False Burglar 

Alarms

2nd Edition

Rana Sampson

Problem-Specific Guides Series

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

No. 5

False Burglar Alarms

2nd Edition

Rana Sampson

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 

#1999-CK-WX-K004 and #2005-CK-WX-K001 by the Office 

of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of 

Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of 

the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, 

companies, products, or services should not be considered an 

endorsement thereof by the author(s) or the U.S. Department 

of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement 

discussion of the issues.

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the 

original date of this publication. Given that URLs and websites are 

in constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the COPS Office can 

vouch for their current validity.

© 2011 Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, Inc. The U.S. 

Department of Justice reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and 

irrevocable license to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use, and 

authorize others to use, this publication for federal government 

purposes. This publication may be freely distributed and used for 

noncommercial and educational purposes.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

ISBN:1-932582-04-5

August 2011

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides Series

Guide No. 5

Contents

Contents

About the Problem-Specific Guide Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

What This Guide Does and Does Not Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

General Description of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Causes of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The Effectiveness of Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The Costs of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Understanding Your Local Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Asking the Right Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Measuring Your Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Specific Responses to Reduce False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Responses With Limited Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Response Not Recommended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Appendix: Summary of Responses to False Burglar Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

| 1 |

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series

About the Problem-Specific Guide Series

The Problem-Specific Guides summarize knowledge about how police can reduce the 

harm caused by specific crime and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention and 

to improving the overall response to incidents, not to investigating offenses or handling 

specific incidents. Neither do they cover all of the technical details about how to implement 

specific responses. The guides are written for police—of whatever rank or assignment—

who must address the specific problem the guides cover. The guides will be most useful to 

officers who:

•	 Understand basic problem-oriented policing principles and methods. The 

guides are not primers in problem-oriented policing. They deal only briefly with the 

initial decision to focus on a particular problem, methods to analyze the problem, 

and means to assess the results of a problem-oriented policing project. They are 

designed to help police decide how best to analyze and address a problem they 

have already identified. (A companion series of Problem-Solving Tools guides has 

been produced to aid in various aspects of problem analysis and assessment.)

•	 Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the complexity of the problem, 

you should be prepared to spend perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and 

responding to it. Carefully studying a problem before responding helps you 

design the right strategy, one that is most likely to work in your community. 

You should not blindly adopt the responses others have used; you must decide 

whether they are appropriate to your local situation. What is true in one place 

may not be true elsewhere; what works in one place may not work everywhere.

•	 Are willing to consider new ways of doing police business. The guides describe 

responses that other police departments have used or that researchers have tested. 

While not all of these responses will be appropriate to your particular problem, they 

should help give a broader view of the kinds of things you could do. You may think 

you cannot implement some of these responses in your jurisdiction, but perhaps you 

can. In many places, when police have discovered a more effective response, they 

have succeeded in having laws and policies changed, improving the response to the 

problem. (A companion series of Response Guides has been produced to help you 

understand how commonly-used police responses work on a variety of problems.) 
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False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

•	 Understand the value and the limits of research knowledge. For some types 

of problems, a lot of useful research is available to the police; for other problems, 

little is available. Accordingly, some guides in this series summarize existing research 

whereas other guides illustrate the need for more research on that particular problem. 

Regardless, research has not provided definitive answers to all the questions you 

might have about the problem. The research may help get you started in designing 

your own responses, but it cannot tell you exactly what to do. This will depend 

greatly on the particular nature of your local problem. In the interest of keeping the 

guides readable, not every piece of relevant research has been cited, nor has every 

point been attributed to its sources. To have done so would have overwhelmed and 

distracted the reader. The references listed at the end of each guide are those drawn 

on most heavily; they are not a complete bibliography of research on the subject. 

•	 Are willing to work with others to find effective solutions to the problem. The 

police alone cannot implement many of the responses discussed in the guides. They 

must frequently implement them in partnership with other responsible private and 

public bodies including other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, 

private businesses, public utilities, community groups, and individual citizens. An 

effective problem-solver must know how to forge genuine partnerships with others 

and be prepared to invest considerable effort in making these partnerships work. 

Each guide identifies particular individuals or groups in the community with whom 

police might work to improve the overall response to that problem. Thorough 

analysis of problems often reveals that individuals and groups other than the police 

are in a stronger position to address problems and that police ought to shift some 

greater responsibility to them to do so. Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing 

Responsibility for Public Safety Problems, provides further discussion of this topic.

The COPS Office defines community policing as “a philosophy that promotes 

organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problemsolving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public 

safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.” These guides emphasize 

problem-solving and police-community partnerships in the context of addressing specific 

public safety problems. For the most part, the organizational strategies that can facilitate 

problem-solving and police-community partnerships vary considerably and discussion of 

them is beyond the scope of these guides.
| 3 |

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series

These guides have drawn on research findings and police practices in the United States, 

the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. 

Even though laws, customs and police practices vary from country to country, it is apparent 

that the police everywhere experience common problems. In a world that is becoming 

increasingly interconnected, it is important that police be aware of research and successful 

practices beyond the borders of their own countries.

Each guide is informed by a thorough review of the research literature and reported 

police practice, and each guide is anonymously peer-reviewed by a line police officer, a 

police executive and a researcher prior to publication. The review process is independently 

managed by the COPS Office, which solicits the reviews. 

For more information about problem-oriented policing, visit the Center for ProblemOriented Policing online at www.popcenter.org. This website offers free online access to:

•	 The Problem-Specific Guides series

•	 The companion Response Guides and Problem-Solving Tools series 

•	 Special publications on crime analysis and on policing terrorism

•	 Instructional information about problem-oriented policing and related topics 

•	 An interactive problem-oriented policing training exercise

•	 An interactive Problem Analysis Module

•	 Online access to important police research and practices

•	 Information about problem-oriented policing conferences and award programs 

| 5 |

Acknowledgments

Acknowledgments

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police are produced by the Center for Problem-Oriented 

Policing, whose officers are Michael S. Scott (Director), Ronald V. Clarke (Associate 

Director), and Graeme R. Newman (Associate Director). While each guide has a primary 

author, other project team members, COPS Office staff, and anonymous peer reviewers 

contributed to each guide by proposing text, recommending research and offering 

suggestions on matters of format and style. 

The project team that developed the guide series comprised Herman Goldstein (University 

of Wisconsin Law School), Ronald V. Clarke (Rutgers University), John E. Eck (University 

of Cincinnati), Michael S. Scott (University of Wisconsin Law School), Rana Sampson 

(Police Consultant), and Deborah Lamm Weisel (North Carolina State University). 

Members of the San Diego; National City, California; and Savannah, Georgia police 

departments provided feedback on the guides’ format and style in the early stages of 

the project.

Cynthia E. Pappas oversaw the project for the COPS Office. Research for the guide was 

conducted at the Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University under the direction of 

Phyllis Schultze. Suzanne Fregly edited this guide.

| 7 |

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms

What This Guide Does and Does Not Cover

This guide deals with the problem of false burglar alarms. It begins by reviewing factors 

that increase the risks of false burglar alarms. It then identifies a series of questions that 

might help you analyze your local problem. Finally, it reviews responses to the problem and 

what is known about them from evaluative research and police practice.

False burglar alarms is but one aspect of the larger set of problems related to alarms and 

misuse of police resources. This guide is limited to addressing the particular harms created 

by false burglar alarms. Related problems not directly addressed in this guide, each of which 

require separate analysis, include:

•	 Misuse and abuse of 911

•	 False fire alarms

•	 False vehicle alarms

•	 False robbery alarms

•	 Noise complaints about audible alarms 

Some of these related problems are covered in other guides in this series, all of which are 

listed at the end of this guide. For the most up-to-date listing of current and future guides, 

see www.popcenter.org.

General Description of the Problem

In the United States in 2002, police responded to approximately 36 million alarm 

activations, at an estimated annual cost of $1.8 billion.1 Most of these activations 

were burglar alarms.† This guide examines current police responses and presents 

alternative strategies to address the false alarm dilemma. Purchasers of an alarm 

system are told to expect a police response to an alarm activation, even though 

they bought the system from a private alarm company with no link to a police 

department. The vast majority of alarm calls—between 94 and 98 percent (higher 

in some jurisdictions)—are false.‡ In other words, alarms’ reliability, which can be 

† In some cities, police also respond to fire alarms. It is typical for burglar alarm calls to substantially outnumber fire alarm 

calls to police departments.

‡ For example, in Dallas, Texas, of the 62,000 alarm calls in 2004, only 2.8 percent were valid (Security Sales and Integration 

2005). In Salt Lake City, Utah, of the thousands of alarm calls responded to in 1999, only 0.3 percent resulted from crime 

(Salt Lake Tribune 2000). In Eugene, Oregon, from the 5,944 alarm calls in 2001, police made only 10 arrests (Salem Police 

Department, Burglar Alarm Task Force 2004).
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False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

measured by these rates of false activations, is generally between 2 and 6 percent. 

