[Cite as In re P.G.T., 2016-Ohio-3429.]

STATE OF OHIO, COLUMBIANA COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

IN THE MATTER OF: 

 P.G.T. 

 D.O.B. 5/18/12 

BRANDON D. GOOD, SR. 

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT-

 APPELLEE 

VS. 

CHARLOTTE TRAGESER 

 DEFENDANT-PETITIONER-

 APPELLANT 

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CASE NO. 14 CO 0034 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, 

Juvenile Division, Columbiana County, 

Ohio 

Case Nos. C2012-0372 & C2012-0373 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellee Attorney Tracey Laslo 

325 East Main Street 

Alliance, Ohio 44601 

For Defendant-Petitioner-Appellant Attorney David Engler 

725 Boardman-Canfield Road, Unit S-3 

Youngstown, Ohio 44512 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

 

 

 Dated: June 13, 2016 
[Cite as In re P.G.T., 2016-Ohio-3429.]

DeGENARO, J. 

{¶1} This appeal filed by Charlotte Trageser, Mother, challenges the 

Columbiana County Juvenile Court's decision that awarded primary custody of the 

minor child to Brandon Good, Father. Mother’s arguments regarding the telephone 

records, disqualification of counsel, and custody, are meritless and the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} On May 18, 2012, P.G.T. was born to Charlotte Trageser and Brandon 

Good. Approximately five months later, Father filed a complaint for allocation of 

parental rights and responsibilities (or in the alternative Shared Parenting) and a 

motion for name change in the Columbiana County Juvenile Court. At the pretrial 

both Mother and Father were ordered to submit to a hair follicle drug screening by 

4:00 pm that day, and a Guardian ad Litem was appointed. Father was also given 

supervised companionship time with the minor child on weekends. 

{¶3} Father did not submit to the drug test and Mother filed a motion again 

requesting an order for Father to submit to a hair follicle drug test and an order 

terminating all companionship with the child. The juvenile court granted both of 

Mother’s motions. Father filed a notice with the juvenile court stating that he 

attempted to get the screening done, however, the test administrator was on vacation 

and had limited availability due to the holidays. Father submitted to the drug test and 

requested the court to reinstate his visitation, which the court did. 

{¶4} Father filed a proposed shared parenting plan. In the meantime Mother 

discharged her lawyer and retained new counsel. The GAL filed an interim report 

recommending standard visitation for Father. The juvenile court awarded Father 

standard visitation in accordance with the county’s local rule of companionship. 

{¶5} A merit hearing was held and evidence was presented. However, the 

matter was unable to be completed in the time allotted and was continued for further 

proceedings. In the interim, Mother filed a motion requesting counsel for Father to be 

recused from representing him. She alleged that his counsel was using information 

obtained during a consultation Attorney Laslo had with her regarding obtaining a 
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divorce from her husband at the time. Attorney Laslo filed a reply denying any 

representation of Mother or any recollection of a consultation with her. The juvenile 

court found Mother lacked credibility and denied her motion. 

{¶6} Mother’s final attorney entered an appearance and promptly assisted 

her in filing an affidavit with the Supreme Court of Ohio to disqualify the juvenile court 

judge. As such, the previously scheduled hearing was stayed. Ultimately, the 

Supreme Court of Ohio found no basis was established to order the disqualification of 

the judge. 

{¶7} The second day of the merit hearing was held and the juvenile court 

granted legal custody of the minor child to Father; Mother received standard visitation 

in accordance with the county’s local rule of companionship. The minor child’s last 

name was changed to Father’s last name. Mother’s income was imputed and she 

was ordered to pay Father child support. 

Telephone Records 

{¶8} In her first of six assignments of error, Mother asserts: 

 The Trial Court Erred by Denying Appellant’s Telephone 

Records To Be Admitted As Evidence In Support of A Motion to 

Disqualify Attorney Laslo As An Abuse of Discretion. 

{¶9} "The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the 

sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 

(1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. "The term ‘abuse of discretion’ means an error 

in judgment involving a decision that is unreasonable based upon the record; that the 

appellate court merely may have reached a different result is not enough." In re

S.S.L.S., 7th Dist. No. 12 CO 8, 2013-Ohio-3026, ¶ 22. 

{¶10} Evid.R. 901 governs authentication: 

The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 

precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
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finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 

{¶11} Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her request to 

admit telephone records in support of her motion to disqualify Father’s attorney. 

