PRESENT: All the Justices 

RODNEY L. DIXON, JR. 

v. Record No. 041952 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 Record No. 041996 June 9, 2005 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 

 In these appeals, we consider the denial of a defendant’s 

motion to suppress certain statements he made to the police 

before being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436 (1966). The central issue we resolve is whether a 

suspect detained at the scene of a traffic accident was in 

police custody for purposes of the Miranda rule after the 

suspect was placed in handcuffs and locked in a police patrol 

car. 

 Rodney Lee Dixon, Jr. was charged in the City of Norfolk 

with driving under the influence (DUI), third offense within the 

past five years, in violation of Code § 18.2-270(C); driving on 

a suspended license, in violation of Code § 18.2-272; and 

refusing to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-268.3. Before trial in the circuit 

court, Dixon filed a motion to suppress certain statements he 

made to the arresting officer, claiming a violation of his 

rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the 
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Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution and Code 

of Virginia. The circuit court denied the motion. 

Dixon entered a conditional guilty plea to all the charges, 

reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 

suppress. See Code § 19.2-254. The circuit court accepted 

Dixon’s pleas and sentenced him to a total of six years’ 

imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, five years and $500 of which 

were suspended. The court also suspended Dixon’s driver’s 

license for one year. 

The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished order, denied 

Dixon’s petition for appeal of his convictions for DUI and 

driving on a suspended license. Dixon v. Commonwealth, Record 

No. 3261-03-1 (July 29, 2004). The Court stated that Dixon was 

not in police custody at the time he made incriminating 

statements to the police and that, therefore, the circuit court 

did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The Court also 

determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Dixon’s 

appeal of the circuit court’s judgment on the charge of refusing 

to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, and transferred 

that case to this Court. 

We consolidated Dixon’s appeal of the circuit court’s 

judgment on the refusal charge with his appeal of his criminal 

convictions from the Court of Appeals. Under established 

principles of appellate review, we will state the evidence in 
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the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 

party in the circuit court. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 

568, 570, 570 S.E.2d 836, 837 (2002); McCain v. Commonwealth, 

261 Va. 483, 486, 545 S.E.2d 541, 543 (2001). 

On February 23, 2003, at about 2:40 a.m., Virginia State 

Trooper Christopher S. Jackson arrived at the scene of a motor 

vehicle accident and fire on Interstate Route 64 in Norfolk. As 

Trooper Jackson approached officers from the Norfolk Police 

Department who initially had responded to the accident scene, 

Jackson saw that the officers had placed handcuffs on Dixon and 

were standing near him. Trooper Jackson observed that Dixon 

appeared “upset,” was acting “unruly” toward the officers, and 

had a “strong odor” of an alcoholic beverage emanating from his 

person. 

After the Norfolk officers removed the existing handcuffs, 

Trooper Jackson placed his own set of handcuffs on Dixon, 

thereby securing Dixon’s hands behind his back. Jackson then 

placed Dixon in the front passenger seat of his patrol car and 

locked the car door. Jackson told Dixon that he was not under 

arrest but “was being detained for investigative reasons [and] 

for [Dixon’s and Trooper Jackson’s] safety.” 

After verifying Dixon’s name and date of birth, Trooper 

Jackson began questioning Dixon about the accident. Jackson 

asked Dixon whether he was operating the vehicle that caught 
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fire, and whether he “had anything to drink during the evening.” 

Dixon replied that he had consumed four or five beers about an 

hour earlier, and that he had “pulled” his car over to the side 

of the road because the car was malfunctioning. 

Trooper Jackson administered several “field sobriety 

tests,” some of which Dixon refused to complete. Dixon also 

refused to submit to a preliminary breath alcohol test. At that 

point, Trooper Jackson informed Dixon that he was under arrest 

and advised him of his Miranda rights. 

Before trial, Dixon filed a motion to suppress the 

statements he made to Trooper Jackson about his alcohol 

consumption and operation of the vehicle. Dixon argued that he 

was in police custody when he was handcuffed and locked in the 

patrol car and, thus, that any statements he gave before being 

advised of his Miranda rights were obtained in violation of the 

Fifth Amendment. 

The circuit court denied Dixon’s motion. The court 

concluded that Trooper Jackson had reasonable suspicion that 

Dixon had been involved in criminal activity, and that Jackson’s 

actions in securing the handcuffs on Dixon and placing him in 

the locked patrol car did not convert the investigative 

detention into a custodial arrest. 

In its order denying Dixon’s petition for appeal of his 

criminal convictions, the Court of Appeals stated that Dixon was 
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not in custody when he made the incriminating statements because 

Trooper Jackson repeatedly advised Dixon that he was not under 

arrest, and placed him in handcuffs due to concerns for safety 

and possible escape. The Court concluded that, therefore, 

Trooper Jackson was not required to advise Dixon of his Miranda

rights before questioning him about the accident. 

On appeal to this Court, Dixon argues that his Fifth 

Amendment rights were violated because a reasonable person in 

his situation would have concluded that he was not free to leave 

the scene of the accident. According to Dixon, the conduct of 

the officers at the scene converted what normally would be 

considered an investigative detention into a custodial arrest. 

Dixon contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation, 

within the meaning of Miranda, because he was placed in 

handcuffs and involuntarily locked in the patrol car before 

being questioned by the police. 

In response, the Commonwealth argues that Trooper Jackson’s 

actions were consistent with an investigative detention 

permitted under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and were 

necessary under the circumstances. The Commonwealth asserts 

that reasonable restraint is permissible during an investigative 

detention, and that Trooper Jackson placed Dixon in handcuffs 

for safety reasons due to Dixon’s “hostile" and “defiant" 

attitude. The Commonwealth also contends that it was necessary 
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to place Dixon in the locked patrol car because of the dangerous 

highway location and Dixon’s prior attempts to leave the scene. 

