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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

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External Research Associates Program

ENABLING UNITY OF EFFORT

IN HOMELAND RESPONSE OPERATIONS

H Steven Blum

Kerry McIntyre

April 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-530-5
iii

FOREWORD

Any significant homeland response event requires 

Americans to work together. This has proven to be a 

complex challenge. Our response capabilities, while 

substantial, are spread across thousands of stakeholders: federal, state, and local government agencies and 

organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and 

private industry. No single actor has all the necessary 

tools to respond completely to a major crisis. Despite 

considerable national effort and resources devoted to 

planning, training, integrating, and improving our 

homeland response capabilities, effectiveness in working together—unity of effort—still seems to elude us. 

Achieving unity of effort is difficult even in simple 

situations. It becomes increasingly complicated when 

it involves dozens or even hundreds of participants 

in a federal system such as ours, where responsibility 

and capability are distributed across many levels and 

functions. Finding ways to synergize a broad range of 

responsible participants is the central challenge to effective homeland response operations. 

In this monograph, H Steven Blum and Kerry McIntyre argue that the problem of achieving unity of effort in homeland response is not one of poor planning 

or inadequate resources, but rather more fundamental. 

It involves the way in which thousands of participants 

from dissimilar professional cultures think about their 

roles and responsibilities for homeland response. To 

address this problem, Blum and McIntyre propose a 

broadly construed national doctrine, developed in a 

dynamic and responsive doctrine-producing system. 

They cite the example of joint military doctrine, which 

attained its contemporary robust state and authoritative impact only through changes implemented as a re-
sult of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The joint doctrineproducing system that arose from Goldwater-Nichols 

remedied many shortcomings, such as enforcing congruity between individual service and joint doctrine, 

identifying and addressing capability gaps, and incorporating the requirements of field commanders. The 

authors contend that a dynamic national homeland 

response doctrine, developed in a truly inclusive national system, would have a similar effect in synergizing national capabilities. They propose a doctrinal 

system that develops and implements operational 

concepts, plans, and training programs. The concepts 

are thoroughly tested in realistic exercises and actual 

operations. The plans, operations, and training programs are then systematically analyzed to inform and 

update evolving doctrinal concepts, which ultimately 

influence the organization, training, and equipping of 

response elements.

Blum and McIntyre contend that such a national 

doctrine requires a new management concept, fashioned on the model of the military’s Joint Interagency 

Task Force (JIATF). They argue that this concept has 

broad potential not just in support of military operations, but any time disparate response organizations 

must work together. They suggest a JIATF-like interagency coordination and action group which could 

operate across and between jurisdictional divides to 

unify not just the federal interagency response, but 

state and perhaps local interagency efforts as well. In 

developing this idea, they outline some of the critical 

functions this element should perform.

Finally, the authors address the problem of ensuring that our military’s available “dual capable” 

forces—active and reserve—are contributing to unity 

of effort in homeland response. They discuss the nascent potential of dual-status command, the artificial 

iv
v

impediment posed by the division of forces into separate legal statuses under Title 10 and Title 32, and the 

possibility of a civil support force generation model 

to improve predictability in providing available capabilities for homeland response.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

H STEVEN BLUM served over 42 years in uniform, 

capping a career as the first National Guardsman to 

serve as a Deputy Combatant Commander. As Deputy 

Commander, U.S. Northern Command, he fundamentally reshaped how Americans and the U.S. military 

think about, prepare for, and conduct operations for 

homeland defense, homeland security, and defense 

support of civil authority. In two terms as Chief, National Guard Bureau, he transformed the National 

Guard from a Cold War strategic reserve into a 21st 

century operational force capable of joint and expeditionary warfare and flexible response to a broad range 

of civil and humanitarian contingencies. He was responsible for deploying over 50,000 National Guardsmen in response to Hurricane Katrina, the largest 

military response to a natural disaster in U.S. history. 

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Blum has commanded a 

Special Forces Detachment, an Infantry Battalion, and 

two brigades. As Commanding General, 29th Infantry Division, he deployed over 6,500 citizen-soldiers 

from 21 states to Bosnia-Herzegovina. He simultaneously served as Commanding General-Multinational 

Division (North) in Operation JOINT FORGE, leading 

a Russian airborne brigade, a Turkish Army brigade, 

and a Multinational Nordic-Polish brigade. General 

Blum currently serves as Executive-in-Residence at 

the Johns Hopkins University School of Education, 

Division of Public Safety and Leadership. He is also 

Managing Director and Practice Lead for Sitrick & 

Company, a broadly known crisis communications 

organization. General Blum is a frequent consultant 

for private and government organizations on planning, training, and disaster response.
viii

KERRY MCINTYRE currently serves as a Strategic 

Planner in support of the Maryland Army National 

Guard. He served nearly 24 years in uniform, including 

more than 21 years of fulltime service in the Maryland 

Army National Guard. His military career includes 

assignments in personnel, operations, and staff management at battalion, brigade, and state (Joint Force 

Headquarters) level. As the Executive Officer, 58th 

Troop Command, he supervised daily planning and 

preparations for the state’s ground Joint Task Force 

for civil support. His career includes a variety of roles 

in civil support operations and exercises. Lieutenant 

Colonel (Ret.) McIntyre is a graduate of the American 

University School of International Service and the U.S. 

Army War College. 
ix

SUMMARY

Balancing authorities and responsibilities within 

our federal system has been a matter of continuous 

debate since the earliest days of the republic. Its continued relevance is exemplified in our current national 

conversation over how to most effectively organize 

and operate for homeland security and defense. Crises and catastrophic events in our homeland require 

Americans from different organizations, jurisdictions, 

and functions to work together. Yet despite considerable national effort and resources devoted to developing and improving our collective response capabilities, effectiveness in working together—unity of 

effort—still seems to elude us.

Achieving unity of effort is the central challenge 

to effective homeland response operations. No single 

organization, function, or stakeholder has all the necessary tools to respond completely to the wide range 

of crises that routinely occur, or could occur, in our 

homeland. Combining the assets, capabilities, expertise, and resources of multiple participants has proven 

to be exceedingly complex and difficult. Our homeland response capabilities are considerable, but they 

are dispersed across a patchwork of jurisdictions and 

functions. The challenge in homeland response operations is neither inadequate resources nor lack of capabilities, but rather in being able to bring them to bear 

at the right time and place, and in the right combination. Disasters in our homeland have enormous consequences. Regardless of cause or extent, they always 

hold the potential for significant loss of life, human 

suffering, economic dislocation, and erosion of public 

confidence in government. Given all that is at stake, 

we must do better. There are certainly a number of 
ways to improve our results; this monograph proposes three specific ways to do so.

First, enhancing our capacity for unity of effort 

requires more than simply devoting more resources 

and rhetoric to the problem. The challenge is more 

fundamental; it requires us to change the way we 

think about homeland response in order to establish 

the intellectual pre-conditions for unified effort. Creating this cultural shift requires a national homeland 

response doctrine, formulated in a dynamic and responsive doctrinal system. Doctrine performs a vital 

unifying function in complex operations. It delineates 

best practices, establishes standards, and clarifies terminology, responsibilities, and procedures. It creates 

common understandings, bridging organizational 

and jurisdictional divides. 

A nascent federal homeland response doctrine currently exists, codified in the National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident Management System 

(NIMS), and Incident Command System (ICS). Yet, a 

doctrinal system is larger than the doctrine itself. It 

operates in a dynamic cycle, providing a process to 

identify capability gaps, develop new operating concepts, and validate them against rigorous standards. 

An effective doctrinal system also incorporates all 

relevant stakeholders in the full cycle of concept development, validation, and integration into plans and 

procedures. Current homeland response doctrine is 

a federal, not national doctrine. A unifying national 

doctrine, engendered in a dynamic and responsive 

system, would provide the basis for developing a national culture of communication and cooperation in 

homeland response operations. 

A second way to enhance our capacity for unity of 

effort is to ensure that national doctrine can be broadx
xi

ly implemented. A truly national homeland response 

doctrine system will function in an interagency, intergovernmental, multi-jurisdictional environment. 

Implementing it requires a new management structure that can also operate in the spaces between agencies and governments. The example of the military’s 

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) points the way 

toward this new structure. A permanent interagency 

coordination and action group, which integrates inputs, resources, and capabilities of all stakeholders, 

can synergize and coordinate the efforts of all. Such 

a structure clearly has an application at federal, state, 

and perhaps even local level, as each has a complex 

interagency framework to manage in order to fully 

integrate response capabilities. To be effective, this 

structure cannot be subordinate to any single agency 

or function; it must be responsive to all stakeholders 

and accountable to an elected leader with authority 

over the interagency effort.