Father counters that the records were not relevant and/or not properly authenticated. 

{¶12} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mother’s cellular 

telephone records as her testimony created confusion as to their authenticity and 

also, she failed to establish how they are relevant to the present matter. 

{¶13} Mother testified that the phone records in question were obtained by 

her from AT&T and that they emanated from her cell phone. She indicated that she 

highlighted two separate numbers on the records which she testified were the 

numbers of Father’s attorney’s office and his attorney’s cell phone. However later in 

the proceeding Mother testified that she had not called the numbers herself, but 

rather her father placed the respective calls; his testimony was not offered. Further, 

Attorney Laslo stated to the court that one of the highlighted numbers was not 

actually to her office. 

{¶14} Additionally, Mother failed to establish how any information Father’s 

attorney may have gained in July 2011 and September 2011 was relevant to the 

present matter. She testified that her first contact with Attorney Laslo occurred by 

phone in July of 2011 and was followed by an office visit in September of 2011, 

lasting 45 minutes. Mother was seeking advice regarding obtaining a divorce from 

her husband at the time, not Father. The minor child was not conceived in July of 

2011. Mother alleges that she was a week pregnant during an alleged office visit in 

September. When pressed for answers as to what information Father’s attorney had 

acquired from 2011 that impacted the custody proceeding herein, Mother gave no 

specific answer. Accordingly, Mother’s first assignment of error is meritless. 

Disqualification 

{¶15} In her second of six assignments of error, Mother asserts: 

 The Trial Court Erred by Denying Appellant’s Motion to 
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Disqualify Attorney Laslo pursuant to Prof. Cond. Rule 1.9 and 1.6 as 

an Abuse of Discretion. 

{¶16} Disqualification of an attorney is a drastic measure that should not be 

imposed unless it is absolutely necessary. Spivey v. Bender, 77 Ohio App.3d 17, 22, 

601 N.E.2d 56 (6th Dist.1991). The trial court has wide latitude when considering a 

motion to disqualify counsel and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. "The term 

‘abuse of discretion’ means an error in judgment involving a decision that is 

unreasonable based upon the record; that the appellate court merely may have 

reached a different result is not enough." In re S.S.L.S., 7th Dist. No. 12 CO 8, 2013-

Ohio-3026, ¶ 22. 

{¶17} This court has applied a three-part test for disqualification of counsel 

due to a conflict of interest: "1) a past attorney-client relationship must have existed 

between the party seeking disqualification and the attorney he or she wishes to 

disqualify; 2) the subject matter of the past relationship must have been substantially 

related to the present case; and 3) the attorney must have acquired confidential 

information from the party seeking disqualification." City of Youngstown v. Joenub, 

Inc., 7th Dist. No. 01–CA–01, 2001–Ohio–3401, ¶15, citing Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross 

& Blue Shield Mut. of N. Ohio, 900 F.2d 882, 889 (6th Cir.1990). 

{¶18} If there is no current or past attorney-client relationship, the motion to 

disqualify should be denied. Henry Filters, Inc. v. Peabody Barnes, Inc., 82 Ohio 

App.3d 255, 260, 611 N.E.2d 873 (6th Dist.1992). However if the court determines 

that there is or has been an attorney-client relationship, the court must then 

determine whether a conflict of interest exists; only if a conflict exists need the 

attorney be disqualified. Id. 

{¶19} It is well established that disqualification of an attorney "should not be 

based solely upon allegation of a conflict of interest." Kitts v. U.S. Health Corp. of S. 

Ohio, 97 Ohio App.3d 271, 275, 646 N.E.2d 555 (4th Dist.1994) The moving party 

has the duty of showing what the connection between the cases is and must provide 

some evidence that a need for the disqualification exists. Phillips v. Haidet, 119 Ohio 
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App.3d 322, 327, 695 N.E.2d 292 (3d Dist.1997). 

{¶20} Mother made general allegations asserting that she had several 

telephone calls and paid a consultation fee of $65.00. Attorney Laslo disputes this 

and any knowledge of Mother. The juvenile court found that Mother lacked credibility. 

