the TGV system in France is 5.9% of

that for the 1994 NEC.

FRA understands that differences of

opinion may exist concerning

methodology or conclusions reached in

the FOX/FDOT risk assessment.

Moreover, as explained below, FRA’s

safety determinations about the FOX

system are based on its own careful

analysis of the proposed system and the

existing French system. However, the

Agency believes the document presents

useful data concerning the general

safety of the French TGV system.

FRA, in conjunction with the Volpe

National Transportation Systems Center

(Volpe), has studied the French TGV

system extensively. FRA and Volpe

technical staff visited France and

Belgium in order to examine the TGV

system in operation, to review the signal

system testing as it is conducted, and to

pose questions to representatives of the

SNCF concerning details of the system.

FRA and Volpe staff visited a

manufacturing plant in eastern France

where the equipment is constructed,

and met with the plant’s staff to discuss

equipment design, crashworthiness,

operating characteristics, and

construction. FRA and Volpe staff

visited a central train dispatching

center, and studied the practices and

required procedures that train

dispatchers follow to prevent train

collisions. FRA and Volpe staff spent

several days at the signal system test

track in Belgium to review the test

procedures and test results with SNCF

personnel. In addition, FRA has

maintained communications with

personnel at the test site to follow the

progress of the signal testing as it

proceeds.

FRA and Volpe staff visited a TGV

repair facility in order to analyze the

existing facility design, and employee

practices at repair facilities generally. At

the repair site, Agency staff received

training from SNCF personnel on the

operation of the major components of

the TGV rolling stock, and the

inspection and maintenance frequencies

that have been established over time by

the SNCF.

Agency and Volpe staff met with

representatives of the French

government and the SNCF in a series of

meetings, and discussed a variety of

questions concerning governmental

oversight of the TGV operation, annual

safety reviews, the process by which the

SNCF revises the TGV system safety

plan, personnel qualifications, operating

rules, track maintenance and repair, and

the development of new equipment.

Personnel from Volpe have studied

and prepared reports on the French

TGV, which not only provide a broad

overview of the system, but also

examine individual components and

operating practices of the system. This,

in combination with Volpe’s broad

expertise in the area of high speed rail

systems generally, aided the FRA team

to make effective and rapid comparisons

and assessments of the relative safety of

all aspects of the French TGV as the

comprehensive review proceeded.

Based on its own review of all of the

information received, FRA possesses a

high level of confidence in the safety of

many of the major elements of the

French system that will be duplicated in

Florida.

Safety Characteristics of the FOX

System

The FOX system planned for

development in Florida contains safety

features that do not exist on the TGV

system in France, and so presumably,

FOX has the potential to surpass the

level of safety that exists on the TGV

high speed lines. The primary

improvements include lower traffic

density, no opportunity for mixed

traffic, an expanded intrusion protection

system, fewer underpasses and

overpasses, an advanced technology

signal system, and the addition of

protective station platform doors. In

addition, the FOX system includes

several attributes that do not exist on

passenger lines in the U.S., which are

discussed below, that should also

enhance the overall safety of the

program.

The traffic density will be lower in

Florida than that of the TGV system in

France. FOX anticipates operating a

maximum of eighteen trains per day in

the first two years of operation, at a rate

of approximately one train every thirty

minutes. FOX plans to increase the

number to twenty-six per day afterward.

In France, approximately 184 TGV

trains run per day. Traffic density has

generally been associated with train

accidents and incidents, and can impact

the likelihood and severity of train

accidents. The expanded train departure

intervals on FOX are expected to reduce

the risk of one train overtaking another

or train-to-train collisions.

FOX will operate over a dedicated

right-of-way that will not include freight
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65481

traffic or other types of passenger

equipment. The high speed track in

France is connected directly to

conventional lines and so the risk of

freight penetrating the high speed tracks

exists. In Florida, the track will not be

connected to rail lines that carry freight

traffic. The only freight equipment that

will be permitted on the FOX system is

that involved in FOX maintenance or

rescue operations. This is a significant

factor that will eliminate or reduce a

variety of risks. First, the likelihood of

a freight-to-passenger trainset collision,

and the high casualty rates that would

accompany such a collision, will be

nearly eliminated. Second, the absence

of freight traffic will minimize track

degradation that occurs with the

transport of heavy loads, which in turn

will reduce the risk of track defects that

cause train derailments. Finally, train

dispatchers will not manage districts

that carry mixed passenger and freight

loads, and so the stress and confusion

that may result from freight and

passenger route scheduling will be

eliminated.

There will no public at-grade

crossings on the FOX system, and so the

risk of a highway-rail grade crossing

accident will be eliminated. There are

no public at-grade crossings on the TGV

high speed lines in France, but

highway-rail grade crossings are

prevalent on the U.S. rail system, and

account for many human injuries and

fatalities. This aspect of the FOX system

greatly reduces the risk of casualties to

railroad employees, passengers, and

road travelers along the FOX right-ofway.

FOX will install fencing that runs the

length of the right-of-way to restrict

unauthorized entry, which should

minimize the risk of accidents involving

trespassers and animals. In addition, the

FOX system will include detection

systems for intrusion, high wind, flood

conditions, and rolling stock that

contains dragging equipment. These

detection systems will be connected to

the signal system, and will notify the

main dispatching center when

hazardous events occur. Some of these

features do not exist on the French TGV,

and most do not currently exist on

American railroads. It is expected that

they will enhance safety for the FOX

system.

The French TGV operates over a

system that includes 490 overpasses and

676 underpasses. Current plans for FOX

indicate that there will be

approximately 100 overpasses and 60

underpasses. In addition, there will be

no moveable bridges on the Florida

system, structures that, like overpasses

and underpasses, tend to increase the

need for maintenance and the risk of

incident.

FOX will utilize a new signal and

train control system that is not currently

in revenue service anywhere in the

world. Trainsets in Belgium are testing

the system, which is a form of Positive

Train Control (PTC), and it is

anticipated that before FOX commences

revenue operations, the system will be

certified and in use in Europe. Although

FRA and others familiar with the system

generally believe that this new variety of

signaling will increase railroad safety,

there may be some risk associated with

the introduction of this new component

to an operative railroad system. The risk

assessment prepared for FOX and FDOT

does not address this factor. However,

FRA believes that this item deserves

significant attention, given the

ramifications of a signal system failure

on high speed passenger lines. This

issue deserves particular concern in

Florida because of the significant risk

that exists there of extreme weather

conditions, i.e., lightning strikes,

hurricanes, and flooding which could

require relatively frequent exercise of

the safety-critical features of this signal

system. As the risk assessment notes,

these are conditions that do not exist in

France. FRA must be very cautious in

establishing standards for a system that

has not been used in revenue service,

and that will be expected to function

without fail in a location where

catastrophic weather conditions are not

rare. Therefore, FRA proposes as a

requirement in this NPRM, a process in

which an independent entity with

proven technical expertise will conduct

a review of the safety of the safetycritical hardware and software

microprocessor-based elements of the

signal system, which will be submitted

to FRA. The proposed standards include

a brief acceptance procedure that would

follow this submission and precede

implementation of the signal system as

finally configured. FRA anticipates that

this sort of process will accompany

certification of the system in Europe,

which will likely predate FOX

operations. Given the risks presented by

a signaling failure on a passenger line

traveling at speeds of 200 mph, the

Agency believes it is necessary to

implement standards that formalize

such a peer review process for FOX in

this country. This is very similar to

procedures that FRA has required other

entities to follow concerning signal

systems. However, FRA invites

comment on this and all other proposals

set forth in the NPRM from interested

and expert parties, particularly as to the

criteria that should be addressed in the

peer review, or other avenues of

achieving the same end.

Although FRA does not currently

enforce safety standards concerning

passenger stations, it is important to

note that the FOX system will include

protective doors on the station platforms

to prevent the risk of injury from loose

equipment or flying debris. As the TGV

safety record discussed above points

out, passengers waiting to board face the

risk of injury unless shielded by the sort

of protection that will be included in

the FOX system.

There are certain advantages to

building this new railroad system,

particularly relating to roadbed and

infrastructure, that accrue simply

because construction will be designed to

suit all components of the system. For

instance, the right-of-way may be

selected to suit the needs of the track

and signaling system. Track curves will

be minimized during track layout and

designed to accommodate speeds in

excess of the maximum revenue service

speed of 200 mph. However, it is

important to acknowledge, as the risk

assessment does, that unique system

aspects such as sink holes are an everpresent, potential problem in Florida,

and decrease the safety of the FOX

system unless mitigated. FOX plans to

use geotechnical analysis to look for

indicators of sinkhole activity prior to

installing the track infrastructure. FRA’s

proposal includes a proviso that any

abnormalities which arise in the

construction phase of development

must be recorded, and that all actions

taken in response to the abnormality

must be documented. Also, this hazard

must be accounted for in the FOX

system safety plan, which will be

developed prior to commencing

construction. FRA seeks comment from

interested parties and experts on this

subject to determine other methods for

managing this risk effectively.

There are two other potential areas of

risk that warrant particular attention.

Neither is fully addressed in the FOX/

FDOT risk assessment. The first

involves the increase in TGV speed from

a maximum of 186 mph, which is

currently used in French operations, to

200 mph, which is proposed for Florida

operations. The risk assessment states

that French TGV plans to increase the

operating speed to 200 mph, and a

safety record will have developed in

France prior to FOX operations in

Florida. Unfortunately, FRA finds itself

in the position of writing safety

standards for the system at this juncture,

when the appropriate safety record

concerning these enhanced speeds is

unformed. As is also noted in the risk

assessment, higher train speed tends to
65482 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

increase the severity of accidents. The

FOX system safety plan must address

this issue, but we also seek comment

from interested parties and experts as to

the enhanced risk involved, if any, and

other viable methods of addressing it.

Second, FRA believes that there is a

risk, however intangible, that arises

from moving this European system to a

new culture where the pertinent

institutional knowledge is not abundant

and the role of the government in

supporting operations is quite different.

For instance, rolling stock maintenance

personnel on FOX will be expected to

inspect and maintain equipment using

unfamiliar tools, in dramatically

different repair facilities, on equipment

that utilizes computers to achieve what

is traditionally done in the U.S. by

visual and manual means. No amount of

training can achieve the level of

professional insight that fifteen years of

experience on the equipment would

produce. The risk assessment alludes to

this factor in passing, and seems to

indicate that so long as the TGV

equipment, inspection frequencies, and

procedures are implemented on FOX,

nothing is lost and no risk ensues.

FRA agrees that it is very difficult to

quantify the value of institutional

knowledge in a system as large as the

French TGV or FOX. However, this is

not a factor that the Agency can or

desires to overlook. In discussions with

FRA, FOX and FDOT have indicated

that they plan to bring TGV

professionals into the training,

maintenance, and operation of the

system. However, it is impossible to

know at this point whether or to what

extent that participation will occur, as

revenue operations are not planned to

commence until 2004. A variety of

events may occur between now and

then to make those plans difficult or

impossible to achieve.

Also factored into this issue of risk, is

the knowledge that the TGV has a

different cost accounting structure, in

which the daily safety of the operation

is not compromised by short-term

operating costs and long-term capitol

costs. The SNCF may be able to make

purchases and decisions that a private

entity would be unable to accomplish.

FRA is certain that all reputable

transportation companies have as their

first priority the safety of passengers and

employees. However, the need to be

profitable in a privately financial

context undeniably plays a role in

decision making that on occasion

impacts safety. FRA believes that there

may be a connection between the TGV’s

superb safety record and the degree to

which the system is financially

supported that will not exist on the FOX

system. There is no way of knowing

with certainty whether TGV safety is

due in some measure to its financial

structure. Similarly, there is no way of

ascertaining at this point whether the

loss of comprehensive institutional

knowledge that is bound to occur in

Florida will impact the safety of the

operation. However, FRA believes that

the potential for these safety risks is

sufficient to make preventative

measures sensible.

In this proposal, FRA seeks to address

these concerns with standards that

provide a very high level of safety in

areas where FRA believes French TGV

safety cannot or will not be met in

Florida. FRA anticipates that the

petitioner may object to the imposition

of certain of the proposed standards that

require more than is currently the

practice in France. However, given the

risk factors outlined above, the grave

potential for human loss in the event of

an accident, and the flexibility that is

incorporated into the proposal, FRA

believes at this time that any perceived

burdens are justified.

System Safety

System safety is the cornerstone of the

French TGV, and as proposed in these

standards, the heart of the FOX high

speed rail system. The systems

approach to safety is used pervasively in

a variety of industries to reduce the

likelihood and occurrence of accidents

and injuries. FRA has discussed the

need for this approach to safety in two

recent rulemakings, Passenger Train

Emergency Standards, 62 FR 8330

(February 24, 1996), and Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards, 62 FR

49728 (September 23, 1997). This

concept requires an organization to

identify, evaluate, and reduce or

eliminate safety hazards that exist in

any portion of the organization’s

‘‘system,’’ or may be caused by

interrelationships between various

components of that system, and create a

system safety plan to reflect those

evaluations. Where possible, the

development of a system safety plan

precedes the design, construction, and

operation of the system, so that

potential risks are eliminated at the

earliest possible opportunity. Once in

place, system safety plans are viewed as

living documents, which should be

updated as circumstances change, new

information becomes available, or goals

shift. Therefore, incremental changes

may be made on a daily basis, if

appropriate, to reflect the safety needs

of the organization. Typically, system

safety plans should be formally updated

on an annual basis, in order to maintain

their utility in advancing safety with the

best information available.

The French TGV utilizes a system

safety approach whose primary goal or

philosophy is to avoid collisions. This

varies from an accident-mitigation

philosophy, which seeks to maximize

protection for employees and others at

risk in the event of an accident. The

FOX system, as planned, will operate

under the theory of collision-avoidance.

Examples of this philosophy at work in

the design of the system are: the grade

separated right-of-way that excludes

public at-grade crossings; double track

that will facilitate train movements sideby-side rather than end-to-end; and the

PTC-style signal system that will

prevent trains from being routed on

collision courses, whether meeting or

overtaking.

Subpart B of the NPRM requires FOX

to prepare a system safety plan. For the

most part, these proposed standards

parallel the FOX Petition, and address

every phase and component of the FOX

system. However, FRA’s proposal also

includes the proviso that FOX submit

the system safety plan to FRA for

approval one year after the effective date

of the final rule in this matter, and that

the plan be updated at least annually.

Based on the philosophy of systems

planning, FRA believes that initiating

this process prior to design and

construction is critical to the

development of a complete system

safety plan and a safe high speed rail

system. FRA understands, however, that

this rulemaking proceeding predates

much of the work involved in the

Florida project, and so filing a complete

system safety plan within one year of

the final rule may be difficult. FRA

seeks comment on this proposal,

including suggestions for other methods

of addressing this issue. For instance,

perhaps the standard should impose a

tiered completion date for portions of

the system safety plan. On the other

hand, a tiered system may undermine

the purpose and philosophy of the

system safety approach. FRA would find

it helpful to know exactly when FDOT

and FOX plan to initiate the final

design, based on the specific right-ofway chosen, and the construction of the

system. This information would likely

inform the Agency’s decision on the

appropriate timing for submission of the

system safety plan. It is important to

note, however, that while FRA has not

predetermined the specific outcome of

this issue, the Agency believes in

general terms that a fairly

comprehensive system safety plan

should precede the design and

construction phases of the FOX system.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65483

FRA’s Proposal

FRA has made every attempt in this

NPRM to facilitate the transfer of the

excellence of the French equipment and

operation, by proposing standards that

would permit the TGV equipment and

procedures to operate in the U.S. in the

same fashion as is done in France.

However, in several areas, FRA has gone

beyond or varied from the French

standards and practices where the

Agency believed it necessary to do so in

order to ensure the highest level of

safety. FRA’s proposal includes

requirements, organized in chapters by

subject matter, to address general legal

principles, system safety, signaling,

track, rolling stock, operating practices,

system qualification testing, personnel

qualifications, and power distribution.

In addition, the proposal adopts and

incorporates by reference several

existing regulations that apply generally

to all railroads operating in the U.S.

These are listed specifically in Subpart

A of the NPRM, and constitute areas in

which FOX needs no special treatment.

In other words, for these safety

disciplines, FOX is so similar to the

general railroad industry that no new

standards are necessary. For instance,

FRA’s alcohol and drug regulations

impose no burdens that are inherently

impossible for FOX to meet or that are

inconsistent with the FOX operation,

and so these standards and any future

amendments to them would apply to

FOX.

FRA’s proposal is similar in many

ways to the Petition FOX filed. The FOX

consortium includes entities that have

been involved with the design,

construction, and operation of the TGV

equipment, and so FRA has made every

effort to study their submission and

replicate it in proposed standards where

appropriate. Their assistance in this

rulemaking proceeding is, and will

continue to be, quite informative and

helpful. However, it is important to note

that railroads in the U.S. operate under

a different legal framework than exists

in France, and the differences are

relevant in understanding why FRA

changed some standards in the NPRM

that were not in the Petition.

The French government has issued

laws which broadly call for a safe

railroad system, but which delegate that

responsibility, in large measure, to the

SNCF. Therefore, the SNCF, or TGV

operator, establishes its own safety

parameters and implements them. Each

year, the SNCF files a report with the

government that outlines the safety

record of the previous year, emerging

trends, and proposed changes to the

operation. However, there are no

government-issued regulations that

mandate TGV activities or authorize

enforcement of rules. There is no

relationship equivalent to this in the

U.S. regulatory or transportation system.

There are political, legal, cultural, and

financial differences at work here, and

the result is that the FOX Petition

omitted some internal SNCF guidelines

that FRA believes would or should be

regulations in the U.S. system. For

instance, some of the FOX supplemental

materials include a list of rolling stock

components that are inspected at

specified intervals in France. These

intervals and items developed internally

at SNCF over years of operational

experience. Although FOX has

expressed the intention to follow the

SNCF internal guidelines in Florida,

FRA believes that these guidelines

should be part of the minimum Federal

standards for the FOX system. Similarly,

FRA has included a proviso in the

Operating Practices Subpart that

requires FRA approval of the FOX

safety-critical operating rules prior to

commencing operations. This was not

part of the Petition, but FRA proposes

it in the interest of ensuring that the

internal, and at this time, undisclosed,

SNCF–TGV operating rules will be

followed on FOX. FRA values the

internal guidelines that have developed

in France over many areas, believes that

they may be equivalent to U.S. Federal

safety standards, and desires to

incorporate them into the minimum

Federal standards.

In addition to the reasons discussed

above, the NPRM takes a different

approach on some issues from that

found in the Petition, based on the

regulatory program that exists in this

country, which has governed railroad

operations for decades. FRA has a

mandate to devise standards that protect

the public, have a rational basis, and do

not impose needless cost. FRA’s existing

regulatory program achieves these goals,

and therefore, it would be unwise to

vary from it greatly unless the subject

matter requires a substantially different

treatment given the nature of the FOX

system. If FRA were to stray

significantly from the existing U.S.

safety standards in this proceeding,

despite the fact that it will only apply

to FOX, serious questions might be

raised concerning the appropriateness of

this proposal.

It is important to note that this

proposal and many individual standards

in it would be inappropriate for any

other U.S. passenger or freight

operation. The safety features of the

FOX system, taken as a whole, do not

exist in combination on any other

railroad in this country. This

uniqueness is the basis on which the

proposal is made, and the treatment of

any specific issue here should not be

viewed as a regulatory trend for

passenger operations generally. In this

proposal, FRA has relied to a great

extent on the operating environment in

which FOX will exist, and unless that

environment is duplicated in identical

fashion elsewhere, these standards

would not be suitable.

FRA believes that this proposal

includes a reasonable and effective

blend of proven practices and

procedures from both the French TGV

system and American railroading.

However, with publication of this

NPRM, FRA invites comment from all

interested parties on each standard

proposed. FRA requests comments on

whether less or more permissive

standards should be adopted, with

supporting rationale; whether

inspection frequencies should be

increased or decreased, or are sufficient

as written, with supporting rationale;

whether FRA should widen or narrow

the scope of subject matters covered by

standards for the FOX system, and the

reasons for such a change; whether FRA

has assessed accurately the safety of

French TGV and the risks that may arise

on the FOX system in Florida; and any

other areas that commenters deem

necessary in order to produce final

safety standards that are effective.

* * * * *

Section-by-Section Analysis

Subpart A—General Requirements

Section 243.1 Purpose and Scope

Paragraph (a) states that the purpose

of this proposal is to prevent accidents,

injuries, and property damage that

could result from operation of FOX, or

‘‘Railroad,’’ as the system is called

throughout the rule text. Also, this

section explains that the scope of the

Part is to provide minimum Federal

safety standards for the Railroad. The

Railroad may adopt more stringent

requirements so long as they are not

inconsistent with this rule.

Section 243.3 Applicability

Paragraph (a) of this section explains

that this Part would apply only to the

FOX system in Florida, and not to any

other railroad operating in the U.S.

Also, this paragraph restricts the FOX

operation to the specific boundaries that

are described in the system description,

§ 243.13 of the rule, unless FOX obtains

prior approval from FRA. Therefore, if

FOX desires to build a new line in the

future, the Railroad would have to

receive FRA approval prior to

commencing operations on that line.
65484 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(The term ‘‘approval’’ is used loosely

here. Conceivably, FOX could file a

Petition for Rulemaking amending the

system description to include the new

line, and FRA’s issuance of the new

section would achieve the desired

result.) FRA believes that such approval

would be necessary to ensure that the

new line meets all of the appropriate

standards that exist in this Part. For

instance, there could be no grade

crossings or mixed traffic on the line.

The TGV equipment is structurally

different than passenger equipment

currently in use in this country, and

would not respond to a collision with a

freight train in the same manner. The

standards in this proposal permit 200

mph travel with this equipment because

of the other operating conditions that

exist on FOX, and FRA must ensure that

those conditions also exist on any new

lines that develop. Paragraph (a) reflects

the fact that the standards in this

proposed rule of particular applicability

are appropriate for the FOX system only

when all of the system elements are

present; the systems approach demands

this result. If an integral portion of the

system disappears, all of the standards

would have to be reevaluated.

Paragraph (b) of this section states

that Part 243, rather than the general

safety standards currently found in Title

49 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR), would govern the FOX system.

However, in recognition of the fact that

the FOX system is similar or identical

to conventional railroad operations in

certain areas, this paragraph also states

that some of the general standards,

which are adopted and incorporated in

paragraph (c), shall apply to FOX.

Paragraphs (b) and (c) work in

conjunction with one another, so that

the two taken as a whole constitute all

of the railroad safety regulations that

would apply to FOX at this time.

Therefore, any regulations found in

Title 49 of the CFR that have not been

adopted and incorporated in paragraph

(c) do not apply to FOX.

Paragraph (c) of this section lists the

general railroad safety standards found

in Title 49 of the CFR that apply to the

FOX system. The subject areas are: Part

209, Safety Enforcement Procedures;

Part 210, Railroad Noise Emission

Compliance Regulations; Part 211, Rules

of Practice; Part 212, State Safety

Participation Regulations; Part 214,

Railroad Workplace Safety; Part 216,

Special Notice and Emergency Order

Procedures; Part 218, Railroad

Operating Practices; Part 219, Control of

Alcohol and Drug Use; Part 220, Radio

Standards and Procedures; Part 225,

Railroad Accidents/Incidents: Reports,

Classification, and Investigations; Part

228, Hours of Service of Railroad

Employees; § 135 of Part 229, Event

Recorders; Part 235, except § 235.7,

Instructions Governing Applications for

Approval of a Discontinuance or

Material Modification of a Signal

System or Relief from the Requirements

of Part 236; Part 240, except §§ 240.227

and 240.229, Qualification and

Certification of Locomotive Engineers;

Part 215, Railroad Freight Car

Standards, Part 229, Railroad

Locomotive Safety Standards, Part 232,

Locomotive Inspection, Part 231,

Railroad Safety Appliance Standards,

and Part 232, Railroad Power Brakes

and Drawbars shall all apply to the FOX

conventional equipment; and FRA’s

proposed Passenger Train Emergency

Standards, which will be codified when

finalized in 49 CFR Part 239. Because

these standards are suitable to apply to

the FOX system as they are currently

written, FRA is adopting and

incorporating them to avoid massive

reprinting. As has been stated earlier in

this proposal, each of these standards

address safety issues in a manner that is

consistent with the FOX operation.

While the relevance to FOX of most

of the incorporated rules is clear, the

relevance of some CFR parts and the

reasons that some sections are

specifically not adopted requires some

discussion. First, 49 CFR 235.7 of the

signal modification standards permits a

railroad to forego filing an application

for approval concerning certain signal

modifications. FRA believes that the

more prudent approach would be to

require FOX to apply for any

modifications of its signal system for

several reasons. The system FOX plans

to utilize does not possess a long

revenue service safety history for which

future events are predictable. As

planned, the system will carry

thousands of passengers each year, and

the cost in human lives for a signal

failure could be catastrophic. FRA

believes that these factors point to the

need for Federal oversight concerning

any modification of the FOX signal

system. Accordingly, 49 CFR 235.7 will

not apply to FOX. Instead, any

modification of the Railroad’s signal

system must be accounted for in the

system safety plan and be done

cautiously in order to enhance the

integrity of the system safety approach.

Second, the Petition did not include

Part 240 in the list of regulations to be

incorporated by reference in this rule.

As FRA understands it, FOX plans to

identify the personnel who will operate

the power cars on the system as

‘‘enginemen’’ and so they object to Part

240 and its pervasive use of the term

‘‘locomotive engineer.’’ FRA chose this

term in Part 240 for a variety of reasons,

none of which relate to the gender,

union status, or other extraneous

background details of the in-cab

personnel who direct locomotive

movements. The term is a functional

distinction that applies to the

performance of a locomotive engineer,

power car driver, or engineman.

Therefore, FRA finds no merit in

reissuing Part 240 in this proceeding in

order to change the title of a cadre of

employees. FRA has no interest in

mandating the use of any occupational

title on any railroad. However, the

Agency does have an interest in and

obligation to use language that is

gender-neutral and consistent with

existing terminology, to the fullest

extent possible.

It is also important to note that FRA’s

proposal does not incorporate 49 CFR

240.227 and 49 CFR 240.229 for

application to FOX. These sections

relate to joint operations with Canadian

railroads, and with other railroads in the

U.S. Neither of these scenarios can

occur on the FOX system for reasons of

geography and more importantly, safety,

and therefore, it is important to exclude

these sections explicitly from

application to FOX.

Third, FRA’s proposal includes the

adoption of several existing standards

that govern the maintenance,

inspection, and operation of

conventional freight equipment (Parts

215, 229, 230, 231, and 232). FRA

believes that these requirements must be

included here in order to protect

employees and the public in instances

where conventional equipment must be

used on the FOX operation. As FRA

understands it, FOX will likely have in

its fleet conventional railroad

equipment to facilitate maintenance and

rescue operations in yards and along the

right-of-way. FRA believes that where

these limited operations arise, the

existing safety standards should apply.

There is nothing in the Petition or

background information concerning

FOX that would make application of

these standards inappropriate or

deleterious to safety. Moreover, the

employees involved with the movement

of conventional equipment must possess

all of the protections that accompany

conventional operations on other

properties.

Fourth, FRA has adopted safety

standards relating to emergency

preparedness for application on the

FOX network. FRA does not understand

FOX to object to imposition of these

standards, but because they were in

proposed, rather than final, form at the

time of Petition filing, FOX did not list

them among the standards incorporated.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65485

In this proposal, FRA adopts the

emergency preparedness standards as

proposed at this time, and ultimately as

they appear in final form. FRA

anticipates that these standards will be

finalized in the very near future and

codified at 49 CFR part 239.

Finally, FOX expressed the desire to

adopt and incorporate by reference the

existing general safety standards

without also adopting future

amendments to these standards. FRA

does not agree with this approach to the

general safety standards. By their very

nature, these standards address subject

matters that present no need for special

treatment on FOX. Following this logic

to its natural conclusion, FRA presumes

that amendments to these same subject

matters will not present the need for

special proceedings or considerations

for FOX. If proposed amendments give

rise to safety concerns on the FOX

system, FOX will have every

opportunity, as a vital and responsible

member of the U.S. railroad system, to

provide comments in the normal course

of regulatory process in those areas.

Paragraph (d) states that FOX is a

railroad, pursuant to the definition set

forth by statute, which includes, in

pertinent part ‘‘high speed ground

transportation systems that connect

metropolitan areas, without regard to

whether those systems use new

technologies not associated with

traditional railroads * * *’’ Therefore,

all of the railroad safety statutes

(including those pertaining to hours of

service) apply to FOX, except portions

of the former Safety Appliance Acts,

from which FRA proposes that FOX be

exempted due to the advanced

technology in use that makes those

requirements unnecessary. (The issue of

new technology and safety appliances is

discussed in detail in the analysis of

§ 243.15 below.)

Paragraph (e) states that the

measurement values provided in the

rule are in metric form, which is due to

the fact that the TGV equipment was

designed abroad according to metric

standards. The NPRM includes the U.S.

equivalent to provide an adequate frame

of reference for interested parties. FRA

has some concern that the American

workforce, which maintains and

inspects conventional railroad

equipment using tools and

measurements in U.S. standard values,

may experience a period of adjustment

in converting to the metric system. The

FOX personnel qualification program,

set forth in Subpart H, must address this

potential safety factor.

Section 243.5 Definitions

As a general rule of regulatory

construction, definitions provide clarity

and understanding to the reader.

Definitions should not include legal

requirements, and should not somehow

hide the true meaning of a standard.

FRA’s proposal makes changes to many

definitions that were provided in the

Petition where those definitions were

unclear, contained legal requirements,

or limited the scope of a standard’s

application. In addition, FRA has added

to the list of definitions included in the

Petition where necessary, and deleted

those that involved terms not used in

the proposed standards.

Most of the definitions included in

this section have been published in

other rulemaking proceedings, or have

straightforward meaning, and so

additional discussion on them is

unnecessary. However, a few terms

should be explained.

FRA would like to emphasize that the

term ‘‘employee’’ used throughout the

proposed rule includes Railroad

employees, as well as the employees of

contractors engaged by the Railroad.

Therefore, contractors must comply

with the requirements of the rule, and

FOX may not avoid the Railroad’s

compliance with the standards through

the use of contracting entities.

The terms ‘‘in passenger service’’ and

‘‘in revenue service’’ have identical

meaning, and include all trains,

trainsets, and passenger equipment that

are carrying or are available to carry

passengers. The determination as to

whether a fare has been paid is not

relevant to establishing the status of the

equipment. The term ‘‘in service’’

includes equipment that is in revenue or

passenger service, as well as other

passenger equipment, unless the

equipment falls into one of three

categories: it is being handled as

defective under § 243.15 of the proposal;

or it is in a repair shop or repair track;

or it is on a storage track without

passengers. Generally, the Railroad will

be subject to civil penalty for any

equipment that is ‘‘in service’’ in

noncomplying condition.

The term ‘‘power car’’ refers to a type

of locomotive used on the TGV system

that is typically positioned at the

beginning and end of a passenger

trainset. Power cars contain a cab in

which the locomotive engineer controls

the train’s movement. As proposed for

FOX, every passenger trainset will

contain a power car at each end with

eight trailer cars between them. FOX

proposed a definition that would have

set power cars apart from locomotives,

but FRA finds no reason to define the

term in that way. Also, it is important

to note that the power cars and trailer

cars are articulated and connected in

such a way as to resist buckling in the

event of a derailment. The term ‘‘semipermanent connectors’’ describes the

connections that exist among and

between the trailer and power cars of a

TGV trainset. These connections are

significantly different from couplers that

exist on conventional equipment. These

connections are designed so that they

may be disconnected only by use of

special tools, and only in repair

facilities. Because of this design,

employees will not be involved in

coupling or uncoupling at locations

where they would face the risk of injury

that arises from working between rail

equipment. Conventional couplers will

only be present on the leading or

trailing ends of each trainset, and will

be used primarily for attachment during

rescue operations. Section 243.431 of

the proposal sets forth the requirements

that govern the use of conventional

couplers and semi-permanent

connectors.

FRA has revised the speed definitions

that the Petition contained. Many of the

definitions appeared to be circular in

their use of terminology and so would

not provide sufficient clarity and notice

to the public. As FRA understands it,

some of the speed definitions would be

pertinent to a matrix that will be

developed for use in the system safety

plan, concerning train speed and

braking capacity. Until such chart

exists, the definitions serve no purpose

and may ultimately be erroneous or

inconsistent with the signal system.

Therefore, FRA proposes a simplified

approach. ‘‘Maximum authorized

speed’’ is defined as the maximum

speed at which trains may operate

safely, taking into account all right-ofway, rolling stock, weather, and other

operating conditions. ‘‘Maximum

revenue service speed’’ is 200 mph,

which cannot be exceeded under any

circumstance. ‘‘Maximum safe operating

speed’’ is the maximum speed at which

braking can occur without damage to

the discs or wheels. ‘‘Slow speed’’ is

any speed less than 20 mph, and

‘‘restricted speed’’ is a speed that is less

than 20 mph that will facilitate stopping

within half the range of vision of the

locomotive engineer.

FRA requests comments on these

changes to the FOX proposed

definitions, as well as all definitions

proposed in this NPRM. FRA also

requests comment on whether

additional definitions should be

provided in the rule text that FRA may

have overlooked in preparing this

proposal.
65486 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Section 243.7 Responsibility for

Compliance

This section sets forth the compliance

and liability requirements that will

govern FOX operations. Paragraph (a)

proposes that the Railroad will be

strictly liable for all violations of the

standards set forth in this rule, except

where equipment is not ‘‘in use’’ or with

respect to violations of the track

standards. To establish a violation of the

equipment standards, FRA must

demonstrate that the equipment was in

use, but need not demonstrate any level

of knowledge on the part of the Railroad

or other violator. To establish a

violation of the track standards, FRA

must show a failure to exercise

reasonable care.

Paragraph (b) states that passenger

equipment will be considered ‘‘in use’’

before a train has departed, but after the

equipment has received or should have

received the appropriate inspection.

This proposal mirrors the approach

taken in FRA’s proposed rule on

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards.

62 FR 49728, 49756. The result of this

language is that FRA need not wait for

a train to depart a terminal before

issuing a citation for a defective

condition. FRA believes that this

authority is consistent with the purpose

of our safety program—to reduce

railroad accidents and injuries, and is

prudent in its application to FOX.

Paragraph (c) states that this rule is

applicable to the Railroad and to any

person performing functions required by

the rule. Although the proposal

expresses the duties imposed by the rule

in terms of the Railroad, FRA wishes to

make clear that any person who

performs on behalf of the Railroad an

action that is covered by the proposed

rule is required to perform that action in

the same manner as required of the

Railroad.

Paragraph (d) relates to track and

states that the Railroad operator is

responsible for compliance with all

track safety provisions set forth in

Subpart D of the proposal. FRA

proposes this language to avoid any

questions of track ownership, which are

particularly important here because

FRA does not know at this juncture

which entity will purchase and own the

right-of-way to be used for the FOX

system. This language is different from

the approach taken in 49 CFR part 213,

FRA’s existing track standards, which

permit an owner to assign responsibility

for operation of the track system to

another entity. FRA obviates the need

for the assignment process set forth in

49 CFR 213.5 by proposing that the

Railroad operator, rather than the rightof-way owner, shall be responsible for

track safety requirements.

When the Railroad operator has

knowledge, or a reasonable person

exercising reasonable care would have

knowledge, that the track does not

comply with the regulations, the

Railroad operator has four options: it

may bring the track into compliance; it

may halt operations over the track; it

may continue operations over the

noncomplying track at 10 mph, for 30

days, under the authority of qualified

personnel; or it may operate under the

operational limits established for track

classes 1–5, as set forth in 49 CFR part

213.

The Petition did not provide this level

of flexibility for operations when track

noncompliance occurs, and on occasion

was silent or unclear concerning

ameliorative action. For instance, the

Petition called for ‘‘immediate remedial

action’’ for some defects, but failed to

specify the required actions. Also, the

Petition established time periods for

certain defects, in which conditions

could go uncorrected. FRA believes that

the options established in this section

greatly enhance safety, provide clarity,

and increase flexibility for the Railroad.

There must be some provision in the

standards for moving equipment that

carries passengers to their final

destination when a noncomplying event

occurs on the Railroad track. FRA

prefers to include these options rather

than dictate one response, in order to

allow the Railroad to choose the best

alternative, given the existing operating

conditions. This proposed section grants

the Railroad broader and more

comprehensive alternatives than were

included in the Petition. FOX has stated

that the French TGV track rarely reaches

the condition that would warrant any of

the measures discussed here. FRA is

hopeful that will also be the case in

Florida, but the Agency must provide a

rational and safe response in the event

of noncomplying track conditions.

Section 243.9 Enforcement

This section describes the civil

penalties that FRA may impose on any

person, including the Railroad or an

independent contractor providing goods

or services to the Railroad, that violates

any requirement of this rule. These

penalty provisions parallel the civil

penalty provisions in numerous other

railroad safety regulations, and are

authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301, 21302,

21303, and 21304. Any person who

violates a requirement of this rule may

be subject to a penalty of $500 to

$10,000 per violation. Individuals may

be subject to penalties for willful

violations only. Where a pattern of

repeated violations, or a grossly

negligent violation creates an imminent

hazard of death or injury, or causes

death or injury, penalties of up to

$20,000 may be assessed. In addition,

each day a violation continues

constitutes a separate offense. Finally, a

person may be subject to criminal

penalties under 49 U.S.C. 21311 for

knowingly and willfully falsifying

reports required by these regulations.

FRA believes that inclusion of the

penalty provisions is important in

ensuring that compliance is achieved.

The final rule will include a schedule

of civil penalties as Appendix A.

Penalty schedules are considered

statements of agency policy, and so

notice and comment are not required

prior to their issuance. See 5 U.S.C.

553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, FRA invites

comment on proposed penalty amounts.

Section 243.11 Preemptive Effect

This section informs the public as to

FRA’s views regarding what will be the

preemptive effect of the final rule in this

proceeding. The presence or absence of

this does not, in itself, affect the

preemptive effect of a final rule, but it

does inform the public concerning the

statutory provision which governs the

preemptive effect of a rule. Section

20106 of title 49 of the United States

Code provides that all regulations

prescribed by the Secretary relating to

railroad safety preempt any State law,

regulation, or order covering the same

subject matter, except a provision

necessary to eliminate or reduce an

essentially local safety hazard that is not

incompatible with a Federal law,

regulation, or order and that does not

unreasonably burden interstate

commerce. With the exception of a

provision directed at an essentially local

safety hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 will

preempt any State regulatory agency

rule covering the same subject matter as

the regulations proposed today when

issued as final rules.

Section 243.13 System Description

This section describes the FOX

system components. In addition, and

more importantly, this provision

requires FOX to include all of the

elements and practices listed in this

section when revenue operations begin.

FRA has determined that the items

discussed in this section are so integral

to the overall safety of the FOX program,

that all standards contained in this

NPRM would have to be reevaluated if

FOX failed to include, construct, or

meet any of these system elements.

FRA’s existing regulatory program

does not include this sort of

requirement in any other safety
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65487

discipline or context. However, due to

the nature of the system safety,

accident-avoidance philosophy that

FOX has adopted in the design of the

system, which FRA reflects in the

proposed standards, FRA believes that it

is necessary to include these

requirements. It is important to note

here that many of the standards

proposed for FOX, if adopted separately,

might lead to unsafe conditions in other

operating environments. In fact, many of

these standards would be wholly

inappropriate on other railroads in this

country where the full panoply of

accident-avoidant measures are not also

present. Therefore, FRA must ensure

that the key system elements of this

operating environment, on which all of

the standards are ultimately based,

remain in the system as finally

configured. FRA’s enforcement

authority extends to this section as it

does to all others in the rule, and the

Railroad’s failure to meet any condition

specified in this section will be subject

to civil penalty or other appropriate

remedy. The FOX Petition contained a

system description section, and it

included most of the components

enumerated here in FRA’s proposal.

However, FRA has deleted some

unnecessary detail, and added a few

proposals that were not contemplated

by the Petition.

Paragraph (a) sets forth the general

parameters of the FOX system.

Paragraph (a)(1) establishes the

geographic limits of the system, which

are Miami to Tampa via Orlando.

Operations beyond these limits are

prohibited without prior FRA approval.

FRA believes that it is extremely

important to restrict the high speed

operations to the right-of-way that is

known at this time. For instance, if the

Railroad chooses to expand its operation

to cover track that includes freight

traffic or grade crossings, many of the

safety standards in this proposal would

not adequately protect passengers. If

FOX decides to increase the boundaries

of the system, that should be

accomplished through a thoughtful,

methodical process that includes FRA

oversight and public comment. FOX

may accomplish this by filing a petition

for rulemaking to develop new

standards, or a petition to amend this

section of the rule, if adopted in this

form in the final standard in this

proceeding.

Paragraph (a)(2) states that trains may

not under any circumstance exceed a

speed of 200 mph, and that the Railroad

must operate at all times in accordance

with the requirements of the rule. This

language is meant to cover those

situations in which conditions warrant

certain speeds that may not be at or near

200 mph. For instance, if severe weather

causes flooding or high wind, the FOX

operating rules would require

significant speed restrictions. This

language makes clear that FOX must

adhere to the speed restrictions,

regardless of the maximum system

capability of 200 mph.

Paragraph (a)(3) prohibits the

transport of any hazardous material on

the FOX high speed rail system.

Although the Petition did not contain

this restriction, FRA believes that safety

demands it. An accident involving

passengers at high speed would be

catastrophic alone; adding hazardous

materials to the mix would greatly

reduce safety for the passengers, the

surrounding environment, and local

residents.

Paragraph (a)(4) prohibits smoking on

trains while they are used in passenger

service. FRA believes that fire safety is

a key component for any passenger

operation, and by prohibiting smoking,

the potential for fire in passenger

compartments is greatly reduced. In

other sections of this proposal, FRA

requires passenger equipment to include

flame-retardant materials and fire

detection systems, and FRA believes

that all requirements are necessary to

protect the public from fire hazards on

passenger trains. Flame-retardent

materials and detection systems greatly

minimize the risk of injury due to fire

and smoke inhalation. A ban on

smoking further increases the level of

passenger safety by eliminating a prime

causal factor from the equipment

altogether. The U.S. airline industry has

adopted this approach with little or no

passenger complaint, and FRA believes

that nonsmoking high speed rail service

will experience a similar outcome.

Nonsmokers and employees would be

protected from the hazards and

discomfort of second-hand smoke, and

smokers would have a relatively short

trip—approximately 150 minutes from

Miami to Tampa, without the

opportunity to smoke. This item was not

included in the Petition, but FRA

believes that its safety interest in

protecting employees and the traveling

public makes this proposal a valid and

important one.

Paragraph (b) describes the proposed

requirements for the FOX right-of-way.

This section requires FOX to operate

over dedicated track, and prohibits any

joint operations with freight or other

passenger service. The Railroad would

be permitted to operate conventional

vehicles of its own to facilitate

maintenance and rescue operations, but

no other mixed freight or passenger

service could occur. Paragraph (b)(2)

prohibits public at-grade crossings

throughout the right-of-way, and states

that animal and equipment crossings

not controlled by the Railroad must be

accomplished by an underpass or

overpass. As previously discussed, this

characteristic of the FOX system greatly

enhances railroad safety, and must be a

part of the system as finally configured,

if all other safety standards are to

remain in place. The right-of-way may

include private grade crossings that are

for the exclusive use of the Railroad.

FRA believes that this is necessary for

the Railroad to complete repairs,

inspections, construction, rescue

movements, or other normal internal

operations.

Paragraphs (b)(3), (4), and (5) require

a permanent fence along the entire rightof-way; require intrusion, flood, high

wind, hot box, and dragging equipment

detectors along the right-of-way where

deemed necessary by the system safety

plan and Chapter 3 of this proposal; and

limit access for Railroad employees to

certain intervals along the right-of-way.

FRA expects that these aspects of the

FOX plan will enhance safety by

reducing or eliminating the incidence of

animals, trespassers, highway vehicles,

and undesirable or unexpected events

that could interrupt or impact safe train

operation. However, FRA requests

additional information from FOX as to

the type of fencing that will be utilized

along the right-of-way. Certain fences

are designed to eliminate entirely the

risk of unathorized entry and would

enhance railroad safety greatly.

However, these fences may be

unnecessary along portions of the rightof-way where the system safety plan

determines that the risk of entry from

individuals, vehicles, or animals is

negligible. Fences used along highways

are generally designed to prevent cars

from leaving the highway right-of way,

rather than to restrict intrusion from

individuals or animals. Therefore,

typical highway fencing may not be

effective in populated areas along the

FOX right-of-way. In short, there are a

variety of factors that must be

considered in determining the

appropriate design and strength for

fencing along the FOX right-of-way. As

FRA understands the situation, FOX has

not yet finalized the location of the

right-of-way, and so it may be premature

to dictate strict guidelines concerning

fencing. However, FRA will consider

the risk factors presented and whether

establishing specific fencing

requirements would be appropriate in

this proceeding. FRA requests a

description from FOX as to what is

planned in the way of fencing, and
65488 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

invites comment from interested parties

on appropriate fencing standards.

Paragraph (b)(6) provides that the

Railroad will build walkways along the

right-of-way, which will be used

primarily for inspection activities or

rescue operations. In order to ensure the

safety of workers and rescue personnel,

the walkways must be built at a safe

distance from the track, which the

proposed standard sets at a minimum of

7.87 feet from the outside rail. This

means that the Railroad’s walkways

must be built at least 7.87 feet from the

field side of the rail, or in other words,

the rail that is farthest from the

Railroad’s double track. Due to the track

centerlines that have been proposed in

paragraph (d) of this section and the

requirement that any walkway be at

least 7.87 feet from the outside rail, the

Railroad cannot build walkways

between the double track. Such a

scenario could lead to hazardous

conditions for employees or rescue

personnel forced to work between the

Railroad’s two tracks, in close proximity

to moving, high speed equipment.

Paragraph (b)(7) requires the Railroad

to design the right-of-way so that it will

accommodate high speed travel,

meaning curves should be avoided or

large, so that the risk of derailment and

excessive braking is reduced.

Paragraphs (b)(8) and (9) require the

Railroad to record all difficulties or

abnormalities discovered during the

construction phase of this project, and

make available to FRA the track layout

drawings that must include specified

information. FRA believes that this

section is critical to the safety of the

FOX infrastructure and high speed

operations. As discussed earlier, sink

holes and other potentially dangerous

sub-grade formations and conditions are

prevalent in Florida, and create serious

risks for FOX unless mitigated. One of

the most serious high speed accidents in

France occurred because an unknown,

underground World War I trench

collapsed under the weight of a TGV

trainset. FRA proposes in this section to

eliminate the risk that such an accident

could occur in Florida. This section was

also included in the FOX Petition.

Paragraph (b)(10) proposes that all

highway bridges that cross the right-ofway be constructed so that drivers of

motor vehicles will have a clear view of

the right-of-way, and so that the

potential for vehicles falling into the

right-of-way are minimized to the fullest

extent possible. It is also important to

note that this proposal is bolstered by

the fall intrusion detection systems that

are required by Subpart C. The detection

systems will alert the Railroad to any

vehicles that enter the right-of-way, but

this section requires an additional level

of safety by mandating highway

overpass design that will minimize the

risk of a vehicle entering the right-ofway in the first place. Similarly,

paragraph (b)(11) requires the Railroad

to protect railroad bridges, if they are

necessary, from impact. Railroad

operations are vulnerable to accident

when railroad bridges are struck by road

or water transport. The track or signal

systems on the bridge may be disturbed

to such an extent that a derailment or

signal malfunction occurs. This

proposal seeks to avoid that by requiring

FOX to erect a barrier or other device

that will protect the bridge structure

from a sudden strike or movement. If

tunnels become necessary on the FOX

right-of-way, paragraph (b)(12) requires

the Railroad to design and construct

them to minimize the safety hazards

connected with excessive air pressure in

the tunnel created by the operation of

trains.

Paragraph(b)(13) restricts track

crossings in areas where operating

speeds reach 100 mph to locations

where designated track crossing devices

are installed. The track crossing devices

must be installed where frequent

crossing by employees is anticipated,

such as turnouts and substations.

Paragraph (b)(14) requires the Railroad

to install emergency traffic stop or slow

devices at certain intervals along the

right-of-way, and at special locations

such as turnouts, substations, block

section limits, or autotransformers.

These devices will be connected to the

signaling system and create a

communication link with the Railroad’s

central traffic control. All of the

proposals in paragraph (b) were

included in the Petition. However, FRA

omitted one of the Petition’s paragraphs

which related to roadway worker

protection. FRA has adopted and

incorporated the existing roadway

worker protection standards, 49 CFR

part 214, and so additional language

concerning this topic is unnecessary

and potentially conflicting. The FOX

Petition also adopted 49 CFR part 214

for incorporation on the FOX system.

In considering the appropriate

standards for FOX to adhere to vis-a-vis

the system description and the

Railroad’s right-of-way, it is important

to determine whether the FOX high

speed trainsets will travel on lines that

are parallel to freight or conventional

passenger operations, and if so, how

close those lines will be to the FOX

track. The presence of heavy,

conventional rail equipment on parallel

track, in close proximity to the FOX

trainsets, would introduce risk factors

that greatly detract from the system’s

overall safety, and might require a

reevaluation of some of the standards in

this proposal. A derailment on the

conventional line could result in an

accident between FOX trainsets and

conventional equipment, which could

bring about the sort of grave damage that

the system, as planned, is designed to

prevent. Therefore, FRA requests

additional information from FOX

concerning the clearance distances that

are required to maintain the accidentavoidant systems approach that FOX

has adopted, if the Railroad ultimately

utilizes a right-of-way that runs parallel

to conventional operations. FRA does

not intend in this inquiry to preclude

altogether a FOX right-of-way that runs

parrallel to traditional rail operations.

However, such a scenario may

undermine the safety of the system, as

it has been described to FRA and as is

reflected in this proposal, and so,

additional safety measures might be

warranted. Similarly, the proximity of a

highway right-of-way and traffic to the

FOX lines is a matter that deserves

attention. There is a ‘‘startle’’ factor

associated with the sudden appearance

of high speed trains next to highway

traffic that should be minimized, to the

extent possible, in the design and

location of the FOX right-of-way. The

Agency invites comment on all of the

issues raised by this topic from

interested parties. Also, FRA asks FOX

to provide additional information that

describes the proximity of conventional

rail lines and highway traffic to the FOX

track, and any additional measures

needed to ensure the safety of the FOX

right-of-way. Based on this information,

FRA will consider whether further

appropriate measures are necessary in

order to ensure the integrity of the

dedicated track system that FOX has

planned for Florida.

Paragraph (c) contains proposed

requirements for all of the Railroad’s

system components: system safety

program; inspection, testing and

maintenance procedures and criteria;

operating practices; emergency

preparedness plan; personnel

qualification requirements; and system

qualification tests. These items are

proposed in the system description

section of the proposal in order to

underscore their importance in the

overall FOX system. Although the

primary requirements of these

substantive areas are set forth in later

Subparts of the proposal, their presence

in the FOX system is mandated by the

requirements of paragraph (c) of this

section.

Paragraph (d) of this section sets forth

the required primary elements of the

Railroad’s track and infrastructure. This
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65489

paragraph works in conjunction with

Subpart D of the proposal, which

contains the specific performance

standards and inspection procedures

that the Railroad must adhere to

concerning track and infrastructure.

This paragraph requires the Railroad to

install and operate over standard gage

track (56.5 in.). Paragraph (d)(3) requires

the Railroad to install and operate over

double track throughout its entire rightof-way. FOX plans to use each track for

a single direction, except during certain

maintenance operations, which will

dramatically reduce the risk of head-on

collisions between trains. As planned,

trains will depart in 30-minute

intervals, and so the risk of one train

overtaking another is also minimized.

Crossover connections are to be

installed at each station, to facilitate

change of direction for trains or the

removal of disabled trains. In addition,

crossovers will be located throughout

the right-of-way in order to provide

flexibility and emergency rescue.

Paragraphs (d)(4) and (5) require the

Railroad to install continuous, shopwelded rail, and concrete ties. These

items enhance the stability of the track

and add to the system’s safety.

Paragraph (d)(6) requires the Railroad to

use ballast that will support the track

structure, but that will not degrade in

combination with concrete ties. Some

forms of ballast in use in the railroad

industry are known to deteriorate when

used with concrete ties. FOX may not

use any of these forms of ballast.

Paragraphs (d)(7)–(10) set forth

standards for the substructure layer.

Paragraph (d)(11) states that FOX must

utilize moveable frog turnouts that are

identical to those used along the TGV

lines in France. FRA proposes this to

ensure that alternate devices, which

may decrease safety, are not substituted

in Florida. Paragraph (d)(12) proposes

that the Railroad may reduce the

thickness of ballast in yards and

maintenance facility operations, where

speeds are generally low. The proposed

requirements of paragraph (d) were

included in the FOX Petition.

Paragraph (e) sets forth requirements

for the integral portions of the Railroad’s

signal system. This paragraph works in

conjunction with Chapter 3 of the rule,

which sets standards for the specific

performance of the signal system

components and procedures. Paragraph

(e)(1) explains that the Railroad’s signal

system shall include automatic train

control (ATC), interlocking equipment,

wayside detectors, and central traffic

control. Paragraphs (e)(2)–(6) describe

the basic function and design that must

exist with respect to the ATC system.

The system must interface with the

interlocking system and train braking

systems. The on-board equipment must

include multiple processors, software

for braking distance-to-go

determinations, and decoders that

receive messages from track beacons

and short cable loops that provide

notification of upcoming curves,

gradients, speed restrictions, and track

occupancy. The on-board equipment

will also calculate braking curves,

continuously monitor speed, and

initiate braking in the event the

locomotive engineer exceeds maximum

authorized speed. The on-board

computers are constructed on a two-outof-three voting architecture, which fails

safe in the event of an equipment

failure. Paragraph (e)(7) requires the

Railroad’s braking profiles to comply

with speed restrictions and maximum

authorized speed. Paragraph (e)(9) sets

basic requirements for the track circuits:

those on main line must provide

jointless audio frequency, which

reduces the chance of intermittent of

broken connections; those in crossovers

may be combined with sequential

release logic in the interlocking

controllers to ensure protection against

poor wheel-rail contact on the seldomused rail; those in yards and

maintenance facilities may be jointed

high-voltage impulse.

Paragraph (e)(10) describes the

function and design of the Railroad’s

interlocking system. The interlocking

must: Interface with the wayside signal

equipment, track circuits, switch

machines, and wayside signals; monitor

all track circuits; interface with the

ATC; exchange supervisory control and

status information with central traffic

control; provide back-up control at each

interlocking; and control switch

machines and monitoring devices used

to verify switch positions. Paragraphs

(e)(11) and (12) require that the

interlocking’s vital logic processor shall

utilize two processors that operate

simultaneously in a redundant fashion,

and that all wayside detectors interface

with the train control system. Finally,

paragraph (e)(13) requires that the

Railroad’s central traffic control shall

monitor and regulate all train routes and

movements. As FRA understands the

current, proposed configuration for the

FOX central traffic control system, there

is no built-in redundancy for the CTC

processors. The wayside processors are

built with a two-out-of-three

architecture, but it is presumed that the

signal system will shut down and trains

will come to a safe stop if the CTC

processors fail. FRA requests

clarification from FOX as to whether

this is an accurate assessment of the

system’s operation. If this is not the

case, FRA may consider further

appropriate standards to ensure the

safety of the system in the event that the

central traffic control system fails.

Paragraph (f) describes the key

communication systems and

components for the Railroad. The

Railroad must install a dedicated, fiberoptic system along the right-of-way to

transmit data, and telephone and radio

communications. In addition, the

system must have back-up systems in

place in the event of failures. For train

operations, the system must include a

dedicated telephone system with fixed

telephones and field sockets along the

track, yards, and platforms; a portable

radio system; and a train radio to

facilitate communication among

trainsets and central traffic control.

Paragraph (g) addresses the primary

elements of the Railroad’s power

distribution system. This paragraph

works in conjunction with Chapter 9 of

the rule, which sets forth minimum

standards for the operation of the power

distribution system. The system will

include a 25 kV overhead catenary

electrification system, which the

Railroad must protect from the

potentially unsafe consequences of

lightning strikes. FRA anticipates that

the Railroad’s system safety plan will

address this potentially serious risk to

the overall safety of the system, and that

the Railroad will devise protective

measures in the design, construction,

and equipment used for the catenary

system and power distribution center.

All power stations along the right-ofway will include remote control

operating features that facilitate

operation from a central control center.

In addition, supervisory control

equipment at remote locations and

power substations must have batterypowered back-up capability in the event

of a power system failure.

Paragraph (h) describes the primary

elements of the Railroad’s rolling stock.

This section works in conjunction with

Subpart E of the proposal, which sets

forth equipment design, operation, and

maintenance standards. Much of this

paragraph is self-explanatory, but it is

important to note that the FOX trainsets

will mimic the basic elements of French

TGV design, and so will consist of

articulated, fixed-consist trains. This

formation resists buckling and twisting,

and tends to stay in an upright position

in the event of a derailment, which

greatly enhances passenger safety. The

FOX trainsets will be capable of

traveling in either direction because a

power car will be positioned at either

end of each trainset. The passenger cars

and power cars will be connected with
65490 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

semi-permanent connections that can be

disconnected only with special tools

and procedures. These semi-permanent

connectors between each trailer car, and

between the power cars and trailer cars,

are not couplers. Therefore, the FOX

trainsets will not and cannot be coupled

or uncoupled in yards or along the rightof-way, a process which presents many

safety risks for employees who work

with conventional equipment. As an

additional safety feature, couplers will

be present and are required at the

leading and trailing end of each trainset,

in case a rescue operation requires

attaching disabled high speed trainsets

to operative equipment.

Paragraph (h)(3) requires each truck of

the trainset to be continuously

monitored by the on-board computer

system, which will alert the locomotive

engineer to any malfunction, including

hunting oscillations, brake defects and

wheelslide. This feature will greatly

enhance the engineer’s ability to prevent

an accident or incident by bringing the

train into proper operating condition, if

possible, or slowing the train, as soon as

possible. This may also restrict potential

brake system degradation, because the

corrective action can occur before the

equipment deteriorates altogether.

However, FRA is uncertain about the

redundant capabilities of the on-board

computer monitoring system. The

system description section of the

Petition states that the main cab

microprocessor is ‘‘backed up by a

separate standby unit.’’ It is unclear

from the language provided as to

whether this unit is designed to work

redundantly and will fail safe in

operation. Therefore, FRA requests

additional information from FOX that

describes in detail how the power car

microprocessor, which continuously

monitors the equipment, is supported

by the other ‘‘standby unit.’’ For

instance, FRA would like to know

whether all circuits are redundant, if

two-out-of-three voting architecture is

employed, and all other pertinent

information concerning the computer’s

resistance to failure in operation.

Section 243.425 of Subpart E, Rolling

Stock describes the requirements of the

automated monitoring system further.

However, because FRA is unsure as to

whether this monitoring is redundant

and will fail safe, FRA proposes in

§ 243.425 that the Railroad address a

complete failure of the automated

monitoring system in the system safety

plan, and through appropriate operating

rules. Based on the information that

FRA receives from FOX concerning this

issue, FRA may determine that an

alternative method of addressing this

risk would be preferable, or that the risk

is adequately covered by the design of

the equipment.

Paragraph (h)(4) requires each trainset

to possess operative wheelslide control,

independent trucks, and fault-tolerant

braking. These devices enhance the

overall system safety by permitting

trainsets to stop within shorter

distances, to slow or stop with certainty,

and to continue operating safely with

defective conditions. The wheelslide

control system is designed to adjust the

braking force on each wheel to prevent

sliding during braking, and prevents flat

wheel conditions to arise, which can

occur when wheels lock during braking.

This proposal deals with fire safety in

a variety of ways. Paragraph (h)(5)

requires all FOX trainsets to possess

operative smoke and fire detection

systems, which will increase the

likelihood that passengers will know of

the existence of fire and smoke in

sufficient time to exit the equipment. As

stated earlier, FRA also proposes to

prohibit smoking on FOX trainsets,

which further enhances passenger

safety. In addition, FRA proposes to

adopt FRA’s emergency preparedness

regulations, which address fire safety

and fire protection for railroad

passengers. Finally, the system safety

plan that FOX develops must address

the likelihood of fire, the risks

presented, and effective methods of

eliminating or reducing those risks.

Paragraph (h)(6) permits FOX to

operate vehicles other than the high

speed equipment on the right-of-way.

However, these vehicles are limited to

maintenance and rescue equipment,

such as a grinding train, a tamping

machine, a track stabilizing machine,

track inspection vehicles (Mauzin car

and Melusine car), an ultrasonic test car

to measure the integrity of the rails, a

ballast-plowing railway car, and electric

and diesel locomotives for shunting and

rescue purposes. All other rail vehicles

are prohibited by the rule. If FOX

believes that other vehicles are

necessary for the safe operation of the

system, those should be listed, with

rationale, in any comments that FOX

may have to this proposal. FRA seeks to

minimize the number and type of

vehicles that operate over the right-ofway, for a variety of reasons that have

been discussed previously. Unless

required to advance safety or move

passengers to their final destination,

FRA believes that the operating

environment would not support

additional or mixed equipment on the

FOX lines.

Paragraph (h)(7) requires the Railroad

to equip fully each repair facility and

employee with the appropriate tools

needed to maintain the equipment.

Paragraph (h)(8) requires the power cars

to incorporate crash energy management

that will protect the locomotive

engineer to the maximum extent

possible. The TGV equipment that FOX

will use embodies this requirement.

Additional, more specific structural

standards are set forth in Subpart E of

the proposal.

Paragraph (h)(10) requires the

locomotive engineer cab to facilitate

ease of movement, vision and access to

all sensors, controls, and indicators, and

to control climate and noise. FRA

believes that these issues have an

impact on employee performance and

railroad safety, and so proposes that the

cab be designed to maximize employee

performance. The TGV equipment that

FOX plans to use incorporates this

principle.

Paragraph (h)(11) describes the

critical components of the passenger

equipment brake system. Each trainset

must be equipped with an electropneumatic brake system that maintains

the independence of each truck’s

response to a brake demand. The

locomotive engineer’s automatic brake

valve in the leading cab controls the

brake pipe pressure. Each of the

following devices must be capable of

initiating an emergency brake

application: the ATC, the deadman

control, two emergency brake valves

located in the cab, and emergency brake

valves located in two trailer cars of each

trainset. Each powered truck shall be

independently controlled by the brake

pipe, and will have electric braking that

is battery-operated in the case of a main

power failure. The brake system will be

arranged so that the electric brake has

priority over others. During emergency

braking, relays will check the level of

electric braking, and will apply the

friction brake if a failure is detected.

The locomotive engineer will have

control of the powered truck electric

brake through the traction-braking

master controller to slow the trainset or

maintain low speed. The braking

functions on each powered truck will be

controlled by separate microprocessors.

Also, microprocessors will continuously

monitor all of the power brake systems.

The microprocessors will store all brake

failures and notify the locomotive

engineer of failures in any of the

following areas: reception of cab and

train control signals, truck hunting,

electric brake, friction brake, fire

detection system, head end power

system, alerter, horn, and wheel slide.

The braking system must be designed

and operated in a failsafe manner, and

include fault tolerant redundancy and

notification of failures as they occur.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65491

Also, paragraph (h)(11) requires the

Railroad to prepare, in conjunction with

its system safety plan, a matrix of

authorized train speed and braking

reductions that correspond to potential

brake failures that may occur en route.

This matrix is required by Subparts B

and E, and this section, and is an

extremely important safety feature of the

FOX system. This document, and the

planning it reflects, will guide the

movement of equipment in passenger

service when brake failures occur en

route, after the daily inspection.

Without this plan in place, the Railroad

may be forced to return to the more

draconian and less effective option of

moving the defective equipment to the

next repair facility. (See full discussion

below in § 243.15 concerning the

movement of defective equipment for

additional information on this topic.)

The French TGV operates under a

braking matrix plan that is devised

specially for each route taken

throughout their system. FOX plans to

replicate this process in Florida. FRA

requires development of and adherence

to the matrix in this NPRM, but believes

that it would be unwise to dictate the

specific speed reductions and

corresponding brake failures in this

proposal. The right-of-way has not yet

been chosen and many subtle operating

conditions are unknown at this time.

FRA believes that the most appropriate

course is to require FOX to prepare and

test the braking matrix as part of the

overall system safety planning and

development called for by the proposal.

However, FRA seeks comment from

FOX and other interested parties on

whether these safety standards should

require the Railroad to automate the

enforcement of the braking matrix.

Given the technological capacity of the

equipment and the importance of the

correct train speed in the event of brake

failure, FRA is considering imposing

such a requirement.

Finally, paragraph (h)(12) states that

the Railroad must install and maintain

hot box detectors throughout the rightof-way, which sense journal bearing

temperature and alert central traffic

control of any potentially defective

equipment.

All of these provisions relating to the

braking system were included in the

FOX Petition, and reflect the state of

modern braking systems for passenger

equipment.

Section 243.15 Movement of Defective

Equipment

This section requires the Railroad to

meet certain conditions prior to moving

defective equipment or continuing with

it in revenue service. Paragraph (a)

provides that any equipment containing

a condition that does not comply with

§ 243.433(f)(1) of the proposal may be

moved only after the Railroad has

completed a series of actions to ensure

the safety of the movement. In order for

the movement to proceed, a qualified

person must determine that the

equipment can be moved safely; the

qualified person must inform the

locomotive engineer and crew of the

non-complying condition, the maximum

authorized speed and other appropriate

restrictions; and the qualified person

must affix a tag to the control cab of the

trainset that contains specified

information concerning the defect.

