'f 

NO. 96-466 & 96-447 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1996 

DAVID SEVERNS, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND 

REHABILITATION SERVICES, 

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 

DIVISION, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable John W. Larson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

John M. McRae, Special Assistant Attorney General, 

Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Christopher Daly, Missoula, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: November 14, 1996 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3 (c) , Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of this Court and by a report of its result 

to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company. 

The Child Support Enforcement ~ivision of the Montana 

Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (CSED) appeals the 

decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, 

requiring the CSED to comply with an earlier order of the District 

Court which the CSED failed to appeal. 

we affirm. 

David Severns (Severns) is the father of two children born of 

two separate relationships. The CSED calculated Severns' child 

support obligation for each child, but Severns took issue with the 

manner in which those obligations were calculated. In determining 

Severns support obligation for his second child, the CSED deducted 

his existing support obligation for his first child from his 

available monthly income. It then used his remaining available 

monthly income as the basis for calculating the support due to his 

second child. 

Severns contended that this method of calculation in effect 

penalized him for having two children by two different mothers. He 

contended that the child support should have been calculated by 

determining the obligation for two children, deducting that amount 

from his available income, and then dividing the figure by two. He 

2 
On appeal, the CSED addresses the propriety of the 1995 order, 

which it contends was erroneous and exceeded the District Court's 

authority. In response, Severns points out that the 1995 order was 

an appealable one, but that the CSED did not appeal it. In the 

absence of an appeal, Severns contends that, correct or incorrect, 

that order became the law of this case. 

The doctrine of "the law of the caseh refers to 

the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a 

legal question and remanded the cause to the court for 

further proceedings, the legal question thus determined 

by the appellate court will not be differently determined 

on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts 

remain the same. 

Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) 886-887 (citations omitted); 

see also Fiscus v. Beartooth ~lectric Cooperative, Inc. (1979) , 180 

Mont. 434, 436, 591 P .2d 196, 197. The law of the case means that 

once an issue has been finally decided, whether rightly or wrongly, 

it cannot again be relitigated. State v. Black (1990), 245 Mont. 

39, 44, 798 P.2d 530, 533 (citing State v. Zimrnerman (19771, 175 

Mont. 179, 185, 573 P. 2d 174, 177) . The principle of the law of 

the case promotes judicial economy and serves the need for finality 

of judgments; it also stands for the proposition that there must be 

an end to litigation at some point. Black, 798 P.2d at 533 (citing 

State v. Perry (1988), 232 Mont. 455, 463-64, 758 P.2d 268, 273- 

74). 

The doctrine of the law of the case has most often been 

applied in Supreme Court decisions. See, for example, Haines 

Pipeline Construction v. Montana Power Co. (1994), 265 Mont. 282, 

876 P.2d 632; In re Marriage of Becker (1992), 255 Mont. 357, 842 
recalculation using another, more equitable formula. The order in 

question set out the law as determined by the District Court. 

Since the CSED did not appeal that judicial determination, the 1995 

order of the District Court was and is the law of this case. 

It is not the function of the CSED to determine whether the 

pronouncements of the District Court are correct or not; that is 

the function of this Court. If the CSED is presented with a 

decision with which it disagrees, it may choose to follow it or it 

may choose to appeal it. It may not, however, choose to ignore it. 

Af f irmed . 

We Concur: -;IC