A third way to enhance unity of effort is to remove 

barriers to employment of military capabilities for 

homeland response operations. There are clear legal 

restrictions on the roles and uses of our military at 

home, which exist for sound reasons. Yet much of our 

military can be characterized as “dual capable,” describing forces with inherent capabilities useful both 

for warfighting and for civil support tasks. It makes 

little difference to the injured, hungry, and dispossessed that the soldier who rescued them is a National 

Guardsman, a Title 10 reservist, or an active duty service member. Their reasonable expectation is that the 

forces raised and sustained with their tax dollars will 

provide for their safety when needed. For this reason, we should be removing impediments to utilizing 

our military forces—particularly our reserve compo-
xii

nents—for homeland response operations when they 

are not engaged in other federal missions. This is not a 

matter of apportioning different forces to the National 

Guard. Rather, it is one of determining when and how 

any relevant military capabilities should be placed 

under a governor’s authority for civil support roles. 

The recent development of the concept of dual status 

command is a step forward in this regard. Development of a predictable civil support force generation 

model, similar to the one employed by the services for 

federal missions overseas, will further enhance unity 

of effort by facilitating planning among the states for 

temporary use of dual status military capabilities.

Achieving unity of effort in homeland response is a 

complex challenge, among the greatest of our age. It is 

the single most important factor in our ability to plan 

for and respond effectively to disasters at home. We 

devote enormous resources to public safety and security at many levels. Our citizens surely have a right to 

expect that these resources will be well used by their 

leaders, elected and appointed. This means that we 

must find better ways to work together. It requires 

leaders and organizations at all levels to combine their 

efforts, resources, and capabilities to achieve complete 

and responsive solutions. It requires us to develop 

new ways of thinking about and managing homeland 

response capabilities, before disaster strikes.
1

ENABLING UNITY OF EFFORT

IN HOMELAND RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense, as that body to which the guardianship of 

the public safety is confided . . . which, by the extension of its authority throughout the States, can alone 

establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures by which the common safety is to be secured?

—Alexander Hamilton,

 Federalist Paper No. 23

Questions about achieving unity of effort in our 

public policy, and the balance of authority and responsibility between various levels of government, are as 

old as the republic. They have enormous contemporary relevance, particularly in the national debate over 

how we organize and act to secure the safety of our 

citizens and interests at home. We believe that achieving unity of effort is the central challenge to effective 

homeland response operations. Despite all the effort 

and considerable resources devoted to improving our 

capabilities, effectiveness in working together—unity 

of effort—still seems to elude us. In many disaster 

situations, including the largest and most dangerous, 

the ability to field a seamless, unified, robust response 

from our enormously capable mix of local, state, and 

federal government and private sector entities is still 

out of reach. This monograph examines how we might 

change our current organization and doctrine today 

to achieve a more effective response. For simplicity, 

the term “homeland response” is used to encompass 

all facets of planning, preparing, and resourcing for; 

directly responding to; and mitigating and recovering from, the broad spectrum of catastrophic events 
2

in the American homeland, ranging from natural to 

man-made disasters, industrial accidents, pandemic 

disease, terrorist attacks, and similar events. 

Why Unity of Effort?

Any significant homeland response event requires Americans to work together. Doing so can 

be a complex challenge. Our nation has enormous 

resources and vast capacity available to it, but these 

are spread across a patchwork of jurisdictions, agencies, and authorities. No single organization, function, 

or stakeholder has all the necessary tools to respond 

completely to a major crisis, let alone many smaller 

ones. Combining the assets, capabilities, expertise, 

organizations, and resources of multiple participants 

is extremely difficult. This should be unsurprising; 

achieving unity of effort is difficult even for structurally similar, well-resourced entities operating under 

unified command—such as our military. It becomes 

increasingly complicated when it involves dozens 

or even hundreds of participants in a federal system 

such as ours, where responsibility and capability are 

distributed across many levels and functions. At each 

level of government, homeland response must combine planners and responders with diverse organizational cultures operating under separate authorities 

and differing, even divergent, operational requirements and objectives. 

In normal times, the distribution and balancing 

of power in our federal system are a considerable 

strength, a crucial element in the vitality and responsiveness of our democracy. However, the multitude 

of threats we face in our homeland are not confined 

to the capabilities of a single function, nor within the 
3

bounds of geography or jurisdiction; both preparedness and response are complicated by the “seams” 

in our system. In his seminal work On War, Carl Von 

Clausewitz wrote that in war even the simplest things 

are difficult, and that “difficulties accumulate . . . producing a kind of friction.” This friction is an impediment that “makes the apparently easy so difficult.”1

Just as in warfare, a kind of Clausewitzian friction is 

quite obviously at work in every homeland response 

situation, in every crisis which demands collective 

action. The diffusion of authorities and capabilities 

across multiple agencies, organizations, and levels of 

government, coupled with the sheer size and complexity of the nation, creates an unavoidable friction that 

makes the simplest operations difficult and achieving 

unity of effort a daunting challenge.

Solving any problem must begin with defining it. 

Our homeland response problem is not one of insufficient resources. We spend billions, possibly more than 

any other nation, on homeland response. It is not one 

of individual assets. We have highly developed medical, police, fire, transportation, logistics, communications, military, and other emergency response capabilities. The problem at its heart is not lacking resources 

and capabilities, but in being unable to bring them to 

bear at the right time and place, and in the right combination, to achieve effective results. It is the inability 

to integrate a vast array of systems and elements into 

a seamless, coordinated response. Combining what 

each stakeholder brings to the table requires cooperation, communication, collaboration, and coordination. 

These are the most important factors in homeland response—they are the key to achieving unity of effort. 

Without them, effective response is impossible. 
4

Some recent and well-known major disasters illustrate the problem. Nuclear disasters elicit particularly 

grave concern because of their potential for largescale human suffering and extremely long-term consequences. On April 26, 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear 

reactor in the former Soviet Republic of Ukraine experienced a disastrous explosion resulting from a combination of poor design and human error. While not an 

American catastrophe, Chernobyl affected people in 

many nations. It demonstrated clearly that problems 

with unity of effort are not unique to our system; the 

potential exists anytime multiple organizations and 

jurisdictions have to work together. It also shows the 

broad (even international) consequences of ineffective 

disaster response. 

Soviet authorities tried to prevent news of it from 

reaching the rest of the world even as they struggled 

to respond to the crisis. The first notification came 

from radiation detectors at a Swedish nuclear facility 

more than 600 miles from the Chernobyl plant.2 First 

responders desperately undertook suicidal efforts to 

control the fire, using inadequate equipment and techniques. The resulting cloud of radioactive material 

spread over much of Europe. Soviet attempts to hide 

the nature and extent of the problem overshadowed 

and hampered their internal response and precluded 

timely assistance from potential international partners, even as it put populations across their country 

and the region at risk. Ad hoc response and poorly 

coordinated efforts exacerbated the consequences of 

what is commonly acknowledged to be the worst disaster in the history of the nuclear industry.3

 Despite 

the bravery of those at the scene, both planning and 

response were ineffective; and the consequences of 

the disaster will continue to challenge the Ukrainian 

government and many others for decades to come.
5

On September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist cells of the 

al Qaeda network hijacked four commercial airliners. They flew two of them into the twin towers of the 

World Trade Center in New York. A third plane was 

used to attack the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, 

and the fourth crashed outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Using comparatively low technology, a determined enemy was able to strike a substantial blow 

within the U.S. homeland. Nearly 3,000 people were 

killed, the largest single loss of life to foreign attack on 

American soil in the nation’s history.4

 In the immediate crisis, authorities struggled to obtain an accurate 

picture of the situation, share information between 

agencies, and determine how to coordinate government efforts to respond to the attacks.5

 In the days and 

weeks that followed, senior leaders had extreme difficulty coordinating the vast resources and capabilities 

of the nation to mitigate and recover from the attacks, 

anticipate and prevent additional attacks, and develop an appropriate response.6

 Air Force planes flew 

combat patrols over the nation’s cities and National 

Guardsmen patrolled the airports. Congress hastily 

debated and passed the USA PATRIOT Act. State and 

local governments desperately tried to evaluate their 

vulnerabilities and to protect the public and private 

assets in their jurisdictions. Substantial reorganizations in the federal government were quickly initiated. A new cabinet-level Department of Homeland 

Security was created by combining 22 federal agencies. The Department of Defense (DoD) established a 

new combatant command (U.S. Northern Command) 

to manage homeland defense, and created a new position with the title of Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs (ASD-HDASA). These changes were generally 
6

necessary and prudent, but unity of effort cannot be 

attained by simply redrawing a line and block chart. 

Unfortunately, some of these organizational changes 

had the unintended consequence of making unity of 

effort more difficult. Despite all the restructuring of 

agencies and refocusing of resources, many still question whether the nation is truly safer or better prepared for the next terrorist strike.7

Four years later, on August 29, 2005, Hurricane 

Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi. The initial effects of the storm, coupled with 

levee failures in New Orleans, caused widespread 

devastation and flooding. Over the ensuing weeks, 

poor information sharing, lack of coordination, and 

politically-motivated bickering delayed a unified response, and thereby exacerbated the suffering of the 

affected population.8

 After Hurricane Katrina, another 

congressional inquiry detailed the causes and results 

of the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history.9

Despite massive national efforts over the preceding 4 

years to reorganize, refocus, and better prepare, the 

congressional inquiry noted a lack of initiative, cooperative effort, effective communication, and situational awareness. Once again, unity of effort eluded us. 