Section 243.433(f)(1) is a daily

inspection requirement contained in the

rolling stock chapter of this proposal,

which includes a list of several items

that must be operating as intended

when the inspection is done in order for

the equipment to depart. Therefore,

paragraph (a) covers any defect that

occurs after the daily inspection has

been completed, and the trainset was

determined to be in compliance and

released for revenue service.

Paragraph (b) provides that a trainset

which develops a non-complying

condition en route, or in other words,

after the daily inspection required by

§ 243.433(f)(1), may continue in revenue

service until the next inspection

required by the rule, only if the Railroad

has accomplished the tasks required by

paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) also states

that, if brake defects arise en route, the

requirements of § 243.409 of the

proposal apply. The pertinent portions

of § 243.409 state that the Railroad must

develop and adhere to speed restrictions

that correspond to varying levels of

brake defects or failure, and that the

locomotive engineer must notify the

central traffic control of any brake

failure that occurs within one trip.

Paragraph (c) permits the movement

of defective equipment in a yard, so

long as there are no passengers in the

equipment, the movement does not

exceed a speed of 10 mph, and the

movement is made solely for the

purpose of moving to a repair facility.

The movement of defective

equipment is a topic that deserves

considerable discussion as it relates to

power brakes and other safety

appliances, given the safety risks

involved and the statutory background

implicated. FRA’s proposed Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards, published

on September 23, 1997 (62 FR 49728)

provide a thorough explanation of the

factors and conclusions involved, which

is summarized here.

FRA’s existing regulations do not

contain requirements pertaining to the

movement of equipment with defective

power brakes. The movement of

equipment with these defects is

currently controlled by a statutory

provision (originally enacted in 1910 as

part of the laws formerly known as the

Safety Appliance Acts), which states:

(a) GENERAL—A vehicle that is equipped

in compliance with this chapter whose

equipment becomes defective or insecure

nevertheless may be moved when necessary

to make repairs, without a penalty being

imposed under section 21302 of this title,

from the place at which the defect or

insecurity was first discovered to the nearest

available place at which the repairs can be

made—

(1) on the railroad line on which the defect

or insecurity was discovered;

or

(2) at the option of a connecting railroad

carrier, on the railroad line of the connecting

carrier, if not further than the place of repair

described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).

Although there is no limit contained

in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the number of

cars with defective equipment that may

be hauled in a train, FRA has a

longstanding interpretation which

requires that, at a minimum, 85 percent

of the cars in a train have operative

brakes. FRA bases this interpretation on

another statutory requirement that

permits a railroad to use a train only if

‘‘at least 50 percent of the vehicles in

the train are equipped with power or

train brakes and the engineer is using

the power or train brakes on those

vehicles and on all other vehicles

equipped with them that are associated

with those vehicles in a train.’’ 49

U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally

enacted in 1903, section 20302 also

granted the Interstate Commerce

Commission (ICC) the authority to

increase this percentage, and in 1910

the ICC issued an order increasing the

minimum percentage to 85 percent. See

49 CFR 232.1, which codified the ICC

order.

As virtually all freight cars are

presently equipped with power brakes

and are operated on an associated

trainline, the statutory requirement is in

essence a requirement that 100 percent

of the cars in a train have operative

power brakes, unless being hauled for

repairs pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303.

Consequently, FRA currently requires

that equipment with defective or

inoperative air brakes constitute no

more than 15 percent of the train and

that, if it is necessary to move the

equipment from where the railroad first

discovered it to be defective, the

defective equipment be moved no

further than the nearest place on the
65492 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

railroad’s line where the necessary

repairs can be made.

The requirements regarding the

movement of equipment with defective

or insecure brakes noted above can

create safety hazards and operational

difficulties in passenger operations. As

the provisions regarding the movement

of defective brake equipment were

written almost a century ago, they do

not address contemporary realities of

these operations. Strict application of

the requirements has the potential of

causing major disruptions of service,

which could create serious safety and

security problems. For example,

requiring repairs to be made at the

nearest location where the necessary

repairs can be made could result in

discharging passengers between stations

where adequate facilities for their safety

are not available, or onto overcrowded

station platforms. In addition, strict

application of the statutory

requirements could result in trains with

defective brake equipment moving

against the current of traffic during high

traffic hours. Irregular movements of

this type increase the risk of collisions.

Furthermore, like many passenger

operations, FOX may operate trains that

include eight or fewer cars.

Consequently, the necessity to cut out

the brakes on one or more cars can

easily result in noncompliance with the

85-percent requirement for hauling the

car for repairs, thus prohibiting train

movement and resulting in the same

sort of safety problems noted above.

FRA has attempted to recognize the

nature of passenger operations, and the

importance of passenger safety, and to

avoid disrupting service when applying

the requirements regarding the

movement of equipment with defective

brakes. FRA believes that speed

restrictions can readily be used to

compensate for the loss of brakes on a

minority of cars. FRA believes that

affirmatively recognizing appropriate

movement restrictions would actually

enhance safety, because compliance

with the existing restrictions is

potentially unsafe.

FRA recognizes that some of the

proposed standards in § 243.15 are not

in accord with the requirement

contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) that

cars with defective or insecure brakes be

moved to the ‘‘nearest’’ location where

the necessary repairs can be made.

However, FRA does have authority

under 49 U.S.C. 20306, entitled

‘‘Exemption for technological

improvements,’’ to establish the

restrictions proposed in § 243.15.

Section 20306 provides:

[T]he Secretary of Transportation may

exempt from the requirements of this chapter

railroad equipment or equipment that will be

operated on rails, when those requirements

preclude the development or implementation

of more efficient railroad transportation

equipment or other transportation

innovations under existing law.

This provision was originally enacted as

a part of the Rock Island Railroad

Transition and Employee Assistance Act

to authorize the use of certain trailers as

freight cars. See Public Law 96–254

(May 30, 1980). FRA believes that the

use of the provision as contemplated in

this proposal is consistent with the

authority granted the Secretary of

Transportation in 49 U.S.C. 20306. As

noted previously, the statutory

requirements regarding the movement of

equipment with defective brakes were

written nearly a century ago, were

focused largely on the operation of

freight equipment, and did not

contemplate passenger train operations

currently prevalent throughout the

nation and that will exist on FOX. Since

the original enactment in 1910 of the

provisions now codified at 49 U.S.C.

20303(a), there have been substantial

changes in the nature of the operations

of passenger trains, and the technology

used in those operations.

Contemporary passenger equipment

incorporates many types of advanced

braking systems; in some cases these

include electrical activation of brakes on

each car (with pneumatic application

through the train line available as a

backup). Dynamic brakes are also

typically employed to limit thermal

stresses on friction surfaces and to limit

the wear and tear on the brake

equipment. Furthermore, the brake

valves and brake components used

today are far more reliable than was the

case several decades ago. In addition to

these technological advances, the brake

equipment used in passenger train

operations incorporates advanced

technologies not found with any

regularity in freight operations. These

include:

• The use of brake cylinder pressure

indicators which provide a reliable

indication of the application and release

of the brakes;

• The use of disc brakes which

provide shorter stopping distances and

decrease the risk of thermal damage to

wheels;

• The ability to effectuate a graduated

release of the brakes due to a design

feature of the brake equipment which

permits more flexibility and more

forgiving train control;

• The ability to cut out brakes on a

per-axle or per-truck basis rather than a

per car basis, thus permitting greater use

of those brakes that are operable;

• The use of a pressure-maintaining

feature on each car which continuously

maintains the air pressure in the brake

system, thereby compensating for any

leakage in the trainline and preventing

a total loss of air in the brake system;

• The use of a separate trainline from

the locomotive main reservoir to

continuously charge supply reservoirs

independent of the brake pipe train line;

and

• Brake ratios that are 21⁄2 times

greater than the brake ratios of loaded

freight cars.

Although some of the technologies

noted above have existed for several

decades, most of the technologies did

not become prevalent until 1980.

Furthermore, most of the noted

technological advances have been

integrated into one efficient and reliable

braking system only within the last

decade. Consequently, the technology

incorporated into the brake equipment

used in contemporary passenger train

operations, including FOX equipment,

increases the reliability of the braking

system and permits the safe operation of

the equipment for extended distances,

even where a portion of the braking

system may be inoperative or defective.

In the face of these technological

advances, FRA believes it is appropriate

to utilize the authority granted by 49

U.S.C. 20306 and exempt certain

passenger train operations from the

specific restriction contained in 49

U.S.C. 20303(a) requiring the movement

of equipment with defective or insecure

brakes to the nearest location where

necessary repairs can be made. FRA

proposes restrictions on the movement

of this type of equipment that are more

conducive to safe operations. Under this

proposal, the Railroad could move such

cars only at reduced speeds and only

until the next required inspection of the

equipment.

In utilizing the authority granted

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20306, the

Secretary is required to make ‘‘findings

based on evidence developed at a

hearing,’’ unless there is ‘‘an agreement

between national railroad labor

representatives and the developer of the

new equipment or technology.’’ FRA is

confident that, after notice and

opportunity for oral and written public

comment, the record will support a

finding that the proposed provisions are

‘‘in the public interest and consistent

with railroad safety,’’ the test required

in order to waive safety requirements

issued under other, general provisions

of the code. See 49 U.S.C. 20103(d). It

should be noted that the exemption

granted to the movement of equipment
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65493

on FOX with defective brakes would not

include an exemption from 49 U.S.C.

20303(c), which contains the liability

provisions attendant with the movement

of equipment with defective or insecure

safety appliances, including power

brakes. Consequently, the liability

provisions contained in 49 U.S.C.

20303(c) will be applicable to the

Railroad when hauling equipment with

defective or insecure power brakes

pursuant to the requirements proposed

by FRA in this notice.

FRA also proposes to exempt FOX

passenger train operations from its

longstanding interpretation, based on 49

U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B) and 49 CFR 232.1

noted above, prohibiting the movement

of a train if more than 15 percent of the

cars in the train have defective,

insecure, or inoperative brakes. As

discussed above, such a limitation is

overly burdensome and has the

potential of creating safety hazards, due

to the short length of the trains

commonly operated in FOX passenger

service.

Based on the preceding discussion,

FRA proposes in this NPRM to permit

FOX trainsets to move under speed

restrictions if brake defects occur en

route. This proposal incorporates

procedures used in France on the TGV

that will guide the establishment of

those speed restrictions. As is discussed

above, the Railroad shall devise a

matrix, in which speed levels are

established to correspond to certain

brake defects that will facilitate the safe

movement of the equipment. The

development of this matrix must be

accomplished in conjunction with the

development of the Railroad’s system

safety plan, which requires FRA

approval. FRA believes that this

approach will ensure a high level of

safety by taking into account advanced

technology, the proven TGV procedure,

and the system safety concept of

planning to minimize or eliminate

hazards.

Subpart B—System Safety Program and

Plan

Section 243.101 General System Safety

Requirements

This Subpart proposes system safety

program requirements that FOX must

develop and follow. System safety is the

concept that forms the foundation for

the proposed rule, as it does for TGV

operation in France. As discussed

earlier in this document, system safety

means the application of design,

operating, technical, and management

techniques and principles throughout

the life cycle of a system to reduce

hazards and unsafe conditions to the

lowest level possible, through the most

effective use of available resources. In

this process, FRA proposes that the

Railroad implement a system safety

program to identify and manage safety

risks, and generate data for use in

making safety decisions.

The proposed requirements for the

Fox system safety program are very

similar to the requirements proposed for

high speed (Tier II) passenger

equipment, which were published on

September 23, 1997 in the Federal

Register (62 FR 40728). However, the

Tier II system safety standards were

developed to cover only the trainset,

and not the remaining railroad system

elements. The system safety program

proposed for FOX covers the design,

development, testing and operation of

the entire railroad system, which

includes track, signal, rolling stock,

operating practices, power distribution,

personnel qualification requirements,

and system qualification tests.

Paragraph (a) of § 243.101 requires the

Railroad to adopt a system safety

program using MIL–STD–882(C) as a

guide. MIL–STD–882(C) is a standard

issued by the Department of Defense

that describes system safety planning

and system safety programs used by the

U.S. military for procuring and

operating weapon systems. This

standard is often used as a form or

reference for system safety planning.

FRA does not intend in this proposal to

dictate how the Railroad should apply

this guidance, but FRA believes that the

Railroad should tailor application of the

guidance to FOX’s unique safety needs

and operating scenarios. FRA envisions

that the system safety plan will be a

living document that evolves as new

information and knowledge become

available. Therefore, this section

requires FOX to update the system

accordingly in the course of operations,

and to change practices that prove to be

unsafe.

Due to the critical role that the system

safety plan plays in this rule, FRA

proposes that FOX submit the initial

plan for FRA approval, and brief FRA

annually on any changes made to it. The

Petition contained language that

provided for FRA ‘‘audits’’ of the system

safety plan, rather than a clear approval

process. However, given the fact that so

many safety features in the FOX system

are controlled by development of the

system safety plan, FRA believes that

anything short of approval would be an

abdication of the Agency’s

responsibility to promulgate clear,

enforceable, and effective safety

standards. For instance, one of the

safety features relied upon in the FOX

risk assessment and Petition involve a

series of wayside detection systems,

which will greatly enhance the safety of

the system and have led to standards in

this proposal that permit 200 mph

speeds and lighter equipment. However,

these detection systems, as proposed,

will not be placed at regular intervals

throughout the right-of-way; rather, they

will be placed, for the most part, where

the system safety plan indicates safety

risks exist. If FRA has no approval

authority over the placement of the

detection systems and the thought

process that determined the placement,

the detection system could conceivably

be used ineffectively, and ultimately

have no impact on improving safety. A

similar analysis can be made concerning

the braking system matrix that will

define operating procedures for

passenger equipment with defective

brakes. Clearly, the Railroad braking

system is key to the safety of the high

speed trainsets, and a matrix that

establishes rational speed restrictions is

mandatory, for safety and statutory

reasons. FRA believes that the Agency

must have an approval mechanism in

place to ensure that such a matrix is in

place. FRA understands that FOX has

the desire and capacity to operate the

system safely, and FRA does not intend

to interfere unnecessarily in the system

safety process that will be undertaken in

Florida. However, FRA believes that the

basis of this rulemaking would be

undermined if Federal oversight of the

FOX system safety plan does not take

place.

This paragraph also requires FOX to

submit the initial system safety plan to

FRA for approval no later than one year

after the rule takes effect. The Petition

contained a less certain time frame,

related to the design and construction

phases of the project. However, FRA

believes that the system safety plan

must be used as a guide in the earliest

conceptual stages of the project. Thus, it

should be available earlier in the

program than initially proposed by

FOX. As discussed previously in this

document, FRA seeks comment from

FOX and other interested parties

concerning alternatives to this proposal.

Commenters are asked to consider the

relative merits of a tiered system safety

plan submission schedule, that would

permit FOX to produce the system

safety plan in stages, rather than as one

complete package. However,

commenters should also address the risk

that such a tiered schedule would lead

to a system safety plan that is

incomplete or inaccurate because it does

not address all potential hazards at the

earliest possible opportunity.

FRA also requires FOX to brief the

FRA annually on the status of the
65494 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

system safety program and on any

proposed changes to the system safety

plan. FRA believes this process will

permit FRA to assess how effectively the

system safety plan works, and how FOX

identifies and resolves safety risks.

Paragraph (b) of § 243.101 makes clear

that the system safety plan must address

the design, construction, maintenance,

operation, and overhaul of the system as

a unit. The plan must address how

individual components of the system

operate, as well as how those

components operate once integrated

into the system. For instance, a

particular appurtenance may perform

well in tests or other operations, but that

same component may not perform

suitably when integrated into the FOX

system. The plan must evaluate

components in this light in order to

ensure the ultimate safety of the system.

Also, this paragraph requires FOX to

consider safety at least as important as

cost and performance in assessing

design, construction, operation,

maintenance, and overhaul of the

Railroad system.

Paragraph (c) describes the various

elements that must be included in the

plan. FRA proposes, at a minimum, that

the system safety plan specifically

address fire protection; software safety;

inspection, testing, and maintenance;

training and qualifications; emergency

preparedness; pre-revenue service

qualification testing; hazard

identification and reduction; operating

procedures for defective equipment in

passenger service; identification of

safety-critical subsystems; and

relationships between safety-critical

subsystems. FRA places emphasis on

these elements of the Fox system

because they tend to be overlooked

when a less formal, non-systems

approach to safety analysis is taken.

Each of these elements of the system

safety program is discussed in greater

detail below.

Paragraph (d) sets forth the approach

and process FOX must take in order to

develop the system safety program. FRA

intends the program to be a formal stepby-step process that includes:

identification of all safety requirements

that govern the operation of the system;

evaluation of the total system to identify

known or potential safety hazards that

may arise over the life cycle of the

Railroad; identification of all safety

issues during the design phase of the

process; elimination or reduction of the

risk posed by the hazards identified;

resolution of safety issues presented;

development of a process to track

progress; and development of a program

of testing and analysis to demonstrate

that safety requirements are met.

Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad to

document how the system design meets

safety requirements, and to monitor how

safety issues are raised and resolved.

This is very important in system safety

philosophy; if risks are not identified,

eliminated or mitigated, the system is

inherently unsafe.

Paragraph (f) requires the system

safety plan to describe how operational

limitations would be imposed if the

FOX system design cannot meet certain

safety requirements. FRA anticipates

that this section would include an

initial determination from FOX that

operational limits can effectively

address the hazard, and if not, a design

change will be put in place to

accommodate the risk. Operational

limits are considered the least desirable

option in system safety planning, and

thus, the last means utilized to reduce

a safety risk.

Paragraph (g) requires the Railroad to

facilitate FRA inspection of the system

safety plan and documentation required

by paragraph (e). FRA must have access

to this information in order to determine

the Railroad’s compliance with the

requirements of this Chapter.

Section 243.103 Fire Protection

Program

As part of the system safety program,

paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to

address fire safety considerations in the

design stage of the project, and to

reduce the risk of harm caused by fire

on the equipment to a level established

in MIL–STD–882(C) as acceptable.

Paragraph (b) requires the Railroad to

make a written analysis of the fire

protection problem, and lists a series of

factors that the Railroad must complete

and consider concerning fire protection.

These paragraphs require the Railroad to

ensure that good fire protection practice

is used during the design and operation

of the equipment. FRA’s primary

concern is to protect passengers from

the risk of fire and smoke inhalation,

and to ensure that they can evacuate

quickly and safely if a fire erupts.

Elements of this analysis correspond

to required action under § 243.413 of the

rolling stock provisions in the rule:

Overheat detectors; a fire or smoke

detection system; a fixed, automatic,

fire-suppression system where the

Railroad’s written analysis determines

they are required; and compliance with

the Railroad’s written procedures for the

inspection, testing, and maintenance of

fire safety systems and equipment that

the procedures designate as mandatory.

[See § 243.413(c)–(f)].

Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to

exercise reasonable care to assure that

the design criteria are followed and that

the tests required by this program are

performed. To fulfill this obligation in

part, the Railroad must include fire

safety requirements in all contracts for

new equipment purchases.

Section 243.105 Software Safety

Program

This section proposes requirements

for the software portion of the system

safety program. Paragraph (a) requires

the Railroad to develop and implement

a software safety program to guide the

design, development, testing,

integration and verification of FOX

system software. Software plays a key

role in the overall performance of the

FOX system, and safety demands that

the Railroad place a strong emphasis on

the system’s software safety.

Paragraph (b) sets out the proposed

required elements of the software safety

program. The program must treat

software that controls or monitors safety

functions as safety-critical, unless a

completely redundant, failsafe, nonsoftware means to provide the same

function is provided as part of the

design. Paragraph (b) also specifies the

steps required to develop a

comprehensive software safety program,

which must culminate in a

demonstration of overall software safety

as part of the pre-revenue service system

qualification tests of the FOX system.

Paragraph (b) also requires the

Railroad to include a hazard analysis in

its software design and implementation

that will, to the fullest extent possible,

prevent unauthorized penetration on all

computerized systems in use. As the

railroad industry embraces new

technology and increases reliance on

electronic information systems, there

must also be development and

adherence to effective methods of

preventing intrusion from unauthorized

railroad personnel and other individuals

or entities. The FOX system relies on

many computerized systems and subsystems, the largest being the Railroad’s

signal system. Clearly, any opportunity

for infiltration of the signal system by

outsiders would expose the passengers,

employees, and those along the right-ofway to grave risk. Therefore, FOX must

develop and implement in its system

safety program a method to prevent

cyber threats and alleviate these risks.

Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to

adhere to the requirements of the

software safety program. To fulfill this

obligation the Railroad must include

software safety requirements in

procurement contracts that involve

design or purchase of software

components.
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Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to

follow the process and procedures of the

software safety program.

Section 243.107 Inspection, Testing,

and Maintenance Program

This section contains the

requirements for the Railroad’s program

for inspecting, testing, and maintaining

the FOX system. FRA’s goal is a set of

standards that will ensure that the Fox

system remains safe as it wears and

ages, and will protect workers who

perform the inspection, testing, and

maintenance tasks. These proposed

requirements are based on FRA’s

knowledge of inspection, testing and

maintenance programs generally, and

the French TGV practices.

Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to

provide to FRA particulars concerning

the inspection, testing, and maintenance

program for the system, including:

Safety inspection procedures, intervals

and criteria; testing procedures and

intervals; scheduled preventive

maintenance intervals; maintenance

procedures; and employee training.

In this proposal, FRA does not dictate

specific program contents, and so the

Railroad retains much flexibility to

tailor the program to its needs and

experience. However, FRA believes this

provision is an important element of the

overall Railroad system, and should be

designed to maximize safe operations

and protect safety-related components

of the system from deterioration over

time.

Paragraph (b) defines broadly the

conditions that can endanger the safety

of the crew, passengers, or equipment,

which the inspection, testing, and

maintenance program should prevent,

or detect and correct. Paragraph (c)

establishes a link between scheduled

maintenance intervals and the system

safety program. Scheduled maintenance

intervals should be set so that worn

parts are replaced before they fail. Initial

intervals should be based on

manufacturer’s recommendations or

operating experience. As more operating

experience is gained, FRA believes that

accumulated reliability data should be

used as the basis for changing

preventive maintenance intervals on

safety-critical components. This

standard should encourage the Railroad

to keep reliability records on safetycritical components, which will provide

confidence that any safety or economic

trade-offs have a firm basis.

Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to

adopt standard operating procedures, in

writing, that explain how all safetycritical inspection, testing, and

maintenance tasks will be performed.

This provision is intended to provide

protection to the workers who perform

maintenance and inspection duties,

many of which are inherently

dangerous. FRA does not intend to

prescribe how these tasks should be

performed. Rather, this proposal

requires the Railroad to devise a

program that will ensure employee

safety in each individual setting that

may arise in the maintenance of all of

the Railroad’s equipment. FRA believes

that standard operating procedures are

often a key component in a successful

program to train employees to perform

their employment duties safely.

Section 243.109 Training,

Qualification, and Designation Program

This section requires the Railroad to

develop and implement a training,

qualification, and designation program

for workers who perform inspection,

testing, and maintenance tasks. FRA

believes that employee training,

qualification, and designation are

central to maintain safe railroad

equipment and a safe workforce.

Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to

establish and comply with a training,

qualification, and designation program

for employees and contractors who

perform safety-related inspection,

testing, or maintenance tasks in this

rule.

Paragraph (b) lists the steps that must

be followed in developing the Railroad’s

training, qualification, and designation

program. This paragraph lists the

general requirements that the Railroad’s

training, qualification, and designation

program must do to ensure that

employees know how to keep the

system operating safely. The SNCF has

a training program in place for operation

of TGV equipment in France that is

similar to these proposed requirements.

The list of actions that FRA proposes

also compel the Railroad to evaluate its

operation and focus its training

resources where the need is greatest.

The proposed rule grants the Railroad

flexibility to focus and provide training

that is needed in order to complete a

specific job category. For instance, the

proposal does not require ‘‘checkers’’ to

receive the same intensive training

needed for ‘‘maintainers.’’ FRA

anticipates that this proposal will not

require extensive changes to the manner

in which TGV employees in France are

trained. However, the proposal will

prevent the Railroad from using

minimally trained and unqualified

people to perform crucial safety tasks.

FRA believes that many benefits will

be gained from the Railroad’s

investment in a comprehensive training

program. The quality of inspections will

improve, which will result in fewer

instances of defective equipment in

revenue service and increased

operational safety. Equipment

conditions that require maintenance

attention are more likely to be

discovered while the equipment is in a

maintenance or yard site, where repairs

can be completed safely and efficiently.

Trouble-shooting will take less time,

and maintenance will be completed

correctly the first time, resulting in

increased safety and decreased costs.

Section 243.111 Emergency

Preparedness Program

This section requires the Railroad to

develop and adopt an emergency

preparedness program that meets the

requirements set forth in FRA’s

proposed Passenger Train Emergency

Standards, 62 FR 8330, (February 24,

1996) which will be codified at 49 CFR

part 239 after consideration of all

comments received and adopted as

final. FRA believes that the FOX system

should meet the same emergency

preparedness requirements imposed on

every other passenger railroad operating

in the U.S.

Section 243.113 Pre-revenue Service

System Qualification Plan

This section sets forth general

requirements for pre-revenue service

testing of the FOX system, and works in

conjunction with the specific provisions

set forth in Chapter 7 of this rule. Prerevenue qualification tests are extremely

important because they represent the

culmination of all safety analysis and

component tests conducted as part of

the system safety program, and will

serve as a basis for all passenger

operations. The pre-revenue service

system qualification tests are intended

to demonstrate the effectiveness of the

system safety program and to prove that

the FOX system can operate safely in its

intended environment. FRA believes

that these procedures and the

documentation required by the prerevenue system qualification test plan

are necessary to ensure that all safety

risks have been reduced to a level that

will facilitate safe operation in revenue

service.

Section 243.115 Hazard Identification

and Reduction

This section requires the Railroad to

identify all hazards that may arise in the

course of operations and analyze

methods available to reduce or

eliminate the hazards. The Railroad may

consider remedies that are based in

design, construction, equipment, or

operations. However, operation-based

solutions are not favored, and should be

used only when no other alternative
65496 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

exists. Design and construction are the

preferred methods to eliminate risk in

system safety philosophy, because they

completely remove the opportunity for

simple human mistakes or errors in

judgment that can occur in the normal

course of operations. This section is

important because operational hazards

cannot be minimized or prevented until

they are first recognized as risks. This

thought process is basic to system

safety, and so this proposal is an

integral component to the Railroad’s

system safety plan.

Section 243.117 Operating Procedures

in the Event of Component Failure

This section requires the Railroad to

consider and develop operating rules

that will protect passengers, employees,

and the public when portions of the

system become defective. This section

works in conjunction with Subpart F of

the rule, which requires the Railroad to

develop a comprehensive set of

operating rules that must be approved

by FRA. It is extremely important to the

overall safety of the system that the

Railroad deliberate over appropriate

procedures that will compensate for the

loss of safety that malfunctioning

equipment causes. Aside from

developing general operating rules,

pursuant to the requirements of Subpart

F, this section obligates the Railroad to

engage in a slightly different thought

process—to focus on defective

equipment and to mitigate the dangers

that arise when equipment

malfunctions. FRA believes that this

section is necessary to ensure passenger

and system safety, particularly as it

relates to power brake defects. Also, this

section requires the Railroad to analyze

and describe the fault tolerant limits of

each system that possesses fault tolerant

components, and develop a process by

which the Railroad and the engineer

operating a trainset will be made aware

that the system is approaching its fault

tolerant limits. This proposal requires

the Railroad to acknowledge the predetermined limits of the system

equipment, and to prepare appropriately

for instances when those limits are

exceeded, which is consistent with and

critical to comprehensive system safety

planning.

Section 243.119 Safety-Critical

Subsystems

This proposed section requires the

Railroad to identify the safety-critical

subsystems that exist in the FOX

system, and to prepare an explanation of

the relationship they have with one

another throughout the life cycle of the

system. FRA anticipates that this

requirement reflects the thought that

would occur in the normal course of

system safety analysis, and believes it is

important enough, in terms of the

ultimate safety of the system, to

incorporate in this Subpart.

Section 243.121 Approval Procedure

This section sets forth the system

safety plan approval procedures that the

Railroad and FRA must follow.

Paragraph (b) requires the Railroad to

file a petition for approval with FRA,

and the petition must include the

Railroad’s system safety plan, pertinent

supporting documentation, and the

primary person to contact if questions

arise. This section also requires the

Railroad to prepare a petition for

approval for safety-critical changes to

the Railroad’s existing safety plan. FRA

believes that such changes have the

potential to alter the overall safety of the

FOX network, and therefore, Federal

oversight should be present. Also,

pursuant to principles of administrative

law, FRA would notify the public of

such changes. Paragraph (c) requires the

Railroad to submit the petition for

approval with FRA’s Associate

Administrator for Safety, and paragraph

(d) describes the actions FRA must take

upon receipt of the petition.

FRA must review the petition,

detemine if it complies with all

procedural requirements, and evaluate

the substantive validity of the petition

or proposed changes to the petition.

Under this proposal, FRA may approve,

approve with special conditions, or

disapprove the petition within ninety

days. If FRA is unable to arrive at a

determination within ninety days, the

petition remains pending until FRA

acts. Once a petition has been approved,

FRA may reopen consideration of the

petition for good cause, which might

include the discovery of new

information or new safety evaluations.

FRA must provide the Railroad with

written notice of the disposition of the

petition. If FRA determines that changes

to safety-critical standards, criteria, or

inspection frequencies are appropriate

in the interest of safety, FRA will

publish a notice in the Federal Register

announcing those changes. Sixty days

after the notice is published, the

changes become effective.

The FOX system safety program is the

most important portion of the Florida

high speed rail project. Every safety

discipline will be governed by the

design, construction, and equipment

determinations made in the process of

developing the Railroad’s system safety

program. FRA has no desire to meddle

unnecessarily in the internal, nonsafety

matters of the Railroad’s operation.

However, due to the role that the system

safety plan plays in the FOX system,

and the potential for human casualty

that exists on the system, FRA believes

that the agency must have approval

authority over the final system safety

plan that is adopted by the Railroad, in

order to ensure the safety of the public.

As stated earlier, FRA invites comment

on alternatives to the timing proposed

for submission of the Railroad’s system

safety plan. In addition, FRA invites

commentary on the approval process

that is proposed in this NPRM, and any

alternatives that may be more effective.

Subpart C—Signal System

Subpart C sets forth the safety

standards for the Railroad’s signal

system. This Subpart is similar to FRA’s

existing signal safety standards, 49 CFR

part 236, that apply generally to railroad

operations in this country. However,

changes have been made to account for

the differences in the signal system that

will be utilized in Florida and the high

speed train operations associated with

the FOX system.

Section 243.201 Plans, Where Kept

This section requires the Railroad to

keep plans that are necessary for the

proper maintenance and testing of the

signal and train control system at each

interlocking and intermediate track

circuit case. Plans must be legible and

accurate, in order to protect against

errors in circuitry connections. This is

consistent with the Petition and current

U.S. practices.

Section 243.202 Grounds

This proposed section requires the

Railroad to keep each circuit that affects

the safety of train operations, free from

any ground or combination of grounds

that will permit a flow of current equal

to or in excess of 75 percent of the

release value of any relay or other

electromagnetic device in the circuit.

However, the following circuits are not

included in this requirement: circuits

that include any track rail; the common

return wires of single-wire, single-break,

signal control circuits using a grounded

common; and alternating current power

distribution circuits that are grounded

in the interest of safety. This is

consistent with the Petition and current

U.S. practice.

Section 243.203 Locking of Signal

Apparatus Housings

This section requires the Railroad to

protect signal apparatus housings from

unauthorized entry. The proposal

requires the Railroad to lock, seal, or

secure all external housings of signal

and track-side automatic train control

system apparatus. The purpose of this
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section is to prevent vital components of

the signal system from being vandalized

or tampered with, which could cause

the system to malfunction. The

proposed rule is consistent with the

Petition and current U.S. practice.

Section 243.204 Design of Control

Circuits on Failsafe Principle

This section requires that the failure

of a safety-critical control circuit will

not cause a condition more permissive

than intended. Safety-critical circuits

shall be designed on a failsafe principle.

This section includes all vital circuits

and track circuits through which signal

control circuits are selected, including

any failure of the data link radio

transmission system. Circuits should be

designed so that failure of any part or

component of the circuit will cause the

most restrictive aspects to be displayed.

The proposed rule is intended to

address the design of the FOX signal

system, including electronic and

processor-based equipment.

Section 243.205 Power-operated

Switch Use

This section requires all switch

movements to be completed by poweroperated electric switch machines.

Hand-operated switches are prohibited

in territory controlled by ATC. Each

power-operated switch will be

controlled from the Railroad’s central

traffic control center. This is consistent

with the FOX petition and current U.S.

practice.

Section 243.206 Yard Operations

This section requires the Railroad to

control yard operations through the

traffic control center for the yard, and to

complete all movements in the yard at

restricted speed. This section also states

that relevant portions of 49 CFR 236.1

through 236.109 apply to signals that

are used in FOX yard operations. There

are some requirements presently in

other sections of this proposed rule that

would apply to yard operations.

However, since signals and switches

used in yard limits will be similar or

identical to conventional signal systems

currently in use in the U.S., FRA

believes that the applicable portions of

49 CFR 236.1 through 236.109 would be

more appropriate. These address such

items as design of control circuits,

operating characteristics, location of

roadway signals, and shunting

sensitivity.

Section 243.207 Timetable

Instructions

The section requires the Railroad to

designate all interlockings, automatic

train control territory, and yard limits in

timetable instructions. The designation

may be published in timetable

instructions in any manner that the

Railroad chooses. This is consistent

with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Wayside and Cab Signals

Section 243.208 Location of Wayside

Signals

This section requires FOX to position

and align each wayside signal so that its

aspects can be visually associated with

the track it governs. The proposal grants

the Railroad discretion to determine

where the wayside signals will be

positioned. FRA’s safety experts will

determine whether the location and

alignment of each signal complies with

the intent of this section and that the

signal aspect is associated with the track

governed. This section is consistent

with the Petition and current U.S.

practice.

Section 243.209 Aspects and

Indications

Paragraph (a) of this section requires

that aspects of wayside signals must be

shown by the color of lights, position of

lights, flashing of lights, or any

combination thereof. They may be

qualified by marker plate, number plate,

letter plate, marker light, or any

combination thereof. Paragraph (b)

states that the fundamental indications

of wayside signal aspects must conform

to the following: a red light or a series

of horizontal lights will indicate stop; a

yellow light or a lunar light will

indicate that speed is to be restricted

and stop may be required; and a green

light or a series of vertical lights will

indicate proceed at maximum

authorized speed. Paragraph (c) requires

that the names, indications, and aspects

of wayside and cab signals must be

defined in the Railroad’s operating rules

or special instructions, and all

modifications must be filed with the

FRA within thirty days after the

modifications take effect. Paragraph (d)

states that absence of a qualifying

appurtenance or the failure of a lamp in

a light signal may not cause the display

of a less restrictive aspect than

intended.

Paragraph (e) of this section relates to

cab display and requires all cab displays

to include the maximum authorized

speed, shown by a bar graph or a needle

in the periphery of the dial used for the

indication of train speed; the target

speed, shown by numbers; and the

target distance corresponding to the

indicated target speed, shown by a

continuously refreshed bar graph and

numbers in case of overflow of the bar

graph. Paragraph (f) states that all bar

graphs and numbers must be

illuminated so that they can be read

easily in all lighting conditions in

which the equipment will be used. This

proposed section is consistent with the

Petition and current U.S. practice.

Section 243.210 Markers

This section requires the Railroad to

equip all high speed lines with block

section markers and route origin

markers, and requires all block section

limits to be indicated by marker plates

installed along the right-of-way. These

markers must be located at adjoining

block sections and must be illuminated

during night operations and when

visibility along the line is limited.

Paragraph (c) requires that route origin

markers must be positioned at the

beginning of each route and must be

equipped with a proceed light.

Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to

provide special shunting markers at

locations that are not equipped with

route origin markers and where turnback operations may be required. This

marker must be equipped with a

shunting light.

This section, as proposed by FRA, is

very similar to portions of the Petition,

except that FRA requires the block

section limits to be illuminated and

FOX proposed that the block section

limits would be indicated by

retroreflective marker plates. FRA

believes that, given the speed trains will

travel and the frequent storms that occur

in Florida, lighted markers enhance the

safety of the system, and impose little

financial burden. This addition should

ensure that locomotive engineers

recognize block sections, which is

particularly important for occasions

when an engineer must rely on the

block sections during any interruption

of the ATC system.

Section 243.211 Spacing of Beacons

This proposed section requires the

Railroad to design the ATC system and

beacon spacing so that the locomotive

engineer can comply with any imposed

speed restriction by initiating a service

brake application, and if the locomotive

engineer fails to react, an automatic

brake application will occur. In ATC

territory, the braking distances must be

designed in order to compensate for

delay time, which will ensure the

trainset complies with the target speed

and distance through the brake

application initiated by the system. An

aspect that mandates a stop at the next

signal requires sufficient spacing so that

a stop can be achieved before reaching

the next signal, without an emergency

brake application. These proposed

sections apply to all systems, including
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the Railroad’s high wind, flood,

intrusion, and dragging equipment

protective devices. The section is

consistent with the FOX petition and

U.S. practice.

Track Circuits

Section 243.212 Track Circuit

Requirements

This proposed section sets forth a

variety of track circuit requirements.

Generally, track relay controlling home

signals or beacons must be in the deenergized position, or a device that

functions as a track relay controlling

home signals or beacons must be in its

most restrictive state. In addition, the

track circuit must be de-energized when

a rail is broken or a rail or switch-frog

is removed or when a trainset occupies

any part of the track circuit. It will not

be a violation if a track circuit is

energized because a break occurs

between the end of rail and track circuit

connector; within the limits of rail-joint

bond, appliance or other protective

device, which provides a bypath for the

electric current; or, as a result of leakage

current or foreign current in the rear of

a point where a break occurs.

This proposed section is consistent

with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.213 Track Circuit

Shunting Sensitivity

This proposed section requires the

Railroad to maintain each track circuit

controlling a home signal so that the

track relay is in a de-energized position,

or a device that functions as a track

relay will be in its most restrictive state

if, when the track circuit is dry, a shunt

is connected across the track rails of the

circuit, including fouling sections of

turnouts. The electric resistance of the

shunt must be: 0.15 Ohm on open track

and 0.25 Ohm in interlocking areas.

These values are given for use with a

ballast of 8 Ohm per kilometer (0.62 mi)

resistance and is consistent with the

FOX petition.

The proposed signal system will

utilize jointless audio frequency track

circuits on the main line. Typical track

circuits on the FOX main line will be

center fed, using one transmitter at the

center and a receiver at each end of the

circuit. In crossover areas, circuits will

be combined with sequential release

logic in the interlocking controllers to

ensure protection against poor wheelrail contact on seldom-used rail. Jointed

high-voltage impulse track circuits must

be used in the yards and maintenance

facilities.

Section 243.214 Insulated Rail Joints

This section requires the Railroad to

maintain insulated rail joints so that the

failure of any track circuit, caused by

track circuit current that flows between

insulated rails, will be prevented. This

is consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice.

Section 243.215 Fouling Wires

This section requires that fouling

wires consist of at least two discrete

conductors, and that each be of

sufficient conductivity and maintained

in such condition that the track relay

will be in de-energized position, or the

device that functions as a track relay

will be in its most restrictive state, when

the circuit is shunted. This is consistent

with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.216 Turnout, Fouling

Section

This section requires rail joints within

the fouling section to be bonded, and

the fouling section to extend at least to

a point where sufficient track centers

and allowance for maximum car

overhang will prevent interference with

trainset movement on the adjacent track.

It is important that all rail joints are

bonded to ensure continuity of track

circuits. The proposed rule is consistent

with the FOX petition and U.S. practice.

Wires and Cables

Section 243.217 Protection of

Insulated Wire; Splice in Underground

Wire; Aerial Cable

This section requires insulated wire to

be protected from mechanical injury,

any splice in underground wire to have

insulation resistance at least equal to the

wire spliced, and all aerial cable to be

supported by messenger. This is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice. Insulated wire must be

positioned in such a manner that it

cannot be damaged by the operation of

apparatus, vehicles, tools, workers, or

by closing doors. Temporary installation

of cable or wires on top of the ground

is prohibited by this section.

Section 243.218 Tagging of Wires and

Interference of Wires or Tags With

Signal Apparatus

This section requires the Railroad to

tag or otherwise mark each wire so that

it can be identified at each terminal.

Tags and other identifiers must be made

of insulating material, arranged so that

they do not interfere with the moving

parts of equipment, and correspond

with the circuit plans. The proposed

rule is consistent with the FOX petition

and U.S. practice.

Standards

Section 243.219 Control Circuits;

Requirements

This section of the proposal requires

the Railroad to install each signal or

beacon that governs train movements

into a block section so that it will

convey its most restrictive state as long

as any of the following conditions exist

within the block: a trainset occupies the

block, points of a switch are not closed

in proper position; a track relay is in deenergized position or a device which

functions as a track relay is in its most

restrictive state; or, when a signal

control circuit is de-energized. This

section reflects the unique

characteristics of the FOX beacon and

loop transmission signal system (TBL)

and is consistent with the Petition.

Section 243.220 Control Circuits for

Signals, Selection Through Point

Detector Operated by Switch Movement

This section requires that control

circuit(s) for each signal aspect or

beacon, which conveys an indication

more favorable than ‘‘proceed at

restricted speed’’ for signal governing

movements over switches, be selected

through a point detector operated

directly by switch points for each

switch, movable-point frog, and derail

in the routes governed by such signal or

beacon. Circuits must be arranged so

that the signal or beacon can convey an

indication more favorable than ‘‘proceed

at restricted speed’’ only when each

switch, movable-point frog, and derail

in the route is in proper position. This

section reflects the FOX TBL system and

is consistent with the Petition.

Section 243.221 Time Locking; Where

Required

This section of the proposal requires

the Railroad to provide time locking in

conjunction with signal aspects or

beacons that convey indications more

favorable than ‘‘proceed at restricted

speed.’’ FRA will expect that any signal

that displays an aspect more favorable

than ‘‘proceed at restricted speed’’ will

have time locking. This requirement

would apply regardless of any speed

restrictions that may be placed on a

stretch of track at any given time. The

time locking must be effective for the

maximum authorized speed that is

permitted on each route. Also, this

section requires the Railroad to provide

locking for all interlocking signals

where route or direction of traffic can be

changed. FRA’s proposal differs from

the Petition by using the term

‘‘interlocking signals’’ rather

than’controlled signals’ because the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65499

FOX system will consist of

interlockings.

Section 243.222 Indication Locking

This proposed section requires the

Railroad to provide indication locking

for switches, movable-point frogs, and

derails. Indication locking should

prevent the clearing of signals governing

movements over switches, movablepoint frogs, and derails until each

operative unit has completed its

required movement. This is consistent

with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.223 Electric Locking

Circuits

This proposed section requires the

Railroad to provide vital design

methods to prevent the system from

displaying aspects that will result in

conflicting or unsafe movements. The

operation of controlling devices, logic,

or apparatus are required to succeed

each other in proper sequence before a

proceed aspect can be displayed. Vital

design methods in interlocking circuitry

shall prevent ‘‘proceed’’ aspects from

being displayed for conflicting

movements.

Section 243.224 Loss of Shunt

Protection; Where Required

This section requires that loss of

shunt protection not permit the release

of the route locking circuit of each

power-operated switch. The loss of

shunt protection must be based on a

sequential release logic. Sequential

release logic requires that when any

track circuit becomes occupied in

logical sequence from a previous track

circuit, in combination with an

established train route, its status will

not be allowed to return to unoccupied,

even though the detected shunt may be

lost, until a specified safe time interval

after the next track circuit in the route

becomes occupied. This section is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice.

Section 243.225 Signal Control

Circuits, Selection Through Track

Relays or Devices Functioning as Track

Relays

This section requires control circuits

for signal aspects or beacons, which

convey indications more favorable than

‘‘proceed at restricted speed,’’ to be

selected through track relays, or through

devices that function as track relays, for

all track circuits in the route governed.

This section would not apply to control

circuits of signals displaying aspects

with indications of ‘‘proceed at

restricted speed.’’ This is consistent

with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.226 Switch, MovablePoint Frog or Split-point Derail

This section requires the Railroad to

equip switches, movable-point frogs, or

split-point derails with clamp locks on

each switch or movable point frog and

to maintain it so that it cannot be locked

when the point is open 6 mm (.25 in)

or more. Each high speed turnout on the

main line must be equipped with a pair

of switch machines (one for the points

and one for the movable frog), clamp

locks, and position detectors.

Section 243.227 Point Detector

This proposed section requires the

Railroad to maintain point detectors so

that when switch mechanisms are

locked in normal or reverse position,

contacts cannot be opened by manually

applying force at the closed switch

point. Point detector circuit controllers

must be maintained so that the contacts

will not assume the position

corresponding to switch point closure if

the switch point is prevented by an

obstruction, from closing to within 6

mm (0.25 in). This is consistent with the

Petition.

Section 243.228 Signals Controlled by

Track Circuits

This section requires control circuits

for aspects with indications more

favorable than ‘‘proceed at restricted

speed’’ to be controlled by track circuits

extending through an entire block

section. A block section would extend

from signal to signal, or from signal to

its defined limits at end of the system.

This section is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.229 Circuits at

Interlocking

This proposed section prevents

circuits at interlockings from displaying

aspects that would permit conflicting

movements. FRA’s proposal uses the

term ‘‘interlocking’’ rather than the FOX

term, ‘‘control point,’’ because the

proposed system will actually consist of

interlockings.

Section 243.230 Signals at Adjacent

Interlockings

This proposed section requires signals

at adjacent interlockings to be arranged

so that movements at greater than

restricted speed cannot be displayed

simultaneously for conflicting

movements. The intent of this section is

to ensure that the maximum authorized

speed between adjacent interlockings

where signals can simultaneously

display aspects indicating ‘‘proceed at

restricted speed’’ may not exceed 20

mph, regardless of more favorable

aspects displayed. This is consistent

with U.S. practice.

Section 243.231 Track Signaled for

Movements in Both Directions, Change

of Direction of Traffic

This section requires that where track

is signaled for train movement in both

directions, occupancy of the track

between opposing signals at adjacent

interlockings must prevent changing the

direction of traffic from that which was

obtained at the time the track became

occupied. After a train, locomotive, or

power car has passed a signal displaying

an aspect permitting it to proceed into

and through an interlocking, the

opposing signals at the adjacent

interlocking will not be permitted to

display any aspect with an indication

other than ‘‘stop,’’ so long as the section

of track between interlockings is

occupied. The only exception to this

applies in instances when a train is left

on the main track while its locomotive,

power car and/or cars move into an

adjacent siding or yard for switching

purposes and must, in returning to its

train, reverse its direction for a short

distance. It would be permissible in

such instances to permit such

movements to be made with a signal

aspect indicating ‘‘proceed not to

exceed restricted speed’’ into the

occupied block.

Section 243.232 Route Locking

The section requires the Railroad to

provide route locking at all

interlockings where power-operated

switches are located. When a train,

locomotive, or power car passes a signal

displaying any type of proceed aspect,

including ‘‘proceed at restricted speed,’’

over power operated switches, track

circuits and route locking would be

required.

Section 243.233 Wayside Detectors

This section addresses all of the

wayside detection systems that will be

located in the FOX right-of-way and

connected to the Railroad’s central

traffic control system. The Railroad

must establish guidelines for the events

that trigger the detection systems in

such a way that all potentially

hazardous occurrences are conveyed to

the signal system or central traffic

control.

Paragraph (c) of this section requires

the Railroad to install fall intrusion

detectors at all highway, animal, and

non-Railroad equipment overpasses and

underpasses. Fall intrusion detectors

must be activated when the network of

protective wiring located at each

overpass and underpass experiences a

partial or complete break, and this
65500 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

information must be transmitted to

central traffic control continuously. The

Railroad’s system safety plan must list

the location of all fall intrusion

detectors, and dictate the actions that

will be taken when intrusions occur.

Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to

install an intrusion detection system in

the protective fencing along the Railroad

right-of-way that must restrict, to the

fullest extent possible, unauthorized

entry by trespassers, personnel,

equipment, and animals. This system

shall be installed at each location that

is identified in the system safety plan as

an area where intrusion is likely to

occur. This system must be connected to

the Railroad’s signal system and to the

central traffic control system, and must

alert the Railroad to any intrusion. Also,

the Railroad must explain in detail

where intrusion is likely to occur and

why, and set forth specific actions that

will be taken when intrusion occurs.

Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad to

install dragging equipment detectors at

all locations where underframe repair or

maintenance work is performed, and at

other locations determined necessary by

the system safety plan. This system

must transmit data continuously to the

central traffic control so that Railroad

personnel can make appropriate

adjustments in operations. The Railroad

must explain, in detail, in the system

safety plan where dragging equipment is

likely to occur and why, and prescribe

specific actions that will be taken when

dragging equipment is located. The

Petition proposed to locate these

detectors only where underframe repair

and maintenance work is completed,

but FRA believes that dragging

equipment may actually occur more

often at other locations throughout the

system. FRA believes that when a rail

unit leaves a repair facility it is less

likely to be in defective condition than

when it travels other portions of the

system. Also, equipment that is entering

or leaving repair facilities will not be

carrying passengers, and so the risk of

injury at these locations is minimal.

Therefore, FRA proposes in this section

that the Railroad, in the process of the

system safety analysis, determine where

the risk of dragged equipment exists,

and place detectors at those locations.

Paragraph (f) requires the Railroad to

install flood detectors where determined

necessary by the system safety plan.

This determination must include

consideration of drainage, culverts,

bridges, overpasses, underpasses, and

flood plain status along the right-of-way.

The flood detection system must alert

the signal system and central traffic

control of any location where an

accumulation of water exists in the

right-of-way that may present a risk to

a right-of-way structure or in-service

railroad equipment. The Railroad’s

system safety plan must include specific

actions that will be taken when high

water is detected.

Paragraph (g) requires the Railroad to

install wind detectors along the right-ofway, where it is determined to be

necessary pursuant to area wind and

weather patterns, topography, and

proximity to large bodies of water. Wind

speed data must be conveyed to the

central traffic control continuously so

that Railroad personnel may make

operational changes when necessary.

The Railroad’s system safety plan must

explain where and why wind detectors

are located along the right-of-way, list

the speeds and conditions at which

operational safety is compromised; and

set forth the specific actions that will be

taken when those wind speeds occur.

Paragraph (h) requires the Railroad to

install and maintain hot box detectors

along the length of the right-of-way to

detect the journal bearing temperature

of all moving rail equipment. The

wayside detectors must be arranged so

that the journal bearing temperature on

both sides of each train, and on each

track, is monitored. The detectors must

be located at least once every twentyfive miles, and must be linked to the

signal system to alert the locomotive

engineer or the central traffic control

system, or both, depending on the level

of the overheating, so that Railroad

personnel can take appropriate action.

This system shall include a hierarchy of

alarms, which will alert the Railroad to

the level of overheating that is occurring

and bring about corresponding actions.

For instance, when journal bearing

temperature could cause safety-critical

components to fail in operation, the

detection system will cause the

defective train to stop at a designated

block marker, and cause all passing

trains to slow to a speed of 50 mph or

less. When the detectors reveal defective

equipment that is less serious, but may

result in unsafe operations, the system

will require the equipment to move to

the next siding, where it will be

inspected before movement. Finally, the

system will include inspection

threshold alarms that will alert the

Railroad to journal bearing temperature

in a trainset that is significantly higher

than the average temperature taken on

the other journal bearings. This alarm

will be transmitted to the central

maintenance facility so that the

appropriate inspection and repair can be

completed.

The Petition contained several

sections on wayside detection systems.

FRA has consolidated the concept by

placing them together in subpart C, and

we require the Railroad to develop the

detectors in conjunction with the

system safety analysis required by

subpart B of this NRPM. The Petition

did not contain sufficient clarity

concerning the detection systems,

which conditions would trigger a

Railroad response, and what the

Railroad response would be, and so FRA

invites comment from FOX and other

interested parties on the language we

propose in this section. It is difficult to

predetermine what events may occur in

Florida and how the Railroad should

respond to varying levels of high wind

or water, for instance. FRA believes that

the system safety approach is the most

effective way of dealing with all of the

factors and conditions that may arise in

Florida, and so we have added that

connection to the proposed rule text.

However, FRA is also concerned that

this section may not yet be clear

enough, in terms of providing notice to

the Railroad and interested parties on

the appropriate activity that must

accompany potentially unsafe events,

and what degree of safety is

compromised before the activity is

required. Therefore, FRA requests

comments from the public on suggested

language or concepts that may more

fully address the risk factors presented.

Section 243.234 Protection of

Maintenance-of-Way Personnel

This section requires that the

signaling system include circuitry to

lock-out particular block sections and

restrict the speed of passing trains on

these block sections or adjacent trackage

for the protection of maintenance of way

personnel, and that corresponding

procedures be covered in the Operating

Rules. This is consistent with the

Petition and current U.S. requirements.

FOX proposes that after receiving

authorization from the CTC center,

roadway workers would be able to

ensure their safety by use of a local

switch that will protect them from

unsafe or inconsistent train movements.

Section 243.235 ATC Device

Installation

This section requires that each power

vehicle capable of being the lead vehicle

be equipped with an automatic train

control or ATC device that will operate

when the trainset travels at a speed of

more than 32 km/h (20 mph). This is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice. It is important to note that FOX

is designing the system to operate so

that, if the ATC system does not operate

correctly when the speed is greater than

32 km/h (20 mph), external backup
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65501

speed control equipment will limit the

speed to 32 km/h (20 mph).

Section 243.236 Forestalling Device

and Speed Control

Paragraph (a) of this section

establishes the requirements of the ATC

system arrangement. Paragraph (b)

establishes required features of the ATC

system, such as braking supervision and

maximum speed supervision. This

section is consistent with the Petition

and U.S. practice, although the system

is more advanced than systems in use in

this country at the present time. FOX is

designing the ATC system to

incorporate the following: (1) Multiple

processor architecture and on-board

equipment; (2) Trackside encoders

sending messages through the track

beacons and short cable loops,

providing notifications of upcoming

curves and gradients in the next portion

of the line, distances to point, and speed

restrictions; (3) On-board equipment

that calculates the braking curve

requirements with respect to the data

received.

Section 243.237 Cab Signal Indication

in Accordance With Maximum Speed

Limit

This section requires that while

providing maximum speed supervision,

the Railroad’s ATC system will provide

a cab signal indication of the maximum

authorized speed. This will provide the

locomotive engineer with valuable

speed authorization information. The

proposal is consistent with the petition

and U.S. standards.

Section 243.238 Automatic Brake

Application; Initiation When the

Maximum Speed Limit Is Exceeded

This section requires that the

Railroad’s ATC system operate to

initiate an automatic brake application

when the speed of the train exceeds the

maximum speed intervention curve.

The Automatic brake application can be

interrupted by the locomotive engineer

only when the speed of the train is

lower than the maximum authorized

speed. This is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice. The FOX

design includes supervision for a local

maximum authorized speed which will

consist of: (1) Providing a cab indication

of the maximum allowed speed; (2)

issuing an audible and/or visual

warning if the trainset speed exceeds

the maximum allowed speed by a

predefined margin and; (3)

automatically applying the brake if the

trainset speed exceeds the maximum

authorized speed by a predefined

margin.

Section 243.239 Advance Cab Signal

Indication.

This section requires that the ATC

system provide a cab signal indication

of the target speed and distance before

commencing the braking supervision,

thus allowing the locomotive engineer

to respond by a manual brake

application. The section is consistent

with the petition and U.S. standards.

The opportunity for information

enabling a manual brake application by

the locomotive engineer is obviously

more desirable than resorting to ATC

system braking intervention.

Section 243.240 Automatic Brake

Application Initiated by the ATC

This section requires that the ATC

system initiate an automatic brake

application to ensure compliance with

target speed and target distance, in the

absence of an appropriate response to a

cab display indication on the part of the

locomotive engineer. This is consistent

with the Petition and U.S. practice. The

FOX system will be designed so that

prior to intervention, the ATC system

will provide an audible and/or visual

warning so that intervention will be

avoided if the engineer reacts within a

pre-defined delay.

Section 243.241 Cab Signal Indication

After Authorization to Enter a Block

Section Where Conditions Defined in

§ 243.219 Exist

Paragraph (a) of this section requires

that if a trainset is authorized to enter

a block section in which any condition

listed in § 423.219 of this Part exists, the

ATC system must display an indication

to ‘‘Proceed at Restricted Speed.’’

Paragraph (b) requires if the restricted

speed is exceeded, the ATC must

initiate an automatic brake application.

This is consistent with the Petition and

U.S. practice. This section will ensure

that if another trainset is occupying the

block, a switch point is not closed in the

proper position or something such as a

broken rail is causing a track relay to be

deenergized, the trainset authorized to

enter such block will be protected from

a collision or derailment.

Section 243.242 Audible Indicator

This section requires that the audible

cab indicator have two distinctive

sounds and be clearly audible

throughout the cab under all operating

conditions. When the cab display

changes, the audible indicator will

sound briefly (for approximately 0.5

seconds) to draw the locomotive

engineer’s attention to the change. This

sound will be used to draw the

engineer’s attention when there is some

change in the speed authorization,

whether permissive or restrictive. There

will be no acknowledgment necessary

for this sound. A different audible

warning will sound before an automatic

brake application is initiated. The

warning will be given in sufficient time

to allow the locomotive engineer and

the train brake equipment to respond to

the change. This indicator will sound

continuously until the warning

condition disappears. The section is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice. Methods to silence or muffle

the audible indicator, such as tampering

with the audible device, would be

prohibited.

Section 243.243 Delay Time

This section requires that the delay

time of the ATC train-borne equipment

ensure that the trainset complies with

the target speed and distance through

the brake application initiated by the

system. This section is consistent with

the Petition. The principle of the ATC

system does not factor in a preset delay

time of 8 seconds, as is required by 49

C.F.R. 236.563. Instead, the system

permanently checks the level of braking

available on the train and takes into

account these data to compute the

warning and braking curves.

Section 243.244 Automatic Brake

Application; Full Service

This section requires that an

automatic brake application initiated by

the ATC system will cause a full service

application of the brakes. This is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice. FRA will consider a full

service brake application to be an

application of the brakes, other than

emergency, which develops the

maximum brake cylinder pressure, as

determined by the design of the brake

equipment for the speed at which the

train is operating.

Section 243.245 Interference With

Application of Brakes by Means of

Brake Valve

This section will ensure that the ATC

apparatus is arranged so the automatic

application of the brakes cannot be

interfered with by means of the brake

valve and the efficiency of the braking

system will not be impaired, thus

assuring safe train movements. This is

consistent with the Petition and with

U.S. practice.

Section 243.246 Control From Lead

Vehicle

This section requires that each

trainset be controlled and operated from

the lead vehicle. Each lead vehicle will

be equipped with an ATC device. This

device will have a fail safe and fault
65502 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

tolerant architecture, such as a two out

of three voting architecture. This is

consistent with the Petition and

constitutes a desirable method of

ensuring safety of train operation and

system reliability.

As defined in this proposal, ‘‘fault

tolerant architecture’’ means the built-in

capability of a system to provide

continued (full or limited) operation in

the presence of a limited number of

faults or failures of the system, such as

a defect in a hardware device,

component or an incorrect step, process

or data definition in a computer

program.

‘‘Two out of three voting architecture’’

means three independent processors

operating on dissimilar software

operating in such a manner so as to

compare the software output from each

processor to ensure safety critical results

match. If one processor produces an

answer inconsistent with the other two

processors the conflicting processor is

taken off-line and the two remaining

processors continue to compare with

each other and drive safety critical

commands, only as long as they both

agree. If the remaining two processors

fail to agree, the system will cease to

issue safety critical commands and will

be shut down and assume a safe state.

Section 243.247 Proper Operative

Relation Between Parts Along Roadway

and Parts on Power Car

This section requires that ATC trackside and power car components be

designed and operate in compatibility

under all conditions of speed, weather,

wear, oscillation, and shock. This

section is consistent with the Petition

and U.S. practice, and will ensure ATC

system reliability under various outside

influences.

Section 243.248 Visibility of Cab

Signals

This section requires that cab signals

be plainly visible to the locomotive or

power car crew from their stations in

the cab. The proposal is consistent with

the Petition and U.S. practice. Cab

signals will be required to be installed

so that the crew member or members

can plainly see aspects displayed from

their normal position in the cab. The

cab signal will be required to be

properly illuminated, without cracked

or broken roundels and its view not

obstructed by other equipment installed

in the cab.

Section 243.249 Power Supply

This section requires that the ATC

system operate from a separate or

isolated power supply. The proposal is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice. Power supplies for ATC

systems should be separate and distinct

to eliminate interference from other

electrical control circuits, thus ensuring

reliable power to the ATC system.

Section 243.250 Seal, Where Required

This section requires that a seal be

maintained on any device other than the

brake-pipe cut-out cock (double-heading

cock), where the operation of the

pneumatic portion of the automatic

train-control apparatus can be cut out.

This is consistent with the Petition and

U.S. practice. The seal is required to be

applied in such a manner that the

device cannot be operated to cut out the

apparatus without breaking the seal.

This provides a means to prevent

tampering with the ATC system.

Section 243.251 Rate of Pressure

Reduction; Equalizing Reservoir or

Brake Pipe

This section will ensure that

equalizing-reservoir pressure or brakepipe pressure reduction during an

automatic brake application will be at

least equal to a manual service brake

application. This is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice, and will

prevent an automatic brake application

from being less effective than an

application by the locomotive engineer.

Section 243.252 Restrictions Imposed

When Device Fails and/or is Cut Out En

Route

Paragraph (a) of this section provides

instructions for train operation in the

event of ATC system failure or when the

ATC system is cut-out en route. It is

important to note that, for purposes of

Subpart C, the ATC system will be

considered to be in failure when two or

more of the on-board processors are not

operating as intended. If one on-board

processor malfunctions, the remaining

two are designed to capably operate the

train safety, and so this event will not

be considered to be an ATC failure. It

is also important to note that, for

purposes of this Subpart, ATC failures

are not limited to malfunctioning onboard processors. A variety of

conditions may occur to result in ATC

failure, and all of them are

contemplated by the language in this

Subpart.

Paragraph (b) requires that where an

ATC system fails or is cut out en route,

the Railroad must test the ATC, record

the results in accordance with § 243.276

(departure test) and § 243.278 (results of

tests), and determine that the ATC is

fully operative before the trainset leaves

its next initial terminal. This section is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice.

Section 243.253 The Trackage

This section requires that the trackage

over which the Railroad operates trains

in revenue service be completely

equipped with wayside equipment

designed to interface with and provide

safety control commands to the lead

vehicle of trainsets which operate over

that trackage. Signaling beacons and

antennas will be installed and

maintained in accordance with

manufacturer’s specifications. This is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice. The ATC system wayside

equipment proposed by FOX will

consist of active beacons and cable

loops which will be used to transmit

intermittent and semi-continuous data

from the track to the train. The

appropriate quantity of beacons and

loops will be calculated in order to meet

performance targets and will be adapted

to the local conditions. Wayside

encoders will be used to store

permanent data for the topology of the

line, and the data sent to the train

through beacons and loops will

interface with the interlocking system.

Section 243.254 Cut Out of the ATC

System

This section requires that any cut out

of the ATC system or activation of the

acknowledging device be registered in

the on-board event recorder. This is

consistent with the Petition and an

improvement over current U.S. practice,

which currently involves keeping a

record of system cut-out. This section

will ensure accurate data depicting any

ATC system intervention.

Reporting Requirements

Section 243.255 Accidents Resulting

from Signal Failure

This section requires that the

occurrence of an accident/incident

arising from the failure of an appliance,

device, method or system to function or

indicate as required by this NPRM that

results in a more favorable aspect than

intended or other conditions hazardous

to the movement of a train, shall be

reported within 24 hours to the FRA by

toll free telephone number, 800–424–

0201. This is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.256 Signal Failure Reports

This section establishes a time period

of five days in which the Railroad must

report each failure of an appliance,

device, method, or system to function or

indicate as required by these standards

that results in a more favorable aspect

than intended or other condition

hazardous to the movement of a train.

Form FRA F6180–14, ‘‘Signal Failure
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65503

Report,’’ must be used for this purpose

and completed in accordance with

instructions printed on the form. This

section is consistent with the Petition

and will constitute a recordkeeping

requirement. Current U.S. requirements

dictate a time period of fifteen days.

However, since this is a controlled

environment and proper ATC system

operation will be vital to the safety of

the passenger trains operating at high

speeds, there is a need for faster

notification by the Railroad and an FRA

investigation concerning any unsafe

signal failure.

Section 243.257 Annual Signal

Systems Report

This section requires that the railroad

file an annual signal systems report,

which will detail current signal system

information, on a form provided by FRA

in accordance with instructions and

definitions on the reverse side of the

form. This section was not in the

Petition, but is consistent with current

U.S. practice.

Inspection, Testing and Maintenance

Section 243.258 General

This section requires that the

Railroad’s inspection, testing and

maintenance program be designed to

ensure that the safety of the Railroad’s

signaling system does not deteriorate

over time, in accordance with § 243.107

of this proposal.

Section 243.259 Interference with

Normal Functioning of Device

This section requires that inspection,

testing and maintenance will not

interfere with or alter the normal

functioning of any signal device, except

after measures are in place to provide

for the safety of train operations that

depend on normal functioning of such

device. This is consistent with the

petition and U.S. practice. Interference

would be any condition that

circumvents, hinders, impedes, or

diminishes whatsoever the intended

protection of a device, and may be done

by testing, installing, repairing,

replacing, operating, or manipulating a

component indicating or affecting the

indication of safe passage for trains.

