UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4892

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

JEROME KINTE FARMER, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, 

Senior District Judge. (5:02-cr-00312-H-1) 

Submitted: July 10, 2009 Decided: July 20, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne 

M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

Jerome Kinte Farmer appeals his sentence to twentyfour months in prison imposed in the district court’s judgment 

revoking supervised release. On appeal, Farmer does not 

challenge the district court’s finding that he violated the 

conditions of his supervised release, but he contends that his 

sentence is plainly unreasonable. We affirm. 

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of 

supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory 

range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 

461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether 

the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id.

at 438. While a district court must consider the Chapter 7 

policy statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. 

B (2007), and the statutory requirements and factors applicable 

to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) 

(2006), the district court ultimately has broad discretion to 

revoke the previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment 

up to the statutory maximum. Id. at 438-39. Only if we find 

the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable, must we 

decide whether it is “plainly” unreasonable. Id. at 439. 

The district court properly determined that Farmer’s 

Chapter 7 policy statement range was twenty-four months. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006); USSG § 7B1.4. In imposing its 

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sentence, the district court noted that it had considered the 

policy statements in Chapter 7, and the court sentenced Farmer 

to twenty-four months in prison. While Farmer acknowledges his 

sentence “comported with the advisory guideline imprisonment,” 

he contends it “contravenes the policy articulated in Chapter 7, 

and the sentence is therefore plainly unreasonable.” 

Specifically, Farmer argues his sentence runs afoul of 

Chapter 7 commentary explaining a revocation sentence “should 

sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking 

into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the 

underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.” 

See USSG ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 3(b). We disagree. The same 

commentary notes revocation policy statements provide “for three 

broad grades of violations [that] permit proportionally longer 

terms for more serious violations.” Id. It is undisputed that 

Farmer’s most serious violation was Grade A, and with a criminal 

history category IV and two-year statutory maximum, his Chapter 

7 range was twenty-four months. We conclude Farmer’s sentence 

comports with Chapter 7 and is not plainly unreasonable. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED