FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FISHERMEN’S FINEST INC; US 

FISHING LLC; NORTH PACIFIC

FISHING INC,

No. 08-36024 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

D.C. No.

v.  2:07-cv-01574-MJP

GARY LOCKE,* as he is the OPINION Secretary of the United States

Department of Commerce,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 6, 2009—Seattle, Washington

Filed January 19, 2010

Before: Arthur L. Alarcón, Andrew J. Kleinfeld and

Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Alarcón;

Dissent by Judge Clifton

*Gary Locke is substituted for his predecessor as Secretary of the

United States Department of Commerce. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). 

1217
COUNSEL

Linda R. Larson, Marten Law Group PLLC, Spokane, Washington, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Charles R. Scott, United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C.,

for the the defendant-appellee.

OPINION

ALARCÓN, Senior Circuit Judge:

Fishermen’s Finest, Inc., North Pacific Fishing, Inc., and

U.S. Fishing, LLC, (“Fishermen’s”) appeal from the district

court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the United States Department of Commerce. Fishermen’s challenges the Secretary’s issuance of a final rule

adopting Amendment 85 (“A85”) to the Fishery Management

Plan (“FMP”) for Groundfish of the Bering Sea and Aleutian

Islands Management Area (“BSAIMA”). 

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1221
The Government allocates Pacific cod in the BSAIMA

among different sectors of the fishing industry. Fishermen’s

belongs to the trawl Catcher / Processor (“CP”) sector. It contends that the most recent allocation, which reduced its share

of the Pacific cod fishery, did not comport with applicable

law.

We affirm because we agree with the district court that the

Secretary did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting

Amendment A85.

I

Fishermen’s operates two medium-sized vessels that fish

for Pacific cod, flatfish, rockfish and Atka mackerel in the

BSAIMA. The BSAIMA fishery is located off the northwest

coast of Alaska. It is this nation’s largest in terms of harvest

and area. Pollock is the most lucrative and largest fishery in

the BSAIMA; Pacific cod is second. Different means of fishing are employed in the BSAIMA. Allocations are made

among different methods of fishing, because of their individualized environmental and socioeconomic impact. A trawler is

a fishing vessel that fishes by dragging a large net or trawl

through the water. CP vessels process fish by removing the

head and gut as soon as they are caught, hence Fishermen’s

belongs to a sector colloquially known as the “Head & Gut”

sector.

A

To understand the substance of Fishermen’s claims requires

an overview of the Government’s regulation of fishing. Finding that “[c]ertain stocks of fish have declined to the point

where their survival is threatened,” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1801(a)(2)(A), Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens

Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“MSA”) in 1976

to “conserve and manage fishery resources” and to “achieve

and maintain, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from

1222 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
each fishery.” Id. § 1801(b)(1) & (4). In order to achieve these

ends the MSA established eight regional Fishery Management

Councils (“Councils”), which could set the Total Allowable

Catch (“TAC”) for each fish species in different fishing

zones. See id. §§ 1852(b) & (c), 1801(b)(5); 1852(h)(1). The

FMP’s, and amendments thereto, do not become effective,

however, until they are approved by the Secretary. See 16

U.S.C. §§ 1854(a)-(b), 1855. The Secretary has delegated this

responsibility to the National Marine Fisheries Service

(“NMFS”), which only promulgates the regulation after

ensuring the FMP’s and amendments are consistent with the

MSA’s ten National Standards, inter alia, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1854(a)-(b), and after a period of public comment. Id.

§§ 1854(a)(1)(B) & (b)(1)(A).

Fishermen’s complains that the most recent allocations of

the Pacific cod TAC in amendment A85 to the current FMP

of the BSAIMA violated National Standard 2 and National

Standard 4 of the MSA. National Standards 2 and 4 provide

that:

(2) Conservation and management measures shall be

based upon the best scientific information available.

. . .

(4) Conservation and management measures shall

not discriminate between residents of different

states. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign

fishing privileges among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and equitable

to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to

promote conservation; and (C) carried out in such a

manner that no particular individual, corporation, or

other entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges.

16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) & (4). The MSA requires the NMFS

to promulgate guidelines interpreting the National Standards.

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1223
Id. at § 1851(b). According to the guidelines, National Standard 2 “best scientific information” “includes, but is not limited to, information of a biological, ecological, economic, or

social nature.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(b)(1) (2006). Further,

FMPs and amendments must “take into account” the “best

scientific information available at the time of preparation” and

if new information becomes available between initial drafting

and NMFS review, it “should be incorporated into the final

FMP where practicable.” Id. § 600.315(b). Where there are

conflicting facts and opinions, the Fishery Management

Councils may choose what to consider “but should justify the

choice.” Id. § 600.315(b)(1).

