J-S34005-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

AARON J. MORRISON,

Appellant No. 1660 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 21, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001792-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2015

Aaron J. Morrison appeals from the judgment of sentence of three and 

one-half to seven years imprisonment followed by three years probation. 

The court imposed that sentence after a jury convicted Appellant of 

kidnapping, false imprisonment, terroristic threats, and simple assault, and 

the trial judge thereafter convicted him of the summary offense of 

harassment. We affirm. 

On September 25, 2012, after previous unsuccessful attempts, the 

victim, Keshia Trimble, terminated a romantic relationship with Appellant. 

The following morning, September 26, 2012, Appellant telephoned her and 

became enraged after she ended the call to get ready for work. Thereafter, 

Appellant made 189 telephone calls to the victim between 8:15 a.m. and 
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10:35 a.m. During this same period, Appellant sent her threatening text 

messages. Appellant told the victim that he was going to steal the money 

from her bank account and that he would report Ms. Trimble to the local 

children and youth services and accuse her of drug use and owning guns so 

that she would lose custody of her child. 

In another text message, Appellant said that he was going to the 

victim’s work and place her in his car and that her co-workers would not see 

her, her son would not see her, and that no one would hear from her. About 

five minutes after this menacing text, Ms. Trimble arrived at work. 

Appellant’s vehicle was in the parking lot, and Appellant grabbed her and 

forced her into his car, telling her that he had duct tape and knives. He then 

forced her to telephone work and say that she would not be coming in. 

Appellant drove to a secluded location about fifteen minutes and five 

miles away from Ms. Trimble’s place of work. He took a knife and started to 

threaten to harm himself. Appellant briefly left his vehicle, and the victim 

quickly managed to telephone police and quietly inform them that she 

needed help. During these events, Ms. Trimble was afraid that she was 

going to be killed. 

In the meantime, at around 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 2012, 

Marlee Roles of Hoopla’s Family Fun & Grill (“Hoopla’s”), where Ms. Trimble 

was employed, telephoned police and told the dispatcher that she believed 

that one of her employees was in trouble. Muncy Township Police Chief 
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Christopher McKibben arrived to investigate. Ms. Roles explained that Ms. 

Trimble did not sound normal when she called off work. Ms. Roles also said 

that another employee saw Ms. Trimble arrive at the parking lot at Hoopla’s 

and that her car, with the keys still in the ignition, was still there. 

Chief McKibben ascertained that the victim’s car engine was still warm, 

as if it had been driven recently. He was not able to locate Ms. Trimble at 

Hoopla’s and unsuccessfully searched for her at a nearby vacant home. One 

of the Hoopla’s employees then told him that the victim had a protection 

from abuse order (“PFA”) against an ex-boyfriend. While inside Hoopla’s, 

Chief McKibben received a dispatch telling him that Ms. Trimble had 

telephoned police asking for help. 

The cell phone signal was triangulated, and Chief McKibben was able 

to ascertain that it was located on Peter Gray Road, which has no outlet, is 

isolated, and is overgrown. Chief McKibben, who was alone, immediately 

traveled to the entrance of the mile-long road and saw Appellant’s car 

backed into the brush. As Chief McKibben approached Appellant’s car, he 

observed the victim in the backseat, and she appeared upset. 

To protect himself and the victim and investigate the situation in 

safety, Chief McKibben pointed his gun at Appellant, ordered him from the 

car and onto the ground, and handcuffed him. Ms. Trimble was flushed, 

crying, and disheveled, and she told Chief McKibben that Appellant 

kidnapped her from Hoopla’s parking lot. 
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After hearing this account, Chief McKibben arrested Appellant at 11:30 

a.m., and gave him Miranda warnings. At that time, Appellant admitted 

that he had kidnapped the victim but he denied that he intended to harm 

her. Chief McKibben then drove Appellant to the police station, where 

Appellant was asked but refused to make a written statement. Questioning 

ceased. Appellant was seated in the chair of Chief McKibben’s office being 

processed when another police officer arrived. It was 1:30 p.m. that same 

day. The police officer entered Chief McKibben’s office and asked Appellant 

if he had been caught stealing. Chief McKibbens told Appellant to tell the 

other officer what he had done, and Appellant said that he had kidnapped a 

girl. 