Nationwide, false alarms account for somewhere between 10 and 25 percent of all

calls to police.2 For many U.S. police agencies, false burglar alarms constitute the 

highest-volume type of call for service. In the United States alone, “solving the 

problem of false alarms would, by itself, relieve 35,000 officers from providing an 

essentially private service.”3

During the 1990s, consolidation within the alarm industry changed the way 

alarm companies delivered services. Larger companies purchased smaller ones, 

and a number of alarm monitoring companies moved, sometimes out of state, to 

achieve economies of scale. For example, a company in Texas might monitor the 

alarms of tens of thousands of customers in Utah or other distant states.† When 

an alarm goes off, the monitoring company calls the owner. If no one answers 

or the person who answers gives the wrong prearranged code, the monitoring 

company calls the police, expecting them to respond.‡

An estimated 32 million security alarm systems have been installed in the 

United States,4 and most of these are monitored. The industry adds roughly 3 

million new systems each year.§ Sixty percent of those are in residences, the rest 

in commercial and institutional properties.5 Alarm industry statistics indicate 

that the average security system costs between $100 and $1,200, depending 

on its complexity, and monitoring fees average about $35 per month. Some 

security companies offer free alarm systems because the monthly monitoring fee 

alone produces strong profits for the industry. At least one of every seven U.S. 

businesses and one of every five U.S. residences have alarms.6 The recent trend 

of wiring new residential construction with alarm capacity has the potential 

to significantly increase the number of alarm calls in the coming decade. 

Consequently, even those police agencies with recently enacted false alarm 

policies and ordinances should revisit their approach; otherwise, their workload 

may be further consumed with false alarm calls.¶

† The mergers also mean that alarm systems originally installed and serviced by one company may now be serviced by another.

Many politicians, fearful of alienating their local security industry, often initially support police response to all alarms. However, 

the monitoring companies they are supporting may not be local at all.

‡ A few alarm companies still respond as part of their contract with customers, but this is rare.

§ Estimates of the number of new alarms installed differ (see Hakim and Blackstone 1997; Spivey and Cobb 1997; Blackstone, 

Hakim, and Spiegel 2000; and National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association 2005).

¶ Arlington, Texas, between 1985 and 2001, the number of police responses to residential alarm calls increased 494 percent, 

and commercial alarm calls increased 186 percent, with 99 percent proving false. In 2001, alarm calls accounted for 19 percent 

of all dispatched calls for service (White 2002).
| 9 |

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms

Alarm associations suggest that false burglar alarms are not evenly distributed: some alarm 

systems experience no false alarms, and others, many. In some jurisdictions, the pattern of 

false alarms is much more widely distributed.† Whether concentrated across locations or 

not, the aggregate number of false alarm calls among all alarmed premises places a high 

demand on limited police resources. 

The Causes of False Burglar Alarms

Research suggests that false burglar alarms result from three main causes: 

•	 User errors, such as using incorrect keypad codes, leaving a door or window open 

when activating the alarm, roaming pets or helium balloons, and errors arising 

from inadequate employee training, such as entering and exiting alarmed premises 

incorrectly7,‡

•	 Faulty or inappropriately selected equipment

•	 Poor installation, including failing to install motion detectors in sensible areas or at 

appropriate heights§

These are not the sole causes. Bad weather, alarm monitoring-center mistakes, and alarm 

line errors also falsely signal a burglar’s presence.8

Commercial properties tend to have even higher false alarm rates than residential properties 

because more people tend to share responsibility for activating and deactivating the alarm 

systems, and the systems tend to be more complex. The rate of false alarms for commercial 

alarm users may be as much as three times higher than the rate of false alarms among 

residential alarm users.9 Chronic false alarm activations are often due to inadequate 

employee training or inferior systems that have not been upgraded. 

† While false alarm calls may be clustered among a relatively small number of premises in some jurisdictions, other 

jurisdictions have found a much broader distribution. For example, one study of a Midwestern capital city showed that 70 

percent of all alarm permit holders had one or two false alarm calls (Gilbertson 2005).The Salem (Oregon) Police Department 

also found that a large number of locations accounted for the volume of alarm calls: 2,643 separate locations accounted for 

5,688 alarm calls (Salem Police Department, Burglar Alarm Task Force 2004).

‡ One U.K. study found that user error caused about 50 percent of alarm activations (Gill and Hemming 2003).

§ The alarm industry suggests user error accounts for the largest portion of false calls, poor installation is on the decline, and 

faulty equipment is less of a problem given recent technological advances [International Association of Chiefs of Police n.d.(a)].
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False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

The Effectiveness of Burglar Alarms

Burglar alarms are intended to prevent burglary and to help police apprehend burglars, 

which, if done reliably and efficiently, benefits the public at large. If, however, burglar 

alarms are unreliable or inefficient, the drain on police resources from responding to them 

may outweigh their benefits. Here we review the evidence of burglar alarms’ contribution to 

these two worthwhile objectives.

Studies from both the United States and the United Kingdom have shown burglar alarms 

to be among the most effective burglary-deterrence measures.10 However, a number 

of other measures that do not impose a substantial burden on police are also effective 

at preventing burglary. Occupancy, or signs of occupancy, is the biggest deterrent. 

In addition, closed-circuit television, window bars, barking dogs, nosy neighbors, 

and motion-activated lights have also been shown to be effective.† For the most part, 

burglars avoid alarmed premises because easier choices are usually available.11 Given the 

availability of non-alarmed premises and similarly unprotected targets (such as houses 

with open garage doors or windows), burglars may be deterred by the mere presence of an 

alarm company’s window sticker or yard sign.12

Do burglar alarms account for burglary declines in the United States? The U.S. burglary 

rate has declined steadily and substantially since the early 1980s.13 During the same time, 

the number of premises with alarms rose, but there is no evidence of a link between the 

two. During the 1990s through 2004, when alarm ownership experienced a steep rise, other 

types of crime declined just as sharply as burglary, suggesting that factors other than an 

increase in the number of alarm systems fueled the burglary decline. 

† See the POP guides titled Burglary of Single-Family Houses and Burglary of Retail Establishments for more complete coverage 

of burglary prevention measures.

Proper installation of alarm systems is essential to prevent 

false alarms.

Bob Morris
| 11 |

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms

Are alarms an efficient and effective way to catch burglars? Although burglary remains one 

of the most frequently reported crimes, the clearance rate for U.S. burglaries has remained 

below 15 percent for many years.14 Clearly, whatever contribution burglar alarms are 

making to solving burglary cases is modest, at best. 

The available research does not provide much support for alarms’ value in catching 

burglars. One study found that police were more likely to catch burglars in the act on 

premises without alarms than those with alarm systems.15 Police responses to burglary calls 

at locations without alarms are typically the result of an eyewitness, such as a neighbor, 

which is more reliable than an alarm. 

The Costs of False Burglar Alarms 

Each false alarm requires approximately 20 minutes of police time, usually for two officers. 

This costs the public hundreds of millions of dollars. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, 

the cost of responding to false alarms is not recouped through fines. Jurisdictions trying to 

recoup costs generally omit the lost-opportunity costs, a potentially significant part of the 

equation.† Typical costs include:

•	 Personnel costs of police call-takers and dispatchers

•	 Personnel, equipment, and costs related to backup personnel

•	 Personnel costs associated with analyzing false alarms

•	 Software, hardware, office space, and equipment costs for false alarm management

•	 Administrative and staff costs of notifications, permitting, billing, and education 

programs

•	 Costs of developing, printing, and distributing publications to educate the public and 

alarm companies about false alarms

•	 Lost-opportunity costs, when police are unavailable to work on actual crime problems

•	 Costs associated with call displacement, because the response to other 911 calls takes 

longer 

In addition, in some jurisdictions, officers have sustained injuries or their vehicles have 

been damaged as the result of traffic accidents while responding to false alarm calls.

† Lost-opportunity costs might include time that police could have spent conducting problem-solving efforts to reduce 

documented crime and disorder, reducing repeat calls at crime hot spots, and engaging the community in public safety 

initiatives. These all compete with time spent on chronic false-alarm response.
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False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

As an inducement to buy an alarm system, a number of companies offer “free monitoring 

services” for the first few months. Many insurance companies offer discounts on insurance 

premiums to customers with operable alarm systems. These discounts may be as much 

as 20 percent for commercial customers, and slightly less for residential owners.16 In 

addition, many police departments offer several “free” false alarms before imposing any 

fine, even though the cost to respond is significant right from the start. The offers of free 

monitoring services by alarm companies and discounts from insurers call into question the 

appropriateness of the current trend in U.S. policing of allowing three or four free false 

alarms per calendar year, because they provide no up-front incentives to encourage owners 

to prevent false alarms.