More recently, a large man-made disaster struck 

the same region. On April 20, 2010, a British Petroleum (BP) deep-water oil-drilling platform in the Gulf 

of Mexico known as Deepwater Horizon suffered a 

catastrophic explosion, sinking the rig. Eleven crew 

members lost their lives, and the damaged well spilled 

crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico as BP, its partners, 

the scientific and technical communities, and government leaders at all levels struggled to find ways to cap 

the well and contain the massive spill. The involvement of a major foreign-owned multinational corpora-
7

tion further complicated the situation. Over the next 3 

months, the well discharged an estimated five million 

barrels of oil into the gulf, constituting the largest accidental oil spill in history and resulting in widespread 

ecological and economic distress that is being felt to 

this day.10 While analyses are still being written, one 

might easily conclude that failure to achieve unity of 

effort reduced the effectiveness of the response, mitigation, and recovery efforts. 

These major catastrophes differ in many of their 

particulars. Some mishaps that were preventable occurred; some that were unavoidable were made worse 

by human error, mechanical failures, procedural lapses, and poor information sharing. This monograph 

will not discuss in-depth postmortems on any of these 

disasters, as such. Rather, it provides recent and wellknown examples of a common problem in disaster 

planning and response. Each crisis was characterized 

by multiple failures among the participants to work 

together effectively. Leaders charged with planning 

and managing the response failed to achieve unity of 

effort. They were less effective than they needed to be, 

and the loss of life, human suffering, and other longterm negative consequences were accordingly made 

considerably worse.

Disasters in our homeland have enormous consequences. Regardless of their cause, size, and scope, 

they always hold the potential for significant loss of 

life, human suffering, economic dislocation, and erosion of public confidence in our government and our 

leaders. Given what is at stake, we must do better. The 

findings of many investigatory committees and blue 

ribbon commissions underscore a broad consensus 

that there are substantial impediments to unity of effort and effective response. Such findings inform the 
8

ongoing national conversation on this topic, as well 

they should. This monograph proposes three recommendations for improving our capacity for unified effort in homeland response operations. Certainly there 

are other ways to enhance and synergize our response 

capabilities, but we believe these proposals merit careful consideration. 

First, to be consistently effective, we must create 

a culture of collaboration and cooperation. We must 

establish the intellectual pre-conditions for unified effort by changing the way we think about homeland 

response. Creating an operating culture that fosters 

unity of effort requires a national homeland response 

doctrine, formulated in a dynamic and responsive doctrinal system. Our military forces and our national firefighting entity have such systems. The military’s joint 

doctrine development system grew out of the legislative mandate of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,11 while 

national fire doctrine has developed under the National Fire Administration, established in response to 

shortcomings identified in the 1973 report of the National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control.12

However, the comprehensive doctrinal systems they 

have developed are not replicated to the same degree 

across the wider homeland response community. 

More important, there is no single national doctrinal system that covers all functions and stakeholders. 

To be clear, there is published federal doctrine embodied in the National Response Framework (NRF), the 

National Incident Management System (NIMS), and 

the Incident Command System (ICS). Publication of 

these documents was a substantial step forward. But 

what is missing is far more important. Doctrine is dynamic; it is evolutionary. To be effective, it must develop within a common system, through a standardized 
9

process incorporating the inputs of all stakeholders as 

a timely response to the lessons of realistic training 

and operational experience. We propose that such a 

comprehensive doctrinal system is not only possible 

for homeland response, but in fact essential. It is the 

living structure and process through which a culture 

of cooperation and collaboration can be fostered. 

Second, to implement a common national doctrine 

which operates across the many divides in our system, we need a new management construct, one that 

operates in the spaces between jurisdictions and functions to integrate and synergize the contributions of 

all. Again, our military has pointed a way forward. 

Several unified commands operate Joint Interagency 

Coordinating Groups (JIACGs) and Joint Interagency 

Task Forces (JIATFs).13 The doctrinal basis for their organization and functions is slender but growing, and 

their operational effectiveness is well established. The 

results of JIATF-South over the preceding 2 decades, 

for example, provide clear evidence of the value of the 

concept.14 We propose establishing a similar concept 

and rigorously testing it across the range of homeland response operations. The concept should not be 

a military one, but instead a more broadly construed 

doctrinal model which will evolve over time and encompass all elements involved in homeland response 

operations. 

Third, we should remove the barriers to unity of 

effort within our military civil support capabilities. 

This requires that we put in place the authorities and 

doctrine necessary to provide our governors (and the 

President) with the ability to effectively employ DoD 

assets for homeland response. Most of our military—

both active and reserve—contains capabilities with 

strong utility for civil support. Placing them off limits 
10

for homeland response is simply counterproductive. 

Our reserve components (RC) are particularly well 

positioned to bear principal responsibility for defense 

support of civil authority (DSCA); they are forward 

deployed across the nation. However, impediments 

to their training, resourcing, readiness, and availability for this mission remain. Military capabilities that 

might be useful to a governor should not be withheld 

in time of need, regardless of the command to which 

they are assigned. This requires that we build the authorities and processes necessary to access useful forces and capabilities, when and where they are needed. 

It may entail further modification of Title 32 of the U.S. 

code to permit swift and seamless movement of capabilities into a status accessible to a governor, and will 

certainly require improved procedural mechanisms.15

Recent steps to clarify and simplify dual status command structures are a logical step in this direction.16

We believe that many military capabilities could, under the right circumstances, be available to a governor 

and serve under a qualified dual status commander. 

Additionally, procedures for identifying and preparing capabilities in advance of catastrophe must be 

developed. DSCA is a complex mission set. Available 

forces should be designated and trained in advance 

if their capabilities are to be fully ready when called. 

States must be able to plan for homeland contingency 

operations with confidence, knowing which military 

capabilities are ready and available, and empowered 

to act decisively to employ them when needed.17

Why National Doctrine?

We must focus first on doctrine to enable unity of 

effort in homeland response. One might observe that 

we already have federal doctrine published by the 
11

Department of Homeland Security, that the services 

have joint doctrine for civil support and homeland 

response, and that many elements across the various 

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)18 have a published doctrine. However, it is not the doctrine we 

possess, but rather the doctrine we lack which is at issue. The open questions about our homeland response 

capabilities, including those questions that have yet to 

be asked, must be answered with doctrinal solutions. 

For this to occur, we need a robust national homeland 

response doctrine which is more than a federal doctrine, larger than the doctrine of individual response 

functions or joint military civil response doctrine. It 

must subsume, deconflict, and integrate the separate 

doctrines of its members; it must do so responsively 

on a continuing basis. It must draw on the input and 

expertise of all participants, particularly the agencies 

and departments of the states and localities, and other 

nonfederal stakeholders. What currently exists is good 

but not unifying doctrine; and it is a federal doctrine 

only. A unifying national doctrine will incorporate all 

the capabilities of the nation within a single system.

The experience of our military makes a strong case 

for a national homeland response doctrine system. 

Despite organizationally similar cultures, unity of 

command, and strong service doctrine, our military’s 

performance in operations such as the Iranian hostage 

rescue in 1980 and the Grenada intervention in 1983 underscore how difficult it is for complex organizations 

to work together effectively. In contrast, the impressive combat performances in Panama, Kuwait, Iraq, 

and Afghanistan in recent decades, and in many operations short of war in various locations, underscore 

the value of joint doctrine in creating unified effort 

across the services. Yet it took a statutory push—the 
12

Goldwater-Nichols Act—to create the joint doctrine 

development system and the body of doctrine our 

military now employs. Prior to that legislation, there 

was no standard process for initiating, coordinating, 

approving, or revising joint doctrine. There was no 

requirement for congruity between joint and service 

doctrine, or for incorporating the requirements of the 

force commanders who had to employ the doctrine. 

There was no way to identify and address conceptual 

voids, and no mechanism for validating the efficacy 

of emerging concepts.19 Our military forces—and the 

nation—paid dearly for the lack of a robust joint doctrine over the decades from the end of World War II 

through 1985.20 Yet the military’s joint doctrine system 

is now in place, has matured over the past 25 years, 

and continues to evolve. The benefits for the military 

services are demonstrated by their unrivaled performance across a broad range of operational challenges. 

Considering the thousands of disparate stakeholders 

involved in homeland response, it will certainly be 

more difficult to bring this kind of rigor to a national 

doctrinal system. For this very reason, such a system 

is all the more important.