After Appellant was charged, he moved to suppress the two 

admissions that he made to police. After that motion was denied, he 

proceeded to trial where he was convicted of the above-described charges. 

In this appeal that followed imposition of judgment of sentence, Appellant 

raises five issues:1

I. Did the Honorable Court err when it denied the motion 

to suppress the incriminating statements as fruit of an unlawful 

arrest when the Appellant was placed in handcuffs at gunpoint 

and not given proper Miranda warnings? 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s statement of issues involved references six issues, but 

Appellant withdrew the final one in the body of his brief. Appellant’s brief at 

21. 
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[II. The Honorable Court erred when it denied the motion 

to suppress the incriminating statements made at the police 

station after officers failed to renew the Miranda warnings.] 

III. Did the Honorable Court err when it denied the motion 

for a new trial due to the failure of the Commonwealth to 

present sufficient evidence regarding the charge of kidnapping, 

namely that the Appellant did not unlawfully remove complainant 

for a substantial distance and did not intend to inflict bodily 

injury or terrorize the complainant when he made no threats or 

aggressive physical movements toward the complainant? 

IV. Did the Honorable Court err in denying the motion for 

mistrial for a violation of Pa. R. Evid. § 404(b), when 

complainant testified on direct examination concerning prior bad 

acts by Appellant, namely that she testified that he had 

threatened to “slit her throat” on prior occasions? 

V. Did the Honorable Court err in allowing the 

Commonwealth to cross-examine Appellant concerning irrelevant 

and prejudicial cellular text messages in violation of Pa. R. Evid. 

§ 403? 

Appellant’s brief at 8-9, 15.2 

Appellant’s first two claims pertain to the denial of his motion to 

suppress. Our standard of review of a suppression court’s denial of a 

suppression motion is settled: 

____________________________________________

2

In his statement of issues raised on appeal, Appellant inadvertently repeats 

issue one and outlines identical contentions as both issue one and issue two. 

However, in the body of his brief, Appellant clarifies that the first issue 

challenges the admissibility of his first statement, which was made at the 

scene of the crime, while his second issue relates to the admissibility of the 

second statement, which was made at the police station. These were the 

positions raised in the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. We have corrected the 

typographical error on page eight in Appellant’s brief by replacing it with the 

one presented in the body of Appellant’s brief. 
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An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is 

limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported 

by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from 

those facts are correct. [Because] the prosecution prevailed in 

the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the 

trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if 

the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. 

Commonwealth v. Postie, 110 A.3d 1034, 1039 (Pa.Super. 2015). 

Appellant claims his crime-scene confession was the product of an 

unlawful arrest unsupported by probable cause. He first argues that he was 

arrested when placed on the ground and handcuffed. Appellant further 

asserts that Chief McKibben lacked probable cause to arrest him after the 

officer spoke with Ms. Trimble. The suppression court ruled that Chief 

McKibben had grounds to conduct an investigatory detention upon his arrival 

at the scene and that such an investigation was occurring when Appellant 

was first handcuffed. 

We agree with this assessment. When Chief McKibben arrived at Peter 

Gray Road, he had the following facts at his disposal. He was told that the 

victim had a PFA against a former boyfriend, had arrived at work, and had 

disappeared. While Chief McKibben was investigating Ms. Trimble’s 

disappearance, he was informed that she had called police asking for help. 

After finding the location of her cell phone, Chief McKibben saw the victim in 

Appellant’s car, which was located in an isolated area, and she appeared 
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distraught. These circumstances gave Chief McKibben reasonable suspicion 

to believe that a crime may have been occurring and justified an 

investigatory detention. Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996 

(Pa.Super. 2014) (police can conduct investigation if they have reasonable 

suspicion that criminality is afoot and that test is an objective one 

determined by examining the totality of the circumstances).