Certain burglary prevention measures have costs only to the owner. Lights, locks, and 

bars installed by a property owner (if within the fire code) are cost-free to the rest of the 

community. The individual purchaser bears these costs. On the other hand, alarm systems 

are not cost-free to the community, especially if up to 98 percent of alarms are false but still 

require the time and resources of a police response.†

Another social cost of burglar alarms is the noise neighbors endure when audible alarms 

sound, fueling noise complaint calls to the police. Some callers seek to alert the police that 

a neighboring alarm has been activated. Others merely want the police to stop the noise. In 

many jurisdictions, legislators have passed time restrictions for audible alarms, limiting them 

to 15 or 20 minutes and prohibiting extra sounding cycles.‡

One of the hidden costs of false burglar alarms is that they can distort the proper 

geographic distribution of police. False burglar alarms do not necessarily concentrate in 

the same places where crime in general, or burglary in particular, concentrates. Burglary 

rates are typically much higher in urban areas than in either suburban or rural areas,§

and residential burglaries tend to concentrate in and around low-income areas. Yet more 

affluent areas tend to have burglar alarms.17 In 2004, those at highest risk for burglary had 

household incomes below $25,000. Those with incomes below $7,500 were at the greatest 

risk, having twice the risk of households with incomes of $75,000 or more.18 In the United 

Kingdom, the risk of burglary among those with household income less than £5,000 was 

† In 2004, 86 percent of Dallas, Texas, households and businesses (representing the percent of unalarmed premises in the City) 

subsidized the police alarm response to the 14 percent of households and businesses that have alarms (Dallas City Council 2005).

‡ In New South Wales, Australia, the Environmental Protection Authority prohibits the sale of building-intruder alarms produced 

after September 1997 that sound for more than five minutes or that can automatically reset and sound again, since police and 

insurance groups have reported that most burglaries are over within five minutes.

See www.environment.nsw.gov.au/noise/alarms.htm.

§ In 2004, the burglary rate for urban areas was higher than rural or suburban areas: 41.9 burglaries per 1,000 urban 

households; 27.8 per 1,000 rural households; and 23.2 per suburban households (Catalano 2005).
| 13 |

The Problem of False Burglar Alarms

twice the national average.19 To the extent that calls-for-service data (which can be heavily 

skewed by alarm calls) are used to allocate police personnel to different areas, more officers 

might be assigned where there are a lot of false burglar alarms rather than where there is a 

lot of crime. No matter where they are assigned, officers spending time responding to false 

burglar alarms have less time available to attend to other crime problems. 

So, while alarm systems may have some benefit for alarm owners as part of an overall 

security package, the question remains whether non-alarm owners in the community 

should shoulder a share of the cost. If alarm use resulted in enhanced public safety—that 

is, alarms led to much higher burglar apprehension rates or, ideally, fewer burglaries across 

an entire jurisdiction—its public value would be more evident. However, the fact that 

alarm calls are overwhelmingly false and do not contribute substantially to police ability 

to apprehend burglars makes the underwriting of alarm response by police and entire 

communities (all taxpayers subsidize police response to alarmed properties) an expensive 

and inefficient approach to burglary reduction across an entire jurisdiction.

User errors account for a high percentage of false burglar 

alarms.

Bob Morris

| 15 |

Understanding Your Local Problem

Understanding Your Local Problem 

Stakeholders

The following groups have an interest in the false burglar alarms problem and ought to 

be considered for the contribution they might make to gathering information about the 

problem and responding to it:

•	 Community members who do not own alarms

•	 Alarm owners

•	 Private security companies

•	 Local government finance officials

•	 Public building managers

•	 Private alarm companies

Asking the Right Questions

The information provided above is only a generalized description of false alarms. The first 

step to address your community’s false alarm problem is to analyze it. You must combine 

the basic facts with a more specific understanding of your community’s problem. Careful 

analysis will help you design a more effective response strategy.† This analysis should, at a 

minimum, answer the following questions: 

•	 What proportion of your department’s call-for-service workload involves responding 

to alarms?

•	 What proportion of the department’s alarm calls is false?

•	 What proportion of the department’s alarm calls are burglar alarms, and what 

proportion of those are false?

•	 What proportion of the department’s noise calls relate to alarms,‡ and what are the calltaking costs for these?

•	 What is the department’s true cost of responding to alarms (police departments should 

locally determine the average time spent responding to alarm calls; see “The Costs of 

False Burglar Alarms,” on page 11)?

† For an example of how one city analyzed and responded to its false burglar-alarm problem, see Salt Lake City Police 

Department (2001), at www.popcenter.org/Library/Goldstein/2001/01-55(F).pdf.

‡ Do not include vehicle alarms, as they are a different alarm problem requiring separate analysis.
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False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

•	 How many residential and commercial alarm systems are operable in your jurisdiction, 

and what is the anticipated growth rate for alarm installation?

•	 At what rate do police catch burglars at alarm calls? 

•	 What are the numbers of false alarm calls from businesses, residences, and 

governmental, public, or semipublic premises (such as schools, city labs, museums, and 

city storage yards)?

•	 Are there any identifiable patterns for commercial alarm calls, such as at opening and 

closing times or during the holidays? (This indicates that alarm companies must educate 

specific groups of alarm owners.) 

•	 Are there any identifiable patterns for residential alarm calls, such as the frequency of 

alarm calls that are cancelled by the owner (or alarm company) within 15 minutes of 

the initial activation? (This indicates the alarm company’s responsibility for educating 

owners about proper alarm operation.) 

•	 Do some alarm companies have higher false alarm rates than others?

•	 What does a review of websites for alarm companies in your area suggest about the 

accuracy of their claims when trying to gain new customers?

•	 What does a review of alarm company policies and contracts suggest about alarm 

companies’ obligations to alarm owners?

•	 Has your department identified jurisdictions that have successfully reduced their total 

number of false alarms, not just their rates per system (see “Responses to the Problem of 

False Burglar Alarms,” on page 19, for examples)?

•	 Has the department interviewed alarm company personnel to determine their 

perspectives on the false alarm problem, and their openness to new solutions? Has the 

alarm industry done an analysis to determine the most failure-prone parts of the systems 

installed in the area, or why so many alarm users make mistakes in activating and 

deactivating their alarms? 

•	 Has the department interviewed groups of property owners (with and without alarms) 

to determine their perspectives on the false alarm problem, and their openness to new 

solutions?

•	 Has the department met with police union or police association leaders to determine 

their perspectives on the false alarm problem, their openness to new solutions, and their 

willingness to support a new approach?
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Understanding Your Local Problem

Measuring Your Effectiveness

You should take measures of the false alarm problem before implementing responses, to 

determine how serious the problem is, and after implementing them, to determine whether 

the responses have been effective. Measurement allows you to determine to what degree 

your efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you might modify your responses if they are 

not producing the desired results. For more detailed guidance on measuring effectiveness, 

see the companion guide to this series, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide 

for Police Problem-Solvers. The following are potentially useful measures of the effectiveness 

of responses to false alarms:

•	 Reduced number of alarm calls

•	 Reduced false alarm numbers for various types of premises—commercial, residential, 

and governmental (such as schools, city labs, museums, and city storage yards)

•	 Reduced number of false alarm calls at high-risk times, such as at business opening and 

closing times, during stormy weather, or during the holiday seasons

•	 Reduced number of personnel hours devoted to handling false alarm calls

•	 Reduced percentage of the police department’s call load devoted to false alarms

•	 Increased percentage of uncommitted time for officers to engage in problem-solving 

concerning actual crime and disorder problems

•	 Reduced costs of handling false alarm calls

•	 Reduced false alarm rates of individual alarm companies

•	 Increased rate at which police catch burglars at alarm calls (if false calls are minimized 

and response times are improved, burglar apprehension rates should rise) 

| 19 |

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar 

Alarms

Your analysis of your local problem should give you a better understanding of the factors 

contributing to it. Once you have analyzed your local problem and established a baseline 

for measuring effectiveness, you should consider possible responses to address the problem. 

The following response strategies provide a foundation of ideas for addressing your 

particular problem. These strategies are drawn from a variety of research studies, police 

reports, and news articles. Several of these strategies may apply to your community’s 

problem. It is critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can 

justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will 

involve implementing several different responses. Law enforcement responses alone are 

seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem. Do not limit yourself to considering 

what police can do: carefully consider who else in your community shares responsibility for 

the problem and can help police better respond to it. The responsibility of responding, in 

some cases, may need to be shifted toward those who have the capacity to implement more 

effective responses. (For more detailed information on shifting and sharing responsibility, 

see Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems.)