Mother waited over a year to raise this issue and did so approximately one month 

before the second day of merit hearing. Mother stated that she paid a consultation 

fee, but upon learning that Attorney Laslo doesn’t charge a consultation fee, 

questioned her recollection of paying that fee. The juvenile court did not find "credible 

evidence that Mrs. Trageser has divulged to Attorney Laslo, by a prior meeting, any 

information regarding personal or other details relevant to the issues before the Court 

for determination and the Court, therefore, concludes that the allegations are untrue." 

{¶21} Even assuming arguendo an attorney-client relationship was 

established, the second prong of the disqualification test requires that the subject 

matter of the past relationship must be substantially related to the present case. 

Mother asserts that her consultation with Attorney Laslo was in regards to a divorce 

with her husband at the time. She fails to argue or establish that the divorce 

consultation was in anyway connected to Father in the present matter. 

{¶22} Mother failed to prove that she had a prior attorney-client relationship 

with Attorney Laslo. As such, she has failed to establish the first prong of the Dana 

test. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to 

disqualify. Accordingly this assignment of error is meritless. 

Custody 

{¶23} In her third of six assignments of error, Mother asserts: 

 The trial court erred in its decision to award Residential Parent 

and Legal Custodian, Child Support and Name Change to the Appellee 

as such is not supported by the evidence in the record as an Abuse of 

Discretion. 

{¶24} It is well settled that a trial court is given broad discretion in its 
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determination of parental custody rights. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 

N.E.2d 1028 (1989). A trial court's custody determination will therefore not be 

disturbed unless it involves an abuse of discretion. Bechtol v. Bechtol, 49 Ohio St.3d 

21, 23, 550 N.E.2d 178 (1990). "The term ‘abuse of discretion’ means an error in 

judgment involving a decision that is unreasonable based upon the record; that the 

appellate court merely may have reached a different result is not enough." In re

S.S.L.S., 7th Dist. No. 12 CO 8, 2013-Ohio-3026, ¶ 22. 

{¶25} "Our threshold question is whether the trial court was ruling on a 

modification of custody or an initial custody determination. Generally, a natural father 

of a child born out of wedlock has equal standing with the mother to assert custody 

rights in an initial custody proceeding." In re Nentwick, 7th Dist. No. 00 CO 0050, 

2002-Ohio-1560, ¶33 citing In re Byrd, 66 Ohio St.2d 334, 421 N.E.2d 1284 (1981), 

paragraph one of syllabus. "In such case, the court shall determine which parent 

shall have the legal custody of the child, taking into account what would be in the 

best interests of the child." Byrd at paragraph two of the syllabus. Father filed his 

complaint approximately five months after the child's birth and the juvenile court 

treated this matter as an initial determination. 

{¶26} The statutory best interests factors within R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) are 

applicable to juvenile custody proceedings. In re Bell, 7th Dist. No. 04NO321, 2005–

Ohio–6603, ¶ 37. These factors include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) the 

parents' wishes; (b) the child's wishes if the court has interviewed the child; (c) the 

child's interaction and interrelationship with the child's parents, siblings, and any 

other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests; (d) the child's 

adjustment to home, school, and community; (e) the mental and physical health of all 

relevant persons; (f) the parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved 

parenting time or companionship rights; (g) whether either parent has failed to make 

child support payments pursuant to a support order; (h) whether either parent or any 

member of their households has been previously convicted of certain criminal 

offenses involving children; (i) whether the residential parent or a parent subject to a 
- 7 - 

shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other's right to 

parenting time in accordance with a court order; and (j) whether either parent has or 

is planning to establish a residence outside of Ohio. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a)-(j). 

{¶27} There is no statutory mandate that a trial court separately address each 

of the best interests factors and a court is presumed to have considered these factors 

absent evidence to the contrary. In re Henthorn, 7th Dist. No. 00-BA-37, 2001-Ohio3459, *3. Although the juvenile court's judgment entry does not specifically discuss 

the enumerated factors, we can presume from the record that the court did consider 

the best interest factors. Henthorn, supra.

{¶28} As to the first factor, the wishes of the parents, both parents sought 

custody. The second factor is not relevant due to the age of the child and the juvenile 

court did not interview her. 