With regards to National Standard 4, allocations are “fair

and equitable” if they are “rationally connected to the

achievement of [optimum yield] or with the furtherance of a

legitimate FMP objective.” Id. § 600.325(c)(3)(i)(A). Further,

“[i]nherent in an allocation is the advantaging of one group to

the detriment of another.” Id. Thus, “[a]n allocation of fishing

privileges may impose a hardship on one group if it is outweighed by the total benefits received by another group or

groups.” Id. § 600.325(c)(3)(i)(B). For example, section 305

of the MSA sets aside a portion of TAC for eligible villages

as part of the Western Alaska Community Development

Quota Program. See 16 U.S.C. § 1855(i)(1)(A).

Fishermen’s also argues that A85’s TAC allocation violates

211(a) of the American Fisheries Act (“AFA”) by creating an

“adverse impact” on non-AFA fishing vessels. In 1998, the

AFA created a monopoly in fishing rights to pollock assigned

to specific vessels that met a past participation test in that

industry. AFA § 208. Fishermen’s does not belong to this

group. It is referred to as a non-AFA participant in BSAIMA

fishing. The vessels granted a monopoly by the AFA operate

as cooperatives that also engage in fishing for other species,

as was anticipated and approved of by the AFA. Because of

the competitive advantage the specific AFA vessels gained

1224 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
due to their pollock monopoly, Congress sought to limit their

impact on other fisheries by dictating that Councils:

shall recommend for approval by the Secretary such

conservation and management measures as it determines necessary to protect other fisheries under its

jurisdiction and the participants in those fisheries,

including processors, from adverse impacts caused

by this Act or fishery cooperatives in the directed

pollock fishery.

AFA § 211(a) (emphasis added). Congress also built in protections in the AFA against unfair competitive advantages for

the AFA vessels by imposing “sideboards,” which are limits

on how much fish of other species AFA vessels are allowed

to catch. AFA § 211(b)(2) & (C). For example, in the Pacific

cod fishery, AFA trawl CP vessels operated under a sideboard

limit of 6.1% of TAC and AFA trawl CV vessels operated

under a sideboard limit of 20.2% of TAC. As a result of the

AFA, non-AFA vessels increased their harvest of non-pollock

species, as they were now excluded from pollock. A80 Final

Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 52, 668.

B

An FMP for the BSAIMA was first promulgated in 1981.

46 Fed. Reg. 63, 295 (Dec. 31, 1981). It includes annual

TACs for each of seventeen target species, including Pacific

cod. In 1994, for the first time, Amendment 24 allocated the

Pacific cod TAC, 44% to the “fixed gear” (hook-and-line and

pot) sector, 54% to the trawl sector, and 2% to the jig gear

sector (fishing lure methods). 59 Fed. Reg. 4009, 4010 (Jan.

28, 1994). These allocations reflected the harvests in those

sectors from 1991 to 1993, with the exception that the jig

gear’s allocations was increased to encourage growth.

Amendment 24 also gave the NMFS authority to “reallocate

Pacific cod from vessels [from one sector to another] anytime

. . . the [NMFS] determines that one gear group or the other

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1225
will not be able to harvest its allocation of Pacific cod.” 59

Fed. Reg. at 4010.

In 1997, Amendment 46 divided the trawl allocation

between catcher vessels (“CV”) and catcher-processors

(“CP”) and allocated 51% to fixed gear, 47% to trawl gear

(divided equally), and 2% for jig gear. 61 Fed. Reg. 59029

(Nov. 20, 1996)(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679). Amendments

64 and 77, passed in 2000 and 2003, respectively, further

refined sector subdivisions from the original fixed gear sector

into five groups. See 65 Fed. Reg. 51553 (Aug. 24,

2000)(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679); 68 Fed. Reg. 49416

(Aug. 18, 2003)(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679). These amendments did not alter the TAC allocated to the trawl CP group.

See 72 Fed. Reg. 5654, 5655 (February 7, 2007) (proposed

rule) (noting a 23.5% TAC quota for trawl CPs between 1997

and A85).

On September 4, 2007, the NMFS updated the FMP for

groundfish of the BSAIMA with Amendment 85, which sets

forth new allocations for the TAC of Pacific cod that each of

nine sectors may catch annually. Fisheries of the Executive

Economic Zone Off Alaska, Pacific Cod Allocations in the

Bering Sea and Aleutian Island Management Area, 72 Fed.

Reg. 50788 (September 4, 2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.

679). For the first time since the MSA, trawl CPs were

divided between AFA trawl catcher processors (part of the

fleet granted pollock fishing rights under the AFA) and nonAFA trawl catcher processors (those who had no pollock fishing rights). 72 Fed. Reg. at 50788. Because AFA trawl CP

vessels were now limited in their amount of Pacific cod by a

direct allocation, there was no longer a need for the 6.1%

sideboard limit imposed by the AFA. The sideboard was

phased out.

The North Pacific Council, which has authority over the

BSAIMA, sought the adoption of A85 because “[g]rowing

demand for Pacific cod, a fully exploited fishery, and other

1226 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
distributional concerns among sectors led the Council to consider a[n] . . . action to revise allocations of Pacific cod

among the many BSAI[MA] groundfish sectors.” 72 Fed.

Reg. at 5657. Revision of allocations had become necessary

because current allocations meant that “one or more sectors

are typically unable to harvest their annual allocation of the

Pacific cod TAC.” 72 Fed. Reg. at 5655. “Thus, to provide an

opportunity for the full harvest of BSAI Pacific cod non-CDQ

TAC, existing allocations of Pacific cod that are projected to

be unharvested by some sectors are annually reallocated by

NMFS to other sectors.” Id. “Since BSAI Pacific cod sector

allocations have been in effect, NMFS has reallocated Pacific

cod each year from the trawl and jig sectors to fixed gear sectors.” Id.; See also Fishery Management Council, Public

Review Draft: Environmental Assessment/Regulatory Impact

Review/Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for Proposed

Amendment 85 iii-iv and Table E-1 (March 12, 2006) (hereinafter “EA/RIR/IRFA”) (noting that between 2000 and 2004,

trawl CPs reallocated 19% of their sector’s quota). The NMFS

also carried out other more minor reallocations. Id.

The problem statement setting forth the objectives of A85

reads as follows:

The BSAIMA Pacific cod fishery is fully utilized

and has been allocated among gear groups and to

sectors within gear groups. The current allocations

among trawl, jig, and fixed gear were implemented

in 1997 (Amendment 46) and the CDQ [Community

Development Quota] allocation was implemented in

1998. These allocations are overdue for review. Harvest patterns have varied significantly among the

sectors resulting in annual in-season re-allocations of

TAC. As a result, the current allocations do not correspond with actual dependency and use by sectors.

Participants in the BSAIMA Pacific cod fishery

who have made significant investments and have

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1227
long-term dependence on the resource need stability

in the allocations to the trawl, jig, fixed gear and

CDQ sectors. To reduce uncertainty and provide stability, allocations should be adjusted to better reflect

historic use by sector. The basis for determining sector allocations will be catch history as well as consideration of socio-economic and community factors.

As other fisheries in the BSAIMA and GOA are

incrementally rationalized, historical participants in

the BSAIMA Pacific cod fishery may be put at a disadvantage. Each sector in the BSAIMA Pacific cod

fishery currently has different degrees of license

requirements and levels of participation. Allocations

to the sector level are a necessary step on the path

towards comprehensive rationalization. Prompt

action is needed to maintain stability in the BSAIMA

Pacific cod fisheries. 

72 Fed. Reg. at 5657. In pursuing socioeconomic factors, the

North Pacific Council stated that it was particularly interested

in expanding entry-level, local opportunities to fish cod for

coastal Alaskan communities that may be under-represented

due to the high fixed cost barrier to entry present in other fishing methods. Id.

The Council aimed to allocate Pacific cod based on the

average of catch history. The pre-A85 and post-A85 allocations can be summarized as follows (all numbers are a percentage of TAC):

1228 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
SECTOR Pre-A85 A85 Average Recent Average

Retained Harvest Retained

(1995-2003) Harvest

(2000-2003)

Jig 2.0 1.4 0.1 0.1

Hook-and- 0.7 2.0 0.4 0.7

line/pot-CV

Hook-and-line CP 40.8 48.7 49.1 49.4

Pot CV (60 ft +) 7.6 8.4 8.6 9.0

AFA Trawl CP 2.2 1.5

23.5 2.3

Non-AFA Trawl 13.4 13.4 16.0

CP

Trawl CV 23.5 22.1 24.0 21.6

72 Fed. Reg. at 5659, Table 3: Current and Proposed Allocations of BSAIMA Pacific cod non-CDQ TAC and Average

Harvest Share by Sector (percent) (emphasis added). When it

began its analysis in 2003, the Council considered alternative

options for the data that should be used in determining the

historical catch. The Council selected the most expansive set

of years, choosing to analyze catch history data from 1995,

when allocations began, to 2003. In April 2006, the Council

voted to take final action and propose new sector allocations,

including providing the non-AFA trawl CP sector with a

13.4% share of the TAC. Fishermen’s points out that these

allocations have a significant financial impact on fisheries as

each percent of the TAC allocated represents approximately

$2 million in revenue. 

By that time further catch history data from 2004 and 2005

was available. The non-AFA trawl CP sector had an average

of 17.7 percent of the retained harvest between 2004 and

2005. 72 Fed. Reg. at 5660, Table 4: Average Share (percent)

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1229
of Retained Harvest 2004-2005. Whereas the data from 1995

to 2003 was processed based on fish tickets, which issue only

upon sale or transfer of fish, the 2004 and 2005 data was

extrapolated from observer estimates. Further, observer coverage varied between sectors. Id.

The Council disregarded the 2004 and 2005 data because

it considered it inequitable to favor the trawl CP sector, which

in response to high market demand for Pacific cod and in

anticipation of A85’s evaluation of usage, had been able,

thanks to its prior over-allocation, to increase steadily its

Pacific cod fishing, while other sectors which suffered from

under-allocation, remained limited to smaller usage. Thus, the

Council “considered [the 2004-2005] data . . . to illustrate

recent harvest trends,” but did not rely upon them in establishing allocations.

Consistent with the problem statement, the Council allocated higher than the average historical catch to those sectors

that would most benefit coastal Alaskan communities: the

small fixed gear sector, 77% of which is comprised of residents of coastal Alaskan communities, and the jig sector,

which uses coastal processing facilities. In justifying the nonAFA trawl CP sector’s allocation, the Council also noted that

the trawl sectors had never “funded” allocation increases for

the entry-level small fixed gear CV sector above its historic

average, that CV sectors contribute more to the economy of

coastal communities than CP sectors (because of onshore processing), and that CV sectors had suffered greater impacts

from restrictions to protect Stellar sea lions.

Re-allocations also occurred based on the need to preserve

a “directed cod” fishery for various sectors. The term “directed” fishery refers to whether vessels intend to catch that particular species of fish or whether the fish is caught

incidentally. Fish caught incidentally are known as “bycatch.”

Vessels previously would discard the dead or dying bycatch

back into the sea although some were kept for sale. Because

1230 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
of the waste and detrimental environmental effects of this

practice, MSA National Standard 9 requires that bycatch be

minimized. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(9). Accordingly, in 1997, the

NMFS required vessels to retain all, or specified amounts of,

pollock and Pacific cod, by adopting Amendment 49 for the

BSAIMA FMP. 62 Fed. Reg. 63, 880, 63, 890 (Dec. 3, 1997)

(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 679.27). In proposing A85, the Council sought to allocate enough Pacific cod TAC to the AFA

trawl CP sector so it could maintain the “minimum necessary”

for a directed Pacific cod fishery. The Council was motivated

by the fact that the AFA trawl CP sector was efficient in its

Pacific cod fishing, with a higher percentage of its allocation

being used up by directed fishing. The Council also made the

decision to favor those with less bycatch by counting pre1997 historical catch data even though that data did not

include bycatch.

Fishermen’s contends that the North Pacific Council allocated Pacific cod TAC to the AFA trawl CP sector as part of

an impermissible and arbitrary political compromise in order

to ensure that one sole vessel of that fleet, the Katie Ann, had

a directed cod fishery. Councilman Fuglvog expressed concern about whether the AFA trawl CP sector allocation would

be sufficient to allow the Katie Ann to continue its directed

cod fishery. In response, Councilwoman Salveson stated that

“this action is intended to . . . establish allocation to better

reflect historic use by sector . . . not to provide for a directed

fishery for any one vessel.” Final allocations to the AFA trawl

CP sector were within the range calculated based on historic

use.

On February 7, 2007, the NMFS published its proposed

rule and request for comments. 72 Fed. Reg. at 5654. On September 4, 2007, it promulgated its final rule and published the

comments and responses. 72 Fed. Reg. at 50788. There were

numerous comments addressing the allocation of cod to nonAFA trawl CPs. See, e.g., 72 Fed. Reg. at 50793 (Comment

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1231
3), 50795 (Comments 6 and 9), 50796 (Comment 11), 50798

(Comment 16).

On October 4, 2007, Fishermen’s filed this action in federal

court challenging A85 under the judicial review powers over

regulations promulgated under the MSA, including FMPs,

granted by the APA. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1) & (2). The district court upheld Secretary’s decision in a summary judgment

order on December 5, 2008. It held that (1) A85’s allocations

were rationally connected to the objectives set forth in the

problem statement and resulted in a fair and equitable result

as required by National Standard 4; (2) the inclusion of the

1995-1997 years and exclusion of the 2004-2005 years in calculating historical catch data was not a failure to consider the

best scientific information available under National Standard

2; (3) the allocation to the AFA trawl CP sector was not a

political compromise merely for the benefit of the Katie Ann;

and (4) the allocations did not create an adverse impact in violation of the AFA by robbing the non-AFA trawl CP sector

to benefit the AFA trawl CP sector. Fishermen’s has timely

appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1291and 1294(1).

II

A

Fishermen’s contends that the Secretary violated National

Standard 2 and National Standard 4 in promulgating A85.

Further, Fishermen’s contends that A85 creates an adverse

impact on non-AFA vessels in violation of the AFA.

“This Court reviews a district court’s decision to grant

summary judgment de novo with all facts read in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Yakutat, Inc. v.

Gutierrez, 407 F.3d 1054, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 641 n.22 (9th Cir.

2004)). In reviewing regulations promulgated under the

1232 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
Magnuson Act, “our only function is to determine whether the

Secretary [of Commerce] ‘has considered the relevant factors

and articulated a rational connection between the facts found

and the choice made.’ ” Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84

F.3d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wash. Crab Producers, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 924 F.2d 1438, 1440-41) (9th Cir.

1990)). “We determine only if the Secretary acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in promulgating such regulations.” Alliance Against IFQs, 84 F.3d at 345. “Under the

APA, we will reverse the agency action only if the action is

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law.” Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 743

(9th Cir. 2004), amended by 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005).

B

[1] To be valid A85 must be consistent with the National

Standards presented in the Magnuson-Stevens Act. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1854; see Yakutat, 407 F.3d at 1058 (The Fishery Management Plans . . . must be consistent with the “national standards” described in the Magnuson Act.”). The regulations

implementing National Standard 4 require that motives for

new allocations be “justified in terms of the objectives of the

FMP.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.325(c)(3)(i)(A). Fishermen’s argues

that, because A85 reduces the non-AFA trawl CP allocation

below Fishermen’s definition of “historical use,” the changed

quota fails to meet the stated objectives. Fishermen’s contrasts the problem statement, which points out that pre-A85

allocations did not reflect “actual dependency and use,” with

the new regulations that reduce their share below their actual

average usage in 2004 and 2005. 72 Fed. Reg. at 5657. Fishermen’s narrowly focuses on this one clause at the expense of

a more comprehensive, coherent reading of the entire statement. While the final problem statement does begin describing, among other concerns, a discrepancy between allocations

and actual use, it specifically provides that the basis for future

allocations “will be catch history” and other socioeconomic

considerations. 72 Fed. Reg. at 5657. Fishermen’s was alloFISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1233
cated an annual TAC that was the average of their historic

usage of Pacific cod from 1995 to 2003. In terms of socioeconomic and community factors, their share was reduced in part

to fund the entry-level small fixed gear sector of coastal Alaskan residents.

[2] Fishermen’s also attempts a novel combination of

National Standard 4 of the MSA with 211(a) of the AFA.

Fishermen’s points out that National Standard 4 forbids

excessive privileges to one group while 211(a) forbids

adverse impacts caused by any unfair advantages to the AFA

vessels. Fishermen’s then would have us conclude that A85,

by shifting percentage points in its final allocation from the

non-AFA trawl CP sector to the AFA trawl CP sector, violated both. The Council, however, may under National Standard 4, “impose a hardship on one group if its outweighed by

the total benefits received by another group or groups.” Id.

§ 600.325(c)(3)(i)(B). As noted above, part of the reduction

was due to socioeconomic factors leading the Council to fund

sectors that favor growth for coastal Alaskan residents. Further, whatever shift in percentage points that could be

“traced” from the non-AFA trawl CP sector to the AFA trawl

CP sector was rationally justified by the need to preserve the

more efficient directed cod fishery of the latter. As for 211(a),

we discuss it separately and do not believe there is any statutory confluence that requires special treatment of 211(a) with

National Standard 4. 

