J-S61041-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

YASSIR GAYLE,

Appellant No. 230 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 10, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0003418-2012

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2017

Appellant, Yassir Gayle, appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

after his jury conviction of two counts of aggravated assault, and one count 

each of criminal conspiracy, firearms not to be carried without a license, 

carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia, and fleeing or attempting to elude 

a police officer.1 We affirm.

We take the following background facts and procedural history from the 

trial court’s July 8, 2016 opinion and our independent review of the certified 

record. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 903, 6106(a)(1) and 6108; and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3733(a), respectively.
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On January 10, 2012, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Officer 

Christopher Culver and his partner, Officer Don Williams, patrolled 

the 2800 block of Ruth Street in Philadelphia in full uniform and in 

a marked police car. (See N.T. Trial, 6/03/15, at 29-30, 44). An 

unidentified white female ran towards their car, pointed to a silver 

Impala with tinted windows that was driving away, and said she 

had been robbed. (See id. at 30, 40, 42). The officers pursued 

the car and activated their lights and sirens. (See id. at 31). 

They ran the tag and found that it was registered to a different 

vehicle. (See id. at 41). The car properly stopped before 

suddenly driving away at a high speed. (See id. at 31-32). 

During the pursuit, the car almost struck a police car from the 

24th District and sped through all stop signs and stop lights. (See 

id. at 42-43, 46). The car struck a barrier at Front Street, but 

continued to drive down the wrong way on Huntingdon Street with 

a blown tire. (See id. at 33, 40-44). It turned onto Emerald 

Street when the front seat passenger, later identified as the 

Appellant, leaned out and shot twice at the officers’ car. (See id.

at 33, 46; N.T. Trial, 6/05/15, at 164-66). The officers radioed 

for help while a police helicopter unit continued to track the 

suspects from the air. (See N.T. Trial, 6/03/15, at 32, 47). 

Officer Culver saw sparks that were consistent with a gunshot. 

(See id. at 49). Officers Ryan Teaford and Chris Clemens from 

the helicopter unit also witnessed the shooting. (See N.T. Trial, 

6/04/16, at 12, 124). Officers later recovered projectiles on the 

2500 block of Emerald Street and from the trunk area of the 

Impala. (See id. at 181; N.T. Trial, 6/05/15, at 47).

The Appellant and the backseat passenger, later identified 

as Eric Livingston, ran out of the car on the 2100 block of 

Frankford Avenue. (See N.T. Trial, 6/03/15, at 51-53, 84). They 

then ducked between two cars and tried to stash two guns 

underneath a car. (See id. at 84). Officers Culver and Williams, 

with their guns drawn, ordered them to raise their hands. (See 

id. at 53-54). The defendants did not comply. (See id.) Instead, 

they resisted arrest by punching and kicking at the officers. (See 

id. at 55). During the struggle, a gun fell from the Appellant’s 

body. (See id. at 55, 85-86). Sergeant John Hoyt testified that 

he also heard and saw the gun fall from the Appellant and later 

recovered the gun and placed it on property receipt. (See N.T. 

Trial, 6/05/15, at 17, 21, 37-38). A dozen other officers 

converged on the scene and eventually apprehended the 

defendants. (See N.T. Trial, 6/03/15, at 84). Officers Williams 

and Culver later recovered the other two guns that the defendants 
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attempted to stash and placed them on property receipts. (See 

N.T. Trial, 6/03/15, at 56; N.T. Trial, 6/05/15, at 184).

After the two defendants ran out of the car, the driver of the 

Impala, later identified as Michael Williams, jumped out of the car, 

before it crashed on Memphis Street. (See N.T. Trial, 6/04/15, at

13). Williams fled into someone’s home through an alleyway. 

(See id. at 18). He later exited the home and was subsequently 

apprehended by the police. (See id. at 74). Counsel[] stipulated 

that [Appellant], Williams, and Livingston did not have a valid 

license to carry on the night of the incident. (See N.T. Trial, 

6/05/15, at 206-07).

(Trial Court Opinion, 7/08/16, at 2-4) (footnotes omitted; some record 

citations and formatting provided).

On June 9, 2015, a jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned 

crimes. The court deferred sentencing for the preparation of a mental health 

evaluation and a presentence investigation report. On August 10, 2015, it 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of not less than twenty nor more 

than forty years’ incarceration plus nineteen years of reporting probation. 

Appellant filed a motion to reconsider sentence and a post-sentence motion 

on August 18, 2015. The court denied the motion to reconsider sentence on 

August 28, 2015. The post-sentence motion was denied on January 19, 2016. 

Appellant timely appealed. On May 19, 2016, after being granted multiple 

extensions, he filed a timely statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to the court’s order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court filed an 

opinion on July 8, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises one issue for our review: “Was the evidence insufficient 

to support [his] conviction for fleeing and eluding the police, where the 
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undisputed evidence at trial was that [he] was not driving the vehicle that 

drove away from the police?” (Appellant’s Brief, at 4).

Our standard of review of this matter is well-settled:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of 

evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that 

of the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying 

the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier 

of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Sauers, 159 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted). 

In this case, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer because he was 

not the driver of the car in question. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 6-8). We 

disagree.

Pursuant to section 3733(a) of the Vehicle Code, “[a]ny driver of a motor 

vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, or who 

otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer, when given a 
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visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, commits” the crime of 

fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a). 

“Driver” is defined as “[a] person who drives or is in actual physical control of 

a vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. 

In the present matter, there is no dispute that Appellant was the front 

seat passenger in the subject vehicle, not the driver. However, this does not 

end our inquiry, because the jury also convicted him of criminal conspiracy. 

Although Appellant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the conviction, we conclude that evidence was sufficient to support a finding 

of criminal conspiracy. 

“A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person to commit a crime 

if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he . . . agrees to 

aid another person in the planning or commission of such crime[.]” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(2).

Circumstantial evidence may provide proof of the 

conspiracy. The conduct of the parties and the circumstances 

surrounding such conduct may create a web of evidence linking 

the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Additionally:

An agreement can be inferred from a variety of 

circumstances including, but not limited to, the 

relation between the parties, knowledge of and 

participation in the crime, and the circumstances and 

conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal 

episode. These factors may coalesce to establish a 

conspiratorial agreement beyond a reasonable doubt 

where one factor alone might fail.
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Furthermore, flight, along with other circumstantial 

evidence, supports the inference of a criminal conspiracy.

Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 42 A.3d 1059 (Pa. 2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Further:

Once there is evidence of the presence of a conspiracy, 

conspirators are liable for acts of co-conspirators committed in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. Even if the conspirator did not act 

as a principal in committing the underlying crime, he is still 

criminally liable for the actions of his co-conspirators taken in 

furtherance of the conspiracy.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002), 

appeal denied, 805 A.2d 521 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted).

Here, the evidence established that Appellant and his co-conspirators 

led the police on a high-speed chase in the City of Philadelphia. During the 

pursuit, Appellant fired at the officers with a semi-automatic handgun. Once 

the car was disabled, Appellant and the two other individuals ran away, 

attempting to elude police officers on foot. We conclude that the jury properly 

found that this “web of evidence” linked Appellant to the conspiracy, beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Devine, supra at 1147 (citation omitted).

Based on the foregoing, Appellant was “liable for acts of co-conspirators 

committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Lambert, supra at 1016 

(citation omitted). Hence, we conclude that, although Appellant was not the 

driver of the vehicle, the evidence supported the jury’s conviction of fleeing 

or attempting to elude a police officer where it was part of a criminal 
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conspiracy in which he was a participant. See Sauers, supra at 11. 

Appellant’s issue lacks merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2017