There will be no difference between

accidental or intentional interference

with respect to the enforcement of this

rule.

Section 243.260 Operating

Characteristics of Electromagnetic,

Electronic, or Electrical Apparatus

This section requires that signal

apparatus which affects the safety of

train operations, be maintained in

accordance with the design limits of the

device. This is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice. The railroad

must have specifications setting forth

the pick-up values, release values,

working values, and condemning limits

of these values for all applicable signal

apparatus in use on its property.

Manufacturer specifications or Railroad

standards compatible with manufacturer

specifications will be used to determine

such values.

Section 243.261 Adjustment, Repair,

or Replacement of Component

This section requires that when any

component of a signal system that is

essential to the safety of train operation

fails to perform its intended signaling

function or does not correspond with

known operating conditions, the cause

shall be determined and the faulty

component adjusted, repaired or

replaced as soon as possible. This is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice. The Railroad would be

required to determine the cause of each

‘‘stop’’ or ‘‘stop and proceed’’ aspect

resulting from an unknown condition. If

that condition is the result of the failure

of a signaling component and is a

hazard to safe operations, corrective

action is required before the next train

movement.

Section 243.262 Purpose of Inspection

and Tests; Removal From Service of a

Relay or Device Failing to Meet Test

Requirements

This section requires all inspections

and tests to be made in accordance with

the specifications of the Railroad and

approved by FRA as part of the system

safety plan. Tests should be made to

determine if the equipment is

maintained in the appropriate condition

so that it will consistently perform its

intended function. Any electronic

device, relay, or other electromagnetic

device that fails to meet the

requirements of the specified tests will

be removed from service, and not

returned to service until its operating

characteristics are consistent with the

design limits. This is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice. This section

would apply to all devices that effect

the safety of train operations. It is

understood and accepted throughout the

railroad industry that all signal devices

must be designed so that the limits of

their operating characteristics provide

adequate safety margins.

Section 243.263 Point Detector Test

This section requires the Railroad to

test point detectors operated by poweroperated switch movement at least once

every three months. This test ensures

that a safe tolerance of switch point

closure is maintained. This section is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice.

Section 243.264 Relays;

Microprocessor Testing

Paragraph (a) of this section requires

that each safety-critical, train-borne

ATC relay be tested at least once each

year to ensure the correct parameters of

the relays. Paragraph (b) requires that

each safety-critical, wayside relay be

tested at least once every four years to

ensure the correct parameters of the

relays. Paragraph (c) requires the

Railroad to test each safety-critical,

train-borne electronic subsystem which

is not verified internally on a

continuous basis at least once each year.

Paragraph (d) provides that each safetycritical, train-borne electronic

subsystem, in which proper operation is

verified internally in a closed loop

fashion, will not require periodic tests.

Subsystems that contain continuous

verification will not need to be tested

because of their fail safe design.

Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad to

test each safety-critical wayside

electronic subsystem, which is not

verified internally on a continuous

basis, at least once every two years.

Paragraph (f) provides that each safetycritical wayside electronic subsystem, in

which proper operation is verified

internally in a closed loop fashion, will

not require periodic tests.

The paragraphs in this section are

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice. Although the relay testing

requirements of this rule are based on

49 CFR part 236, new language has been

added to this proposal in order to

address microprocessors.

Section 243.265 Ground Tests

Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to

test for grounds on each safety-critical

energy bus furnishing power to circuits

at least once every three months.

Paragraphs (b) and (c) provide

exceptions to this requirement. Periodic

ground tests would not be required if

ground detection devices are properly

functioning, or if the design of circuits

is such that a grounded energy bus

could not impact the safety of train

operation. An inspection of the ground

detection device to ensure proper

operation of the device will be required

at least once every three months. This

section is consistent with the Petition,

except for the inspection of ground

detection devices, and with U.S.

practice, except that ground tests are not

required when automatic detection

devices are used. If ground detection

devices are used, such devices should
65504 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

be verified for proper operation on a

periodic basis.

Section 243.266 Insulation Resistance

Tests; Wires in Trunking and Cables

Paragraph (a) of this section requires

that an insulation resistance test of

signal system wires and cables be made

at least once every 10 years to ensure

that circuit conductors are in proper

working order for the safe operation of

the signal system. Paragraph (b)

provides that a circuit may not be

permitted to function on a conductor

that has an insulation resistance to

ground or between conductors of less

than 200,000 ohms. When a test reveals

this condition, the conductor must be

removed from service immediately to

avoid the risk of an unsafe failure in the

Railroad’s signal system. This section is

consistent with the FOX petition and

U.S. practice.

Section 243.267 Time Releases,

Timing Relays and Timing Devices

This section requires the Railroad to

test time releases, timing relays, and

timing devices at least once each year.

The timing must be maintained at no

less than 90 percent of the

predetermined time interval, to ensure

adequate predetermined parameters,

such as train braking distance

calculations. The predetermined time

will be shown on the plans or marked

on the time release, timing relay, or

timing device. Where time releases are

an integral part of a safety-critical,

processor-based controller, and are

specified in the applications program,

such intervals must be tested only at the

time of installation and whenever a

change is made in the applications

program. This section is consistent with

the Petition and with U.S. practice.

Section 243.268 Time Locking

This section requires that where time

locking is an integral part of a safetycritical, processor-based controller, and

is specified in the applications program,

the locking will be tested at the time of

installation and whenever a change is

made in the applications program. This

is consistent with the Petition. The time

locking test will determine that no route

can be changed until a predetermined

amount of time has expired, ensuring

the safe movement of the train whose

route has been established. There will

be no periodic testing required under

this rule, such as once every two years,

which is required in 49 CFR part 236,

because the vital logic processor of the

interlocking controller will employ two

processors that operate simultaneously

in a redundant, checking-system

architecture. All safety-critical

operations will be continuously

performed by both processors. The solid

state controller will be based on closed

loop principles, software diversity, and

the use of vital hardware design

techniques.

Section 243.269 Route Locking

This section similarly requires the

Railroad to test route locking at the time

of installation, whenever a change is

made in the applications program, and

when route locking has been

disarranged. This is consistent with the

Petition, except that FRA has included

the test requirement ‘‘when route

locking has been disarranged.’’ In this

context, the term ‘‘disarranged’’ could

apply to several circumstances. Route

locking will be considered to be

disarranged when: a vital relay, if used,

in the route locking circuit is replaced

with another; when two or more

conductors are severed; when a cable or

conductor in a locking circuit is

replaced with another; or when wires

are removed at the same time from more

than one terminal of a relay or terminal

board. The route locking test will

determine that a train’s route cannot be

changed once the train has passed a

signal indicating proceed until the train

has cleared the track section of the route

governed. No periodic testing is

required by this proposal for the reasons

previously stated in § 243.268.

Section 243.270 Indication Locking

This section similarly requires that

indication locking be tested at the time

of installation, whenever a change is

made in the applications program and

when the indication locking has been

disarranged. This is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice, except that

no periodic testing is required for the

reasons stated previously. The

indication locking test will ensure that

no conflicting route can be established,

and no power-operated switch can be

moved with a route already established

for a train.

Section 243.271 Traffic Locking

This proposed section requires the

Railroad to test traffic locking at the

time of installation and whenever a

change is made in the applications

program. This is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice, except that

there will be no periodic testing

required by this rule for the reasons

stated previously. The traffic locking

test will determine that the direction of

train traffic cannot be changed, for

instance, an opposing proceed signal

displayed, where a route is already

established for a train in one direction.

Section 243.272 Switch Obstruction

Test

This section requires the Railroad to

conduct a switch obstruction test of

each switch when the lock rod is

installed, and at least once every 3

months. This section is consistent with

the Petition. This deviates from the

monthly switch obstruction test

currently required of existing railroads

because of the differences in the FOX

operating environment. FRA believes

that switches will experience little or no

variation from their original

adjustments.

Section 243.273 Locomotive or

Powercar Power Supply Voltage

Requirement

This section requires that the output

voltage of the power supply for FOX

locomotive ATC will be maintained

within 10 percent of rated voltage. This

will ensure adequate and steady energy

to operate the ATC system. This section

is consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice.

Section 243.274 Power-Car or

Locomotive Insulation Resistance;

Requirement

This section requires that when the

periodic test prescribed in § 243.266 is

performed, insulation resistance

between wiring and ground of the

automatic train control system may not

be less than one megohm. This deviates

from the Petition by stating a value for

minimum insulation resistance. This

requirement is based on current practice

for existing operations in this country.

The standard referred to in the FOX

Petition for insulation resistance (EN–

50155) does not state a minimum value,

and hence, provides no notice as to

what the standard is and would be

unenforceable.

Section 243.275 Antennas and

Beacons

This section requires the Railroad to

inspect and maintain signaling beacons

and antennas in accordance with

manufacturer’s specifications. Also,

antennas and beacons that have been

repaired or rewound must adhere to the

same operating characteristics which

they possessed originally or as specified

for new equipment. This proposal

would ensure that the beacons or

antennas are in condition sufficient to

transmit reliable data to the on-board

ATC equipment. This section is

consistent with the Petition and U.S.

standards.

Section 243.276 Departure Test

Paragraph (a) of this section requires

the Railroad to test the train-borne ATC
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65505

equipment by operation over track

elements, by operation over a test

circuit, or by an on-board test device in

order to ensure a reliable means of

testing the apparatus. Paragraph (b)

requires the Railroad to determine the

extent of the departure test in

accordance with the system safety

analysis described in Subpart B, and

include, at a minimum, ground-to-train

transmission, the cab display

indications, and the interface with the

train brakes.

Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to

perform a departure test, and put onboard ATC equipment in service before

the trainset operates over equipped

territory. If the ATC is cut out, the

Railroad must perform another

departure test before the ATC

equipment can be considered operative.

Paragraph (d) provides only one

departure test is required in each 24-

hour period, except as provided in

§ 243.252(b) concerning failures or cutouts en route. This is consistent with

current U.S. practice and has provided

a high level of safety.

Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad to

record each test run and its outcome in

the train-borne event recorder,

downloaded and retained for at least

one year. This will provide a database

in the event that a determination of

proper testing is needed.

This section is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice, except for the

train-borne event recorder requirement,

which is a desirable feature of this ATC

system that will enhance safety. ‘‘Onboard equipment’’ will consist of the onboard unit, vehicle antenna, cab display,

and systems that will interface with the

train, including a speed measurement

system, an event recorder, and an onboard microprocessor system network.

The on-board unit consists of processing

logic and receiving/transmitting

equipment. The vehicle antenna will be

mounted under the power-car frame and

will receive line description data. The

cab display will include the actual

speed of train, target speed, target

distance, and maximum authorized

speed information.

Section 243.277 Periodic Test

This section requires the Railroad to

perform a periodic test of the trainborne ATC equipment at least once

every two months and on multiple-unit

cars as specified by the Railroad, subject

to approval by FRA. The Petition

recommended a periodic test at least

once each year. Current U.S. practice

requires a periodic test at least once

every 92 days. However, existing

standards require a ‘‘daily or after trip

test,’’ unless a periodic test is done at

intervals of not more than two months.

It is FRA’s belief that, unless the

Railroad intends to perform daily or

after-trip tests, the ATC equipment

should be tested on the same periodic

basis as required by current U.S.

industry standards. FRA sees nothing in

the FOX system to make this

requirement unnecessary, and believes

that the test enhances safety with

minimal cost.

Section 243.278 Results of Tests

This section requires the Railroad to

record the results of tests made in

compliance with §§ 243.252(b), 243.262

through 243.272 inclusive, 243.276, and

243.277. This section sets forth the

required information for recording tests

either via pre-printed or computerized

forms, or by electronic means. This

section is consistent with the Petition

and U.S. practice.

Section 243.279 Independent

Verification and Validation

This section describes the process by

which an independent entity with

known technical expertise will conduct

an audit of all safety-critical, processorbased equipment in the Railroad’s signal

system. The audit must be done on the

system as it is finally configured, and

before revenue operations commence.

Paragraph (b) lists the items that the

audit must review, and paragraph (c)

requires preparation of a report by the

independent audit firm. Paragraph (d)

describes the procedure by which the

report and the Railroad’s signal system

will be accepted.

FRA believes that this process is

necessary in order to ensure the

integrity of the FOX signal system. As

discussed earlier, the system is not

currently in revenue service anywhere

in the world, and although safety

experts agree that it will likely improve

railroad safety, there is no safety record

available on which FRA can assess the

system’s reliability and endurance

during operations. Of particular concern

is the likelihood of severe weather in

Florida, which could disrupt or

obliterate the operation of the signal

system. FRA believes that an

independent audit of the system’s

software and processors will reveal any

system weakness and assist the Railroad

in mitigating hazards. FRA does not

have the expertise at this time to

conduct such an audit, and so seeks

appropriate input from recognized,

independent experts in the field before

the system is approved for revenue

service. FRA has required other

companies to undergo similar

independent validation and verification

inspections, and believes that such an

inspection is equally wise in the case of

FOX. FRA understands that the FOX

signal system is being tested presently

in Belgium, and will likely be used in

revenue service in Europe prior to the

commencement of FOX operations. FRA

anticipates that the European testing

will reveal and correct potential

problems, which will benefit FOX and

help to focus the review done on the

system in the U.S. However, FRA

expects that the right-of-way chosen for

Florida and the extreme weather

conditions that exist, present new

factors that will not be considered

during the testing in Europe. For all of

these reasons, FRA believes that an

independent audit would greatly

enhance the safety of the system, and

will ultimately work to the Railroad’s

advantage. This proposal was not

included in the Petition. FRA seeks

comment from the public concerning

the value of the audit and any other

information that the Agency should

evaluate concerning the FOX signal

system.

FRA suggests as a guide a verification

and validation study commissioned by

the Volpe Transportation Systems

Center, and completed by Battelle in

1995, entitled Safety of High Speed

Ground Transportation Systems,

Analytical Methodology for Safety

Validation of Computer Controlled

Subsystems, Volume 1: State-of-the-Art

and Assessment of Safety Verification/

Validation Methodologies (Battelle

Volume 1 Report), and Volume 2:

Development of a Safety Validation

Methodology (Battelle Volume 2

Report).

Subpart D—Track Safety Standards

Subpart D of the NPRM sets forth

minimum track safety standards for the

FOX system. These proposed standards

are based on the Petition, the Agency’s

proposed high speed track standards for

general application in the U.S. railroad

industry (62 FR 36138, July 3, 1997)

known as ‘‘Track Subpart G,’’ and other

pertinent standards used

internationally. A brief discussion of

each of these is warranted, in order to

understand the standards proposed in

this NPRM for application on FOX.

FRA’s Railroad Safety Advisory

Committee (RSAC) convened a working

group to revise, where appropriate, the

existing track standards that govern

track safety in the general railroad

system (49 CFR part 213). The working

group included representatives from rail

labor, railroads, trade associations, state

government groups, track equipment

manufacturers, and FRA. The working

group established a special task group,

which consisted of individuals with
65506 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

high speed track expertise, to focus

specifically on new high speed track

standards.

The high speed task group recognized

that high speed track safety standards

should be based on sound engineering

research, and foreign and domestic

practice, and, be understandable, cost

beneficial, and enforceable. With these

principles in mind, the task group

concluded early on that it could not

consider high speed track or high speed

vehicles in isolation but must consider

them as an integral system. This

approach led to the development of

vehicle/track interaction performance

limits—the cornerstone of the group’s

recommended standards.

The task group asked FRA’s Office of

Research and Development to organize

an effort to provide recommendations

on vehicle/track interaction and track

geometry. An informal group of experts,

including members of the FOX

consortium, contributed to this effort.

Engineering studies conducted by the

experts included evaluation of the use

of measuring track geometry with offsets

from several chord lengths, computer

simulations of vehicle response to track

surface and alignment variations,

application of the proposed

specifications to previously measured

track geometry, and comparison of

specifications to foreign practice.

The work began with general

acceptance of established parameters for

vehicle/track interaction (VTI). Then,

through analysis of modelling, test data,

and foreign practice, the group of

experts selected a small number of

descriptors adequate to assure freedom

from derailment and other hazardous

vehicle/track interactions. For the most

part, these proposals were considered

appropriate for both dedicated track and

mixed-traffic environments. The

recommendations of the experts on the

topics of VTI and track geometry were

considered by the high speed task group

and incorporated into its

recommendation to the RSAC track

working group for Track subpart G. The

RSAC track working group also

accepted the recommendations of the

high speed task group, and they became

part of Track subpart G, as it was

published by FRA for comment on July

3, 1997.

After the track working group

forwarded its recommendations to

RSAC, members of the high speed task

group and its supporting panel of

experts met with a separate group who

were working on FRA’s proposed

passenger equipment standards for high

speed rail (Tier II). The purpose of this

meeting was to ensure that the proposed

track standards and the proposed

equipment standards would not

conflict. The conclusions reached

during this meeting are pertinent to this

NPRM and are discussed in detail

below.

Members of the FOX consortium and

FRA staff participated in the

development of Track subpart G, and

did so with the knowledge that those

standards would apply generally to high

speed operations across the country.

However, it was understood that

portions of the FOX Petition and FRA’s

proposed track standards for FOX might

vary from Track subpart G, in this rule

of particular applicability, in order to

accommodate and assess accurately the

specific safety needs in Florida.

Therefore, it is not surprising that FOX

incorporated many of the Track subpart

G proposals in the Petition, that FRA

proposes many of those

recommendations here, and that both

FRA and FOX believe portions of Track

subpart G may not adequately address

safety standards for the system planned

for Florida.

In its Petition, FOX altered some of

the proposals that are contained in

Track subpart G, based on the operating

characteristics that will exist in Florida,

such as the absence of freight

equipment, and the French TGV

practice. The Petition, however, is not

identical to the French TGV practice

either. As FRA understands it, FOX

believes that the lower train density,

detection systems, and other operating

conditions that will exist in Florida that

are not also present in France, merit

some reconsideration of the French

general practice on high speed lines.

FRA believes that the majority of

Track subpart G is applicable to all high

speed environments, including the

environment proposed in the Petition.

FRA is in agreement with FOX that

certain specific standards, particularly

those pertaining to inspection methods

and frequencies, are largely dependent

on the loads associated with the types

and amount of traffic on the high speed

line. The dynamic loads associated with

different types of traffic affect the rate of

track degradation, which is an

important factor to consider when

selecting an inspection strategy. Any

comprehensive inspection strategy must

include automated and visual

inspections, which together ensure that

the track maintains a high quality, so

that it will not induce adverse vehicle

response and will withstand the

dynamic loads imparted to the track.

In this NPRM, FRA alters some of the

inspection frequencies that were set

forth in Track subpart G, due to the fact

that the FOX system will not include

freight traffic, and because of the other

operating features that are unique to

FOX. Also, FRA reviewed practices

utilized on the French TGV and on

Japan’s high speed rail system, and

weighed the appropriateness of those

standards to the Florida system. Finally,

as discussed previously in this

document, FRA recognizes that there are

unknown factors, which may present

risks or benefits to passengers and

employees, that arise because the

French system works in a very different

financial and legal framework; the US

workforce does not possess great

institutional knowledge of the system;

the Florida topography and weather

differ greatly from France; and the FOX

system will include features that do not

exist now, and have no reliable safety

record on which to predict safety. FRA

proposes a track safety program that

reflects all of the available relevant

information, and consideration of the

unknown elements outlined above.

Subpart D of this proposal represents

FRA’s best judgment on appropriate

track safety standards that will

effectively protect passengers and

employees in Florida. FRA anticipates

that FOX will object to some of the

inspection intervals set forth in this

NPRM. FRA believes that the minimal

costs associated with the increased

inspection frequencies are outweighed

by the safety benefit that will accrue to

the system, and take into account some

of the unknown risks that result from

moving this system from France to

North America that were discussed

previously in this document.

Section 243.301 Restoration or

Renewal of Track Under Traffic

Conditions

This section, except for minor editing,

mirrors the Petition. There are two

elements of concern addressed in this

section: the track structure stability

must not significantly degrade, and

roadway worker safety may not be

compromised. Only track maintenance

involving replacement of worn, broken,

or missing components or fastenings,

which does not affect safe train

movement is permitted. Paragraph (b)

prohibits specific activities during train

operations, which would compromise

track stability and railroad safety.

Section 243.303 Measuring Track not

Under Load

This section is identical to the

Petition and is consistent with the

present track safety standards, which

require that any rail movement

occurring while the track is loaded must

be added to the measurement of the

unloaded track.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65507

Section 243.305 Drainage

This section is identical to the

Petition and current U.S. practice. The

Railroad must design and maintain the

right-of-way so that water drains

without obstruction, and to such an

extent that safe train operations are not

jeopardized.

Section 243.307 Vegetation

This section corresponds to the

Petition and current U.S. practice. The

Railroad must restrict the growth of

vegetation along the right-of-way so that

it will not interfere with safe train

operations.

Section 243.309 Track Geometry;

General and Section 243.311 Track Gage

FRA’s proposal for §§ 243.309 and

243.311 concerning track geometry and

track gage differs from the Petition.

FRA’s proposal essentially incorporates

and expands upon the geometry table

found in the Petition, which follows the

French TGV’s geometry inspection

techniques. However, FRA includes a

second intervention table to address

multiple defects, the requirement to

make an additional chordal

measurement, additional requirements

for the geometry measurement system,

and other changes that FRA believes are

necessary for safety.

FOX asserts that the values used in

the Petition are identical to those used

by the French TGV, which permit wider

and narrower gage than would be

acceptable for railroad operations in this

country. Gage limits are extremely

important to railroad safety because

high wheel forces and wheel climb can

occur in tight gage conditions, and high

wheel forces and sudden wide gage can

occur in wide gage conditions. These

conditions can cause train derailments

and incidents.

FOX proposes to use the European

combination of rail and wheelset

profiles, including the wheelset flange

back-to-back dimensions, which are

slightly different than standard US

designs. The significance of these

dimensional variations is that the

distance between the flange points on a

nominal FOX-style wheelset will be

very close to the distance between

flange points on a standard US

wheelset. There is an increase in the

tread cone angle of the FOX wheel

profile from a 1-in-40 slope to a 1-in6.67 slope for the last 20 mm of the

tread, which would tend to increase any

gage widening forces if the wheel

experiences very wide gage. The flange

back-to-back dimension is larger than

permitted under current US practice

and should be considered when

designing guard rails and flange ways.

FRA is concerned that the Petition

would allow tight gage up to 170 km/

h (105 mph). The use of 1420 mm gage

with wheelsets in nominal condition

would cause more than 1⁄2′′ wheel climb

on both wheels. Based on these

dimensional analyses, FRA recommends

that the minimum gage be modified to

12 mm less than nominal for speeds

below 105 mph.

FRA has concluded that several

modifications to the Petition are

necessary to address additional key

safety concerns in this regard. The

Petition does not include a provision for

multiple or repeating defects, but FRA

believes that such provisions are

essential to a comprehensive set of

minimum track safety standards. The

basis of this concept is that safe railroad

operations are jeopardized by a series of

track defects that in isolation may not be

troublesome, but in combination may

result in train incidents or accidents.

The panel of experts who advised the

high speed track task group considered

the case of multiple alignment defects

and their ability to excite harmonic

motion in the carbody. Multiple

deviations were considered to occur

when three or more non-overlapping

deviations from uniformity in track

alignment occurred within a distance

equal to five times the specified chord

length.

FOX states that the Mauzin car, (or

track geometry measurement system, as

it is called in the proposed rule text),

which is a geometry car used in French

TGV track inspection, will be used to

measure track geometry in Florida. This

car does not detect multiple defects.

Therefore, FRA proposes provisions in

this document to compensate for this

deficiency, based on French practice

and Track Subpart G, so that a level of

safety equivalent to the proposals of

Track Subpart G is maintained. In

§ 243.309, FRA modifies the geometry

table FOX proposed in the Petition.

FRA’s modifications are consistent

with FRA’s understanding of French

TGV practice, which includes several

levels of track geometry defects that

require varying levels of remedial action

over different periods of time, as

determined by the magnitude of the

measurements from the Mauzin car.

FRA’s proposal makes these French

maintenance practices the minimum

safety requirements for track geometry

measurement. FRA believes that it is

important to include these practices in

the two-table approach proposed by

FRA, because the two intervention

tables, in combination will prevent

multiple defects from occurring.

Multiple defects are addressed in a

different manner in Track Subpart G,

where specific thresholds are

established when more than one defect

occurs in rapid succession.

The use of these multiple intervention

levels identify deteriorating track

conditions before they become critical

track defects. This practice makes the

occurrence of critical multiple defects

less likely to occur than would

otherwise be expected with a single,

safety-level strategy. To capture the

desired level of safety, the high speed

task group recommended adopting a

multiple defect table. Another approach

would be a bi-level intervention table,

in which the first level would require

remedial action within a reasonable

period of time to correct defects, and the

second level would require immediate

action to correct critical defects. FRA’s

proposal incorporates these concepts.

Aside from the differences outlined

above between the Petition and FRA’s

proposal, FRA adds a chordal

measurement that would not be

required under the Petition. The FOX

petition proposes two chordal

measurements to identify critical

alignment defects. Careful dynamic

analyses indicate that track anomalies

with wavelengths at approximately 20

meters can cause unacceptable vehicle

responses and may not be detected by

the thresholds proposed in the Petition

for the 10-meter and 31-meter chordal

measurements. FOX engineers have

informed FRA that French TGV

maintenance practice and use of the

Mauzin car, particularly the use of 20-

meter chordal measurements by the

equipment, precludes the existence of

these critical track defects. However,

such maintenance practice is not

covered by the Petition, and so does not

provide the level of assurance desired in

this important area. FRA proposes here

that the measurements obtained through

use of the Mauzin car be processed in

a manner similar to the process used to

create the 31 meter chord offsets to

create a 20-meter chordal measurement.

FRA proposes appropriate thresholds

for this chord in the tables provided in

§ 243.309.

For the reasons explained above

concerning multiple defects, warp, and

related geometry considerations, FRA

has concluded that the approach to

track geometry that is proposed in the

Petition would be acceptable only if the

measurements are performed with a

measurement vehicle that is similar to

the Mauzin car, or the track geometry

measurement system. Therefore, as set

forth in § 243.331, the standards

proposed in this document apply if FOX

uses a Mauzin-type vehicle. If FOX does

not use a Mauzin car or the track

geometry measurement system, the
65508 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

requirements of Track Subpart G would

apply.

Section 243.313 Curves, elevation and

speed limitations

This section of the NPRM is

unchanged from Track Subpart G and

the Petition. The section provides for a

procedure in which the Railroad may

seek approval to operate equipment at

higher curving speeds, based on

engineering data. FRA utilizes these

procedures when processing waivers for

higher cant deficiencies. In order to

operate with higher cant deficiencies,

the Railroad must submit specified

engineering data and analysis to FRA

that determines safe operations at the

new level of cant deficiency. This

information would also be part of the

Railroad’s determinations concerning

safe curving speeds.

Section 243.315 Track Strength

This section is identical to Track

Subpart G and the Petition. FRA

concurs that the track must be of very

high quality to withstand the vertical

and lateral loads associated with high

speed trains. During the high speed task

group discussions, the subject of track

modulus was discussed at great length.

Track modulus is a physical

measurement of the strength of the

track. However, it is difficult to measure

track modulus with present technology.

Track Subpart G and FRA’s proposal do

not include a specific numeric value for

the vertical and lateral strength of the

track. Rather, FRA relies on the track’s

safety performance, as determined by

the monitoring of vehicle/track

interaction and track geometry

measurements required in §§ 243.309,

243.311, and 243.333.

Section 243.317 Crossties

The Petition would require concrete

ties for all tracks that carry passenger

service trains and FRA includes this

proposal in this NPRM. FRA has made

a small change from the Petition

concerning all other track, by increasing

the number of non-concrete ties from 14

ties in each 39 foot segment of track, to

18 ties in each segment. The remainder

of this section mirrors the tie

requirements contained in Track

Subpart G for higher track classes, and

the existing track safety standards for

the lower classes. This section also lists

characteristics of defective concrete or

non-concrete ties, which must be

replaced by the Railroad. In all cases,

the ties must be capable of holding gage,

maintaining surface, and maintaining

alignment within the geometry limits

specified in § 243.309.

Section 243.319 Continuous Welded

Rail (CWR)

This section is consistent with Track

Subpart G and the Petition and lists

requirements for effectively installing,

adjusting, and maintaining CWR. The

Railroad must submit a plan to address

CWR installation, adjustment,

maintenance and inspection, and a

training program for the application of

those procedures. The procedures must

follow the detailed guidelines set forth

in this section of the NPRM, which

represent current industry practice to

protect against track buckling.

Section 243.321 Rail End Mismatch

This section of FRA’s proposal is

identical to Petition. The values listed

in this section for rail end mismatch

represent pervasive industry practice in

the U.S. and abroad. Controlling

mismatched rail is essential for the

safety of a high speed operation. If a

wheel flange would encounter a

mismatch of the rail on the gage corner,

an accident or incident would be likely.

The limits included for this condition

follow FRA’s present track safety

standards for Class 6 track.

Section 243.323 Rail Joints and Torch

Cut Rails

FRA’s proposal concerning rail joints

and torch cut rails differs from the

Petition. FOX stated in its petition that

the requirements pertaining to rail joints

found in Track Subpart G were not

included in the Petition because they

would not be utilized at all on the

Railroad in Florida. As FRA

understands it, the French TGV practice

does not permit rail joints and so FOX

would also not permit them on the

system in Florida. However, FRA

believes that it is essential to include

minimum Federal standards for the

condition of joint bars, because joint bar

failures or disturbances can quickly lead

to train accidents or incidents. If the

operating and maintenance practices

employed by FOX do not permit unsafe

joint bar conditions to develop, the

Railroad will have no difficulty in

maintaining compliance with this

proposal.

In addition, the Petition would permit

torch cutting, even in routine welding

tasks on the Railroad’s track. Based on

its own expertise and consistent with

the high speed task group’s

recommendations in Track Subpart G,

FRA permits torch cutting rails only in

emergency situations. Current U.S.

practice utilizes torch cutting only

where needed for emergency repairs. It

is generally believed in this country that

technology has advanced to the point

that cutting rail with the available

variety of rail saws is more efficient

than torch cutting.

Torch cuts present safety hazards in

the railroad environment. In 1983,

following its investigation of an Amtrak

derailment in Texas where torch cut

rails became an issue, the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

recommended that railroads remove all

torch cut rail and that trains travel at 10

mph over any new torch cuts that were

made in emergency situations, or as a

preparatory step in field welding. It

should be noted, however, that the rail

involved in the Texas accident had a

high alloy content, which tends to

increase the rail’s resistance to wear, but

decreases the rail’s resistance to

fracture. Torch cutting is no longer used

in the U.S. industry because analysis

reveals that torch cut rails have a greater

tendency to develop fractures, and FRA

believes that FOX should not utilize

torch cutting on its system. FRA’s

proposal lists emergency or temporary

conditions in which torch cutting may

be used, but otherwise prohibits the

practice.

Section 243.325 Turnouts and

Crossovers, Generally

FRA’s proposal is identical to the

Petition and Track Subpart G. The

members of the high speed task group

discussed many types of turnout designs

and fastenings, which may be in use

today or developed in the future. The

group believed, and FRA adopts in this

proposal, that the best way to address

turnouts would be to require each

railroad to prepare a detailed,

comprehensive Guidebook on the

inspection and maintenance for all

turnouts and crossovers. The book

would contain, at a minimum,

inspection frequency, inspection

methodology, limiting measurement

values for all components subject to

wear or requiring adjustment, and

maintenance techniques. The

Guidebook must be submitted to the

FRA and FRA will monitor the

Railroad’s compliance with the

identified procedures. FRA believes that

most major railroads currently provide

their employees with instructions for

the maintenance of turnouts, and this

requirement in the NPRM creates

minimal additional paperwork for the

Railroad.

Section 243.329 Derails

This section is identical to Track

Subpart G and the Petition. It is

absolutely critical to safe railroad

operations to prevent equipment

standing on side tracks from fouling the

main track. Each derail must be
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65509

operable, clearly visible, and linked to

the Railroad’s signal system.

Section 243.331 Track Geometry

Measurement Systems

This section of FRA’s proposal varies

from the Petition. As discussed in the

section-by-section analysis for

§ 243.309, FRA developed geometry

tables for this proposal that differ from

the tables set forth in Subpart G and the

FOX submission. This is due to the fact

that the Mauzin car, used by the French

and probably by FOX, measures track

characteristics in different ways than

track geometry measurement systems in

this country. Therefore, the table set

forth in § 243.309, which lists

parameters for alignment, surface, gage,

gage variation, cant, and warp, is

acceptable, so long as the Railroad

measures these parameters with a

Mauzin, or Track Geometry

Measurement System, car. Use of FRA’s

T–10 geometry car, which measures

geometry in a different manner than the

Mauzin car used on the French TGV,

would not correspond accurately to the

geometry table set forth in § 243.309.

Therefore, FRA’s specific requirements

for the Railroad’s Track Geometry

Measurement System included in this

section describe a Mauzin car. FRA

believes that the table in § 243.309 and

use of the Mauzin car will provide a

level of safety equivalent to that of

Subpart G. If FOX ultimately elects to

substitute another geometry vehicle

with different properties than those

identified in the Mauzin car, the

Railroad must comport with the

equivalent requirements set forth in

Track Subpart G.

Track Subpart G contains a

requirement for a geometry inspection

once per month, with at least 15 days

between inspections. The Petition

proposed geometry vehicle inspections

at least twice within 200 calendar days,

with at least 30 days between

inspections, or nearly once every three

months. In this NPRM, FRA proposes to

make this requirement twice within 180

days, with at least 30 days between

inspections, so that the requirement is

clearly done once every three months.

In its determination of the

recommended frequency of geometry

car inspections, the RSAC high speed

task group considered the possibility of

mixed passenger-freight service, which

would likely accelerate the rate of track

degradation. FRA concludes that, in

view of the light loads and dedicated

traffic on the proposed FOX line, an

inspection with a geometry car once

every three months sufficiently provides

for the necessary monitoring of

geometry parameters. If the Railroad

discovers exceptions to the geometry

limits, the Railroad must field verify the

exceptions and institute remedial action

within two days.

This section also requires the Railroad

to maintain continuous plots of all

measured track geometry parameters

and exception reports that contain a

systematic listing of all track geometry

conditions that constitute an exception

to the speed limits over the track

segments surveyed, for at least one year.

Section 243.333 Track/Vehicle

Performance Measurement Systems.

This section proposes requirements

for the periodic measurement of carbody

and truck accelerations using a Track

Acceleration Measurement System

(TAMS), which differs from the FOX

Petition. The Petition and Track Subpart

G differ in a variety of ways concerning

track/vehicle measurement systems.

FOX did not incorporate many of the

Track Subpart G proposals with respect

to condemning safety limits and

corresponding remedial actions. FOX

did not include a requirement for the

measurement of wheel/rail forces,

beyond the qualification phase of the

project. Track Subpart G, on the other

hand, proposes an annual requirement

for the measurement of wheel/rail forces

to verify that the track/vehicle system

remains within safe performance limits

throughout the life of the system. Also,

Track Subpart G requires immediate

action when minimum performance

limits are exceeded, regardless of speed,

while FOX proposed to set different

safety limits for various speed ranges. In

the Petition, FOX states that ‘‘Each

exception must lead to an immediate

slow order on the corresponding portion

of track’’ but later states that ‘‘within

two days after the inspection, field

verify and institute remedial action for

all recorded exceptions.’’ Track Subpart

G also includes filtering characteristics

that are not apparent in the Petition’s

discussion of the TAMS car and

proposed safety thresholds. Finally, the

Petition uses ‘‘zero-to-peak’’ thresholds

and the Track Subpart G uses ‘‘peak-topeak.’’ Under most circumstances, an

interpretation of an accelerometer trace

using a ‘‘zero-to-peak’’ measurement

results in approximately one-half of the

magnitude of a ‘‘peak-to-peak’’

threshold. In the development of the

proposed high speed standards

contained in Track Subpart G, the high

speed experts recommended using the

peak-to-peak criterion.

FRA believes that an immediate speed

reduction must be imposed when

vehicle/track performance limits are

exceeded. The intent of track and

carbody acceleration limits is to limit

vehicle response, regardless of track

condition and vehicle speed. FRA

proposes to adopt the approach

contained in Track Subpart G for

vehicle/track interaction safety limits.

The measurement of wheel/rail forces

and accelerations is required. Many

experts advise that derailments may be

imminent if these limits are exceeded.

An immediate speed reduction must be

imposed until the Railroad determines

the cause of the adverse vehicle/track

interaction and corrects the condition.

The Petition suggests, and FRA

proposes, using the term ‘‘TAMS’’ to

describe a vehicle with capabilities such

as the ‘‘Melusine’’ car in France to

measure accelerations. Although this

term is not used in Track Subpart G, the

frequency of inspection recommended

in Track Subpart G is approximately the

same as the Petition. For speeds over

125 mph, Track Subpart G requires the

measurement of accelerations at a

frequency of at least twice within sixty

days, with not less than fifteen days

between inspections. FOX proposed an

inspection frequency of at least twice

within 45 calendar days, with not less

than seven days between inspections.

FRA has adopted the frequency set forth

in the Petition.

To summarize, FRA’s proposal differs

from the Petition in several significant

ways. The Petition would require the

measurement of wheel/rail forces once

during system qualification, and would

not require periodic re-measurement of

wheel/rail forces. FRA believes

renewed, periodic measurements are

necessary to ensure safety. The Petition

does incorporate a requirement for the

periodic measurement of accelerations,

but uses threshold descriptors,

thresholds, and remedial actions that

differ from FRA’s view and proposal.

These measurement systems and

remedial measures are important to

demonstrate continued vehicle/track

safety performance—the cornerstone of

high speed track standards.

Section 243.335 Wheel/rail Force

Measurement System.

In this section, FRA proposes that

FOX conduct bi-annual wheel/rail force

measurements and that FOX equipment

not exceed limits established in the

vehicle/track interaction chart in this

section. The Petition did not contain a

similar section or requirement.

The FOX petition and Track Subpart

G would require a qualification

procedure for vehicles on the high

speed track, using instrumented

wheelsets. The high speed task group

concluded that the interaction of the

high speed vehicle on the track must not

exceed wheel/rail force, truck side
65510 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

accelerometer, and carbody

accelerometer performance thresholds

during the qualification phase and

during the life of the railroad. The

Petition includes a requirement for the

use of instrumented wheelsets to

measure wheel/rail forces during the

system qualification phase, but does not

include a requirement for a periodic remeasurement of wheel/rail forces during

the life of the system because ‘‘forces are

proportional to accelerations,’’ which

are monitored every two weeks. FRA

believes that wheel/rail force

measurements, and carbody and

truckside accelerometer measurements

relate to different safety concerns and

so, the measurements are not

appropriate substitutes for one another.

Vehicle/track interaction has critical

consequences in railroad safety, and so

establishing safe parameters and

developing a measurement system to

adhere to those parameters is highly

important for any track safety program.

The high speed task group considered

several hazardous and unacceptable

vehicle/track interaction events that are

well-known in railroad engineering, and

for the most part, occur on existing high

speed operations. These unsafe events

include wheel climb, rail rollover,

vehicle overturning, gage widening, and

track panel shift. Truck hunting is a

dynamic phenomenon that results from

unstable motion of railroad wheelsets,

and may result in wheel climb or other

unsafe events.

FRA’s proposed vehicle/track

interaction chart includes provisions for

truck hunting and carbody

accelerometers. Truck hunting is

typically measured by truck-mounted

lateral accelerometers. Carbody

accelerations measurements address

different concerns. Large carbody

accelerations can be hazardous to

standing or walking passengers; large

vertical accelerations may cause

passengers to fall. The primary and

secondary suspension characteristics of

a particular car and truck spacing

influence the natural frequency of

vertical motion and, therefore, the

wavelength of profile variations become

of interest. Carbody vertical acceleration

is also an indicator of variation in

vertical force applied to the rails.

FRA believes that an annual or

biannual inspection using instrumented

wheelsets must be considered as part of

a high speed inspection strategy that

includes visual inspections, pilot

(sweeper) train, geometry car

inspections, periodic carbody and truckmounted accelerometer measurements,

and other inspections deemed

necessary. All of these requirements are

largely dependent on track and vehicle

degradation. Paragraph (a) of this

section requires FOX to complete a

wheel/rail force measurement system

inspection biannually, with at least 240

days between each inspection, to

ascertain whether the vehicles respond

to the existing track within the limit

defined. FRA agrees with FOX that its

axle loads, minimization of unsprung

mass, high quality track, and low cant

deficiency would probably not lead to

the sort of track or vehicle degradation

that would become hazardous within

one year after the Railroad’s trainsets

meet the pre-revenue qualification

phase of the system. However, the track

or vehicle degradation rate is an

unknown and FRA, therefore, believes

that an inspection frequency of once

every two years, as required by

paragraph (b) in this section, is a

prudent requirement.

This section requires the Railroad to

maintain for one year after a qualifying

track acceleration measurement is done,

a copy of the plot and exception

printout for the track segment involved,

the date the inspection was made, the

track segment involved, and the

remedial action taken, for all listed

exceptions. The Railroad must maintain

a list of locations where the limits are

exceeded.

Section 243.337 Daily Inspection

Trainset

In this section, FRA proposes a daily

inspection trainset that must be

operated each morning over the

Railroad’s entire system, prior to

revenue service. FRA also proposes that

the inspection train be equipped with

on-board truck side and carbody

accelerometers to measure track

conditions, and that the Railroad

develop procedures to notify track

personnel when track conditions

warrant attention. In its petition, FOX

described the French TGV practice of

operating a daily sweep train to visually

inspect the track and ensure that the

right-of-way is free from obstacles, and

included such a requirement for Florida.

FRA agrees that this is a valuable safety

measure. However, FRA added the

requirements for minimal

instrumentation on the daily inspection

train in order to more closely reflect the

expertise of the high speed task group

and the Tier II passenger equipment

group.

Track Subpart G requires

accelerometers in at ‘‘least two cars in

every train.’’ At the latter stages of the

development of Track Subpart G, the

high speed task group met with a group

of experts working on the Tier II

equipment standards. This group

consisted of members from labor, the

rail industry, and private associations.

Many members from both groups

concluded that requirements for

carbody accelerometers on every train

would generate voluminous data that

would not be necessary for safety.

Members of both groups noted that a

requirement for lateral truck-mounted

accelerometers already existed in the

Tier II passenger equipment standards.

Instead, many members of both

groups felt that accelerometer

measurements could better be addressed

with a requirement for lateral and

vertical carbody accelerometers and

lateral truckside accelerometers on at

least one train each day. Truck and

carbody accelerometers on one train per

day would detect settlement or other

geometry conditions, such as culvert

settlement or an anomaly inadvertently

introduced by a maintenance crew,

before they became serious. Several of

the members believed that safety would

be enhanced if track personnel were

dispatched to investigate the track

whenever the accelerometers indicated

possible track concerns. These members

felt that these conditions could be

identified and corrected before the next

regularly scheduled periodic ride

quality inspection with an instrumented

car, and concluded that the threshold to

trigger notification and the procedures

for the notification of the track

personnel should be left up to the high

speed railroad.

The requirement here for the daily

monitoring of accelerations was

included in order to provide an

instrumented ‘‘rough track report.’’ It is

normal practice in this country for train

engineers or crews who sense an

irregularity in the track, to communicate

their concerns to track personnel who

then perform a follow-up inspection.

The accelerometers on the daily

inspection train would remove the

subjectivity from this process, and

would more accurately identify areas

that should be investigated by track

personnel. However, because of time

limitations, the high speed task group

was ultimately unable to change the

requirement from accelerometers on

every train to accelerometers on one

train per day.

FOX believes that a requirement for

daily carbody accelerometer

measurements is unnecessary because

the TGV equipment comes equipped

with truck-side accelerometers on each

power and trailer truck, and the truckside accelerometers would identify the

defect as being track related. However,

carbody accelerometers perform an

entirely different function than truckside accelerometers. FOX recognizes

this distinction by recommending an
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65511

inspection with carbody and truckside

inspections once every two weeks.

FRA believes that a requirement for

accelerometers on the daily inspection

train would enhance safety at minimal

cost and so, includes the requirement in

the NPRM. However, FRA invites

comment on this section, as on all

others in the NPRM.

Section 243.339 Inspection of Rail in

Service

This section proposes that the

Railroad develop and implement

written inspection procedures for

internal defects, joint bars, and defective

rails. The section includes a chart of

specific defects with corresponding

remedial measures, and requires the

Railroad to adhere to appropriate

remedial actions.

In this NPRM, FRA replaced the

section in the FOX petition entitled

‘‘Defective Rails’’ with this section, with

substantial change. The Petition stated

that the frequency of inspection for rail

defects should be once per year in view

of French TGV practice and the fact that

the track will be newly constructed in

Florida. Track Subpart G proposes an

inspection frequency of twice per year

for high speed rail in the general system,

which is higher than the annual

inspection required in the current track

standards for lower speed operations.

In view of the load characteristics

proposed for the FOX project, the

occurrence of rail flaws are not expected

to be high. In addition, since rail flaw

growth is largely dependent on

accumulated tonnage, the growth of

flaws is expected to be minimal.

However, there are concerns relating to

new rail due to possible weld defects

that may occur in the factory or field,

and the potential for damage to the rail

during installation. In addition to the

requirements for the initial inspection of

new rail at the mill and an inspection

of welds required by proposed § 243.341

discussed below, FRA’s proposal

includes a requirement in § 243.339 for

the Railroad to conduct a continuous

inspection of all rail within ninety days

after the initiation of revenue service.

This inspection will verify that the mill

inspection and plant weld inspections

accurately located any rail flaws present

in the new rail and will confirm that the

rail was not damaged during

installation. FRA concurs with the

language of the Petition, in which it is

determined that a rail inspection

frequency of once each year is

appropriate, considering the absence of

freight traffic and the presence of

relatively light axle loads on the

proposed FOX lines.

FOX proposed a remedial action table

for rail flaws based on French TGV

practice and somewhat vague standards

that ‘‘take into account the quality of the

track to be restored once the defect is

fixed.’’ The defect table in the Petition

largely does not categorize all defects in

terms of the size of the defect, and so

does not include corresponding

remedial actions that are based on the

size or severity of the defect. For

example, the FOX proposal does not

specify different remedial actions for

transverse defects of varying sizes.

FRA believes it would be unwise to

deviate from the rail flaw procedures

that developed in this country to control

rail-caused accidents. They are included

in Track Subpart G and are identical for

high and low speed track. These

requirements are the result of railroad

experience in this country, rail flaw

research, and recommendations from

the NTSB.

FRA does not anticipate that adoption

of this rail flaw table and with

accompanying remedial actions will

negatively impact FOX maintenance

policies. Given the axle loads associated

with the FOX system, the rail flaws of

the size specified in the table may never

occur in Florida, and so FOX would

have no difficulty in complying with

this section. However, if these serious

rail flaws do arise, this section will

secure the safety of passengers and

employees.

Section 243.341 Initial Inspection of

New Rail and Welds

This section sets forth minimum

standards for the Railroad’s in-service

rail and weld inspections, mill

inspections, welding plant inspections,

and field weld inspections. FRA has

made a minor change in this section

from what was set forth in the Petition,

by correcting an error in the rule text

that would have permitted an in-service

inspection, conducted ninety days after

the rail is installed, for a mill or welding

plant inspection. FRA believes that FOX

intends to conduct a mill and welding

plant inspection prior to installation,

which is common practice on US

railroads. Rail defects discovered in the

course of these inspections must be

handled in accordance with the actions

set forth in § 243.339 of the proposal.

Section 243.343 Visual Inspections

This section requires the Railroad to

conduct a visual track inspection once

each seven days by riding in a vehicle

at a speed that facilitates visual

inspection of the track structure. This

section is not consistent with the

Petition, which proposed a visual

inspection once each six weeks.

FOX proposed a six-week visual

inspection based on French TGV

practice. However, the practice in this

country historically has been to conduct

a visual inspection at least twice each

week on all passenger lines. For

example, Amtrak performs walking

visual inspections on the Northeast

Corridor at a frequency of at least two

times per week. Amtrak also conducts

automated inspections in a manner

similar to the French TGV practice,

which includes geometry car and

acceleration measurements.

In the lower speed classes of track in

the US, present track safety standards

require two visual inspections per week

on passenger tracks, but do not mandate

the use of automated inspections to

supplement the visual inspections.

Freight railroads also typically inspect

main tracks at least twice each week.

Many railroad maintenance officials

believe that this inspection frequency

facilitates early identification of

conditions that require maintenance.

However, it is also important to note

that, while many major railroads use

geometry cars, the use of the automated

inspection techniques proposed by FOX

are generally not used on freight

railroads.

Track Subpart G requires two

inspections per week for track speeds

between 110 mph and 160 mph, and

three times per week for speeds between

160 mph and 200 mph. These frequency

levels developed through consideration

of all available automated and visual

inspection methods. Some members of

the high speed task group emphasized

that state-of-the-art automated

inspections techniques enhance, but

cannot replace visual inspections.

Walking or hi-rail inspections identify

certain conditions, such as loose or

missing fastenings and blocked culverts,

that are not discovered by geometry,

acceleration, rail flaw, or other

automated equipment. Visual and

automated inspections compliment one

another, and should both be part of a

high speed track safety system.

In support of its position of

performing visual inspections at a

frequency of once every six weeks, FOX

discusses its concern for the hazards

inspectors might face along the high

speed line. In addition, FOX argues that

more frequent visual inspections are

unnecessary in view of its total

inspection program, which is based on

French TGV practices. FOX also asserts

the daily ‘‘sweeper’’ train conducts a

visual inspection of the track and

ensures that the right-of-way is clear.

FRA acknowledges the hazards

associated with inspecting high speed

track and urges FOX to take every
65512 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

precaution to ensure the safety of its

inspectors. (This NPRM adopts and

incorporates safety standards for

roadway workers in 49 CFR part 214,

which should address these safety

concerns if followed properly.) Also,

FOX may wish to conduct inspection

activities during low traffic periods, and

perhaps at night as is done in France.

Amtrak routinely accomplished track

work during evening hours, and has

policies in place to protect inspection

crews.

FRA has considered the factors

discussed above and believes that a

prudent, initial standard would include

one weekly visual inspection of the

track and turnouts. This is consistent

with the visual inspections conducted

in Japan on high speed, dedicated lines.

However, FRA invites comment on this

inspection frequency from safety experts

and members of the public. FRA

considered, but did not succeed in

devising, an objective performance

standard for adjusting inspection

frequency. Commenters are invited to

suggest such a performance standard.

Section 243.345 Special Inspections

This section requires the Railroad to

make special track inspections where

emergency or extreme events occur that

could cause damage to the track

structure. This section is consistent with

Petition.

Section 243.347 Inspection Records

This section sets forth minimum

requirements for treatment of the

Railroad’s track inspection records. The

section is consistent with the Petition

and Track Subpart G. However, this

proposal contains a noteworthy change

from the present track safety standards

for records inspections. Paragraph (d) of

this section requires the Railroad to

record any location where a proper rail

inspection cannot be performed because

of rail surface conditions. The new

language in this section requires a

recordkeeping of those instances.

Paragraph (f) of this section also

proposes a provision for maintaining

and retrieving electronic records of track

inspections. The provision permits

Railroad to design its own electronic

system, so long as the system meets

specified criteria to safeguard the

integrity and authenticity of each

record. The provision also requires that

railroads make available paper copies of

electronic records when needed by FRA

or by railroad track inspectors.

Subpart E—Rolling Stock

Subpart E sets forth minimum safety

standards for the design, performance,

and maintenance of the FOX rolling

stock. For the most part, the Railroad’s

compliance with the design and

performance requirements of this

Subpart will be demonstrated by the

pre-revenue qualification tests required

in Subparts B and G of this proposal.

However, FRA will closely monitor the

operation of the FOX equipment

throughout the life of the system in

order to ensure compliance with the

equipment inspection, test, and

maintenance requirements.

The rolling stock safety standards set

forth in the NPRM are very similar to

the Petition, and are based on 15 years

of safe operating experience in France.

As discussed previously in this

document, the French design, operation,

and maintenance practices have

resulted in an exceedingly safe

passenger system. FRA proposes

standards in this Subpart that will

facilitate development of an equally safe

system in Florida. It is extremely

important to note, as we do throughout

this NPRM, that these standards would

not be appropriate for any other

operation in this country. The standards

set forth in this Subpart relate to a

specific system with unique safety

characteristics. This proposal reflects

the combination of many operating

features, and if any one feature

disappears, all of the standards would

have to be reevaluated.

Section 243.401 Clearance

Requirements

This subsection requires the rolling

stock to be designed to meet all

applicable clearance requirements of the

Railroad, including the static clearance

diagram, the dynamic clearance diagram

and the obstacle clearance diagram.

Rolling stock clearance of all natural or

infrastructure obstacles is a basic safety

requirement. Adequate clearance of all

obstacles will be demonstrated during

the pre-revenue service system

qualification tests. At a minimum, the

Railroad must make the following

diagrams available to FRA upon request:

rolling stock static clearance diagram,

rolling stock dynamic clearance

diagram, and obstacle clearance

diagram.

Section 243.403 Structural Strength of

Trainset

This section sets forth the structural

design or performance requirements for

the FOX passenger equipment. This

section is patterned after FRA’s

proposed Tier II Passenger Equipment

Safety Standards, which were published

on September 23, 1997 (62 FR 49728).

The Tier II passenger proposals are

based equipment that would travel at

high speed (125 to 150 mph) in existing

North American rail corridors, which

may include grade crossings used by

heavy highway vehicles, and mixed rail

traffic that includes heavy freight or

commuter trains.

FRA recognizes that existing North

American corridors which contain grade

crossings or mixed freight-commuter

rail operations may be less conducive to

safe operation of passenger trains at

speeds greater than 150 mph. Due to the

high degree of kinetic energy that must

be dissipated in the event of a collision

or derailment, structural mitigation of

the effects of the accident are very

difficult to achieve in high speed

passenger equipment. Therefore,

combining very high speed operations

with slow, heavy rail traffic, or heavy

highway vehicles at grade crossings,

produces a relatively high risk of

collision and passenger injury. As

discussed previously, to counter these

risks, the French TGV system operates

on an accident-avoidance, rather than

accident-mitigation philosophy. FOX

plans to utilize this philosophy in

Florida, and the standards that FRA

proposes concerning rolling stock reflect

this approach to safety.

FRA proposes structural standards for

the FOX passenger trainsets that are

based on International Union of

Railways (UIC) standards for the design

of passenger equipment in Europe, and

on SNCF specifications that adapt UIC

standards to the TGV trainset

configuration. The European structural

standards result in a lighter trainset,

which facilitates travel at high speeds

with minimal track forces and lower

track degradation.

Paragraph (a) proposes two very

important general structural

requirements. First, the passenger cars

in each trainset must be semipermanently coupled with articulated

trucks between the trailer cars. These

trainsets may be uncoupled only in

repair facilities, in accordance with the

operating procedures set forth in

§ 243.433. When a derailment occurs at

high speed, trains containing

individually coupled passenger cars

tend to buckle, accordion style, which

exposes individual cars to side impacts

or rollover. The articulated connection

between trailer cars has been shown to

be extremely effective in keeping the

trainset in-line and upright during

derailments, even at high speed. The

articulated connection also provides

significant anti-climbing resistance

between each passenger car.

The second proposed general

requirement is essentially an operating

requirement with strong structural

implications. FRA requires the Railroad

to operate every trainset with a power
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65513

car at each end of the train. FOX

proposed to operate in this manner, and

FRA believes that these high speed

trainsets should not be operated in a

push-pull mode. The presence of a

power car in the lead maximizes the

protection provided for the cab crew

and passengers, in the event of a headon or rear end collision.

Paragraph (b) proposes the structural

requirements for power cars. Paragraph

(b)(1) lists the basic carbody structural

strengths of the power car, which

represent European design practice and

the UIC standards. Equipment built to

these standards provides structural

protection for the operator and

passengers during low speed train-totrain collisions that might occur in

station or yard operations. Also,

equipment built to these standards

provides structural protection for the

operator and passengers during

collisions at moderate speeds with

highway vehicles. The proposal

establishes the magnitude of the force

that the power car structure must resist,

and how that force must be applied

during the testing and analysis that will

be done to ensure that the design

complies with each safety standard.

Paragraph (b)(2) proposes that each

power car be equipped with an antipenetration wall ahead of the operator’s

cab. This anti-penetration wall serves

the function of a collision post in North

American design practice, or of a

forward end structure, as proposed in

the Tier II passenger equipment NPRM.

This anti-penetration wall in the power

car cab plays a vital role in protecting

personnel and the equipment in a

collision with another object. This

structure must resist override, prevent

the entry of fluids into occupied spaces

of the cab, and allow the crash energy

management system to function. FRA

proposes the following specific design

parameters for the anti-penetration wall:

resist a longitudinal compressive load of

3000 kN (675,000 lb) at the top of the

underframe, without exceeding the

ultimate strength of the joint; and resist

a longitudinal compressive load of 1500

kN (337,000 lb) applied at a height of

760 mm (30 in) above the top of the

underframe, and reacted at the rear of

the cab structure, without exceeding the

ultimate strength of the structure. FRA

also requires that the Railroad verify

compliance with these requirements by

either linear static analysis or equivalent

means.

Paragraph (b)(3) sets forth the crash

energy management requirements for

the power car. Crash energy

management is an equipment design

technique used to provide controlled

deformation and collapse of designated

sections of the unoccupied volumes of

a passenger train, to absorb energy that

occurs in a collision. This permits

collision energy to dissipate before any

structural damage occurs to the

occupied volumes of the train, and

reduces the decelerations experienced

by passengers and crew members in a

collision. Reduced decelerations

mitigate the force of any secondary

collision between passengers and

objects in the train’s interior, such as

seats. The French equipment

incorporates a crash energy management

design that has been demonstrated to be

safe and commercially feasible. This is

the sort of design that will likely

develop on the Amtrak lines in the

Northeast Corridor.

FRA proposes that in unoccupied

areas, each power car shall be designed

to absorb a minimum 4.2 megajoules

through controlled structural

deformation. This requirement can be

met using existing technology and

provides an adequate level of safety.

Paragraph (b)(4) proposes a basic

longitudinal compressive strength for

the power car cab. Specifically, FRA

proposes that in occupied areas, each

power car must be designed to resist,

without permanent deformation of the

sidesill, contrail, and side post

structural members, a longitudinal

compressive load of 3560 kN (800,000

lb) when applied uniformly at the front

of the cab between the underframe and

waist level, and reacted at the cross

section of the carbody at the back of the

cab. This proposed requirement

provides a degree of crash refuge or

structural shelter to the operator

equivalent to that typical of North

American design practice.

Paragraph (b)(5) requires each power

car to be designed to withstand a

uniformly distributed vertical load of

1.3 times its static laden weight, when

supported at the truck centers, without

permanent deformation. This

requirement essentially sets the vertical

stiffness of the car body as it is

supported between the two trucks.

Paragraph (b)(6) proposes the rollover

strength for the FOX power cars.

Specifically, power cars must be

designed to rest on their sides,

uniformly supported at the top (cantrail)

and the bottom (sidesill) chords of the

side frame with the allowable stress in

the main structural members for

occupied volumes for this condition

limited to one-half yield stress. In

addition, power cars must be designed

to rest on their roofs, with damage

limited to roof sheathing and framing.

Deformation of the roof sheathing and

framing, to the extent necessary to

permit the vehicle to be supported

directly on the top chords of the side

frames and end frames, are permitted.

The permissible stress in the main

structural members for occupied

volumes for this condition are one-half

yield. These rollover strength

requirements are equivalent to the

requirements proposed in the Tier II

NPRM for passenger cars. Presently,

there are no North American standards

for rollover strength of locomotives.

Paragraph (c) proposes the structural

requirements for trailer cars. Paragraph

(c)(1) lists the basic carbody structural

strengths of the trailer car. These

parameters represent European design

practice as reflected in UIC standards.

Equipment built to these standards

provides structural protection for the

passengers during low speed, train-totrain collisions typical of station or yard

operations. Equipment built to these

standards also provide structural

protection for the passengers during

collisions at moderate speeds with most

highway vehicles. The proposed

requirements specify the magnitude of

the force that the trailer car structure

must resist and how that force is to be

applied during the test and analysis

done to prove that the design complies

with each requirement.

Paragraph (c)(2) requires each trailer

car to be designed to withstand a

uniformly distributed vertical load of

1.3 times its static laden weight, when

supported at the truck centers, without

permanent deformation. This

requirement essentially sets the vertical

stiffness of the car body as it is

supported between the two trucks.

Paragraph (c)(3) proposes that the

occupied volumes of trailer cars be

designed to resist, without permanent

deformation of the sidesill, cantrail, and

side post structural members, a

longitudinal compressive load of 3560

kN (800,000 lb.) when applied as

distributed over the carbody cross

section at the seated passenger

compartment. This requirement is

equivalent to North American practice

for passenger coach design.

Paragraph (c)(4) proposes that trailer

cars possess the same rollover strength

as power cars. This rollover strength

requirement is equivalent to the

requirements set forth in the Tier II

standards of FRA’s Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards NPRM for

passenger coaches.

Section 243.405 Trailer Car Interior

This section contains proposed

requirements for interior fittings and

surfaces in passenger trailer cars.

Research indicates that passengers

striking interior objects in trains,

principally during collisions and
65514 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

1 ‘‘Rail Safety/Equipment Crashworthiness.’’ M. J.

Reiley, R. H. Jines, & A. E. Tanner. (FRA/ORD–77/

73, Vol. I, July 1978).’’

derailments, account for 57% of the

serious injuries and 7% of the fatalities

on passenger trains.1 Once survivable

space is ensured by basic vehicle

structural strength and crash energy

management, the design of the interior

becomes an important factor in

preventing or mitigating serious injury.

To reduce the injury and fatality

numbers, FRA proposes that passenger

seats and other interior fittings be

securely attached to the car body;

interior fittings be recessed or flushmounted; overhead storage racks

provide restraint for stowed articles; and

sharp edges be padded or otherwise

avoided.

FRA and NTSB investigations of

passenger train accidents have revealed

that luggage, seats, and other interior

objects that break or loosen during an

accident often cause passenger and crew

injuries. During a collision, the greatest

decelerations, and thus the likeliest

forces to cause potential failure of

interior fitting attachment points, occur

in the longitudinal direction, i.e., in the

direction parallel to the normal

direction of train travel. Current North

American design practice consists of

seats and other interior fittings that

withstand the forces due to

accelerations of 6g in the longitudinal

direction, 3g in the vertical direction,

and 3g in the lateral direction. Due to

injuries caused by broken seats and

other loose fixtures, FRA believes that

the current design practice is

inadequate. Accordingly, FRA’s NPRM

for Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards proposed that each seat in a

passenger car remain firmly attached to

the car body when subjected to

individually applied accelerations of 4g

in the vertical direction and 4g in the

lateral direction acting on the

deadweight of the seat or seats, if a

tandem unit. In addition, the attachment

must resist a longitudinal inertial force

of 8g acting on the mass of the seat, plus

the impact force of the mass of a 95thpercentile male occupant(s) being

decelerated from a relative speed of 25

mph and striking the seat from behind.

By resisting the force of an occupant

striking the seat from behind, a potential

domino effect of seats breaking away

from their attachments is avoided.

In addition, the NPRM for Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards proposes

that overhead storage racks provide

longitudinal and lateral restraint for

stowed articles to minimize the

potential for these objects to come loose

and injure train occupants. Further, to

prevent overhead storage racks from

breaking away from their attachment

points to the carbody, the racks must

have an ultimate strength capable of

resisting individually applied

accelerations of 8g longitudinally, 4g

vertically, and 4g laterally acting on the

mass of the luggage stowed.

Paragraph (a)(1) proposes that Fox

trainset seat backs be designed to

withstand, with deflection and

permanent deformation allowed, but

without total failure, the load due to a

95th-percentile male seat occupant

accelerated with the following pulse: 0

to 6g in 0.05 s; 6g for 0.125 s; and 6 to

0g in 0.05 s.

Paragraph (a)(2) proposes that the

ultimate strength of a seat attachment to

the trailer carbody be sufficient to

withstand the following individuallyapplied accelerations acting on the mass

of the seat, plus the mass of a seat

occupant who is a 95th-percentile male:

6 g, longitudinal; 2 g, lateral; and 2 g,

vertical.

Paragraph (b)(1) proposes that other

interior fittings be attached to the trailer

carbody with sufficient strength to

withstand the following individuallyapplied accelerations acting on the mass

of the fitting: 3 g, longitudinal; 2 g,

lateral; and 2 g, vertical.

Paragraph (b)(2) requires, to the extent

possible, that interior fittings be

recessed or flush-mounted, and corners

and sharp edges avoided altogether or

padded to mitigate the consequences of

impact with such surfaces.

Paragraph (c) proposes that luggage

stowage compartments include a means

to restrain luggage, and have sufficient

strength to resist loads due to the

following individually-applied

accelerations acting on the mass of the

luggage that the compartment is

designed to accommodate: 3 g,

longitudinal; 2 g, lateral; and 2 g,

vertical.

These seat attachment, interior fitting

attachment, and luggage compartment

strengths that FRA proposes for the FOX

system are lower than those set forth in

FRA’s Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards for Tier II equipment. Also,

FRA is not proposing for FOX enclosed

overhead luggage racks, as are proposed

for the generic Tier II equipment. FRA

believes that the standards we propose

here for FOX provide an equivalent

level of safety for passengers and

employees on the FOX equipment for

several reasons.