This guide assumes that the alarm industry has the responsibility to improve the quality 

of its equipment, install devices more accurately, improve its advice to consumers about 

the suitability of different types of systems for different types of homes and businesses, and 

increase user knowledge of its products. The responses described next have some potential 

to reduce false alarm calls. Police policies that stimulate the alarm industry to improve its 

products’ overall reliability are strongly preferred so as to minimize the burden on police in 

the effort to reduce the incidence of false burglar alarms. 
| 20 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

Specific Responses to Reduce False Burglar Alarms

1. Requiring alarm companies to verify alarm legitimacy before calling the police 

(commonly called “verified response”). Under this approach, alarm monitoring 

companies must verify the legitimacy of alarms (except holdup, duress, and panic 

alarms) before calling the police. Verified response typically involves visual on-scene 

verification of a break-in. Verification may also be established by remote video 

surveillance. Audio intrusion detection technology is also available.† However, it is 

not nearly as effective as visual on-scene or video verification at this point.‡ As for 

in-person verification, it is usually conducted by private security personnel who travel 

to the location, assess the situation, and if necessary, contact police.§ By requiring 

alarm monitoring companies to screen alarm activations, police response is reserved 

for true break-ins, actual attempts and holdup, duress, and panic alarms. Under this 

approach, only holdup, duress, and panic alarms require permits, whereas burglar 

alarms do not, reducing the administrative costs associated with a police-staffed false 

alarm program.20

Cities adopting verified response have found enormous decreases in the number of 

alarm calls, typically around 90 percent, which improves police response times to other 

types of calls. In 2000, Salt Lake City, Utah, adopted verified response using visual 

verification. By significantly reducing the number of calls to which officers needed 

to respond, the Salt Lake City Police Department gained an equivalent of five fulltime officers, decreased the workload of call-takers and dispatchers, and decreased 

the response time to other calls for service. Area alarm industry representatives cited 

increased revenues (as a result of the service charge applied for verification) and similar 

sales levels to those before the verified response policy.21

† Audio intrusion detection technology relies on sensors that, when activated, transmit a signal to the alarm company whereby 

an operator listens to live audio from the location and decides whether to notify the police.

‡ London’s Metropolitan Police Service (2006) found that audio verification false alarm rates were 80 percent. Several cities in 

the United States, including Fremont (California), Salt Lake City, and Burien (Washington), have also examined audio verification 

versus visual/video verification and found significant false alarm rates for audio monitoring. The Fremont Police Department 

(2006) found a 96 percent false rate with audio monitoring in an analysis of one year’s worth of audio alarms. The Salt Lake City 

Police Department (2006) found an 82 percent false rate on audio monitoring over several years, although the number of audio 

alarms calls was modest. The Burien Police Department (2006) found a 92 percent false rate on audio alarms in its review of 

nearly seven years of audio calls that were made from the unincorporated areas of King County, Washington, and 13 contract 

cities in King County.

§ Private security forces in the United States outnumber sworn police officers by about four to one (Betten and Mervosh 2005).

The Private Sector Liaison Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, collaborating with alarm industry 

organizations, published guidelines for private security response but noted, “the alarm industry does not support response by 

other than sworn police officers, except as a final step in an escalating series of sanctions for alarm system abusers or as a 

supplement to response service provided by local police.” [International Association of Chiefs of Police n.d.(c)].
| 21 |

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms

This approach may be most feasible in more populous areas: jurisdictions with few 

alarm customers scattered over a large area may have difficulty securing a private 

resource that can deliver satisfactory and cost-effective response times.22 However, in 

all likelihood, police in those jurisdictions have long response times to these alarm 

calls. In cities adopting verified response, insurance companies continue to provide 

discounts to alarm owners, as it is the monitoring itself, not whether it is done by 

police or private security, that appears to matter.23 Over the past few years, between 20 

and 25 U.S. cities have adopted this approach, and several police agencies in Canada 

have done so as well. 

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (supported by the National Burglar 

& Fire Alarm Association and the Central Station Alarm Association) recommends 

an approach to reducing false alarms that includes, among other things, telephone 

(or other electronic) verification by alarm companies and notification to alarm 

owners every time their alarm activates.24 The difference between this approach and 

verified response is that the latter requires the alarm company to make visual or video 

verification, eliminating the police response to almost all false alarms. Common 

arguments against using alarm company personnel to verify alarms are that the public 

expects a police response and police are better trained than private security to respond 

to such situations.25 In addition, some mass media reports of verified response policies 

are characterized in a light unfavorable to police, creating the impression that police are 

providing less effective service. 

The majority of police agencies that adopted verified response had to withstand 

significant resistance from the alarm industry. The alarm industry has defeated verified 

response proposals in many other cities. Adopting a verified response policy requires 

an investment in educating political leaders, the public, and interested parties (alarm 

companies, police unions, and the media) about the costs and benefits of a modified 

response. It also requires alarm companies’ availability for initial response to alarms. 
| 22 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

2. Charging a fee for service for all false holdup, duress, and panic alarms. When 

an alarm is personally activated (as in a holdup, duress, or panic alarm), gaining 

additional verification before dispatching a police officer is unrealistic. Even though 

these calls would seem the most likely to be true, many will also be false. As a result, 

a fee for service is charged for false holdup, duress, and panic alarm calls both so 

that police do not have to absorb the costs of false calls and to encourage responsible 

handling of these alarms. Salt Lake City, Utah, has adopted a fining approach to 

reduce the number of false holdup, duress, and panic alarms. In the United Kingdom, 

a combined approach of fines, eventual loss of police service, and device reengineering 

is used to reduce technology-related false alarms.26 Each department should conduct a 

separate analysis of holdup, duress, and panic alarms to identify the size and scope of 

the local problem.

3. Responding to holdup, duress, and panic alarms only if they come from a 

building. This approach is intended to stem the burgeoning use of mobile personal 

alarms and should be used in addition to the strategies discussed above.† New 

technology has prompted entrepreneurs to market mobile alarms: some handheld, 

some worn on clothing, others in automobiles. If police response is promised as part 

of these advances, the volume of false alarm calls could increase dramatically. To 

combat this potential problem, police agencies can adopt policies providing for police 

response only when an alarm originates from a building. Salt Lake City’s ordinance 

includes a section to address this problem, but again, a separate analysis of this 

problem is recommended.‡

† Those panic devices police provide to victims of ongoing crimes, such as stalking, may be exempted.

‡ False duress calls from cell phones are similar to the problem of false mobile personal-alarm calls. With the advent of E911 

Phase 2, which reveals the location of cell phone users calling 911, police agencies will face the dilemma of whether to respond 

to cell phone hang-up calls to 911. Most of these hang-ups are the result of unintentionally dialing 911. The 911 operator hears 

no caller and has to decide whether to dispatch an officer. In essence, these are the equivalent of false burglar alarms. For more 

information about this particular problem, see the POP guide titled Misuse and Abuse of 911.
| 23 |

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms

Responses With Limited Effectiveness 

4. Establishing an ordinance requiring owners to obtain alarm permits and to 

pay escalating fines for false alarms. Many police agencies rely on a local alarm 

ordinance to guide policy and establish false alarm fines.† Some ordinances provide 

for fixed fines, others include escalating fines against repeat abusers, and a few apply 

a cost-recovery system. Typically, fines are allocated to the general fund and not to 

the police budget. Invariably, alarm owners are not fined until they have several false 

alarms (usually three or four). Many ordinances also require alarm owners to obtain 

a permit. In theory, alarm permits help police departments to track and fine alarm 

abusers and to notify the most chronic abusers of the suspension of police response. 

However, some jurisdictions have found that some alarm companies do not make 

their customers aware of the permit requirement, and many alarm owners do not 

apply for required permits, which severely compromises this response’s effectiveness.27

This approach is administratively costly and requires continued officer dispatch 

(except in the most chronic cases).‡ Some residents resent police fines for services, 

as they mistakenly believe their taxes cover them. As a result, it may be difficult to 

collect fines; collection rates can be as low as 60 percent without significant followup.28 Finally, some jurisdictions have experienced initial reductions in the number of 

false alarms after an ordinance has been passed, but in general, these initial decreases 

do not endure over the long term.29

5. Setting a cost recovery-based fee for all false alarm calls. A fee for service would 

cover all costs associated with responding to false alarms. These include lostopportunity costs for officers responding to false alarms rather than proactively 

working on reducing crime and disorder problems.§ A fee for service differs from a 

fine in that it is not punitive; it is meant only to recover costs. It is unclear whether 

a fee for service reduces false alarms, though it does reimburse the city for providing 

a police response to calls that are almost always false. Any cost-recovery policy would 

need to incorporate follow-up action against nonpayers.

† The National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association and the False Alarm Reduction Association offer guidance for jurisdictions 

wishing to draft an ordinance providing sample language, including definitions; registration requirements; duties of users, 

installers, and monitors; fines; notifications; suspensions; appeals; and reinstatement. Further, the guidance includes checklists 

for installers and users, and guidelines for setting fines and fees (National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association and the False Alarm 

Reduction Association 2001).

‡ In 2004, the city of Dallas, Texas, spent upwards of $650,000 administering its false alarm-reduction program involving fines 

and collections (Dallas City Council 2005).

§ Calculating lost-opportunity costs might be less difficult for departments engaged in problem-oriented policing. Line officers 

in these departments proactively address specific crime and disorder problems.
| 24 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

6. Charging permit fees and fines directly to alarm companies. To lessen the 

administrative burden inherent in strategies requiring alarm users to obtain permits 

and to pay fines in the event of a false alarm, some jurisdictions charge these fees 

directly to the alarm installation or monitoring company. Not only does this practice 

ensure that all new alarms are registered with police, but it also greatly reduces 

the number of contacts that police alarm administrators must make. Rather than 

contacting thousands of alarm owners, alarm administrators make contact with a 

much smaller number of installers and monitoring companies. 