{¶29} Concerning the third factor, there was testimony regarding both 

parents' family structure and the minor child’s interaction with family members. The 

juvenile court noted that the minor child was the third biological child for both Mother 

and Father, who was expecting a fourth child with another woman. Father has 

custody of his two other children, as does Mother. Father testified that all of his 

children "get along great" and that they play, laugh, and have fun. The minor child 

has a relationship with his mother, father and sister. Father testified that he takes 

care of P.G.T. when he has her and if he is working that his mother, father and 

girlfriend assist in childcare. Mother testified that her children and stepson get sad 

when they are apart from P.G.T. and they all have a loving relationship. Her husband, 

mom and dad help support her in raising P.G.T. 

{¶30} As to the fourth factor, the court noted in its judgment entry that even 

though the child was one year of age, Mother reported that she had previously 

enrolled the child in preschool/day care and indicated her intent to continue that 

enrollment. 

{¶31} Regarding the fifth factor, the mental and physical health of all relevant 

persons, Mother testified that she has arthritis in her hands. Father testified that he 
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has "good" mental and physical health. Father testified that P.G.T. had been "sick a 

few times" having upper respiratory issues and ear infections. Mother testified that 

P.G.T. was evaluated for a "rapid heartbeat", had surgery on her ears, had blocked 

tear ducts, sinusitis and chronic conjunctivitis in her eyes due to allergies. On day two 

of the merit hearing, Mother testified that P.G.T. had asthma, pneumonia, an upper 

respiratory infection and the flu. Mother maintained throughout the proceedings that 

P.G.T. is smart, well-developed and happy. 

{¶32} As to the sixth factor, the juvenile court specifically found that Mother 

has mostly complied with permitting visitation between the minor child and Father, 

however, based upon the testimony and evidence presented, that Father would be 

the parent more likely to foster a relationship of respect between the child and 

Mother. 

{¶33} The last four factors regarding child support payments, criminal 

offenses involving children, shared parenting visitation and establishing a residence 

outside of Ohio were not at issue. 

{¶34} Mother argues that the juvenile court ignored any testimony or evidence 

that was favorable to her and found only positive points regarding Father. The trial 

court was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and evidence 

presented. Mother fails to acknowledge that her own testimony reduced her credibility 

at several points in the proceeding. There were numerous examples of Mother’s 

testimony being exaggerated, unbelievable or simply untruthful: 1) Mother stated that 

she had consulted with Father’s attorney and paid a consultation fee, however, after 

learning that no consultation fee is charged by this attorney, she stated she didn’t pay 

one; 2) Mother testified that Father has "never" provided financially and medically for 

the child, specifically citing that P.G.T. lost an earring and Father refused to replace 

it; 3) Mother testified that P.G.T. has to see a doctor after "every other visit" with 

Father. 

{¶35} The juvenile court cautioned Mother about her manner of testifying on 

several occasions: 
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"Ma'am just answer the question that is asked." 

"Wait a minute. Ma'am you need to answer the question directly that is 

proposed to you." 

"Ma'am wait a minute. This isn't rocket science, she is trying to figure 

out how often you said that you take the child after every visit, then you 

said after every other, the child visiting regularly and now when she 

tries to nail you down you start something else. You need to listen 

carefully to the question. And answer that directly, we went through this 

the first time you testified." 

"When you are asked a question I need you to, I mean you want to 

qualify everything, to deny it and then you finally sneak your way back 

to half admitting it. Just tell it like it is the first time. Directly to the 

question. This will be a lot clearer record.” 

“You know, again you will have your opportunity and you have had. Ok. 

Do you understand what I said? You said two different things there. 

Because you out right denied then you come back to, sounds like half. 

Ok those are two different responses." 

{¶36} As this Court has previously stated, it would be helpful for the juvenile 

court to specifically refer to the factors set out in R.C. 3109.04 when making custody 

determinations. Henthorn, supra. However, evidence was presented relating to all of 

the relevant best interest factors. The court stated that it received testimony and 

exhibits during the 1.5 day merit hearing, reviewed the reports of the GAL who was 

subject to cross examination, and reviewed the DNA and drug testing results. The 

juvenile court appears to have considered all of the factors even though it did not 

discuss each factor specifically in its judgment entry. Mother had serious credibility 

issues which the trial court noted and cautioned her about. Accordingly, the juvenile 
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court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody of P.G.T. to Father. 

{¶37} Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred by ordering child 

support and changing the minor child's name. Regarding the name change, the 

Supreme Court of Ohio held: 

1. Pursuant to R.C. 3111.13(C), a court of common pleas may 

determine the surname by which the child shall be known after 

establishment of the existence of the parent and child relationship, and 

a showing that the name determination is in the best interest of the 

child. 