First, the Railroad’s operation is based

on principles of accident-avoidance. As

discussed previously, this safety

philosophy will be implemented on

FOX through a variety of operating

features, including the dedicated rightof-way, the absence of grade crossings,

low train density, and an advanced

signaling system. In combination, these

characteristics of the system provide a

very high level of safety performance

and a very low risk of an accident.

Second, FOX could not find any

record of passenger injury caused by

loose seats, loose interior fixtures or

fallen luggage on TGV trainsets,

including the high speed derailments.

Given the high number of passengermiles covered by the TGV in France

since 1981, this fact tends to indicate

that such injuries are unlikely.

Third, the trainset provides several

alternate stowage areas so that all

luggage need not be stored on the

overhead racks. The TGV trainsets will

have two locations, at the first and last

passenger units, where heavy or large

pieces of baggage may be checked into

a dedicated compartment for stowage.

Also, two of the passenger units will

include stowage racks for large carry-on

luggage. Finally, stowage will also be

available throughout the trainset

between back-to-back seats. The

overhead racks would typically be used

for smaller and lighter luggage, which is

less likely to cause injury in an

accident.

Fourth, the TGV trainsets inherently

provide excellent ride quality at high

speed due to the articulated design, the

quality and geometry of the track, the

suspension characteristics, and the large

curve radii. The articulated design

eliminates in-train forces due to slack;

the quality and geometry of the track

provide smooth high speed operation;

and the large curve radii facilitates high

speed travel through curves at low cant

deficiency. These combined factors

result in very low longitudinal, lateral,

and vertical forces on trainsets

throughout the speed range.

Finally, the estimated increase in

weight, per trailer car, of nearly 456 kg

(1,000 lb.) that would be required to

meet the more stringent, generic

standards would be detrimental to the

operational design limits for this high

speed transportation system.

Section 243.407 Glazing

Paragraph (a) proposes the glazing

impact and ballistic requirements for

the trainset, which are based on French

TGV standards. The end facing

(engineer’s front windshield) must resist

an energy of 30 kJ at 20° C (72° F) and

25 kJ at 0° C (32° F). As a comparison,

the proposed Tier II equipment

standards would require the end facing

glazing to resist 12.2 kJ of energy for

operation at 240 kph (150 mph) and

21.7 kJ for 322 kph (200 mph) operation.

These glazing standards are more
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65515

stringent than those proposed for Tier II

equipment, and have proven effective in

service in France.

Paragraph (b) requires interior glazing

to meet the minimum requirements of

AS1 type laminated glass, as defined in

American National Standard ‘‘Safety

Code for Glazing Materials for Glazing

Motor Vehicles Operating on Land

Highways,’’ ASA Standard Z26.1–1966.

This requirement alleviates the need for

interior glazing to meet the stringent

impact resistance requirements placed

on exterior glazing, but ensures that the

glazing will shatter in a safe manner in

the event of an accident, much like

automotive glazing.

Paragraph (c) proposes that the

glazing frame will hold glazing in place

against all forces that are generated in

the tests required by this proposal.

Section 243.409 Brake System

Paragraph (a) requires the FOX brake

system to be capable of stopping

trainsets with a service application of

the brakes from its maximum authorized

operating speed, within the signal

spacing that exists on the track. This

proposed requirement is the

fundamental performance standard for

any train brake system. This section

merely codifies a requirement which is

current industry practice, and is the

basis for safe train operations in the U.S.

Paragraph (a) also defines the test

conditions for braking under low

adhesion levels as defined in UIC leaflet

541.05. This standard requires a specific

quantity of detergent to be sprayed on

the rails during the braking test. In

addition, paragraph (a) requires the flow

rate, defined by UIC 541.05, to be

doubled at speeds in excess of 180 km/

h (112 mph). This meets the French

TGV requirement to minimize the

attainable adhesion level during a high

speed test, in order to ensure a high

margin of safety for high speed braking.

Paragraph (b) proposes that the

braking on each truck shall be

independently controlled by the brake

pipe. Unlike conventional North

American brake systems which have a

brake manifold on each car, the FOX

trainset braking system has a separate

manifold for each truck. The brakes are

applied through a brake pipe pressure

reduction, controlled by the engineer’s

brake valve. A uniform distribution of

the pressure reduction throughout the

train is enhanced by an electropneumatic control. An electric trainline

signal is used to activate an electropneumatic valve on the brake manifold

for each truck, which provides a quick

and uniform control of the brake pipe

pressure. This arrangement also

minimizes the operational effects of a

failure of a brake manifold, in that only

one truck in the consist is inoperative if

a brake manifold has failed or has cut

out.

Paragraph (c) proposes to require that

the electric brake be completely

independent on each powered truck and

shall operate with the loss of the

overhead power supply. The kinetic

energy of a train, and hence the energy

that must be dissipated in stopping a

train, is proportional to its mass and the

square of its speed. Therefore, there is

a radical increase in energy to be

dissipated for a very high speed train,

compared to that required for a typical

North American train. As an example,

the energy that must be dissipated to

stop the Railroad’s trainset (1–8–1; or

one power car, eight trailer cars, and

one power car) from 322 km/h (200

mph), is about 1.7×106 kJ (1.3 billion ftlb). To put this in perspective, this is

approximately 3 times the energy

required to stop a 1–8–1 Amfleet consist

from 161 km/h (100 mph). Unlike

conventional North American

equipment, very high speed trainsets

rely to a great extent on the electric

brake. Therefore, paragraph (c) requires

the electric brake to be independent on

each powered truck and be able to

operate if power from the catenary is

lost. To achieve this, separate batteries

and battery chargers are used for field

excitation of the traction motors on each

truck. There are two power cars on each

FOX trainset, each with two powered

trucks; each trainset will have four

completely independent electric brakes,

which provides for a high level of

redundancy and safety.

In addition, paragraph (d) proposes

that any failure of the electric brake on

any powered truck must be displayed to

the train operator. This important safety

feature will alert the operator so that

s/he can take compensating action to

prevent accident or incident.

Paragraph (e) requires the brake

system to be designed to prevent

thermal damage to wheels or discs. The

purpose of this requirement is to ensure

that the brake system is designed and

operated to prevent dangerous cracks in

wheels. Passenger equipment wheels are

normally heat treated so that the wheel

rim is in compression. This condition

forces small cracks that form in the rim

to be closed. Heavy tread braking can

heat wheels to the point that a stress

reversal occurs and the wheel rim is in

tension to a certain depth. Rim tension

is a dangerous condition because it

promotes surface crack growth. In 1994,

FRA published an NPRM on power

brakes, which proposed a wheel surface

temperature limit to prevent this

condition. (See 59 FR 47729). Several

brake manufacturers and railroads

objected to this approach, claiming that

the temperature limit was too

conservative and did not facilitate the

development of new materials that can

withstand higher temperatures. Based

on these comments and concerns, FRA

is proposing a more flexible

performance requirement here, rather

than a wheel tread surface temperature

limit. This is an extremely important

safety requirement because a cracked

wheel that fails at high speed can have

catastrophic consequences. In addition,

the proposed requirement will lead to

longer wheel life, and so should provide

maintenance savings to the Railroad.

Paragraph (f) proposes to require the

Railroad to demonstrate, through

analysis and test, the maximum safe

operating speed of the trainset where no

thermal damage occurs to wheels or

discs, for various combinations of

electric and friction brake failure. The

railroad must also demonstrate that no

thermal damage results to the wheels or

discs under conditions resulting in

maximum friction braking effort being

exerted. Unlike conventional North

American passenger trains which may

vary in weight, length and braking

capability, FOX will use fixed consists.

This significantly simplifies the task of

determining the braking characteristics

for various modes of degraded braking.

Demonstrating that the requirements of

paragraph (e) have been met will be an

important objective of the pre-revenue

service system qualification tests.

Paragraph (f) also requires the

Railroad to develop a matrix that lists a

variety and combination of brake

failures and corresponding safe speeds

that must be followed in the event of

brake failures. This matrix must be

completed in conjunction with the

Railroad’s system safety plan analysis,

and must be displayed prominently in

each power car. This process is

employed by the French TGV to assess

accurately appropriate braking distances

and train speed for each route on the

TGV line. This paragraph requires FOX

to complete this analysis for the entire

right-of-way in Florida, and to adhere to

the train speeds that are determined to

be safe for all potential brake failures.

Paragraph (g) requires that when a

failure of the electric or friction portion

of the brake occurs en route, the trainset

must proceed at the speed determined

appropriate by the matrix prepared in

accordance with paragraph (f), and

confirmed by the pre-revenue service

system qualification tests required by

§ 243.21 and Subpart G of this proposed

rule. Also, the engineer must notify

central traffic control of any

combination of brake failure that
65516 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

requires a speed restriction. On the FOX

system, these speed limitations will be

automatically enforced by the signal

system.

In paragraph (h), FRA proposes that

the trainset be equipped with an

emergency application feature that

produces an irretrievable stop, using a

brake rate consistent with prevailing

adhesion, passenger safety, and brake

system thermal capacity. In addition, an

emergency application shall be available

at any time, and a means to apply the

emergency brake must be provided at

two locations in each trainset that are

accessible to the train crew. This

paragraph merely codifies current

industry practice and ensures that

passenger equipment will continue to be

designed with an emergency brake

application feature. In FRA’s 1994

NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposed

a requirement that all trains be

equipped with an emergency

application feature capable of increasing

the train’s deceleration rate a minimum

of 15 percent. See 59 FR 47729.

Comments received indicated that

passenger brake equipment should

provide a deceleration rate with a full

service application that is close to the

emergency brake rate, and that the

proposed requirement would require

lowering full service brake rates, which

would compromise safety and reduce

train speeds. Based on these comments,

FRA proposes the current requirement,

which is in accordance with suggestions

made by several U.S. passenger

railroads.

Paragraph (i) proposes that FOX

trainsets be designed so that an

inspector would not be on, under, or

between components of the equipment

in order to observe brake actuation or

release. The proposal grants the

Railroad flexibility to use a reliable

indicator in place of direct observation

of the brake application or piston travel.

The current design of many passenger

car brake systems make direct and safe

observation extremely difficult. FRA

wishes to avoid this and the employee

injuries that may result. Brake system

piston travel or piston cylinder pressure

indicators have been used with

satisfactory results for many years.

Although indicators do not provide 100

percent certainty that train brakes are

effective, FRA believes that they provide

a high degree of assurance and are

preferable to placing an inspector in a

dangerous position.

Paragraph (j) requires the trainset

brake design to permit a disabled train’s

pneumatic brakes to be controlled by a

rescue locomotive through brake pipe

control alone. This feature will facilitate

easy and safe removal of disabled

trainsets to an appropriate repair shop.

Paragraph (k) proposes that the Fox

trainset be equipped with a hand or

parking brake that can be set and

released manually and can hold the

equipment on the maximum grade

anticipated by the operating railroad. A

hand or parking brake is an important

safety feature, which prevents parked

equipment from rolling or runaway. In

the 1994 NPRM on power brakes, FRA

proposed requiring a hand brake on cars

and locomotives. See 59 FR 47729. FRA

received several comments suggesting

that the term ‘‘parking brake’’ be added

to the requirement, because that is the

term used in many passenger

operations. Based on those suggestions,

FRA has added the term in this

proposal. This requirement differs from

typical North American practice, which

calls for a hand brake on each car. FOX

trainsets are a fixed consist that can not

be uncoupled in the field, and so this

proposal treats the trainset as a single

vehicle.

Paragraph (l) proposes an

independent failure detection system to

compare brake commands with brake

system output to determine if a failure

has occurred. The failure detection

system shall report brake system failures

to the automated train monitoring

system. This requirement ties the brake

system to the automatic monitoring

system, as required by § 243.425(a)

discussed below. Also, this important

safety feature will alert the operator to

potential brake system problems so that

timely compensating action.

Paragraph (m) requires that each truck

of the trainset be equipped with a

wheelslide system designed to

automatically adjust the braking force

on each wheel to prevent axle-locking

during braking. In the event of failure of

a truck’s wheelslide system, control will

be automatically provided by the

wheelslide system of an adjacent truck.

This redundancy is necessary, because

at very high speeds, the available

adhesion between the wheel and the rail

is lower than exists at slower,

conventional speeds. This factor

increases the possibility of wheelslide

during braking at high speeds. The FOX

trainset has a separate and independent

microprocessor to control wheelslide on

each truck. If a microprocessor fails, an

adjacent microprocessor takes over

wheelslide control for the truck with the

inoperative microprocessor. The trainset

is also equipped with a system that

detects non-rotating axles and removes

pressure from the brake cylinders until

rotation resumes. Paragraph (m) also

proposes that a visual and/or audible

alarm be provided in the cab of the

controlling power car if a blocked axle

is detected.

Section 243.411 Truck and Suspension

System

This section contains the proposed

requirements for trucks and suspension

systems. Truck and suspension system

performance are crucial to the safe

operation of high speed passenger

equipment. The suspension system

requirements proposed in this section

were also used for the successful

demonstrations of the X–2000 and the

ICE trainsets on the Northeast Corridor

at speeds up to 135 mph. These

proposed requirements are also likely to

be part of the suspension system

performance Amtrak’s passenger future

equipment.

Paragraph (a)(1) requires the truck-tocar-body attachment on the FOX trainset

to resist, without failure, a force of

250,000 pounds acting in any horizontal

direction. The requirement for the

attachment to resist a horizontal force is

intended to allow the truck to act as an

anti-climbing device during a collision.

With the truck attached to the car body,

the truck of an overriding rail vehicle is

likely to be caught by the underframe of

the overridden rail vehicle, thus

arresting the override. The parameter

selected represents the current North

American design practice, which has

proven effective in preventing

horizontal shear of trucks from car

bodies.

Paragraph (a)(2) requires each

component of the truck must to remain

attached to the truck when a force

equivalent to 2g acting on the mass of

the component is exerted in any

direction on that component. Paragraph

(a)(1) is intended to keep the truck

attached to the car body, and paragraph

(a)(2) is intended to keep truck

components attached to the truck.

To ensure safe, stable performance

and ride quality, paragraph (b) requires

suspension systems to be designed to

prevent wheel climb, wheel lift, rail

rollover, rail shift, and to prevent

vehicles from overturning. These

requirements must be met in all

operating environments, and under all

track and loading conditions as

determined by the operating railroad. In

addition, these requirements must be

met under all track speeds and

conditions, consistent with the

requirements of Subpart D, up to the

maximum operating speed and

maximum cant deficiency of the

equipment. These broad suspension

system performance requirements

address the operation of equipment at

both high speed over well maintained

track and at low speed over lower
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65517

classes of track. Suspension system

performance requirements are needed at

both high and low speeds, in order to

prevent derailments while negotiating

curves. Compliance with paragraph (b)

must be demonstrated during the

Railroad’s pre-revenue service system

qualification testing of the equipment as

described in Subpart G.

Paragraph (c) requires the steady-state

lateral acceleration of passenger cars to

be less than 0.1g, as measured parallel

to the car floor inside the passenger

compartment, under all operating

conditions. Passenger cars must not

operate when the steady-state lateral

acceleration is 0.1g or greater. FRA

originally considered limiting the cant

deficiency to effect this requirement, but

members of the RSAC track working

group concluded that this steady-state

lateral acceleration requirement would

ensure safe operation.

Paragraph (d) requires each truck to

be equipped with a permanently

installed lateral accelerometer mounted

on the truck frame. If hunting

oscillations are detected, the train

monitoring system shall provide an

alarm to the locomotive engineer and

the train shall be slowed by the

locomotive engineer to a speed of 8

km/h (5 mph) less than the speed at

which hunting oscillations stopped.

Also, this requirement must be included

in the Railroad’s operating rules.

Paragraph (e) provides ride vibration,

or quality, limits for vertical

accelerations, lateral accelerations, and

the combination of lateral and vertical

accelerations. These limits must be met

while the equipment is traveling at the

maximum operating speed over its

intended route during the qualification

phase of the system. The limiting

parameters and the means to measure

them are a result of the consensus

recommendations from the RSAC high

speed track task group and the

passenger equipment working group.

These standards have proven effective

during the demonstrations of the X–

2000 and ICE trainsets here in the U.S.

Compliance with ride quality

requirements contained in this

paragraph must be demonstrated during

the pre-revenue service qualification

tests required by § 243.113 and Subpart

G of this proposal. One of the most

important objectives of pre-revenue

service system qualification testing is to

demonstrate that suspension system

performance requirements have been

met.

Paragraph (f) requires bearing

overheat sensors to be provided onboard the equipment, or at reasonable

wayside intervals. FRA prefers sensors

on-board the equipment, in order to

eliminate the risk of a hotbox that

develops between wayside locations.

However, FRA recognizes that on-board

sensors have a history of falsely

detecting overheat conditions, which

have caused operating difficulties for

some passenger railroads.

Section 243.413 Fire Safety

This section contains the fire safety

requirements proposed for the FOX

system. In 1984, FRA published

guidelines recommending testing

methods and performance criteria for

the flammability, smoke emission, and

fire endurance characteristics for

categories and functions of materials to

be used in the construction of new or

rebuilt rail passenger equipment. 49 FR

33076 (Aug. 20, 1984); 49 FR 44582

(Nov. 7, 1984). The guidelines mirrored

fire safety guidelines developed by the

Federal Transit Administration

(formerly known as the Urban Mass

Transit Administration).

The intent of the guidelines is to

prevent fire ignition and to maximize

the time available for passenger

evacuation where fire does occur. FRA

subsequently reissued the guidelines in

1989 in order to update the

recommended testing methods. 54 FR

1837 (Jan. 17, 1989). Testing methods

cited in the current FRA guidelines

include those of the American Society

of Testing and Materials (ASTM) and

the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA). In particular, the ASTM and

FAA testing methods provide a useful

screening device to identify materials

that are especially hazardous.

FRA sought comments in the Advance

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(ANPRM) for Passenger Equipment

Safety Standards on the need for more

thorough fire safety guidelines. 61 FR

30672 (June 17, 1996). FRA noted that

fire resistance, detection, and

suppression technologies have all

advanced since the guidelines were first

published. In addition, FRA explained

that a trend toward a systems approach

to fire safety is evident in most

countries with modern rail systems. In

response, the National Fire Protection

Association (NFPA) commented that

perhaps more thorough guidelines are

needed, or at least should be evaluated.

Paragraph (a) addresses fire safety by

proposing to make FRA’s fire safety

guidelines mandatory in the

construction of FOX trainsets. In

addition, the proposed rule would also

require that fire safety be furthered

through a fire protection plan and

program carried out by the railroad.

Paragraph (b) proposes that the Railroad

require certification from the equipment

supplier that combustible materials

used in the construction of trainset

interiors have been tested by a

recognized independent testing

laboratory, and that the results comply

with the requirements of paragraph (a)

of this section.

Paragraphs (c)–(e) link the fire safety

analysis portion of the system safety

program required by Subpart B to the

trainset design requirements. These

paragraphs require the Railroad to

ensure that good fire protection practice

is used during the design and operation

of the equipment. These paragraphs

require the Railroad to install various

detection and suppression equipment

where the Railroad’s written analysis

determines they are required.

Paragraph (f) requires the Railroad to

comply with all elements of its written

procedures designated as mandatory

under Subpart B for the inspection,

testing, and maintenance of all fire

safety systems and equipment.

Section 243.415 Doors

This section contains the

requirements for exterior side doors on

FOX trailer cars. These doors are the

primary means of egress from the train.

During an NTSB investigation of the

February 16, 1996, collision between the

MARC and Amtrak trains in Silver

Spring, Maryland, that agency identified

unsafe conditions on MARC’s rail cars

that had been manufactured by

Sumitomo. Concerned that the unsafe

conditions identified on these rail cars

may exist on other commuter lines

subject to FRA oversight, on March 12,

1996, the NTSB recommended that

FRA:

Inspect all commuter rail equipment to

determine whether it has: (1) Easily

accessible interior emergency quick-release

mechanisms adjacent to exterior passageway

doors; (2) removable windows or kick panels

in interior and exterior passageway doors;

and (3) prominently displayed retroreflective signage marking all interior and

exterior emergency exits. If any commuter

equipment lacks one or more or these

features, take appropriate emergency

measures to ensure corrective action until

these measures are incorporated into

minimum passenger car safety standards.

(Class I, Urgent Action) (R–96–7).

The requirements proposed in this

section respond to this NTSB

recommendation.

Paragraph (a) proposes requirements

for powered, exterior side doors. In

paragraph (a)(1) FRA proposes that each

trailer car have a minimum of four

exterior side doors, or the functional

equivalent of four side doors, that each

permit at least one 95th-percentile male

to pass through at a single time. FRA

believes that such a requirement is
65518 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

necessary, at least as an interim

measure, so that each passenger car

have a sufficient number of exits to

allow passengers to quickly exit in an

emergency. This requirement would be

met by providing two sets of doublewide doors that permit two 95thpercentile males to pass through at the

same time. However, FRA invites

comment concerning the extent to

which the design of the FOX trainsets

cannot comply with this proposed

section. FRA may modify this proposal

based on information provided by FOX

or other interested parties. As a long

term approach, FRA is investigating an

emergency evacuation performance

requirement similar to that used in

commercial aviation where a sufficient

number of emergency exits must be

provided to evacuate the maximum

passenger load in a specified time for

various types of emergency situations.

Paragraph (a)(2) proposes that the

status of each powered, exterior door

shall be displayed to the crew in the

operating power car and if door

interlocks are used, the sensors used to

detect train motion shall be nominally

set to operate at 5 km/h (3 mph). Such

a proposal would enable a crew member

in the operating cab to determine

whether train doors are closed before

departure. This capability is well within

current technology and complies with

the emergency exit requirements

proposed in the NPRM for Tier II

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards.

In paragraph (a)(3) FRA proposes that

powered, exterior doors be powered by

the compressed air system or by

electricity. If powered by electricity, the

doors shall be connected to an

emergency back-up power system. The

back-up power system should facilitate

rapid evacuation through the doors in

the event of primary power failure.

Paragraph (a)(4) requires that each

powered, exterior door be equipped

with a manual override that is: Located

adjacent to the door that it controls;

capable of opening the door without

power from inside and outside the car;

and designed and maintained so that a

person may access the override device

from inside and outside the car, without

the use of any tool or other implement.

FRA believes this requirement is

necessary to ensure that passengers are

able to quickly evacuate the train.

Paragraph (a)(5) requires that

instructions for manual override be

clearly posted in the car interior at door

locations. As a result of the MARC/

Amtrak accident in Silver Spring,

Maryland, the NTSB stated that several

train passengers were unaware of the

locations of emergency exits, and none

knew how to operate them. The NTSB

found that the interior emergency

window decals were not prominently

displayed and that one car had no

interior emergency window decals.

Paragraph (a)(6) addresses this

concern by requiring a means for

emergency responders to access the

manual override from outside the car be

provided. In addition, instructions for

access and use of the handle must be

clearly posted outside the car at all door

locations. As a result of the Silver

Spring accident, the NTSB had found

that the exterior emergency decals were

often faded or obliterated, and the

information on them, when legible,

directed emergency responders to

another sign at the end of the car for

instructions on how to open emergency

exits.

Paragraph (a)(7) requires that manual

door releases be activated easily. To

ensure that most passengers are capable

of opening the doors using the manual

releases, FRA proposes that they be

easily operable by a 5th-percentile

female, without the use of any tool to

accomplish the manual override, in the

event of head-end power loss.

To ensure that manual override

devices are easily accessible by

passengers, FRA is proposing

requirements in paragraph (a)(8) to

address covers and screens used to

protect such devices from casual or

inadvertent use. FRA desires to balance

the concern that passengers may

unnecessarily exit cars when no

emergency is present with the need for

passengers to easily access a doorrelease mechanism in a life-threatening

situation. Thus, the Railroad may

protect a manual override device used

to open a powered, exterior door with

a cover or a screen capable of removal

by a 5th-percentile female without

requiring the use of a tool or other

implement. If the method of removing

the protective cover or screen entails

breaking or shattering it, the cover or

screen must be scored, perforated, or

otherwise weakened so that a 5thpercentile female can penetrate the

cover or screen with a single blow of her

fist without injury to her hand.

In paragraph (b), FRA proposes that

passenger compartment end doors be

equipped with a kick-out panel, pop-out

window or other equivalent means of

egress in the event the door will not

open. The NTSB noted that none of the

car doors on the MARC train involved

in the Silver Spring, Maryland, accident

had removable windows or pop-out

emergency escape panels (‘‘kick

panels’’) for use in an emergency.

FRA shares the NTSB’s concern about

passenger egress in an emergency;

however, FRA believes that the NTSB’s

suggestion to install kick panels is best

limited to interior doors to ensure

passage through a train in an

emergency—and not applied to exterior

doors. To the best of FRA’s knowledge,

the concept of kick panels has not been

utilized in North American rail

equipment. Installing kick panels below

the window levels in exterior doors was

evaluated by FRA—with concurrence

from the Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards Working Groups—as

unacceptable for safety reasons. Because

passenger railroads have encountered

recurring situations in which passengers

have inappropriately exited moving

trains, leading to death or serious injury,

introducing kick panels in exterior

doors would create an unacceptable risk

of inadvertent use, particularly by

children.

Use of kick panels to open

passageways through a train has merit.

If panels can be made sufficiently large

without decreasing the functionality of

doors in normal operation, such a

feature may facilitate evacuation

through the length of the train if exterior

side doors are jammed. Evacuation

throughout the length of the train is

often the safest route of egress in

situations such as fires, derailments in

multiple track territory, and incidents in

third-rail powered commuter service.

Accordingly, FRA proposed in the

NPRM for Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards that Tier II passenger car end

doors be equipped with a kick-out

panel, pop-out window or other similar

means of egress in the event the doors

will not open.

Section 243.417 Emergency Equipment

Paragraph (a) proposes that the

emergency system requirements given

in this section apply to each FOX trailer

car. Experience gained during rescues

conducted after recent passenger train

accidents indicates that emergency

lighting systems either did not work or

failed after a short time, greatly

hindering rescue operations. Paragraph

(b) requires FOX trailer cars to be

equipped with emergency lighting

providing a minimum average

illumination level of 55 lux (5.1 ftcandles) at floor level for all potential

evacuation routes, and a back-up power

feature capable of operation for a

minimum of two hours after loss of

normal power.

The two-hour time duration for

availability of back-up power is based

on experience gained during rescue

operations for passenger train accidents

in remote locations. In such accidents,

fully-equipped emergency response

forces can take an hour or more to arrive

at the site, and additional time is
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65519

required to deploy and reach people

trapped or injured in the train. In

addition, the back-up power system

must be able to operate in all

orientations and after experiencing a

shock due to a longitudinal acceleration

of 3g and vertical and lateral

accelerations of 2g. The shock

requirement will ensure that the backup power system has a reasonable

chance of operating after the initial

shock caused by a collision or

derailment.

Paragraph (c) requires an emergency

communication system within the train

with back-up power. This safety feature

will allow the train crew to provide

evacuation and other instructions to

passengers. Such a system can help

prevent panic that often occurs during

emergency situations. FRA is proposing

that transmission locations be located

throughout the trainset and that the

locations be marked with clear

instructions for the use of the

emergency communication system.

Paragraph (d) proposes that locations

of emergency equipment and exits be

clearly marked with luminescent

material that makes the identity and

location of the emergency exit

recognizable from a distance equal to

the width of the car. This requirement

is intended to allow passengers and

crew to easily locate emergency

equipment and exits, even under poor

visibility conditions. The requirement

will aid an orderly evacuation of the

train in the event of an emergency.

Paragraph (e) contains the proposed

requirements for FOX emergency exits.

Paragraph (e)(2) requires clear and

understandable instructions for the use

of emergency exits to be posted at each

emergency exit and be visible from a

distance of 30 inches. This provision

should aid passengers unfamiliar with

the operation of emergency exits to

operate them and evacuate train

quickly.

Paragraph (e)(3) proposes that each

trailer car have a minimum of four

emergency window exits, arranged in a

staggered configuration, or with one

located at each end of each side of the

trailer car. Each FOX trailer car will be

equipped with 4 emergency windows, 2

at each end and one on each side, to

comply with this requirement. An

emergency window is also located in

each FOX trailer car side entrance door

to provide emergency access in the

event of a blocked door. This

configuration complies with the

emergency exit requirements proposed

in the NPRM for Passenger Equipment

Safety Standards.

Paragraph (e)(4) proposes that each

trailer car window emergency exit shall

have a minimum free opening of 1.6 m

(63 in) wide by 0.6 m (24 in) high. This

configuration complies with the

emergency window exit requirements

proposed in the NPRM for Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards and is the

minimum size that will allow a fully

equipped emergency responder to enter

the car through the window. The FOX

trainsets will have emergency windows

much larger than this minimum size.

Paragraph (e)(5) requires that

emergency window exits be capable of

activating easily. The FOX system

trainsets will employ breakable

emergency windows, rather than the

conventional North American

removable type. This will facilitate use

of a window-to-carbody seal that will

withstand the large pressure variation

between passing trainsets, and use of a

flush-mounted window seal that will

minimize air drag for high speed

operations. A small pointed hammer

will be located at each end of the

passenger compartment, beside each

window and door, to break the

emergency window. FRA proposes that

each emergency window exit shall be

easily operable by a 5th-percentile

female using this hammer. No other tool

or implement may be required for this

purpose.

Paragraph (e)(6) proposes that each

power car have an emergency roof hatch

with a minimum opening of 0.45 m (18

in) by 0.6 m (24 in) and an emergency

escape exit in the cab sidewall. Such

features should aid in removing

passengers and crew members from a

vehicle that is either on its side or

upright in water. This proposed

requirement exceeds the requirements

for Tier II equipment proposed in the

NPRM on Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards.

In paragraph (f) FRA requires the

Railroad to have in place a redundant

means for the train crew to

communicate with the pertinent

railroad operations center to summon

aid in the event of an emergency

situation. These redundant methods

may include operating portable radios

or cellular telephones. This requirement

will ensure that emergency response

forces can be quickly summoned in the

event of an emergency.

Section 243.419 Operator’s Controls and

Power Car Layout

FRA believes that power car cab

interior features play an important role

in safety, because they affect employee

response and performance. Given the

speed that FOX trainsets will travel,

FRA believes it would be appropriate to

establish minimum standards for the

cab layout, in order to maximize

employee cab performance. The

proposed requirements set forth in this

section attempt to capture sound

ergonomic design practice for cab layout

in order to minimize the risk of human

error, attention loss, and operator

fatigue. These standards are selfexplanatory, and consistent with the

FOX high speed equipment.

Section 243.421 Exterior Lights

Paragraph (a) proposes that each

power car be equipped with two or

more headlights, each capable of

producing 12,000 or more candela.

Paragraph (b) proposes the following

taillight requirements: each trailing

power car shall be equipped with two

or more red taillights; each taillight

shall be located at least 1.2 m (3.9 ft)

above rail; each taillight shall produce

15 or more candela; and taillights of the

trailing power car must be on when the

trainset is on a section of the system that

is in revenue service.

The intensity of the headlights and

taillights proposed here for the FOX

trainsets are lower than exist on

standard North American equipment.

Due to all of the unique operating

characteristics that are part of the FOX

system, (no grade crossings, a fenced

right-of-way with intrusion detection

systems, no mixed traffic, advanced

signal system), the high speed

equipment can be (and often is in

France) operated at full speed without

the locomotive engineer having sight of

the right-of-way. The intensity of the

TGV lights have provided safe operation

for fifteen years of revenue service in

France, and FRA believes this will be

sufficient for the system in Florida.

Section 243.423 Electrical System

Design

This section contains the proposed

requirements for the FOX electrical

system design. These requirements

reflect common electrical safety practice

and are widely recognized as good

electrical design practice. They include

provisions for circuit protection against

surges, overload and ground faults;

electrical conductor sizes and properties

to provide a margin of safety for the

intended application; battery system

design to prevent the risk of

overcharging or accumulation of

dangerous gases that can cause an

explosion; and design of resistor grids

that dissipate energy produced by

dynamic braking with sufficient

electrical isolation and ventilation to

minimize the risk of fires. These

proposed electrical system design

requirements are consistent with the

FRA’s NPRM for Tier II Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards.
65520 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Section 243.425 Automated Monitoring

This section contains proposed

requirements for automated monitoring

of the status or performance of the

Railroad’s safety-related equipment

systems and subsystems. Investigations

of past passenger train accidents reveal

that many accidents were caused, in

some measure, by human error. FOX’s

high operating speeds will reduce the

time train operators will have to react to

nonconforming conditions, and evaluate

potentially dangerous situations.

Therefore, the potential for accidents

increases. Automated monitoring

systems can reduce the risk of accidents

by alerting the operator to abnormal

conditions and advising the operator of

necessary or recommended corrective

action as soon as the abnormalities

appear. These systems can even be

designed to make automatic corrective

action in certain situations. FRA

proposes that the FOX trainsets be

equipped with an automated system to

monitor various train systems and

components. The requirements that FRA

proposes are consistent with the

requirements for FRA’s NPRM for Tier

II Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards.

Paragraph (a) requires the train to be

equipped to monitor the performance of

a minimum set of safety-related systems

and components that includes the

following: Reception of cab signals and

train control signals; truck hunting;

electric brake status; friction brake

status; fire detection systems; head end

power status; alerter; horn; and wheel

slide. This monitoring system will also

provide information to the Railroad for

use in trouble-shooting, maintenance,

and to accumulate reliability data that

will form the basis for establishing

required periodic maintenance

intervals.

Paragraph (b) requires that the

locomotive engineer be alerted when

any of the monitored parameters are out

of predetermined limits. The Railroad’s

operating rules, developed pursuant to

§ 243.117 and Subpart F of the rule, will

govern the engineer’s activities if the

equipment malfunctions. If the engineer

does not act in accordance with the

Railroad operating rules for this

situation, the Railroad’s central traffic

control must initiate corrective action.

Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to

develop, in the course of its system

safety plan analysis, appropriate

operating rules that will address

engineer and train performance if a

trainset’s automated monitoring system

becomes defective en route, or is

defective when the daily inspection

required by § 243.433 is completed. The

automated monitoring system greatly

enhances safe operations. Although

trains may operate safety without this

system, FRA believes that specific

practices must be developed and

followed by the Railroad to address

such items as train speed, braking

distances, and communications when

the system becomes defective. As stated

earlier in this document, FRA is unclear

whether this monitoring system is

designed to function in redundant

fashion. If that is the case, it may be very

unlikely that the monitoring system will

ever fail. Nonetheless, FRA believes that

the added precaution of standards to

cover that event is necessary to ensure

safety.

Paragraph (d) proposes that each lead

power car be equipped with an event

recorder that monitors and records

safety data as required by § 243.425(a) of

this proposal and 49 CFR 229.135, Event

Recorders.

Paragraph (e) requires that each of the

systems monitored, and listed in

paragraph (a), must be inspected during

the daily inspection that is required by

§ 243.433 of this Subpart. This works in

conjunction with § 243.433(f)(1), which

requires the Railroad to inspect these

monitored systems in the daily

inspection of each trainset. If for some

reason, conditions cannot be

determined through the automated

monitoring system, the Railroad must

perform a visual inspection before the

trainset can be placed in revenue

service.

Section 243.427 Trainset System

Software and Hardware Integration

This section contains the proposed

requirements for the Railroad’s rolling

stock hardware and software. This

section reflects the growing role of

automated systems to control passenger

train safety functions. Paragraph (a)

proposes that the trainset system

hardware and software integration

conform with CF–001, On-Board

Electronic Equipment and Computer

Hardware. In addition, paragraph (b)

proposes that the trainset system

hardware and software integration

conform with Pr CF–67–004,

Methodology for the Development of

On-Board Micro-Computer Equipment.

These requirements represent

accepted practice, and will not limit the

flexibility of the Railroad’s equipment

designers. However, these standards

reflect good design, that has led to

reliable, safe computer hardware and

software control systems in the

European railroad industry. Computer

hardware and software systems

designed to meet these standards may

require an initial investment, but it has

shown that such an investment is

quickly recovered by the reduction in

hardware and software integration

problems, minimizing trouble-shooting,

debugging of equipment.

Section 243.429 Control System

Design Requirements

This section requires that the rolling

stock computer be designed and

function pursuant to the software safety

program developed as part of the

Railroad’s system safety plan in Subpart

B of this proposal, discussed previously.

Section 243.431 Safety Appliance

This section contains proposed

requirements for safety appliances on

FOX trainsets. The proposal is

consistent in concept with existing

requirements, but is tailored specifically

for application to this new and

somewhat unconventional equipment.

These requirements are also consistent

with those proposed for Tier II

equipment in the FRA’s Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards.

Paragraph (a) of this section contains

the proposed requirements for couplers

that are positioned at either end of the

trainset, which will be used to connect

to other locomotives for hauling or

rescue purposes. Paragraph (a) requires

automatic couplers at the leading and

trailing ends of the trainset to couple on

impact, and uncouple by use of

uncoupling lever or other means that

does not require a person to go on,

under, or between equipment units.

This requirement prevents employee

exposure to the safety hazards that arise

from working on or between rail

equipment. The leading and trailing

automatic couplers of the trainset must

be compatible with the Railroad’s rescue

locomotive couplers, without the use of

special adapters. This would facilitate

rapid movement of disabled trains and

protects employees from the hazards of

going between the locomotive units.

Paragraph (a) also proposes that all

couplers be equipped with an anticlimbing mechanism capable of

resisting an upward or downward

vertical force of 250 kN (56,200 lb)

without permanent deformation. This is

common European design and is

appropriate in an operating

environment such as the FOX system,

where the risk of a collision has been

greatly reduced through strict collisionavoidance measures, and the articulated

train formation that resists climbing in

the event of an accident.

Paragraph (b) of this section sets forth

minimum requirements for safety

appliance mechanical strength and

fasteners. Handrails and sill steps must

be made of steel pipe that is 1 inch in
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65521

diameter, and fasteners must have a

mechanical strength of at least a M10-

diameter SAE steel bolt. These

standards are consistent with European

and U.S. practice, and provide a high

degree of safety for employees who must

utilize the safety appliances in the

course of their duties.

Paragraph (c) sets forth the minimum

standards for handrails and handholds.

All handrails and handholds must be

made of stainless steel, which provides

optimum strength and durability for

equipment exposed to all sorts of

environmental elements. This paragraph

also establishes minimum clearance

requirements that will facilitate safe

employee usage. Handrails and

handholds are not required on units of

a trainset that are semi-permanently

connected, as the FOX trainsets are. The

reason for this exclusion is that these

units can be disconnected only in repair

facilities with the use of special tools,

and employees have no reason to

position themselves between units and

so, have no need for the handholds and

handrails for that process. Similarly,

handrails and handholds are not

required on the leading and trailing

units, which are equipped with

automatic couplers that are coupled or

uncoupled with the use of tools that do

not require employees to work between

the units. However, handrails and

handholds are required at both sides of

the doors used to board and depart the

trainset. This will provide passengers

and employees additional stability and

safety as they enter or leave the

equipment.

Paragraph (d) of this section sets forth

the minimum requirements for sill steps

on the FOX passenger equipment. Sill

steps must be present below each side

door on all power and trailer cars, and

must be made of expanded metal or

equivalent anti-skid material, in order to

protect employees and passengers from

slipping from the step. Sill steps must

conform to the clearance requirements

set forth in order to accommodate safety

the average foot, and must be securely

fastened to prevent collapse when under

load. Sill steps are not required on cars

that are semi-permanently connected, or

on the leading and trailing units, which

are equipped with automatic couplers.

FOX may utilize these devices, but is

not required to do so, so long as the

equipment remains semi-permanently

connected, and possesses automatic

couplers at each end of each trainset.

Finally, paragraph (e) of this section

describes the manner in which the FOX

trailer and power cars are connected to

one another. The system does not use

traditional couplers that are common in

U.S. railroading. Cars are connected

through articulated semi-permanent

connections that can be disengaged only

in repair facilities, with the use of

special tools. These connectors between

trainset vehicles are an integral design

characteristic of the French TGV

equipment, and one which will be

duplicated on the FOX system.

Employees are not placed in danger

from the hazards that arise from

unexpected rail car movements, and

these connectors tend to resist buckling

and rolling in the event of a derailment.

They greatly enhance employee and

passenger safety, and this proposal

requires their use.

Section 243.433 Trainset Inspection,

Testing and Maintenance Requirements

This section sets forth the minimum

standards for the FOX inspection,

testing, and maintenance program. FRA

proposes general guidelines for the

Railroad to follow in order to develop a

comprehensive inspection, testing, and

maintenance program that will assure

the safety of the system’s rolling stock.

However, FRA proposes to exercise final

approval of the inspection, testing, and

maintenance program developed by the

Railroad and to enforce the safetycritical inspection, testing, and

maintenance procedures, criteria, and

maintenance intervals that result from

the approval process.

FRA sets forth this proposed cycle of

preventive maintenance for the FOX

trainsets, which is based on the

operational experience acquired in

France throughout the last fifteen years.

The French inspection and maintenance

program utilizes accumulated mileage

and degradation rates as indicators for

inspection needs, and FRA adopts those

criteria in this proposal.

Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to

obtain FRA approval of the written

inspection program for the rolling stock

prior to implementation of that program

and prior to commencing operations. At

a minimum, this program must include

the complete inspection, testing, and

maintenance program for the TGV

trainsets as it is performed in France,

including all inspections set forth in

§ 243.433(d) of this rule. This

information shall include a detailed

description of: safety inspection

procedures, intervals and criteria; test

procedures and intervals; scheduled

preventive maintenance intervals;

maintenance procedures; special test

equipment or measuring devices

required to perform safety inspections

and tests; and training and qualification

of employees and contractors to perform

safety inspections, tests and

maintenance.

Paragraph (b) requires the Railroad to

designate which inspection and

maintenance criteria are safety-critical,

and deems all emergency equipment

safety-critical. ‘‘Safety-critical’’

requirements are those that, if not

fulfilled, increase the risk of damage to

equipment or personal injury to a

passenger, crew member, or other

person. The Railroad must identify the

items in the inspection, testing, and

maintenance program that are safetycritical, and must submit the program to

FRA.

Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to

obtain FRA approval for any changes to

the safety-critical portion of the program

required in this section. Paragraph (d)

requires the Railroad to adopt and

implement the inspection, testing, and

maintenance program that FRA

approved and paragraph (e) mandates

that the Railroad’s program must ensure

that all systems and components are free

from hazardous conditions.

Paragraph (f) sets forth specific

inspections and maintenance programs

that FOX must complete throughout the

life of the system. These are identical to

the French practice, which have

produced a high level of safety on the

TGV system. Paragraph (f)(1) sets forth

the daily inspection that each trainset

must undergo before it can begin

revenue operations. This paragraph lists

a series of conditions that, if not

corrected, would prevent the trainset

from commencing passenger service.

These conditions are: Malfunction of the

driving assistance system (SIAC);

malfunction of the fire detection system;

indication of an unbalanced tripod;

indication of a broken tripod; indication

of blocked axle; a single phase

pantograph or its circuit breaker out of

order; power car failure or cut-out;

isolated roof disconnecting switch

H(HT); transformer cooling or

ventilation out of order; two or more

motor blocks isolated; mechanical brake

on one or more trucks isolated; total

failure of the anti-slide device on one

truck; failure of locomotive engineer’s

vigilance system (VACMA);

speedometer failure; failure of on-board

signaling system; failure of the speed

measuring system (the warning flag of

the speedometer does not disappear

when the driving cab is activated);

locomotive engineer’s console out of

order; locomotive engineer’s brake valve

not operating; leak in the main reservoir

line; leak in the main brake pipe; failure

indication during the required brake

test; any battery charger out of order;

and total failure of the trainset interior

lighting.

The daily inspection is required prior

to placing a trainset in service for the
65522 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

first time during a calendar day. As FRA

understands it, this inspection will

utilize the automated, electronic test

features that are part of the FOX

equipment, rather than rely on visual or

manual inspections. As rail technology

improves, reliance on electronic sensors

will naturally increase, and benefits

flow from this progression. Electronic

devices can often detect imperfections

or potential problems that are invisible

to the human eye. Also, some of the

equipment that the automated testing

devices inspect are difficult or

impossible to view on the TGV trainsets.

Therefore, this electronic capability

reduces the risk of injury to employees

who might otherwise crawl on, under,

or between equipment subject to

movement, and dramatically reduces

the risk that defective equipment could

be released for service.

Paragraph (f)(1) also requires that if

any of the conditions listed above

cannot be detected through the

equipment’s on-board automated

monitoring system, the Railroad must

conduct a visual inspection to verify

that the condition does not exist and the

equipment is safe for use. As FRA

understands the FOX equipment, the

automated monitoring system should

have the capability to detect all of the

potentially unsafe conditions that are

listed in the daily inspection

requirement. However, this in unclear

from the FOX submission. Also, if the

on-board monitoring system

malfunctions, all of the conditions listed

in this paragraph could not be detected

from the cab and a visual inspection

would be the only method of ensuring

that the conditions do not exist. As

discussed previously, the Railroad must

develop appropriate operating rules,

pursuant to § 243.117 and § 243.425 of

this proposal, to address the safety risks

that may arise if an on-board monitoring

system fails en route or during this daily

inspection. FRA believes that, in the

interest of safety, the Railroad must

conduct a visual inspection to detect the

items listed in this paragraph if the onboard monitoring system is not capable

of detecting them.

FRA is considering making all or

some of these items part of a trip

inspection, rather than a daily

inspection, which would be completed

before each trainset begins a new trip.

FRA is concerned that some of the items

listed in the daily inspection are so

critical to the safety of the system, that

a train should not be in service for any

period of time when those items are not

functioning properly. A recent

passenger train collision in England, in

which six fatalities occurred, may have

been prevented if the railroad had

conducted a trip inspection and then

prevented the train’s departure when

the defective condition was discovered.

Because the items inspected here in the

daily inspection are inspected

electronically, as FRA understands it,

requiring the inspection to occur at the

beginning of each trip would impose

few, if any, financial or operational

burdens on the Railroad. However, FRA

seeks comment on the merit of this

proposal and any changes to it. Also,

FRA requests commenters to discuss

which, if any, items should be required

to be inspected on a trip basis.

Paragraph (f)(2) describes the

examination in service which is a

walking visual inspection conducted by

qualified personnel every 4000 km

(2,485 mi), at a location where there is

a repair pit and access to the top of the

trainset. The purpose of the examination

in service is to detect anomalies that

have occurred and correct them so that

the trainset can be returned to service

without any safety risk. This

examination focuses on the systems

keenly involved in trainset

trackworthiness, including running

gear, trucks, and components under the

carbody. As FRA understands it, this

may become a daily visual inspection if

the ridership studies commissioned by

FOX become a reality, and the system

operates so that each trainset will

complete four round-trip journeys each

day.

At a minimum, the items listed below

must be inspected during an

examination in service. All conditions

found that do not comply with the

safety inspection criteria required by

§ 243.433(a)(1) of this rule must be

corrected before the trainset is put into

revenue service: Condition of the

pantographs and roof insulators;

condition of sanding nozzles; fixation

and condition of dampers; condition of

suspension springs; fixation and

condition of grounding straps; condition

of side skirts and underbody panels;

condition of trucks; oil levels; traction

motor-to-carbody securement; presence

of brake pads; condition of brake shoes;

condition of wheel tread; and condition

of drive train.

Paragraph (f)(3) proposes the running

gear inspection which must be done by

qualified personnel once every 18 days.

The purpose of the running gear

inspection is to guarantee running safety

by monitoring wear conditions on

wheels, bearings, brakes and suspension

systems. The inspection is to be

conducted once every 18 days on each

trainset, independent of distance

traveled.

At a minimum, the items listed below

must be inspected during a running gear

inspection. All conditions found that do

not comply with the safety inspection

criteria required by § 243.433(a)(1) of

this proposal must be corrected before

the trainset is put into revenue service:

A visual inspection of trucks; an

inspection of the operation of flangelubricating devices; an inspection of the

condition and attachment of dampers,

roof mounted elements, and suspension

components; an inspection of the brake

rigging, journal bearings, and tripod

transmission; a visual inspection of the

condition and attachment of brake pads;

an inspection of the oil levels on drive

train; an inspection of the securement of

drive train and wheel slide sensors; an

inspection of the condition of the

pantographs and roof insulators; and

check for audible leaks on pneumatic

system.

Paragraph (f)(4) sets requirements

proposed for the wheel inspection (also

called Systematic Work). Each trainset

wheel and wheel profile must be

inspected by qualified personnel at an

interval not to exceed 50,000 km of

travel. Equipment not in compliance

with the inspection criteria established

in paragraph (a) must be corrected or

replaced before trainset returns to

revenue service. The purpose of the

wheel inspection is to ensure safety and

ride comfort at high speeds.

Paragraph (f)(5) describes the Minor

Inspection which must be done by

qualified personnel at an interval not to

exceed 150,000 km of travel or 7 months

of time, whichever comes first. The

Minor Inspection must be equivalent to

the Minor (Limited) Inspection

performed on TGV trainsets in France

and performed in accordance with the

tests procedures and inspection criteria

established in paragraph (a). All

conditions found that do not comply

with the safety inspection criteria

required by paragraph (a) must be

corrected before the trainset is put into

revenue service. The Minor Inspection

must complete the following for

electrical parts: Inspect current return

devices, antennas, transponders;

examine batteries; check operation of

lighting; check operation of

speedometer unit and of cab signal

receptor; check sensors and sensor

protectors; check roof switches and

contacts; check circuit breakers; and

check traction motors and main

transformers. For mechanical parts, the

Railroad must: Inspect axles, axle boxes

and trucks; check tightening torque of

shock absorber and support mounting

bolts; check buffing gear; inspect

pantographs; check attachment of antiroll bars; examine condition of guardirons; check setting of sanders; verify

proper operation of flange-lubricating
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65523

devices; check level and condition of oil

on motor and reducing gears; check

attachment of geared motors; check for

grease projections from the motive force

transmission components, and carrying

and fixed rings of the articulation joint;

check attachment of motive force

transmission components and tripod

transmission; check condition of

motorized axle torque reaction rods;

check condition of brake-units and

brake shoes; check condition of disk

brake pads and of the brake rigging

cylinder assembly; check condition of

bellows; check for attachment defects

and/or distortions on carbody

components such as underside panels,

skirts, windows, fairings, etc.; verify

proper operation of doors including

locking devices; check for defects on

front windows; inspect extinguishers,

tooling and safety equipment; and

inspect tachometer and odometer

sensors. For pneumatic parts, the

Railroad must check main compressor;

check the oil level and check for leaks

on main compressor; check condition of

pneumatic suspension components; and

check brake equipment and brake

indicator lamps.

Paragraph (f)(6) describes the general

inspection which must be conducted at

an interval not to exceed 300,000 km of

travel or 13 months of time, whichever

comes first. The Railroad must perform

a General Inspection (equivalent to the

General Inspection performed on TGV

trainsets in France) in accordance with

the tests procedures and inspection

criteria established in paragraph (a). All

conditions found that do not comply

with the safety inspection criteria

required by paragraph (a) must be

corrected before the trainset is put into

revenue service. The General Inspection

must consist of the following steps for

electrical parts: Inspect circuit breaker;

examine insulators; inspect main

transformers; inspect braids and

connecting shunts, sensors and sensor

protectors; examine electro-pneumatic

and electromagnetic contacts; inspect

freon enclosures; check for anomalies

on resistors; check operation of various

signaling lights; visual inspection of

diodes and antennas; check condition of

electronic plug-in units; check

condition of switches, controls, joints;

check condition of master controller;

check operation of clock, indicator of

imposed speed; check operation of

ground-to-train radio link and speed

supervision by transponder; check

operation of passenger alarms; inspect

antenna; verify that headlights (full and

dimmed), tail lights, other indicators,

lighting, desks operate properly; verify

power supply to electrical outlets

available to passengers and service

personnel; check operation of lights and

telltale indicators in electrical cabinets;

inspect various motors (traction, main,

auxiliary compressors, ventilation);

check operation of refrigeration system

and circuit breakers. For mechanical

parts, the Railroad must: Check

operation of pantographs; check for

defects on trucks (cracks, distortions);

check for defects and check play on

fixed and carrying rings of articulation

joint; check for defects on intercar

passageways; check for defects on doors,

locks and joints; check interbody and

anti-tilt dampers; check tread brake

units; check underbody rotation stops.

For pneumatic parts, the Railroad must:

Check pressure gauge; check operation

of braking gear; check operation of the

anti-wheelslide device; check operation

of the emergency brake valve; clean

driver’s brake valve and check its

operation; inspect various flexible and

half-couplings; check operation of

valves which control alarms,

windshield washers, windshield wipers,

and of differential valves; check brake

indicator lights.

Paragraph (f)(7) proposes the Major

Inspection which must be conducted at

an interval not to exceed 600,000 km of

travel or 25 months of time, whichever

comes first. The Railroad must perform

a Major Inspection (equivalent to the

Major Inspection performed on TGV

trainsets in France) in accordance with

the tests procedures and inspection

criteria established in paragraph (a) of

this section. All conditions found that

do not comply with the safety

inspection criteria required by

paragraph (a) shall be corrected before

the trainset is put into revenue service.

The Major Inspection must include the

following steps for electrical parts:

Inspect roof cable and lightning

arresters; check operation of the roof

switch; inspect battery switches; inspect

battery charger and battery voltmeter;

inspect inverters; examine coils; clean

electronic gear; inspect couplers and

connecting cables; check driver’s

console switch box; test driver’s

vigilance system; pre-departure checks

(pantograph uplift, air conditioning,

etc.); check operation of cab signal;

clean switchgear cabinets; lubricate

traction motors; check ammeters, key

switch panel; check 30 KVA inverter;

check spare light bulb supply.

For mechanical parts, the Railroad

must: Check calibration of pantographs;

check for defects on motorized axle

reaction rods; check the constituents of

fixed and carrying rings of articulation

joint; check that headlight covers are

tightly secured; check for defects on

carbody exterior paint. For pneumatic

parts, the Railroad must inspect air and

oil filters; inspect main compressor

couplings; check operation of the main

air dryer; check operation of pressure

gauges; inspect pneumatic suspension

reservoirs; check operation of power car

and trailer car brakes; check operation

of pneumatic pressure regulators;

inspect truck-to-carbody coupling and

pneumatic suspension connections; and

check operation of the spring-applied

parking brake.

Paragraph (g) proposes that the

Railroad designate brake system repair

point(s) in the inspection criteria

established in paragraph (a) of this

section. FRA proposes that no trainset

depart a brake system repair point

unless that trainset has a 100%

operational brake system.

Paragraph (h) proposes that the

Railroad’s program established pursuant

to paragraph (a) must include the

Railroad’s scheduled maintenance

intervals for equipment based on TGV

operations in Europe, and on an

analysis required the system safety

program set forth in Subpart B of this

rule. FRA proposes to allow the

maintenance intervals for safety-critical

components to be changed only when

justified by accumulated acceptable

operating data. Changes in maintenance

cycles of safety-critical components

must be based on verifiable data made

available to all interested parties and

shall be reviewed by FRA. This proposal

is another attempt to balance the needs

of the operating railroad to run

efficiently and the concern of rail labor

organizations that railroads have the

ability to unilaterally make safety

decisions.

Paragraph (i) requires the Railroad to

establish a training and qualification

program as defined in Subpart H of this

proposal to qualify individuals to

perform inspections, testing, and

maintenance on the rolling stock. Only

qualified individuals may perform

inspections, testing, and maintenance of

the rolling stock. An employee or

contractor employee shall have

knowledge of standard procedures

described in paragraph (h) of this

section in order to qualify to perform a

task. FRA does not prescribe a detailed

training program or qualification and

designation process.

Paragraph (j) proposes that the

Railroad’s program required by this

section include the Railroad’s written

standard procedures for performing all

safety-critical equipment inspection,

testing, maintenance, or repair tasks.

This paragraph proposes various broad

requirements relating to the content and

enforceability of the standard operating

procedures. FRA has drawn on the
65524 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

experiences of other heavy industries

and in the military, where inherently

dangerous tasks are common, which

have proven that standard operating

procedures are an effective tool in

reducing work-related injuries. Further,

standard operating procedures can form

the basis for periodic safety refresher

training. FRA does not propose to

prescribe the detailed procedures to be

used. The proposed rule is designed to

have the detailed procedures developed

by those with most knowledge of how

to safely perform the tasks—the

operators and employees.

These standard procedures must:

Describe in detail each step required to

safely perform the task; describe the

knowledge necessary to safely perform

the task; describe any precautions that

must be taken to safely perform the task;

describe the use of any safety equipment

necessary to perform the task; be

approved by the railroad’s chief

mechanical officer; be approved by the

railroad’s official responsible for safety;

be enforced by supervisors with

responsibility for accomplishing the

tasks; and be reviewed annually by the

railroad.

Paragraph (k) requires the Railroad to

establish an inspection, testing, and

maintenance quality control program,

which will be enforced by the Railroad,

to reasonably ensure that inspections,

tests, and maintenance are performed in

accordance with Federal safety

standards and the procedures

established by the Railroad. In essence,

this creates the need for the Railroad to

perform spot checks of the work

performed by its employees and

contractors to ensure that the work is

performed in accordance with

established procedures and Federal

requirements. FRA believes that this is

a very important management function

that, if neglected will surely lead to

safety problems.

Paragraph (l) of this section requires

the Railroad to make and maintain a

written or electronic record of each of

the inspections required in this Subpart.

The record must be maintained for at

least one year. Inspection records are

extremely helpful to railroads and FRA

in determining the natural life of

equipment and components, and

appropriate safety limits that should be

imposed because of those natural

restrictions. These records will assist

the Railroad and FRA to determine

whether all inspection and replacement

intervals are understood and followed

by the system employees and

supervisory staff. Also, these records are

often helpful, in the event of an

accident, to determine probable

causation factors.

Subpart F—Operating Practices

Operating rules and practices play a

vital role in assuring railroad safety.

This Subpart proposes requirements for

the Railroad’s operating rules and

practices, which for the most part,

mirror the Petition and general U.S.

practice. However, FRA makes some

important changes to our treatment of

the FOX operating rules, based on the

peculiarities of this operation.

Section 243.501 Purpose

First, this proposal grants FRA

authority to approve the FOX operating

rules prior to revenue operations. FRA

believes that approval authority is

necessary to ensure that FOX follows, to

the maximum extent possible, the

safety-critical operating rules used in

France on the TGV, which have helped

to create the TGV’s admirable safety

record. FRA has not had the opportunity

to review these rules, though they exist,

and believes that Federal approval of

the FOX operating rules should not

occur until a comparison between the

TGV rules and the FOX operating rules

can take place. Therefore, this section

proposes that FRA must approve FOX

operating rules before revenue

operations commence.

Section 243.503 Operating Rules; Filing

and Recordkeeping

Section 243.503 of the proposal sets

forth the filing and recordkeeping

requirements for the Railroad. Paragraph

(a) requires FOX to file its operating

rules with FRA six months prior to

commencing internal operations, and

one year prior to revenue operations.

The reason for this distinction is that

FRA would like to review the Railroad’s

operating rules when the equipment

first travels across the system, when the

potential for employee injury exists.

This requirement would ensure that the

Railroad has in place appropriate

operating rules at that time to protect

employees from moving equipment and

operating systems, and the potential for

injury that may arise as a result of initial

disorganization, inconsistent

movements, or faulty equipment. FRA

requests comment from FOX and other

interested parties as to whether the

operating rules prepared for internal

operations will vary greatly from the

rules for revenue operations. If the rules

are strikingly different, modifications

may need to be made to this proposed

requirement.

Paragraph (a) also requires the

Railroad to designate which of its

operating rules are safety-critical, and

states that FRA will adopt and

incorporate the safety-critical rules as

Appendix C to this Part. Paragraph (b)

of the proposal requires the Railroad to

file any amendment to its operating

rules with FRA within 30 days of the

day it takes effect. Section 243.509 of

this Subpart, discussed below, permits

the amendment to remain in effect until

or unless FRA disapproves the

amendment. Therefore, this Subpart

grants FRA the authority to approve the

Railroad’s operating rules, as well as all

changes that are made to the rules after

initial approval.

Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to

keep one copy of the operating rules at

headquarters and make the records

available to FRA for inspection or

duplication. Paragraph (d) authorizes

FRA to issue civil penalties or take other

enforcement action against any person

who violates a safety-critical operating

rule, which has been adopted and

incorporated by reference in Appendix

C to this rule under paragraph (a)

discussed above. This proposal marks

an important change from the way in

which FRA currently addresses

operating rules for existing railroads.

This authority will underscore the

importance of Railroad, employee, and

contractor adherence to safety-critical

rules that have been developed

thoughtfully and in connection with

development of a system safety plan.

FRA has no desire to meddle

unnecessarily into non-safety issues on

railroad property, and the authority

proposed in this paragraph will not

facilitate such Federal action. FRA may

only initiate enforcement actions under

this section where clear safety hazards

arise due to the violation of a safetycritical rule. This authority will enhance

the system’s performance for

passengers, employees, and the

Railroad.

Section 243.505 Program of Operational

Tests and Inspections; Recordkeeping

Section 243.505 requires the Railroad

to conduct periodic tests and

inspections to determine the extent of

compliance with its code of operating

rules, timetables, and timetable special

instructions in accordance with the

program filed with and approved by the

FRA. This section is consistent with the

Petition and current U.S. practice, and

will ensure that FRA will be informed

of the Railroad’s internal validation that

employees are complying with the

operating rules.

The testing and inspections refer to

operational field tests and inspections,

not qualifying tests or examinations of

employees in operating rule classes.

Also, the terms ‘‘inspection’’ and ‘‘test’’

are not functional equivalents. The term

‘‘inspection’’ is broader in scope and
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65525

may include varying numbers and types

of specific ‘‘tests.’’ Each terminal,

division, or other organizational

category would be inspected

periodically for compliance with

operating rules. The number and variety

of specific ‘‘tests’’ comprising each

periodic inspection may vary according

to the size and nature of the component,

local operating conditions, and safety

problems uncovered in past inspections

or that have developed since the

previous inspections. The documents

listed in paragraphs (a-d) must be kept

at system headquarters, for specified

time periods, and must be available to

FRA for inspection and copying during

normal business hours.

Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad,

before March 1, to maintain an annual

summary covering the previous year’s

activities. This must include the

number, type and result of each

operational test and inspection that was

conducted in accordance with

paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.

Paragraph (e) facilitates retaining the

required information in an electronic

format. This format may be utilized only

where certain procedures are in place.

There must be restricted access to the

electronic database, and identification

of those personnel granted access to the

information. Also, a terminal with a

central processing unit attached to

either a fax or printer, that can retrieve

and produce information in a usable

format for immediate review by FRA

representatives must be present. The

Railroad must designate a person who is

authorized to authenticate retrieved

information from the electronic system

as true and accurate copies of such

electronic records.

Section 243.507 Program of Instruction

on Operating Rules; Recordkeeping;

Electronic Recordkeeping

Section 243.507 contains the

requirements for the Railroad to develop

and implement a program of instruction

on its code of operating rules. The

Railroad must ensure that its employees

understand and comply with its code of

operating rules. Many railroad accidents

are attributable to a lack of compliance

with railroad operating rules or a

misinterpretation of their intended

application. If the Railroad’s employees

have a better understanding of the

operating rules, the chances for noncompliance or misinterpretation should

be reduced.

Paragraph (a) requires that a written

instructional program, kept at system

headquarters and at the division

headquarters, will be the basis of

instruction on the Railroad’s operating

rules for those employees governed by

such rules. FRA does not intend to

prescribe every detail of what the

program must contain. However, the

program should be based on the specific

safety needs and operating environment

of the high speed rail system being

developed.

Paragraph (b) covers the gradual

implementation schedule of its program

of periodic instruction. Each

amendment to the original program will

be retained at the system headquarters

and at the division headquarters. The

program must be available to

representatives of the FRA for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours. The program must

include a description of the means and

procedures for instruction of different

classes of affected employees. The

frequency of instruction and the

rationale on which it is based, must also

be explained. A schedule for completing

initial instructions for employees who

are already employed and for those

hired at a later date also must be

included in the program.

Paragraph (c) states that the Railroad

is authorized to retain, via electronic

recordkeeping, its program for periodic

instruction of its employees on

operating rules provided that the

conditions and requirements set forth in

§ 243.505 of this proposal are met.

Section 243.509 Operating Rules

Approval

Section 243.509 proposes the

approval process for the Railroad’s

operating rules. Within ninety days of

receipt, FRA must notify the Railroad,

in writing, of the operating rules’

approval or disapproval. If FRA

disapproves the entire package or

individual operating rules, FRA must

explain in its written response the

reasons for the disapproval, and the

actions needed to obtain FRA approval.

Paragraph (b) of this section requires the

Railroad to submit any operating rule

amendment to FRA for review, within

thirty days after it was issued by the

Railroad. The amendment will remain

in effect, unless FRA notifies the

Railroad, in writing, that the

amendment has been disapproved. This

section also states that the Railroad

must submit supporting documentation

to FRA that FRA believes is necessary

to make an enlightened determination of

the Railroad’s proposed operating rules.

FRA anticipates that the TGV operating

rules, for instance, would be one

document necessary to determine

whether the FOX operating rules are

comprehensive and likely to provide a

high level of safety on the Railroad.

Subpart G—System Qualification Tests

This Subpart sets forth pre-revenue

qualification testing requirements that

the Railroad must complete for a period

of four months prior to commencing

passenger service. This testing program

developed pursuant to this Subpart is

required by Subpart B of the proposal,

and will be approved as part of the

system safety plan approved by FRA.