7. Outsourcing the administration of permits, fines, and fees. Administering 

permits, fines, and fees can be cumbersome and, if not implemented properly, the 

deterrent value of an ordinance is lost. Automation is essential to reduce the alarm 

administrator’s workload.† These administrative duties can be outsourced to a private 

firm in exchange for a portion of the fees.‡ Even with outsourcing, collection rates 

may be only about 60 or 70 percent.30 However, it is important to recognize that this 

response only manages, but will not solve, the problem.

8. Requiring alarm monitoring companies to make two calls to owners of activated 

systems before calling police. Most jurisdictions require alarm monitoring companies 

to make a single contact with the owner of an activated alarm system to learn whether 

the alarm was inadvertently set off during routine operations (e.g., arming or disarming 

the system). A practice labeled “enhanced call verification” requires monitoring 

companies to attempt contact using two or more phone numbers (for example, an 

owner’s home phone and cell phone) before calling police. Jurisdictions adopting this 

strategy have noted modest reductions (around 25 to 40 percent) in the number of 

false alarm calls to police.31 Customer satisfaction may increase because fines for police 

response to false alarms are avoided. However, because alarm monitoring companies 

generally handle customers from many jurisdictions, they may have difficulty applying 

multiple policies correctly. Furthermore, not all alarm companies comply with these 

directives, fearing liability if police are not called to the scene when a crime is in fact 

occurring. It is important to note that these efforts to contact the alarm owner are not 

† The Central Station Alarm Association developed a software package, False Alarm Analysis Program, to assist jurisdictions 

with the cumbersome task of administration. The software creates invoices and bills, tracks payment delinquency, and provides 

reports that analyze individual alarm users’ false alarm rates and those of customers of individual monitoring companies. The 

software package also has online training. See www.csaaul.org/faap.htm. However, “off the shelf” software packages may not 

suit every jurisdiction’s needs (Kanable 2001).

‡ The Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Police Department outsourced the administration and tracking of ordinance 

enforcement to a private company (Mowrey n.d.). The company launched a media campaign to encourage users to register 

alarms and also set up a toll-free telephone number to answer questions about the local ordinance (Kanable 2001).
| 25 |

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms

the equivalent of verification. The person called may be out of town or away from the 

location and would have no idea if their premise was being burgled. Finally, police 

cannot verify or enforce the “enhanced call verification” approach. 

9. Accepting dispatch cancellations. Some police agencies will cancel a dispatch upon 

request by an alarm company. The alarm company cancellation is usually based on 

telephone, not visual, verification. This approach can lead to decreases in the number 

of alarm calls, but it also inadvertently increases the number of incoming calls to 

dispatchers, because cancellation calls must be fielded and dispatched.†

10. Alerting alarm companies about false-alarm abusers. Some police agencies contact 

alarm companies with the names of customers who are false-alarm abusers. This 

practice can reduce false alarms if alarm companies work with alarm owners to 

remedy the abuse.32 This approach depends on the alarm company’s willingness to 

follow up with its customers, and its capacity to bring abusers into line. It works best 

if both the alarm companies and the abusers are charged for costs. Alerting alarm 

companies requires police administrative staffing and police response to all alarm calls, 

and it may necessitate additional police resources as the number of alarm systems 

rises. In addition, some alarm companies may not be willing to share customer lists 

with police. 

11. Setting criteria for temporarily suspending police response. After a predetermined 

number of false alarms, some jurisdictions withhold police response to subsequent 

alarm activations.‡ Other jurisdictions will not dispatch police to locations that do 

not have a valid alarm permit on file. Proper implementation requires quick access 

to the number of prior false alarms and the permit status of the location, adding 

responsibilities to police call dispatchers. This response can be combined with 

a modified verified response policy so that either the police or a private security 

company respond to all alarms. Alarm owners should be warned of the intent to 

† An evaluation of Memphis, Tennessee’s, Alarm Office found that, while some alarm companies did indeed cancel alarm calls 

before dispatch, the practice did not have a measurable impact on the overall number of false alarms to which police were 

required to respond (Forde and Hellman 2004). Similarly, since Montgomery County, Maryland, enacted its alarm ordinance in 

1995, alarm monitoring companies cancelled 24 percent of all requests for dispatch. While this reduced the number of false 

alarms to which police responded, it also increased dispatchers’ workload (Montgomery County Police Department 2004).

‡ In 2004, the Los Angeles (California) Police Department restructured its response to burglar alarms by 1) increasing fines, 

2) suspending service after two false alarms in a rolling 12-month period, and 3) requiring alarm verification for all calls after 

suspension. In 2005, these changes reduced the number of alarm calls by about half, led to approximately the same cancellation 

rate, and required approximately half the number of alarm dispatches (Los Angeles Police Department 2005). The approach 

requires a significant amount of administrative work, including alarm permitting, false alarm classes, appeals processes, 

and use of a collection agency for past-due accounts [Los Angeles Police Commission, Alarms Section, Board of Police 

Commissioners (n.d.)].
| 26 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

suspend police response and should receive official notification of the suspension of 

services. Many jurisdictions allow owners to appeal the suspension decision and to 

“earn back” police response after some time. This approach can involve significant 

financial costs for the police in accommodating the administrative and appeal work 

this approach requires.

12. Publishing alarm companies’ false alarm rates on websites or elsewhere. Police 

can calculate and publish the false alarm rates of individual alarm companies to 

help potential buyers make informed decisions. This could prompt companies with 

higher false alarm rates to improve their practices, but requires significant police 

administrative work. 

13. Conducting alarm users’ education classes. Some police agencies hold false-alarm 

classes for abusers, usually with some success. These classes typically offer information 

on the scope of the false alarm problem in the local area and the basic functions 

of alarm systems, along with maintenance procedures and other practices that can 

help to reduce false alarm activations.† Many jurisdictions waive the fine incurred 

for a false alarm if the alarm owner attends the class. While some jurisdictions such 

as Phoenix, Arizona, and Bellevue, Washington, claim that as few as 10 percent 

of attendees have a subsequent false alarm, other jurisdictions such as Memphis, 

Tennessee, and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, have not experienced the same success level 

of success.33 The most effective alarm education efforts are done by alarm monitoring 

and installation companies providing on-premises instruction so that users receive 

hand-on training with their own equipment.34 Most often, however, police teach 

the alarm reduction classes offered. Representatives from alarm companies, arguably 

the group most knowledgeable about reducing false alarm calls, sometimes choose 

not to even attend. In general, alarm users’ classes must lead to a dramatic reduction 

in the total number of false alarms in a given jurisdiction to pay for the personnel 

and administrative costs of operating the program.35 Further, it is debatable whether 

police should bear the responsibility for alarm education efforts required for using a 

private consumer product.36

† The False Alarm Reduction Association and National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association created guidelines for establishing an 

alarm users’ awareness school (False Alarm Reduction Association and National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association 2000).
| 27 |

Responses to the Problem of False Burglar Alarms

14. Lowering the call priority of alarms. Avoiding the political issues involved in 

disagreeing with the alarm industry or in battling with city or county legislators, some 

police agencies have simply lowered the call priority for alarms (other than holdup, 

duress, and panic alarms). Other jurisdictions simply issue a general alert, allowing 

officers on patrol to respond at their discretion. This does not reduce the number 

of false alarms, nor does it reduce the number of alarm calls coming into a police 

dispatch center. 

Response Not Recommended

15. Providing an emergency police response to unverified burglar alarm calls. A 

number of police agencies still respond to alarm calls with their highest priority, 

often referred to as “priority one,” authorizing the swiftest response to the call. The 

research does not support this level of response due to the high rate of false alarms. In 

addition, this approach does nothing to address the underlying causes of false alarms. 

| 29 |

Appendix 

Appendix: Summary of Responses to False 

Burglar Alarms

The table below summarizes the responses to false burglar alarms, the mechanism by which 

they are intended to work, the conditions under which they ought to work best, and some 

factors you should consider before implementing a particular response. It is critical that 

you tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify each response based 

on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing several 

different responses. Law enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing or 

solving the problem.

Response 

No.

Page 

No.

Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

Effective Responses

1. 20 Requiring alarm 

companies to 

verify alarm 

legitimacy before 

calling the police 

(commonly 

called “verified 

response”)

The alarm company 

responds to the 

scene of an alarm 

and calls the police 

only if a crime has 

occurred or been 

attempted. If the 

alarm company is in 

visual contact with 

the alarm site, such 

as through CCTV, 

and can verify a 

crime or an attempt, 

police will respond

...holdup, panic, 

and duress alarms 

are exempted; 

alarm companies 

are prohibited 

from classifying an 

alarm call as duress 

when it isn’t; and 

combined with 

responses 2 and 3 

below

Requires educating 

the public, police 

union, and media 

to enable police 

leaders to establish 

departmental 

policy, or to 

encourage local (and 

sometimes state) 

legislators to enact 

ordinances 

2. 22 Charging a fee for 

service for all false 

holdup, duress, 

and panic alarms

Used in 

combination with 

response 1, keeps 

these types of alarm 

calls from becoming 

unmanageable

...the alarm 

industry is 

prohibited from 

classifying ordinary 

burglar alarms as 

“duress” alarms, 

and combined with 

responses 1 and 3

Requires permits 

for holdup, duress, 

and panic alarms, 

as well as false 

alarm-reduction 

management to 

monitor trends in 

such calls 
| 30 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

Response 

No.

Page 

No.

Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

3. 22 Responding to 

holdup, duress, 

and panic alarms 

only if they come 

from a building 

For an example, see 

the Salt Lake City 

ordinance at www.

slcgov.com/police. 

Police may make 

exceptions for panic 

alarms given to 

high-risk domestic 

violence and 

stalking victims

...publicized so 

that mobile-alarm 

manufacturers know 

the police will not 

respond

Requires outreach 

to mobile-alarm 

manufacturers

Responses With Limited Effectiveness

4. 23 Establishing 

an ordinance 

requiring owners 

to obtain alarm 

permits and to pay 

escalating fines for 

false alarms

Requires permits for 

alarm owners and 

escalating fines for 

false alarms 

...all alarmed 

premises obtain 

required permits, 

the community has 

an extremely low 

number of false 

alarms, and officers 

have sufficient 

free time so that 

responding to false 

alarm calls does not 

impede their ability 

to work on actual 

crime problems

Involves significant 

administrative 

resources; collection 

rates may be low; 

may involve taking 

legal action against 

nonpayers

5. 23 Setting a cost 

recovery-based fee 

for all false-alarm 

calls

The city calculates 

the true cost of 

false-alarm response, 

including the lostopportunity costs 

for police 

...the political 

climate is more 

supportive of fees 

for service than 

“verified response”

Involves billing 

and follow-up with 

customers who fail 

to pay; may involve 

taking legal action 

against nonpayers
| 31 |

Appendix 

Response 

No.

Page 

No.

Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

6. 24 Charging permit 

fees and fines 

directly to alarm 

companies

Reduces the number 

of contacts police 

must make to 

recover costs, and 

ensures all new 

alarm system owners 

obtain permits

...alarm companies 

recognize the 

value of reduced 

administrative 

workload for police

Requires 

cooperation from 

alarm companies

7. 24 Outsourcing the 

administration of 

permits, fines, and 

fees

Private companies 

are contracted 

to manage the 

administrative 

burden of 

permitting, tracking 

down, and collecting 

fines and fees from 

nonpayers

...permitting, fine, 

and fee transactions 

are automated

Manages, but does 

not solve, the false 

alarm problem

8. 24 Requiring alarm 

monitoring 

companies to 

make two calls 

to owners of 

activated systems 

before calling 

police

Provides an 

additional 

opportunity to 

verify the validity 

of an alarm by 

contacting owners 

who are not on the 

alarmed premises 

when alarm activates

...alarm monitoring 

companies are 

diligent in applying 

policy, and alarm 

owners have 

multiple contact 

numbers

Monitoring 

companies 

serving multiple 

jurisdictions may 

have difficulty 

applying multiple 

policies correctly; 

some alarm 

companies fear 

liability if police 

are not called 

immediately

9. 25 Accepting dispatch 

cancellations

The alarm company 

verifies (usually by 

telephone) that the 

alarm was false, and 

then calls police, 

who cancel their 

response

...established by 

ordinance, and 

alarm companies 

follow through

Increases the 

number of incoming 

calls dispatchers 

must handle
| 32 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

Response 

No.

Page 

No.

Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

10. 25 Alerting alarm 

companies about 

false-alarm abusers

Police sort records 

of false-alarm 

abusers by company, 

and notify the 

companies

...accompanied 

by sanctions for 

noncompliance; or 

alarm companies, 

along with 

individual alarm 

owners, are charged 

for costs

Requires police staff 

time to sort records, 

and alarm company 

cooperation in 

dealing with alarm 

owners

11. 25 Setting criteria 

for temporarily 

suspending police 

response

Police response 

is withheld for 

properties with 

chronic false alarms 

or for those premises 

without a valid 

alarm permit, and 

can be combined 

with a modified 

“verified response” 

policy

...police have quick 

access to database 

containing the 

number of prior 

false alarms and 

permit status, and 

alarm owners are 

notified of the 

intent to suspend 

police response

Requires significant 

administrative effort 

to maintain current 

records of prior false 

alarms and permit 

status

12. 26 Publishing alarm 

companies’ 

false alarm rates 

on websites or 

elsewhere

Police post alarm 

companies’ false 

alarm rates on 

department websites 

or elsewhere

...police alert alarm 

companies that they 

are going to do so, 

and give them time 

to reduce their false 

alarm rates before 

publication

Requires accurate 

and regular 

updating, perhaps 

quarterly. In the 

United Kingdom, 

an inspectorate 

monitors companies’ 

false alarm rates. For 

those companies 

unwilling to reduce 

high rates, the police 

do not respond 

to alarms without 

evidence of a crime 

in progress37 
| 33 |

Appendix 

Response 

No.

Page 

No.

Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations

13. 26 Conducting alarm 

users’ education 

classes

Police hold classes 

for alarm abusers 

to reduce the 

number of errors 

made activating and 

deactivating the 

system

...classes are 

taught by the 

alarm installation 

and monitoring 

companies, and 

provide on-premises 

instruction so users 

receive hands-on 

training

If police lead classes, 

they must develop 

expertise in typical 

alarm systems and 

their false-trigger 

patterns; must 

lead to a dramatic 

reduction in the 

number of false 

alarms to be costeffective; unclear 

what responsibility 

police should 

have for educating 

users of a private 

consumer product

14. 27 Lowering the call 

priority of alarms 

Police code 

alarm calls as 

“low priority” for 

dispatch purposes 

...police have 

sufficient resources 

to respond to 

alarm calls, and 

local legislators are 

unwilling to address 

the problem in any 

other way

Does not address 

the underlying 

causes of false 

alarms; does not 

reduce the number 

of incoming calls to 

police dispatchers

Response Not Recommended

15. 27 Providing a high 

priority emergency 

police response to 

unverified burglar 

alarm calls

Police treat alarm 

calls as actual 

emergencies, despite 

extensive research 

findings to the 

contrary

...the community 

has few crime 

problems, and police 

have sufficient 

resources to do so 

Assumes police 

desire full 

responsibility for 

false alarms, or 

the community 

and legislature are 

unwilling to accept 

extensive research 

concerning the 

percentage of false 

alarms

| 35 |

Endnotes

Endnotes

1. Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005). 

2. Blackstone, Buck and Hakim (2005); International Association of Chiefs of Police 

(n.d.)(a). 

3. Blackstone, Hakim, and Spiegel (2000); Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005).

4. National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association (2005). 

5. Blackstone, Hakim, and Spiegel (2000). 

6. Light (2001); Hakim and Blackstone (1997).

7. Seattle Police Department (n.d.).

8. Seattle Police Department (n.d.).

9. Blackstone, Hakim, and Spiegel (2001); Gilbertson (2005).

10.Budd (2001); Palmer, Holmes, and Hollin (2002); Hakim, Rengert, and 

Shachmurove (2001).

11.Cromwell and Olson (2004).

12.Cromwell and Olson (2004). 

13.Federal Bureau of Investigation (2004).

14.Federal Bureau of Investigation (2004).

15.LeBeau and Vincent (1998).

16.Buck, Hakim, and Gaffney (1993).

17.Budd (2001).

18.Catalano (2005).

19.Budd (2001). 

20.Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005). 

21.Salt Lake City Police Department (2001).

22.Baranzini (2002); Cahalane (2001).

23.Salem Police Department, Burglar Alarm Task Force (2004); Steckler (2005); 

Werner (2005).
| 36 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

24.International Association of Chiefs of Police (2002).

25.International Association of Chiefs of Police (2002).

26.British Security Industry Association (2005).

27.Butterfield (2003); Forde and Hellman (2004); Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim 

(2005); Steckler (2005). 

28.Forde and Hellman (2004).

29.Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005).

30.Stephens (2005). 

31.Mowrey and Rice (2004); Fernandez (2005).

32.Phoenix Police Department (2000).

33.False Alarm Reduction Association and the National Burglar & Fire Alarm 

Association (2000); Security Industry Association (2005); Gill and Hemming 

(2003); Forde and Hellman (2004).

34.Gill and Hemming (2003).

35.Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005).

36.Blackstone, Buck, and Hakim (2005).

37.Association of Chief Police Officers (2000). 
| 37 |

References

References

Association of Chief Police Officers, (2000). “ACPO Revises Security Systems Policy: Press 

Release.” October 25. London: Association of Chief Police Officers. 

