****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and inthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************

### BECK AND BECK, LLC v. JAMES T. COSTELLO (AC 36225)
Beach, Sheldon and Harper, Js. Argued May 12—officially released August 11, 2015 

### (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Levin, J. [motion to strike]; Sommer, J.

[motion to strike.])
James T. Costello, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

### Lauren R. Masotta, for the appellees (plaintiff and counterclaim defendant).Opinion 

### SHELDON, J. In this action arising from the legal representation of the defendant, James T. Costello, by the plaintiff, Beck & Beck, LLC, the defendant appeals fromthejudgmentofthetrialcourtstrikinghis counterclaims against the plaintiff law firm and its principal, Kenneth A. Beck.1 

### We reverse thejudgment ofthe trial court on the defendant’s counterclaim and remand the matter for further proceedings.2


### On August 30, 2011, the plaintiff filed this action in small claims court against the defendant seeking to
recover unpaid legal fees for its prior representation of the defendant in a receivership action against the defendant’s condominium association. The defendant filed amotionto transferthis case tothe regular docket of the Superior Court pursuant to Practice Book § 24- 21. He also filed an answer, a special defense, and a four count counterclaim alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, professional malpractice, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. After the case was transferred, the plaintiff filed a motionto strike the defendant’s entire counterclaim on the ground that the defendant’s claims were legally insufficient because he ‘‘[could not] possibly establish proximate cause or damages

. . . .’’ The trial court, Levin, J ., granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike.
The defendant thereafter moved to cite in the plaintiff’s principal, Attorney Kenneth A. Beck, individually,
as a counterclaim defendant. After the court granted the defendant’s motion to cite in Beck, the defendant filedan amendedanswer, aspecial defense, andacounterclaim against the plaintiff, and aparallel cross claim againstAttorneyBeck.3

### The amended counterclaim and parallelcrossclaimpleadedclaimsthatwereessentially identical to those pleaded in the defendant’s stricken counterclaim. The plaintiff thereafter moved to strike the defendant’samendedcounterclaim ontwo grounds: first, that the defendant could not prevail on any claim setforthinhiscounterclaimbecausehe couldnotprove the causation or damages elements of any such claim; and second, that ‘‘[t]he counterclaims and cross claims mirror the previously stricken counterclaims.’’
The court, Sommer, J

., granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike in a memorandum of decision originally filed
on July 9, 2013, and later corrected on September 27, 2013. The court determined that the defendant had ‘‘failed to submit a justiciable claim to the court, thus depriving the court ofjurisdiction, that is, the authority to decide those claims on their merits, because it lacks jurisdiction as a matter of law.’’ The court rendered judgment onthe counterclaim and cross claim on October 7, 2013, and this appeal followed.4

### ‘‘Because amotionto strike challengesthe legalsufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court’s ruling

. . . is plenary. We take the facts to be those alleged in the [pleading] that has been stricken and we construe the [pleading] in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.

. . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the [pleading] would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.

. . . Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] neednotbe expresslyalleged.

. . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a [pleading] challenged by a

. . . motion to strike, allwell-pleadedfacts andthose facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.

. . . Indeed, pleadingsmustbe construedbroadlyandrealistically, rather than narrowly and technically.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v

. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 317–18, 907A.2d 1188 (2006). ‘‘Thetrialcourt maynotseekbeyondthe [challengedpleading] forfacts not alleged, or necessarily implied, and this court will not.’’Fortini v. NewEnglandLogHomes, Inc., 4 Conn. App. 132, 135, 492 A.2d 545, cert. dismissed, 197 Conn. 801, 495 A.2d 280 (1985).
In the court’s memorandum of decision granting the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s counterclaim, the court referred to and relied on ‘‘the record in the underlying case,’’ presumably the receivership action. In so doing, it strayed beyond the permissible bounds ofits authorityin assessingthe legal sufficiency of a claim on a motion to strike.5 

### The plaintiff agreed in its argument before this court that the trial court had improperly relied upon evidence outside the four
corners ofthe defendant’s counterclaim in determining the legal sufficiency ofthatpleading. Because the court relied on facts that were not contained in the defendant’s counterclaim in assessing its legal sufficiency, its judgment striking that pleading cannot stand.6


### The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although Beck signed the motion to strike on behalf of his law firm as theplaintiffinthis action, he did notmove to strike the counterclaim against him individually. The court’s memorandum of decision did not mention Beck at all in his capacity as a counterclaim defendant, but purported to dispose of the defendant’s counterclaim in its entirety. When the court subsequently rendered judgment on the motion to strike, the motion for judgment thereon, which was filed by the defendant, represented that the court had stricken his counterclaim in its entirety. Thus, although it would appear from the record, prior to the filing of the defendant’s motion for judgment, thathis counterclaimagainstBeckindividuallyremainedpending, it is apparentthatthe parties andthe courtpresumed otherwise. This confusion is representative of the tortuous procedural history of this case, the complete recitation of which is not necessary for our resolution of the defendant’s claim on appeal. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the counterclaim was stricken in its entirety and that the defendant is appealing the judgment rendered by the court in favor of the plaintiff and Beck individually, both as counterclaim defendants.2 After the court renderedjudgment on the defendant’s counterclaim, the

case proceeded to trial on the plaintiff’s complaint. Following a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of$750. The courtdeclinedtheplaintiff’srequestforattorney’sfeespursuant to General Statutes § 52-251a. In its briefto this court, the plaintiffcontends that itis entitledto said attorney’s fees. Because theplaintifffailedto appeal from the court’s judgment in this regard, that claim is not properly before

us. The defendant likewise has not challenged the court’s judgment on the plaintiff’s complaint.
3 The cross claim against Beck individually is included in the defendant’s counterclaim. For ease of reference, we refer to the entire pleading as the defendant’s counterclaim.

4 The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly granted this initial motion to strike his counterclaim. He contends that his counterclaim

was legally sufficient and that he was denied his right to a hearing on that motion to strike. He previously had filed an appeal of the court’s initial striking of his counterclaim, but that appeal was dismissed for lack of a final judgment. As explained herein, the defendant thereafter amended his counterclaim. It would thus appear, on the record before us, that by filing

anamendedpleading, thedefendantwaivedhisrighttochallengethestriking of his initial counterclaim. See Parker v. Ginsburg Development CT, LLC, 85 Conn. App. 777, 780, 859 A.2d 46 (2004). We leave the question of what effect, ifany, the striking ofthat counterclaim had on the amended counterclaim to the trial court for resolution on remand.

5 For example, the trial court found the following: ‘‘The action underlying this case was an application by the defendant for appointment ofa receiver for a condominium association. By way of background, the plaintiff filed a motion in that case which the court heard on October 22, 2010, and denied. Thereafter, the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s services and filed a pro
se appearance on January 3, 2011. He then filed three successive motions for order. The court scheduled hearings on those motions for August 29, 2011, and September 6, 2011. Pursuant to Practice Book [§] 14-3, the court dismissed the defendant’s claim for failure to prosecute. The defendant has not presented any facts which would support a finding by this court that any court orderissuedinthe underlyingactionforappointment ofareceiver

was the result of the plaintiff’s actions. The defendant’s own conduct, or failure to act, not anything attributable to the plaintiff

. . . resulted in dismissal. The action for appointment ofreceivership remained pending for almostayearafter [thedefendant] terminatedrepresentationbytheplaintiff. There is no indication that the dismissal was related in any way to the plaintiff’s action. In fact, the record establishes that the defendant’s own actions or failure to act while representing himself were the cause of the dismissal. Furthermore, even upon dismissal ofhis case, the defendant was not without a remedy. Connecticut law provides a statutory remedy to reinstate a dismissal case, the accidental failure of suit statute [General Statutes] § 52-592. OnOctober22, 2010,JudgeTymastatedthatthedefendant could bring another motion for the appointment of receiver, and that he should consider retaining an expert. Based on the record in this case, the defendant cannot claim he was harmed by the court’s decision on October 22, 2010.

. . . * * * ‘‘According to the record in the underlying case, at the time Judge Tyma denied the motion for appointment ofreceiver on October 22, 2010, he told the defendant he could bring another motion for appointment of receiver and if he did so, [he] should consider retaining an expert. The defendant

wasnotdamaged, norwasheprecludedfromassertinghisrightsorprosecuting his claim as a result ofthe October 22, 2010 court order. The defendant chose not to pursue his claim or in any way protect his own rights.’’ The court determined, on the bases of these facts, inter alia, that there

was no controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, and that the defendant’s claimwas thus notjusticiable. None ofthese facts are ascertainable from the defendant’s counterclaim.
6 Because we reverse the trial court’sjudgment on the one ground raised by the defendant, we need not address any other possible infirmities with the court’s decision.