Doctrine performs a vital unifying function in 

complex operations. It delineates “what is taught, 

believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., what 

works best).” It provides textbook solutions for how 

things should be done to achieve specific results. It 

“standardizes terminology, training, relationships, 

responsibilities, and processes.”21 Prior to GoldwaterNichols, the individual services had well-developed 

doctrinal concepts. Each had institutional structures 

for identifying unmet requirements and for updating and improving their doctrine. For example, the 

Army’s doctrinal revolution following the Vietnam 
13

War was an institutional response to perceived new 

strategic challenges. It helped lay the foundation for 

the successes of our land forces over the ensuing 3 

decades.22 Yet individual service doctrine, by definition, must be subordinate to joint doctrine. To achieve 

common understanding between the services, joint 

doctrine coordinates and integrates service doctrinal concepts. It operates across service boundaries 

to unify their approaches to common challenges and 

bind together the ways in which they are addressed. 

Joint doctrine provides the cultural basis for effective 

communication by standardizing terms and formats. 

It enhances coordination by generating and updating 

common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). It 

promotes collaboration and cooperation by providing 

common ways of thinking about and solving problems. Doctrine clarifies relationships: who leads and 

who follows, who supports and who is supported. 

Joint doctrine “promotes a common perspective from 

which to plan, train, and conduct military operations 

. . . it guides employment of forces in coordinated and 

integrated action toward a common objective.”23 Joint 

doctrine creates the basis for our military to cooperatively produce capabilities far greater than any single 

service can field. In short, despite the commonly acknowledged importance across the services of unity 

of command, it is joint doctrine that has given them 

unity of effort.

Joint military doctrine operates in a dynamic cycle. 

It provides a process through which capability gaps 

are identified. Corresponding operating concepts are 

developed, fielded, and incorporated into operational 

plans and then validated against rigorous standards 

in realistic training and the crucible of real-world experience. The results are analyzed and used to influ-
14

ence the ongoing development of doctrine. Successful 

results support training, organizing, and equipping 

standards. Failures are equally important, driving 

changes to improve doctrinal concepts and standards 

and hopefully future results. But whether success or 

failure, the development of future capabilities, of joint 

operating concepts, and of standards for equipping, 

training, and organizing response elements are dynamically affected by the rigorously tested results of 

today’s doctrinal concepts. 

A recent DoD advisory panel on enhancing defense support of civil authority found that “there is 

currently no comprehensive national integrated planning system to respond to either natural or manmade 

disasters.” Further, “planning among federal agencies 

and other levels of government is fragmented and 

nonstandard, and there is no formal process by which 

state plans can inform federal planning and vice versa.”24 The panel report asserted that: 

the emergency response community has long understood that the foundation for any effective response to 

a . . . catastrophic incident consists of effective planning and information sharing before the emergency 

and a coordinated preparation and response activity 

prior to, during, and after the incident.25

To correct the shortcomings in planning and coordination processes, they recommended that: 

the President direct the establishment of an integrated 

planning system that promotes coordinated planning 

among local, state, and federal government entities 

and the private sector . . . international organizations 

and friendly and allied governments.26
15

The panel cited a 2003 Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive (HSPD-8) as an appropriate model. Much of 

what HSPD-8 sought to establish looks a lot like a national homeland response doctrine system. It directed 

the creation of:

• A national doctrine and planning guidance, 

instruction, and process to ensure consistent 

planning across the federal government;

• A mechanism for concept development;

• A process . . . for plan refinement which reflects 

developments in risk, capabilities, and policies, 

and incorporates lessons learned from exercises 

and actual incidents;

• A process that links regional, state, local, and 

tribal plans; planning cycles; and processes, 

and allows these plans to inform the development of federal plans;

• A process for fostering vertical and horizontal 

integration of federal, state, local, and tribal 

plans, and for using assessments of state, local, 

and tribal capabilities to inform the development of federal plans; and,

• A guide for all-hazards planning, with comprehensive, practical guidance and instruction on 

fundamental planning principles that can be 

used at federal, state, local, and tribal levels to 

assist the planning process.27

The objective of HSPD-8 was to create a system 

in which thinking about homeland response among 

federal, state, and local governments comes together 

to create a unified, and unifying, national way of operating—that is, a national doctrine. There is federal 

doctrine, and there are federal exercises and training; 

states and localities also plan and train. However, 
16

there is no national point of convergence in our homeland response thinking. There is no single place where 

differing concepts are understood, de-conflicted, and 

synthesized to create integrated response capabilities. 

There is no unified system to identify capability gaps 

and requirements, develop concepts, solicit input, 

and ensure “buy in” from all stakeholders. There is no 

systematic process to validate national doctrinal concepts in full-scale, realistic exercises, and real-world 

experience, or to integrate them into national planning. The effect of a robust joint operating doctrine on 

our military has been profound. It would be equally 

profound for our homeland response capabilities. It 

would provide a locus in which common understandings are formed, where common operating concepts 

and principles are analyzed, validated, updated, and 

authoritatively disseminated. 

A National Homeland Response Doctrine System.

A system that dynamically develops a national 

homeland response doctrine for all participants is the 

critical first step to enabling unity of effort. But what 

should this system look like? In general, it should operate like the model depicted in Figure 1. It should certainly include all of the elements in HSPD-8 outlined 

above. The DoD advisory panel found that the current 

administration had not “reaffirmed, amended, or superseded” HSPD-8, and so they recommended a presidential directive establishing an integrated national 

planning system. Yet, a system founded on executive 

order seems inconsistent with creating the basis for 

unity of effort. The flaw in such a system, of course, 

is that it is a creature of the federal executive branch 

alone. It will extend only as far as the reach of the ex-
17

ecutive branch and last as long as a President directs. 

Presidential orders also lack specific and long-term 

funding, hampering their implementation beyond the 

executive branch. 

Figure 1. Theoretical Model of the

National Homeland Response Doctrinal Cycle.

A truly national system must be based on more 

than executive fiat, and must endure beyond the next 

election cycle. It is important to start somewhere, and 

a presidential directive may be a useful starting point. 

Certainly, it could enable a doctrinal system to be 

established more quickly. But in the end, just as the 

armed forces needed the legislative spur of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to develop a true joint doctrine 

system, so a national homeland response doctrinal 

system will require a legislative impetus to be enduring, to be properly resourced and fully reflective of the 

broad mix of interests at stake. Just as important, this 
18

system must be larger than the federal government. In 

our democratic system, responsibility and authority 

are balanced. Our homeland response is graduated, 

beginning at the local level and progressively drawing upon the higher-level resources and capabilities 

needed to address the challenge. In this system, under 

most circumstances the federal government can lead, 

facilitate, incorporate, integrate . . . but not dictate. 

Consequently, it must include—as equal partners—

the states, localities, and others. A congressional 

mandate would provide the kind of broad national 

representation that is needed. The executive branch 

could undertake both kinds of actions, initially issuing a presidential directive to the various executive 

branch departments even as legislation is developed 

to create a more lasting system. However, a national 

doctrine system will be enduring only if it is broadly 

construed, has a basis in federal law, and is adequately 

resourced. Most important, it must include more than 

federal government entities and equities.

Properly established, a national homeland response doctrinal system will incorporate a senior 

body of elected and appointed federal, state, and local 

officials who will validate requirements and emerging 

strategic operating concepts. Including representation 

from states, localities, and other players that must be 

a part of a national system will ensure their buy-in 

and cooperation. Operating below this senior level 

should be a set of institutional bodies which identify 

capability gaps and requirements, develop draft doctrinal concepts, present them for validation, and, once 

validated, fully develop and implement them as interagency and/or intergovernmental components of the 

national doctrine. This subordinate structure should 

also include regular representation and input from 
19

all members of the homeland response community. 

National doctrine should begin with and build upon 

the NRF, NIMS, and ICS, which are well accepted and 

broadly understood; it would develop and evolve 

concepts as needed. Doctrinal concepts created in this 

system would be incorporated into planning at each 

level in part because the stakeholders help to develop 

them. The system could further ensure this by including procedures for linking local, state, and federal 

plans, planning cycles and processes, and for integrating plans of other stakeholders into federal planning. 

This will require more than a new process—it will require a doctrinally-based awareness that the federal 

government must (in most cases) lead by supporting. 

It will require federal response plans that support and 

integrate those of the states and other participants in 

the process. 

A national doctrine system must go beyond concept development and integration of plans. Doctrinal 

concepts, plans, and capabilities must be rigorously 

tested with realistic training and exercises, conducted 

under consistent standards relying on objective data 

collection, and combined with painstaking analysis of 

actual, “real world” operations. Validation of doctrine 

should include a national homeland response training 

center system, with its main “training aid” being an 

actual mock-up of a small city.28 This unfortunate city 

would be routinely threatened by natural disasters, 

assaulted by imaginative domestic and foreign terrorists, subject to industrial accidents, and bathed in 

pandemic diseases. It would host a diverse array of 

participants drawn from the federal interagency, state 

and local governments, and other relevant partners. A 

full-scale national training center would be a proving 

ground for developing doctrinal concepts that can be 
20

replicated, trained, improved, adapted, and applied 

in jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations across the 

nation. It should link multiple elements and smaller 

regional centers in virtual space to provide tailored 

and multiechelon training across agencies, jurisdictions, and responsibilities. Senior leaders of federal, 

state, and local government would interact with news 

media, industry, and private organizations while directing and managing actual responders operating in 

realistic conditions. The system should be robustly 

instrumented and staffed to gather data for analysis, 

dissemination, and doctrinal development. The result would be better response elements, led by better 

trained and more capable leaders—in particular those 

senior leaders responsible for achieving unified effort 

across jurisdictions and response functions. Doctrinal 

concepts would be validated, improved, or rejected. 