Appellant maintains that Chief McKibben did not conduct an 

investigation upon his arrival but rather immediately arrested him because 

Appellant was ordered to lay down on the ground and was handcuffed. We 

cannot agree. Chief McKibben stated that, when he arrived at the crime 

scene, he did not place Appellant under arrest. He continued, “I put 

handcuffs on him to put him in custodial detention until I could figure out 

what was going on. I’m by myself.” N.T., Suppression Hearing, 5/17/13, at 

13. Chief McKibben explained that Appellant was handcuffed for the officer’s 

safety. Id. at 19. The mere fact that Appellant was handcuffed did not 

convert the investigation into an arrest. Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 

A.2d 341, 348 (Pa.Super. 2005) (“[P]olice officers may handcuff individuals 

during an investigative detention.”) Chief McKibben’s actions were 

unassailable given his knowledge of the situation and his sole presence at 

the scene. 
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Appellant next claims that Chief McKibben did not have probable cause 

to arrest him after speaking with the victim since he did not have cause to 

believe that she was trustworthy. 

Probable cause to effectuate an arrest exists when the 

facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting 

officer are reasonably trustworthy and sufficient to justify a 

person of reasonable caution in believing that the arrestee has 

committed an offense. In addressing the existence of probable 

cause, courts must focus on the circumstances as seen through 

the eyes of the trained police officer, taking into consideration 

that probable cause does not involve certainties, but rather the 

factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 

reasonable and prudent men act.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 486 (Pa.Super. 2014).

Herein, Chief McKibben said that the victim told him that Appellant 

“grabbed her from her place of employment, threw her in the back of the 

vehicle, locked the doors and took off towards Muncy with her.” N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 5/17/13, at 11. She also reported that Appellant 

made the following threat to her: “You’re going to make me do something 

with this knife that I’m going to regret the rest of my life.” Id. 

We reject Appellant’s position that there was no indication that Ms. 

Trimble was being truthful. Chief McKibben knew that Ms. Trimble arrived at 

work in her car, mysteriously reported off after coming to work, 

disappeared, and had a PFA against a former boyfriend. That officer also 

was aware that she had telephoned police asking for help. Her veracity was 

additionally bolstered by the evidence that the victim appeared distraught 
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when Chief McKibben arrived. Id. at 19 (Chief McKibben testifying that the 

victim appeared, “Very upset, face was flush, she had make-up running all 

over her face, clothes were disheveled.”). Finally, Ms. Trimble was located 

in an isolated, wooded area with a man. Hence, we find that, after speaking 

with Ms. Trimble, Chief McKibben had probable cause to arrest Appellant for 

committing the crime of kidnapping. Since Appellant’s arrest was supported 

by probable cause and he was given Miranda warnings before confessing, 

the suppression court properly refused to suppress Appellant’s inculpatory 

remark at the scene of the crime.

Appellant’s second position is that the suppression court’s erred in 

refusing to suppress the statement that he made at the police station. 

Appellant avers that the Miranda warnings given to him at the scene were 

stale and should have been re-administered to him before he gave the 

second inculpatory remark.3 As we noted in Commonwealth v. Cohen, 53 

A.3d 882, 888 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted), when determining 

whether Miranda warnings are stale, we examine these factors:

____________________________________________

3 We note that Appellant does not suggest that he invoked his Miranda

rights at any point and merely maintains that the first warnings were stale. 

Chief McKibben did not indicate either that Appellant said that he did not 

want to speak with police any longer or that Appellant requested a lawyer. 

Chief McKibben explained that, at the police station, Appellant merely 

refused to provide a written statement and that they began to talk about 

other matters. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/17/13, at 15. 
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 The length of time between the warnings and the challenged 

interrogation, whether the interrogation was conducted at the 

same place where the warnings were given, whether the officer 

who gave the warnings also conducted the questioning, and 

whether the statements obtained are materially different from 

other statements that may have been made at the time of the 

warnings.