The testing program will provide the

Railroad assurance that the system is

safe, as designed and constructed, so

that passengers are not put at risk when

operations begin. For the most part, this

Subpart is self-explanatory.

Section 243.601 Responsibility for

Verification Demonstrations and Tests

Section 243.601 requires the Railroad

to comply with the pre-revenue service

testing plan, which must meet the

specific requirements of this Subpart

and the determinations made during the

system safety plan analysis required by

Subpart B of this proposal.

Section 243.603 Preparation of Test Plan

Section 243.603 requires FOX to

develop a test plan that covers every

aspect of the system. The plan must

include a clear set of objectives, and the

Railroad’s primary objective should be

to demonstrate that the system, as

constructed and operated, meets all

design and performance standards

required by this proposal. The test plan

must set a schedule for the testing,

describe all property and facilities that

will be used, detail how the tests will

be conducted, describe how the data

obtained will be analyzed, create quality

control procedures to ensure that the

testing is done correctly, and

demonstrate the inspection criteria

developed for revenue service.

Paragraph (d) requires that the test

program include steps to verify the

results of the installation and

performance tests performed by

contractors and manufacturers, conduct

pre-operational testing of individual

components and subsystems, and to

conduct the full system tests.

Section 243.605 Pre-operational

Qualification Tests

Section 243.605 details the preoperational qualification tests that the

Railroad must complete on all safetycritical components of the system. The

components must be shown to meet

performance specifications and verify

specified operational functions. This

section is consistent with the Petition.
65526 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Section 243.607 Integrated Operational

Testing of Systems.

This section outlines the testing that

FOX must complete with respect to the

integrated systems. These tests include

vehicle clearances to structures along

the right-of-way; mechanical

performance of the overhead catenary

system; and the integrated performance

of the track, signal, power supply,

vehicle, software, and communications.

Also, this section requires the Railroad

to demonstrate safe system performance

during normal and degraded operating

conditions. These tests must verify

power supply protection; catenary and

pantograph interaction; incremental

increases in train speed; braking rates;

and wheel suspension characteristics.

Paragraph (b)(10) of this section

requires the Railroad to verify the track

and civil structure under dynamic load.

FOX must conduct qualification testing

to ensure that the equipment will not

exceed the wheel/rail force safety limits

specified in the table in Subpart D and

the limits for ride vibration specified in

Subpart E at any speed less than 10 mph

above the maximum authorized speed.

During the qualification of the vehicle/

track system, the ride vibration levels in

§ 243.411 will be used rather than the

accelerometer levels contained in

§ 243.335. During a joint meeting of

RSAC’s High Speed Task Group and a

group working on the Tier II Passenger

Equipment standards, many members of

both groups concluded that the lower

ride vibration quality levels should

apply when a railroad wishes to initially

qualify a system, but that the

accelerometer levels in the table as

represented in § 243.335 should apply

during daily operation of the system.

Equipment and track tolerances are

expected to loosen slightly during

operation, but the vehicle/track system

must be monitored during the life of the

system to ensure that the wheel/rail

force measurement and accelerations

specified in § 243.335 are not exceeded.

These concepts are discussed in greater

detail in the analysis of Subpart D.

The Railroad must establish a testing

speed at least 10 mph above the

maximum operating speed, as well as

target test and operating conditions, and

conduct a test program sufficient to

evaluate the operating limits of the track

and equipment. The test program must

demonstrate safe vehicle dynamic

response as speeds are incrementally

increased from 100 mph to the target

maximum speed. The test must be

suspended where any of the vehicle/

track performance limits in this section

are exceeded.

At the conclusion of the test, when

the maximum safe operating speed is

known, along with permissible levels of

cant deficiency, a test run will be made

over the entire route at the speeds the

Railroad will request FRA to approve for

such service, and a second run again at

10 mph above this speed. A report of the

test procedures and results must be

submitted to FRA upon completion of

the tests. The test report must also show

the design flange angle of the

equipment, because this flange angle is

used to calculate the safety limit for the

ratio of the lateral force to the vertical

force exerted by the same wheel on the

rail. FRA believes that this testing, in

combination with all of the other tests,

will reveal any weaknesses in the

system or construction of the

components, and will greatly enhance

the overall safety of high speed

passenger line.

Section 243.609 Pre-revenue Service

Testing

Section 243.609 requires the Railroad

to conduct the pre-revenue service tests

for four months prior to operations. The

testing will expose problems before

passengers are at risk, and will also give

operational experience to the Railroad

and its employees. This section is

consistent with the Petition.

Section 243.611 Verification of

Compliance

Section 243.11 requires the Railroad

to prepare a report that details the

results of all pre-operational tests, and

outlines the remedial measures

necessary to correct any deficiencies

discovered during the testing. This

section also requires the Railroad to

implement the improvement measures

discussed in the report, and to submit

the report to FRA sixty days prior to

commencing railroad operations.

This Subpart, as proposed, is very

similar in concept to the Petition. FRA

has made some subtle changes,

primarily to streamline the requirements

and avoid duplication with Subpart B of

the proposal. The requirement proposed

in paragraph (c) of § 243.611, which

mandates report filing with FRA sixty

days prior to revenue operations, was

not included in the Petition. FRA

invites comment on the timing set forth

in paragraph (c), and may consider

alternatives to this proposal. FRA

believes that Federal review of the

verification report is necessary to ensure

that all problems encountered during

testing are corrected, and additional

time may be warranted in order to

conduct that review adequately and

thoughtfully. FRA has no desire to

prevent timely commencement of

revenue operations, and would take that

into consideration in determining a

different time period.

Subpart H—Personnel Qualification

Requirements

Section 243.701 General Requirements

This Subpart sets forth specific

requirements for the Railroad’s

personnel qualification program. This

Subpart works in conjunction with

Subpart B of the proposal, which

requires that the Railroad’s system

safety plan consider the sort of training

and qualifications that will be necessary

to maintain the appropriate level of

safety in the Railroad’s revenue

operations. This program takes on

particular importance with respect to

FOX because the American workforce

generally does not have thorough

knowledge of the FOX equipment and

practices. Also, if FOX follows through

with plans to bring representatives from

the French TGV to Florida to train

American workers, there will be

language differences that must be

overcome during the training process. In

addition, the American workforce may

not be accustomed to heavy reliance on

metric measurements, which are

prevalent in Europe and used

throughout the FOX system. All of these

factors make the Railroad’s employee

training and testing program critical to

the safety of the high speed system.

Also, it is important to repeat that all

contractor employees must be trained

and qualified by the Railroad for the

tasks that they are required to complete.

This section sets forth specific

parameters for the Railroad’s employee

qualification program. The Railroad

must develop and implement a program

that prepares employees to complete

their safety-related tasks effectively, and

requires supervisory personnel to

understand fully the Railroad system

and exercise prudent judgment to

ensure that the system runs safely. The

program must provide ‘‘hands-on’’

testing and refresher training of all

employees. The Railroad must

designate, in writing, that each

employee possesses the knowledge to

assume his or her assigned duties, and

maintain these records for the duration

of each employee’s employment.

Paragraph (c) states that the Railroad’s

personnel qualification program must

explain the process by which the

Railroad will confirm that employees

are fully capable of handling assigned

tasks, and must explain how the

Railroad will measure employee skills.

Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad’s

training program for locomotive

engineers to follow existing regulations,
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65527

49 CFR part 240, as discussed

previously. Paragraph (f) prohibits the

Railroad from using unqualified or

untrained personnel from completing

tasks on the Railroad’s system.

Section 243.703–Section 243.709

Personnel Qualifications for Track

Maintenance and Inspection Personnel

Section 243.703 of Subpart H

describes the qualifications that

Railroad track personnel must possess

in order to maintain and inspect track.

Work on or about track structure

supporting qualified high speed

passenger trains demands the highest

awareness about the need to perform

work properly. Section 243.703 sets

forth requirements for the Railroad to

designate qualified individuals

responsible for the maintenance and

inspection of track in compliance with

the safety requirements for Subpart D.

The Railroad must maintain records of

each designation in effect, the basis for

the designation (including training and

test results), and the records of the track

inspections made by the qualified

individuals.

Three categories of qualifications are

set forth: § 423.705 establishes the

qualifications for the individuals who

supervise restorations and renewals;

§ 423.707 establishes the qualifications

for those individuals who inspect track

for defects; and § 243.709 sets forth

qualifications for persons who inspect

and restore continuous welded rail.

A person may be qualified to perform

restorations and renewals under

§ 243.705 in three ways. First, the

person may combine five or more years

of supervisory experience in track

maintenance for track Class 4 or higher

and the successful completion of a

course offered by the employer or by a

college level engineering program,

supplemented by special on-the-job

training. Second, a person may be

qualified by a combination of at least

one year of supervisory experience in

track maintenance of Class 4 or higher,

80 hours of specialized training or in a

college level program, supplemented

with on-the-job training. Third, an

employee with at least two years of

experience in maintenance of high

speed track can achieve qualification

status by completing 120 hours of

specialized training in maintenance of

high speed track, provided by the

employer or by a college level

engineering program, supplemented by

special on-the-job training. The third

option is intended to provide a means

for the railroad to promote and qualify

an outstanding employee who has the

prerequisite experience in maintenance

of high speed track.

Pursuant to § 243.707, a person may

be qualified to perform track inspections

by attaining five or more years of

experience in inspection in track Class

4 or higher and by completing a course

taught by the employer or by a college

level engineering program,

supplemented by special on-the-job

training. Or, the person may be qualified

by attaining a combination of at least

one year of experience in track

inspection in Class 4 and higher and by

successfully completing 80 hours of

specialized training in the inspection of

high speed track provided by the

employer or by a college level

engineering program, supplemented

with on-the-job training. Finally, a

person may be qualified by attaining

two years of experience in track

maintenance in Class 4 and above and

by successfully completing 120 hours of

specialized training in the inspection of

high speed track provided by the

employer or by a college level

engineering program, supplemented by

special on-the-job training provided by

the employer with emphasis on the

inspection of high speed track. The

third option is intended to provide a

way for employees with two years of

experience in the maintenance of high

speed track to gain the necessary

training to be qualified to inspect track.

For both categories of qualifications,

the person must have experience in

Class 4 track or above. To properly

maintain and inspect Class 4 track or

higher requires a level of knowledge of

track geometry and track conditions that

are not as readily obtained at lower

classes. Persons who are qualified for

high speed track must know how to

work, maintain, and measure high

quality track. Experience in Class 4

track is established as a lower limit to

provide a pool of candidates, who may

be drawn from freight railroads, who

would provide the necessary experience

on well-maintained track. Each person

must demonstrate annually to the

Railroad that he or she understands the

requirements of Subpart D, can detect

deviations, and can prescribe

appropriate remedial action to correct or

safely compensate for those deviations.

A recorded examination on Subpart D is

required.

Section 243.709 proposes specific

requirements for qualifications of

persons charged with maintaining and

inspecting continuous welded rail

(CWR). Training of employees in CWR

procedures is essential for high speed

operations. Each person inspecting and

maintaining CWR must understand how

CWR behaves and how to prevent track

buckles and other adverse track

reactions to thermal and dynamic

loading. As part of the qualification,

each employee who restores and

inspects CWR must have an

examination on the procedures for the

handling of CWR required by § 243.329.

Section 243.711—§ 243.717 Personnel

Qualifications for Signal Maintenance

and Inspection Personnel

These sections describe the minimum

qualifications for the Railroad’s signal

personnel. The Railroad must designate

that signal employees have been

qualified to perform their assigned

tasks, and the designated employees

must meet the specified standards in

these sections.

FRA is reluctant to dictate specific

education or experience levels that

would be required for various

employment categories. FRA believes it

more appropriate to set broad minimum

standards that provide FOX flexibility to

choose the best work force available.

However, each employee designated as

qualified must demonstrate annually,

and preferably in writing, that she or he

understands the signal safety standards

set forth in Subpart C, that he or she can

detect deviations from the standards,

and that he or she can prescribe

appropriate remedial measures. Signal

supervisors must successfully complete

the program that the employees

complete, and must possess the ability

to exercise judgment and make rational

decisions concerning the Railroad’s

signal system.

Section 243.719–§ 243.723 Personnel

Qualifications for Rolling Stock

Maintenance and Inspection Personnel

These sections establish minimum

standards for the Railroad’s rolling stock

personnel. Again, FRA is reluctant to

dictate specific education or experience

levels, and so sets broad categories that

provide FOX flexibility and ensure that

qualified individuals are secured to

work on the system’s rolling stock. The

Railroad must give rolling stock

personnel written procedures to follow,

hands-on training on the equipment,

and periodic refresher training.

FRA invites comment from interested

parties on these proposed qualification

standards. The proposal varies slightly

from discipline to discipline, and

reflects, to some extent, the existing

qualification programs in this country.

Because we are dealing with a new

system, however, where specialized

training will be very important, FRA

seeks suggestions from the safety

community on alternate methods to

guarantee an informed and prepared

workforce.
65528 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Subpart I—Power Distribution

This Subpart of the proposal sets

minimum requirements for the

Railroad’s power distribution system.

As is explained in the system

description of this proposal, the

Railroad will operate on electric power

generated and transferred to the

equipment from an overhead catenary

system. The catenary will maintain high

voltage power throughout the length of

the right-of-way, which can create an

extremely hazardous work environment

if not handled properly. The proposed

standards in this Subpart follow

generally accepted principles found in

the National Electric Safety Code and

the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health

Administration’s (OSHA) existing

employee protection requirements, and

also are generally consistent with the

Petition. FRA wishes to make very clear

that nothing in this proposal displaces

OSHA’s authority over employees

working on, around, or with the

Railroad’s electrical generation,

distribution, or transmission systems or

subsystems. Furthermore, it is important

to note that this proposal does not

displace OSHA’s authority over any

working condition that the Railroad’s

employees face that have not been

specifically addressed in the final

standards that follow this proposal.

Section 243.801 Warning Signs

This section of the proposal requires

the Railroad to post warning signs

throughout the right-of-way, at

underpasses and overpasses, and at each

catenary mast to provide notice to

employees, trespassers, and other

individuals that high voltage lines are

present. FRA believes that plentiful

warnings will go a long way to prevent

injuries to unauthorized individuals,

and will also serve as a necessary

reminder to employees working along

the right-of-way.

Section 243.803 Clearance

Requirements

This section requires all electrical

clearances to meet the European

standard, UIC 606–2 OR, which

references formulas and values that are

consistent with the system configuration

that will develop in Florida, and that

has safely guided the operation of the

TGV in France. This standard includes

references to other European standards,

such as UIC 505–6, which must also be

followed by FOX. The consideration of

appropriate clearances in not a trivial

matter, and many factors influence the

development of safe, adequate

clearances. Because the catenary system

is dynamic, the task becomes that much

more complicated. Therefore, FRA

proposes that FOX adhere to the

pertinent European standards, which we

know safely accommodate the

equipment that will be utilized in

Florida and the employees who work

along the right-of-way.

Section 243.805 Catenary Connections

This section requires the Railroad to

ground the catenary masts to the ground

or rail. Grounding of the catenary masts

to the rail should be coordinated with

the signaling system installation to

insure that they function properly

together, and FOX should design and

construct this portion of the system in

conjunction with the system safety plan.

This is consistent with the Petition,

which states that FOX will ground each

catenary pole to the earthling wire,

which will run the length of the rightof-way, and will be grounded to earth

approximately every 10 km or 6.2 miles.

This is consistent with common safe

practice. This section also states that the

electrical impedance of the connection

must meet the step and touch

requirements set forth in international

standards to prevent electrical shock. At

a system level, the lower the impedance

of the grounding system, the quicker the

fault energy is diverted to ground, and

the sooner the protection equipment, or

circuit breakers, will isolate the faulty

section of catenary/power distribution

system. At an individual level, current

takes the path of least resistance, and

therefore, if someone was in contact

with an object that had current running

through it, we would want the

grounding system to divert as much

energy away from objects that

potentially could come in contact with

members of the public and railroad

employees.

Section 243.807 Access to Stations

Section 243.807 of Subpart I requires

the Railroad to prevent unauthorized

personnel from entering power supply

stations, substations, and

autotransformer stations. This provision

aims at protecting employees and

members of the public from exposing

themselves to high voltage hazards, and

also ensuring that the power system will

not be harmed or disrupted by

intruders. FOX states in the Petition that

they intend to follow the National

Electrical Safety Code with respect to

station access and FRA believes that

would provide an adequate measure of

safety.

Section 243.809 Actuators

This section of the proposal requires

the Railroad to protect the operator from

electrical shock, direct or induced, that

may occur in the actuators of high

voltage switches. The operation of the

high voltage switch may induce current

or voltage surges that may cause voltage

surges between the switch control and

ground. The person operating the switch

much be protected against these surges.

Section 243.811 Power Feeding

Section 243.811 requires the Railroad

to protect the power distribution system

from short circuits and over voltage that

may occur as a result of lightning or

utility surges. FRA is reluctant to dictate

the specific method that FOX uses to

accomplish this task, but believes that

the system must be protected from

interruptions or breakdowns that can

occur on any electrical system, and may

surely occur in Florida where electrical

storms are commonplace.

Section 243.813 Emergency Devices

Section 243.813 provides for

communication and power

disconnection abilities in the event of

an emergency along the right-of-way.

This section requires the Railroad to

place emergency devices that are

capable of disconnecting and isolating

power, or grounding the catenary to the

rail, or both, at every underpass,

overpass, emergency entrance, supply

station, substation, and autotransformer

station along the right-of-way. Also, the

Railroad must install telephones at each

of these locations, and they must be

connected to the Railroad’s central

power dispatching center.

Section 243.815 Overpass Protection

Section 243.815 requires the Railroad

to install fencing or other suitable

device at each overpass that is adjacent

to, above, or beneath the catenary. This

section should protect the public,

employees, and the electrical system by

preventing accidental, hazardous

contact with the catenary.

Section 243.817 Safety Work Rules

Section 243.817 states FRA’s

expectation that FOX will provide for

the safety of all employees by following

all work practices covered by pertinent

regulations issued by OSHA concerning

the generation, distribution, and

transmission of electrical power. The

Petition states that FOX intends to

follow the National Electrical Safety

Code (NECS) in this regard. FRA

believes that FOX should and will be

able to comply with both sets of

standards. FOX must comply with

pertinent OSHA regulations, as they

constitute the enforceable standard for

working conditions that other federal

agencies have not regulated. FRA has

not exercised jurisdiction over the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65529

working conditions that arise in the

course of maintaining or inspecting

power distribution systems, and

therefore the pertinent OSHA standards

apply to these employee working

conditions. The NESC is a professional

reference standard, commonly followed

by all entities that operate, maintain,

and inspect power distribution systems.

As FRA understands it, the OSHA

regulations and the NESC are not

identical in scope and content, but

complement one another. FRA invites

comment as to whether compliance

with each standard would be difficult to

accomplish on the FOX system, and the

reasoning for it. FRA anticipates that the

Railroad’s system safety plan analysis

will devote attention to the

development of appropriate employee

work rules and protections vis-a-vis

power distribution that are consistent

with the OSHA and NESC safety

standards.

Section 243.819 Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance of Power Distribution

System

Section 243.819 requires the Railroad

to develop an inspection, testing, and

maintenance program for the power

distribution system. This section works

in conjunction with Subparts B and H

of the proposal, which also require the

Railroad to establish and adhere to a

comprehensive program that facilitates

proper operation of the equipment and

system, and which guarantees that

employees receive adequate training to

perform their duties safety. This section

also includes specific inspection items

and intervals, which comport with

general industry practice and the

Petition.

Appendix A—Schedule of Civil

Penalties

This appendix is being reserved until

promulgation of the final rule of

particular applicability. At that time,

FRA will include a schedule of civil

penalties to be used in connection with

enforcement of the standards in the rule

of particular applicability. Because such

schedules are statements of policy,

notice and comment are not required

prior to their issuance. See 5 U.S.C.

553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, commenters

are invited to submit suggestions to FRA

describing the types of actions or

omissions under each regulatory section

that would subject a person to the

assessment of a civil penalty.

Commenters are also invited to

recommend what penalties may be

appropriate, based upon the relative

seriousness of each type of violation.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

FRA prepared a cost/benefit analysis

of the NPRM for the FOX high speed rail

system, and determined that the NPRM

imposes no new costs on FOX. The

analysis hinges on the establishment of

what constitutes a baseline level of

regulatory cost. The assumptions were:

• FOX will operate as it proposed in

the Petition.

• There is no cost or benefit if FOX

intended or intends to follow the

proposal under its current practices.

Where it was not clear what FOX

intends to do as a business practice, the

FRA assumed that FOX would follow

procedures established by TGV

operations in France.

• There is no cost or benefit where

FOX would have to follow the

requirements of the proposal under

current or proposed regulations

applying to all railroad operations. (For

example, FOX will be required to file

accident reports.)

• There is no cost or benefit where

FOX has proposed, and FRA has

accepted, provisions which are less

strict than current or proposed

regulations, but for which FOX has

proposed limitations on its operations

or other practices which directly affect

the safety issue in question. (For

example, because FOX will limit the

weight of its trains and exclude freight

operations, the dynamic load on the

track will be less than on other track

Class 4 and higher, so FRA will permit

FOX to make one visual inspection a

week, where other high-speed lines

would be subject to visual inspection

two or three times a week.)

• There is no cost or benefit where

FOX would have to follow restrictions

FRA now places on other railroads

under waivers to accomplish the same

end. (For example, FRA is requiring that

railroads participating in the ITCS

demonstration program validate their

software.)

• The proposed rules FRA considered

as part of the base case include track

standards for high-speed operations,

emergency preparedness and passenger

equipment safety standards for Tier II

equipment.

The proposed rule will not impose

any costs on FOX beyond those above,

so the FRA does not anticipate that the

proposed rule will create any benefits.

If the first assumption, that FOX will

operate as it represented in the Petition,

is not true, then the public safety would

be ensured by this proposal, and it

would create benefits.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

(5 U.S.C. 601, et seq.) requires an

assessment of the impacts of proposed

rules on small entities. FRA has

determined that this proceeding will not

have a significant impact on a

substantial number of small entities.

The NPRM and any final standards that

evolve in this proceeding relate only to

the FOX high speed rail system, and

FOX is not a small entity.

Paperwork Reduction Act

In accordance with the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C 3501–

3520, and its implementing regulations,

5 CFR part 1320, when information

collection requirements pertain to nine

or fewer entities, Office of Management

and Budget (OMB) approval of the

collection requirements is not required.

This regulation pertains to one railroad,

and therefore, OMB approval of the

paperwork collection requirements in

this proposed rule is not required.

Environmental impact

FRA has evaluated these proposed

standards in accordance with its

procedures for ensuring full

consideration of the environmental

impact of FRA actions, as required by

the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.), and

related laws and regulations. FRA has

determined that this NPRM does not in

and of itself have a direct impact on the

environment. These proposed standards

establish an improved framework for

safety oversight of the system proposed

by FOX, but FOX could build or operate

a similar high speed rail network in the

State of Florida under existing Federal

railroad safety regulations of general

applicability. It is expected that there

will be other Federal approvals. The

FRA has entered into a Memorandum of

Understanding with the Federal

Highway Administration (FHWA) and

the Florida Department of

Transportation (FDOT) through which

the parties have established a process

for considering the environmental

impact of the implementation of the

FOX high speed rail system in Florida

to the extent that Federal approvals are

required. The FHWA and FRA have

agreed to serve as joint lead agencies for

the purpose of complying with the

statutory requirements of NEPA and

related statutes, and such compliance

will be completed prior to the proposed

rule having practical effect. FDOT has

agreed to coordinate the development of

environmental studies at the state level.

Appropriate notices, including a notice

of the intent to prepare an
65530 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

environmental analysis, will be

provided to the public by the FRA and

FHWA in accordance with FRA and

FHWA procedures implementing NEPA.

Federalism Implications

This proposed rule has been analyzed

in accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in Executive Order

12612, and it has been determined that

the proposed rule does not have

sufficient federalism implications to

warrant the preparation of a Federalism

Assessment. It should be noted that the

U.S. Supreme Court in CSX v.

Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993),

upheld Federal preemption of any state

or local attempts to regulate train speed.

Nothing in this notice proposes to

change that relationship.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 243

French TGV, High Speed Rail,

Railroad safety, System safety

The Proposed Rule

In consideration of the foregoing, FRA

proposes to amend Title 49 of the Code

of Federal Regulations by adding Part

243, as follows:

PART 243—FLORIDA OVERLAND

EXPRESS HIGH SPEED RAIL SAFETY

STANDARDS

Subpart A—General Requirements

Sec.

243.1 Purpose and scope.

243.3 Applicability.

243.5 Definitions.

243.7 Responsibility for compliance.

243.9 Enforcement.

243.11 Preemptive effect.

243.13 System description.

243.15 Movement of defective equipment.

Subpart B—System Safety Program and

Plan

243.101 General system safety

requirements.

243.103 Fire protection program.

243.105 Software safety program.

243.107 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

243.109 Training, qualification, and

designation program.

243.111 Emergency preparedness program.

243.113 Pre-revenue service system

qualification testing plan.

243.115 Hazard identification and

reduction.

243.117 Operating procedures in the event

of component failures.

243.119 Safety-critical subsystems.

243.121 Approval procedure.

Subpart C—Signal System

243.201 Plans, where kept.

243.202 Grounds.

243.203 Locking of signal apparatus

housings.

243.204 Design of control circuits on the

failsafe principle.

243.205 Power-operated switch use.

243.206 Yard operations.

243.207 Timetable instructions.

Wayside and cab signals

243.208 Location of wayside signals.

243.209 Aspects and indications.

243.210 Markers.

243.211 Spacing of beacons.

Track circuits

243.212 Track circuit requirements.

243.213 Track circuit shunting sensitivity.

243.214 Insulated rail joints.

243.215 Fouling wires.

243.216 Turnout, fouling section.

Wires and cables

243.217 Protection of insulated wire; splice

in underground wire; aerial cable.

243.218 Tagging of wires and interference

of wires or tags with signal apparatus.

Standards

243.219 Control circuits; requirements.

243.220 Control circuits for signals,

selection through point detector operated

by switch movement.

243.221 Time locking; where required.

243.222 Indication locking.

243.223 Electric locking circuits.

243.224 Loss of shunt protection; where

required.

243.225 Signal control circuits, selection

through track relays or devices

functioning as track relays.

243.226 Switch, movable-point frog or splitpoint derail.

243.227 Point detector.

243.228 Signals controlled by track circuits.

243.229 Circuits at interlocking.

243.230 Signals at adjacent interlockings.

243.231 Track signaled for movements in

both directions, change of direction of

traffic.

243.232 Route locking.

243.233 Wayside detectors.

243.234 Protection of maintenance-of-way

personnel.

243.235 ATC device installation.

243.236 Forestalling device and speed

control.

243.237 Cab signal indication in accordance

with maximum speed limit.

243.238 Automatic brake application;

initiation when the maximum speed

limit is exceeded.

243.239 Advance cab signal indication.

243.240 Automatic brake application

initiated by the ATC.

243.241 Cab signal indication after

authorization to enter a block section

where conditions defined in § 243.219

exist.

243.242 Audible indicator.

243.243 Delay time.

243.244 Automatic brake application; full

service.

243.245 Interference with application of

brakes by means of brake valve.

243.246 Control from lead vehicle.

243.247 Proper operative relation between

parts along roadway and parts on power

car.

243.248 Visibility of cab signals.

243.249 Power supply.

243.250 Seal, where required.

243.251 Rate of pressure reduction;

equalizing reservoir or brake pipe.

243.252 Restrictions imposed when device

fails and/or is cut out en route.

243.253 Trackage.

243.254 Cut out of the ATC system.

Reporting Requirements.

243.255 Accidents resulting from signal

failure.

243.256 Signal failure reports.

243.257 Annual signal systems report.

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

243.258 General.

243.259 Interference with normal

functioning of device.

243.260 Operating characteristics of

electromagnetic, electronic, or electrical

apparatus.

243.261 Adjustment, repair, or replacement

of component.

243.262 Purpose of inspection and tests;

removal from service of a relay or device

failing to meet test requirements.

243.263 Point detector test.

243.264 Relays; microprocessor testing.

243.265 Ground tests.

243.266 Insulation resistance tests; wires in

trunking and cables.

243.267 Time releases, timing relays and

timing devices.

243.268 Time locking.

243.269 Route locking.

243.270 Indication locking.

243.271 Traffic locking.

243.272 Switch obstruction test.

243.273 Locomotive or power car power

supply voltage requirement.

243.274 Power car or locomotive insulation

resistance; requirement.

243.275 Antennas and beacons.

243.276 Departure test.

243.277 Periodic test.

243.278 Results of tests.

243.279 Independent verification and

validation.

Subpart D—Track Safety Standards

243.301 Restoration or renewal of track

under traffic conditions.

243.303 Measuring track not under load.

243.305 Drainage.

243.307 Vegetation.

Geometry

243.309 Track geometry; general.

243.311 Track gage.

243.313 Curves, elevation and speed

limitations.

Track Structure

243.315 Track strength.

243.317 Crossties.

243.319 Continuous welded rail.

243.321 Rail end mismatch.

243.323 Rail joints and torch cut rails.

243.325 Turnouts and crossovers, generally.

243.327 Frog guard rails and guard faces;

gage.

243.329 Derails

Inspection

243.331 Track geometry measurement

systems.

243.333 Track/vehicle performance

measurement system.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65531

243.335 Wheel/rail force measurement

system.

243.337 Daily inspection trainset.

243.339 Inspection of rail in service.

243.341 Initial inspection of new rail and

welds.

243.343 Visual inspections.

243.345 Special inspections.

243.347 Inspection records.

Subpart E—Rolling Stock

243.401 Clearance requirements.

243.403 Structural strength of trainset.

243.405 Trailer car interior.

243.407 Glazing.

243.409 Brake system.

243.411 Truck and suspension system.

243.413 Fire safety.

243.415 Doors.

243.417 Emergency equipment.

243.419 Operator’s controls and power car

layout.

243.421 Exterior lights.

243.423 Electrical system design.

243.425 Automated monitoring.

243.427 Trainset system software and

hardware integration.

243.429 Control system design

requirements.

243.431 Safety appliance.

Inspection

243.433 Trainset inspection, testing &

maintenance.

Subpart F—Operating Rules

243.501 Purpose.

243.503 Operating rule; filing and

recordkeeping.

243.505 Program of operational tests and

inspections; recordkeeping.

243.507 Program of instruction on operating

rules; recordkeeping; electronic

recordkeeping.

243.509 Operating rules approval.

Subpart G—System Qualification Tests

243.601 Responsibility for verification

demonstrations and tests.

243.603 Preparation of test plan.

243.605 Pre-operational qualification tests.

243.607 Integrated operational testing of

systems.

243.609 Pre-revenue service testing.

243.611 Verification of compliance.

Subpart H—Personnel Qualification

Requirements

243.701 General requirements.

Track Personnel

243.703 Personnel qualifications for track

maintenance and inspection personnel.

243.705 Personnel qualified to supervise

track restoration and renewal.

243.707 Personnel qualified to inspect

track.

243.709 Personnel qualified to inspect and

restore continuous welded rail.

Signal Personnel

243.711 Personnel qualifications for signal

maintenance and inspection personnel.

243.713 Personnel qualified as signal

inspector.

243.715 Personnel qualified as signal

maintainer.

243.717 Personnel qualified to supervise

signal inspectors and maintainers.

Rolling Stock Personnel

243.719 Personnel qualifications for rolling

stock personnel.

243.721 Personnel qualified to inspect and

maintain rolling stock.

243.723 Personnel qualified to supervise

the inspection and maintenance of

rolling stock.

Subpart I—Power Distribution

243.801 Warning signs.

243.803 Clearance requirements.

243.805 Catenary connections.

243.807 Access to stations.

243.809 Actuators.

243.811 Power feeding.

243.813 Emergency devices.

243.815 Overpass protection.

243.817 Safety work rules.

243.819 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance of power distribution

system.

Appendix A—Schedule of Civil Penalties

[Reserved]

Appendix B—Test Performance Criteria for

the Flammability and Smoke Emission

Characteristics of Materials Used in

Constructing or Refurbishing Locomotive

Cab and Passenger Car Interiors

Appendix C—Railroad Safety-Critical

Operating Rules [Reserved]

Authority: Subtitle V of Title 49 of the

United States Code; 49 CFR 1.49(m).

Subpart A—General Requirements

§ 243.1 Purpose and scope.

This Part prescribes minimum Federal

safety standards for the high speed

transportation system described in

detail in § 243.13 of this rule, known as

the Florida Overland Express and

hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘Railroad.’’

The purpose of this rule is to prevent

accidents, casualties, and property

damage which could result from

operation of this system.

§ 243.3 Applicability.

(a) This Part applies only to the

Railroad operating between Miami,

Orlando and Tampa in the State of

Florida, as described § 243.13. The

Railroad shall operate only within the

system defined in § 243.13. Any

operations outside the system as defined

in § 243.13 are prohibited without prior

approval by the FRA.

(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c)

below, this rule, rather than the

generally applicable Federal railroad

safety regulations, shall apply to the

Railroad.

(c) Effective on the date the Railroad

begins revenue operations, the following

generally applicable Federal railroad

safety regulations, all of which are

found in Title 49 of the Code of Federal

Regulations, and in the case of

paragraph (c)(14), which will be

codified in the near future, and any

amendments thereto, are hereby made

applicable to the Railroad, regardless of

any statements of limited application

that they may contain:

(1) Part 209, Railroad Safety

Enforcement Procedures;

(2) Part 210, Railroad Noise Emission

Compliance Regulations;

(3) Part 211, Rules of Practice;

(4) Part 212, State Safety Participation

Regulations;

(5) Part 214, Railroad Workplace

Safety;

(6) Part 216, Special Notice and

Emergency Order Procedures;

(7) Part 218, Railroad Operating

Practices;

(8) Part 219, Control of Alcohol and

Drug Use;

(9) Part 220, Radio Standards and

Procedures;

(10) Part 225, Railroad Accidents/

Incidents: Reports, Classification, and

Investigations;

(11) Part 228, Hours of Service of

Railroad Employees;

(12) Part 229, Section 135, Event

Recorders;

(13) Part 235, Instructions Governing

Applications for Approval of a

Discontinuance or Material

Modification of a Signal System or

Relief from the Requirements of Part

236, except § 235.7; Any reference in

Part 235 to Part 236 shall be read to be

a reference to Subpart C, Signal

Standards, of this rule;

(14) The emergency preparedness

requirements set forth in FRA’s

proposed Passenger Train Emergency

Standards, 62 FR 8330 (February 24,

1996), which shall be codified as

modified after consideration of all

comments received at 49 CFR part 239;

(15) Part 240, Qualification and

Certification of Locomotive Engineers,

except sections 240.227 and 240.229;

and

(16) Part 215, Railroad Freight Car

Safety Standards; Part 229, Railroad

Locomotive Safety Standards; Part 230,

Locomotive Inspection; Part 231,

Railroad Safety Appliance Standards;

and Part 232 Railroad Power Brakes and

Drawbars shall apply to the Railroad’s

conventional locomotive and freight

fleet as it is used in work trains, rescue

operations, yard movements, and other

non-passenger functions.

(d) The Federal railroad safety statutes

apply to all railroads, as defined in 49

U.S.C. 20102. The Railroad covered by

this Part is a railroad under that

definition. Therefore, the Federal

railroad safety statutes, Subtitle V of

Title 49 of the United States Code, apply

directly to the Railroad. However,

pursuant to authority granted under 49
65532 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

U.S.C. 20306 (formerly the Rock Island

Railroad Transition and Employee

Assistance Act), FRA has exempted the

Railroad from certain requirements of 49

U.S.C. 20301, et seq. (formerly the

Safety Appliance Acts).

(e) The Syste`me International, or

metric measurement system, is the

measuring system used throughout this

rule. For clarification, United States’

standard values typically follow the

metric values in parentheses, and a soft

conversion has been used.

§ 243.5 Definitions.

As used in this Part:

Adjusting/destressing, track means

the procedure by which a rail’s

temperature is readjusted to the desired

value. It typically consists of cutting the

rail and removing rail anchoring

devices, which provides for the

necessary expansion and contraction,

and then re-assembling the track.

Administrator means the

Administrator of FRA, the Deputy

Administrator of FRA, or the delegate of

either.

Alerter means a device or system

installed in the locomotive engineer cab

to promote continuous, active

locomotive engineer attentiveness by

monitoring select locomotive engineer

control activities, providing alarms, and

stopping the train, if necessary. If

fluctuation of a monitored locomotive

engineer control is not detected within

a predetermined time, a sequence of

audible and visual alarms is activated to

progressively prompt a response by the

locomotive engineer. Failure by the

locomotive engineer to institute a

change of state in a monitored control,

or acknowledge the alerter alarm

activity through a manual reset

provision, results in a penalty brake

application, bringing the power car,

locomotive, consist or trainset to a stop.

Anti-climbing mechanism means

parts of the ends of adjoining trainset

units that are designed to engage, when

the units are subjected to large buff

loads, to prevent override of one unit by

another.

Associate Administrator means the

Associate Administrator for Safety,

FRA, or a Deputy Associate

Administrator for Safety, FRA.

Automatic train control (ATC) means

equipment installed on the power car or

locomotive working in conjunction with

a track-side system, so arranged that its

operation will automatically result in

the application of the brakes to stop a

train or control its speed at designated

speed or location restrictions, should

the locomotive engineer not respond.

Block means a length of track of

defined limits, the use of which trains,

trainsets, or any other on-track, selfpropelled equipment are governed by

block signals, or cab signals, or both.

Block signal means a manual signal at

the entrance of a block to govern trains,

trainsets, or any other on-track, selfpropelled equipment entering and

operating in that block.

Block, absolute means a block in

which no train is permitted to enter

while it is occupied by another train,

trainset, or any other on-track, selfpropelled equipment.

Brake, air means a combination of

devices operated by compressed air,

arranged in a system and controlled

manually, electrically, or pneumatically,

by means of which the motion of a

power car, trailer car, or trainset is

retarded or arrested.

Brake, disc means a retardation

system used on some rail vehicles,

primarily passenger equipment, that

utilizes flat metal discs as the braking

surface, instead of the wheel tread.

Brake, dynamic or electric means a

train or trainset braking system in which

the kinetic energy of a moving train or

trainset is used to generate electric

current at the power car or locomotive

traction motors, which is then

dissipated through banks of resistor

grids.

Brake, emergency application means a

brake application that results in the

maximum designed retarding force for

the train brake system.

Brake, full service application means

an application of the brakes resulting

from a continuous or a split reduction

in brake pipe pressure at a service rate

until maximum brake cylinder pressure

is developed. As applied to an

automatic or electro-pneumatic brake

with speed governor control, an

application other than emergency which

develops the maximum brake cylinder

pressure, as determined by the design of

the brake equipment for the speed at

which the train is operating.

Brake, tread means a braking system

that uses a brake shoe that acts on the

tread of the wheel to retard the vehicle.

Brake control system means the

components, including software, that

either automatically or under the

control of the engineer cause changes in

the retarding force applied to the

trainset by the brake system.

Brake pipe means the system of

piping, including branch pipes, angle

cocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors,

hose, and hose couplings, that connects

power cars and all trailer cars and

permits the passage of air to control the

power car and trailer car brakes.

Brake system failure means the brake

system not applying or releasing in

response to commands, or other

significant departure from intended

operation.

Braking supervision means a function

of the ATC system whereby the speed

and position of the trainset are

monitored in relation to its effective

braking performance to ensure

compliance with the target speed and

target distance.

Broken base means any break in the

base of the rail.

Broken rail means a complete break of

the rail.

Buckling incident/buckling rail mean

the formation of a lateral mis-alignment

sufficient in magnitude to constitute a

deviation of 125 mm (4.9 in.) measured

within a 20 m (65.6 ft.) chord. These

normally occur when rail temperatures

are relatively high and are caused by

high longitudinal compressive forces.

Cab means the compartment of the

power car or locomotive designed to be

occupied by the crew, and from which

the propelling power and power brakes

of the trainset are manually controlled.

Cab signal means a signal located in

the locomotive engineer’s compartment

or cab, indicating a condition affecting

the movement of a trainset, power car or

locomotive and used in conjunction

with interlocking signals, and in

conjunction with or in lieu of block

signals.

Calendar day means any period

beginning at 12:01 a.m. and ending at

midnight on a given date.

Cant means the vertical distance of

the outer rail above the inner rail in a

curve.

Cant deficiency means the additional

height, which if added to the outer rail

in a curve, at the designated vehicle

speed, would provide a single resultant

force, due to the combined effects of

weight and centrifugal force on the

vehicle, having a direction

perpendicular to the plane of the track.

Cant, rail means a rail’s inward

inclination.

Cantrail means the longitudinal

structural member at the intersection of

the side wall and the roof of a rail

vehicle.

Central traffic control means the

system of railroad operation in which

the movement of trains over routes and

through blocks on a designated section

of track or tracks is directed by signals

controlled from a designated point.

Compound fissure means a

progressive fracture originating in a

horizontal split rail head which turns

up or down in the head of the rail as a

smooth, bright, or dark surface

progressing until substantially at a right

angle to the length of the rail.

Compound fissures require examination

of both faces of the fracture to locate the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65533

horizontal split head from which they

originate.

Continuous welded rail (CWR) means

rail that has been welded together into

lengths exceeding 120 m (394 ft).

Crack, rolling stock means a fracture

without complete separation into parts,

except that castings with shrinkage

cracks or hot tears that do not

significantly diminish the strength of

the member are not considered to be

cracked.

Crash energy management means an

approach to the design of passenger rail

equipment which controls the

dissipation of energy during a collision

to protect the occupied volumes from

crushing, and to limit the decelerations

on passengers and crew in those

volumes. This may be accomplished by

designing energy-absorbing structures of

low strength in the unoccupied volumes

of a rail vehicle or passenger train to

collapse in a controlled fashion, while

providing higher structural strength in

the occupied volumes. Energy

deflection can also be part of a crash

energy management approach. Crash

energy management can be used to help

provide anticlimbing resistance and to

reduce the risk of train buckling during

a collision.

Crew means the complement of crew

members assigned to operate a train.

Crew member means a Railroad

employee called to perform service

covered by 49 U.S.C. 21103 and subject

to the Railroad’s operating rules and

program of operational tests and

inspections required in this rule.

Critical buckling stress, means the

minimum stress necessary to initiate

buckling of a structural member.

Critical software means software

whose failure could have an impact on

safety, or could cause large social or

financial loss.

Damaged rail means any rail broken

or injured by accidents, wrecks, broken

wheels, flat wheels, unbalanced wheels,

slipping or similar causes.

Desired rail installation temperature

range means the rail temperature range

in a specific geographical area, at which

forces in CWR installed in that

temperature range should not cause a

track buckle in extreme heat, or a pullapart during extreme cold weather.

Detail fracture means a progressive

fracture originating at or near the

surface of the rail head. These fractures

do not include transverse fissures,

compound fissures, or other defects

which have origins internal to the rail.

Detail fractures may arise from shelling,

head checks, or flaking of the rail.

Disturbed track means track having

reduced resistance to lateral or

longitudinal movement, or both, as a

result of the disturbance of the roadbed

or ballast by track maintenance or any

other event.

Emergency application means a brake

application which results from an

emergency reduction.

Emergency reduction means a

depletion of brake pipe pressure at a

rate sufficiently rapid to move the

operating valve to emergency position.

Employee or Railroad employee

means any employee of, contractor of, or

employee of a contractor of, the

Railroad.

End structure means the main support

projecting upward from the floor or

underframe of a power car, locomotive,

trailer car or other rail vehicle. The end

structure is securely attached to the

underframe at each end of a rail vehicle.

Engine burn fracture means a

progressive fracture originating in spots

where driving wheels have slipped on

top of the rail head. In developing

downward, such fractures frequently

resemble the compound or transverse

fissures, with which they should not be

confused or classified.

Event recorder means a device,

designed to resist tampering, that

monitors and records data on train

speed, direction of motion, time,

distance, throttle position, brake

applications and operations (including

train brake, independent brake, and, if

so equipped, electric brake applications

and operations) and, where the

locomotive, including a power car, is so

equipped, cab signal aspect(s), over the

most recent 48 hours of operation of the

electrical system of the locomotive on

which it is installed.

Failsafe means a characteristic of a

system or its elements that, upon any

failure or malfunction affecting safety,

will cause the system to revert to a state

that is known to be safe.

Fault tolerant architecture means the

built-in capability of a system to provide

continued full or continued limited

operation in the presence of a limited

number of faults or failures of the

system, such as a defect in a hardware

device or component, or an incorrect

step, process or data definition in a

computer program.

Flattened head or flattened rail means

a short length of rail, not a joint, which

has flattened out across the width of the

rail head to a depth of 10 mm (0.4 in)

or more below the rest of the rail.

Flattened rail occurrences have no

repetitive regularity and thus do not

include corrugations, and have no

apparent localized cause such as a weld

or engine burn. Their individual length

is relatively short, as compared to a

condition such as head flow on the low

rail of curves.

Full service application means a brake

application which results from one or

more brake pipe reductions sufficient in

amount to cause a full service reduction.

Full service reduction means a service

reduction sufficient in amount to cause

equalization of pressure in brake

cylinder with pressure in the reservoir

from which compressed air is supplied

to brake cylinder.

Glazing, end-facing means a glazing

panel located where a line

perpendicular to the exterior surface of

the panel makes a vertical or horizontal

angle of 50 degrees or less with the

longitudinal center line of the rail

vehicle in which the panel is installed.

A glazing panel that curves so as to meet

the definition for both side-facing and

end-facing glazing is end-facing glazing.

Glazing, exterior means a glazing

panel that is an integral part of the

exterior skin of a rail vehicle with a

surface exposed to the outside

environment.

Glazing frame means the arrangement

used to install the glazing into the

structure of a rail vehicle.

Glazing, interior means a glazing

panel with no surface exposed to the

outside environment and which is

protected from projectiles by the

structure of a rail vehicle.

Glazing, side-facing means a glazing

panel located where a line

perpendicular to the exterior surface of

the panel makes an angle of more than

50 degrees with the longitudinal center

line of the rail vehicle in which the

panel is installed.

Grade Crossing means a location

where a public highway, road, or street

or private roadway, including associated

sidewalks and pathways, crosses one or

more railroad tracks at grade.

Handrails means safety appliances

installed on either side of a rail vehicle’s

exterior doors to assist passengers and

crew to safely board and depart the

vehicle.

Head end power means electrical

power provided on board the

locomotive of a passenger train to serve

the train.

High voltage means an electrical

potential of more than 150 volts.

Home signal means a roadway signal

at the entrance to a route or block to

govern trains entering and using that

route or block.

Horizontal split head means a

horizontal progressive defect originating

inside of the rail head, usually 6 mm

(0.25 in) or more below the running

surface and progressing horizontally in

all directions, and generally

accompanied by a flat spot on the

running surface. The defect appears as
65534 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

a crack lengthwise of the rail when it

reaches the side of the rail head.

Hunting oscillations means a

sustained cyclic oscillation of the truck

which is evidenced by lateral

accelerations in excess of 0.4g root mean

square, mean-removed, for 2 seconds.

In passenger service/in revenue

service means a train or passenger

equipment that is carrying, or available

to carry, passengers. Passengers need

not have paid a fare in order for the

equipment to constitute in passenger or

revenue service.

In service means equipment subject to

this that is in passenger or revenue

service, unless the equipment:

(1) Is being handled in accordance

with § 243.15, as applicable;

(2) Is in a repair shop or on a repair

track; or

(3) Is on a storage track and is not

carrying passengers.

Indication locking means electric

locking which directly prevents the

operation of a switch or other operative

unit, in case another unit which should

operate first fails to make the required

movement.

Interior fittings means any component

in the passenger compartment which is

mounted to the ceiling, sidewalls or end

walls and which projects into the

passenger compartment more than 25

mm (1 in.) from the surface or surfaces

to which it is mounted. Interior fittings

do not include seats, windows, side

wall, end wall, floor, door pockets and

ceiling lining materials.

Interlocking means an arrangement of

signals and signal appliances so

interconnected that their movements

must succeed each other in proper

sequence and which may be operated

manually or automatically.

Interlocking block limits means the

tracks between the opposing home

signals of an interlocking.

Knowingly means having actual

knowledge of the facts that give rise to

a violation, or knowledge that a

reasonable person acting in the

circumstances and exercising reasonable

care would have.

Linear static analysis means an

analysis of the stresses in a structure

under load, for which the loads are

constant and the loads do not cause

permanent deformation to the structure.

Locomotive means a piece of on-track

equipment other than hi-rail,

specialized maintenance or other

similar equipment that may consist of

one or more units operated from a single

control stand—

(1) With one or more propelling

motors designed for moving other

equipment;

(2) With one or more propelling

motors designed to transport freight,

passenger traffic or both; or

(3) Without propelling motors but

with one or more controls. This term

does not include locomotives propelled

by steam power.

Locomotive, controlling means the

locomotive from which the locomotive

engineer exercises control over the train.

Longitudinal means in a direction

parallel to the normal direction of travel

of a rail vehicle.

Luminescent material means a

material that absorbs light energy when

ambient levels of light are high and

emits this stored energy when ambient

levels of light are low, making the

material appear to glow in the dark.

L/V ratio means the ratio of the lateral

force that any wheel exerts on an

individual rail to the vertical force

exerted by the same wheel on the rail.

MIL–STD–882C means a military

standard issued by the United States

Department of Defense to provide

uniform requirements for developing

and implementing a system safety

program to identify and then eliminate

the hazards of a system or reduce the

associated risk to an acceptable level.

Main track means a principal track,

other than an auxiliary track, designated

by timetable or special instructions, and

upon which trains are authorized to

operate by one or more of the following

explicit methods of control: timetable/

train order, signal indication, yard

limits, or some form of direct train

control.

Marker, block section means a marker

located at the boundary between

adjoining block sections.

Marker, route origin means a marker

that is equipped with a proceed light

signal, located at the beginning of a

route.

Marker, shunting means a special

marker, which is equipped with a

shunting light, that is used for turn back

operations where no route origin marker

exists.

Marker, signaling means a marker

used in open track, located at the

boundaries between each block, to

indicate spacing information.

Mechanical stabilization means a

procedure used to restore track

resistance to disturbed track following

certain maintenance operations. This

procedure may incorporate dynamic

track stabilizers or ballast consolidators,

which are units of work equipment that

are used as a substitute for the

stabilization action provided by the

passage of tonnage trains.

Occupied volume means the spaces of

a vehicle where passengers or crew are

normally located during service

operation, such as the operating cab and

passenger seating and sleeping areas.

Vestibules are typically not considered

occupied, except when in use as a

control cab.

Override means to climb over the

normal coupling or side buffers and

linking mechanism and impact the end

of the adjoining vehicle or unit above

the underframe.

Permanent deformation means a

permanent change in the shape of a

structural member.

Person means all categories of entities

covered under 1 U.S.C. 1, including but

not limited to the following: a railroad;

a manager, supervisor, official, or other

employee or agent of a railroad; any

owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of

railroad equipment, track, or facilities;

any independent contractor providing

goods or services to a railroad; and any

employee of such owner, manufacturer,

lessor, lessee, or independent

contractor.

Piped rail means a vertical split in a

rail, usually in the web, due to failure

of the shrinkage cavity in the ingot to

unite in rolling.

Power car means a type of locomotive

at the leading or trailing end, or both,

of a trainset which has a locomotive

engineer cab and propelling motors that

move the trainset; when at the leading

end of the trainset, the unit from which

the locomotive engineer controls the

trainset.

Qualified person means a person

determined by the Railroad to have the

knowledge and skills necessary to

perform one or more functions required

by this rule. The Railroad determines

the qualifications and competencies for

employees designated to perform

various functions in the manner set

forth in this rule.

Rail anchors means those devices

which are attached to the rail and bear

against the side of the crosstie to control

longitudinal rail movement. Certain

types of rail fasteners also act as rail

anchors and control longitudinal rail

movement by exerting a downward

clamping force on the upper surface of

the rail base.

Rail temperature means the

temperature of the rail, measured with

a rail thermometer.

Railroad equipment means all trains,

trainsets, rail cars, locomotives, and

maintenance vehicles owned or used by

the Railroad.

Railroad operation means any

movement of a train, trainset,

locomotive, on-track equipment, or

track motor car, singly or in

combination with other equipment, on

the track owned or operated by the

Railroad.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65535

Railroad, the means the company,

also known as the Florida Overland

eXpress (FOX), which owns and

operates the high speed rail

transportation system connecting

Orlando, Miami, and Tampa and which

is responsible for compliance with all

aspects of this rule.

Redundancy means the existence in a

system of more than one means of

accomplishing a given function, with

those means so arranged that if one

means of accomplishing a function fails

then another performs the function.

Redundancy, active means that all

redundant items are operating

simultaneously rather than being

activated when needed.

Redundant system means a piece of

equipment or a system that duplicates

the essential function of another piece

of equipment or system to the extent

that either may perform the required

function regardless of the state of

operation or failure of the other.

Refresher training means periodic

retraining required and imposed by the

Railroad for employees or contractors to

remain certified to perform specific

equipment inspection, testing, or

maintenance functions.

Repair point means a location

designated by the Railroad where

repairs of the type necessary occur on a

regular basis, and that contains all

facilities, tools, and qualified employees

required to make necessary repairs.

Rollover strength means strength

needed to protect the structural integrity

of a rail vehicle in the event the vehicle

leaves the track and impacts the ground

on its side or roof.

Roof rail means the longitudinal

structural member at the intersection of

the side wall and the roof sheathing.

Route locking means electric locking,

effective when a train passes a signal

displaying an aspect for it to proceed,

which prevents the movement of any

switch, movable-point frog, or derail in

advance of the train within the route

entered. It may be so arranged that as a

train clears a track section of the route,

the locking affecting that section is

released.

Safety appliance means an appliance,

required under 49 U.S.C. chapter 203,

excluding power brakes. The term

includes automatic couplers,

handbrakes, sill steps, handholds,

handrails, or ladder treads which are

made of steel or a material of equal or

greater mechanical strength used by the

traveling public and Railroad employees

that provides a means for safe coupling,

uncoupling, or ascending or descending

Railroad equipment.

Safety-critical means a component,

system or task that, if not available, not

performed, or not performed correctly,

increases the risk of damage to

equipment or injury to a passenger,

crew member, or other person.

Safety measurement criterion means a

measurement limit or observation

threshold used to trigger the duty to take

corrective action to prevent a serious

safety problem from developing.

Measurements may be taken manually

or by reliable sensors.

Semi-permanently coupled means

coupled by means of a drawbar or other

coupling mechanism that requires tools

to perform the uncoupling operation.

Coupling and uncoupling of each unit

in a train can be performed safely only

while at a maintenance or shop location

where personnel can safely get under a

unit or between units.

Service application means a brake

application which results from one or

more service reductions.

Service reduction means a decrease in

brake-pipe pressure, usually of from 5 to

25 pounds, at a rate sufficiently rapid to

move the operating valve to service

position, but at a rate not rapid enough

to operate the valve to emergency

position. Quick service is that feature of

the operating valve which provides for

local reduction of brake-pipe pressure.

Shear strength means the ability of a

structural member to resist forces or

components of forces acting

perpendicular to compression or tension

forces, or both, in the member.

Shock absorbent material means

material designed to prevent or mitigate

injuries due to impact by yielding and

absorbing much of the energy of impact.

Side posts means main vertical

structural elements in the sides of a rail

vehicle.

Side sills means that portion of the

underframe or side at the bottom of the

rail vehicle side wall.

Soft conversion means a dimension

taken, typically from a product or

component of a product, already

designed and manufactured to English

system dimensions, and expressing that

dimension to nearly equivalent English

or metric dimensions.

Spall, glazing means small pieces of

glazing that fly off the back surface of

glazing when an object strikes the front

surface.

Speed, maximum authorized means

the speed at which trains are permitted

to travel safely, as determined by all

operating conditions and signal aspects.

Speed, maximum revenue service

means a speed of 200 mph.

Speed, maximum safe operating

means the highest speed at which train

braking may occur without thermal

damage to the discs or wheels.

Speed, restricted means a speed that

will permit stopping within one-half the

range of vision, but not exceeding 20

mph.

Speed, slow means a speed not

exceeding 20 mph.

Split web means a lengthwise crack

along the side of the web of a rail and

extending into or through it.

Superelevation means the actual

elevation of the outside rail above the

inside rail.

System headquarters means the

location designated by the Railroad as

the primary office for the Railroad

system.

System safety plan means a document

produced by the Railroad that states in

detail the techniques, procedures, and

tests to follow to reduce hazards and

unsafe conditions to the lowest level

possible through the most effective use

of available resources. The system safety

plan is used as part of the design

process to ensure that the equipment

and system meets all Federal safety

standards and the Railroad’s safety

design requirements.

System safety program means the

activities described in the system safety

plan to be performed to ensure that the

Railroad’s equipment and operations

meet all Federal safety standards and

the Railroad’s safety design

requirements.

Target distance means the distance

from the front of the train to the target.

Target speed means the maximum

speed limit which takes effect at the

target.

Terminal means the starting point or

ending point of a single scheduled trip

for a train. Normally, this location is

where the trainset would reverse its

direction.

TGV means a high speed rail system

currently in use in France, on which

some of the equipment and operations

to be utilized by the Railroad subject to

the requirements of this rule are based.

Thrust tube means the structural

members in the trailer car end

underframe that transmit longitudinal

loads from the cross member located at

the end of the trailer to the Car body

side sills.

Tight/kinky rail means continuous

welded rail that exhibits minute

alignment irregularities, which indicate

that the rail is undergoing a level of

compression at which it may deform

unacceptably.

Time locking means electric locking,

which after a signal has been caused to

display an aspect to proceed, prevents,

until after the expiration of a

predetermined time interval after such

signal has been caused to display its

most restrictive aspect, the operation of
65536 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

any switch, movable-point frog, or

derail in the route governed by that

signal, and which prevents an aspect to

proceed from being displayed for any

conflicting route.

Track acceleration measurement

system means an on-track vehicle used

to measure lateral truck accelerations,

lateral carbody accelerations, and

vertical carbody accelerations. A

Melusine car, used on the French TGV,

is a type of track acceleration

measurement system.

Track geometry measurement system

means an on-track vehicle used to

measure track surface, warp, alignment,

and gage. The vehicle typically has eight

axles spaced symmetrically from the

centerline of the vehicle and conducts

measurements by means of mechanical

contact. A Mauzin car, used on the

French TGV, is a type of track geometry

measurement system.

Track lateral resistance means the

resistance provided by the rail/crosstie

structure against lateral displacement.

Track longitudinal resistance means

the resistance provided by the rail

anchors/rail fasteners and the ballast

section to the rail/crosstie structure

against longitudinal displacement.

Traffic locking means electric locking

which prevents changing the direction

of traffic on a section of track while that

section is occupied or while a signal

displays an aspect for a movement to

proceed into that section.

Trailer car means a unit of a trainset

designed to provide transportation for

passengers, baggage, or mail.

Train means a combination of a single

power car or locomotive with any other

power car, locomotive, trailer car, or

maintenance car. This term includes a

trainset.

Train-induced forces means the

vertical, longitudinal, and lateral

dynamic forces which are generated

during train movement and which can

contribute to the buckling potential of

track.

Trainset means a passenger train

including the locomotive(s) and power

car(s) and passenger cars that are semipermanently coupled to operate as a

single unit. The individual components

are uncoupled only for emergencies or

maintenance conducted in repair

facilities.

Transmission beacon to locomotive

(TBL) means the system which provides

interface between the interlocking signal

system and the automatic train control

system used by the Railroad, resulting

in the proper speed and location of all

train movements.

Transverse fissure means a

progressive crosswise fracture starting

from a crystalline center or nucleus

inside the head from which it spreads

outward as a smooth, bright, or dark,

round or oval surface substantially at a

right angle to the length of the rail. The

distinguishing features of a transverse

fissure from other types of fractures or

defects are the crystalline center or

nucleus and the nearly smooth surface

of the development which surrounds it.

Trip means the length of any singledirection, scheduled journey taken by a

trainset. Once a trainset completes a

turnaround at a station or

predetermined location along the rightof-way, a new trip begins.

Two-out-of-three voting architecture

means three independent processors

operating on dissimilar software in such

a manner so as to compare the software

output from each processor to ensure

that safety-critical results are identical.

If one processor produces an answer

inconsistent with the other two

processors, the conflicting processor is

taken off-line and the two remaining

processors continue to compare with

each other, and drive safety-critical

commands, only so long as they both

agree. If the remaining two processors

fail to agree, the system ceases to issue

safety-critical commands, shuts down,

and assumes a safe state.

Uncoupling mechanism means the

arrangement for operating the coupler

by any means.

Underframe means the lower

horizontal structure of a car body.

Unit means car, trailer car, power car

or locomotive of any type. For

articulated equipment a unit means a

piece of equipment located between two

trucks.

Unoccupied volume means the

sections of the passenger vehicle or

power vehicle which do not contain

seating and are not normally occupied

by passengers or crew.

Validation means the process of

evaluating a system or component

during or at the end of the development

process to determine whether it satisfies

specified requirements.

Vehicle, rail means a car, trailer car,

locomotive, power car, or similar

vehicle.

Verification means the process of

evaluating a system or component to

determine whether the products of a

given development phase satisfy the

conditions imposed at the start of that

phase.

Vertical split head means a vertical

split through or near the middle of the

head of a rail, and extending into or

through it. A crack or rust streak may

show under the head close to the web

or pieces may be split off the side of the

head.

Vestibule means an area of a trailer or

passenger car that normally does not

contain seating, that leads from the

seating area to the side exit doors.

Vital design method means a method

of designing any device, circuit or

software module used to implement a

function essential to the safe operation

of trains, such that the probability of its

failing to return to the prescribed safe

state is so low as to be considered

practically nonexistent.

Vital logic processor means a

processor designed and operated

according to vital design method.

Warp means a measure of the change

in track cant over a short distance.

Window, emergency means that

segment of a side facing glazing location

which has been designed to permit

rapid and easy removal during a crisis

situation.

Windshield means the combination of

individual units of glazing material of

the power car or locomotive that are

positioned in an end facing glazing

location.

Yard means a system of tracks within

defined limits provided for the making

up of trains, storing of cars and other

purposes.

Yield strength means the stress under

which a material will exhibit permanent

deformation.

§ 243.7 Responsibility for compliance.

(a) The Railroad shall not—

(1) Use, haul, permit to be used or

hauled on its line(s) any train or

passenger equipment, that

(i) has one or more defects not in

compliance with this Part; or

(ii) has not been inspected and tested

as required by a provision of this Part;

or

(2) Operate over any track, except as

provided in paragraph (d) of this

section, that has one or more conditions

not in compliance with a provision of

this Part, if the Railroad has actual

knowledge of the facts giving rise to the

violation, or a reasonable person acting

in the circumstances and exercising

reasonable care would have that

knowledge; or

(3) Violate any other provision of this

Part.

(b) For purposes of this rule,

passenger equipment shall be

considered in use prior to the train’s

departure as soon as it has received, or

should have received, the inspection

required under this Part for movement

and is ready for service.

(c) Although many of the

requirements of this Part are stated in

terms of the duties of the Railroad,

when any person (including, but not

limited to, a contractor performing
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65537

safety-related tasks under contract to the

Railroad subject to this part) performs

any function required by this Part, that

person (whether or not the Railroad) is

required to perform that function in

accordance with this Part.

(d) For purposes of this Part, the

Railroad operator shall be responsible

for compliance with all track safety

provisions set forth in Subpart D. When

the Railroad operator has actual

knowledge of the facts giving rise to a

violation, or a reasonable person acting

in the circumstances and exercising

reasonable care would have knowledge

that the track does not comply with the

requirements of this Part, it shall—

(1) Bring the track into compliance;

(2) Halt operations over that track;

(3) Continue operations over the

segment of noncomplying track at a

speed of 10 mph for a period not to

exceed 30 days, under the authority of

a person qualified under section

243.705 of this Part to supervise

restorations and renewal of track under

traffic conditions; or

(4) Operate in accordance with the

appropriate operational limits

established for track classes 1 through 5

as set forth in 49 CFR part 213.

§ 243.9 Enforcement.

(a) Civil penalties. Any person who

violates any requirement of this Part or

causes the violation of any such

requirement is subject to a civil penalty

of at least $500 and not more than

$10,000 per violation, except that,

where a grossly negligent violation or a

pattern of repeated violations has

created an imminent hazard of death or

injury or has caused death or injury, a

penalty of up to $20,000 per violation

may be assessed. Penalties may be

assessed against individuals only for

willful violations. Each day a violation

continues shall constitute a separate

offense. See 49 CFR part 209, Appendix

A for a detailed statement of agency

civil penalty policy.

(b) Criminal penalties. Any person

who knowingly and willfully falsifies a

record or report required to be made

under this Part, or knowingly and

willfully fails to make, prepare, or

preserve such a record or report may be

liable for criminal penalties of a fine up

to $5,000, imprisonment up to two

years, or both, under the authority of 49

U.S.C. 21311.

(c) Other remedies. FRA has other

enforcement remedies available to it,

including the authority to seek

injunctive relief and to issue

compliance orders, special notices for

repair, orders disqualifying individuals

from safety-sensitive service, and

emergency orders. FRA may use these

other remedies, in addition to or instead

of civil or criminal penalties, to ensure

the system’s compliance with the

Federal railroad safety regulations and

statutes, and to otherwise address safety

concerns with respect to the system.

§ 243.11 Preemptive effect.

Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of

this Part preempts any State law, rule,

regulation, order, or standard covering

the same subject matter, except for a

provision directed at an essentially local

safety hazard if that provision is

consistent with this part and does not

impose an undue burden on interstate

commerce.