Results would be passed into a feedback loop which 

would provide the basis for improvements in training, organization, equipment, and in the evolution of 

homeland response doctrine and capabilities. 

The “integrated planning system” envisioned in 

HSPD-8 is important, and if fully implemented could 

certainly improve unity of effort. But, we should not 

focus solely on plans, which can and should change. 

Plans and planning are vitally important, but a national doctrine is larger than the plans it produces. Consistent unity of effort will grow out of a culture of cooperation and collaboration, which can be fostered by a 

national doctrine system. Plans specify ways of doing 

things, but doctrine begins with ways of thinking and 

understanding—these should precede and drive planning. A national homeland response doctrine system 

would integrate all stakeholders in the evolutionary 

process of how we think about and understand chal-
21

lenges to safety and security at home, and collaboratively develop responses to them. It takes a great deal 

of time and effort to create an operational culture that 

fosters unity of effort. The example of our military’s 

organizational evolution from the National Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1947, to the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act of 1986, to the present day, is instructive in this 

respect. Developing a culture of collaboration and 

cooperation for homeland response will not occur 

overnight, but rather as the long-term result of patient 

development and continuous improvement.

A New Management Construct.

A second way to achieve unity of effort is to improve our management capabilities. With the advent 

of a dynamic national homeland response doctrinal 

system, we will need to develop a new management 

structure that will operate in the spaces between agencies and organizations. The NRF and ICS identify unified command as a key principle for effective incident 

management, but it is a temporary, incident-specific 

creation rather than a permanent one. Unity of command can be temporarily achieved in any incident, 

but cannot be permanently maintained, nor would we 

want it to be, in a system based on graduated response 

and shared responsibility. What we want to do, both 

within the scope of a single incident and as an ongoing 

factor in planning and preparation, is to establish and 

sustain unified effort. Day to day, our departments 

and agencies do not work together, yet in a crisis, they 

must. A national doctrine will provide the basis for 

effectively working together by establishing the intellectual pre-conditions for cooperation, collaboration, 

communication, and coordination. However, given 
22

the breadth and scope of what is to be implemented, a 

new management construct must also be created, one 

that works to bridge the divides within the homeland 

response community before, during, and after incidents. It must foster unified effort across the doctrine 

development cycle, throughout planning and plan integration, and in training, organizing, and equipping 

response capabilities. The national homeland response 

doctrine system will function in an interagency, intergovernmental, multijurisdictional environment. 

Implementing it requires a permanent management 

structure that will similarly operate in the gaps between agencies and governments. Here too, the experience of our military provides an example that points 

in the direction homeland response must go: the Joint 

Interagency Task Force, or JIATF. 

Joint military doctrine for civil support has recognized the need for interagency planning and coordination for a number of years. This doctrine described 

an Interagency Planning Cell (IPC) that is “activated 

upon receipt of the . . . warning or alert order, or at the 

direction of the combatant commander” in response 

to a domestic disaster. This ad hoc entity was tailored 

to the crisis and set up to “rapidly advise the supported combatant commander about the resources of 

other agencies in the relief effort.” The concept was 

developed to facilitate “coherent and efficient planning and coordination effort through the participation 

of interagency subject matter experts, [and to lighten 

the] burden of coordination at the JTF level.”29 In this 

way, the IPC functioned similarly to the interagency 

Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG) called 

for under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) doctrine. A CDRG “convenes . . . when 

needed” at the headquarters of the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). Comprised of representa-
23

tives from various federal agencies, the CDRG is set 

up to “provide guidance and policy direction on coordination and operational issues.”30 Such interagency 

coordination entities are important, but both the IPC 

and CDRG—and similar ad hoc organizations—are 

temporary. 

More recently, joint military doctrine has promulgated the concept of a standing JIACG. The JIACG 

is a permanent planning and coordination element. 

Described as “an element of a [geographic combatant 

commander’s] staff,” the JIACG “is an interagency 

staff group that establishes and enhances regular, 

timely, and collaborative working relationships between other governmental agencies’ representatives 

and military operational planners.” The JIACG is 

established at the discretion of the combatant commander to “complement the interagency coordination that occurs at the national level through the DoD 

and the NSC [National Security Council] and HSC 

[Homeland Security Council] systems.” Its members 

“participate in contingency, crisis action, and security 

cooperation planning, [and] provide a conduit back to 

their parent organizations.”31 This helps synchronize 

joint operations—of the combatant command—with 

the efforts of other government agencies. As a more 

permanent element, the JIACG is an improvement 

over the IPC and CDRG. Yet it is still optional and, 

more importantly, an adjunct to military planning and 

operations. It incorporates other federal agencies and 

even nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 

inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), but these 

function under military direction, to support military 

needs.

A more germane example is provided by JIATFSouth. Established more than 2 decades ago to coor-
24

dinate military and interagency efforts to combat the 

international narcotics trade, JIATF-South has built a 

strong reputation for success. Although established 

under authority of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 and still nominally a military entity, 

JIATF-South is much more a multiservice, multiagency national task force. A key element in this entity is 

the integration of participating agencies in command 

and leadership posts. It is led by a Coast Guard admiral, with a deputy director from the Customs and 

Border Patrol (CPB). It integrates senior leaders from 

various federal agencies into its leadership structure 

at lower levels as well: the senior intelligence and operations directors are military officers, but their deputies come from the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA) and the CPB. In routine operations, “it is not 

uncommon to see a CBP agent serving as command 

duty officer, an Air Force captain as the intelligence 

watch officer, a Coast Guard operations specialist as 

the intelligence watch assistant, and a Navy lieutenant as the tactical action officer.”32 JIATF-South incorporates multiple agencies into its intelligence operations, effectively sharing information drawn from 

the resources of its members. It also includes international liaisons. The joint service, multiagency, and 

international structure enables it to quickly develop 

and share fused operational information, task assets 

under the control of the combatant commander, and 

coordinate the efforts of other assets under the control 

of participating agencies and international partners. 

While there is little formal military doctrine about 

what a JIATF is and should do—and virtually none 

among other participating agencies—the record of 

JIATF-South demonstrates that the concept works. As 

joint doctrine evolves, it will only strengthen and expand the potential of the JIATF.
25

There have been recent calls to establish JIATFlike entities for homeland response operations. For 

example, a recent advisory panel recommended formation of a JIATF for incidents involving chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons, to facilitate “pre-incident 

planning and coordination” and rapidly “translate 

national-level decisionmaking for a CBRNE incident 

into operational and tactical actions.”33 Such ideas suggest an emerging consensus that the JIATF construct 

has utility in homeland response operations. Yet this 

and similar ideas, and the structure of even highly 

successful JIATFs like JIATF-South, are too narrowly 

construed at present. This interagency coordinating 

structure cannot, for example, be an adjunct of U.S. 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM). NORTHCOM 

has a role to play, with important lead responsibilities 

for homeland defense and support responsibilities for 

other homeland security and civil support operations. 

However, the structure that is needed cannot be subordinate to any particular federal agency or department—it must belong to and support them all. It must 

begin as a broadly held doctrinal concept, and become more robust through expansion of its potential. 

A standing JIATF-like interagency coordination and 

action group—an “ICAG” perhaps—should be established at the national level to integrate the planning, 

resourcing, and management of homeland response 

operations. It should reflect a common doctrinal understanding for a multi-participant entity operating 

in the spaces between agencies. As such, it cannot be 

a military structure, although it will certainly contain 

military elements. By the same token, it cannot be a 

creature of any other single agency or department 

head. The ICAG could rely on a lead agency for sup-
port, but because it serves to integrate the interagency 

space, it must draw on the capabilities and strengths 

of all relevant participants. 

This model clearly has a similar application for 

the states. Each has a vigorous interagency community that is relevant to its own disaster planning and 

response efforts. If a federal ICAG would work to enhance unity of effort across the federal interagency, so 

too would a set of state-level ICAGs, accredited to each 

governor, perform the same useful function. One need 

not be overly prescriptive about the ICAG structure—

the senior leader it serves should be free to tailor and 

employ it as suits the needs of his agencies and constituencies. As it evolves, the doctrinal concept might 

include narrow functional versions (e.g., an ICAG 

for national CBRNE response), as well as geographically based and broadly responsive ones—much as 

we have geographic and functional commands within 

our military to address different types of problems 

and responsibilities. In any case, some functions and 

characteristics should be common to all. These would 

include:

• Accreditation to a senior executive with authority over the interagency construct being coordinated, and accountable to the citizens served by 

the participating agencies and organizations;

• An integrated leadership structure that fosters 

full involvement by all participating agencies;

• Authority to task some assets useful to its routine work; and to coordinate for swift access 

to other assets that ought to be available when 

needed;

• Interagency analysis, fusion, and dissemination of relevant intelligence and operational 

information;

26
27

• Fair sharing of responsibilities for resourcing, 

staffing, and support; and even-handed treatment of the metrics of success for all participants;

• Ongoing coordination, communication, and 

collaboration between agencies served by the 

ICAG, as well as with the ICAGs of other states 

and the federal government.