2. In determining the best interest of the child concerning the surname 

to be used when parents who have never been married contest a 

surname, the court should consider: the length of time that the child has 

used a surname, the effect of a name change on the father-child 

relationship and on the mother-child relationship, the identification of 

the child as part of a family unit, the embarrassment, discomfort or 

inconvenience that may result when a child bears a surname different 

from the custodial parent's, the preference of the child if the child is of 

an age and maturity to express a meaningful preference and any other 

factor relevant to the child's best interest. Courts should consider only 

those factors present in the particular circumstances of each case. 

Bobo v. Jewell, 38 Ohio St.3d 330, 528 N.E.2d 180 (1988), syllabus. 

{¶38} The juvenile court held that it was in the best interest of the minor child 

to grant Father's request for the name change. While the juvenile court did not 

provide specific reasons, it is clear from the record that there are several factors 

which support this conclusion, including: Father was awarded primary custody of the 

minor child and would be living a majority of the time with his family, all of which used 

his surname; the child was very young and had not identified with a particular 
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surname; the child was not of an age to express a preference; there would be little 

inconvenience in changing the child's surname due to the child's age; and also, 

Mother had remarried and assumed her new husband's surname, as such Mother did 

not share the surname that she wished the minor child to keep. Accordingly, the 

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting Father's request to change the 

minor child's last name. Mother's argument is meritless. 

{¶39} Mother also alleged in this assignment of error that the juvenile court 

erred in awarding Father child support, but she provides no argument in her brief, 

instead focusing on the decision to award custody to Father and the name change. 

As such, it will not be addressed herein. 

Imputed Income 

{¶40} In her fourth of six assignments of error, Mother asserts: 

 The Trial Court erred in finding that Mother’s imputed income of 

$18,720 a year for purposes of calculating child support was not 

supported by the evidence in the record and is in contravention of R.C. 

3119.01(C)(11) was an abuse of discretion. 

{¶41} "In order to calculate child support, the trial court must determine the 

parent's income." Schley v. Gillum, 5th Dist. No. 11 CAF 10 0098, 2012-Ohio-2787, 

¶13. "[T]he amount of "potential income" to be imputed to a child support obligor, are 

matters to be determined by the trial court based upon the facts and circumstances of 

each case." Rock v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 616 N.E.2d 218 (1993), syllabus. 

{¶42} A trial court has discretion in the calculation of child support and the 

appellate court will not disturb a child support order absent a showing of an abuse of 

discretion. Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390, 1997-Ohio-105, 686 N.E.2d 1108. 

"An abuse of discretion means an error in judgment involving a decision that is 

unreasonable based upon the record; that the appellate court merely may have 

reached a different result is not enough." In re S.S.L.S., supra. 

{¶43} The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in imputing an annual 
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income of $18,720 to Mother. Mother has a managing beautician license and is a 

certified EMT. She previously worked as a manager at Best Cuts in Salem, Ohio 

making from $9 to $26 per hour. She currently has a managing beautician license 

but states she cannot cut hair 12 hours a day due to arthritis. However, she testified 

that she is also a certified (national and state) EMT and if she worked she could start 

at $8.50 to $10 per hour. 

{¶44} The juvenile court judge found that Mother "chooses not to work for the 

stated reason of spending time with her children." This finding was supported by 

Mother’s testimony that she didn’t work to spend time with the children. Mother did 

not lack day care or assistance as she testified that her husband, mom, and dad help 

support her in raising the child. 

{¶45} A review of Mother’s brief reveals that her argument is focused on the 

fact that the juvenile court did not make an express finding that she was voluntarily 

unemployed or underemployed. She contends that the court needed to make this 

explicit finding. Father argues that the findings made by the juvenile court are 

sufficient. 