§ 243.13 System description.

(a) General. This section describes the

components, operations, equipment,

systems, and geographic limits of the

Railroad’s high speed rail system.

Conditions that exceed or differ from

the description set forth in this section

are prohibited. In addition, the Railroad

shall adhere to the following general

requirements:

(1) The Railroad shall operate

between Miami, Orlando, and Tampa,

Florida only. Operation beyond these

locations is prohibited without prior

approval by FRA.

(2) The Railroad shall not under any

circumstance exceed 200 mph, and at

all times shall operate at speeds

consistent with all requirements of this

Part.

(3) The Railroad shall not transport or

permit to be transported any product

that has been established to be a

hazardous material pursuant to 49 CFR

part 172, as amended.

(4) The Railroad shall not permit

smoking on any trainset while that

trainset is in passenger service.

(b) Right-of-Way. (1) The Railroad

shall operate on a completely dedicated

right-of-way. The Railroad shall not

operate or conduct joint operations with

rail freight or other rail passenger traffic.

Other than its passenger trainsets and

power cars, only the equipment listed in

paragraph (h)(6) of this section may be

operated on the Railroad’s tracks.

(2) There shall be no public at-grade

crossings. Animal and non-Railroad

equipment crossings shall be

accomplished by means of an underpass

or overpass. Private at-grade crossings

shall be for the exclusive use of the

Railroad’s internal operations.

(3) The entire perimeter of the

system’s right-of-way shall be

permanently fenced.

(4) The Railroad shall install fall

intrusion, intrusion, flood, wind, hot

box and dragging equipment detectors

in accordance with the requirements set

forth in Subpart C.

(5) Access to the right-of-way for

roadway worker staff or emergency

personnel shall be provided at intervals

not to exceed 3.2 km (2 mi). This access

shall be protected against entry by

unauthorized persons.

(6) Throughout the length of the rightof-way, the Railroad shall install

walkways, located at a safe distance

from the tracks, at a minimum distance

of 2.4 m (7.87 ft) from the outside rail

for a design speed of 350 km/h (217

mph). The walkways shall be used

primarily for track and right-of-way

inspection, and when required by

emergency crews.

(7) The right-of-way shall be designed

for the high operating speeds planned

which necessitate large curve radii in

both the horizontal and vertical planes.

(8) The Railroad shall record all

difficulties and special situations

regarding geology, hydrology,

settlement, landslide, concrete and

quality criteria that arise during

construction of the right-of-way. After

construction, the Railroad shall monitor

the stability and quality standards of

structures such as bridges, viaducts and

earth structures.

(9) The Railroad shall make available

for review by the FRA the track layout

drawings which show, at a minimum,

the following information:

(i) Length of straight sections, spirals

and curves, curve radius,

superelevation, superelevation

variations, gradients, vertical curve

radii;

(ii) Turnouts and crossover location,

technology and geometry;

(iii) Maximum operating speed and

allowable cant deficiencies;

(iv) Signal boxes, block sectioning,

wayside signal and communication

devices;

(v) Power feeding equipment and cutout devices;

(vi) Location of accesses to the rightof-way;

(vii) Designated track crossing

locations for Railroad personnel; and

(viii) The Railroad shall also submit

the specifications for the track layout,

permissible track forces, components

such as rail, ballast, ties, rail fasteners,

switches.

(10) Highway bridges. In order to

guarantee a clear view for drivers of

motor vehicles, highway bridges shall

be constructed in a straight line and

sharp bumps shall be avoided.

Protection devices shall be installed to

restrict to the maximum extent possible

motor vehicles from falling onto the

right-of-way.
65538 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(11) Rail bridges. There shall be no

movable bridges in the Railroad’s

system. Stationary rail bridges located

over highways shall have their

foundations protected against the

impact of road vehicles.

(12) Tunnels. There shall be no

tunnels in the Railroad’s system.

(13) Track Crossing Device for

Roadway Workers. Crossing of the tracks

where operations occur above 160 km/

h (100 mph) is not permitted except

where designated track crossing devices

are installed. Such track crossing

devices shall be installed at all locations

where the need for track crossing by

workers is expected to occur on a

regular basis, such as turnout areas and

substations.

(14) Emergency Traffic Stops.

Emergency traffic stopping or slowing

devices, or both, shall be installed at

regular intervals on both sides of the

tracks, at intervals not to exceed 3.2 km

(2 mi), and at all special locations

including block section limits, turnouts,

substations or autotransformers. These

devices shall act directly on the

signaling system and establish voice

connection to the central traffic control

system.

(c) Railroad system components. (1)

System safety program. The Railroad

shall develop, implement, and use a

comprehensive system safety program,

as described in detail in Subpart B of

this Part, to ensure the identification,

analysis, resolution, and documentation

of all safety-critical processes and

hazards.

(2) Inspection, testing, and

maintenance procedures and criteria.

The Railroad shall develop, implement

and use a system of inspection, testing,

maintenance procedures and criteria,

which meet the standards set forth in

this Part, to ensure the integrity and safe

operation of the Railroad’s equipment,

infrastructure, signal system, and power

distribution.

(3) Operating practices. The Railroad

shall develop, implement, and use

operating rules, which meet the

standards set forth in Subpart F of this

Part, which are based on the practices

and procedures used on the French TGV

system, to ensure the integrity and safe

operation of the Railroad’s system.

(4) Emergency preparedness plan. The

Railroad shall develop, implement, and

use an emergency preparedness plan,

which meets the standards to be set

forth in 49 CFR part 239, to reduce the

risk of injury to passengers and

employees in the event of an emergency.

This emergency plan shall incorporate

proven safety procedures used on the

French TGV system.

(5) Personnel qualification

requirements. The Railroad shall

develop, implement, and use a training

and testing program, which meets the

standards set forth in Subpart H of this

Part, to ensure that all personnel,

including Railroad employees and

employees of Railroad contractors,

possess the skills and knowledge

necessary to effectively perform their

duties.

(6) System qualification tests. The

Railroad shall develop, implement, and

use a series of operational and design

tests, which meet the standards set forth

in Subpart G of this Part, to demonstrate

the safe operation of system

components, and the system as a whole.

(d) Track and infrastructure. (1) The

Railroad shall construct its track and

infrastructure to meet all material and

operational design criteria, within

normal acceptable construction

tolerances, and to meet the requirements

set forth in Subpart D of this Part.

(2) The Railroad shall operate on

nominal standard gage, 1.435 m (56.5

in.), track.

(3) The Railroad shall install and

operate on double track throughout its

entire length, with a minimum nominal

distance between track centerlines of 4.5

m (14.75 ft). Generally, each track will

be used for a single direction of traffic,

and trains will not overtake each other.

The Railroad shall install crossover

connections between the double track at

each station, and at regular intervals

along the line to permit flexibility in

train operations, maintenance, and

emergency rescue.

(4) The Railroad’s track shall consist

of continuous welded rail that is shopwelded in continuous welded strings of

approximately 396 m (1,300 ft.). Once

installed, the rail will be field-welded to

form one continuous track segment. The

rail shall be nominal 130-pound rail, or

equivalent.

(5) The Railroad shall install concrete

ties, nominally spaced at .6 m (23.6 in.)

center-to-center.

(6) The Railroad shall use ballast to

support the track structure, as required

by Subpart D of this Part. The Railroad

shall use ballast that does not

excessively degrade when used in

combination with concrete ties. The

ballast shall be of 20–60 mm (.8 to 2.4

in.) specification and layered to a

nominal depth of .35 m (14 in.) under

the ties.

(7) The substructure layer shall

consist of compacted sandy granular

material, 20% maximum fines, layered

to a depth selected on the basis of the

prepared subgrade and ballast

compatibility. The nominal depth of

this layer will be .20 m (8 in.).

(8) The formation layer shall consist

of compacted granular sandy material,

15% maximum fines, layered to a depth

selected on the basis of embankment

and ballast compatibility. The nominal

depth of this layer shall be .70 m (27.6

in.).

(9) The embankment shall consist of

compacted granular sandy material,

15% maximum fines, layered to a depth

selected on the basis of embankment

and ballast compatibility. The nominal

depth of this layer will be .80 m (31.5

in.).

(10) Excavated decomposed organic

materials shall be replaced with

compacted granular sandy materials,

20% maximum fines.

(11) Mainline high speed movable

frog turnouts shall be the same as those

developed for and used on the TGV

lines in France.

(12) In yards and maintenance

facilities, where operations will be at

lower speeds, the Railroad shall install

50 kg/m (100 lb/yd) rail, a reduced

ballast thickness of 25 cm (10 in.), and

concrete or timber ties at turnouts with

50 kg/m (100 lb/yd) rail or equivalent.

(e) Signal system. (1) The Railroad’s

signal system shall include an automatic

train control system (ATC), interlocking

equipment, wayside detectors, and

centralized traffic control (CTC).

(2) The Railroad’s ATC shall be a

transmission beacon-to-locomotive

system, and shall interface with the

interlocking system. The interlocking

system shall generate movement

authorizations, and the transmission

beacon system will notify the power car

and locomotive engineer of movement

information.

(3) The Railroad’s ATC shall

incorporate speed and distance-to-go

principles; safety-based multiple

processor architecture and on-board

equipment; wayside encoders that send

messages through the track beacons and

short cable loops, and provide

notifications of upcoming curves and

gradients, distances to point, and speed

restrictions; and on-board equipment

that calculates the braking curve

requirements with respect to the data

received.

(4) The Railroad’s ATC shall provide

continuous speed monitoring and

interface with the train braking systems.

The ATC shall initiate braking to control

speed in the event the locomotive

engineer exceeds the maximum

authorized speed.

(5) The on-board ATC computers shall

be based on a two-out-of-three voting

architecture. Operations shall be

accomplished by the use of three

processors that shall operate

simultaneously.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65539

(6) The Railroad’s ATC shall receive

information from interlockings, that

shall be transmitted to on-board

equipment through track beacons and

short cable loops. Track beacons shall

transmit speed limit and line data for

each block section. Cable loops shall be

used for specific local information and,

at the end of each block section, for

permission to proceed.

(7) Braking profiles shall be calculated

in the on-board controller to comply

with necessary speed limits and target

points determined by the track profile

and wayside equipment data.

(8) Each block section will be denoted

by a block section marker. On open line,

block sections shall be equipped with

one train detection system each. In areas

managed by interlockings, the length of

the section will vary according to the

configuration of the line.

(9) Track circuits shall be of two

types:

(i) Jointless audio frequency track

circuits shall be used on the main line;

in crossover areas, these circuits will be

combined with sequential release logic

in the interlocking controllers to ensure

protection against poor wheel-rail

contact on little-used rail; and

(ii) Jointed high-voltage impulse track

circuits shall be used in the yards and

maintenance facilities.

(10) The interlocking equipment shall:

(i) interface with the wayside signal

equipment, track circuits, switch

machines, and wayside signals;

(ii) Monitor all track circuits;

(iii) Interface with the automatic train

control system;

(iv) Exchange supervisory control and

status information with central control;

(v) Provide local back-up control at

each interlocking location; and

(vi) Control switch machines and

monitor devices used to verify switch

position.

(11) The vital logic processor module

of the interlocking controller shall

employ two processors that operate

simultaneously in a redundant checking

system architecture.

(12) All wayside detectors shall

interface with the train control system

and be monitored from the central

traffic control facility through the

interlocking equipment.

(13) The Railroad’s central traffic

control shall regulate, from a single

point, all train routes and movements.

(f) Communications. (1) The Railroad

shall install a dedicated, fiber-optic

communication system along the rightof-way to transmit data, telephone, and

radio communications. To ensure

transmission reliability, the system shall

include back-up transmission routes.

(2) For train operation and

maintenance, the Railroad shall install:

(i) A dedicated telephone system with

fixed telephones and field sockets along

the tracks, yards, and platforms;

(ii) A portable radio system for

maintenance and service use; and

(iii) A train radio, which shall

facilitate communication between each

trainset and central control at any time.

(g) Power distribution. (1) The

Railroad shall install a 25 kV (60

alternating current) overhead catenary

electrification system.

(2) The Railroad shall protect against

local lightning conditions in the design

and operation of the power distribution

system.

(3) All power substations located

along the right-of-way shall be provided

with remote control operating features

that permit operation from a centrallylocated control center.

(4) Supervisory control equipment at

remote locations and power substations

shall have battery-powered back-up

capability in the event of total utility

service failure.

(h) Rolling stock. (1) The Railroad’s

rolling stock shall be designed,

operated, and maintained in accordance

with the requirements set forth in

Subpart E of this Part.

(2) The Railroad’s trainsets shall be bidirectional, articulated, fixed-consist

trains with a power car at each end and

eight passenger or trailer cars between

the power cars. The power cars and

trailer cars shall not be coupled

together, but shall be semi-permanently

connected into one unit that is capable

of being disconnected only in a repair

facility. The trailing and leading ends of

each trainset shall be equipped with

automatic couplers. The trailer cars

shall be arranged so that adjacent car

body ends are supported by a common

truck. The end trailers shall be

supported by a separate truck at the

carbody end adjacent to the power car.

(3) Each truck of a trainset shall be

continuously monitored by on-board

computer while in operation to ensure

proper function. The on-board computer

screen shall alert the locomotive

engineer if malfunction occurs.

(4) Each trainset shall be equipped

with wheelslide control, independent

trucks, and fault-tolerant braking.

(5) All trainsets shall include

operating smoke and fire detection

systems.

(6) The Railroad shall operate other

rail vehicles for maintenance and rescue

purposes, including a grinding train, a

tamping lining machine, a track

stabilizing machine, a track geometry

measurement car or Mauzin car, a track

acceleration measurement car or

Melusine car, an ultrasonic test car to

measure the integrity of the rails, a

ballast-plowing railway car, and electric

and diesel locomotives for shunting and

rescue purposes.

(7) Each maintenance center and

maintenance employee shall be fully

equipped with tools, autonomous

motorized railway motorized cars, and

road vehicles needed for performance of

duties required by this Part.

(8) Each power car and trailer car

shall incorporate crash energy

management, and each power car shall

contain a structural anti-penetration

wall ahead of the locomotive engineer

cab, and energy absorbing structures at

the front and rear of the car body.

(9) The power cars shall be equipped

with an alternating current propulsion

system. Two self-commutated,

synchronous traction motors on each

truck of each power car shall provide

maximum power at the wheel rims.

(10) The locomotive engineer cab

shall be arranged to enhance safety of

operation, range of vision, visibility and

readability of controls and indicators,

accessibility of controls, climate control,

noise control, engineer comfort and

vigilance, and efficiency. The engineer’s

control stand shall be centrally located.

(11) The Railroad’s passenger

equipment brake system shall meet the

following standards:

(i) Each trainset shall be equipped

with a two-pipe, electro-pneumatic

brake system, which shall ensure that

each truck respond independently to a

brake demand from a reduction.

(ii) The pressure in each brake pipe

shall be controlled by the locomotive

engineer’s automatic brake valve in the

leading cab. In the event of a failure of

this device, a purely pneumatic control

shall be available for use by the

locomotive engineer.

(iii) The maximum brake cylinder

pressure shall vary depending on the

speed range. At speeds above 200

km/h (125 mph), the maximum brake

cylinder pressure will be reduced to

avoid excessive demand of the

adhesion.

(iv) Independent of the automatic

brake valve, the ATC, deadman control,

two emergency brake valves located in

each cab, and emergency brake valves

located in two trailer cars, shall each be

capable of producing a rapid and

complete evacuation of the brake pipe

and initiate an emergency application.

(v) Each powered truck shall be

independently controlled by the brake

pipe, and shall have electric braking

that is battery operated as a back-up in

case of main power failure. The brake

system shall perform so that the electric

brake shall have priority action. The

electric brake control shall be performed

by the same electronic equipment that
65540 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

controls the traction equipment on each

truck. During emergency braking,

electro-mechanical relays, independent

of electronic control, shall check the

level of electric braking and in case of

failure, the friction brake shall be

automatically applied at its maximum

value. If the electronic equipment

controlling the powered truck is out of

service, friction braking shall be

available in an emergency through a

pneumatic application.

(vi) The control of the powered truck

electric brake shall be available to the

locomotive engineer through the

traction-braking master controller to

slow the trainset or maintain speed

down a gradient. This brake application

shall be provided with an electric signal

without any reduction in the brake pipe

pressure.

(vii) A separate microprocessor shall

control the traction and the braking

functions on each powered truck. Each

microprocessor for the traction motor

units shall be programmed so that the

retarding force is distributed effectively

between motors and air brake

equipment. Each microprocessor shall

also monitor the power dissipation in

the rheostats.

(viii) Each power car and trailer car

shall be equipped with wheelslide

protection.

An anti-skid device for each truck

shall be included in the traction system

controls. The anti-skid function shall be

controlled by a separate microprocessor

for each power car truck. The anti-skid

function for each truck shall be backed

up a system that detects and notifies the

engineer of nonrotating axles.

(ix) Each trainset shall be equipped

with an operative on-board detection

system. During operation, all power

equipment shall be continuously

monitored by microprocessor. The

detection system shall store all failures

detected. Failures of the nature

described in § 243.425 of Subpart E of

this Part shall appear on the display

screen in the locomotive or power car

cab.

(x) The Railroad’s system safety plan

shall establish a maximum authorized

speed and brake reduction matrix to

address brake failures that occur in

service or in passenger service. In the

event of any brake failure on a trainset,

the locomotive engineer shall reduce

train speed to the maximum authorized

speed for that failure, as established in

the Railroad’s safety system plan.

(xi) The brake system on each trainset

shall be designed and operated fail-safe.

System redundancy and notification

procedures shall ensure continuous

monitoring and back-up in the event of

failure.

(12) Hot box detectors. The Railroad

shall install and maintain hot box

detectors along the length of the rightof-way that detect the journal bearing

temperature of all moving rail

equipment. The detectors shall be

interconnected to the central traffic

control and shall alert the Railroad and

the locomotive engineer of defective

equipment.

§ 243.15 Movement of defective

equipment.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs

(b) and (c) of this section and after

departure in compliance with the daily

inspection required by section

243.433(f)(1), a trainset with one or

more conditions not in compliance with

the list in section 243.433(f)(1) of this

Part may be moved in revenue service

only after the Railroad has complied

with all of the following:

(1) A qualified person determines that

it is safe to move the trainset, consistent

with the Railroad’s operating rules

developed and approved in accordance

with the requirements of Subpart F of

this Part;

(2) The qualified person making the

non-compliance determination notifies

the locomotive engineer in charge of

movement of the trainset and crew, in

writing, that the trainset is noncomplying, but safe to move, and of the

maximum authorized speed, and any

other restrictions that may apply; and

(3) A tag bearing the words ‘‘noncomplying trainset’’ and containing the

following information, are securely

attached to the control stand on each

control cab of the trainset:

(i) The trainset number;

(ii) The name and signature of the

qualified person making the noncompliance determination;

(iii) The location and date of the

inspection that led to the noncompliance determination;

(iv) A description of each defect;

(v) Movement restrictions, if any; and

(vi) The authorized destination of the

trainset.

A copy of this tag may be used to

provide the notification required by

paragraph (a)(2) above.

(b) A trainset that develops a noncomplying condition en route may

continue in revenue service, so long as

the requirements of paragraph (a) are

otherwise fully met, until the next daily

inspection, examination in service,

running gear inspection, wheel

inspection, minor inspection, general

inspection, or major inspection,

whichever is required by this Part to

occur first. Where en route defects or

failures of the brake system occur,

trainset movement shall be governed by

section 243.409 of this Part.

(c) A non-complying trainset, power

car, or locomotive may be moved

without passengers within a yard, at

speeds not in excess of 16 km/h (10

mph), without meeting the requirements

of paragraph (a) of this section where

the movement is solely for the purpose

of repair. The Railroad shall insure that

the movement is made safely.

Subpart B—System Safety Program

and Plan

§ 243.101 General system safety

requirements.

(a) One year after the date that this

Part takes effect, the Railroad shall

adopt a written system safety plan that

describes the railroad’s system safety

program, using MIL–STD–882(C) as a

guide. The Railroad shall submit the

system safety plan to FRA for approval.

The Railroad shall update the system

safety plan as new information and

knowledge concerning systems and

equipment arise in the course of

operations. The Railroad shall brief

FRA’s Associate Administrator for

Safety annually on the status of the

system safety program, including any

changes proposed for the system safety

plan.

(b) The system safety plan shall

describe the system safety program to be

conducted as part of the Railroad’s

system design and construction process

to ensure that the Railroad identifies,

addresses, and documents all safety

issues and Federal safety requirements.

The system safety plan shall also

describe the system safety program to be

conducted as part of the operation,

maintenance, and overhaul of all system

components. The system safety plan

shall take into account the operation of

system components as they operate in

isolation, as well as how they operate

within the system. The system safety

program shall ensure that safety issues

are considered as important as cost and

performance issues in the design,

construction, operation, maintenance,

and overhaul of the Railroad’s system.

(c) The system safety plan shall be the

Railroad’s principal safety document. It

shall be used as guidance or, as

applicable, as a requirement for the

development and operation of the

Railroad’s system and subsystems. At a

minimum, the system safety plan shall

address:

(1) Fire protection;

(2) Software safety;

(3) Inspection, testing, and

maintenance;

(4) Training and qualifications;

(5) Emergency preparedness;

(6) Pre-revenue service system

qualification testing;
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65541

(7) Hazard identification and

reduction;

(8) Operating procedures in the event

of equipment that becomes defective

while in passenger service;

(9) Identification of safety-critical

subsystems;

(10) Relationships between safetycritical subsystems; and

(11) Adequate staffing.

(d) The system safety plan shall

describe the approaches and processes

to be used to:

(1) Identify all safety requirements,

including Federal requirements

governing the design of passenger

equipment and its supporting systems;

(2) Evaluate the total system,

including hardware, software, testing,

and support activities, to identify

known or potential safety hazards over

the life cycle of the Railroad’s system;

(3) Identify safety issues during

design reviews;

(4) Eliminate or reduce the risk posed

by the hazards identified;

(5) Monitor the progress made toward

resolving safety issues, reducing

hazards, and meeting safety

requirements; and

(6) Develop a program of testing or

analysis, or both, to demonstrate that

safety requirements have been met.

(e) As part of the system safety

program, adequate documentation shall

be maintained to audit how the design

and operation of the Railroad’s system

meets safety requirements, and to

monitor how safety issues are raised and

resolved.

(f) The system safety plan shall

address how operational limits may be

imposed on the use of the Railroad’s

system if the system design cannot meet

certain safety requirements.

(g) The Railroads shall make the

system safety plan and documentation

required by paragraph (e) of this section

available for inspection and copying by

FRA.

§ 243.103 Fire protection program.

(a) As part of the system safety

program, the Railroad shall include fire

safety considerations and features in the

design of the Railroad’s system that

reduce the risk of personal injury and

equipment damage caused by fires onboard to a level established as

acceptable in MIL–STD–882(C).

(b) As part of the system safety

program, the Railroad shall complete a

detailed, written analysis of the fire

protection problem. In conducting this

analysis, the Railroad shall:

(1) Ensure that good fire protection

practice is used as part of the equipment

design process;

(2) Take effective steps to design

equipment to be sufficiently fire

resistant so that fire detection devices

permit evacuation of the equipment

before fire, smoke, or toxic fumes cause

injury to a passenger or crew member;

(3) Identify, analyze, and prioritize

the fire hazards inherent in the design

of equipment;

(4) Document and explain how safety

issues are resolved in relation to cost

and performance in the design of

equipment so that the risk of fire hazard

is minimized;

(5) Describe the analysis and tests

necessary to demonstrate how the fire

protection approach taken in the design

of equipment will enable a train to meet

the fire protection standards of this

Subpart and of the Railroad’s system

safety plan;

(6) Describe the analysis and tests

necessary in order to select materials

that will provide sufficient fire

resistance to ensure adequate time for

fire detection and safe evacuation;

(7) Reasonably ensure that a

ventilation system does not contribute

to the lethality of a fire;

(8) Identify in writing the trainset

components that are a risk of initiating

fire and which require overheat

protection. As prescribed in

§ 243.413(c), overheat detectors shall be

installed in all components where the

analysis determines that such

equipment is necessary. If overheat

protection is not provided for a

component at risk of being a source of

fire, the written rationale and

justification for the decision shall be

included as part of the system safety

program documentation;

(9) Identify in writing all unoccupied

train compartments that contain

equipment or material that pose a fire

hazard, and analyze the benefit

provided by including a fire or smoke

detection system in each compartment

identified. As prescribed in

§ 243.413(d), fire or smoke detectors

shall be installed in unoccupied

compartments where the analysis

determines that such equipment is

necessary to ensure sufficient time for

the safe evacuation of a train. The

written analysis shall explain why a fire

or smoke detector is not necessary, if the

decision is made not to install one in

any of the unoccupied compartments

identified as a potential source of fire;

(10) Perform an analysis of the

occupied and unoccupied spaces which

require portable fire extinguishers. The

analysis shall include the proper type

and size of fire extinguisher for each

location;

(11) Identify in writing all unoccupied

train compartments that contain

equipment or material that poses a fire

hazard. On a case-by-case basis, analyze

the benefit provided by including a

fixed, automatic fire-suppression system

in each compartment identified. The

type and size of the automatic firesuppression system for each necessary

application shall be determined. As

prescribed in § 243.413(e) a fixed,

automatic fire suppression system shall

be installed in unoccupied

compartments where the analysis

determines it is necessary and practical

to ensure sufficient time for the safe

evacuation of the train. The analysis

shall provide the reasoning why a fixed,

automatic fire-suppression system is not

necessary or practical if the decision is

made not to install one in any of the

unoccupied compartments identified in

the plan; and

(12) Develop and adopt written

procedures for the inspection, testing,

and maintenance of all fire safety

systems and equipment. As prescribed

in § 243.413(f), the Railroad shall

comply with those procedures that it

designates as mandatory.

(c) The Railroad shall reasonably

ensure that the design criteria is

followed and that the tests required by

the fire protection portion of the

Railroad’s system safety plan and

program are performed.

§ 243.105 Software safety program.

(a) The Railroad shall develop and

maintain a software safety program to

guide the design, development, testing,

integration, and verification of computer

programs used to control or monitor the

Railroad’s equipment, operations and

systems.

(b) The software safety program shall:

(1) Treat system software that controls

or monitors safety functions as safetycritical, unless a completely redundant,

failsafe, non-software means to perform

the same function is provided; and

(2) Describe the following items,

objectives, or tasks to ensure that safe,

reliable, and impenetrable system

software is used to monitor or perform

safety functions:

(i) The software design process to be

used;

(ii) The software design

documentation to be produced;

(iii) The software hazard analysis that

will be performed, including a detailed

explanation of the measures needed and

taken by the Railroad to prevent the risk

of penetration by unauthorized

individuals or entities;

(iv) The software safety reviews that

will be performed;

(v) The software hazard monitoring

and tracking that will occur;

(vi) The hardware and software

integration safety tests that will be

conducted; and
65542 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(vii) The demonstration of overall

software safety as part of the prerevenue service tests of the Railroad’s

system.

(c) The Railroad shall adhere to the

design criteria, and perform the tests

required by the software safety portion

of the system safety program. To fulfill

this obligation in part, the Railroad shall

include software safety requirements in

each of its contracts for the purchase of

new equipment or new components of

existing equipment that contain safetycritical software.

(d) The Railroad shall use a formal

safety methodology to develop electrical

and electronic control systems that

control safety functions. The safety

methodology shall include a Failure

Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis

(FMECA) and verification tests for all

components of the control system and

its interfaces, including computer

software.

(e) Safety-related control systems

driven by computer software shall

include hardware and software design

features that result in a control system

that fails safe.

(f) The Railroad shall develop and

comply with a comprehensive hardware

and software integration program for

safety-critical systems to ensure that the

software functions as intended when

installed in a hardware system identical

to that to be used in service.

(g) The Railroad shall follow the

software safety procedures required by

the software safety portion of the system

safety program.

§ 243.107 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

(a) General. The Railroad shall

provide to FRA detailed information,

consistent with the requirements of this

rule and including those set forth in

§ 243.433(a), §§ 243.331 through

243.347, and §§ 243.258 through

243.279 of this Part, on the inspection,

testing, and maintenance procedures

necessary for the Railroad to safely

operate its system. This information

shall include a detailed description of:

(1) Safety inspection procedures,

intervals, and criteria;

(2) Test procedures and intervals;

(3) Scheduled preventive

maintenance intervals;

(4) Maintenance procedures; and

(5) Special testing equipment or

measuring devices required to perform

safety inspections and tests.

(b) General inspection, testing, and

maintenance procedures. The

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program shall contain procedures that

reasonably ensure that the Railroad’s

system is free from general conditions

that endanger the safety of the crew,

passengers, or equipment. This program

shall include procedures to ensure that

the system, all subsystems, and

components are free from the following

conditions that may endanger the safety

of the crew, passengers, or equipment:

(1) A continuous accumulation of oil

or grease on the rolling stock;

(2) Improper functioning of any

component in the track, signal, rolling

stock, or communication systems;

(3) A crack, break, excessive wear,

structural defect, or weakness of a

component in the track, signal, or

rolling stock systems;

(4) A leak in any portion of the rolling

stock;

(5) Use of a component or system

under a condition that exceeds the

design capabilities of that component or

system; and

(6) Insecure attachment of a

component of the track, signal or rolling

stock systems.

(c) Maintenance intervals. Initial

scheduled maintenance intervals should

be based on analysis completed as part

of the system safety program. The

intervals should be changed only when

justified by accumulated, verifiable

operating data, and approved in

conjunction with the system safety plan

approval.

(d) Standard procedures for safely

performing inspection, testing, and

maintenance, or repairs. The Railroad

shall establish written standard

procedures for performing all safetycritical or potentially hazardous

inspection, testing, maintenance, and

repair tasks. These standard procedures

shall be available to FRA upon request

and shall:

(1) Describe in detail each step

required to safely perform the task;

(2) Describe the knowledge necessary

to safely perform the task;

(3) Describe any precautions that shall

be taken to safely perform the task;

(4) Describe the use of any safety

equipment necessary to perform the

task;

(5) Be approved by the Railroad’s

official responsible for safety;

(6) Be enforced by the Railroad’s

supervisors responsible for

accomplishing the tasks; and

(7) Be reviewed annually by the

Railroad.

§ 243.109 Training, qualification, and

designation program.

The Railroad shall adopt and comply

with a training, qualification, and

designation program for employees and

contractors that perform emergency

preparedness tasks or safety-related

inspections, tests, or maintenance duties

on the Railroad’s system. This program

shall meet the minimum requirements

set forth in Subpart H of this Part, and

it shall be submitted to FRA for

approval as part of the Railroad’s system

safety plan.

§ 243.111 Emergency Preparedness

Program.

The Railroad shall develop, adopt,

and implement an emergency

preparedness plan that complies with

the requirements of FRA’s proposed

Passenger Train Emergency Standards

as ultimately codified in 49 CFR part

239, as amended.

§ 243.113 Pre-revenue service system

qualification testing plan.

The Railroad shall submit a prerevenue service qualification testing

plan, as part of the system safety plan,

prior to testing the system. The prerevenue service qualification testing

plan shall cover all systems, including

the signal, communication,

infrastructure and track, rolling stock,

software, and operating practices

systems. The testing plan shall include

all of the elements required by Subpart

G of this Part and shall be approved in

conjunction with the Railroad’s system

safety plan, prior to commencement of

testing.

§ 243.115 Hazard identification and

reduction.

(a) The Railroad shall include in its

system safety program, an identification

of all hazards that may arise in the

system, which shall be reduced to

writing and available for review and

copying by FRA.

(b) The Railroad shall include in its

system safety program, a written

analysis of how the identified safety

hazards may be reduced or eliminated

through design, construction,

equipment, or operations. Through

system safety analysis, the Railroad

shall choose the reduction or

elimination method most appropriate

for the safety of the system. A solution

based in operations shall be

discouraged. The Railroad’s written

analysis shall be available for review

and copying by FRA.

§ 243.117 Operating procedures in the

event of component failures.

(a) The Railroad shall include in its

system safety program consideration of

appropriate operating procedures in the

event that rolling stock or any other

system component becomes defective

while in passenger service. The

Railroad’s system safety program shall

include, at a minimum, appropriate

operating procedures for all major

component failures under all potential
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65543

operating conditions; a description of

the limits of the fault tolerance for each

fault-tolerant system; and the

development of a process by which the

Railroad and any locomotive engineer

operating a trainset will become aware

that a system is approaching the limits

of its fault tolerance before those limits

are reached or surpassed.

(b) As part of the system safety

program, the Railroad shall complete a

written explanation of the

considerations completed under

paragraph (a). The Railroad’s written

explanation shall be available for review

and copying by FRA.

§ 243.119 Safety-critical subsystems.

The Railroad shall include in its

system safety program an identification

of all safety-critical subsystems. The

Railroad shall also prepare an

explanation of the relationship between

all safety-critical subsystems. The

Railroad’s written identification and

explanation shall be available for review

and copying by FRA.

§ 243.121 Approval procedure.

(a) General. The following procedures

govern consideration and action upon

requests for approval of the Railroad’s

system safety plan and safety-critical

changes to the Railroad’s existing

system safety plan.

(b) Petitions for approval. The

Railroad’s petition for approval of the

system safety plan, or petition for

approval of safety-critical changes to the

system safety plan shall contain—

(1) The name, title, address, and

telephone number of the Railroad’s

primary person to be contacted with

regard to review of the petition;

(2) The system safety plan proposed,

in detail, which addresses the Railroad’s

entire system as described in this Part;

and

(3) In the case of the Railroad’s initial

petition for approval, appropriate data

or analysis, or both, establishing that the

system safety plan will provide a high

level of safety; and in the case of

petitions for approval of safety-critical

changes to the system safety plan, data

or analysis, or both, which establishes

that the requested change(s) provides an

equivalent or greater level of safety than

provided in the Railroad’s previous

system safety plan.

(c) Service. The Railroad’s petition for

approval under paragraph (b) of this

section shall be submitted in triplicate

to the Associate Administrator for

Safety, FRA, 400 7th Street, S.W., Stop

25, Washington, D.C. 20590.

(d) Disposition of petition. (1) If FRA

finds that the petition complies with the

requirements of this section and that the

proposed plan is acceptable or proposed

changes are justified, the petition shall

be granted, normally within 90 days of

its receipt. If the petition is neither

granted nor denied within 90 days, the

petition remains pending for decision.

FRA may attach special conditions to

the approval of the petition. Following

the approval of a petition, FRA may

reopen consideration of the petition for

cause stated.

(2) If FRA finds that the petition does

not comply with the requirements of

this section and that the proposed plan

is not acceptable or that the proposed

changes are not justified, the petition

shall be denied, normally within 90

days of its receipt.

(3) When FRA grants or denies a

petition, or reopens consideration of the

petition, written notice shall be sent to

the petitioner.

(e) Publication of Changes. If FRA

determines that changes to safetycritical standards, procedures, or

inspection frequencies set forth in this

rule are justified, the Administrator

shall publish in the Federal Register a

notice which explains those changes.

The changes to the Railroad’s system

safety plan shall take effect 60 days after

publication of such notice.

Subpart C—Signal System

General

§ 243.201 Plans, where kept.

As required for maintenance, plans

shall be kept at all interlockings and

intermediate track circuit cases. Plans

shall be legible and correct.

§ 243.202 Grounds.

Each circuit, the functioning of which

affects the safety of train operations,

shall be kept free of any ground or

combination of grounds which will

permit a flow of current equal to or in

excess of 75 percent of the release value

of any relay or other electromagnetic

device in the circuit, except circuits

which include any track rail and except

the common return wires of single-wire,

single-break, signal control circuits

using a grounded common, and

alternating current power distribution

circuits which are grounded in the

interest of safety.

§ 243.203 Locking of signal apparatus

housings.

Signal apparatus housings shall be

secured against unauthorized entry.

§ 243.204 Design of control circuits on the

failsafe principle.

The failure of a safety-critical control

circuit shall not cause a condition more

permissive than intended. Safety-critical

circuits shall be designed on the failsafe

principle.

§ 243.205 Power-operated switch use.

All switch movements shall be

operated by power-operated electric

switch machines. Hand-operated

switches are prohibited in territory

controlled by ATC.

§ 243.206 Yard operations.

Yard operations shall be controlled

through the traffic control center for the

yard, and movements in the yard shall

be made at restricted speed. Relevant

provisions of 49 CFR 236.1 through

236.109 shall apply to signals that are

used in yard operations.

§ 243.207 Timetable instructions.

Interlockings, automatic train control

territory, and yard limits shall be

designated in timetable instructions.

Wayside and Cab Signals

§ 243.208 Location of wayside signals.

Each wayside signal shall be

positioned and aligned so that its

aspects can be visually associated with

the track it governs.

§ 243.209 Aspects and indications.

(a) Aspects of wayside signals shall be

shown by the color of lights, position of

lights, flashing of lights, or any

combination thereof. They may be

qualified by marker plate, number plate,

letter plate, marker light, or any

combination thereof.

(b) The fundamental indications of

wayside signal aspects shall conform to

the following:

(1) A red light or a series of horizontal

lights shall be used to indicate stop; and

(2) A yellow light or a lunar light shall

be used to indicate that speed is to be

restricted and stop may be required.

(3) A green light or a series of vertical

lights shall be used to indicate proceed

at authorized speed.

(c) The names, indications, and

aspects of wayside and cab signals shall

be defined in the Railroad’s Operating

Rule Book or Special Instructions.

Modifications shall be filed with the

FRA within thirty days after such

modifications become effective.

(d) The absence of a qualifying

appurtenance or the failure of a lamp in

a light signal shall not cause the display

of a less restrictive aspect than

intended.

(e) Cab display:

(1) The aspects of the cab display

shall include:

(i) the maximum authorized speed,

shown by a bar-graph or a needle in

periphery of the dial used for the

indication of train speed;
65544 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(ii) the target speed, shown by

numbers; and

(iii) the target distance corresponding

to the indicated target speed, shown by

a continuously refreshed bar-graph and

numbers in case of overflow of the bargraph.

(2) [Reserved]

(f) All bar-graphs and numbers shall

be illuminated well enough to read

clearly in all lighting conditions in

which the equipment will be used.

§ 243.210 Markers.

(a) Block section markers and route

origin markers shall be provided on

high speed lines.

(b) Block section limits shall be

indicated by marker plates installed

along the right-of-way. The markers

shall be located at adjoining block

sections. Marker plates shall be

illuminated for train operations that

occur between one hour before sunset

and one hour after sunrise, and during

all other hours when weather conditions

restrict visibility.

(c) Where route origin markers are

used, the markers shall be located at the

beginning of each route and each shall

be equipped with a proceed light.

(d) Special shunting markers shall be

provided at locations not equipped with

route origin markers where turn-back

operations may be required. Each such

marker shall be equipped with a

shunting light.

§ 243.211 Spacing of beacons.

The ATC system and beacon spacing

shall be designed and operate such that:

(a) The locomotive engineer can

comply with any imposed speed

restriction through the use of a service

brake application;

(b) if the locomotive engineer fails to

react appropriately in response to speed

restrictions or other safety-critical

information conveyed, the safety of the

trainset shall be ensured by an

automatic brake application.

Track Circuits

§ 243.212 Track circuit requirements.

(a) The track relay controlling home

signals or beacons shall be in deenergized position, or a device that

functions as a track relay controlling

home signals or beacons shall be in its

most restrictive state, and the track

circuit shall be de-energized where any

of the following conditions exist:

(1) When a rail is broken or a rail or

switch-frog is removed. It shall not be a

violation of this requirement if a track

circuit is energized:

(i) When a break occurs between the

end of rail and track circuit connector;

within the limits of rail-joint bond,

appliance or other protective device,

which provides a bypath for the electric

current, or;

(ii) As a result of leakage current or

foreign current in the rear of a point

where a break occurs.

(2) When any portion of a trainset

occupies any part of a track circuit.

(b) [Reserved]

§ 243.213 Track circuit shunting

sensitivity.

Each track circuit controlling a home

signal shall be maintained so that the

track relay is in a de-energized position,

or a device that functions as a track

relay shall be in its most restrictive state

if, when the track circuit is dry, a shunt

is connected across the track rails of the

circuit, including fouling sections of

turnouts. The electric resistance of the

shunt shall be:

(a) 0.15 Ohm on open track, for use

with a ballast of 8 Ohm per kilometer

(0.62 mi) resistance.

(b) 0.25 Ohm in interlocking areas, for

use with a ballast of 8 Ohm per

kilometer (0.62 mi) resistance.

§ 243.214 Insulated rail joints.

Insulated rail joints shall be

maintained in a condition to prevent the

failure of any track circuit due to track

circuit current that flows between

insulated rails.

§ 243.215 Fouling Wires.

Fouling wires shall consist of at least

two discrete conductors, and each shall

be of sufficient conductivity and

maintained in such condition that the

track relay will be in de-energized

position, or device that functions as a

track relay will be in its most restrictive

state, when the circuit is shunted.

§ 243.216 Turnout, fouling section.

Rail joints within the fouling section

shall be bonded, and fouling section

shall extend at least to a point where

sufficient track centers and allowance

for maximum car overhang and width

will prevent interference with trainset

movement on an adjacent track.

Wires and Cables

§ 243.217 Protection of insulated wire;

splice in underground wire; aerial cable.

Insulated wire shall be protected from

mechanical injury. The insulation shall

not be punctured for test purposes. A

splice in underground wire shall have

insulation resistance at least equal to the

wire spliced. Aerial cable shall be

supported by messenger.

§ 243.218 Tagging of wires and

interference of wires or tags with signal

apparatus.

Each wire shall be tagged or otherwise

so marked that it can be identified at

each terminal. Tags and other marks of

identification shall be made of

insulating material and so arranged that

tags and wires do not interfere with

moving parts of apparatus.

Standards

§ 243.219 Control circuits; requirements.

The circuits shall be so installed that

each signal or beacon which governs

train movements into a block section

will convey its most restrictive state as

long as any of the following conditions

exist within the block:

(a) Occupancy by any portion of a

trainset;

(b) When points of a switch are not

closed in proper position; or

(c) When a track relay is in deenergized position or a device which

functions as a track relay is in its most

restrictive state; or when signal control

circuit is de-energized.

§ 243.220 Control circuits for signals,

selection through point detector operated

by switch movement.

The control circuit for each signal

aspect or beacon, which conveys an

indication more favorable than ‘‘proceed

at restricted speed’’ for a signal

governing movement(s) over switches,

shall be selected through a point

detector operated directly by switch

points for each switch, movable-point

frog, and derail in the routes governed

by such signal or beacon. Circuits shall

be arranged so that such a signal or

beacon can convey an indication more

favorable than ‘‘proceed at restricted

speed’’ only when each switch,

movable-point frog, and derail in the

route is in proper position.

§ 243.221 Time locking; where required.

Time locking shall be provided in

conjunction with signal aspects or

beacons which convey indications more

favorable than ‘‘proceed at restricted

speed’’. Time locking shall be provided

for all interlocking signals where route

or direction of traffic can be changed.

§ 243.222 Indication locking.

Indication locking shall be provided

for switches, movable-point frogs and

derails.

§ 243.223 Electric locking circuits.

Vital design methods in interlocking

circuitry shall prevent ‘‘proceed’’

aspects from being displayed for

conflicting movements.
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§ 243.224 Loss of shunt protection; where

required.

A loss of shunt protection shall not

permit the release of the route locking

circuit of each power-operated switch.

The loss of shunt protection shall be

based on a sequential release logic.

Sequential release logic requires that

when any track circuit becomes

occupied in logical sequence from a

previous track circuit, in combination

with an established train route, its status

will not be allowed to return to

unoccupied, even though the detected

shunt may be lost, until a specified safe

time interval after the next track circuit

in the route becomes occupied.

§ 243.225 Signal control circuits, selection

through track relays or devices functioning

as track relays.

The control circuits for signal aspects

or beacons which convey indications

more favorable than ‘‘proceed at

restricted speed’’ shall be selected

through track relays, or through devices

that function as track relays, for all track

circuits in the route governed.

§ 243.226 Switch, movable-point frog or

split-point derail.

A switch, movable-point frog, or splitpoint derail shall be equipped with

clamp locks and shall be maintained so

that it cannot be locked when the point

is open 6 mm (.25 in) or more.

§ 243.227 Point detector.

Point detectors shall be maintained so

that when switch mechanisms are

locked in normal or reverse position,

contacts cannot be opened by manually

applying force at the closed switch

point. Point detector circuit controllers

shall be maintained so that the contacts

will not assume the position

corresponding to switch point closure if

the switch point is prevented by an

obstruction from closing to within 6 mm

(0.25 in).

§ 243.228 Signals controlled by track

circuits.

The control circuits for aspects with

indications more favorable than

‘‘proceed at restricted speed’’ shall be

controlled by track circuits extending

through the entire block.

§ 243.229 Circuits at interlocking.

Circuits at an interlocking shall be so

interconnected that aspects to proceed

cannot be displayed simultaneously for

conflicting movements.

§ 243.230 Signals at adjacent

interlockings.

Signals at adjacent interlockings shall

be so interconnected that aspects to

proceed on tracks signaled for

movements at greater than restricted

speed cannot be displayed

simultaneously for conflicting

movements.

§ 243.231 Track signaled for movements in

both directions, change of direction of

traffic.

On track signaled for movements in

both directions, occupancy of the track

between opposing signals at adjacent

interlockings shall prevent changing the

direction of traffic from that which was

obtained at the time the track became

occupied.

§ 243.232 Route locking.

Route locking shall be provided at all

interlockings where power-operated

switches are located.

§ 243.233 Wayside detectors.

(a) All wayside detectors, including

flood, wind, hot box, fall intrusion,

intrusion, and dragging equipment

detection systems, shall be linked to the

central traffic control system or to the

signaling system, or both.

(b) The Railroad shall design and

implement the wayside detection

systems so that any detection of a

potentially unsafe condition will be

immediately conveyed to the central

traffic control system or to the signaling

system, or both.

(c) Fall intrusion detectors. The

Railroad shall install fall intrusion

detectors at all highway, animal, and

non-Railroad equipment overpasses and

underpasses. Fall intrusion detectors

shall be activated when the network of

protective wiring located at each

overpass and underpass experiences a

partial or complete break. The fall

intrusion detectors’ data output shall be

transmitted to the central traffic control

facility such that sensor information is

continuously available to Railroad

operations personnel. The Railroad’s

system safety plan shall list all locations

where fall intrusion detectors are

installed, and shall set forth the actions

to be taken when specific conditions are

detected.

(d) Intrusion detectors. The Railroad

shall install a wayside intrusion

detection system in the protective

fencing along the Railroad right-of-way

that shall restrict, to the maximum

extent possible, all non-Railroad

intrusion. The wayside intrusion

detection system shall be installed at

each location identified by the system

safety plan as an area where intrusion

is likely to occur. This system shall be

connected to the Railroad’s signal

system and to the central traffic control

system, and shall alert the Railroad

when an intrusion occurs. The

Railroad’s system safety plan shall

explain in detail where intrusion is

likely to occur and why, and set forth

specific actions to be taken by the

Railroad when intrusion occurs.

(e) Dragging equipment detectors. The

Railroad shall install dragging

equipment detectors at all locations

where underframe repair or

maintenance work is performed,

including locations where maintenance

facility track joins the main line, and at

other locations determined necessary by

the system safety plan. The dragging

equipment detector data output shall be

transmitted to the central traffic control

facility such that sensor information is

continuously available to railroad

operations personnel. The Railroad’s

system safety plan shall explain in

detail where dragging equipment is

likely to occur and why, and shall set

forth specific actions to be taken by the

Railroad when such dragging equipment

is detected.

(f) Flood detectors. The Railroad shall

install flood detectors along the right-ofway where determined necessary by the

system safety plan, taking into account

factors of drainage, culverts, bridges,

overpasses, underpasses, and flood

plain status. The flood detection system

shall notify the signal system and

central traffic control of any location

where an accumulation of water exists

in the right-of-way that may present a

risk to a right-of-way structure, in

service equipment, or passenger service

equipment. The Railroad’s system safety

plan shall include specific actions to be

taken when such water is detected.

(g) Wind detectors. The Railroad shall

install wind detectors along the right-ofway where determined necessary by the

system safety plan, taking into account

area wind and weather patterns,

topography, and proximity to large

bodies of water. This wind speed data

output shall be transmitted to the

central traffic control facility such that

sensor information is continuously

available to Railroad operations

personnel. The Railroad’s system safety

plan shall explain in detail the locations

chosen for wind detectors and why; list

the speeds and conditions at which

operational safety is compromised; and

set forth specific actions to be taken

when those wind speeds are detected.

(h) Hot box detectors. The Railroad

shall install and maintain hot box

detectors along the length of the rightof-way that detect the journal bearing

temperature of all moving rail

equipment. Wayside detectors shall be

arranged so as to check the journal

bearing temperature on both sides of the

trains, on each track. Detectors shall be

located at intervals not to exceed 40 km
65546 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(25 mi). Hot box detectors shall be

linked to the signal system to alert the

locomotive engine or the central traffic

control system, or both, depending on

the level of the overheating, so that

proper action will be taken by the

Railroad. The hot box detector system

shall include a tiered alarm system, as

set forth below, to ensure that

appropriate action accompanies journal

box overheating.

(1) Danger alarms shall alert the

Railroad when any journal box or

journal box component fails in

operation, which shall cause the

defective train to stop at a designated

block marker, and shall cause all

passing trains to slow to a speed not in

excess of 80 km/hr or 50 mph;

(2) Simple alarms shall alert the

Railroad when journal box overheating

that is likely to compromise safety

occurs, which shall cause the defective

trainset to reach the next siding where

it shall be parked and inspected prior to

resuming operations; and

(3) Inspection threshold alarms shall

alert the Railroad when the temperature

of the journal bearing is significantly

higher than the average temperature

taken on the other journal bearings. This

alarm shall be transmitted to the central

maintenance facility and the

appropriate inspection and repair shall

be completed.

The Railroad shall develop the hot

box detection system in conjunction

with the system safety plan, and shall

explain in detail the location of the

detectors and the temperatures that

trigger corresponding remedial

measures.

§ 243.234 Protection of maintenance-ofway personnel.

To protect maintenance-of-way

personnel, the signaling system shall

include circuitry to lock-out particular

block sections and restrict the speed of

passing trains on these block sections or

adjacent trackage. The Railroad shall

develop signal Operating Rules, as

required in section 6 of this rule, in

accordance with this requirement.

§ 243.235 ATC device installation.

Each power vehicle capable of being

the lead vehicle in a trainset shall be

equipped with an automatic train

control (ATC) device which shall be

operative at all times the trainset

operates at a speed of more than 32 km/

h (20 mph).

§ 243.236 Forestalling device and speed

control.

(a) The ATC system shall be so

arranged that if the authorization to

proceed is not received from the

wayside equipment and the train has

reached the limit of its authorized

progression, the trainset will be brought

to a complete stop. The system shall not

allow movement except upon the

operation of an acknowledging device,

and then only at slow speed until an

authorization to proceed is received by

the onboard train control device.

(b) The ATC system shall include the

following features:

(1) Braking supervision, requiring the

train to proceed at a speed ensuring

compliance with the target speed at the

target distance.

(2) Maximum speed supervision,

effecting an automatic brake application

whenever the maximum speed limit is

exceeded.

§ 243.237 Cab signal indication in

accordance with maximum speed limit.

While providing maximum speed

supervision, the ATC system shall

provide a cab signal indication of the

maximum authorized speed.

§ 243.238 Automatic brake application;

initiation when the maximum speed limit is

exceeded.

The ATC system shall operate to

initiate an automatic brake application

when the speed of the train exceeds the

maximum speed intervention curve.

The automatic brake application can be

interrupted by the locomotive engineer

only when the speed of the train is

lower than the maximum authorized

speed. Absent intervention by the

engineer, an automatic brake

application shall bring the train to a

speed of less than maximum authorized

speed. Mere acknowledgment by the

engineer does not constitute

intervention.

§ 243.239 Advance cab signal indication.

The ATC system shall provide a cab

signal indication of the target speed and

distance before commencing the braking

supervision, thus allowing the

locomotive engineer to respond by a

manual brake application.

§ 243.240 Automatic brake application

initiated by the ATC.

In the absence of an appropriate

response to a cab display indication on

the part of the locomotive engineer, the

ATC system shall initiate an automatic

brake application to ensure compliance

with target speed and target distance.

The automatic brake application can be

interrupted by the engineer only when

the speed of the train is lower than the

maximum authorized speed. Absent

intervention by the engineer, an

automatic brake application shall bring

the train to a speed of less than

maximum authorized speed. Mere

acknowledgment by the engineer does

not constitute intervention.

§ 243.241 Cab signal indication after

authorization to enter a block section where

conditions defined in § 243.219 exist.

(a) If a trainset is authorized to enter

a block section in which any condition

listed in § 243.219 of this Part exists, the

ATC system shall display an indication

to ‘‘Proceed at Restricted Speed’.

(b) If the restricted speed is exceeded,

the ATC shall initiate an automatic

brake application. Absent intervention

by the engineer, an automatic brake

application shall bring the train to a

speed of less than maximum authorized

speed. Mere acknowledgment by the

engineer does not constitute

intervention.

§ 243.242 Audible indicator.

The audible cab indicator shall have

two distinctive sounds as noted in (a)

and (b) below, and be clearly audible

throughout the cab under all operating

conditions.

(a) When the cab display changes, the

audible indicator shall sound briefly (for

approximately 0.5 seconds) to draw the

engineer’s attention to the change.

(b) An audible warning shall sound

before an automatic brake application is

initiated. The warning shall be given in

sufficient time to allow the engineer and

the train brake equipment to respond to

the change. The indicator shall sound

continuously until the warning

condition disappears.

§ 243.243 Delay time.

The delay time of the ATC train-borne

equipment shall be such as to ensure

that the trainset shall comply with the

target speed and distance through the

brake application initiated by the

system.

§ 243.244 Automatic brake application; full

service.

An automatic brake application

initiated by the ATC system shall cause

a full service application of the brakes.

§ 243.245 Interference with application of

brakes by means of brake valve.

The ATC apparatus shall be so

arranged as not to interfere with the

application of the brakes by means of

the brake valve and not to impair the

efficiency of the brake system.

§ 243.246 Control from lead vehicle.

Each trainset shall be controlled and

operated from the lead vehicle. Each

lead vehicle shall be equipped with an

ATC device. This device shall have a

fail-safe and fault tolerant architecture,

such as a two-out-of-three voting

architecture.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65547

§ 243.247 Proper operative relation

between parts along roadway and parts on

power car.

ATC track-side and power car

components shall be designed and shall

operate in compatibility under all

conditions of speed, weather, wear,

oscillation, and shock.

§ 243.248 Visibility of cab signals.

The cab signals shall be plainly

visible to the locomotive crew or power

car crew from their stations in the cab.

§ 243.249 Power supply.

The ATC system shall operate from a

separate or isolated power supply.

§ 243.250 Seal, where required.

A seal shall be maintained on any

device other than the brake-pipe cut-out

cock (double-heading cock), by means of

which the operation of the pneumatic

portion of the automatic train-control

apparatus can be cut out.

§ 243.251 Rate of pressure reduction;

equalizing reservoir or brake pipe.

The equalizing-reservoir pressure or

brake-pipe pressure reduction during an

automatic brake application shall be at

a rate not less than that which results

from a manual service application.

§ 243.252 Restrictions imposed when

device fails and/or is cut out en route.

(a) When the ATC system fails or is

cut out en route, the train may proceed

at restricted speed to the next available

point of communication or siding,

where a report must be made to a

designated officer. An ATC system

failure may result from a variety of

conditions; for purposes of this Subpart,

the failure of two or more of the onboard processors will be considered an

ATC failure. Where an absolute block is

established in advance of the train on

which the device is inoperative, the

train may proceed at a speed not to

exceed 127 km/h (79 mph).

(b) Where an ATC system fails or is

cut out en route, the Railroad shall test

the ATC and record the results in

accordance with §§ 243.276 and

243.278, and determine that the ATC is

fully operative before the trainset leaves

its next initial terminal.

§ 243.253 The trackage.

The trackage over which the Railroad

operates trains in revenue service shall

be completely equipped with wayside

equipment designed to interface with

and provide safety control commands to

the lead vehicle of trainsets which

operate over that trackage. Signaling

beacons and antennas shall be installed

and maintained in accordance with

manufacturer’s specifications.

§ 243.254 Cut out of the ATC system.

Any cut out of the ATC system or

activation of the acknowledging device

shall be registered in the on-board event

recorder.

Reporting Requirements

§ 243.255 Accidents resulting from signal

failure.

The occurrence of an accident/

incident arising from the failure of an

appliance, device, method or system to

function or indicate as required by this

rule that results in a more favorable

aspect than intended or other conditions

hazardous to the movement of a train,

shall be reported within 24 hours to the

FRA by toll free telephone number,

800–424–0201.

§ 243.256 Signal failure reports.

Each failure of an appliance, device,

method, or system to function or

indicate as required by this rule that

results in a more favorable aspect than

intended or other condition hazardous

to the movement of a train shall be

reported to the FRA within five days

from the date of occurrence. Form FRA

F6180–14, ‘‘Signal Failure Report,’’

shall be used for this purpose and

completed in accordance with

instructions printed on the form.

§ 243.257 Annual signal systems report.

The Railroad shall file an annual

report with FRA which details the

signal system configuration and

operation, on a form provided by FRA

in accordance with instructions and

definitions on the reverse side of the

form. The report shall be filed annually

on or before April 1 of each year.

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

§ 243.258 General.

The Inspection, Testing and

Maintenance program shall be designed

to ensure that the safety of the railroad’s

signaling system does not deteriorate

over time, in accordance with § 243.107

of this Part.

§ 243.259 Interference with normal

functioning of device.

Inspection, testing and maintenance

shall not interfere with or alter the

normal functioning of any signal device

except after measures are in place to

provide for the safety of train operations

that depend on normal functioning of

such device. Where interference or

alteration has occurred, the device must

be functioning normally before train

operations dependent on such

functioning resume.

§ 243.260 Operating characteristics of

electromagnetic, electronic, or electrical

apparatus.

Signal apparatus, the functioning of

which affects the safety of train

operations, shall be maintained in

accordance with the limits within

which the device is designed to operate.

§ 243.261 Adjustment, repair, or

replacement of component.

When any component of a signal

system, the proper functioning of which

is essential to the safety of train

operation, fails to perform its intended

signaling function or is not in

correspondence with known operating

conditions, the cause shall be

determined and the faulty component

adjusted, repaired or replaced without

undue delay.

§ 243.262 Purpose of inspection and tests;

removal from service of a relay or device

failing to meet test requirements.

Inspections and tests shall be made in

accordance with specifications of the

Railroad, subject to approval by FRA in

conjunction with the System Safety Plan

set forth in Subpart B, to determine if

the equipment is maintained in the

proper condition to perform its intended

function. Any electronic device, relay,

or other electromagnetic device which

fails to meet the requirements of

specified tests shall be removed from

service, and shall not be restored to

service until its operating characteristics

are in accordance with the limits within

which such device or relay is designed

to operate.

§ 243.263 Point detector test.

Point detectors operated by poweroperated switch movement shall be

tested at least once every three months.

§ 243.264 Relays; microprocessor testing.

(a) Each safety-critical, train-borne

ATC relay shall be tested at least once

each year.

(b) Each safety-critical, wayside relay

shall be tested at least once every four

years.

(c) Each safety-critical, train-borne

electronic subsystem which is not

verified internally on a continuous basis

shall be tested at least once each year.

(d) Each safety-critical, train-borne

electronic subsystem in which proper

operation is verified internally in a

closed loop fashion shall not require

periodic tests.

(e) Each safety-critical wayside

electronic subsystem which is not

verified internally on a continuous basis

shall be tested at least once every two

years.

(f) Each safety-critical wayside

electronic subsystem, in which proper
65548 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

operation is verified internally in a

closed loop fashion, shall not require

periodic tests.

§ 243.265 Ground tests.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs

(b) and (c) below, a test for grounds on

each safety-critical energy bus

furnishing power to circuits shall be

made at least once every three months.

(b) The provisions of this section 315

shall not apply to track circuit wires,

common return wires of grounded

common single-break circuits, or

alternating current power distribution

circuits grounded in the interest of

safety.

(c) Periodic ground tests are not

required if ground detection devices are

properly functioning, or if the design of

circuits is such that a grounded energy

bus could not impact the safety of train

operation. An inspection of each ground

detection device to ensure proper

operation of such device shall be made

at least once every three months.

§ 243.266 Insulation resistance tests;

wires in trunking and cables.

(a) Insulation resistance of wires and

cables, except conductors connected

directly to track rails, shall be tested

when wires, cables, and insulation are

dry. Insulation resistance tests shall be

made between all conductors and

ground, and between conductors in each

multiple conductor cable, and between

conductors in trunking, when wires or

cables are installed and at least once

every 10 years.

(b) In no case shall a circuit be

permitted to function on a conductor

having an insulation resistance to

ground or between conductors of less

than 200,000 ohms.

§ 243.267 Time releases, timing relays, and

timing devices.

Time releases, timing relays, and

timing devices shall be tested at least

once each year. The timing shall be

maintained at not less than 90 percent

of the predetermined time interval,

which shall be shown on the plans or

marked on the time release, timing

relay, or timing device. Where time

releases are an integral part of a safetycritical, processor-based controller and

are specified in the applications

program, such intervals shall be tested

only at the time of installation and

whenever a change is made in the

applications program.

§ 243.268 Time locking.

Where time locking is an integral part

of a safety-critical, processor-based

controller and is specified in the

applications program, such locking shall

be tested at the time of installation and

whenever a change is made in the

applications program.

§ 243.269 Route locking.

Where route locking is an integral part

of a safety-critical, processor based

controller and is specified in the

applications program, such locking shall

be tested at the time of installation,

whenever a change is made in the

applications program, and when route

locking has been disarranged.

§ 243.270 Indication locking.

Where indication locking is an

integral part of a safety-critical,

processor based controller and is

specified in the applications program,

such locking shall be tested at the time

of installation, whenever a change is

made in the applications program, and

when the indication locking has been

disarranged.

§ 243.271 Traffic locking.

Where traffic locking is an integral

part of a safety-critical, processor based

controller and is specified in the

applications program, such locking shall

be tested at the time of installation and

whenever a change is made in the

applications program.

§ 243.272 Switch obstruction test.

A switch obstruction test of each

switch shall be made when a lock rod

is installed and at least once every 3

months.

§ 243.273 Locomotive or power car power

supply voltage requirement.

The output voltage of power supply

for power car or locomotive ATC shall

be maintained within 10 percent of

rated voltage.

§ 243.274 Power car or locomotive

insulation resistance; requirement.

When the periodic test prescribed in

§ 243.266 is performed, insulation

resistance between wiring and ground of

the automatic train control system shall

be not less than one megohm.

§ 243.275 Antennas and beacons.

(a) Signaling beacons and antennas

shall be inspected and maintained in

accordance with the manufacturer’s

specifications.

(b) Antennas and beacons which have

been repaired or rewound shall have the

same operating characteristics which

they possessed originally or as specified

for new equipment.

§ 243.276 Departure test.

(a) The train-borne ATC equipment

shall be tested using one of the

following methods:

(1) Operation over track elements;

(2) Operation over a test circuit; or

(3) Onboard test device.

(b) The extent of the departure test

shall be defined by the Railroad in

accordance with the system safety plan

required by Subpart B of this Part, but

shall include at least the following:

(1) Ground-to-train transmission;

(2) The cab display indications; and

(3) The interface with the train brakes.

(c) The Railroad shall perform a

departure test, and onboard ATC

equipment shall be put in service,

before the trainset operates over

equipped territory. If the ATC is cut out,

the Railroad shall perform another

departure test before the ATC

equipment is considered operative.

(d) If a locomotive or power car makes

more than one trip in a 24-hour period,

only one departure test is required in

such a 24-hour period, except as

provided in section 3.119(b) concerning

failures or cut-outs en route.

(e) Each test run and its outcome shall

be recorded in the train-borne event

recorder. These records shall be

downloaded and retained for at least

one year.

§ 243.277 Periodic test.

A periodic test of the train borne ATC

equipment shall be performed at least

once every two months and on multipleunit cars as specified by the Railroad,

subject to approval by the FRA.

§ 243.278 Results of tests.

(a) Results of tests made in

compliance with § 243.252(b),

§§ 243.262 through 243.272, § 243.276,

and § 243.277, shall be recorded on preprinted or computerized forms provided

by the Railroad or by electronic means.

Such forms shall show the name of the

Railroad, place and date, equipment

tested, results of tests, repairs,

replacements, adjustments made, and

condition in which the apparatus was

left. Each record shall be signed by the

employee making the test and shall be

filed in the office of a supervisory

official having jurisdiction. Results of

tests shall be retained until the next

record is filed, but in no case less than

one year.

(b) For purposes of compliance with

the requirements of this section, the

Railroad may maintain and transfer

records through electronic transmission,

storage, and retrieval provided that:

(1) The electronic system be designed

so that the integrity of each record is

maintained through appropriate levels

of security such as recognition of an

electronic signature, or other means,

which uniquely identify the initiating

person as the author of that record. No

two persons shall have the same

electronic identity;
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65549

(2) The electronic system shall ensure

that each record cannot be modified in

any way, or replaced, once the record is

transmitted and stored;

(3) Any amendment to a record shall

be electronically stored apart from the

record which it amends. Each

amendment to a record shall be

uniquely identified as to the person

making the amendment;

(4) The electronic system shall

provide for the maintenance of

inspection records as originally

submitted without corruption or loss of

data; and

(5) Paper copies of electronic records

and amendments to those records, that

may be necessary to document

compliance with this Subpart, shall be

made available for inspection and

copying by the FRA.