Additional capabilities could be built into the 

ICAG concept. Over time, it would mature within the 

national homeland response doctrine; as governments 

at each level discover what works best, this information will be fed back into the doctrinal cycle to improve 

it. But regardless of how the ICAG is structured in 

each specific instance, it will operate with overarching 

responsibility, day in and day out, to be the integrating structure for all interagency participants, ensuring 

unity of effort in planning and operations.

Unity of Effort across the Military. 

A third way to increase unity of effort is to improve our ability to employ all relevant military forces 

and functions in the full range of homeland response 

operations. Although its primary responsibility is defense against foreign threats, our military has taken on 

a wide range of other tasks in recent history, including 

nation-building,34 stability operations,35 and civil support.36 Regarding the latter, the 2008 Commission on 

the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) final report 

included a number of significant findings—among 

them, that DoD fails to put adequate effort (planning, 

programming, and budgeting) into civil support capabilities, and “historically has not made civil support a 

priority.”37
28

It is somewhat ironic that our military would place 

less emphasis on support for civil authority at home, 

even as they have very successfully executed peacekeeping and stability operations abroad. In recent decades, both unilaterally and within multinational coalitions, our forces have routinely been the only entity 

capable of providing security and stability, preserving 

life and property, delivering medical care, and assisting in the restoration of civil institutions. Yet aside 

from National Guard operations, DoD has been reluctant to engage in civil support operations at home, 

and perhaps understandably so. There is substantial 

primary capability in our nation, at many levels, for 

disaster planning and response; state and local leaders 

are quite rightly held to account for their performance 

in this area. Yet the CNGR report recommends that 

Congress mandate civil support as a primary mission 

for DoD, “equal in priority to its combat responsibilities.”38

The reason for this is plain: our military possesses 

a variety of capabilities with great value in responding to disasters and mitigating their effects; Americans 

expect that the military resources they paid for will 

be available when needed to protect them. It makes 

little difference to the injured, hungry, and dispossessed that the cause of their misery is a hurricane, a 

pandemic, an industrial disaster, or a terrorist strike. 

Their reasonable expectation is that “the government” 

will provide for public safety in their hour of need. 

For this reason, we should be removing impediments 

to unity of effort in utilizing our military forces, and 

our reserve components in particular, for homeland 

response operations when they are not engaged in 

federal missions overseas.
29

There are clear legal restrictions on the roles and 

uses of our military at home, which exist for sound 

reasons that need not be debated here.39 It is sufficient 

to note that our forefathers wisely saw the problems 

inherent to employing military forces in roles normally confined to civil authority. However, the principal 

challenge in employing our military for homeland 

response is not a constitutional issue, but rather one 

of lesser law. The role of the federal government in 

raising, supporting, and employing military forces for 

both overseas missions and in various roles at home 

is clearly established, as is its ability to federalize National Guard units when needed. What is not well 

settled—but must be—is the ability of our governors 

to swiftly and seamlessly employ all the capabilities 

that might be made available to them when needed. 

This includes employment of military capabilities; it 

is critical to a governor’s ability to formulate complete 

and well-coordinated homeland response plans with 

confidence. The status of most forces under Title 10 

currently precludes placing them under state authority. This includes all DoD reserve components other 

than the National Guard and the active components 

of all services. 

Most of our military capabilities are organized and 

resourced for federal service, as it ought to be. Yet 

some (the National Guard) are available for local and 

state missions. From a governor’s standpoint, nothing 

could be easier or more efficient than having all the 

available military forces in his state operate under his 

control when not needed for federal missions. There 

are sound reasons why this is not so, and our present system—despite the Title 10/Title 32 divide—has 

served reasonably well over time in providing ready 

forces for federal missions. Certainly, no one could 
30

claim that National Guard forces have been less ready 

or available for service overseas since September 2001 

than their Title 10 counterparts because they were 

tasked with state missions. In fact, quite the opposite 

is true. The example of the governor of Louisiana doing without thousands of that state’s National Guard 

soldiers who were deployed to Iraq during Hurricane 

Katrina simply underscores the point that when the 

nation is at war, our military forces are at the federal 

government’s direction. What has become increasingly clear since 9/11 is that state and local jurisdictions 

have a vital role to play in the full range of homeland 

response operations, including preventing and responding to terrorism. Given this reality, how might 

we reorganize to broaden the base of military capabilities available to them?

The CNGR made several recommendations to 

improve military support for homeland response. It 

recognized the value of new capabilities (such as National Guard homeland response elements), as well as 

other military units which are “dual-capable forces.”40

Not all military forces have a value in civil support 

operations. Some have more obvious uses than others, 

but many are, in fact, dual-capable. This includes not 

only National Guard, but Title 10 active and reserve 

forces as well. These elements have routinely served 

in peacekeeping and stability operations overseas and 

occasionally in support of civil authority at home, performing tasks which are not the ones for which they 

were originally organized, trained, and equipped. 

Simply put, our military can do more than just fight 

our nation’s wars. From the birth of the republic to the 

present day, our National Guard—and on occasion, 

our Title 10 forces—have proven the value of dualcapable military forces.
31

Achieving unity of effort for homeland response 

among our military services is neither a matter of 

determining which forces ought to be in the National Guard and which should not, nor one of simply 

combining National Guard and Reserve structures 

(an argument which begs the point). Rather, it is one 

of determining when and how to best place military 

forces under a governor’s authority to make them 

readily available for civil support roles. Toward this 

end, we should be removing impediments to training, planning for, and employing military units under the direction of a governor. A pre-qualified dual 

status commander would have authority to direct and 

coordinate the efforts of all military forces acting in 

support of the governor (or the governors) of affected 

states and territories. These officers are senior military 

leaders trained and selected in advance for their expertise and local knowledge. This positions them well 

to plan for the utilization of available military assets in 

their regions. Dual status command has been successfully employed in recent years for pre-planned joint 

and multiagency civil support events such as the 2004 

G8 Summit, nominating conventions, and border control operations.41 It makes sense for the military leaders with the most local knowledge and experience to 

lead defense support of civil authority in their areas of 

responsibility. Dual status command works. It should 

be the rule, not the exception; and better methods 

must be developed for placing useful military capabilities under dual status command, when requested 

and if available, for homeland response. This means 

developing better advance planning and implementation procedures for dual status command, such as 

has been proposed by the Council of Governors.42 This 

should include the full range of “no notice” homeland 

response disaster events.
32

We must also make all relevant military capabilities 

available for homeland response in a way that facilitates effective planning. The services have developed 

procedures for identification and rotation of forces 

to support overseas deployments, such as the Army 

Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. This system is 

a “rotational readiness model” which provides “strategic flexibility to meet security requirements for a 

continuous presence of deployed forces.”43 Such a system could be adapted to identify capabilities available 

for civil support operations in a similar way—a civil 

support force generation cycle—to ensure that those 

who plan for civil support by DoD assets have a predictable way to obtain needed capabilities to support 

those plans and contingencies. This would facilitate 

early identification and training of units and capabilities—active and reserve—for civil support task proficiency as they rotate into the pool of available elements; and it could be nuanced to complement and 

support the demands of federal missions overseas. 

With a predictable system for force generation, governors and dual status commanders would be in a better position to plan for, request, and employ available 

military capabilities when they are needed. 

Unity of Effort.

The greatest challenge in homeland response operations is creating unity of effort. Many essential 

capabilities are spread across multiple jurisdictions, 

agencies, and organizations. This patchwork of authority, responsibility, and capability reflects our vibrant democratic system, yet it is these same divides 

that makes unity of effort so difficult. Most of the time, 

we want these seams in our system. We prefer to deal 
33

with governments close to home, accessible and responsive to most of our routine needs. In times of crisis, we do not want federal authority to replace state 

and local authority. But we do want our governments 

to work together, to use assets and capabilities that are 

already available in coordinated and thoughtful ways 

to ensure the public safety. When necessary, we want 

federal assets to complement and complete—not compete with—our local and state efforts in a seamless, 

unified response.

This requires a new approach. It requires us to 

foster a culture of communication, coordination, collaboration, and cooperation among the many entities 

that have a role in homeland response operations. To 

be able to act with unity and decision, we must be able 

to plan, train, resource, and prepare for unified effort. 

This begins with how we think about homeland response, and each participant’s role in it. A truly unifying national doctrine that stresses these tenets, developed and dynamically updated in an inclusive system, 

will break down barriers to effectiveness and remove 

impediments to unity of effort in times of crisis. To 

implement a national doctrine across the divides in 

our system, we need new management concepts that 

work between and among all participants, such as the 

proposed interagency coordination and action group. 