{¶46} There is a split in the districts as to whether the express words of 

"voluntarily unemployed" or "voluntarily underemployed" need to be stated. In 

Drummer v. Drummer, 3d Dist. No. 12–11–10, 2012–Ohio–3064, the trial court 

imputed income to Father, William Drummer, without making express findings. The 

Third District rejected his argument that the words "voluntarily unemployed" or 

"voluntarily underemployed" had to be stated: 

*** William contends that the trial court committed reversible error when 

it did not expressly find that he was either voluntarily unemployed or 

underemployed. Though the better practice would be to expressly find 

that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, we 

disagree with William's contention in light of this court's precedent in 

O'Connor v. O'Connor, 184 Ohio App.3d 538, 921 N.E.2d 700, 2009–

Ohio–5436 (3d Dist.). In O'Connor, the trial court did not expressly find 
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that the parent was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed for 

purposes of imputing potential income to the parent. Nevertheless, this 

court explained that the absence of an express finding of voluntary 

unemployment or underemployment is not reversible error where a 

reviewing court is capable of inferring such a finding from the record. 

O'Connor at ¶ 11; see also Wheeler v. Wheeler, 6th Dist. No. OT–04–

025, 2005–Ohio–1025, ¶ 26 (no statutory requirement that the trial 

court's finding concerning voluntary unemployment or 

underemployment be express); but see Collins v. Collins, 9th Dist. No. 

10CA0004, 2011–Ohio–2087, ¶ 36 (trial court's finding concerning 

voluntary unemployment or underemployment must be express). 

Drummer, ¶ 27. 

{¶47} Other than calling the $18,720 "heavy handed" and arguing that the 

figure is based on speculative income, Mother does not provide any evidence that 

the juvenile court abused its discretion in arriving at the figure of $18,720. Mother’s 

own testimony supports the figure. She is certified as an EMT on a national and state 

level and testified that she could start at $8.50 to $10 per hour. The juvenile court 

apparently used $9.00 and based the figure on a 40 hour work week for 52 weeks 

which equals $18,720. This computation was entirely reasonable and within the 

juvenile court’s discretion. Accordingly, Mother’s fourth assignment of error is 

meritless. 

 Child Support Worksheet 

{¶48} As both Mother’s fifth and six assignments of error are interrelated they 

will be discussed together. Mother asserts: 

 The trial court erred when it filed a defective child support 

worksheet when it failed to include Father’s child support on Line 8 of 

the worksheet he receives for his 2 other children as an abuse of 

discretion. 
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 The trial court erred when it filed a defective child support 

worksheet when it failed to verify income as required by R.C. 

3119.05(A) as an abuse of discretion. 

{¶49} A juvenile court must comply with Chapter 3119, among other statutes, 

when it makes or modifies a child support order. Grenga v. Bonacci, 7th Dist. No. 08 

MA 59, 2008–Ohio–6369, ¶11. A trial court has discretion in the calculation of child 

support and the appellate court will not disturb a child support order absent a 

showing of an abuse of discretion. Pauly, supra. "An abuse of discretion means an 

error in judgment involving a decision that is unreasonable based upon the record; 

that the appellate court merely may have reached a different result is not enough." In 

re S.S.L.S, supra. 

{¶50} Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in calculating child 

support because it failed to include child support received by Father for his other two 

children. Father responds that though there is a child support order, he doesn’t 

actually receive the support. 

{¶51} Regarding Father, there was not any direct testimony that Father 

received any child support payments. On the financial affidavit he did not list any 

support received on Line 8. Regarding Mother, her financial affidavit listed monthly 

support received of "290.00 for Faith when Father pays." 

{¶52} Mother’s contention that Father receives child support is not supported 

by the record, nor was it raised or developed at trial. Mother had ample opportunity to 

cross-examine Father on his financial affidavit or to elicit testimony regarding any 

financial support he received. She cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal. 

"A court of appeals cannot consider the issue for the first time without the trial court 

having had an opportunity to address the issue." State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 

501, 1996-Ohio-73, 668 N.E.2d 489. 

{¶53} Mother also argues that the trial court erred when it failed to verify her 

income. She argues that the court was mandated to review financial documents to 

determine her income. As previously discussed in the fourth assignment of error, 
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Mother’s income was imputed to her based upon her testimony that she is certified as 

an EMT on a national and state level and testified that she could start at $8.50 to $10 

per hour. The trial court apparently used $9.00 and based the figure on a 40 hour 

work week for 52 weeks which equals $18,720. There would be no documentation to 

review as she was voluntarily unemployed and income was imputed to her. 

Accordingly Mother’s fifth and sixth assignments of error are meritless.

{¶54} As all of Mother’s arguments are meritless, the judgment of the juvenile 

court is affirmed. 

Donofrio, P. J., 

Waite, J., 

APPROVED: 

 

Mary DeGenaro, Judge