J-S55017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. JAMES WALSH, Appellant No. 133 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-MD-0000231-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and S TRASSBURGER, J. * MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 Appellant, James Walsh, appeals pro se from an order issued by the trial court on November 14, 2014. Because we concl ude that the order is not final and/or appealable, we quash. The complicated factual and procedural history of this case is irrelevant to our disposition of Appellant’s appeal . We need only explain that Appellant’s case involves various contempt proceedi ngs stemming from his failure to pay costs and fines owed to Blair County . On November 14, 2014, the court issued the order from which Appellant now seeks to appeal. That order: (1) continued (at Appellant’s request) the d isposition of a pro se

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cour t.J-S55017-15

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petition previously filed by Appellant; 1 (2) vacated/rescinded a bench warrant that had been issued for Appellant; and (3) granted Appellant’s counsel’s oral request to withdraw from representin g Appellant. For the following reasons, we sua sponte conclude that this order is not final and/or appealable. See In re Miscin , 885 A.2d 558, 560-61 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating that “[w]e may examine the is sue of appealability sua sponte because it affects the Court’s jurisdiction over t he case”). Our Supreme Court has explained: As a general rule, ... appellate courts have jurisdic tion only over appeals taken from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) defines a final order as follows: Definition of final order. A final order is any order that: (1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or (2) is expressly defined as a final order by statut e; or (3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivi sion (c) of this rule. Pa.R.A.P. [] 341(b). This rule is interpreted in ac cordance with the plain language of its terms. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wickett

, 563 Pa. 595, 601 n. 6, 763 A.2d 813, 817 n. 6 (200 0). Commonwealth v. Scarborough , 64 A.3d 602, 608 (Pa. 2013) (one citation omitted).

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1 In that pro se petition, Appellant sought the restoration of his r ight to appeal nunc pro tunc from an order issued on March 12, 2014.J-S55017-15

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Here, the trial court’s November 14, 2014 order di d three things. First, it continued the disposition of a pro se petition filed by Appellant. Clearly, the court’s order is not final/appealable in this regard. Second, the order vacated/rescinded a bench warrant issued for Appellant’s arrest. Because Appellant is not aggrieved by the court’s o rdering the bench warrant to be vacated/rescinded, he cannot appeal f rom that component of the order. See Pierro v. Pierro , 252 A.2d 652, 653 (Pa. 1969) (holding that an appeal “must be quashed[]” where the appell ant was “not a party aggrieved by the order” because he was not “adverse ly affected” thereby). Third, the order granted Appellant’s counsel’s pet ition to withdraw. We acknowledge that, Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 sets forth a narrow exception to the general rule that only final orders are subject to appellate review. See Pugar v. Greco , 483 Pa. 68, 72, 394 A.2d 542, 544 (1978) (stating rule of finality). Under this exception, an interlocutory order is considered “final” and immed iately appealable if (1) it is separable from and collater al to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too impo rtant to be denied review; and (3) the question presented is su ch that if review is postponed until final judgment in the cas e, the claimed right will be irreparably lost. See Pugar , 483 Pa. at 73, 394 A.2d at 545 (setting forth test for appealable coll ateral order); Pa.R.A.P. 313 (codifying collateral order exception ). This third prong requires that the matter must effectively be unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. See Commonwealth v. Johnson , 550 Pa. 298, 302 n. 2, 705 A.2d 830, 832 n. 2 (19 98) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay , 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)). See also Commonwealth v. Myers , 457 Pa. 317, 320, 322 A.2d 131, 133 (1974) (order is not immediately appealable if it cannot be said “that ‘denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of [the] individual's claim’” (quotingJ-S55017-15

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United States v. Ryan , 402 U.S. 530, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971))). Commonwealth v. Wells , 719 A.2d 729, 730 (Pa. 1998) (footnotes omitted).

In Wells , our Supreme Court held that an order denying defe nse counsel’s request to withdraw in a collateral revie w proceeding under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 95 41-9546, is not immediately appealable under the collateral order d octrine. Wells , 719 A.2d at 731. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Johnson , 705 A.2d 830, 834 (Pa. 1998), our Supreme Court held that a pretrial order disqualifying counsel in a criminal case is not immediately appealable as a collateral order. In both Wells and Johnson , the Court reasoned that the third prong of the collateral order test was not satisfied, because th e appellant’s right to counsel would not be irreparably lost if review of the order was postponed until final judgment. See Johnson , 705 A.2d at 834 (“[A]n order disqualifying counsel is reviewable after judgment of sentence. If a judgment is obtained and it is determined on appeal that the trial court improperly removed counsel, the right to counsel of choice is not lost. There will be a new trial and the defendant will have his counsel of choice.”); Wells , 719 A.2d at 731 (“[S]ince Appellant’s claimed rig ht [to conflict-free counsel] would not be irreparably lost if review of the order were postponed until final judgment, the court’s order denying the Petition to Withdraw is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.”).J-S55017-15

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The rationale expressed in Wells and Johnson applies in the present case. Even assuming that Appellant has a right to counsel in the contemptrelated proceedings below, that right will not be i rretrievably lost if he waits until a final judgment is rendered to file an appea l challenging the court’s decision to grant court-appointed counsel’s petitio n to withdraw. Accordingly, as in Wells and Johnson , the court’s order granting counsel’s petition to withdraw is not immediately appealable as a collateral order. In sum, we conclude that no aspect of the trial co urt’s November 14, 2014 order renders it final and appealable. Accord ingly, we quash this appeal and remand to the trial court for further pr oceedings. Appeal quashed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction reli nquished. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2015