This element will integrate and synthesize the efforts 

of all stakeholders, working in the spaces between to 

stitch together the jurisdictional patchwork into a usable blanket of protection. We must remove all barriers that currently exist to full utilization of relevant 

military capabilities for homeland response. This can 

be accomplished by making forces available to our 

governors when and where they are needed, returning them to the nation when the crisis is past; and by 
34

providing reliable processes to plan for their readiness 

and availability before disaster strikes. 

Achieving unity of effort in homeland response is 

a complex challenge, among the greatest of our age. 

It is the single most important factor in our ability to 

plan for and respond effectively to disasters in our 

homeland. We devote enormous resources to public 

safety and security at many levels. Our citizens surely 

have a right to expect that these resources will be well 

used by their leaders, elected and appointed. This 

means that we must find better ways to work together. It requires leaders and organizations at all levels 

to combine their efforts, resources, and capabilities to 

achieve responsive and complete solutions. John Jay 

observed in the Federalist Papers No. 3 that “among the 

many objects to which a wise and free people find it 

necessary to direct their attention, that of providing 

for their safety seems to be the first.”44 There cannot 

be any higher priority for government than ensuring 

the safety of its citizens. This is a serious issue, deserving a serious approach. National security begins with 

homeland security, and homeland security depends 

fundamentally on our ability to work together, to 

bring our enormous capacity to bear at the right time, 

the right place, and in the right measure. Americans 

have long and proud traditions both of celebrating 

our differences, and of joining together in adversity to 

achieve common purposes. We should not allow any 

of the routinely divisive factors prevent us from working together effectively in times of crisis.
35

ENDNOTES 

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

pp. 119-121.

2. “Chernobyl Haunts Engineer Who Alerted the World,” 

CNN World News Interactive, April 26, 1996, available from 

www.cnn.com/WORLD/9604/26/chernobyl/230pm/index2.html.

3. “Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and SocioEconomic Impacts,” The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, Vienna, 

Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency Division of Publications, p. 10, available from www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/

Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf. 

4. U.S. Congress, “Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,” The 9/11 Commission Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 311, 

available from www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.

5. The 9/11 Commission Report details multiple examples of 

chaos and confusion during the morning of the attacks, at every 

level from the federal interagency down to the local level, such as 

the interaction between the New York Port Authority and the tenants in the World Trade Center. It cites problems with information 

sharing and attaining situational awareness, for example, between 

the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 

and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); and in attempting to put fighter aircraft into the air (ibid., pp. 26-27) to respond 

to attacking aircraft. Another example was the failure of the Port 

Authority to develop fire evacuation protocols, to convey those 

to Trade Center tenants, and to ensure that the tenants had been 

adequately oriented (ibid., pp. 280-281). Recent releases of audio 

tapes from the morning of the attack bear out the report’s findings, particularly “confusion and lack of co-ordination between 

military and civil authorities in the aftermath of the attacks.” See 

Karen McVeigh, “Newly Released 9/11 Audio Recordings Reveal Chaos and Confusion,” guardian.co.uk, London, United Kingdom (UK), September 8, 2011, available from www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2011/sep/08/september-11-audio-recordings-public. 

6. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 325-328.
36

7. Ten years after 9/11, stories appear routinely in the media about potential terrorist threats. As the anniversary of the 

terrorist strikes approached, there was increased concern of another attack by al Qaeda. For example, the Chicago Sun-Times reported that “The U.S. government has long known that terrorists 

see the 10th anniversary of 9/11 and other uniquely American 

dates as opportunities to strike. Officials have also been concerned that some may see this anniversary as an opportunity to 

avenge Osama bin Laden’s death.” Eileen Sullivan and Lolita C. 

Baldor, “Threat Puts New York, DC on alert as 9/11 Anniversary Nears,” Chicago Sun-Times, September 10, 2011, from www.

suntimes.com/news/nation/7568755-418/terror-threat-puts-ny-dc-onalert-as-911-anniversary-nears.html. Numerous opinion columns 

also speculate that the nation may not be safer. For example, a 

commentator recently wrote that “those who follow the terrorist threat most closely don’t think bin Laden’s death will have 

reduced it much, if at all.” Christopher Dickey, “The Next Terror Threat,” The Daily Beast, May 6, 2011, available from www.the

dailybeast.com/articles/2011/05/06/al-qaeda-terror-threat-to-new-yorkcity-and-us-trains-remains-high.html. 

8. U.S. Congress, “Report by the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 

Katrina,” A Failure of Initiative, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, pp. 359-362.

9. Ibid., p. 7.

10. Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, “Gulf Spill Is the 

Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say,” www.NYTimes.com, August 2, 

2010, available from www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html.

11. David A. Sawyer, “The Joint Doctrine Development System,” Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, pp. 36-37. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 caused a far-reaching reorganization of the national defense 

establishment, viewed by many as the most significant since the 

National Security Act of 1947. Among its major provisions, it significantly strengthened the authority of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff relative to the separate service chiefs. The act designated the Chairman as “the principal military advisor to the presi-
37

dent, National Security Council and secretary of defense.” It also 

established the position of vice-chairman, made the Joint Staff the 

chairman’s staff, and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president through the Secretary of Defense to the 

unified commanders. Regarding joint doctrine, the act vested statutory responsibility in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

for “developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed 

forces” (Title 10 U.S. Code Subtitle A Part I Chapter 5 § 153). Text 

available from www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html. 

12. Lennard G. Kruger, United States Fire Administration: An 

Overview, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 10, 2008, available from opencrs.com/document/RS20071/2011-

04-20/.

13. Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 8, 2008, p. IV-12. A Joint 

Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is a staff group “composed of U.S. Government civilian and military experts.” It “establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships 

between civilian and military operational planners.” The JIACG is 

“accredited [to the] combatant commander” and “tailored to meet 

[his] requirements.” It enhances the combatant commander’s 

ability to “collaborate at the operational level” with other federal 

agencies. Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) were developed 

during the Clinton Administration in an effort to correct perceived 

weaknesses in the command and control of the nation’s counternarcotics efforts. As a result, four JIATFs were established (JIATFNorth, -South, -East and -West) to better integrate the efforts of 

the federal interagency in narcotics interdiction. Along with military personnel, the JIATFs include staff from the U.S. Customs 

and Border Patrol (CBP), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA), and Department of State.

14. JIATF-South is located in Key West, Florida, and operates under the authority of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Its mission is to “conduct interagency and international 

Detection & Monitoring operations,” and to “facilitate the interdiction of illicit [narcotics] trafficking and other Narco-terrorist 

threats in support of national and partner nation security,” available from www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/.
38

15. Title 32 of the U.S. Code lays out the legal basis for the National Guard. National Guard units are unique among the United 

States military in their dual status as both state and federal forces. 

While they are principally supported by federal funds, they remain under the command of the governor of the state until “federalized” (i.e., placed into federal service under Title 10 of the U.S. 

Code). Since National Guard forces are under the command of 

the governor while in Title 32 status, they are easily made available for tasks as directed by the governor (including training and 

readiness preparations for state missions). National Guardsmen 

may also be placed in “State Active Duty” status, in which the 

state pays their operating costs and utilizes them as needed to 

support other civil authorities. The National Guard provides civil support in thousands of missions each year. For example, in 

2005—the year of Hurricane Katrina—the Army National Guard 

responded to over 23,000 incidents within the United States, including relief from tornadoes, wildfires, hurricanes, floods, and 

other natural and man-made disasters (National Guard Bureau, 

“Army National Guard Fact Sheet—Army National Guard 2005,” 

Arlington, VA: available from www.arng.army.mil/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publications/News%20Media%20Factsheets/ARNG_Factsheet_May_06%20ARNG%20fact%20Sheet.pdf). 

16. Jeffrey W. Burkett, “Command and Control of Military 

Forces in the Homeland,” Joint Force Quarterly, Fall 2008, pp. 130-

131. Under the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress amended Title 32 of the U.S. Code to permit National Guard 

officers to retain their state commissions after being ordered to 

federal active duty. This is known as dual status. In dual status 

command, a National Guard commander in Title 32 status is ordered to federal active duty under Title 10 but retains his state 

commission as well. This provides the statutory authority for one 

person to simultaneously command both state (Title 32 and state 

active duty status) and federal (Title 10 active and reserve) forces.

17. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 11, 2011, p. GL-7. A contingency is a 

“situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect U.S. interests.” A contingency operation is “a military operation that: a. is designated by the Secretary 
39

of Defense as an operation in which members of the Armed Forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or 

hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing force; or b. is created by definition of law.” Department 

of Defense, JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2, 2007 

(with Change 1, May 20, 2009), p. GL-6.

18. National Response Framework, Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 2008. The National Response Framework organizes federal and state response capabilities into 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The ESFs enable 

grouping functions and resources into similar categories to facilitate their employment and management. The ESFs “serve as the 

primary operational-level mechanism to provide assistance in 

functional areas such as transportation, communications, public 

works and engineering, firefighting, mass care, housing, human 

services, public health and medical services, search and rescue, 

agriculture and natural resources, and energy” (pp. 57-60).

19. David A. Sawyer, “The Joint Doctrine Development System,” Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, p. 37. 

20. There are a range of historical examples demonstrating 

the problems inherent in working without a strong joint doctrine. One of the most persuasive is the failed attempt to rescue 

American hostages from Iran in 1980. The conclusions of the Holloway Report found that “the ad hoc nature of the organization 

and planning [was] related to most of the major issues” which 

contributed to the failure of the mission. “Report of the Special 

Operations Review Group,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, The Pentagon, 1980, p. 60.

21. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

5120.02B, Joint Doctrine Development System, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, The Pentagon, December 4, 2009, Appendix 

A, pp. 1-2.

22. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Transforming the Army: TRADOC’s First Thirty Years 1973-2003, TRADOC 

Historical Study Series, Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, 

2003, pp. 34-38.
40

23. JP 1, p. ix.

24. Steve Abbott, et al., “Report of the Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities 

After Certain Incidents to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, Committees on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives,” Before 

Disaster Strikes: Imperatives for Enhancing Defense Support to Civil 

Authorities, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

September 15, 2010, pp. 28-29.

25. Ibid., p. 35.

26. Ibid., p. 29.

27. George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness, Annex 1, Washington, DC: The White 

House, December 17, 2003, available from www.dhs.gov/xabout/

laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm. 

28. A “full-scale” training center should be large enough to 

fully train and operate all participants in relevant scenarios. By 

way of comparison, the Army’s National Training Center (NTC) 

at Fort Irwin, California, which opened in October 1980, is approximately the size of Rhode Island. See Anne W. Chapman, The 

National Training Center Matures 1985-1993, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Historical Study Series, Fort 

Monroe, VA: Military History Office, 2003, p. 102. As the center 

matured, even this size was deemed insufficient for full-scale 

training, and additional land was sought (Ibid., pp. 65-97). A National Homeland Response Training Center should emulate the 

military NTC in scale, scope, and capability.

29. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, 

Vol. I, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, U.S. Government 

Printing Office, October 9, 1996, pp. III-3-III-5.

30. Department of Homeland Security, “Federal Response 

Plan,” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2003, Appendix D.
41

31. JP 1, pp. VII-5-VII-7.

32. Richard M. Yeatman, “JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1996-97, p. 26.

33. Abbott et al., pp. 26-27.

34. James Dobbins et al., “The Beginners Guide to NationBuilding,” Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, National 

Security Research Division, 2007, p. xvii. The term “nation building” has been used in various ways. “Nation-building, as it is 

commonly referred to in the United States, involves the use of 

armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and 

economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society 

emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.” 

35. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, August 11, 2011, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, p. V-4. Stability operations is 

“an umbrella term for various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe 

and secure environment, and to provide essential governmental 

services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”

36. JP 3-28, Civil Support, September 14, 2007, Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 

vii-x. The term “civil support” (CS) includes DoD support to U.S. 

civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law 

enforcement and other activities. “CS operations are divided into 

three broad categories of domestic emergencies, designated law 

enforcement support, and other activities.” Domestic emergencies include disasters in which military capabilities are used to 

“save lives, prevent suffering, and mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions.” It may include “assistance in restoring public health and services, and civil order may 

include augmentation of local first responders and equipment.” 

Law enforcement support may include support for or augmentation of local law enforcement capabilities. Other activities include 

military operations in support of National Special Security Events 

(NSSE). NSSE are “certain special events that, by virtue of their 
42

political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the 

target of terrorism or other criminal activity.” 

37. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, “Final 

Report to the Congress and the Secretary of Defense,” Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational 

Force,” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 31, 2008, p. 90.

38. Ibid., p. 91.

39. Jennifer K. Elsea, The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, September 16, 2005, available from 

fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53685.pdf. 

Recognizing the risk that a standing army could pose to 

individual civil liberties and the sovereignty retained by 

the several states, but also cognizant of the need to provide 

for the defense of the nation against foreign and domestic 

threats, the framers of the Constitution incorporated a system of checks and balances to divide the control of the military between the President and Congress and to share the 

control of the militia with the states. 

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 U.S.C. section 1385: Use of 

Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus) was passed to limit domestic law enforcement roles the Army had assumed in the post-Civil 

War era. However, its limitations have been gradually reduced 

as federal military forces have been employed in countering the 

international narcotics trade, and more recently, the threat of 

terrorism. Additionally, limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act 

never applied to military activity other than law enforcement 

(e.g., disaster response), nor to the National Guard while serving 

under a governor in Title 32 status. (See, for example, Craig T. 

Trebilcock, “The Myth of Posse Comitatus,” Journal of Homeland 

Security, Homeland Security Institute, October 2000, available from www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Trebilcock.

htm#_edn1.) 

Under the Insurrection Act of 1807 (10 USC sections 331-335), 

when there are “insurrections in any State against its government,” the President “may, upon the request of its legislature or 
43

of its governor . . . call into Federal service . . . the militia of the 

other States . . . and use such of the armed forces, as he considers 

necessary to suppress the insurrection.” The Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. 

section 5121), authorizes the Federal government to help state 

and local governments alleviate the suffering and damage caused 

by disasters. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 

of 2007 considerably broadened Presidential authority to deploy 

troops within the United States. Under section 1042 of this act, the 

President could “deploy troops as a police force during a natural 

disaster, epidemic, serious public health emergency, terrorist attack, or other condition, when the President determines that the 

authorities of the state are incapable of maintaining public order.” This occasioned a considerable backlash among the states, 

and was repealed by the subsequent 2008 NDAA. The Robert T. 

Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (42 

U.S.C. section 5121), authorizes the Federal government to help 

state and local governments alleviate the suffering and damage 

caused by disasters.

40. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, The Pentagon, June 2005, p. 3. 

Dual capable forces are those with inherent capabilities that have 

application for both warfighting and civil support tasks. For example, DoD recognizes the value of these types of capabilities in 

relation to CBRNE response. The DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support states that, 

[w]ith the exception of a dedicated command and control 

element (currently the Joint Task Force-Civil Support) and 

the Army National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(WMD) Civil Support Teams, DoD will rely on dual-capable 

forces for the domestic consequence management [CM] mission. These dual-capable forces must be trained, equipped, 

and ready to provide timely assistance to civil authorities in 

times of domestic CBRNE catastrophes, programming for 

this capability when directed.

The DoD Joint Operating Concept for Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support states that:

Warfighting forces with dual capability for CBRNE defense 

and domestic CBRNE CM operations must be identified, 
44

trained, equipped, and exercised as necessary to assist civil 

authorities. This capability must include forces and assets 

able to provide agent detection and assessment, agent containment, quarantine, evacuation, force protection, decontamination, medical operations in a contaminated environment, and medical surge capabilities (including mortuary 

affairs).

Joint Operating Concept for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 

Washington, DC: Department of Defense,The Pentagon, October 

2007, p. 43. While the DoD discussion centers on CBRNE, there 

are obviously many other capabilities within our military forces 

which fall under the very broad characterization of dual capable, 

including medical, transportation, supply, air traffic control, and 

military police, to name but a few.

41. National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 

11th, 2001, Hurricane Katrina and Beyond, Arlington, VA: Chief, 

National Guard Bureau, pp. 6-8. 

The command and control construct for the G8 Summit, 

DNC, RNC, and Operation Winter Freeze represent landmark achievements. For the first time in our nation’s history, the National Guard attained unity of command for 

all military forces operating in support of a major event. In 

each case, from one Joint Force Headquarters, a single National Guard officer commanded Guard units from multiple 

States operating under Title 32 authority, as well as Active 

Component Army/Navy/Air Force/Marine Corps Title 10 

forces in a joint, intergovernmental/interagency environment.

42. Ludwig J. Schumacher, “Dual Status Command for NoNotice Events: Integrating the Military Response to Domestic Disasters,” Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 7, Article 4, February 2011, 

pp. 4-5, available from www.hsaj.org/?article=7.1.4. In preparation 

for civil support operations in response to Hurricane Irene, DoD 

(for the first time) appointed four dual-status commanders from 

the North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island National Guards to “direct both federal active-duty forces 

and state National Guard forces,” to “ensure that state and federal 

military forces . . . work effectively together,” to prevent “duplication of effort, and provide the life-saving efforts that governors 
45

request.” “DoD Announces Hurricane Irene Dual-Status Commanders,” News Release, Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), available from www.defense.

gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=14756.

43. Department of Defense, Army Regulation 525-29, Army 

Force Generation, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 14, 2010, p. 1.

44. John Jay, “The Same Subject Continued—Concerning the 

Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence,” Clinton Rossiter, ed., 

The Federalist Papers, No. 3, New York: Signet Classic Edition, New 

American Library, 2003, p. 36.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Authors

Lieutenant General (Retired) H Steven Blum

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Kerry McIntyre

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil