* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50859 Summary Calendar

ANDRES SANCHEZ Plaintiff-Appellant v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas Case No. 1:06-CV-500
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff-AppellantAndresSanchez challenges the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision to deny his claim for disability benefits. Because the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is consistent with applicable law, we AFFIRM. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D February 14, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-50859

2 I. BACKGROUND On September 23, 2003, Sanchez applied for disability benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Sanchez alleged that he was unable to work due to bronchitis, hypertension, sleep apnea, congestive heart failure (CHF), human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). The Commissioner denied Sanchez’s claims at the initial and reconsideration levels of the application process. Sanchez then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ heard testimony from Sanchez, a medical expert, and a vocational expert. On September 20, 2005, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Sanchez’s application for benefits. When the Appeals Council denied Sanchez’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes ofjudicial review. Sanchez filed suit, and the matter
was referred by consent to a magistratejudge. The magistrate judge, acting as the district court, upheld the ALJ’s decision. II. DISCUSSION We review the Commissioner’s decision to deny social security benefits only todeterminewhether thedecision issupported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Brown v. Apfel , 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept asadequate tosupport a conclusion.” Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that ofthe Commissioner. H ollisv. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988). Sanchez argues that theALJ erred in concluding that hewas not disabled. In finding that Sanchez was not disabled, the ALJ executed the multi-step sequential inquiry required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 520. The ALJ firstNo. 07-50859

3 determined that Sanchez was not currently engaged in substantial gainful employment. Second, the ALJ concluded that some of Sanchez’s impairments

— namely, his chronic back and leg pain, HIV, CHF, sleep apnea, and drug and alcohol abuse

— were severe. Third, the ALJ found that Sanchez was not entitled to a presumption ofdisability because none of his severe impairments, either individually or collectively, corresponded to an impairment specifically listed in the regulations. Fourth, the ALJ determined that Sanchez retained the residual functional capacity to lift and carry twenty poundsoccasionally and ten pounds frequently, and to stand, walk, and sit six hours in an eight-hour workday, so long as he avoided exposure to extreme temperatures. The ALJ considered Sanchez’s subjective, alleged limitations but found such complaints not totally credible. Based upon these findings, the ALJ determined that Sanchez could return to his past relevant work as a cashier or general clerk. Accordingly, theALJ held that Sanchez was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Sanchez argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion that he is capable of performing his past relevant work as a cashier
or general clerk. First, Sanchez contends that the ALJ disregarded evidence that his fatigue and weakness would require him to frequently miss work. However, the record indicates that the ALJ properly considered and rejected absenteeism as a potential limiting factor. The ALJ specifically questioned the vocational expert about the number of permissible absences per month for a hypothetical cashier or clerk. The ALJ also heard testimony from a medical expert, Dr. Turbeville, indicating that Sanchez’sweaknessand fatigue would not
result in an unacceptable number of absences. Dr. Turbeville stated that if Sanchez avoided extreme temperatures, he could perform light work without a problem. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to reject absenteeism as a limiting factor.No. 07-50859

4 Sanchez also contends that the ALJ erred by disregarding his depression in finding that he could perform past relevant work. This argument is without merit. The physicians of record reported that Sanchez had no severe mental limitations. Moreover, Sanchez testified that he took medication that helped his depression, and Dr. Turbeville opined that Sanchez had not complained of depression since starting the medication. If an impairment reasonably can be remedied or controlled by medication or therapy, it cannot serve as a basis for
a finding of disability. J ohnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 348 (5th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Sanchez’s depression would not preclude him from performing his past relevant work. Next, Sanchez asserts that the ALJ erred by adopting the opinion of Dr. Turbeville, a medical expert, over that of Dr. Werntz, a doctor who actually treated Sanchez. In April 2003, Dr. Werntz reported that “[d]ue to health related concerns, Mr. Sanchez may not be able to maintain gainful employment at this time.” Ordinarily, the opinions, diagnoses, and medical evidence of a treating physician should be accorded considerable weight in determining disability. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 465–66 (5th Cir. 2005). However,
a physician’s conclusory opinion ofdisability intrudes upon an area reserved to the Commissioner, and the ALJ may reject such an opinion without referring to the factors used to evaluate a typical medical opinion. Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 2003). The ALJ properly rejected Dr. Werntz’s conclusory statement regarding Sanchez’s ability to maintain employment. Finally, Sanchez argues that theALJ erred in finding that his allegations
were “not totally credible.” We disagree. First, Sanchez offered inconsistent accounts o

f his condition. For instance, Sanchez complained of debilitating weakness and fatigue, but testified that he could lift approximately fifty pounds and that he could cook, do laundry, clean, grocery shop and drive. See Leggett
v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 565 n.12 (5th Cir. 1995) (considering ability to conductNo. 07-50859

5 daily activities in assessing credibility). Sanchez also alleged that he could not afford to purchase a CPAP device to alleviate his sleep apnea, but the record indicates that hesmoked and regularly abused alcohol. In addition, the medical evidencedemonstrated that, despite hisallegations, Sanchez exhibited virtually
no external manifestations of pain, and past pain had been alleviated by medication. See Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1384 (5th Cir. 1988) (lack of external manifestation o f pain, such as limitations in motion or ambulation, indicates lack of disabling pain). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Sanchez’s complaints are not totally credible. For these reasons, we conclude that the Commissioner properly denied Sanchez disability benefits and affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.