Thus, the Commonwealth argues that under the circumstances 

presented, the circuit court correctly concluded that Dixon was 

not in police custody at the time he made the incriminating 

statements. 

In resolving this issue, we review settled principles of 

constitutional law that govern our inquiry. Under Miranda, 

before a suspect in police custody may be questioned by law 

enforcement officers, the suspect must be warned that he has a 

right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used 

as evidence against him, and that he has the right to have an 

attorney, either retained or appointed, present to assist him. 

384 U.S. at 444. Statements obtained by law enforcement 

officers in violation of this rule generally will be subject to 

exclusion for most proof purposes in a criminal trial. Id. at 

479; see Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). But

see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (exception for second 

statement obtained as a result of prior, unwarned statement); 

New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety 

exception); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (impeachment 

exception). 

The safeguards required by Miranda must be afforded to a 

suspect as soon as the police have restricted his freedom of 
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action to a “degree associated with formal arrest.” Berkemer v. 

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. 

Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)); see Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 

322; Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 605, 450 S.E.2d 124, 

129 (1994). Therefore, “[i]f a motorist who has been detained 

pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment 

that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be 

entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by 

Miranda.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440; see Oregon v. Mathiason, 

429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). 

Because the determination whether a suspect is “in custody” 

requires an objective focus, the only relevant inquiry is how a 

reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would have 

understood his circumstances. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; see

Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25; George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 

264, 272, 411 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1991). Thus, the subjective 

perspective of either the suspect or the interrogating police 

officer has no bearing on the issue whether the suspect was “in 

custody” at the time he was questioned by the police. 

Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324; Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; George, 

242 Va. at 272, 411 S.E.2d at 17. 

As the Supreme Court observed in Berkemer, the ordinary 

traffic stop is more analogous to a “Terry stop” than to 

restrictions associated with a formal arrest. 468 U.S. at 439. 
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Because both ordinary traffic stops and “Terry stops” are 

comparatively brief and noncoercive in nature, the Supreme Court 

has held that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such 

stops generally are not “in custody” for purposes of the Miranda

rule. Id. at 440. However, because a suspect may be “in 

custody” for purposes of Miranda before he actually has been 

arrested, we consider the circumstances of Dixon’s detention 

under the test stated by the Supreme Court in Berkemer to 

determine whether a reasonable person in Dixon’s position would 

have concluded that his freedom was being curtailed to a degree 

associated with a formal arrest. Id. at 442; see Stansbury, 511 

U.S. at 322; Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; Burket, 248 Va. at 605, 

450 S.E.2d at 129; George, 242 Va. at 272, 411 S.E.2d at 17. 

This detention occurred around 3:00 a.m. on the shoulder of 

an interstate highway. Although Trooper Jackson told Dixon that 

he was not under arrest, Jackson secured Dixon’s hands in 

handcuffs behind his back and placed him in the front seat of 

the locked patrol car. Jackson informed Dixon that he was being 

detained for investigative and safety considerations. We 

conclude that under these circumstances, a reasonable person in 

Dixon’s position would have understood that his freedom was 

being restricted to a degree associated with a formal arrest. 

See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322; 
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Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; Burket, 248 Va. at 605, 450 S.E.2d at 

129; George, 242 Va. at 272, 411 S.E.2d at 17. 

Our conclusion in this regard is influenced most strongly 

by the combined factors of Dixon being restrained in handcuffs 

and being locked in a police patrol car. While the presence of 

either of these factors, in the absence of the other, may not 

result in a curtailment of freedom ordinarily associated with a 

formal arrest, the presence of both factors compels the 

conclusion that a reasonable person subjected to both restraints 

would conclude that he was in police custody. 

This holding is in accord with decisions from several other 

states which, under varying other circumstances, have concluded 

that a suspect was “in custody” for purposes of the Miranda rule 

after being placed in handcuffs and secured in a police patrol 

car. See State v. Frank, 986 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Idaho Ct. App. 

1999); Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2000); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 716 N.E.2d 1036, 1038 (Mass. App. 

Ct. 1999); State v. Johnston, 572 S.E.2d 438, 441 (N.C. Ct. App. 

2002). The decisions of these courts, and our holding today, 

reflect the observation in Berkemer that although the 

determination whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of 

Miranda is not an “easily administered” rule, the rule serves 

well to protect both the constitutional rights of detained 
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citizens and the legitimate interests of law enforcement. See

Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441. 

Accordingly, under the facts and circumstances before us, 

we hold that Trooper Jackson was required to give Miranda

warnings to Dixon before questioning him, and that the circuit 

court erred in denying Dixon’s motion to suppress with regard to 

the criminal charges pending against him. Because the charge of 

refusing to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, Code 

§ 18.2-268.3, is civil, rather than criminal in nature, see

Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 290, 170 S.E.2d 199, 202 

(1969), our holding does not affect the circuit court’s 

adjudication of that charge.*

For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 

judgment on the refusal charge. We will reverse the Court of 

Appeals’ judgment on the criminal convictions under Code § 18.2-

270(C) and Code § 18.2-272, and remand the criminal charges for 

a new trial, if the Commonwealth so elects, in accordance with 

the principles expressed in this opinion. 

Record No. 041996 - Affirmed and final judgment.

 Record No. 041952 - Reversed and remanded.

 *

 Dixon’s counsel conceded at oral argument that our 

resolution of the issue whether the circuit court erred in 

denying the motion to suppress would not affect the circuit 

court’s judgment on the refusal charge.