§ 243.279 Independent verification and

validation.

(a) General. The Railroad shall

undergo a third-party safety audit of all

safety-critical processor-based

equipment and system elements as

finally configured, prior to commencing

operations. In order to complete this

requirement, the Railroad shall contract

with an independent reviewer, deemed

‘‘Reviewer’’ for purposes of this section,

that is experienced in conducting

verification and validation audits of

safety-critical processor-based

equipment and systems. The Reviewer

shall use as a comparable standard for

appropriate methodology and

performance, all of the following

standards:

(1) Railway Applications: The

specifications and demonstration of

dependability, reliability, availability,

maintainability and safety. prEN 50126,

European Committee for

Electrotechnical Standardization

(November 1995).

(2) Railway Applications: Software for

Railway Control and Protection

Systems. prEN 50128, European

Committee for Electrotechnical

Standardization (August 1996).

(3) Railway Applications: Safety

Related Electronic Systems for

Signaling, version 0.9. prEN 50129,

European Committee for

Electrotechnical Standardization (March

1996).

(4) On-board Electronic Equipment

and Computer Hardware. CF 67–001,

Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fers

Francais (June 1990).

(5) Methodology for the Development

of On-board Micro-computer

Equipment. prCF 67–004, and NF F71–

004, Societe Nationale des Chemins de

Fers Francais (February 1989).

(6) Railway Applications: Electronic

Equipment used on Rolling Stock. EN

50155, European Committee for

Electrotechnical Standardization

(November 1995).

(b) Items included in audit. (1) The

Reviewer shall assess and comment on

the adequacy of the processes which the

Railroad applied to the design and

development of the signal system. The

Reviewer shall identify and document

any safety vulnerabilities that are not

adequately mitigated by the Railroad’s

processes.

(2) The Reviewer shall evaluate the

adequacy of the Railroad’s system safety

plan concerning the signal system.

(3) The Reviewer shall analyze the

Railroad’s hazard analysis for

comprehensiveness and adherence to

the system safety plan.

(4) The Reviewer shall analyze the

Railroad’s fault tree analysis for

completeness, accuracy, and adherence

to the system safety plan.

(5) The Reviewer shall randomly

select various safety-critical modules for

audit to verify whether the Railroad’s

system safety plan were followed. The

number of modules selected should be

determined jointly by the Railroad and

the Reviewer to ensure that a

representative number sufficient to

provide confidence that all unaudited

modules were developed in adherence

to the Railroad’s system safety plan.

(6) The Reviewer shall evaluate and

comment on the Railroad’s plan for

installation and test procedures for

revenue service.

(c) Reviewer’s report. (1) The

Reviewer shall prepare a report of the

audit and provide copies to the Railroad

and FRA.

(2) The Reviewer’s report shall be

submitted to the Railroad and FRA prior

to the commencement of installation

testing and contain, at a minimum, the

following:

(i) The Reviewer’s evaluation of the

adequacy of the Railroad’s system safety

program concerning the signal system,

including any vulnerabilities that were

not adequately mitigated;

(ii) The method by which the Railroad

would assure system safety in the event

of hardware or software failures,

including an explanation of how the

Railroad will assure that all potentially

hazardous operating circumstances are

identified;

(iii) The method by which the

Railroad addresses the

comprehensiveness of the system design

for the requirements of the railroad

operations it will govern, including an

explanation of how the Railroad will

assure that all potentially hazardous

operating circumstances are identified,

how the Railroad records deficiencies

identified in the design process, and

how the Railroad tracks the correction

of these deficiencies;

(iv) The identification of any

documentation that was denied,

incomplete, or inadequate;

(v) The identification of each system

procedure or process that was not

properly followed;

(vi) The identification of each

deficiency or criticism not adequately

mitigated in which the positions of the

Reviewer and Railroad are clearly

stated;

(vii) The identification of the

Railroad’s software verification and

validation procedures for its safetycritical applications, and adequacy of

these procedures;

(viii) The methods used by the

Railroad to develop safety-critical

software, such as the use of structured

language, code checks, modularity, or

other similar techniques; and

(ix) A brief outline of what would be

required to determine a mean time

between unsafe failure value for the

Railroad’s hardware, a mean time

between unsafe execution of the

Railroad’s software, and a mean time

between hazardous events of the

Railroad’s system.

(d) FRA acceptance.

(1) FRA shall analyze the Reviewer’s

report upon receipt. Based on its

analysis of the report, FRA shall notify

the Railroad in writing that the signal

system as finally configured is accepted

or not accepted.

(2) In the event that FRA does not

accept the signal system as finally

configured, FRA shall provide a written

explanation of the reasons for the nonacceptance.

(3) In the event that FRA does not

accept the signal system as finally

configured, the Railroad shall have an

opportunity to respond to the

Reviewer’s report and to FRA’s nonacceptance.

(4) The Railroad shall conform the

signal system to the Reviewer’s

recommendations and FRA acceptance

prior to revenue operations.

Subpart D—Track Safety Standards

§ 243.301 Restoration or renewal of track

under traffic conditions.

(a) Restoration or renewal of track

under traffic conditions is limited to the

replacement of worn, broken, or missing

components or fastenings that do not

affect the safe passage of trains.

(b) The following activities are

expressly prohibited under traffic

conditions:
65550 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(1) Any work that interrupts rail

continuity, e.g., as in joint bar

replacement or rail replacement;

(2) Any work that adversely affects

the lateral or vertical stability of the

track with the exception of spot tamping

an isolated condition where not more

than 5 m (16.4 lineal ft) of track are

involved at any one time and the

ambient air temperature is not above 35

C (95 F); and

(3) Removal and replacement of the

rail fastenings on more than one tie at

a time within 5 m (16.4 ft).

§ 243.303 Measuring track not under load.

When unloaded track is measured to

determine compliance with

requirements of this Part, evidence of

rail movement, if any, that occurs while

the track is loaded shall be added to the

measurements of the unloaded track.

§ 243.305 Drainage.

Each drainage or other water carrying

facility under or immediately adjacent

to the roadbed shall be maintained and

kept free of obstruction, to

accommodate expected water flow for

the area concerned.

§ 243.307 Vegetation.

Vegetation on railroad property which

is on or immediately adjacent to

roadbed shall be controlled so that it

does not:

(a) Become a fire hazard to trackcarrying structures;

(b) Obstruct visibility of railroad signs

and signals;

(c) Interfere with railroad employees

performing normal trackside duties;

(d) Prevent proper functioning of

signal and communication lines; or

(e) Prevent railroad employees from

visually inspecting moving equipment

from their normal duty stations.

Geometry

§ 243.309 Track Geometry; General.

If any value listed in the following

Safety Level One Geometry Table are

exceeded, the Railroad shall initiate

remedial action within two calendar

days. If the values listed in the

following Safety Level Two table are

exceeded, the Railroad shall initiate

immediate remedial action. For either

the Level One or Level Two tables, a

reduction in operating speed so that the

condition complies with the limits

listed for a lower speed shall constitute

bringing the track into compliance.

SAFETY LEVEL ONE GEOMETRY TABLE

Max. speed

km/h (mph)

322

(200)

230

(143)

170

(105)

100

(62)

80

(50)

60

(37)

40

(25)

Alignment (mm) ......................................................................... 10 9 10 13 16 17 21 24

20 9 10 13 16 17 21 24

31 15 18 18 NA NA NA NA

Surface (mm) ............................................................................. 5 12.2 11 13 16 18 19 21 52

31 18 22 22 NA NA NA NA

SAFETY LEVEL ONE GEOMETRY TABLE

Max.

speed km/

h (mph)

322

(200)

230

(143)

170

(105)

100

(62)

80

(50)

60

(37)

40

(25)

Gage (mm) 1 ................................................................................ minimum ¥7 ¥9 ¥12 ¥12 ¥12 ¥12 ¥12

min. mean

value 2

¥4 ¥7 ¥7 ¥7 NA NA NA

maximum 3 +27 +27 +35 +35 +35 +35 +37

Gage Variation 4 .......................................................................... mm on 10

m base

15 15 15 15 NA NA NA

Cant (mm) .................................................................................... maximum

Chord

(m)

180 180 180 180 180 180 180

Alignment (mm) ........................................................................... 10 12 14 17 21 23 28 32

20 12 14 17 21 23 28 32

31 20 24 24 NA NA NA NA

Surface (mm) ............................................................................... 5 12.2 15 18 22 24 26 28 70

31 24 30 30 NA NA NA NA

Warp (mm) ................................................................................... 6 10 15 15 18 18 18 24 24

1With respect to the nominal track gage, 1435 mm (56.5 in).

2 Mean value on a 100 m (328 ft) length of track.

3 Local defect value > +20 mm (0.79 in) has to be corrected.

4Gage variation is defined as the difference between the minimum and maximum gage measurements within 10 meters.

5The maximum values indicated on this line are not mid-chord offsets but are the difference between the average level at eight locations

spaced symmetrically from the center at 0.675 m, 2.075 m, 3.64 m, and 6.11 m and a location at 0.675 m from the center. Surface12.2=1⁄8(Z¥6.11+Z¥3.64+Z¥2.075+Z¥0.675+Z0.675+Z2.075+Z3.64+Z6.11)¥Z0.675 6 Difference between the cross level value at any location and the mean value of the crosslevel over a distance of +/¥5.0 m (16.4 ft).

§ 243.311 Track gage.

(a) Gage is measured between the

heads of the rails at right-angles to the

rails in a plane 15 mm (0.6 in) below the

top of the rail head.

(b) The minimum gage, maximum

gage, minimum mean value, and gage

variation shall comply with the

requirements defined in the Safety Level

Two Geometry table given in Section

4.11.

§ 243.313 Curves, elevation and speed

limitations.

(a) The maximum operating speed for

each curve shall be determined by the

following formula:
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65551

1 1 Actual elevation for each 50 m (164 ft) track

segment in the body of the curve is determined by

averaging the elevation for 10 points through the

segment at 5 m (16.4 ft) spacing. If the curve length

is less than 50 m (164 ft), the points through the

full length of the body of the curve shall be

averaged. If Eu exceeds 100 mm (4 in), the Vmax

formula applies to the spirals on both ends of the

curve.

2Curve radius (Degree of curvature) is determined

by averaging the degree of curvature over the same

track segment as the elevation.

V g R

E E

D

a u max = ∗ ∗ ∗ . + 3 6

where:

Vmax = Maximum allowable operating

speed (km/h).

Ea = Actual elevation of the outside rail

above the inside rail (mm) 1.

R = Curve radius (m) 2.

Eu = Maximum allowable unbalanced

elevation (mm).

D = Distance between wheel contact

circles (mm).

g = acceleration due to gravity (m/s2).

In U.S. Engineering Units this formula

becomes:

V

E E

D

a u max . = +

0 0007∗

where:

Vmax = Maximum allowable operating

speed (mph).

Ea = Actual elevation of the outside rail

above the inside rail (in).1

D = Degree of curvature (degrees).2

Eu = Unbalanced elevation.

(b) Equipment meeting the standards

of this section may be operated at

curving speeds determined by the

formula in paragraph (a) of this section,

provided:

(1) It is demonstrated that when

positioned on a track with uniform

superelevation, Ea, reflecting the

intended target cant deficiency, Eu, no

wheel of the equipment unloads to a

value of 60 percent or less of its static

value on perfectly level track and the

roll angle between the floor of the

vehicle and the horizontal does not

exceed 5.7 degrees;

(2) It is demonstrated that when

positioned on a track with a uniform

180 mm (7 in) superelevation, no wheel

unloads to a value less than 60% of its

static value on perfectly level track and

the angle, measured about the roll axis,

between the floor of the vehicle and the

horizontal does not exceed 8.6 degrees;

(3) The Railroad provides a complete

description of the class of equipment

involved, including schematic diagrams

of the suspension system and the

location of the center of gravity above

top of rail;

(4) The Railroad provides a complete

description of the test procedure and

instrumentation used to qualify the

equipment and the maximum values for

wheel unloading and roll angles which

were observed during testing; the test

procedure may be conducted in a test

facility, where all wheels on one side

(right or left) of the equipment are raised

or lowered by the intended cant

deficiency, the vertical wheel loads

under each wheel are measured, and a

level is used to record the angle through

which the floor of the vehicle has been

rotated;

(5) The Railroad describes the

procedures or standards in effect which

detail the maintenance of the

suspension system for the particular

class of equipment; and

(6) The Railroad identifies the line

segment on which the higher curving

speeds are proposed to be implemented.

(c) Upon receipt of the information

contained in paragraph (b), FRA shall

approve use of the equipment and

curving speeds established pursuant to

paragraph (a). The Railroad shall notify

the FRA Associate Administrator for

Safety, in writing, no less than thirty

calendar days prior to any proposed

implementation of curving speeds

higher than Vmax when the ‘‘Eu’’ term

(above) will exceed 100 mm (4 in).

Track Structure

§ 243.315 Track strength.

(a) Track shall have a sufficient

vertical strength to withstand the

maximum vehicle loads generated at

maximum permissible train speeds, cant

deficiencies and surface limitations. For

purposes of this section, vertical track

strength is defined as the track capacity

to constrain vertical deformations so

that the track shall return, following

maximum load, to a configuration in

compliance with the track performance

and geometry requirements of this Part.

(b) Track shall have sufficient lateral

strength to withstand the maximum

thermal and vehicle loads generated at

maximum permissible train speeds, cant

deficiencies and lateral alignment

limitations. For purposes of this section

lateral track strength is defined as the

track capacity to constrain lateral

deformations so that track shall return,

following maximum load, to a

configuration in compliance with the

track performance and geometry

requirements of this Part.

§ 243.317 Crossties.

(a) Crossties shall be made of a

material to which rail can be securely

fastened. They shall be of concrete

construction for all tracks over which

trains run in revenue service.

(b) Each 12 m (39 ft) segment of track

shall have:

(1) A sufficient number of crossties

which, in combination, provide

effective support that will:

(i) Hold gage within the limits

prescribed in § 243.311;

(ii) Maintain surface within the limits

prescribed in Safety Level Two

Geometry Table prescribed in § 243.309;

and

(iii) Maintain alignment within the

limits prescribed in Safety Level Two

Geometry Table prescribed in § 243.309.

(2) The minimum number and type of

crossties specified in paragraph (c) or

(d) of this section effectively distributed

to support the entire segment; and

(3) Crossties of the type specified in

paragraph (c) or (d) of this section that

are located at a joint location as

specified in paragraph (f) of this section.

(c) For non-concrete tie construction,

each 12 m (39 ft) segment of track shall

have 18 crossties which are not:

(1) Broken through;

(2) Split or otherwise impaired to the

extent the crossties would allow the

ballast to work through, or would not

hold spikes or rail fasteners;

(3) So deteriorated that the tie plate or

base of rail could move laterally 10 mm

(0.4 in) relative to the crossties;

(4) Cut by the tie plate through more

than 40 percent of the thickness of the

tie; or

(5) Configured with less than 2 rail

holding spikes or fasteners per tie plate.

(6) So unable, due to insufficient

fastener toe load, to maintain

longitudinal restraint and maintain rail

hold down and gage.

(d) For concrete-tie construction, each

12 m (39 ft) segment of track shall have

16 crossties which are not:

(1) So deteriorated that the pre-stress

strands are ineffective or withdrawn

into the tie at one end and the tie

exhibits structural cracks in the rail seat

or in the gage of track;

(2) Configured with less than 2

fasteners on the same rail;

(3) So deteriorated in the vicinity of

the rail fastener that the fastener

assembly may pull out or move laterally

more than 10 mm (0.4 in) relative to the

crosstie;

(4) So deteriorated that the fastener

base plate or base of rail could move

laterally more than 10 mm (0.4 in)

relative to the crossties;

(5) So deteriorated that rail seat

abrasion is sufficiently deep to cause

loss of rail fastener toeload;

(6) Completely broken through; or

(7) So unable, due to insufficient

fastener toe load, to maintain

longitudinal restraint and maintain rail

hold down and gage.

(e) The following speed limitation

shall apply in case the number of
65552 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

nondefective ties on each 12 m (39 ft)

segment defined in paragraph (c) and (d)

of this section is not achieved:

Max. speed

Number of

non defective ties

170 km/h (110 mph) ................. 14

145 km/h (90 mph) ................... 12

95 km/h (60 mph) ..................... 8

25 km/h (15 mph) ..................... 5

(f) Service track, including sidings,

yards, sheds, and workshops, shall have

at least one non-defective crosstie, the

centerline of which is within 0.5 m (1.6

ft) of the rail joint location, or two

crossties, the center lines of which are

within 0.65 m (2.1 ft) either side of the

rail joint location. All other tracks shall

have two non-defective ties within 0.65

m (2.1 ft) each side of the rail joint.

(g) For track constructed without

crossties, such as slab track and track

connected directly to bridge structural

components, the track structure shall

meet the requirements of paragraphs

(b)(1)(i), (ii) and (iii).

(h) On all tracks where the operating

speeds exceed 170 km/hr (105 mph),

there shall be at least three nondefective ties each side of a defective

tie.

(i) Where wooden crossties are used

there must be tie plates under the

running rails on at least nine of ten

consecutive ties.

(j) No metal object which causes a

concentrated load by solely supporting

a rail shall be allowed between the base

of the rail and the bearing surface of the

tie plate.

§ 243.319 Continuous welded rail (CWR).

The Railroad shall have in effect

written procedures which address the

installation, adjustment, maintenance

and inspection of CWR, and a training

program for the application of those

procedures, in accordance with

§ 243.107 of this Part. These procedures

shall be submitted to the FRA Associate

Administrator for Safety as part of the

Railroad’s system safety plan, and shall

include:

(a) Procedures for the installation and

adjustment of CWR which include:

(1) Designation of a desired rail

installation temperature range for the

geographic area in which the CWR is

located; and

(2) Destressing procedures/methods

which address proper attainment of the

desired rail installation temperature

range when adjusting CWR.

(b) Rail anchoring or fastening

requirements that will provide sufficient

restraint to limit longitudinal rail and

crosstie movement to the extent

practical, and that specifically address

CWR rail anchoring or fastening

patterns on bridges, bridge approaches,

and at other locations where possible

longitudinal rail and crosstie

movement—associated with normally

expected train-induced forces—is

restricted.

(c) Procedures which specifically

address maintaining a desired rail

installation temperature range when

cutting CWR including rail repairs, intrack welding, and in conjunction with

adjustments made in the area of tight

track, a track buckle, or a pull-apart.

Rail repair practices shall take into

consideration the existing rail

temperature so that:

(1) When rail is replaced, the length

installed shall be determined by taking

into consideration the existing rail

temperature and the desired rail

installation temperature range; and

(2) Under no circumstances should

rail be added when the rail temperature

is below that designated by paragraph

(a)(1) of this section, without provisions

for adjustment.

(d) Procedures which address the

monitoring of CWR in curved track for

inward shifts of alignment toward the

center of the curve as a result of

disturbed track.

(e) Procedures which control train

speed on CWR track when:

(1) Maintenance work, track

rehabilitation, track construction, or any

other event occurs which disturbs the

roadbed or ballast section and reduces

the lateral or longitudinal resistance of

the track.

(2) In formulating the procedures

under this paragraph, the track owner

shall:

(i) Determine the speed required, and

the duration and subsequent removal of

any speed restriction based on the

restoration of the ballast, along with

sufficient ballast re-consolidation to

stabilize the track to a level that can

accommodate expected train-induced

forces. Ballast re-consolidation can be

achieved through either the passage of

train tonnage or mechanical

stabilization procedures, or both; and

(ii) Take into consideration the type of

crossties used.

(f) Procedures which prescribe when

physical track inspections are to be

performed to detect conditions prone to

buckling in CWR track. At a minimum,

these procedures shall address

inspecting track to identify:

(1) Locations where tight or kinky rail

conditions are likely to occur; and

(2) Locations where track work of the

nature described in paragraph (e)(1) of

this section has recently been

performed.

(3) In formulating the procedures

under this paragraph, the Railroad

shall—

(i) Specify the timing of the

inspection; and

(ii) Specify the appropriate remedial

actions to be taken when conditions

prone to buckling are found.

(g) The Railroad shall have in effect a

comprehensive training program for the

application of these written CWR

procedures, with provisions for periodic

retraining for those individuals

designated as qualified in accordance

with Subpart H to supervise the

installation, adjustment, and

maintenance of CWR track and to

perform inspections of CWR track.

(h) The Railroad shall prescribe

recordkeeping requirements in order to

maintain a history of track constructed

with CWR. At a minimum, these records

shall include:

(1) Rail laying temperature, location

and date of CWR installations. This

record shall be retained for the life of

the rail; and

(2) A record of any CWR installation

or maintenance work that does not

conform with the written procedures.

Such record must include the location

of the rail and be maintained until the

CWR is brought into conformance with

such procedures.

§ 243.321 Rail end mismatch.

Any mismatch of rails at joints may

not be more than that prescribed by the

following table:

Any mismatch of rails at joints may not be

more than the following—

On the tread of the

rail ends

On the gage side of

the rail ends

3 mm (.13 in). 3 mm (.13 in).

§ 243.323 Rail joints and torch cut rails.

(a) Each rail joint, insulated joint, and

compromise joint shall be of a

structurally sound design and

appropriate dimensions for the rail on

which it is applied.

(b) If a joint bar is cracked, broken, or

permits excessive vertical movement of

either rail when all bolts are tight, it

shall be replaced.

(c) If a joint bar is cracked or broken

between the middle two bolt holes it

shall be replaced.

(d) Each rail shall be bolted with at

least two bolts at each joint.

(e) Each joint bar shall be held in

position by track bolts tightened to

allow the joint bar to firmly support the

abutting rail ends and to allow

longitudinal movement of the rail in the

joint to accommodate expansion and
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65553

contraction due to temperature

variations.

(f) No rail shall have a bolt hole which

is torch cut or burned.

(g) No joint bar shall be reconfigured

by torch cutting.

(h) No rail having a torch cut or flame

cut end may be used, except as a

temporary repair during emergency

situations. When a rail end is torch cut

in emergency situations, speed over that

rail end must not exceed 25 km (40

mph) until removed.

§ 243.325 Turnouts and crossovers,

generally.

(a) In turnouts and track crossings, the

fastenings shall be intact and

maintained to keep the components

securely in place. Also, each switch,

frog, and guard rail shall be kept free of

obstructions that may interfere with the

passage of wheels.

(b) The track through and on each

side of track crossings and turnouts

shall be equipped with rail anchoring to

restrain rail movement affecting the

position of switch points and frogs.

Elastic fasteners designed to restrict

longitudinal rail movement are

considered rail anchoring.

(c) Each flangeway at turnouts shall

be at least 38 mm (1.5 in) wide.

(d) For all turnouts and crossovers,

the Railroad shall prepare an inspection

and maintenance Guidebook for use by

Railroad employees which shall be

submitted to the FRA Associate

Administrator for Safety. The

Guidebook shall contain at a minimum:

(1) Inspection frequency and

methodology, including limiting

measurement values for all components

subject to wear or requiring adjustment;

and

(2) Maintenance procedures and

techniques.

§ 243.327 Frog guard rails and guard

faces; gage.

The guard check and guard face gages

in frogs shall be within the limits

prescribed in the following table,

applicable for a nominal track gage of

1435 mm (56.5 in).

Guard check gage Guard face gage

The distance between

the gage line of a

frog to the guard

line 1 of its guard

rail or guarding

face, measured

across the track at

right angles to the

gage line,2 may not

be less than—

1435¥45=1390

mm

The distance between guard lines,1

measured across

the track at right

angles to the gage

line,2 may not be

more than—

1435¥80=1355

mm

1A line along that side of the flangeway

which is nearer to the center of the track and

at the same elevation as the gage line. 2A line 10 mm (0.4 in) below the top of the

center line of the head of the running rail, or

corresponding location of the tread portion of

the track structure.

§ 243.329 Derails.

(a) All sidetracks connecting with

main tracks shall be equipped with

protection switches or functioning

derails of the correct size and type,

unless Railroad equipment on the track

cannot move to foul the main track

because of grade characteristics.

(b) Each derail shall be clearly visible

to Railroad personnel operating rail

equipment on the affected track and to

Railroad personnel working adjacent to

the affected track. When in a locked

position, a derail shall be free of any lost

motion that would allow it to be

operated without removal of the lock.

(c) If a track protected by a derail is

occupied by standing railroad rolling

stock, the derail shall be in derailing

position.

(d) Each derail shall be interlocked

with the signal system so as to produce

a maximally restrictive signal aspect if

the device is not deployed in a

completely functional position.

Inspection

§ 243.331 Track Geometry Measurement

Systems.

(a) A Track Geometry Measurement

System (TGMS) vehicle shall be

operated at least twice within each 180

calendar days with not less than 30 days

between inspections to demonstrate

compliance with the geometry

requirements in § 243.309.

(b) The TGMS Car shall have the

following capabilities:

(1) It shall be equipped with three

bogies and have a rigid body which acts

as the datum plane for all

measurements.

(2) The body shall rest on two end

bogies which are spaced at 9.700 m

(31.82 ft) between center lines.

(3) The four-axle middle bogie shall

move laterally when the vehicle travels

through a curve.

(4) The TGMS car shall have eight

axles spaced symmetrically from the

centerline of the vehicle at 0.675 m,

2.075 m, 3.64 m, and 6.11. Each axle

shall have a 9 tonne (20 kips) axle load.

(5) Information shall be gathered at

rail level by means of mechanical

contact:

(i) vertically, through the 16 high

carbon steel wheels with a cylindrical

profile; and

(ii) laterally, through double sensors,

each with a roller which follows the rail

head’s internal profile at an angle of 70

degrees placed between the outer

bogies, 5 meters from the centerline of

the vehicle.

(6) Measurements shall be recorded

by two means on the vehicle:

(i) A continuous plot, on a constant

distance basis, of the geometry

parameters identified in the tables in

§ 243.309; and

(ii) Electronic records of elementary

signals from transducers measuring

displacements of different cables from

the measuring points. In addition, the

electronic record shall include all the

computed track geometry parameters

developed to determine compliance

with the geometry tables in § 243.309.

Calculations of the extended base

measurements are performed through

real-time analog or digital processing of

the alignment and level signals and are

electronically recorded and displayed

on charts.

(7) The following parameters shall be

measured vertically:

(i) Surface: The surface or

longitudinal level must be developed

over two rail bases; the fundamental

base of 12.2 m (40 ft) and the extended

base of 31 m (102 ft) base. The

fundamental surface measurement is the

difference between the average level at

eight locations spaced symmetrically

from the center of the vehicle at 0.675

m, 2.075 m, 3.64 m, and 6.11 m and the

level at 0.675 m. Surface12.2 = 1⁄8(Z¥6.11

+ Z¥3.64 + Z¥2.075 + Z¥0.675 + Z0.675 +

Z2.075 + Z3.64 + Z6.11) ¥ Z0.675. The

extended base measurement is

calculated using the same transducers as

used in the fundamental measurement.

The displacement must be combined

and appropriately filtered to produce a

signal equivalent to the offset from the

middle of a 31 meter chord.

(ii) Warp: The cant variation shall be

obtained by calculating the difference

between the cant of an axle on the

middle bogie and the average cant of the

4 axles of the end bogies.

(8) The following parameters shall be

measured laterally:

(i) Alignment: The alignment for each

rail must be developed based on three

chords; the fundamental chord of 10 m
65554 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(32.8 ft), a middle distance chord of 20

m (65.6 ft) and an extended chord of 31

m (102 ft) base. The fundamental chord

is measured through three double

sensors: one at the center of the vehicle

and the others symmetrically spaced 5

meters from the center. The long chords

are developed through combinations

and appropriate filtering of the

fundamental measurements.

(ii) Gage: The gage is measured by a

pair of central double sensors.

(9) The extended base graph shall be

obtained by analog or digital

computation of the level and alignment

signals, and shall be printed out in real

time on-board the vehicle.

(10) Long wavelength values of level

and alignment are calculated by lowpass filtering of the actual

measurements with a transfer function

specific to the signals for level (12.20 m

(40 ft) base) and alignment (versine of

10 m (32.8 ft) chord) recorded by the

TGMS vehicle.

(11) The low-pass filtering shall be

accomplished in the spatial frequency

range, due to the monitoring of the cutoff frequency of the low-pass filters as

a function of the running speed.

(c) The TGMS shall, at a minimum,

meet design requirements which specify

that—

(1) Track geometry measurements

shall be taken no more than 1 m (3.3 ft)

away from the contact point of wheels

carrying a vertical load of no less than

4500 kg (10,000 lb) per wheel;

(2) Track geometry measurements

shall be taken and recorded on a

distance-based sampling interval which

shall not exceed 0.6 m (2 ft);

(3) Calibration procedures and

parameters assigned to the system

assure that measured and recorded

values accurately represent track

conditions; and

(4) Track geometry measurements

recorded by the system shall not differ

by more than 3 mm (0.13 in) on

repeated runs at the same site at the

same speed.

(d) A qualifying TGMS shall measure

and process the necessary track

geometry parameters that enable the

system to determine compliance with:

(1) Track gage; mean gage within 100

m (328 ft.); and gage variation within 10

m (32.8 feet);

(2) Alignment; 10 m (32.8 ft.), 20 m

(65.6 ft.), and 31 m (102 ft.) Mid Chord

Offsets;

(3) Curvature, Cant and Vmax;

(4) Surface; 12.2 m ( 40 ft.) averaged

chord; 31 m (102 ft.) Mid Chord Offset;

and

(5) Warp.

(e) A qualifying TGMS shall be

capable of producing, within 24 hours

of the inspection, output reports that:

(1) Provide a continuous plot, on a

constant-distance axis, of all measured

track geometry parameters required in

paragraph (d) of this Section; and

(2) Provide an exception report

containing a systematic listing of all

track geometry conditions which

constitute an exception to the speed

limits over the segment surveyed.

(f) The output reports required under

paragraph (e) of this Section shall

contain sufficient location identification

information so that maintenance

workers may easily locate indicated

exceptions.

(g) Following a track inspection

performed by a qualifying TGMS, the

Railroad shall, within two days after the

inspection, field verify and institute

remedial action for all exceptions.

(h) The Railroad shall maintain a

record for a period of one year following

an inspection performed by a qualifying

TGMS that includes a copy of the plot,

the track segment involved, a copy of

the exception printout, the date of the

inspection, and the location, date, and

type of remedial action taken for all

listed exceptions.

(i) If the Railroad elects to substitute

a geometry vehicle with different

properties than those identified in

paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section for

the TGMS car, the Railroad shall use a

geometry vehicle consistent with the

requirements of Subpart G, Train

Operations at Track Classes 6 and

Higher of FRA’s proposed Track Safety

Standards, 62 FR 36138 (July 3, 1997),

and as ultimately codified in 49 CFR

part 213.

§ 243.333 Track/vehicle performance

Measurement Systems.

(a) A Track Acceleration

Measurement System (TAMS) vehicle

shall be operated at least twice within

each 45 calendar days, with not less

than 7 days between inspections, to

determine whether a representative

vehicle responds to the existing track

conditions within the limits defined in

the Vehicle/Track Interaction

Performance Limits table for

accelerations.

(b) A TAMS vehicle must operate

within 5% of the maximum authorized

speed over any section of track in order

to qualify as a valid survey.

(c) A qualifying TAMS shall be

capable of measuring and processing the

necessary acceleration parameters, at an

interval which shall not exceed 0.6 m (2

ft), which enables the system to

determine compliance with:

(1) Lateral truck acceleration;

(2) Lateral carbody acceleration; and

(3) Vertical carbody acceleration.

(d) A qualifying TAMS shall be

capable of producing, within 24 hours

of the inspection, output reports that:

(1) Provide a continuous plot, on a

constant-distance axis, of all measured

acceleration parameters required in

paragraph (c) of this section; and

(2) Provide an exception report

containing a systematic listing of all

acceleration conditions which

constitute an exception to the speed

limits over the segment surveyed, as

indicated in the table of Vehicle/Track

Interaction Performance Limits

contained in § 243.335.

(e) If the carbody lateral, carbody

vertical, or truck frame lateral

accelerations exceed the safety limits as

stated in the table, the Railroad must

immediately initiate remedial action,

which shall include reducing the

maximum authorized speed for that

section of track to a speed at least 8 km/

h (5 mph) below the speed at which the

acceleration limits were reached.

(f) The Railroad shall maintain a

record for a period of one year following

an inspection performed by a qualifying

TAMS that includes, a copy of the plot,

a description of the track segment

involved, the exception printout for the

track segment involved, the date of the

inspection, and the location, date, and

remedial action taken for all listed

exceptions to the class.

§ 243.335 Wheel/Rail Force Measurement

System.

(a) A Wheel/Rail Force Measurement

System (WRFMS) shall be operated over

the track bi-annually with not less than

240 days between inspections to

determine whether a representative

vehicle responds to the existing track

conditions within the limits defined in

the Vehicle/Track Interaction

Performance Limits table for wheel rail

forces.

(b) A WRFMS vehicle must operate at

the revenue speed profile speed for a

section of track to qualify as a valid

survey.

(c) A qualifying WRFMS shall be

equipped with instrumented wheelsets

to measure wheel/rail forces and shall

be capable of measuring and processing

the necessary wheel rail force

parameters, at an interval which shall

not exceed 0.6 m (2 ft), which enables

the system to determine compliance

with:

(1) Minimum vertical wheel load;

(2) Wheel L/V ratio, the ratio of the

lateral wheel load to the vertical wheel

load;

(3) Net axle lateral load; and

(4) Truck side L/V ratio.

(d) A qualifying WRFMS shall be

capable of producing, within 24 hours

of the inspection, output reports that:
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65555

(1) Provide a continuous plot, on a

constant-distance axis, of all measured

wheel force and force ratio parameters

required in paragraph (c) of this section;

(2) Provide an exception report

containing a systematic listing of all

wheel force and force ratio conditions

which constitute an exception to the

speed limits over the segment surveyed,

as indicated in the following table of

Vehicle/Track Interaction Performance

Limits.

(e) If the wheel forces or force ratios

exceed the safety limits as stated in the

table, the Railroad must immediately

initiate remedial action, which may

include reducing the maximum

authorized speed for that section of

track, until these wheel forces and force

ratios are within the safety limits.

(f) The Railroad shall maintain a

record for a period of two years

following an inspection performed by a

qualifying WRFMS that includes, a

description of the track segment

involved, the exception printout for the

track segment involved, the date of the

inspection, and the location, date, and

remedial action taken for all listed

exceptions to the class, and at a copy of

the plot specified in paragraph (d) of

this section for a distance along the

track of at least 10 feet, centered on each

exception.

VEHICLE/TRACK INTERACTION LIMITS

Parameter Safety limit Filter/window Requirements

Wheel/Rail Forces:1

Single Wheel Vertical Load Ratio .............. ≤0.1 .............. 5 ft ................ No wheel of the equipment shall be permitted to unload to less

than 10% of the static vertical wheel load. The static vertical

wheel load is defined as the load that the wheel would carry

when stationary on level track. The vertical wheel load limit

shall be increased by the amount of measurement error.

Single Wheel L/V Ratio .............................. ≤ (tan ¥.5)/

(1 + .5 tan).

5 ft ................ The ratio of the lateral force that any wheel exerts on an individual rail to the vertical force exerted by the same wheel on

the rail shall be less than the safety limit calculated for the

wheel’s flange angle ().

Net Axle L/V Ratio ...................................... ≤0.5 .............. 5 ft ................ The net lateral force exerted by any axle on the track shall not

exceed 50% of the static vertical load that the axle exerts on

the track.

Truck Side L/V Ratio .................................. ≤0.6 .............. 5 ft ................ The ratio of the lateral forces that the wheels on one side of

any truck exert on an individual rail to the vertical forces exerted by the same wheels on that rail shall be less than 0.6.

Accelerations: 2

Carbody Lateral ......................................... ≤0.5 g peakto-peak.10 Hz 1 sec

window.

The peak-to-peak accelerations, measured as the algebraic

difference between the two extreme values of measured acceleration in a one second time period, shall not exceed 0.5

g.

Carbody Vertical ......................................... ≤0.6 g peakto-peak.10 Hz 1 sec

window.

The peak-to-peak accelerations, measured as the algebraic

difference between the two extreme values of measured acceleration in a one-second time period, shall not exceed 0.6

g.

Truck Lateral 3 ............................................ ≤0.4 g RMS

mean-removed.

10 Hz 2 sec

window.

Truck hunting 4 shall not develop below the maximum authorized speed.

1The lateral and vertical wheel forces shall be measured with instrumented wheelsets with the measurements processed through a low pass

filter with a minimum cut-off frequency of 25 Hz. The sample rate for wheel force data shall be at least 250 samples/sec. 2 Carbody lateral and vertical accelerations shall be measured near the car ends at the floor level.

3Truck accelerations in the lateral direction shall be measured at a position directly above the axle. The measurements shall be processed

through a filter having a pass band of 0.5 to 10 Hz. 4Truck hunting is defined as a sustained cyclic oscillation of the truck which is evidenced by lateral accelerations in excess of 0.4 g root mean

square, mean-removed, for 2 seconds.

§ 243.337 Daily inspection trainset.

(a) An inspection trainset shall be

operated each morning over the

Railroad’s system prior to commencing

revenue service. The inspection trainset

shall operate at a speed no greater than

170 km/h (105 mph) to conduct a visual

inspection of the track and ensure that

the right of way is clear of obstacles

within the clearance envelope and to

identify conditions that could cause

accidents.

(b) The inspection trainset shall be

equipped with on-board truck side and

carbody accelerometers. The Railroad

shall have in effect written procedures

for the notification of track maintenance

personnel when the acceleration

measurements indicate a possible trackrelated condition.

§ 243.339 Inspection of rail in service.

(a) Prior to revenue service and as part

of the system safety plan, the Railroad

shall submit to the FRA Associate

Administrator for Safety written

procedures for the inspection of rails.

(b) A continuous search for internal

defects shall be made of all rail within

90 days after initiation of revenue

service and, thereafter, at least annually,

with not less than 240 days between

inspections.

(c) Inspection equipment shall be

capable of detecting defects between

joint bars and within the area enclosed

by joint bars.

(d) Each defective rail shall be marked

with a highly visible marking on both

sides of the rail.

(e) If the person assigned to operate

the rail defect detection equipment

being used determines that, due to rail

surface conditions, a valid search for

internal defects could not be made over

a particular length of track, the test on

that particular length of track cannot be

considered as a search for internal

defects under this section.

(f) When an owner of track to which

this part applies learns, through

inspection or otherwise, that a rail in

that track contains any of the defects

listed in the following table, a person

designated under § 243.705 or § 243.707
65556 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

shall determine whether or not the track

may continue in use. If he determines

that the track may continue in use,

operation over the defective rail is not

permitted until—

(1) The rail is replaced; or

(2) The remedial action prescribed in

the table is initiated—

REMEDIAL ACTION

Defect

Length of defect (inch) Percent of rail head crosssectional area weakened

by defect

If defective rail

is not replaced,

take the remedial action prescribed in note

More than But not

more than Less than But not less

than

Transverse fissure ............................................................................. .................... .................... 70 5 B.

.................... .................... 100 70 A2.

.................... .................... .................... 100 A.

Compound fissure .............................................................................. .................... .................... 70 5 B.

.................... .................... 100 70 A2.

.................... .................... .................... 100 A.

Detail fracture .................................................................................... .................... .................... 25 5 C.

Engine burn fracture .......................................................................... .................... .................... 80 25 D.

Defective weld ................................................................................... .................... .................... 100 80 A2 or E and H.

.................... .................... .................... 100 A or E and H.

Horizontal split head .......................................................................... 1 2 .................... .................... H and F.

Vertical split head .............................................................................. .................... 4 .................... .................... I and G.

Split web ............................................................................................ 2 .................... .................... .................... B.

Piped rail ............................................................................................ 4 (1) (1) .................... A.

Head web separation ......................................................................... (1) .................... .................... ....................

Bolt hole crack ................................................................................... 1⁄2 1 .................... .................... H and F.

1 11⁄2 .................... .................... H and G.

11⁄2 .................... .................... .................... B.

(1) (1) (1) .................... A.

Broken base ....................................................................................... 1 6 .................... .................... D.

6 .................... .................... .................... A or E and I.

Ordinary break ................................................................................... .................... .................... .................... .................... A or E.

Damaged rail ..................................................................................... .................... .................... .................... .................... D.

Flattened rail ...................................................................................... .................... .................... .................... .................... H.

1Break out in rail head.

2 Depth ≥ 3⁄8 and Length ≥ 8.

Notes

A. Assign person designated under

§ 243.705 or § 243.707 to visually supervise

each operation over defective rail.

A2. Assign person designated under

§ 243.705 or § 243.707 to make visual

inspection. That person may authorize

operation to continue without visual

supervision at a maximum of 10 mph for up

to 24 hours prior to another such visual

inspection or replacement or repair of the

rail.

B. Limit operating speed over defective rail

to that as authorized by a person designated

under § 243.705. The operating speed may

not exceed 30 mph.

C. Apply joint bars bolted only through the

outermost holes to defect within 20 days after

it is determined to continue the track in use.

Limit operating speed over defective rail to

30 mph until angle bars are applied;

thereafter, limit speed to 50 mph. When a

search for internal rail defects is conducted

under this section and defects are discovered

which require remedial action C, the

operating speed shall be limited to 50 mph,

for a period not to exceed 4 days. If the

defective rail has not been removed from the

track or a permanent repair made within 4

days of the discovery, limit operating speed

over the defective rail to 30 mph until joint

bars are applied; thereafter, limit speed to 50

mph.

D. Apply joint bars bolted only through the

outermost holes to defect within 10 days after

it is determined to continue the track in use.

Limit operating speed over the defective rail

to 30 mph or less as authorized by a person

designated under § 243.705 until angle bars

are applied; thereafter, limit speed to 50

mph.

E. Apply joint bars to defect and bolt in

accordance with § 243.323.

F. Inspect rail 90 days after it is determined

to continue the track in use.

G. Inspect rail 30 days after it is

determined to continue the track in use.

H. Limit operating speed over defective rail

to 50 mph.

I. Limit operating speed over defective rail

to 30 mph.

§ 243.341 Initial inspection of new rail and

welds.

(a) The Railroad shall provide for the

initial inspection of newly

manufactured rail, and for initial

inspection of new welds made in either

new or used rail. The Railroad may

demonstrate compliance with this

section by providing for:

(1) Mill inspection. A continuous

inspection at the rail manufacturer’s

mill shall constitute compliance with

the requirement for initial inspection of

new rail, provided that the inspection

equipment meets the applicable

requirements specified in § 243.339 of

this Part. The Railroad shall obtain a

copy of the manufacturer’s report of

inspection and retain it as a record until

the rail receives its first scheduled

inspection under § 243.339 of this Part;

(2) Welding plant inspection. A

continuous inspection at a welding

plant, if conducted in accordance with

the provisions of paragraph (a)(1) of this

section, and accompanied by a plant

operator’s report of inspection which is

retained as a record by the Railroad,

shall constitute compliance with the

requirements for initial inspection of

new rail and plant welds, or of new

plant welds made in used rail; and

(3) Inspection of field welds. Initial

inspection of new field welds, either

those joining the ends of CWR strings or

those made for isolated repairs, shall be

conducted not less than one day and not

more than 30 days after the welds have

been made. The initial inspection may

be conducted by means of portable test

equipment. The Railroad shall retain a

record of such inspections until the

welds receive their first scheduled

inspection under § 243.339 of this Part.
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(b) Each defective rail found during

inspections conducted under paragraph

(a)(3) of this section shall be marked

with highly visible markings on both

sides of the rail and the appropriate

remedial action as set forth in § 243.339

of this Part will apply.

§ 243.343 Visual inspections.

(a) All track shall be visually

inspected in accordance with the

schedule prescribed in paragraph (c) of

this section by person qualified under

§ 243.705 or § 243.707.

(b) With the exception of paragraph

(e) below, each inspection shall be made

by riding over the track in a vehicle at

a speed that allows the person making

the inspection to visually inspect the

track structure for compliance with this

rule. However, mechanical, electrical,

and other track inspection devices may

be used to supplement visual

inspection. If a vehicle is used for visual

inspection, the speed of the vehicle may

not be more than 8 km/h (5 mph) when

operating over track crossings or

turnouts.

(c) Each inspection shall be made at

a minimum frequency of once every

seven days with at least three days

between inspections.

(d) If a deviation from the

requirements of this rule is found

during the visual inspection, remedial

action shall be initiated immediately.

(e) Each turnout and crossover shall

be inspected on foot at least once each

week. The inspection shall be in

accordance with the guidebook

prepared as required under § 243.325 of

this Part.

§ 243.345 Special inspections.

In the event of fire, flood, severe

storm, temperature extremes or other

occurrence which might have damaged

track structure, a special inspection

shall be made of the track and ROW

involved as soon as possible after the

occurrence.

§ 243.347 Inspection records.

(a) The Railroad shall keep a record of

each inspection required to be

performed on that track under this

Subpart.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (f)

of this section, each record of an

inspection under § 243.343 shall be

prepared on the day the inspection is

made and signed by the person making

the inspection.

(c) Records shall specify the track

inspected, date of inspection, location

and nature of any deviation from the

requirements of this part, and the

remedial action taken by the person

making the inspection.

(d) Rail inspection records shall

specify the date of inspection, the

location and nature of any internal

defects found, the remedial action taken

and the date thereof, and the location of

any intervals of track not tested

pursuant to § 243.339 of this Part. The

Railroad shall retain a rail inspection

record for at least two years after the

inspection and for one year after

remedial action is taken.

(e) The Railroad required to keep

inspection records under this section

shall make those records available for

inspection and copying by the FRA.

(f) For purposes of compliance with

the requirements of this section, the

Railroad may maintain and transfer

records through electronic transmission,

storage, and retrieval provided that:

(1) The electronic system be designed

so that the integrity of each record may

be maintained through appropriate

levels of security such as recognition of

an electronic signature, or other means,

which uniquely identify the initiating

person as the author of that record. No

two persons shall have the same

electronic identity;

(2) The electronic storage of each

record shall be initiated by the person

making the inspection within 24 hours

following the completion of that

inspection;

(3) The electronic system shall ensure

that each record cannot be modified in

any way, or replaced, once the record is

transmitted and stored;

(4) Any amendment to a record shall

be electronically stored apart from the

record which it amends. Each

amendment to a record shall be

uniquely identified as to the person

making the amendment;

(5) The electronic system shall

provide for the maintenance of

inspection records as originally

submitted without corruption or loss of

data; and

(6) Paper copies of electronic records

and amendments to those records, that

may be necessary to document

compliance with this part, shall be

made available for inspection and

copying by the FRA and qualified State

track inspectors. Such paper copies

shall be made available to the track

inspectors and at the locations specified

in paragraph (c) of this section.

(g) Track inspection records shall be

kept available to persons who

performed the inspection and to persons

performing subsequent inspections.

(h) Each Track/Vehicle Performance

record required under § 243.333 and

§ 243.335 of this Part shall be made

available for inspection and copying by

the FRA at the locations specified in

paragraph (c) of this section.

Subpart E—Rolling Stock

§ 243.401 Clearance requirements.

The rolling stock shall be designed to

meet all applicable clearance

requirements of the Railroad. At a

minimum, the Railroad shall make the

following diagrams available to FRA

upon request:

(a) Rolling stock static clearance

diagram;

(b) Rolling stock dynamic clearance

diagram; and

(c) Obstacle clearance diagram.

§ 243.413 Structural strength of trainset.

(a) General. (1) The trainset shall be

permanently coupled with articulated

trucks between the trailer cars. Trainsets

shall be uncoupled only in repair

facilities, in accordance with the

operating procedures set forth in

§ 243.433.

(2) The trainset shall be operated with

a power car at each end.

(b) Power Car. (1) Each power car

shall resist, without permanent

deformation, the following loads:

(i) A compressive load of 2000 kN

(450,000 lb.) applied at the underframe

level;

(ii) A compressive load of 700 kN

(157,500 lb.) uniformly distributed and

applied on a 100 mm (4 in.) high band

to the cab end of the carbody at any

height between the underframe and the

structure below the front window,

reacted at the buffer location at the

opposite end of the car;

(iii) A compressive load of 300 kN

(67,500 lb.), applied on the rear end of

the power car shell, at the carbody waist

level, reacted at the coupler position at

the cab end;

(iv) A uniformly distributed

compressive load of 300 kN (67,500 lb.),

applied on the cab end of the power car

shell, at cantrail level, reacted at the

buffer location at the rear of the power

car;

(v) A compressive load of 300 kN

(67,500 lb.), applied at the middle of the

obstacle deflector over a width of 500

mm (20 in.) at a height of 500 mm (20

in.) above top of rail, reacted at buffer

location at the rear of the power car;

(vi) A compressive load of 250 kN

(56,200 lb.) applied at the side edges of

the obstacle deflector over a width of

500 mm (20 in.) at a height of 500 mm

(20 in.) above top of rail, reacted at the

buffer location at the rear of the power

car;

(vii) A tensile load of 1000 kN

(225,000 lb.) applied on the front and

rear coupling devices.

(2) Each power car shall be equipped

with an anti-penetration wall ahead of

the cab which is capable of resisting:
65558 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(i) A longitudinal compressive load of

3000 kN (675,000 lb) at the top of the

underframe, without exceeding the

ultimate strength of the joint; and

(ii) A longitudinal compressive load

of 1500 kN (337,000 lb) applied at a

height of 760 mm (30 in) above the top

of the underframe, and reacted at the

rear of the cab structure, without

exceeding the ultimate strength of the

structure. Compliance shall be verified

by either linear static analysis or

equivalent means.

(3) In unoccupied areas, each power

car shall be designed to absorb a

minimum 4.2 MJ through controlled

structural deformation.

(4) In occupied areas, each power car

shall be designed to resist without

permanent deformation of the sidesill,

cantrail, and side post structural

members, a longitudinal compressive

load of 3560 kN (800,000 lb) when

applied uniformly at the front of the cab

between the underframe and waist level,

and reacted at the cross section of the

carbody at the back of the cab.

(5) Each power car shall be designed

to withstand a uniformly distributed

vertical load of 1.3 times its static laden

weight, when supported at the truck

centers, without permanent

deformation. Compliance shall be

verified by either linear static analysis

or equivalent means.

(6) Rollover strength of power cars

shall be designed to permit those cars

to:

(i) Rest on their sides, uniformly

supported at the top (cantrail) and the

bottom (sidesill) chords of the side

frame. The allowable stress in the main

structural members for occupied

volumes for this condition shall be onehalf yield; and

(ii) Rest on their roofs with damage

limited to roof sheathing and framing.

Deformation of the roof sheathing and

framing to the extent necessary to

permit the vehicle to be supported

directly on the top chords of the side

frames and end frames shall be allowed.

The allowable stress in the main

structural members for occupied

volumes for this condition shall be onehalf yield.

Compliance with this requirement

shall be verified by either linear static

analysis or equivalent means.

(c) Trailer Car. (1) Each trailer car of

the trainset shall resist, without

permanent deformation, the following

loads:

(i) A compressive load of 2000 kN

(450,000 lb) applied at the level of the

thrust tubes;

(ii) A uniformly distributed

compressive load of 300 kN (67,500 lb),

applied to the end of the trailer carshell,

at cantrail level; and

(iii) A tensile load of 1000 kN

(225,000 lb) applied at the level of the

thrust tube. and

(2) Each trailer car shall be designed

to withstand a uniformly distributed

vertical load of 1.3 times its static laden

weight, when supported at the truck

centers, without permanent

deformation.

(3) The occupied volumes of trailer

cars shall be designed to resist without

permanent deformation of the sidesill,

cantrail, and side post structural

members, a longitudinal compressive

load of 3560 kN (800,000 lb.) when

applied as distributed over the carbody

cross section at the seated passenger

compartment. Compliance with this

requirement shall be verified by either

linear static analysis or equivalent

means.

(4) Rollover Strength of trailer cars

shall be designed to permit those cars

to:

(i) Rest on their sides, uniformly

supported at the top (cantrail) and the

bottom (sidesill) chords of the side

frame. The allowable stress in the main

structural members for occupied

volumes for this condition shall be onehalf yield; and

(ii) Rest on their roofs with damage

limited to roof sheathing and framing.

Deformation of the roof sheathing and

framing to the extent necessary to

permit the vehicle to be supported

directly on the top chords of the side

frames and end frames shall be allowed.

The allowable stress in the main

structural members for occupied

volumes for this condition shall be onehalf yield.

Compliance with this requirement

shall be verified by either linear static

analysis or equivalent means.

§ 243.405 Trailer car interior.

(a) Seat and seat attachment strength.

(1) Seat backs shall be designed to

withstand, with deflection and

permanent deformation allowed, but

without total failure, the load due to a

95th-percentile male (85 kg or 187 lb.)

seat occupant accelerated with the

following pulse:

(i) 0 to 6g in 0.05 s;

(ii) 6g for 0.125 s; and

(iii) 6 to 0g in 0.05 s.

(2) The ultimate strength of a seat

attachment to the trailer carbody shall

be sufficient to withstand the following

individually-applied accelerations

acting on the mass of the seat plus the

mass of a seat occupant who is a 95thpercentile male (85kg or 187 lb.):

(i) Longitudinal: 6 g;

(ii) Lateral: 2 g; and

(iii) Vertical: 2 g.

(b) Interior Fittings. (1) Interior fittings

shall be attached to the trailer carbody

with sufficient strength to withstand the

following individually-applied

accelerations acting on the mass of the

fitting:

(i) Longitudinal: 3 g;

(ii) Lateral: 2 g; and

(iii) Vertical: 2 g.

(2) To the extent possible, interior

fittings shall be recessed or flushmounted, and corners and sharp edges

shall be either avoided or padded to

mitigate the consequences of impact

with such surfaces.

(c) Luggage Stowage Compartments.

Luggage stowage compartments shall

include a means to restrain luggage, and

have sufficient strength to resist loads

due to the following individuallyapplied accelerations acting on the mass

of the luggage that the compartment is

designed to accommodate:

(1) Longitudinal: 3 g;

(2) Lateral: 2 g; and

(3) Vertical: 2 g.

(g = 1 gravity; s = seconds)

§ 243.407 Glazing.

(a) Exterior Impact Performance. (1)

End-facing exterior glazing shall resist

the impact of a 10 kg (22 lb) solid

aluminum sphere with an impact energy

of 30 kJ at 22°C (72°F) and 25 kJ at 0°C

(32°F).

(2) Driver’s cab side-facing exterior

glazing shall resist the horizontal impact

of a 600g (1.3 lb) steel sphere with an

energy of 15 kJ.

(3) Trailer car side-facing exterior

glazing shall resist, without spall or

penetration, the impact of a 2.46g (38

grains) bullet at an impact speed of 442

m/s (1,450 ft/s).

(4) Glazing and frame shall resist the

forces due to air pressure differences

under all operations caused by trains

passing with the minimum separation

for two adjacent tracks while traveling

in opposite directions, each traveling at

maximum operating speed.

(b) Interior Performance. Interior

equipment glazing shall meet the

minimum requirements of AS1 type

laminated glass as defined in American

National Standard ‘‘Safety Code for

Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor

Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,’’

ASA Standard Z26.1–1990.

(c) Frame. The glazing frame shall

hold glazing in place against all forces

generated in the tests specified in this

section.

§ 243.409 Brake system.

(a) The brake system shall be capable

of stopping the trainset within the

prevailing signal spacing from its
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65559

maximum authorized speed, under test

conditions of adhesion as defined in

UIC leaflet 541.05, with flow of

detergent. The flow rate of detergent

shall be doubled for speeds in excess of

180 km/h (112 mph).

(b) The braking on each truck shall be

independently controlled by the brake

pipe.

(c) The electric brake on each

powered truck shall be completely

independent and shall operate with the

loss of the overhead power supply.

(d) Any failure of the electric portion

of the brake system on any power truck

shall be displayed for the locomotive

engineer in the control cab.

(e) The brake system shall be designed

to prevent thermal damage to wheels or

discs. The Railroad shall demonstrate,

through analysis and test that is

confirmed by the system safety plan and

pre-revenue service tests, that no

thermal damage results to the wheels or

discs under conditions resulting in

maximum friction braking effort being

exerted.

(f) The Railroad shall demonstrate,

through analysis and test that is

confirmed by the system safety plan and

pre-revenue service tests, the maximum

authorized speed of the trainset at

which no thermal damage to wheels or

discs occurs, for various combinations

of electric and friction brake failures.

The Railroad shall develop a matrix that

clearly lists potential brake failures or

combinations of failures, to which each

speed corresponds, that shall be

displayed in each power car.

(g) In the event of an en route failure

of the electric or friction portion of the

brake, or both, a train may proceed at a

speed no greater than the maximum

authorized speed as set forth in the

matrix required by paragraph (f) of this

section. The locomotive engineer shall

notify central traffic control of any brake

failure that requires a speed restriction

in a trip.

(h) The trainset shall be equipped

with an emergency application feature

that produces an irretrievable stop,

using a brake rate consistent with

prevailing adhesion, passenger safety,

and brake system thermal capacity. An

emergency application shall be available

at any time. A means to apply the

emergency brake shall be provided at

two locations accessible to the train

crew in each trailer car.

(i) The brake system shall be designed

so that an inspector may determine

whether the brake system is functioning

properly without being placed in a

dangerous position on, under or

between the equipment. This

determination may be made through

automated inspection equipment that

utilizes sensors to verify that the brakes

have been applied and released.

(j) The brake system design shall

allow a disabled train’s pneumatic

brakes to be controlled by a rescue

locomotive through brake pipe control

alone.

(k) The train shall be equipped with

a spring-applied, air-released parking

brake that is capable of holding the train

on any part of the Railroad system and,

at a minimum, on a 0.5% grade.

(l) An independent failure detection

system shall compare brake commands

with brake system output to determine

if a failure has occurred. The failure

detection system shall report

immediately brake system failures to the

automated train monitoring system.

(m) Each truck of the trainset shall be

equipped with a wheelslide system

designed to automatically adjust the

braking force on each wheel to prevent

axle-locking during braking. In the event

of failure of a truck’s wheelslide system,

control shall be automatically provided

by the wheelslide system of an adjacent

truck. A visual or audible alarm, or

both, shall be provided in the cab of the

controlling power car if a blocked axle

is detected.

§ 243.411 Truck and suspension system.

(a) Truck-to-car-body attachment. (1)

For all power cars and trailer cars, the

strength of the truck-to-car-body

attachment shall be sufficient to resist

without permanent deformation a

longitudinal force equivalent to 2.5g

acting on the mass of the truck.

(2) Components of the truck, which

include axles, wheels, bearings, truck

mounted brake system, suspension

system components, and any other

components integral to the design of the

truck, shall remain attached to the truck

when a force equivalent to 2g acting on

a mass of any component is exerted in

any direction on that component.

(b) Wheel climb. Suspension systems

shall prevent wheel climb, wheel lift,

rail roll-over, track shift, and vehicle

over-turning and provide safe, stable

performance and ride quality.

Suspension systems shall meet these

design requirements in all safety-critical

operating environments, track

conditions, and loading conditions.

Compliance with these requirements

shall be demonstrated as part of the

System Qualification Tests set forth in

Subpart G of this Rule.

(c) Lateral accelerations. The trainsets

shall not operate under conditions that

correspond to a steady-state lateral

acceleration to the outside of the curve

of 0.1g or greater, as measured parallel

to the car floor.

(d) Hunting oscillations. Each truck

shall be equipped with a permanently

installed lateral accelerometer mounted

on the truck frame. The accelerometer

output signals shall be calibrated and

filtered, and shall pass through signal

conditioning circuitry designed to

determine if hunting oscillations of the

truck are occurring. If hunting

oscillations are detected, the train

monitoring system shall provide an

alarm to the locomotive engineer and

the train shall be slowed by the

locomotive engineer to a speed 8 km/h

(5 mph) less than speed at which

hunting oscillations stopped. This

requirement shall be included in the

Railroad’s Operating Rules.

(e) Ride vibration. Compliance with

ride quality requirements contained in

this paragraph shall be demonstrated

during equipment pre-revenue service

qualification tests in accordance with

§ 243.113 and Subpart G of this Part.

The Federal Railroad Administration

shall verify ride quality performance of

trainset equipment through the use of

instrumentation. While traveling at the

maximum revenue service speed over

the intended route, the train suspension

system shall:

(1) Limit the vertical acceleration as

measured by a vertical accelerometer

mounted on the car floor to no greater

than 0.55g single event, peak-to-peak.

(2) Limit the lateral acceleration as

measured by a lateral accelerometer

mounted on the car floor to no greater

than 0.3g single event, peak-to-peak.

(3) Limit the combination of lateral

acceleration (L) and vertical acceleration

(V) occurring within any time period of

2 consecutive seconds as expressed by

the square root of (V2+L2) to no greater

than 0.604g, where L may not exceed

0.3g and V may not exceed 0.55g.

(f) Bearing overheat sensors. Bearing

overheat sensors shall be provided on

board each trainset or at wayside

intervals, as determined by the system

safety plan.

§ 243.413 Fire safety.

(a) All materials used in constructing

the interior of both a trailer car and a

power car shall meet the flammability

and smoke emission characteristics

testing standards contained in

Appendix B to this rule, or alternative

standards issued or recognized by an

expert consensus organization after

approval by FRA in conjunction with

approval of the Railroad’s system safety

plan required by Subpart B of this Part.

For purposes of this section, the interior

of a trailer car and a power car includes

walls, floors, ceilings, seats, doors,

windows, electrical conduits, air ducts,

and any other internal equipment.
65560 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(b) The railroad shall require

certification that combustible materials

to be used in the construction of trainset

interiors have been tested by a

recognized independent testing

laboratory, and that the results comply

with the requirements of paragraph (a)

of this section.

(c) Overheat detectors shall be

installed in all components of the

trainset where the written analysis

required by Subpart B determines that

such equipment is necessary.

(d) Fire or smoke detectors shall be

installed in unoccupied compartments

of a train if the analysis required by

Subpart B determines that such

equipment is necessary to ensure

sufficient time for the safe evacuation of

the train.

(e) A fixed, automatic fire suppression

system shall be installed in unoccupied

compartments of a train if the analysis

required by Subpart B determines that

such a system is necessary and practical

to ensure sufficient time for the safe

evacuation of the train.

(f) The railroad shall comply with

those elements of its written procedures,

under Subpart B, for the inspection,

testing, and maintenance of all fire

safety systems and equipment that it has

designated as mandatory.

(g) The Railroad shall prohibit

smoking on all trainsets in passenger

service.

§ 243.415 Doors.

(a) Powered, exterior side doors. (1)

Each trailer car shall have a minimum

of four exterior side doors, or the

functional equivalent of four side doors,

that each permit at least one 95thpercentile male to pass through at a

single time.

(2) The status of each powered,

exterior door shall be displayed to the

crew in the operating power car. If door

interlocks are used, the sensors used to

detect train motion shall be nominally

set to operate at 5 km/h (3 mph).

(3) Powered, exterior doors shall be

powered by the compressed air system

or by electricity. If powered by

electricity, the doors shall be connected

to an emergency back-up power system.

(4) Each powered, exterior door shall

be equipped with a manual override

that is:

(i) Located adjacent to the door that it

controls;

(ii) Capable of opening the door

without power from both inside and

outside the car; and

(iii) Designed and maintained so that

a person may access the override device

from both inside and outside the car

without the use of any tool or other

implement.

(5) Instructions for manual override

shall be clearly posted in the car interior

at door locations.

(6) A means for emergency responders

to access the manual override from

outside the car shall be provided.

Instructions for access and use of the

handle shall be clearly posted outside

the car at all door locations.

(7) Manual door releases shall be

easily operable by a 5th-percentile

female without requiring the use of any

tools to accomplish the manual override

in the event of head-end power loss.

(8) The Railroad may protect a manual

override device used to open a powered,

exterior door with a cover or a screen

capable of removal by a 5th-percentile

female without requiring the use of a

tool or other implement. If the method

of removing the protective cover or

screen entails breaking or shattering it,

the cover or screen shall be scored,

perforated, or otherwise weakened so

that a 5th-percentile female can

penetrate the cover or screen with a

single blow of her fist without injury to

her hand.

(b) Passenger compartment end doors

shall be equipped with a kick-out panel,

pop-out window or other equivalent

means of egress in the event the door

will not open.

§ 243.417 Emergency equipment.

(a) Emergency system requirements

set forth in this Subpart shall apply to

each trailer car.

(b) Emergency lighting shall be

provided and shall include the

following:

(1) An illumination level of a

minimum of 55 lux (5.1 ft-candles) at

floor level for all normal passenger and

crew evacuation routes from the

equipment;

(2) A back-up power system capable

of operating all emergency lighting for a

period of at least two hours;

(3) A back-up power system capable

of operating in all equipment

orientations; and

(4) A back-up power system capable

of operating after the initial shock of a

collision or derailment due to

individually applied shock loads at 3g/

2g/2g, longitudinal/vertical/lateral

respectively.

(c) A means of emergency

communication throughout the trainset

shall be provided and shall include the

following:

(1) Transmission locations that are

clearly marked with luminescent

material at each end of each unit

adjacent to the unit or car end doors;

(2) Back-up power for a minimum

time period of two hours; and

(3) Clear and understandable

operating instructions at or near each

transmission location.

(d) Locations of emergency equipment

shall be clearly marked with

luminescent material that makes the

identity and location of the equipment

recognizable from a distance equal to

the width of the car.

(e) Emergency exits. (1) Locations of

all emergency exits shall be clearly

marked with luminescent material that

makes the identity and location of the

emergency exit recognizable from a

distance equal to the width of the car.

(2) Clear and understandable

instructions for use of the emergency

exits shall be posted at each emergency

exit and they must be visible from a

distance of 30 inches.

(3) Each trailer car shall have a

minimum of four emergency window

exits, arranged in a staggered

configuration or with one located at

each end of each side of the trailer car.

(4) Each trailer car sealed window

emergency exit shall have a minimum

free opening of 1.6 m (63 in) wide by 0.6

m (24 in) high.

(5) Each emergency window exit shall

be easily operable by a 5th percentile

female without requiring the use of a

tool or implement other than a hammer

designed to break the glazing that shall

be located adjacent to each emergency

window.

(6) Each power car shall have an

emergency roof hatch with a minimum

opening of 0.45 m (18 in) by 0.6 m (24

in) and an emergency escape exit in the

cab sidewall.

(f) The Railroad shall have in place a

redundant means for the train crew to

communicate with the pertinent

railroad operations center to summon

aid in the event of an emergency

situation. These may include operating

portable radios or cellular telephones.

§ 243.419 Operator’s controls and power

car layout.

(a) Operator controls in the power

vehicle or control cab shall be arranged

to be comfortably within view and easy

reach when the locomotive engineer is

seated in the normal train control

position.

(b) The control panels shall be laid

out to minimize the risk of human error.

(c) An alerter (Vigilance Device

System) shall be provided. This system

shall be operative at all speeds above 8

km/h (5 mph). If not acknowledged, the

alerter shall cause a brake application to

stop the train.

(d) Cab information displays shall be

designed with the following

characteristics:

(1) Simplicity and standardization

shall be the driving criteria for design of
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65561

formats for the display of information in

the cab;

(2) Essential, safety-critical

information shall be displayed as a

default condition at the most visible

place for the locomotive engineer.

(3) Operator selection shall be

required to display other than default

information.

(4) Cab or train control signals shall

be displayed for the locomotive

engineer.

(5) Displays shall be readable from the

locomotive engineer’s normal position

under all lighting conditions.

(e) The power car shall be equipped

with an obstacle deflector which

extends across both rails of the track.

The height of the obstacle deflector shall

be more than 150 mm (5.9 in) and less

than 300 mm (11.8 in) off the rails.

(f) The cab layout shall be arranged to

meet the following requirements:

(1) The crew has an effective field of

view in the forward direction, and the

right and left of the direction of travel;

and

(2) Field-of-view obstructions due to

required structural members shall be

minimized.

(g) Each seat provided for a crew

member shall:

(1) Be secured to the carbody with an

attachment having an ultimate strength

capable of withstanding the loads due to

individually applied accelerations of 3g/

2g/2g acting longitudinally/ laterally/

vertically respectively on the mass of

the seat and the crew member

occupying it; and

(2) Be designed according to Layout of

Drivers’ Cabs in Locomotives, Railcars,

Multiple Unit Trains and Driving

Trailers, UIC 651, International Union of

Railways Standard (First Edition, 1986),

which requires that:

(i) All adjustments have the range

necessary to accommodate a 5thpercentile to a 95th-percentile male;

(ii) The seat is equipped with a forceassisted 200 mm longitudinal

adjustment, operated from the seated

position; and

(iii) The seat has a 20 degrees

manually reclining seat back, adjustable

from the seated position.

(h) The ultimate strength of power car

control cab interior fitting and

equipment attachments shall be

sufficient to resist without failure loads

due to individually applied

accelerations of 3g/2g/2g longitudinally/

laterally/vertically respectively acting

on the mass of the fitting or equipment.

(i) Sharp edges and corners on interior

surfaces of the cab likely to be impacted

by the crew during a collision or

derailment shall be eliminated, where

possible, and if not, padded.

(j) Each power car used in revenue

service shall be equipped with operating

heat and air conditioning systems.

§ 243.421 Exterior lights.

(a) Headlights. Each power car shall

be equipped with two or more

headlights. Each headlight shall

produce 12,000 or more candela.

(b) Taillights. (1) Each trailing power

car shall be equipped with two or more

red taillights;

(2) Each taillight shall be located at

least 1.2 m (3.9 ft) above rail;

(3) Each taillight shall produce 15 or

more candela; and

(4) Taillights of the trailing power car

must be on when the trainset is on a

section of the system that is in revenue

service.

§ 243.423 Electrical system design.

(a) Circuit protection. (1) The main

propulsion power line shall be

protected with a lightning arrestor,

automatic circuit breaker, and overload

relay. The lightning arrestor shall be run

by the most direct path possible to

ground with a connection to ground of

not less than No. 6 AWG. These

overload protection devices shall be

housed in an enclosure designed

specifically for that purpose with arc

chute vented directly to outside air.

(2) Head end power, including

trainline power distribution, shall be

provided with both overload and

ground fault protection.

(3) Circuits used for purposes other

than propelling the equipment shall be

connected to their power source through

circuit breakers or equivalent currentlimiting devices.

(4) Each auxiliary circuit shall be

provided with a circuit breaker located

as near as practical to the point of

connection to the source of power for

that circuit. Such protection may be

omitted from circuits controlling safetycritical devices.

(b) Main battery system. (1) The main

batteries shall be isolated from the cab

and passenger seating areas by a noncombustible barrier.

(2) Battery chargers shall be designed

to protect against overcharging.

(3) Battery circuits shall include an

emergency battery cut-off switch to

completely disconnect the energy stored

in the batteries from the load.

(4) If batteries are of the type to

potentially vent explosive gases, the

batteries shall be adequately ventilated

to prevent accumulation of explosive

concentrations of these gases.

(c) Power dissipation resistors. (1)

Power dissipation resistors shall be

adequately ventilated to prevent

overheating under worst-case operating

conditions.

(2) Power dissipation grids shall be

designed and installed with sufficient

isolation to prevent combustion

between resistor elements and

combustible material.

(3) Power dissipation resistor circuits

shall incorporate warning or protective

devices for low ventilation air flow,

over-temperature and short circuit

failures.

(4) Resistor elements shall be

electrically insulated from resistor

frames, and the frames shall be

electrically insulated from the supports

that hold them.

§ 243.425 Automated monitoring.

(a) Each trainset shall be equipped to

monitor the performance of the

following systems or components:

(1) Reception of cab and train control

signals;

(2) Truck hunting;

(3) Electric brake status;

(4) Friction brake status;

(5) Fire detection systems;

(6) Head end power status;

(7) Alerter;

(8) Horn; and

(9) Wheelslide.

(b) The monitoring system shall alert

the locomotive engineer immediately

when any of the monitored parameters

are out of predetermined limits. The

Railroad’s operating rules, developed

pursuant to § 243.117 and Subpart F of

this Part, shall control train movement

when the monitored parameters are out

of predetermined limits. If the

locomotive engineer fails to act in

accordance with these procedures, the

Railroad’s central traffic control shall

initiate corrective action.

(c) The Railroad shall develop, in the

course of the system safety analysis and

pursuant to § 243.117 of this Part,

appropriate operating rules to address

locomotive engineer and equipment

performance in the event that the

automatic monitoring system becomes

defective en route, or is defective when

the daily inspection required by

§ 243.433 is completed.

(d) Each lead power car shall be

equipped with an operative event

recorder that monitors and records all

safety data required by § 243.425(a) of

this Part and 49 CFR 229.135, Event

Recorders.

(e) All monitored systems set forth in

paragraph (a) of this section shall be

tested during each daily inspection

required by § 243.433(f).

§ 243.427 Trainset system software and

hardware integration.

(a) The trainset system hardware and

software integration shall conform with

On-Board Electronic Equipment and
65562 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Computer Hardware, CF 67–001, Bureau

of Railroad Standards, (June 1990).

(b) The trainset system hardware and

software integration shall conform with

Methodology for the Development of

On-Board Micro-Computer Equipment,

Pr CF 67–004 and NF F71–004, Bureau

of Railroad Standards, (February 1989).

§ 243.429 Control system design

requirements.

The Railroad’s trainset computer

hardware and software shall meet the

requirements set forth in § 243.105 of

this Part.

§ 243.431 Safety appliance.

(a) Couplers. (1) The leading and

trailing ends of each semi-permanently

connected trainset shall be equipped

with an automatic coupler that couples

on impact and uncouples by either

activation of a traditional uncoupling

lever, or some other type of uncoupling

mechanism that does not require a

person to go between equipment units.

(2) The leading and trailing end

couplers and uncoupling devices may

be stored within a removable shrouded

housing.

(3) Leading and trailing automatic

couplers of trains shall be compatible

with the Railroad’s rescue locomotives

without the use of special adapters.

(4) All couplers shall be equipped

with an anti-climbing mechanism

capable of resisting an upward or

downward vertical force of 250 kN

(56,200 lb) without permanent

deformation.

(b) Safety appliance mechanical

strength and fasteners. (1) All handrails

and sill steps shall be made of

approximately 25 mm (1 in.) diameter

steel pipe.

(2) All safety appliances shall be

securely fastened to the carbody

structure with mechanical fasteners that

have mechanical strength greater than or

equal to that of a M10 diameter SAE

steel bolt mechanical fastener.

(c) Handrails and handholds. (1)

Handrails and handholds shall be made

of stainless steel.

(2) Vertical handrails shall conform to

the following:

(i) The maximum distance above top

of rail to the bottom of the handrail shall

be 1250 mm (49.2 in) and the minimum

distance shall be 500 mm (19.7 in);

(ii) Minimum hand clearance distance

between the handrail and the vehicle

body shall be 50 mm (1.97 in) for the

entire length; and

(iii) Vertical handrails shall be

securely fastened to the vehicle body.

(3) Handholds and handrails are not

required on units of the trainset which

are semi-permanently connected, which

can be disconnected only in a repair

facility.

(4) Handholds and handrails are not

required at the leading and trailing ends

of the trainset equipped with automatic

couplers, as these couplers are to be

used only for rescue operations, and

coupling can be achieved without

requiring personnel to go between units.

(5) Passenger handrails or handholds

shall be provided at both side access

doors used to board or depart the train.

(6) Power vehicle side exits shall be

equipped with handholds and

handrails.

(d) Sill steps. (1) Each power vehicle

or control cab shall be equipped with

sill steps below each side door;

(2) Power vehicle or control cab sill

steps shall be made of expanded metal

or equivalent anti-skid material;

(3) Sill steps shall be designed and

installed so that:

(4) The minimum tread length of the

sill step shall be 250 mm (9.8 in);

(5) The minimum clear depth shall be

150 mm (5.9 in);

(6) Sill steps shall not have a vertical

rise between treads exceeding 450 mm

(17.7 in). The lowest sill step tread shall

be not more than 500 mm (19.7 in)

above the top of the rail;

(7) All sill steps shall be securely

fastened;

(8) Sill steps are not required on units

of the trainset that are semi-permanently

connected, which can be disconnected

only in a repair facility;

(9) Sill steps are not required at the

leading and trailing ends of the trainset

equipped with automatic couplers as

these couplers are to be used only for

rescue operations, and coupling can be

achieved without requiring personnel to

go between units.

(10) Power vehicle side exits shall be

equipped with sill steps.

(e) Semi-permanent connectors

between trainset vehicles. Each trailer

car and power car in a trainset shall be

connected to the adjacent trailer car or

power car by use of a semi-permanent

connector. Semi-permanent connectors

may be disconnected only in repair

facilities, with the use of special tools,

and in such a manner that do not

require employees to go on, under, or

between equipment. Semi-permanent

connectors are not couplers.

§ 243.433 Trainset inspection, testing and

maintenance requirements.

(a) The Railroad shall develop a

written inspection program for the

rolling stock, in accordance with and

approved under the requirements of

Subpart B, prior to implementation of

that program and prior to commencing

operations. At a minimum, this program

shall include the complete inspection,

testing, and maintenance program for

the TGV trainset as it is performed in

France, including all inspections set

forth in paragraph (f) below. This

information shall include a detailed

description of:

(1) Safety inspection procedures,

intervals and criteria;

(2) Test procedures and intervals;

(3) Scheduled preventive

maintenance intervals;

(4) Maintenance procedures;

(5) Special test equipment or

measuring devices required to perform

safety inspections and tests;

(6) Training and qualification of

employees and contractors to perform

safety inspections, tests and

maintenance; and

(7) Methods of ensuring accurate

records of required inspections.

(b) Identification of safety-critical

items. In the program required by

paragraph (a), the Railroad shall identify

all inspection and testing procedures

and criteria, and maintenance intervals

that the Railroad deems to be safetycritical. Operation of emergency

equipment, emergency back-up systems,

and trainset exits shall be deemed

safety-critical.

(c) Program changes. The Railroad

must obtain FRA approval for any

changes to the safety-critical portion of

the trainset inspection, testing, and

maintenance program required by

paragraph (a).

(d) Compliance. After the Railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program is approved by FRA pursuant

to the requirements and procedures set

forth in Subpart B, the Railroad shall

adopt the program and shall perform:

(1) All inspections and tests described

in the program in accordance with the

procedures and criteria that the Railroad

identified as safety-critical; and

(2) All maintenance tasks and

procedures described in the program in

accordance with the procedures and

intervals that the railroad identified as

safety-critical.

(e) The inspection, testing, and

maintenance program shall ensure that

all systems and components of the

equipment are free of conditions that

endanger the safety of the crew,

passengers, or equipment. These

conditions include, but are not limited

to:

(1) A continuous accumulation of oil

or grease;

(2) Improper functioning of a

component;

(3) A crack, break, excessive wear,

structural defect or weakness of a

component;

(4) A leak;
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65563

(5) Use of a component or system

under conditions that exceed those for

which the component or system is

designed to operate; and

(6) Insecure attachment of a

component.

(f) Specific safety inspections. The

program under paragraph (a) of this

section shall specify that all passenger

equipment shall receive thorough safety

inspections by qualified personnel at

regular intervals. At a minimum, each

trainset shall have:

(1) Daily inspection. Each trainset in

use shall be inspected at least once each

calendar day by qualified personnel.

The inspection shall verify the correct

operation of all on-board safety systems.

If any of the conditions listed below are

found during this inspection, the

trainset shall not be put into revenue

service until that condition is rectified.

If the existence of any condition listed

below cannot be determined by use of

the on-board automated monitoring

system, the Railroad shall perform a

visual inspection to determine if the

condition exists.

(i) Malfunction of the driving

assistance system (SIAC);

(ii) Malfunction of the fire detection

system;

(iii) Indication of an unbalanced

tripod;

(iv) Indication of a broken tripod;

(v) Indication of blocked axle;

(vi) A single phase pantograph or its

circuit breaker out of order;

(vii) Power car failure or cut-out;

(viii) Isolated roof disconnecting

switch H(HT);

(ix) Transformer cooling or ventilation

out of order;

(x) Two or more motor blocks

isolated;

(xi) Mechanical brake on one or more

trucks isolated;

(xii) Total failure of the anti-slide

device on one truck;

(xiii) Failure of locomotive engineer’s

vigilance system (VACMA);

(xiv) Speedometer failure;

(xv) Failure of on-board signaling

system;

(xvi) Failure of the speed measuring

system (the warning flag of the

speedometer does not disappear when

the driving cab is activated);

(xvii) Locomotive engineer’s console

out of order;

(xviii) Locomotive engineer’s brake

valve not operating;

(xix) Leak in the main reservoir line;

(xx) Leak in the main brake pipe;

(xxi) Failure indication during the

required brake test;

(xxii) Trailer car battery charger out of

order; and

(xxiii) Total failure of the trainset

interior lighting.

(2) Examination in service. A visual

inspection conducted by qualified

personnel every 4000 km (2,485 mi), at

a location where there is a repair pit and

access to the top of the trainset. At a

minimum, the items listed below shall

be inspected. All conditions found that

do not comply with the safety

inspection criteria required by

paragraph (a) of this section shall be

corrected before the trainset is put into

revenue service.

(i) Condition of the pantographs and

roof insulators;

(ii) Condition of sanding nozzles;

(iii) Fixation and condition of

dampers;

(iv) Condition of suspension springs;

(v) Fixation and condition of

grounding straps;

(vi) Condition of side skirts and

underbody panels;

(vii) Condition of trucks;

(viii) Oil levels;

(ix) Traction motor-to-carbody

securement;

(x) Presence of brake pads;

(xi) Condition of brake shoes;

(xii) Condition of wheel tread;

(xiii) Condition of drive train.

(3) Running gear inspection. The

running gear shall be inspected by

qualified personnel once every 18 days.

At a minimum, the items listed below

shall be inspected. All conditions found

that do not comply with the safety

inspection criteria required by

paragraph (a) of this section shall be

corrected before the trainset is put into

revenue service.

(i) A visual inspection of trucks;

(ii) An inspection of the operation of

flange-lubricating devices;

(iii) An inspection of the condition

and attachment of dampers, roof

mounted elements, and suspension

components;

(iv) An inspection of the brake

rigging, journal bearings, and tripod

transmission

(v) A visual inspection of the

condition and attachment of brake pads;

(vi) An inspection of the oil levels on

drive train;

(vii) An inspection of the securement

of drive train and wheel slide sensors;

(viii) An inspection of the condition

of the pantographs and roof insulators;

and

(ix) Check for audible leaks on

pneumatic system.

(4) Wheel inspection. Each trainset

wheel and reprofile shall be inspected

by qualified personnel at an interval not

to exceed 50,000 km of travel.

Equipment not in compliance with the

inspection criteria established in

paragraph (a) of this section shall be

replaced before the wheel or reprofile

returns to revenue service.

(5) Minor inspection. At an interval

not to exceed 150,000 km of travel or 7

months of time, whichever comes first,

the Railroad shall perform a Minor

Inspection on all trainsets in accordance

with the test procedures and inspection

criteria established in paragraph (a) of

this section. All conditions found that

do not comply with the safety

inspection criteria required by

paragraph (a) shall be corrected before

the trainset is put into revenue service.

The Minor Inspection shall include:

(i) Electrical Parts:

(A) Inspect current return devices,

antennas, and transponders;

(B) Examine batteries;

(C) Check operation of lighting;

(D) Check operation of speedometer

unit and of cab signal receptor;

(E) Check sensors and sensor

protectors;

(F) Check roof switches and contacts;

(G) Check circuit breakers; and

(H) Check traction motors and main

transformers.

(ii) Mechanical Parts:

(A) Inspect axles, axle boxes and

trucks;

(B) Check tightening torque of shock

absorber and support mounting bolts;

(C) Check buffing gear;

(D) Inspect pantographs;

(E) Check attachment of anti-roll bars;

(F) Examine condition of guard-irons;

(G) Check setting of sanders;

(H) Verify proper operation of flangelubricating devices;

(I) Check level and condition of oil on

motor and reducing gears;

(J) Check attachment of geared motors;

(K) Check for grease projections from

the motive force transmission

components, and carrying and fixed

rings of the articulation joint;

(L) Check attachment of motive force

transmission components and tripod

transmission;

(M) Check condition of motorized

axle torque reaction rods;

(N) Check condition of brake-units

and brake shoes;

(O) Check condition of disk brake

pads and of the brake rigging cylinder

assembly;

(P) Check condition of bellows;

(Q) Check for attachment defects and

distortions on car body components,

including underside panels, skirts,

windows, and fairings;

(R) Verify proper operation of all

doors, including locking devices;

(S) Check for defects on front power

car windows;

(T) Inspect fire extinguishers,

emergency safety equipment and tools,

including the tink hammer; and

(U) Inspect tachometer and odometer

sensors.
65564 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(iii) Pneumatic Parts:

(A) Inspect main compressor for

proper operation;

(B) Check oil level and leaks in the

compressor;

(C) Inspect condition of pneumatic

suspension components; and

(D) Inspect brake equipment and

brake indicator lamps.

(6) General inspection. At an interval

not to exceed 300,000 km of travel or 13

months of time, whichever comes first,

the Railroad shall perform a General

Inspection of all trainsets in accordance

with the tests procedures and inspection

criteria established in paragraph (a) of

this section. All conditions found that

do not comply with the safety

inspection criteria required by

paragraph (a) shall be corrected before

the trainset is put into revenue service.

The General Inspection shall include all

items required in the Minor Inspection

and:

(i) Electrical Parts:

(A) Inspect circuit breakers;

(B) Examine insulators;

(C) Inspect main transformers;

(D) Inspect braids and connecting

shunts, sensors and sensor protectors;

(E) Examine electro-pneumatic and

electromagnetic contacts;

(F) Inspect freon enclosures;

(G) Check for anomalies on resistors;

(H) Check operation of signaling

lights;

(I) Visual inspection of diodes and

antennas;

(J) Check condition of electronic plugin units;

(K) Check condition of switches,

controls, and joints;

(L) Check condition of master

controller;

(M) Check operation of clock and

indicator of imposed speed;

(N) Check operation of ground-to-train

radio link and speed supervision by

transponder;

(O) Check operation of passenger

alarms;

(P) Inspect antenna;

(Q) Verify that headlights, tail lights,

indicators, lighting, desks operate

properly in full and dimmed status;

(R) Verify power supply to electrical

outlets that are accessible to passengers

and service personnel;

(S) Check operation of lights and

indicators in electrical cabinets;

(T) Inspect traction, main, auxiliary

compressor, and ventilation motors; and

(U) Check operation of refrigeration

system and circuit breakers.

(ii) Mechanical Parts:

(A) Check operation of pantographs;

(B) Check for defects, including cracks

and distortions, on trucks;

(C) Check for defects and check play

on fixed and carrying rings of

articulation joint;

(D) Check for defects on intercar

passageways;

(E) Check for defects on doors, locks,

and joints;

(F) Check interbody and anti-tilt

dampers;

(G) Check tread brake units; and

(H) Check underbody rotation stops.

(iii) Pneumatic Parts:

(A) Check pressure gauge;

(B) Check operation of braking gear;

(C) Check operation of the antiwheelslide device;

(D) Check operation of the emergency

brake valve;

(E) Clean driver’s brake valve and

check its operation;

(F) Inspect flexible and halfcouplings;

(G) Check operation of valves which

control alarms, windshield washers,

windshield wipers, and of differential

valves; and

(H) Check brake indicator lights.

(7) Major inspection. At an interval

not to exceed 600,000 km of travel or 25

months of time, whichever comes first,

the Railroad shall perform a Major

Inspection on all trainsets in accordance

with the tests procedures and inspection

criteria established in paragraph (a) of

this section. All conditions found that

do not comply with the safety

inspection criteria required by

paragraph (a) shall be corrected before

the trainset is put into revenue service.

The Major Inspection shall include all

items required in the General Inspection

and:

(i) Electrical Parts:

(A) Inspect roof cable and lightning

arresters;

(B) Inspect operation of the roof

switch;

(C) Inspect battery switches;

(D) Inspect battery charger and battery

voltmeter;

(E) Inspect inverters;

(F) Examine coils;

(G) Clean electronic gear;

(H) Inspect couplers and connecting

cables;

(I) Inspect driver’s console switch

box;

(J) Test driver’s vigilance system;

(K) Pre-departure sensors;

(L) Inspect operation of cab signal;

(M) Clean switchgear cabinets;

(N) Lubricate traction motors;

(O) Inspect ammeters and key switch

panel;

(P) Inspect 30 KVA inverter; and

(R) Inspect spare light bulb supply.

(ii) Mechanical Parts:

(A) Inspect calibration of pantographs;

(B) Inspect for defects on motorized

axle reaction rods;

(C) Inspect the constituents of fixed

and carrying rings of articulation joint;

(D) Inspect that headlight covers are

tightly secured; and

(E) Inspect for defects on car body

exterior paint.

(iii) Pneumatic Parts:

(A) Inspect air and oil filters;

(B) Inspect main compressor

couplings;

(C) Inspect operation of the main air

dryer;

(D) Inspect operation of pressure

gauges;

(E) Inspect pneumatic suspension

reservoirs;

(F) Inspect operation of power car and

trailer car brakes;

(G) Inspect operation of pneumatic

pressure regulators;

(H) Inspect truck-to-car body coupling

and pneumatic suspension connections;

and

(I) Inspect operation of the springapplied parking brake.

(g) Brake system repair points. The

Railroad shall designate brake system

repair point(s) in the inspection criteria

established in paragraph (a) of this

section. No trainset shall depart a brake

system repair point unless that trainset

has a 100 percent operational brake

system.

(h) Maintenance intervals. The

Railroad’s program established pursuant

to paragraph (a) of this section shall

include the Railroad’s scheduled

maintenance intervals for equipment

based on TGV operations in Europe, and

on an analysis required the system

safety program set forth in Subpart B of

this Part. The maintenance interval of a

safety-critical components shall be

changed only when justified by

accumulated, verifiable operating data,

and approved by FRA as part of a

system safety plan amendment.

(i) Training and qualification

program. The Railroad shall establish a

training and qualification program as

defined in Subpart H of this Part to

qualify individuals to perform

inspections, testing, and maintenance

on the equipment. Only qualified

individuals shall perform inspections,

testing, and maintenance of the

equipment. An employee or contractor

employee shall have knowledge of

standard procedures described in

paragraph (h) of this section in order to

qualify to perform a task.

(j) Standard procedures for safely

performing inspection, testing,

maintenance, or repairs. The Railroad’s

program required by paragraph (a) of

this section shall include the Railroad’s

written standard procedures for

performing all safety-critical equipment

inspection, testing, maintenance, or

repair tasks. These standard procedures

shall:
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65565

(1) Describe in detail each step

required to safely perform the task;

(2) Describe the knowledge necessary

to safely perform the task;

(3) Describe any precautions that must

be taken to safely perform the task;

(4) Describe the use of any safety

equipment necessary to perform the

task;

(5) Be approved by the railroad’s chief

mechanical officer;

(6) Be approved by the railroad’s

official responsible for safety;

(7) Be enforced by supervisors with

responsibility for accomplishing the

tasks; and

(8) Be reviewed annually by the

Railroad.

(k) Quality control program. The

Railroad shall establish an inspection,

testing, and maintenance quality control

program enforced by the Railroad or its

contractor(s) to reasonably ensure that

inspections, tests, and maintenance are

performed in accordance with Federal

safety standards and the procedures

established by the railroad.

(l) Recordkeeping. The Railroad shall

make and maintain a written or

electronic record of each required

inspection under this section. Each

record shall be maintained for at least

one year from the date of the inspection.

Subpart F—Operating Rules

§ 243.501 Purpose.

Through the requirements of this

Subpart, FRA learns the condition of the

operating and emergency preparedness

rules and practices in use by the

Railroad. The Railroad’s operating rules,

and any amendments thereto, are

subject to FRA approval in accordance

with the procedures set forth in

§ 243.509 of this Subpart. The rules and

practices covered by this Subpart

include the procedures for instruction

and testing of all employees involved

with the movement of rail vehicles,

including locomotive engineers, onboard attendants, central control staff,

and all maintenance staff, which are

necessary to ensure that they possess

the requisite skill and knowledge of the

rules and operating practices to

maintain the safety of the system.

§ 243.503 Operating rules; filing and

recordkeeping.

(a) The Railroad shall file with FRA

one copy of its code of operating rules,

timetables, timetable special

instructions six months prior to

commencing internal operations, and

one year prior to commencing any

revenue passenger transportation

operations. The Railroad shall designate

those rules, practices, and procedures

that it deems safety-critical. Upon FRA

approval of the operating rules pursuant

to the procedures set forth in § 243.509,

FRA will adopt and incorporate the

safety-critical operating rules as

Appendix C to this Part. The Railroad’s

Emergency Preparedness Plan shall be

filed in accordance with the

requirements of FRA’s Passenger Train

Emergency Standards as ultimately

codified in 49 CFR part 239, as

amended.

(b) The Railroad shall file each

amendment to its code of operating

rules, each new timetable, and each new

timetable special instruction within 30

days after it is issued.

(c) The Railroad shall keep one copy

of its current code of operating rules,

timetables, timetable special instruction,

at its system headquarters, and shall

make such records available to

representatives of the FRA for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours. These records shall be

retained at the Railroad’s system

headquarters for one year after the end

of the calendar year to which they

relate.

(d) Any person who fails to comply

with a safety-critical operating rule or

practice, including timetables, timetable

special instructions, or operational

directives, issued pursuant to this

Subpart and adopted and incorporated

by reference in Appendix C to this rule,

is subject to a civil penalty or other

enforcement action for violation of those

safety-critical rules and practices, in

accordance with § 243.9 of this Part.

§ 243.505 Program of operational tests and

inspections; recordkeeping.

(a) Requirement to conduct

operational tests and inspections. The

Railroad shall periodically conduct

operational tests and inspections to

determine the extent of compliance with

its code of operating rules, timetables,

timetable special instructions, and

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program in accordance with a written

program retained at its system

headquarters.

(b) Written program of operational

tests and inspections. Three months

prior to commencing operations, and six

months prior to commencing any

revenue passenger service operations,

the Railroad shall file and retain one

copy of its current program for periodic

performance of the operational tests and

inspections required by paragraph (a) of

this section, and shall file and retain

one copy of each subsequent

amendment to such program as

amendments are made. These records

shall be retained at the system

headquarters of the Railroad for three

calendar years after the end of the

calendar year to which they relate.

These records shall be made available to

representatives of the FRA for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours. The program shall:

(1) Provide for operational testing and

inspection under the various operating

conditions on the Railroad;

(2) Describe each type of operational

test and inspection adopted, including

the means and procedures used to carry

it out;

(3) State the purpose of each type of

operational test and inspection;

(4) State, according to operating

divisions where applicable, the

frequency with which each type of

operational test and inspection is

conducted;

(5) Begin within 30 days after the date

of commencing operations; and

(6) Include a schedule for making the

program fully operative within 210 days

after it begins.

(c) Records of individual tests and

inspections. The Railroad shall keep a

record of the date, time, place, and

result of each operational test and

inspection that was performed in

accordance with its program. Each

record shall specify the officer

administering the test and inspection

and each employee tested. These

records shall be retained at the system

headquarters of the Railroad for one

calendar year after the end of the

calendar year to which they relate.

These records shall be made available to

representatives of the Federal Railroad

Administration for inspection and

copying during normal business hours.

(d) Annual summary on operational

tests and inspections. Before March 1 of

each calendar year, the Railroad shall

retain, at its system headquarters, one

copy of a written summary of the

following with respect to its previous

year’s activities: The number, type, and

result of each operational test and

inspection that was conducted as

required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of

this section. These records shall be

retained for three calendar years after

the end of the calendar year to which

they relate and shall be made available

to representatives of FRA for inspection

and copying during normal business

hours.

(e) Electronic recordkeeping. The

Railroad is authorized to retain by

electronic recordkeeping the

information prescribed in paragraphs (b)

through (d) of this section, provided that

all of the following conditions are met:

(1) The Railroad adequately limits and

controls accessibility to such

information retained in its electronic
65566 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

database system and identifies those

individuals who have such access;

(2) The Railroad has a terminal at the

system headquarters and at each

division headquarters;

(3) Each such terminal has a desk-top

computer (i.e., monitor, central

processing unit, and keyboard) and

either a facsimile machine or a printer

connected to the computer to retrieve

and produce information in a usable

format for immediate review by FRA

representatives;

(4) The Railroad has a designated

representative who is authorized to

authenticate retrieved information from

the electronic system as true and

accurate copies of the electronically

kept records; and

(5) The Railroad provides

representatives of the Federal Railroad

Administration with immediate access

to these records for inspection and

copying during normal business hours

and provides printouts of such records

upon request.

§ 243.507 Program of instruction on

operating rules; recordkeeping; electronic

recordkeeping.

(a) To ensure that each Railroad

employee whose activities are governed

by the Railroad’s operating rules

understands those rules, the Railroad

shall periodically instruct each such

employee on the meaning and

application of its operating rules in

accordance with a written program

retained at its system headquarters and

at the division headquarters.

(b) Three months before commencing

operations, and six months before

commencing any revenue passenger

service operations, the Railroad shall

file and retain one copy of its current

program for the periodic instruction of

its employees as required by paragraph

(a) of this section and shall file and

retain one copy of any amendment to

that program as amendments are made.

These records shall be retained at the

Railroad’s system headquarters for one

calendar year after the end of the

calendar year to which they relate.

These records shall be made available to

representatives of the FRA for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours. This program shall:

(1) Describe the means and

procedures used for instruction of the

various classes of affected employees;

(2) State the frequency of instruction

and the basis for determining that

frequency;

(3) Include a schedule for completing

the initial instruction of employees who

are already employed when the program

begins;

(4) Begin on the date of commencing

operations; and

(5) Provide for initial instruction of

each employee hired after the program

begins.

(c) The Railroad to which this Subpart

applies is authorized to retain by

electronic recordkeeping its program for

periodic instruction of its employees on

operating rules, provided that the

requirements stated in § 243.505(e)(1)–

(5) of this Subpart are satisfied.

§ 243.509 Operating rules approval.

(a) The Railroad shall submit its

operating rules to FRA’s Associate

Administrator for Safety for review,

within the time intervals required by

this Subpart. FRA shall notify the

Railroad, in writing, within 90 days of

receipt of the Railroad’s submission,

that the rules are approved,

disapproved, or disapproved in part. If

disapproved or disapproved in part,

FRA shall explain the reason on which

the disapproval is based, and the

measures needed to obtain approval.

(b) The Railroad shall submit any

amendment to its operating rules to

FRA’s Associate Administrator for

Safety for review, within 30 days after

it is issued. The Railroad’s amendment

shall go into effect until such time that

FRA notifies the Railroad, in writing,

that such amendment is disapproved or

disapproved in part. If disapproved,

FRA shall explain the reason on which

the disapproval is based, and the

measures needed to obtain approval.

(c) In the course of the approval

process set forth in this section, the

Railroad shall provide to FRA

supporting documentation that FRA

deems necessary to assess accurately the

level of safety provided for in the

Railroad’s operating rules.

Subpart G—System Qualification Tests

§ 243.601 Responsibility for verification

demonstrations and tests.

The Railroad shall comply with the

pre-revenue qualification tests and

verification requirements set forth in

this Subpart and in Subpart B to

demonstrate the overall safety of the

system, prior to revenue operations.

§ 243.603 Preparation of test plan.

(a) Prior to commencing revenue

service operations and in accordance

with Subpart B of this Part, the Railroad

shall develop a system-wide test plan,

that includes testing procedures, to

demonstrate the operability of all

system elements, including track and

infrastructure, signal, communications,

rolling stock, software, and operating

practices, and the system as a whole.

After receiving FRA approval of the prerevenue service test plan as part of the

system safety plan approval, and prior

to commencing revenue service, the

Railroad shall adopt and comply with

the approved plan, including

completion of all tests required by the

plan.

(b) The plan shall be made available

to FRA for inspection and copying upon

request.

(c) The plan shall include all of the

following elements:

(1) A clear statement of the test

objectives. One of the principal test

objectives shall be to demonstrate that

the Railroad’s system meets the safety

design and performance requirements

specified in this Part when operated in

the environment in which it will be

used;

(2) A schedule for conducting the

tests;

(3) A description of the Railroad

property or facilities to be used to

conduct the tests;

(4) A detailed description of how the

tests are to be conducted. This

description shall include:

(i) An identification of the systems

and equipment to be tested;

(ii) The method by which the systems

and equipment shall be tested;

(iii) The criteria to be used to evaluate

the system’s and equipment’s

performance; and

(iv) The means by which the test

results will be reported to FRA.

(5) A description of any special

instrumentation to be used during the

tests;

(6) A description of the information or

data to be obtained;

(7) A description of how the

information or data obtained is to be

analyzed or used;

(8) A clear description of any criteria

to be used as safety limits during the

testing;

(9) A description of the criteria to be

used to measure or determine the

success or failure of the tests. If system

qualification is to be based on

extrapolation of less than full-level

testing results, the analysis done to

justify the validity of the extrapolation

shall be described.

(10) A description of any special

safety precautions to be observed during

the testing;

(11) A written set of standard

operating procedures to be used to

ensure that the testing is done safely;

(12) Quality control procedures to

ensure that the inspection, testing, and

maintenance procedures are followed;

and

(13) A demonstration of the

inspection criteria to be used for the

revenue service operation of the

Railroad’s system.
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(d) The test plan shall include steps

to:

(1) Verify results of installation tests

performed by contractors and

manufacturers;

(2) Conduct pre-operational testing of

individual safety-related equipment,

facilities, and subsystems; and

(3) Conduct operational testing of the

system safety.

(e) The test plan shall include

detailed, written procedures for the

testing and start-up of all safety-critical

equipment, facilities, and subsystems

installed on the line, in passenger

stations, in maintenance shops, and on

the trainsets.

§ 243.605 Pre-operational qualification

tests.

(a) The Railroad shall conduct preoperational qualification tests, prior to

commencing revenue operations, to

verify that all safety-critical components

meet all functional and all performance

specifications.

(b) The pre-operational qualification

tests of equipment, facilities, and

subsystems shall include, at a

minimum:

(1) Verification of the correct utility

supply circuits, procedures for

energization and de-energization, and

formal permit-to-work procedures;

(2) Verification of the installation of

radio communication equipment that is

compatible with existing systems and

suitable for integration into the planned

network; and

(3) Verification of the operation of the

dedicated telephone systems in facilities

and along the right-of-way;

(4) Verification of the operation of all

safety-related equipment in the

maintenance shop;

(5) Verification of local control of

substation equipment;

(6) Energization of substations and

verification of formal permit-to-work

procedures;

(7) Continuity testing of the overhead

catenary system and rail return circuits;

(8) High-potential testing of traction

power supply feeders and the overhead

catenary system;

(9) Energization of each section of the

overhead catenary system and

verification of formal permit-to-work

procedures;

(10) Verification of yard and shop

overhead catenary system sectionalizing

for power isolation during vehicle

maintenance;

(11) Verification of compliance with

civil works and track standards;

(12) Verification that all civil works,

support structures, and installations are

correctly positioned with respect to

mechanical and electrical clearance

envelopes, and with the Railroad’s

structure and clearance diagrams;

(13) Verification that the dimensions

of the vehicles are in compliance with

the Railroad’s structure and clearance

diagrams;

(14) Verification of correct operation

of all wayside detectors;

(15) Verification of safe operation of

signal system and central traffic control

functions;

(16) Verification of local operation of

track switching and signal system

equipment;

(17) Verification of all on-board

trainset safety-critical components;

(18) Verification of all emergency

preparedness procedures; and

(19) Verification that the system’s

software operates as intended, is reliable

and crash-resistant, is impenetrable to

unauthorized entry, and interacts

redundantly as designed.

§ 243.607 Integrated operational testing of

systems.

(a) Prior to commencing revenue

operations, the Railroad shall conduct

high speed tests of the trainsets

throughout the system to:

(1) Apply dynamic loads to track and

bridge structures;

(2) Verify vehicle clearances to

structures and platforms;

(3) Verify mechanical positioning of

the overhead catenary system; and

(4) Verify performance of the vehicle,

track, power supply, signal and

communication systems.

(b) The Railroad shall demonstrate

safe operation of the system during

normal and degraded-mode operating

conditions. At a minimum, the

following operation tests shall be

performed:

(1) Short-circuit tests to check power

supply protection circuits and signal

system immunization;

(2) Slow-speed operation of a trainset;

(3) Verification of correct overhead

catenary and pantograph interaction;

(4) Verification of vehicle clearance at

structures and passenger platforms;

(5) Incremental increase of train

speed;

(6) Performance tests on vehicles to

verify braking rates;

(7) Verification that vehicle noise and

vibration are in compliance with codes

and regulations;

(8) Verification of correct vehicle

suspension characteristics;

(9) Verification of ride quality at

operating speeds established in test

plan;

(10) Verification of track and civil

structure performance under dynamic

load, which shall meet the following

requirements:

(i) Each rolling stock type shall be

qualified for its intended speed in order

to demonstrate that the vehicle dynamic

response to track alignment and

geometry variations are within

acceptable limits to assure safe

operation;

(ii) The qualification testing shall

insure that the equipment will not

exceed the wheel/rail force safety limits

specified in the table in section 4.37 and

the limits for ride vibration specified in

section 5.13(e) at any speed less than 16

km/h (10 mph) above the proposed

maximum operating speed;

(iii) The Railroad shall establish a

target maximum testing speed that is at

least 16 km/h (10 mph) above the

proposed maximum revenue service

speed, appropriate target test and

operating conditions, and conduct a test

program sufficient to evaluate the

operating limits of the track and

equipment in order to gather the test

data required to support the analysis

required above. The test program shall

demonstrate vehicle dynamic response

as speeds are incrementally increased

from 160 km/h (100 mph) to the target

maximum test speeds. The test shall be

suspended at that speed where any of

the vehicle/track performance limits in

this section are exceeded;

(iv) At the conclusion of the testing

phase, the Railroad shall complete test

runs with the subject equipment over

the entire route proposed for revenue

service, when maximum safe operating

speed has been determined taking into

account permissible levels of cant

deficiency. These concluding tests shall

be conducted:

(A) At the speeds the Railroad will

request FRA to approve for service; and

(B) At 16 km/h (10 mph) above such

speed; and

(v) The Railroad shall submit a report

of the test procedures and results to

FRA upon completion of the tests. The

test report shall include the design

flange angle of the equipment that

applied to the criteria for the ratio of

lateral forces that any wheel exerts on

an individual rail to the vertical force

exerted on the rail. This flange angle

shall be used in the determination of the

lateral to vertical wheel load safety limit

for the track/vehicle performance

measurements required by Subpart D.

(11) Load tests with vehicles to verify

relay settings and signal and

communication system immunization;

(12) Monitoring of utility supply

circuits and telephone circuits to ensure

the adequacy of power supplies, and to

verify that transit-related disturbances

are within acceptable limits;
65568 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(13) Verification of vehicle detection

due to shunting of signal system

circuits;

(14) Verification of correct signal

status indications;

(15) Verification of safe operation of

automatic train control (ATC) system;

(16) Tests of vehicle radio reception

during system-wide vehicle operation;

and

(17) Verification that the system’s

software operates as intended, is reliable

and crash-resistant, is impenetrable to

unauthorized entry, and interacts

redundantly as designed.

§ 243.609 Pre-revenue service testing.

For a period of four or more months

prior to revenue operations, the Railroad

shall conduct pre-revenue service tests

that include simulation of full revenue

service operation to verify overall

system performance, and provide

operating and maintenance experience.

The frequency and duration of the tests

shall be determined in conjunction with

preparation of the Railroad’s system

safety plan and approved by FRA, as set

forth in Subpart B of this Part.

§ 243.611 Verification of compliance.

(a) The Railroad shall prepare a report

detailing the results of all preoperational and pre-revenue service

qualification tests. The report shall

identify any problems encountered

during testing, and alternative actions

necessary to correct defects in

workmanship, materials, equipment,

design, or operating parameters.

(b) The Railroad shall implement all

alternative actions necessary to correct

defects, as identified by the report.

(c) The Railroad shall submit the

report to FRA 60 days prior to

commencing revenue operations.

Subpart H—Personnel Qualification

Requirements

§ 243.701 General requirements.

(a) The Railroad shall develop and

implement a personnel qualification

training program to meet the

requirements set forth in § 243.109 of

this Part, to provide all employees who

perform safety-related duties the

knowledge and skills necessary to

effectively complete safety-related

duties.

(b) As part of this program, the

Railroad shall, at a minimum:

(1) Identify the safety-related tasks

that must be performed on the

Railroad’s system, including all

emergency preparedness tasks required

by this Part;

(2) Develop written procedures for the

performance of the tasks identified;

(3) Identify the skills and knowledge

necessary to perform each task;

(4) Develop a training course that

includes classroom and ‘‘hands-on’’

instruction designed to impart the skills

and knowledge identified as necessary

to perform each task;

(5) Require all employees to

successfully complete the training

course that covers the system,

equipment, and tasks for which they are

responsible;

(6) Require all employees to pass a

written examination covering the

system, equipment, and tasks for which

they are responsible;

(7) Require all employees to

demonstrate ‘‘hands-on’’ capability to

perform their assigned tasks;

(8) Require supervisors to complete

the program that covers the employees

that they supervise;

(9) Require supervisors to exercise

oversight to ensure that all the

identified tasks are performed in

accordance with the Railroad’s written

procedures;

(10) Complete required training of the

work force prior to the start of revenue

service;

(11) Designate in writing that each

employee has the knowledge and skills

necessary to perform the safety-related

tasks for which she or he is responsible;

(12) Require periodic refresher

training at an interval not to exceed

three years that includes classroom

instruction, ‘‘hands-on’’ training, and

testing;

(13) Add new systems and equipment

to the qualification and designation

program prior to introduction into

revenue service; and

(14) Maintain records for the duration

of the employee’s employment which

demonstrate that each employee

performing safety-related tasks on the

Railroad’s system is currently qualified

to do so. These records shall distinguish

the qualifications of the employee as a

qualified person.

(c) The personnel qualification

training program shall define the

process by which the Railroad will

ensure that all employees who perform

safety-related duties are qualified to

complete those duties. The program

shall define the method by which the

Railroad measures the knowledge and

skills of all employees who perform

safety-related duties.

(d) With regard to the types of

employees for whom specific

qualification requirements are set forth

in this Subpart, the Railroad’s training

program shall be designed and

implemented to ensure that those

employees meet those requirements.

(e) The Railroad’s personnel

qualification training program for

locomotive engineers shall follow the

requirements set forth in 49 CFR part

240.

(f) The Railroad may not permit any

individual, whether an employee of the

Railroad or of a contractor, to perform

the functions described in this Subpart

unless that individual meets the

qualification standards of this Subpart

and has been trained in a program that

is designed to ensure that the individual

meets those requirements.

(g) All records required by this

Subpart shall be maintained by the

Railroad and available for FRA review

for the duration of an employee’s

employment.

Track Personnel

§ 243.703 Personnel qualifications for

track maintenance and inspection

personnel.

(a) General. The Railroad shall

designate qualified individuals

responsible for the maintenance and

inspection of track in compliance with

the safety requirements prescribed in

Subpart D of this Part. Each designated

individual, including contractors and

their employees, must meet the

minimum qualifications set forth in this

Subpart.

(b) Recordkeeping. With respect to the

designation of individuals under this

section, the Railroad shall maintain

written records of:

(1) Each designation in effect;

(2) The basis for each designation,

including but not limited to:

(i) The exact nature of any training

courses attended and the dates thereof;

(ii) The manner in which the Railroad

has determined a successful completion

of that training course, including test

scores or other qualifying results;

§ 243.705 Personnel qualified to supervise

track restoration and renewal.

(a) Each individual designated to

supervise restorations and renewals of

track shall have:

(1) At least five years of responsible

supervisory experience in railroad track

maintenance of FRA track Class 4 or

higher, and the successful completion of

a course offered by the employer or by

a college level engineering program,

supplemented by special on-the-job

training that emphasizes the techniques

to be employed in the supervision,

restoration, and renewal of high speed

track;

(2) A combination of at least one year

of responsible supervisory experience in

track maintenance in FRA Track Class 4

or higher and the successful completion

of a minimum of 80 hours of specialized
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65569

training in the maintenance of high

speed track provided by the employer or

by a college level engineering program,

supplemented by special on-the-job

training provided by the employer with

emphasis on the maintenance of high

speed track; or

(3) A combination of at least two years

of experience in track maintenance in

FRA Track Class 4 or higher and the

successful completion of a minimum of

120 hours of specialized training in the

maintenance of high speed track

provided by the employer or by a

college level engineering program

supplemented by special on the job

training provided by the employer with

emphasis on the maintenance of high

speed track.

(b) Each individual designated to

supervise restorations and renewals of

track shall demonstrate annually to the

Railroad that the individual:

(1) Knows and understands the

requirements of Subpart D of this Part;

(2) Can detect deviations from those

requirements; and

(3) Can prescribe appropriate

remedial action to correct or safely

compensate for those deviations.

(c) Each individual designated to

supervise restorations and renewals of

track shall have written authorization

from the Railroad to prescribe remedial

actions to correct or safely compensate

for deviations from the requirements of

Subpart D of this Part and shall have

successfully completed a recorded

examination on Subpart D as part of the

qualification process.

§ 243.707 Personnel qualified to inspect

track.

(a) Each individual designated to

inspect track for defects, shall have:

(1) At least five years of responsible

experience inspecting track in FRA

Track Class 4 or above, and the

successful completion of a course

offered by the Railroad or by a college

level engineering program,

supplemented by special on-the-job

training that emphasizes the techniques

to be employed in the inspection of high

speed track; or

(2) A combination of at least one year

of responsible experience in track

inspection in FRA Class 4 or above and

the successful completion of a

minimum of 80 hours of specialized

training in the inspection of high speed

track provided by the Railroad or by a

college level engineering program,

supplemented by special on-the-job

training provided by the Railroad with

emphasis on the inspection of high

speed track; or

(3) A combination of at least two years

of experience in track maintenance in

FRA Class 4 or above and the successful

completion of a minimum of 120 hours

of specialized training in the inspection

of high speed track provided by the

Railroad or from a college level

engineering program, supplemented by

special on-the-job training provided by

the Railroad with emphasis on the

inspection of high speed track.

(b) Each individual designated to

inspect track for defects shall

demonstrate annually to the Railroad

that the individual:

(1) Knows and understands the

requirements of Subpart D of this Part;

(2) Can detect deviations from those

requirements; and

(3) Can prescribe appropriate

remedial action to correct or safely

compensate for those deviations.

(c) Each individual designated to

inspect track for defects shall have

written authorization from the Railroad

to prescribe remedial actions to correct

or safely compensate for deviations from

the requirements in Subpart D of this

Part and shall have successfully

completed a recorded examination on

Subpart D as part of the qualification

process.

§ 243.709 Personnel qualified to inspect

and restore continuous welded rail.

(a) Individuals designated under

§§ 243.705 and 243.707 may inspect

continuous welded rail track (CWR) or

supervise the installation, adjustment,

and maintenance of CWR in accordance

with the written procedures established

by the Railroad, provided they have:

(1) Current qualifications under either

§ 243.705 or § 243.707;

(2) Successfully completed a training

course of at least eight hours duration

developed specifically for the

application of written CWR procedures

issued by the Railroad; and

(3) Demonstrated to the Railroad that

the individual:

(i) Knows and understands the

requirements of those written CWR

procedures;

(ii) Can detect deviations from those

requirements; and

(iii) Can prescribe appropriate

remedial action to correct or safely

compensate for those deviations.

(b) Individuals designated to inspect

CWR or supervise the installation,

adjustment, and maintenance of CWR

shall have written authorization from

the Railroad to prescribe remedial

actions to correct or safely compensate

for deviations from the requirements in

those procedures and must have

successfully completed a recorded

examination on those procedures as part

of the qualification process. The

recorded examination may be written,

or in the form of a computer file with

the results of an interactive training

course.

Signal Personnel

§ 243.711 Personnel qualifications for

signal maintenance and inspection

personnel.

(a) General. The Railroad shall

designate qualified individuals

responsible for the maintenance and

inspection of the signal system in

compliance with the safety

requirements prescribed in Subpart C of

this Part. Each designated individual,

including contractors and their

employees, shall meet the minimum

qualifications set forth in this Subpart.

(b) Recordkeeping. With respect to the

designation of individuals under this

section, the Railroad shall maintain

written records of:

(1) Each designation in effect;

(2) The basis for each designation,

including but not limited to:

(i) The exact nature of any training

courses attended and the dates thereof;

(ii) The manner in which the Railroad

has determined a successful completion

of that training course, including test

scores or other qualifying results;

(3) Signal inspections made by each

individual as required by Subpart C.

These records must be made available

for inspection and copying by the

Federal Railroad Administrator during

regular business hours.

§ 243.713 Personnel qualified signal

inspector.

(a) Each individual designated to

inspect the Railroad’s signal system

shall have:

(1) Six or more years of signal

maintenance experience that includes

specialized training in each three-year

period provided by the Railroad; or

(2) Four or more years of signal

maintenance experience, and an

associate degree in electrical

engineering or related technical

specialization, that includes training in

each three-year period provided by the

Railroad; or

(3) Two or more years of signal

maintenance experience and a

bachelor’s degree in electrical

engineering or related technical

specialization, that includes training in

each three-year period provided by the

Railroad.

(b) Each individual designated to

inspect the signal system for defects

shall demonstrate annually to the

Railroad that the individual:

(1) Knows and understands the

requirements of subpart C;

(2) Can detect deviations from those

requirements; and
65570 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

(3) Can prescribe appropriate

remedial action to correct or safely

compensate for those deviations.

§ 243.715 Personnel qualified as signal

maintainer.

(a) Each individual designated as a

signal maintainer by the Railroad shall

complete a training program during the

first two years of employment by the

Railroad. Upon successful completion of

the training program, the signal

maintainer shall be authorized to work

in the proximity of high voltage lines

and on signal equipment.

(b) When required to maintain the

signal system for defects, each

individual designated must demonstrate

annually to the Railroad that the

individual:

(1) Knows and understands the

requirements of subpart C;

(2) Can detect deviations from those

requirements; and

(3) Can prescribe appropriate

remedial action to correct or safely

compensate for those deviations.

§ 243.717 Personnel qualified to supervise

signal inspectors and maintainers.

When required to supervise the

inspection and maintenance of signal

systems, each designated supervisor

must:

(a) Successfully complete the program

that covers the employees they

supervise; and

(b) Exercise oversight to ensure that

all of the identified tasks are performed

in accordance with the Railroad’s

qualification program.

Rolling Stock Personnel

§ 243.719 Personnel qualifications for

rolling stock personnel.

(a) General. The Railroad shall

designate qualified individuals

responsible for the inspection and

maintenance of the Railroad’s rolling

stock. Each designated individual,

including contractors and their

employees, shall meet the minimum

qualifications set forth in this section.

(b) Recordkeeping. With respect to the

designation of individuals under this

section, the Railroad shall maintain

written records of:

(1) Each designation in effect;

(2) The basis for each designation,

including but not limited to:

(i) The exact nature of any training

courses attended and the dates thereof;

(ii) The manner in which the Railroad

has determined a successful completion

of that training course, including test

scores or other qualifying results;

(c) The Railroad’s qualification

program for rolling stock personnel

shall, at a minimum:

(1) Identify the safety-related tasks

that shall be performed on each type of

equipment that the Railroad operates;

(2) Include written procedures for the

performance of the tasks identified;

(3) Identify the skills and knowledge

necessary to perform each task;

(4) Include classroom and ‘‘hands-on’’

lessons designed to impart the skills and

knowledge identified as necessary to

safely perform each task;

(5) Require periodic refresher training

at an interval not to exceed three years

that includes classroom and ‘‘hands-on’’

training, as well as testing; and

(6) Include new equipment in the

qualification and designation program

prior to its introduction to revenue

service.

§ 243.721 Personnel qualified to inspect

and maintain rolling stock.

Each designated individual required

to inspect and maintain rolling stock

shall, at a minimum:

(a) Successfully complete the training

course that covers the equipment and

tasks for which they are responsible;

(b) Pass a written examination

covering the equipment and tasks for

which they are responsible; and

(c) Successfully demonstrate ‘‘handson’’ capability to perform the assigned

tasks on the type of equipment to which

they are assigned.

§ 243.723 Personnel qualified to supervise

the inspection and maintenance of rolling

stock.

Each individual designated to

supervise the inspection and

maintenance of rolling stock personnel

shall, at a minimum:

(a) Successfully complete the program

that covers the employees that they

supervise;

(b) Exercise oversight to ensure that

all the identified tasks are performed in

accordance with the Railroad’s

qualification program.

Subpart I—Power Distribution

§ 243.801 Warning signs.

(a) The Railroad shall post warning

signs concerning the danger of high

voltage lines along the right-of-way, at

regular intervals not to exceed 183 m

(600 ft).

(b) The Railroad shall post warning

signs concerning the danger of high

voltage lines at all underpasses and

overpasses.

(c) The Railroad shall attach warning

signs concerning the danger of high

voltage lines to each catenary mast, at a

height of 1.2 to 1.5 m (4 to 5 ft).

(d) The Railroad shall post warning

signs concerning the danger of high

voltage lines on catenary masts that are

adjacent to all overpasses. These

warning signs shall be positioned so

that they are clearly visible from the

overpass.

§ 243.803 Clearance requirements.

Electrical clearance between the

catenary system and fixed equipment in

the right-of-way shall meet all pertinent

international standards, including UIC

606–2 OR, in order to avoid fault

currents.

§ 243.805 Catenary connections.

All catenary masts shall be connected

to the ground or the rail, as determined

by the Railroad’s system safety plan.

The electrical impedance of the

connection shall meet the step and

touch potential requirements given in

international standards to protect

against an electrical shock hazard.

§ 243.807 Access to stations.

Access to supply stations, substations

and autotransformer stations shall be

restricted to authorized personnel only.

§ 243.809 Actuators.

The actuators of high voltage switches

shall be designed to protect the operator

against electrical shock, either direct or

induced.

§ 243.811 Power feeding.

(a) The parallel power feeder shall be

protected against short circuits along the

catenary.

(b) The parallel power feeder shall be

protected from over-voltage power

surges due to lightning and from surges

caused by the utility system.

§ 243.813 Emergency devices.

(a) The Railroad shall install at each

underpass, overpass, emergency

entrance to the right-of-way, supply

station, substation, and autotransformer

station devices capable of disconnecting

and isolating power and/or grounding

the catenary to the rail that may be used

in the event of an emergency.

(b) The Railroad shall install

telephones along the right-of-way that

are connected directly to the central

power dispatching center. One

telephone shall be located at each

device provided in accordance with

paragraph (a) of this section.

§ 243.815 Overpass protection.

The Railroad shall install at each

overpass fencing, or other suitable

protective device or equipment that

shall prevent any accidental contact

with the catenary.

§ 243.817 Safety work rules.

All pertinent safety standards issued

by the U.S. Occupational Safety and
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules 65571

Health Administration, concerning

personal protective equipment,

practices, and work rules for employees

involved with the electric power

generation, distribution, and

transmission system, shall apply to the

Railroad. FRA has not exercised

jurisdiction over those working

conditions.

§ 243.819 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance of the power distribution

system.

(a) The Railroad shall establish a

training and qualification program as

requires by Subparts B and H to qualify

individuals to perform inspections, tests

and maintenance of the power

distribution system. Only qualified

individuals shall perform inspections,

tests and maintenance of the equipment.

(b) Qualified personnel shall perform

a visual inspection of performance of

the current collection through the

pantograph-catenary interface.

(c) Qualified personnel shall perform

a walking inspection of each suspension

and anchoring or supporting structure of

the catenary system, all switching

devices, and all telephones located

along the right-of-way at least once

every four months.

(d) Qualified personnel shall inspect

all emergency shutdown devices and all

manual switches annually.

(e) The Railroad shall provide to FRA

for review detailed information on the

inspection, test, and maintenance

procedures necessary for safe operation

of the power distribution equipment.

This information shall include a

detailed description of:

(1) Safety inspection procedures,

requirements, intervals and criteria;

(2) Test procedures and intervals;

(3) Scheduled preventive

maintenance intervals;

(4) Maintenance procedures;

(5) Special testing equipment and

measuring devices required to perform

safety inspections and tests; and

(6) Training and certification of

employees and contractors qualified to

perform safety inspections, testing and

maintenance.

Appendix A to Part 243—Schedule of

Civil Penalties—[Reserved]

Appendix B to Part 243—Test

Performance Criteria for the

Flammability and Smoke Emission

Characteristics of Materials Used in

Constructing or Refurbishing

Locomotive Cab and Passenger Car

Interiors

This appendix provides the performance

standards for testing the flammability and

smoke emission characteristics of materials

used in constructing or refurbishing

locomotive cab and passenger car interiors,

in accordance with the requirements of

§ 243.413.

(a) Definitions.

Critical radiant flux (CRF) means, as

defined in ASTM E–648, a measure of the

behavior of horizontally-mounted floor

covering systems exposed to a flaming

ignition source in a graded radiant heat

energy environment in a test chamber.

Flame spread index (IS) means, as defined

in ASTM E–162, a factor derived from the

rate of progress of the flame front (FS) and the

rate of heat liberation by the material under

test (Q), such that (IS) = (FS) × Q.

Flaming dripping means periodic dripping

of flaming material from the site of material

burning or material installation.

Flaming running means continuous

flaming material leaving the site of material

burning or material installation.

Specific optical density (DS) means, as

defined in ASTM E–662, the optical density

measured over unit path length within a

chamber of unit volume, produced from a

specimen of unit surface area, that is

irradiated by a heat flux of 2.5 watts/cm2 for

a specified period of time.

Surface flammability means the rate at

which flames will travel along surfaces.

(b) Required test procedures and

performance criteria.

The materials used in locomotive cabs and

passenger cars shall be tested according to

the procedures and performance criteria set

forth in the following table. In all instances,

the most recent version of the test procedures

or the revision in effect at the time a vehicle

is ordered should be employed in the

evaluation of the materials specified.

Category Function of material Test procedure Performance criteria

Passenger seats, Sleeping and dining

car components.

Cushions, Mattresses 1, 2, 5, 9 * ............. ASTM D–3675

ASTM E–662

Is≤25

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤175

Seat and/or Mattress Frame 1, 5, 8 ........ ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤35

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

Seat and Toilet Shroud, Food

Trays 1, 5.

ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤35

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

Seat Upholstery, Mattress Ticking and

Covers, Curtains 1, 2, 3, 5.

FAR 25.853 (Vertical)

ASTM E–662

Flame Time≤10 sec; Burn length≤6

inch

Ds (4.0)≤250 coated; Ds (4.0)≤100

uncoated

Panels .................................................. Wall 1, 5, 10 ............................................. ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤35

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

Ceiling 1, 5, 10 ......................................... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤35

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

Partition, Tables and Shelves 1, 5 ........ ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤35

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

Windscreen 2, 5 ..................................... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤35

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

HVAC Ducting 1, 5 ................................ ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤35

Ds (1.5)≤100

Window 4, 5 ........................................... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤100

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

Light Diffuser 5 ..................................... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤100

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

Flooring ................................................ Structural 6 ........................................... ASTM E–119 Pass

Covering 7, 10 ........................................ ASTM E–648

ASTM E–662

CRF≥0.5 w/cm2

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

Insulation .............................................. Thermal 1, 2, 5 ........................................ ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤25

Ds (1.5)≤100

Acoustic 1, 2, 5 ....................................... ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤25

Ds (1.5)≤100

Elastomers ........................................... Window Gaskets, Door Nosing, Diaphragms, Roof Mat 1.ASTM C–542

ASTM E–662

Pass

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200
65572 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 239 / Friday, December 12, 1997 / Proposed Rules

Category Function of material Test procedure Performance criteria

Exterior Plastic Components ................ End Cap, Roof Housings 1, 5 ................ ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤35

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

Component Box Covers ....................... Interior, Exterior Boxes 1, 3, 5 ................ ASTM E–162

ASTM E–662

Is≤35

Ds (1.5)≤100; Ds (4.0)≤200

1 Materials tested for surface flammability must not exhibit any flaming running or flaming dripping.

2The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics must be demonstrated to be permanent by washing, if appropriate, according to

FED–STD–191A Textile Test Method 5830. 3The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics must be demonstrated to be permanent by dry-cleaning, if appropriate, according to ASTM–D–2724. Materials that cannot be washed or dry cleaned must be so labeled and meet the applicable performance criteria after

being cleaned as recommended by the manufacturer. 4For double window glazing, only the interior glazing must meet the materials requirements specified herein; the exterior need not meet those

requirements. 5ASTM E–662 maximum test limits for smoke emission (specified optical density) must be measured in either the flaming or non-flaming

mode, depending on which mode generates the most smoke. 6Structural flooring assemblies must meet the performance criteria during a nominal test period determined by the railroad property. The nominal test period must be twice the maximum expected period of time, under normal circumstances, for a vehicle to come to a complete, safe stop

from maximum speed, plus the time necessary to evacuate all passengers from a vehicle to a safe area. The nominal test period must not be

less than 15 minutes. Only one specimen need be tested. A proportional reduction may be made in the dimensions of the specimen provided

that it represents a true test of its ability to perform as a barrier against under-car fires. Penetrations (ducts, etc.) must be designed against acting as passageways for fire and smoke. 7Flooring covering must be tested in accordance with ASTM E–648 with its padding, if the padding is used in actual installation.

8Arm rests, if foamed plastic, are tested as cushions and, if hard material, are tested as a seat back shroud.

9Testing is performed without upholstery.

10 Carpeting on walls and ceilings is to be considered wall and ceiling panel materials, respectively.

(c) The sources of test procedures specified

in the table are as follows:

(1) Leaching Resistance of Cloth, FED–

STD–191A–Textile Test Method 5830.

(Available from: General Services

Administration Specifications Division,

Building 197 Washington Navy Yard,

Washington, D.C. 20407.)

(2) Federal Aviation Administration

Vertical Burn Test, FAR–25.853.

(3) American Society for Testing Materials

(ASTM):

(i) Specification for Gaskets, ASTM C–542.

(ii) Surface Flammability of Flexible

Cellular Materials Using a Radiant Heat

Energy Source, ASTM D–3675.

(iii) Fire Tests of Building Construction

and Materials, ASTM E–119.

(iv) Surface Flammability of Materials

Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source, ASTM

E–162.

(v) Bonded and Laminated Apparel

Fabrics, ASTM D–2724.

(vi) Critical Radiant Flux of Floor Covering

Systems Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source,

ASTM E–648.

(vii) Specific Optical Density of Smoke

Generated by Solid Materials, ASTM E–662.

(Available from: American Society for

Testing Materials, 1916 Race Street,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.)

Appendix C to Part 243—Railroad

Safety—Critical Operating Rules

[Reserved]

Issued in Washington, D.C. this 24th day

of November, 1997.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Federal Railroad Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–31457 Filed 12–11–97; 8:45 am]

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