This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-2156

Peter Loren Martel, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

Filed July 13, 2015

Affirmed

Rodenberg, Judge

Beltrami County District Court

File No. 04-CR-13-83

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn Lockwood, Assistant 

Public Defender, Connor Chapman (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for 

appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Annie P. Claesson-Huseby, Beltrami County Attorney, Katherine D. Galler, Assistant 

County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and 

Klaphake, Judge.

*

 

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. 

Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

RODENBERG, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s award of restitution for medical expenses 

incurred by the victim of his indecent exposure, arguing that the expenses were not 

medically necessary and not directly caused by appellant’s crime. We affirm.

FACTS

In January 2013, appellant Peter Martell exposed his partially-erect penis to A.V., 

a high school acquaintance of appellant’s, at A.V.’s workplace. Appellant was charged 

with and convicted of misdemeanor indecent exposure, in violation of Minn. Stat. 

§ 617.23, subd. 1(1) (2012).

After the incident, A.V. had problems that seemed to result from appellant’s 

crime, including anxiety and diarrhea. Her doctor ordered a colonoscopy to determine if 

A.V.’s diarrhea had an organic cause. The colonoscopy was “unremarkable,” suggesting 

that A.V.’s symptoms were in fact caused by the anxiety she had about appellant’s crime. 

Before the sentencing hearing, A.V. submitted documents supporting her request for 

$2,353.84 in restitution arising from the colonoscopy procedure. 

At sentencing, a victim’s advocate read A.V.’s victim impact statement. A.V. 

stated that she “used to feel comfortable at [her] workplace, but not anymore” and that 

she did “not feel comfortable around male customers at work.” Additionally, A.V. “spent 

a lot of time wondering if I am the first victim of this man, or one of many.” A.V. had 

“taken time off work to go to the doctor multiple times . . . been tested and diagnosed 

with anxiety . . . [and] incurred medical expenses.” She requested restitution for her 
3

medical expenses. The district court sentenced appellant, including a restitution

obligation, and set a separate hearing for arguments concerning the amount of restitution. 

Before the restitution hearing, appellant filed an affidavit challenging the propriety 

of a restitution award for the colonoscopy expenses. He argued that there was “no basis 

or support” for the restitution, that the request does not “specify any reason justifying 

certain amounts of restitution claimed,” and that “the request for restitution does not 

adequately identify how, what, when, or why the restitution request is made for the 

amount requested.” 

At the restitution hearing, the state rested on the restitution certificate form and 

accompanying exhibits, which included a letter from appellant’s doctor to the district 

court. The doctor’s letter stated:

[A.V.] is a patient of mine. She was significantly traumatized 

by an event of indecent exposure. Shortly after that, she 

developed some significant diarrhea. It would seem to be 

exacerbated anytime there is some involvement with this 

court case. She ended up needing a colonoscopy which 

fortunately was found to be unremarkable, therefore, even 

more so contributing to the fact that the stress and anxiety of 

the assailant [sic] had caused had caused [sic] her symptoms.

Appellant’s counsel offered no additional affidavits, exhibits, testimony or evidence. The 

district court ordered restitution in the full amount requested by A.V., stating that there 

could “be no argument that her diarrhea was a physical manifestation of the distress she 

suffered as a result of that assault.” The district court stated that “A.V.’s diarrhea was a 

direct result of [appellant’s] actions” and “A.V.’s decision to follow her doctor’s 
4

recommendation for a colonoscopy was reasonable and appropriate under the 

circumstances.”

Appellant subsequently moved the district court to modify his sentence. Appellant 

sought to introduce information related to diarrhea and colonoscopies as part of this 

motion. The district court construed the motion as one for postconviction relief, denied 

the motion, and affirmed its earlier restitution award. This appeal followed. 

D E C I S I O N

Appellant raises two arguments to support his position that the restitution order 

should be reversed and vacated. He first argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

prove that appellant’s colonoscopy, ordered due to her diarrhea symptoms, was a direct 

result of the offense he committed. He also argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

prove that the colonoscopy was necessary and compensable. 

Crime victims have a “right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a 

criminal charge.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012). They “are entitled to 

restitution for losses they incur from the crime.” State v. Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474, 477 

(Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2014).

District courts have significant discretion in awarding restitution. State v. 

Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1999). We review the district court’s restitution 

determination for an abuse of its discretion. Id. at 672. However, whether an item is 

compensable under the restitution statute is a legal question we review de novo. State v. 

Ramsay, 789 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Minn. App. 2010). 
5

The district court record “must provide a factual basis for [a restitution] award.” 

State v. Keehn, 554 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 

1996). The state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the amount of loss 

sustained by a victim [is] a result of the offense” and a particular expense’s 

“appropriateness.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2012). In challenging a 

restitution award, a convicted defendant has a burden of production that “must include a 

detailed sworn affidavit of the offender setting forth all challenges to the restitution or 

items of restitution, and specifying all reasons justifying dollar amounts of restitution 

which differ from the amounts requested by the victim or victims.” Id. 

The restitution statute’s “broad language gives the [district] court significant 

discretion to award restitution for a victim’s expenses,” Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 671, 

and provides that an award includes, “but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses 

resulting from the crime,” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). Restitution can be awarded 

“only for losses the defendant directly caused by the conduct that led to his conviction.” 

Miller, 842 N.W.2d at 477 (quotation omitted). Restitution requests “must describe the 

items or elements of loss, itemize the total dollar amounts of restitution claimed, and 

specify the reasons justifying these amounts.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). The 

primary purpose of restitution is “to compensate the crime victim for losses by restoring 

the victim’s original financial condition.” State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn. 

App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2011).

Here, the state was required to prove that A.V.’s colonoscopy was more likely 

than not caused by appellant’s behavior and was required to prove the amount of the 
6

restitution. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (stating losses include “medical and 

therapy costs”); Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (stating “the proper amount or type of 

restitution must be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence”); State v. 

Fader, 358 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 1984) (stating loss to a sexual assault victim “would 

include the cost of necessary treatment and related expenses”).

Appellant mischaracterizes the holding in Fader, as supporting the proposition 

that “[m]edical treatment and related expenses can be claimed under restitution only 

when necessary.” In Fader, the supreme court observed that victims of sexual assault 

may have losses “difficult to quantify” and followed this observation by stating “[i]t 

would include the cost of necessary treatment and related expenses, but beyond that, one 

gets into the realm of speculation.” 358 N.W.2d at 48. Fader does not stand for the 

proposition that only necessary treatment and expenses are compensable under the statute 

for any victim. Minnesota courts have permitted restitution for damages suffered by 

victims in a wide variety of situations, including awards for expenses beyond strictly 

necessary medical expenses. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2015 WL 

2185004, at *5 (Minn. App. May 11, 2015) (stating that because the victim suffered 

psychological trauma as a result of the offense, and moving expenses were directly linked 

to that trauma, it was within the district court’s discretion to award restitution for those 

expenses); Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 672 (affirming restitution awarded for a Hmong Hu 

Plig healing ceremony); State v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. 1995) (concluding 

that expenses relating to counter-abduction operation was compensable as restitution); 

Keehn, 554 N.W.2d at 408-09 (affirming award to Department of Human Services, as an 
7

insurer, for expenses incurred when providing the victim’s child with psychological 

services and counseling).

The district court concluded that the letter from A.V.’s doctor demonstrates that 

“A.V.’s diarrhea was a direct result of [appellant’s] actions” and “A.V.’s decision to 

follow her doctor’s recommendation for a colonoscopy was reasonable and appropriate 

under the circumstances.” Appellant offered no evidence to support his arguments.1

There is ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s restitution 

award. The record supports a conclusion that appellant’s conduct was more likely than 

not the direct cause for A.V.’s symptoms, which in turn necessitated a diagnostic 

procedure to determine the source of her symptoms and her treatment. 

Appellant correctly notes that the doctor’s letter does not explicitly state that 

A.V.’s symptoms were directly caused by appellant’s conduct. But a common-sense 

reading of that letter makes evident that the “unremarkable” results of the colonoscopy 

support the conclusion that A.V.’s diarrhea symptoms were more likely than not caused 

by appellant’s crime. The procedure ruled out organic causes for A.V.’s symptoms. The 

district court was well within its broad discretion in drawing the reasonable inference that 

the cause of the colonoscopy expense was appellant’s crime (and not some other medical 

condition that would have been discovered by the colonoscopy). Because the 

colonoscopy was reasonably required to determine the cause of A.V.’s symptoms and the 

 

1

In the postconviction order denying vacation of the restitution award, the district court 

observed that information appellant submitted with his postconviction petition constituted 

an improper attempt to supplement the record with additional information that was not in 

the record at the time of sentencing.
8

potential treatment, and because crime victims are entitled to restitution for costs they 

incurred because of a crime, Miller, 842 N.W.2d at 477, the district court did not err in 

concluding that the costs of A.V.’s colonoscopy were appropriately included as 

restitution in appellant’s sentence. See also State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662 (Minn 

2007) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution to 

a murder victim’s adult children for their personal expenses resulting from the murder, 

including expenses for their voluntary attendance at the trial).

Appellant also argues that the colonoscopy is “too attenuated” to be a direct result 

of appellant’s criminal conduct, and that it is not the sort of procedure or expense 

typically resulting from indecent exposure. The colonoscopy procedure was intended to 

rule out other possible causes of A.V.’s symptoms. A.V.’s doctor stated that her 

symptoms started after appellant’s crime and were exacerbated whenever there was 

“some involvement with this court case.” The restitution statute explicitly provides that 

medical expenses are properly compensable costs for crime victims, stating that 

“restitution may include, but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses resulting from the 

crime, including medical . . . costs.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). 

It is undisputed that the cost of the colonoscopy was $2,353.84. While a colonoscopy 

may not be a medical test typically required for victims in indecent exposure cases, the 

particular facts before us are that A.V. was “significantly traumatized” by the incident 

and she suffered from “significant diarrhea.” Her doctor also stated that she “ended up 

needing a colonoscopy” to rule out other causes of the diarrhea. The particular facts of 

this case establish a link between the crime and A.V.’s medical procedure and resulting 
9

expenses. Moreover, the goal of restitution is to restore the victim to her “original 

financial condition” had the incident not occurred. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d at 852. The 

district court’s restitution award served that purpose.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 

restitution for the costs of A.V.’s colonoscopy. Because A.V. suffered trauma resulting 

in “significant diarrhea” as a result of appellant’s criminal conduct, and the cost of this 

procedure was directly linked to ruling out other diseases as the source of A.V.’s 

symptoms, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in awarding 

restitution of $2,353.84.

Affirmed.