Accord Commonwealth v. Scott, 752 A.2d 871, 875 (Pa. 2000) (“This 

Court has never created a prophylactic rule that a suspect must be rewarned 

of his constitutional rights every time a custodial interrogation is renewed.”); 

see also Commonwealth v. Hill, 104 A.3d 1220 (Pa. 2014) (case 

remanded for reconsideration under correct standards where we held that a 

pre-polygraph counseled waiver of Miranda rights did not apply to a police 

interrogation that followed conduct of polygraph). If the circumstances 

outlined above establish that there has been a clear continuity in the 

interrogation, no renewal of rights is required. Scott, supra. 

In this case, Chief McKibben testified that he administered Miranda

warnings to Appellant after placing him under arrest. That officer then 

asked, “Do you know why I’m here?” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/17/13, at 

11. Appellant responded, “Yeah because I kidnapped her but I wasn’t going 

to hurt her.” Id. Thereafter, Appellant was transported to the police 

station. Once there, Appellant declined to give a written statement so Chief 

McKibben and Appellant started to talk about his family. Another officer 

arrived at 1:30 p.m., about two hours after the warnings were given. That 

officer asked Appellant whether he had been caught stealing because arrests 
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in that area generally were for retail theft. Chief McKibben then said, “Go 

ahead and tell him what you did,” and Appellant said, “I kidnapped a girl.” 

Id. at 16. 

Herein, Chief McKibben disseminated the warnings at the scene and 

was the same officer who asked Appellant the question leading to the second 

admission. There was only a two-hour gap between the Miranda warnings 

and the second confession. Finally, the second statement was identical to 

the first one. Under the circumstances, the suppression court did not err in 

finding that there was a continuity in interrogation and that Appellant’s 

Miranda warnings were not stale. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 282 A.2d 

276 (Pa. 1971) (applicable warnings were not stale when they were given 

less than five hours before second admission, second statement was not 

materially different from first one, defendant had been moved only a few 

miles, and officer who gave warnings was with officer who questioned 

defendant during the second interrogation). 

Appellant’s third issue is a sufficiency challenge to the kidnapping 

conviction. Our standard of review in this context is as follows:

Whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, 

there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying 

the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the 

facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need 

not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts

regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder 
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unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa.Super. 2015). 

A person is guilty of kidnapping if he, in relevant part, “unlawfully 

removes another a substantial distance under the circumstances from the 

place where he is found” with the intention “to terrorize the victim.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2901(a)(3). Appellant contends that there was no proof either 

that he removed the victim a substantial distance from Hoopla’s or that he 

intended to terrorize her. As our Supreme Court noted, 

For purposes of the kidnapping statute, a substantial 

distance is not limited to a defined linear distance or a certain 

time period. The determination of whether the victim was moved 

a substantial distance is evaluated under the circumstances of 

the incident. Further, the guilt of an abductor cannot depend 

upon the fortuity of the distance he has transported his victim 

nor the length of time elapsed. 

Commonwealth v. Malloy, 856 A.2d 767, 779 (Pa. 2004) (citations 

omitted). 

In this case, Appellant was angry at the victim, forced her into his car, 

and drove her fifteen minutes and 5.2 miles away to a secluded, wooded 

area. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that Appellant transported her a 

substantial distance. Id. (kidnapping occurred when victim was forced into 

vehicle and driven fifteen minutes and five point two miles from point of 

abduction to an isolated area of the city). 
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We also conclude that the following proof supports the jury’s 

determination that Appellant’s actions were undertaken to terrorize the 

victim. About five minutes before abducting her, Appellant told the victim 

that he was going to take her away and that no one from work would see 

her, her son would not see her, and no one would hear from her. He then 

forced her into the car and told her that he had knives and duct tape. He 

also said to Ms. Trimble that she was going to make him do something with 

the knife that he would regret. Finally, Appellant took the victim to an 

isolated, wooded area. The victim stated that she was afraid for her life. 

