2016 UT App 218

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEFF PRICE AND ANN PRICE,

Appellees,

v.

DANIELLE SPRAGUE,

Appellant.

Memorandum Decision

No. 20150663-CA

Filed November 3, 2016

Second District Court, Farmington Department

The Honorable David R. Hamilton

No. 120701157

Danielle Sprague, Appellant Pro Se

Matthew N. Evans and A.J. Green, Attorneys

for Appellees

JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Memorandum Decision, in 

which JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and DAVID N. MORTENSEN

concurred.

TOOMEY, Judge:

¶1 Danielle Sprague appeals the trial court’s judgment in 

favor of Jeff Price and Ann Price in this landlord-tenant dispute.

Sprague’s argument is inadequately briefed and we therefore 

affirm.

¶2 “It is well established that an appellate court will decline 

to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately 

brief.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998). An 

adequately briefed argument “contain[s] the contentions and 

reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . 

with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 

relied on.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). “Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) 
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20150663-CA 2 2016 UT App 218

requires not just bald citation to authority but development of 

that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority.” 

State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).

¶3 Sprague appears pro se. Parties who represent themselves 

are “held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any 

qualified member of the bar.” Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 11, 194 

P.3d 903 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Nevertheless, “appellate courts are generally lenient with pro se 

litigants,” Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, ¶ 27, 312 P.3d 951 (citing 

Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, ¶¶ 3–4, 67 P.3d 1000), and they are 

“entitled to every consideration that may reasonably be 

indulged,” Allen, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 11 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶4 But even applying a more lenient standard, Sprague’s 

brief is far from adequate. The brief states five issues presented 

for our review,1 but it does not state “the standard of appellate 

review with supporting authority” nor does it provide “citation 

to the record showing that the [issues were] preserved in the 

trial court.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). And although Sprague 

includes some citation to authority in her argument, she does not 

 

1. The issues raised in the brief are (1) whether the trial court 

erred in concluding Sprague terminated a lease agreement with 

the Prices by sending them an eviction notice, (2) whether the 

trial court erred in finding Sprague did not present sufficient 

evidence to prove the Prices caused water damage to the 

property they leased from Sprague, (3) whether the trial court 

erred in concluding Sprague breached the lease agreement by 

not refunding the Prices’ security deposit, (4) whether the trial 

court erred in concluding the Prices did not materially breach 

the lease agreement, and (5) whether the trial court erred in not 

concluding the Prices’ behavior was in bad faith and in breach of 

the implied covenant of fair dealing.
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20150663-CA 3 2016 UT App 218

develop it or explain how it applies to the particular issues.

These deficiencies prevent us from understanding “what 

particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record those 

errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities, 

those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other 

relief.” State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, ¶ 13, 47 P.3d 107 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶5 For example, Sprague alleges that the Prices filed “this 

meritless lawsuit . . . in bad faith.” But she does not demonstrate 

that this issue was preserved at trial—indeed, we could find no 

reference to bad faith anywhere in the trial transcript or in the 

court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Nor has Sprague 

attempted to show why this issue should be reviewed under an 

exception to the preservation requirement, such as plain error or 

exceptional circumstances. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah

Ct. App. 1996). Furthermore, after explaining the facts supporting

her allegation of bad faith, Sprague cites four Utah cases without 

any description of their holdings or how they might apply to this 

particular issue.

¶6 Moreover, although the initial brief and the reply brief 

include voluminous addenda, these addenda contain documents 

outside the record, which we cannot consider on appeal. See 

State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, ¶ 7, 974 P.2d 279 (explaining that an 

appellate court’s review is limited to the evidence contained in 

the record on appeal). “[A]lthough the record may be 

supplemented if anything material is omitted, it may not be 

done by simply including the omitted material in the party’s 

addendum.” Id. Sprague’s briefs cite the addenda, but because 

the addenda are not numbered in a manner consistent with the 

trial court record, it is difficult to determine which information is 

contained in the record and may be considered, and which is not 

and must be disregarded.

¶7 Finally, many of the facts Sprague alleged in her brief are 

unsupported by any citation to the record, and where she
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20150663-CA 4 2016 UT App 218

includes a citation to a document included in one of the 

addenda, the cited material often does not support her factual 

proposition. To illustrate, Sprague claims that on a particular 

day, the Prices informed her that the dishwasher in the leased 

premises was leaking and demanded she clean up the leaked 

water. But the portion of the addendum Sprague cites in support 

of this claim shows only the purchase receipt of a dishwasher 

and an email informing the Prices that a dishwasher would be

installed. Additionally, Sprague claims that on December 8, 

2012, the Prices informed her they would leave the residence the 

next day, but she cites a page in the addendum that is a copy of

an email from October.

¶8 Even allowing Sprague every consideration that may

reasonably be indulged, the lack of citation to the record and 

development of relevant authority preclude us from reaching the 

merits of her appeal. We therefore affirm.