Baranzini, R. (2002). Reducing False Alarms: A Systemic Approach. IQ Report 34(6). 

Washington, D.C.: International City/County Management Association.

Betten, M., and M. Mervosh (2005). “Should Police Respond to Alarms?” Security 

Management 49(6):166, 168.

Blackstone, E., A. Buck, and S. Hakim (2005). “Evaluation of Alternative Policies To 

Combat False Emergency Calls.” Evaluation and Program Planning 28(2):233–242.

Blackstone, E., S. Hakim, and U. Spiegel (2001). “Congestion in Delivery of Emergency 

Services in Urban Areas: The Case of Police Response to Burglar Alarms.” Working 

paper. Philadelphia: Center for Competitive Government, Temple University.

——(2000). “The Schizophrenian Good: The Case of Police Response to Alarms.” 

Unpublished paper, October 24.

British Security Industry Association (2005). Guidelines for the Implementation of the ACPO 

Requirements for the Reduction of False Holdup Alarms: The 10-Point Plan. Worcester, 

England: British Security Industry Association. www.bsia.co.uk/pdfs/Form_176.pdf. 

Buck, A., S. Hakim, and M. Gaffney (1993). “The Residential Security System/

Homeowner’s Insurance Discount Connection.” Security Dealer (April): 28–33.

Budd, T. (2001). Burglary: Practice Messages From the British Crime Survey. Briefing Note 

5/01. London: Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit.

Burien Police Department (2006). Personal communication, December 5.

Butterfield, F. (2003). “Alarms Without the Burglars Put Strain on Police Budgets.” New 

York Times, January 17, p. A1.

Cahalane, M. (2001). “Reducing False Alarms Has a Price—So Does Response: Is the Real 

Price Worth Paying?” Security Journal 14(1):31–53.

Catalano, S. (2005). Criminal Victimization, 2004. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice 

Statistics. 

City of Milwaukee (2005). “Police Chief Hegerty To Update Council Members on Alarm 

Response Policy.” Milwaukee (Wisconsin): City of Milwaukee. www.ci.mil.wi.us/

display/displayFile.asp?docid=7312&filename=/User/cklose/08alarmpolicy.briefing.pdf. 

Cromwell, P., and J. Olson (2004). Breaking and Entering: Burglars on Burglary. Belmont 

(California): Thomson/Wadsworth.
| 38 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

Dallas City Council (2005). Verified Alarm Response Options. 

www.dallascityhall.com/dallas/eng/council_briefings/briefings/20051205_alarm.pdf. 

False Alarm Reduction Association and the National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association 

(2000). How To Create an Alarm User Awareness School for Your Municipality. 

Rockville (Maryland): False Alarm Reduction Association; Silver Spring (Maryland): 

National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2004). Crime in the United States, 2003. Washington, 

D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Fernandez, L. (2005). “Fremont, Calif., Police To End Automatic Response to Home 

Alarms.” San Jose Mercury News, February 5, p. 1B.

Forde, D., and R. Hellman (2004). Update to Best Practice Number Three: False Burglar 

Alarms Since the Formation of the Metro Alarm Office. Memphis (Tennessee): Memphis 

Shelby Crime Commission.

Fremont Police Department (2006). Personal communication, November 21.

Gilbertson, T. (2005). “Reducing False Security Alarm Calls for Police Service: A Policy 

Research Note.” Criminal Justice Policy Review 16(4):499–506.

Gill, M., and M. Hemming (2003). The Causes of False Alarms. Leicester (England): 

Perpetuity Press.

Hakim, S., and E. Blackstone (1997). Securing Home and Business: A Guide to the 

Electronic Security Industry. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Hakim, S., G. Rengert, and Y. Shachmurove (2001). “Target Search of Burglars: A 

Revised Economic Model.” Papers in Regional Science 80(2):121–137.

International Association of Chiefs of Police (n.d.)(a). “False Alarm Perspectives.” 

www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/FalseAlarmPerspectives%2Epdf. 

——(n.d.)(b). “Response to Mobile Security Alarm Devices.” 

www.theiacp.org/pubinfo/pubs/pslc/pslc8.introduction.htm. 

——(n.d)(c). “Nonsworn Alarm Responder Guidelines.” www.theiacp.org/documents/

pdfs/Publications/nonswornalarmresponderguidelines.pdf. 

——(2002). “IACP/PSLC Position Paper: Verified Response.” Alexandria (Virginia): 

International Association of Chiefs of Police. www.siacinc.org/documents/IACPPSLC%20Documents/IACP-verified%20response%20position%20letter.pdf.

Kanable, R. (2001). “False Alarms: A Call for Law Enforcement, the Alarm Industry, and 

Citizens.” Law Enforcement Technology 28(6):54–56, 58, 60, 62.
| 39 |

References

LeBeau, J., and K. Vincent (1998). “Mapping It Out: Repeat-Address Burglar Alarms 

and Burglaries.” In D. Weisburd and T. McEwen (eds.), Crime Mapping and Crime 

Prevention. Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 8. New York: Criminal Justice Press.

Light, J. (2001). “The Effects of Privatization on Public Services: A Historical Evaluation 

Approach.” New Directions for Evaluation 90:25–39.

London Metropolitan Police Service (2006). Personal communication, December 7.

Los Angeles Police Commission, Alarm Section, Board of Police Commissioners (n.d.). 

Frequently Asked Questions. Los Angeles: Los Angeles Police Commission. 

www.lapdonline.org/organization/bpc/commission_investigation/alarm/

alarm_faqs.htm.

Los Angeles Police Department (2005). Two-Alarm Dispatch Status Report, January 2005 to 

October 2005. Los Angeles: Los Angeles Police Department. 

Montgomery County Police Department (2004). False Alarm Reduction. Rockville 

(Maryland): Montgomery County Police Department.

Mowrey, G. (n.d.). Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department False Alarm Reduction, Billing, 

and Tracking Program. Charlotte (North Carolina): Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 

Department. 

Mowrey, G., and D. Rice (2004). “Alarm Industry Steps Up To Reduce False Alarms Calls 

Through Enhanced Call Verification.” Police Chief 71(9):14–15.

National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association (2005). Industry Statistics—Electronic Security 

Industry. www.alarm.org/stats-industry.html. 

National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association and the False Alarm Reduction Association 

(2001). NBFAA/FARA Model Burglar Alarm Ordinance. Silver Spring (Maryland): 

National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association; Rockville (Maryland): False Alarm 

Reduction Association.

Palmer, E., A. Holmes, and C. Hollin (2002). “Investigating Burglars’ Decisions: Factors 

Influencing Target Choice, Method of Entry, Reasons for Offending, Repeat 

Victimization of a Property, and Victim Awareness.” Security Journal 15(1):7–18.

Phoenix Police Department (2000). False Alarm Reduction Plan. Phoenix (Arizona): 

Phoenix Police Department.

Salem Police Department, Burglar Alarm Task Force (2004). Final Report and 

Recommendations to the Mayor and City Council. Salem (Oregon): Salem Police 

Department. www.cityofsalem.net/~citygov/staff_reports/2004/011204/5.b.pdf. 

Salt Lake City Police Department (2006). Personal communication, November 30, 2006.
| 40 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

——(2001). “The False Alarm Solution: Verified Response.” Submission for the Herman 

Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. www.popcenter.org/

Library/Goldstein/2001/01-55(F).pdf. 

Salt Lake Tribune (2000). “Crying Wolf.” March 15, p. A12. 

Seattle Police Department (n.d.). False Alarms. Seattle: Seattle Police Department. www.

seattle.gov/police/prevention/Alarms/default.htm. 

Security Industry Association (2005). SIA White Paper: Solution to False Alarm Problem. 

Alexandria (Virginia): Security Industry Association.

Security Sales and Integration (2005). Dallas Approves Verified Response for Businesses. 

Torrance (California): Security Sales and Integration. www.securitysales.com/t_ci_

newsView.cfm?nid=2630.

Spivey, K., and R. Cobb (1997). “Public Safety/Private Sector Working To Solve the 

Problem.” The Police Chief 64(6):44–52. 

Steckler, C. (Fremont Police Department) (2005). Personal communication, December 13. 

Stephens, D. (Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department) (2005). Personal 

communication, December 17. 

Werner, S. (Salt Lake City Police Department) (2005). Personal communication, 

December 15. 

White, J. (2002). The False Alarm Problem. Arlington (Texas): Arlington Police 

Department. 
| 41 |

About the Author

About the Author

Rana Sampson

Rana Sampson is a national problem-oriented policing consultant and the former director 

of public safety for the University of San Diego. She was previously a White House 

Fellow; National Institute of Justice Fellow; senior researcher and trainer at the Police 

Executive Research Forum; attorney; and patrol officer, undercover narcotics officer and 

patrol sergeant with the New York City Police Department, where she was awarded several 

commendations of merit and won the National Improvement of Justice Award. She is the 

coauthor (with Michael Scott) of Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case 

Studies in Problem-Solving, which documents high-quality crime control efforts from around 

the United States, Canada and Europe. She is a judge for the Herman Goldstein Award for 

Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, a former judge for the police Fulbright awards, 

and a commissioner with California’s Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. 