We thus reject Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the kidnapping conviction. 

Appellant’s fourth averment is that the trial court improperly denied 

his request for a mistrial after the victim testified that, on a previous 

occasion, Appellant had threatened to slit her throat. We review the trial 

court’s denial of a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. 

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 728 (Pa. 2013). It is settled that 

“a trial court may grant a mistrial only where the incident upon which the 

motion is based is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive 

the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and 

rendering a true verdict.” Id. (citation omitted). Indeed the grant of a 

mistrial is “an extreme remedy that is required only where the challenged 

event deprived the accused of a fair and impartial trial.” Id. (citation 
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omitted). If a “trial court gives adequate cautionary instructions, declaration 

of a mistrial is not necessary.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Herein, the following exchange led to Appellant’s request for a mistrial:

[District Attorney] Q.: Did [Appellant] say anything to you before 

Chief McKibben got there?

[Ms. Trimble] A.: No. 

Q. Now you said that [Appellant] made it clear to you that he 

had knives and duct tape?

A. Yes. 

Q. Did he tell you how may knives?

A. Um, I can’t remember if he gave me a number, he just said 

he had knives. 

Q. Were you scared that [Appellant] would use that knife on 

you, the one that you saw?

A. Yes. 

Q. Why were you scared?

A. He has made threats previously about slitting my throat. 

N.T. Trial, 2/25/14, at 32. 

After Appellant objected, the district attorney explained that she “was 

not anticipating that answer. I had thought that she was going to say that 

she was scared because he had the knife in his hand and was using it[.]” 

Id. at 33. The court denied the mistrial on the basis that it was an 

“inadvertent comment by the victim and not planned to be brought out by 

the Commonwealth.” Id. at 34. The court gave a curative instruction, 
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telling the jury to disregard the statement and to give it no weight or 

credibility. Since the mention of the prior bad act was revealed by the 

victim, was not intentionally elicited by the prosecution, was not exploited by 

the district attorney, and the trial court immediately gave a curative 

instruction, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying the mistrial request. Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256 

(Pa.Super. 2009). 

Appellant’s final complaint is that the trial court impermissibly allowed 

him to be cross-examined about the contents of text messages that he sent 

Ms. Trimble on September 15 and 16, 2012, within two weeks of the 

kidnapping. “It is well-settled that ‘the scope of cross examination is a 

matter within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed by this 

Court absent an abuse of that discretion.’” Commonwealth v. Kouma, 53 

A.3d 760, 768 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted). 

In this case, Appellant maintained during his direct examination that 

he ended the romantic relationship with Ms. Trimble and that, as a result, 

she was suicidal. Appellant stated that the threatening text messages that 

he sent on the day of the kidnapping were intended to elicit a response from 

Ms. Trimble because he was worried that she would hurt herself. The trial 

court then permitted Appellant to be cross-examined with a text message 

that he sent Ms. Trimble on September 15, and in which Appellant said he 

was going for “anger management and I’m asking around for prices on a 
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therapist.” N.T. Trial, 2/25/14, at 145. In addition, the trial court allowed 

Appellant to be asked about a text message that he sent on September 16 

that, “All I do is hurt people. I’m so sorry. Keshia Trimble, I’ll always be 

thinking of you and praying you give me another chance. I’ve learned my 

lesson and I’ve already scheduled some help for myself. I hope you will be 

on my side in the future.” Id. at 146. 

We conclude that the cross-examination was proper since the text 

messages directly contradicted Appellant’s direct testimony that Ms. Trimble, 

rather than he, was the person who was emotionally unstable as well as 

Appellant’s insistence that he, instead of Ms. Trimble, ended their 

relationship. The text messages impeached Appellant’s testimony and were 

properly used during cross-examination. Hence, we reject Appellant’s 

assertions on appeal and affirm. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/2015