Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1509-CR-1386 | April 26, 2016 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna K. Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jenneil Jackson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 26, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

15A01-1509-CR-1386

Appeal from the Dearborn 

Superior Court

The Honorable Jonathan N. 

Cleary, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

15D01-1208-FB-43

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1509-CR-1386 | April 26, 2016 Page 2 of 5

Statement of the Case

[1] Jenneil Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals the trial court’s order that she serve 730

days of her previously suspended sentence for Class B felony conspiracy to 

commit burglary after she violated her probation for that conviction.

1

 On 

appeal, Jackson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her 

to serve that amount of her suspended sentence because it was excessive in light 

of her desire to reform. In light of Jackson’s criminal history and the fact that 

this was her second violation of her probation for her conspiracy to commit 

burglary conviction, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

[2] We affirm. 

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered

Jackson to serve 730 days of her previously suspended sentence in 

the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). 

Facts

[3] On August 28, 2013, Jackson pled guilty to Class B felony conspiracy to 

commit burglary. The trial court sentenced her to 2,920 days, with 1,460 of 

those days suspended to probation. One of the conditions of her probation was 

that she “[n]ot consume any alcohol, illegal drugs or the synthetic form of any 

illegal drug, or controlled substance, without a valid prescription and submit to 

 

1

IND. CODE §§ 35-41-5-2 and 35-43-2-1(1)(B)(i). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1509-CR-1386 | April 26, 2016 Page 3 of 5

testing as required by Probation, Community Corrections, or a Law 

Enforcement Officer.” (App. 26).

[4] On December 1, 2014, Jackson’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke 

Jackson’s probation, alleging that on November 24, 2014, Jackson had violated 

the terms of her probation by testing positive for marijuana. On May 7, 2015, 

Jackson pled guilty to the violation, and the trial court ordered her to serve 

forty-four (44) days of her suspended sentence. 

[5] Subsequently, on August 10, 2015, Jackson’s probation officer filed a second 

petition to revoke her probation. In the petition, the officer alleged that on or 

about July 30, 2015, Jackson had tested positive for methamphetamine and 

amphetamine. On August 20, 2015, at her initial hearing, Jackson admitted to 

violation. As a result, the trial court revoked her probation a second time and 

ordered her to serve 730 days of her previously suspended sentence. As a basis 

for its order, the trial court cited Jackson’s criminal history and the fact that it 

was her second probation violation in this cause. Jackson now appeals.

Decision

[6] On appeal, Jackson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 

her to serve 730 days of her previously suspended sentence in the DOC. She 

acknowledges that she violated her probation twice, but she argues that 

“[r]ather than using her mistake as an excuse to binge and fall completely off 

the wagon, [she] used her relapse as an impetus to try even harder to maintain 

sobriety.” (Jackson’s Br. 8). Specifically, she “went to drug classes and is 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1509-CR-1386 | April 26, 2016 Page 4 of 5

working hard to stay sober.” (Jackson’s Br. 8). In light of this desire to change, 

Jackson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve 

half of her suspended sentence.

[7] First, we note that “‘[p]robation is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty 

[that] is a favor, not a right.’” Lampley v. State, 31 N.E.3d 1034, 1037 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015) (quoting Ripps v. State, 968 N.E.2d 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). 

INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3(h) sets forth a trial court’s options once the trial 

court has found a probation violation. It provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any 

time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke 

is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one 

(1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without 

modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more 

than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was 

suspended at the time of initial sentencing. 

I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). Our supreme court has held that a trial court’s sanction 

decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion 

standard. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). This is because 

“[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than 

incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to 

proceed.” Id. We will find that a trial court has abused its discretion when its 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1509-CR-1386 | April 26, 2016 Page 5 of 5

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before it. Id. 

[8] Even though Jackson asserts she has been attending drug classes and attempting 

to stay sober, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it ordered her to serve 730 days of her previously suspended sentence. As the 

trial court noted, this was Jackson’s second probation violation under this 

cause, and the trial court had already granted her leniency when it ordered her 

to serve only forty-four days of her suspended sentence and allowed her to then 

continue on probation after her first probation violation. In addition, Jackson 

has a notable criminal history that includes several drug and alcohol related 

offenses. These offenses included, among others, three convictions of Class C 

misdemeanor illegal consumption of an alcoholic beverage; one conviction of 

Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct; and one conviction for Class B 

misdemeanor public intoxication that endangers the person’s life. In addition, 

Jackson was convicted of Class A misdemeanor conversion in 2007 and 

violated her probation four times in that cause. In light of the leniency the trial 

court afforded Jackson in the past and her criminal history, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered her to serve 730 days 

of her suspended sentence.

[9] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Riley, J., concur.