Sampson holds a law degree from Harvard and a bachelor’s degree from Barnard College, 

Columbia University.

| 43 |

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Problem-Specific Guides Series:

1. Assaults in and Around Bars, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott and Kelly Dedel. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

2. Street Prostitution, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott and Kelly Dedel. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-01-0

3. Speeding in Residential Areas, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott with David K. 

Maddox. 2010. ISBN: 978-1-935676-02-7

4. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. Rana Sampson. 2001. 

ISBN: 1-932582-03-7

5. False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition. Rana Sampson. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-04-5

6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-05-3

7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1

8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-07-X

9. Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8

10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-09-6

11. Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X

12. Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8

13. Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6

14. Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4

15. Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-14-2

16. Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott and Kelly 

Dedel. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-15-0

17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-16-9

18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7

19. Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-18-5

20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3

21. Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-27-4

22. Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-30-4

23. Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A. Braga. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-31-2

24. Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell and Nancy G. La Vigne. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-33-9 

25. Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-35-3

26. Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glesnor and Kenneth J. Peak. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-36-3

27. Underage Drinking. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-39-8
| 44 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

28. Street Racing. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-42-8

29. Cruising. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-43-6

30. Disorder at Budget Motels. Karin Schmerler. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

31. Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets. Alex Harocopos and Mike Hough. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-45-2

32. Bomb Threats in Schools. Graeme R. Newman. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-46-0

33. Illicit Sexual Activity in Public Places. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-47-9

34. Robbery of Taxi Drivers. Martha J. Smith. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-50-9

35. School Vandalism and Break-Ins. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. ISBN: 1-9325802-51-7

36. Drunk Driving. Michael S. Scott, Nina J. Emerson, Louis B. Antonacci, and Joel B. 

Plant. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-57-6

37. Juvenile Runaways. Kelly Dedel. 2006. ISBN: 1932582-56-8

38. The Exploitation of Trafficked Women. Graeme R. Newman. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-59-2

39. Student Party Riots. Tamara D. Madensen and John E. Eck. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-60-6

40. People with Mental Illness. Gary Cordner. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-63-0

41. Child Pornography on the Internet. Richard Wortley and Stephen Smallbone. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-65-7

42. Witness Intimidation. Kelly Dedel. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-67-3

43. Burglary at Single-Family House Construction Sites. Rachel Boba and Roberto 

Santos. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

44. Disorder at Day Laborer Sites. Rob Guerette. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-72-X

45. Domestic Violence. Rana Sampson. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-74-6

46. Thefts of and from Cars on Residential Streets and Driveways. Todd Keister. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-76-2

47. Drive-By Shootings. Kelly Dedel. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-77-0

48. Bank Robbery. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-78-9

49. Robbery of Convenience Stores. Alicia Altizio and Diana York. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-79-7

50. Traffic Congestion Around Schools. Nancy G. La Vigne. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-82-7

51. Pedestrian Injuries and Fatalities. Justin A. Heinonen and John E. Eck. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-83-5

52. Bicycle Theft. Shane D. Johnson, Aiden Sidebottom, and Adam Thorpe. 2008. 

ISBN: 1-932582-87-8

53. Abandoned Vehicles. Michael G. Maxfield. 2008. ISBN: 1-932582-88-6
| 45 |

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

54. Spectator Violence in Stadiums. Tamara D. Madensen and John E. Eck. 2008. 

ISBN: 1-932582-89-4

55. Child Abuse and Neglect in the Home. Kelly Dedel. 2010. ISBN: 978-1-935676-00-3

56. Homeless Encampments. Sharon Chamard. 2010. ISBN: 978-1-935676-01-0

57. Stolen Goods Markets. Michael Sutton. 2010. ISBN: 978-1-935676-09-6

58. Theft of Scrap Metal. Brandon R. Kooi. 2010. ISBN: 978-1-935676-12-6

59. Street Robbery. Khadija M. Monk, Justin A. Heinonen, and John E. Eck. 2010. 

ISBN: 978-1-935676-13-3

60. Theft of Customers’ Personal Property in Cafés and Bars. Shane D. Johnson, Kate 

J. Bowers, Lorraine Gamman, Loreen Mamerow and Anna Warne. 2010. 

ISBN: 978-1-935676-15-7

61. Aggressive Driving. Colleen Laing. 2010. ISBN: 978-1-935676-18-8

62. Sexual Assault of Women by Strangers. Kelly Dedel. 2011. ISBN: 978-1-935676-43-0

Response Guides Series:

1. The Benefits and Consequences of Police Crackdowns. Michael S. Scott. 2003.

ISBN: 1-932582-24-X

2. Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime: Should You Go Down This Road?

Ronald V. Clarke. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

3. Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems. Michael S. Scott 

and Herman Goldstein. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-55-X

4. Video Surveillance of Public Places. Jerry Ratcliffe. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-58-4

5. Crime Prevention Publicity Campaigns. Emmanuel Barthe. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-66-5

6. Sting Operations. Graeme R. Newman with assistance of Kelly Socia. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-84-3

7. Asset Forfeiture. John L. Worall. 2008. ISBN: 1-932582-90-8 

8. Improving Street Lighting to Reduce Crime in Residential Areas. Ronald V. 

Clarke. 2008. ISBN: 1-932582-91-6

9. Dealing With Crime and Disorder in Urban Parks. Jim Hilborn. 2009. 

ISBN: 1-932582-92-4

10. Assigning Police Officers to Schools. Barbara Raymond. 2010. 

ISBN: 978-1-935676-14-0
| 46 |

False Burglar Alarms, 2nd Edition

Problem-Solving Tools Series: 

1. Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police ProblemSolvers. John E. Eck. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-19-3

2. Researching a Problem. Ronald V. Clarke and Phyllis A. Schultz. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-48-7

3. Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem-Solving. Scott H. Decker. 

2005. ISBN: 1-932582-49-5

4. Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-54-1

5. Partnering with Businesses to Address Public Safety Problems. Sharon Chamard. 

2006. ISBN: 1-932582-62-2

6. Understanding Risky Facilities. Ronald V. Clarke and John E. Eck. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-75-4

7. Implementing Responses to Problems. Rick Brown and Michael S. Scott. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-80-0

8. Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Problem-Solving.

Diane Zahm. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-81-9

9. Enhancing the Problem-Solving Capacity of Crime Analysis Units. Matthew B. 

White. 2008. ISBN: 1-932582-85-1

10. Analyzing Crime Displacement and Diffusion. Rob T. Guerette. 2009. 

ISBN: 1-932582-93-2

Special Publications:

Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps. Ronald V. Clarke and John 

E. Eck, 2005. ISBN:1-932582-52-5

Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide. Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. 

Clarke. 2008.

Effective Policing and Crime Prevention: A Problem-Oriented Guide for Mayors, 

City Managers, and County Executives. Joel B. Plant and Michael S. Scott. 2009. 
| 47 |

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides

Abandoned Buildings and Lots

Animal Abuse

Chronic Public Inebriation

Drug-Impaired Driving

Gasoline Drive-Offs

Home Invasion Robbery

Missing Persons

Prescription Fraud and Abuse, 2nd Edition

Shoplifting, 2nd Edition

Theft of Vehicles for Export Across Land Borders

Understanding Hot Products

Problem-Solving Tools

Understanding Repeat Offending

Response Guides

Monitoring Offenders on Conditional Release

Using Civil Actions Against Property to Control Crime Problems

Special Publications

Intelligence Analysis and Problem-Solving

Problem-Oriented Policing Implementation Manual

For a complete and up-to-date listing of all available POP Guides, see the Center for 

Problem-Oriented Policing website at www.popcenter.org.

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series and other 

COPS Office publications, call the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770, 

via e-mail at askCOPSRC@usdoj.gov, or visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

Got a Problem? We’ve got answers!

Log onto the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing website at 

www.popcenter.org for a wealth of information to help you deal 

more effectively with crime and disorder in your community, 

including:

•	 Recommended readings in problem-oriented policing 

and situational crime prevention

•	 A complete listing of other POP Guides

•	 A listing of forthcoming POP Guides

Designed for police and those who work with them to address 

community problems, www.popcenter.org is a great resource for 

problem-oriented policing.

Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office).

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

145 N Street, N.E.

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS Office programs, 

call the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov

In the United States, false alarms account for 10 to 25 percent of all calls to the 

police. In this problem-oriented guide for police, author Rana Sampson explores the 

problem of false burglar alarms and presents alternative strategies to address the 

false alarm dilemma. The guide begins by reviewing the factors that increase the risk 

of false burglar alarms. It then identifies a series of questions that might help law 

enforcement address their local problem of false burglar alarms. Finally, it reviews 

responses to the problem and what is known about them from evaluative research 

and police practice.

Originally published March 2007, updated August 2011

ISBN: 1-932582-04-5

e061014286