Fishermen’s attempts to combine the requirements of AFA

211(a) with National Standard 4, by claiming the NMFS was

required to analyze specifically any adverse impact A85

would have on the non-AFA trawl CP sector caused by benefitting the AFA trawl CP sector. As explained below, however, if anything, A85 had an adverse impact on the AFA

trawl CP sector, thus, there can be no reasonable expectation

that the NMFS should analyse a non-existent harm. 

[3] Fishermen’s has failed to demonstrate that the allocation, although disadvantageous to them, was not fair or equi1234 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
table in furthering the beneficial objectives of the FMP. Thus,

A85 comports with National Standard 4.

[4] Fishermen’s makes a related argument that the NMFS

failed to analyze the impact of the allocations under National

Standard 4 by failing to consider its “potential” loss of a

directed cod fishery. The regulations state that “the Council

should make an initial estimate of the relative benefits and

hardships imposed by the allocation.” 50 C.F.R.

§ 600.325(c)(3)(i)(B). However, the EA/RIR/IFRA demonstrates that the Council did consider the impact of the changes

on the non-AFA trawl CP sector. For example, the Council

considered the extent limitations on bycatch would prevent a

direct cod fishery for the trawl sector, and noted that separate

allowances would prevent the non-AFA trawl sector from

closing down directed cod fishing for the entire trawl sector.

Further, the responses to the comments published with the

final rule show that the NMFS determined that, even under a

“worst case scenario,” the non-AFA trawl CP sector would be

able to maintain a directed cod fishery. See 72 Fed. Reg. at

50799, 50801. The National Standards do not require any particular outcome with respect to allocations; rather, they provide a framework for the Council’s analysis. There is nothing

in the MSA that guarantees Fishermen’s a directed cod fishery. Fishermen’s is to a certain extent a victim of its own success, because the greater its operations for other fish species,

inevitably the greater its incidental bycatch of Pacific cod.

One of the BSAIMA FMP’s objectives under the MSA is

“conservation and management.” Accordingly, under

National Standard 9, the FMPs, and the amendments thereto,

must minimize bycatch. The Council is not tied down by the

need to allocate in order to preserve directed cod fisheries for

participants with high levels of bycatch. The Council fulfilled

its obligations under the framework by analyzing the impact

of the new allocations on the non-AFA trawl CP sector. Thus,

none of the Secretary’s actions on this issue were arbitrary or

capricious. Alliance Against IFQs, 84 F. 3d at 345.

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1235
C

[5] Under National Standard 2, conservation and management measures “shall be based upon the best scientific information available,” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2), which, “includes,

but is not limited to, information of a biological, ecological,

economic, or social nature.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(b)(1). Fishermen’s argues that the Council failed to consider the most

relevant data in developing the new allocations. Fishermen’s

asserts that the Council considered data that was too old and

no longer relevant to reallocation information, and failed to

consider the relevance of the most recent available data. Fishermen’s further argues that instead of basing the decision on

“scientific analysis” it was an “arbitrary political compromise.” 

[6] Fishermen’s maintains that the older catch history data

analyzed by the Council was irrelevant. They argue that any

data collected before 1998 is particularly misleading because

catch regulations changed in 1998. In support, Fishermen’s

point out that in A80, a concurrent amendment designed to

reorganize all species fishing in the BSAIMA, pre-1998 data

was ignored because there was a concern the data would fail

to best “represent the traditional harvest patterns of the [A]80

sector.” 72 Fed. Reg. at 52688 (A80 Final Rule). The Council,

however, stated its rationale for including the older data in

A85. The year of 1995 was selected as a starting point

because it immediately followed the first Magnuson-Stevens

Act allocations. The Council acknowledged that there were

intervening events that may have changed the circumstances

of the allocations, in particular the 1998 AFA legislation and

2001 attempts to protect the Steller sea lion. For example, the

passing of the AFA legislation pushed the non-AFA trawl

sector into increased cod fishing. The AFA, however, pushed

all non-AFA Pacific cod participants into increased Pacific

cod use, not just Fishermen’s. The key difference is that

because Fishermen’s belonged to a sector with one of the

most significant over-allocations prior to A85, it was one of

1236 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
the few who could increase its usage without being limited by

its allocation in response to the AFA. If the Council focused

exclusively on post 1999 data, it would benefit Fishermen’s

unfairly while ignoring long-term harvest trends for the industry as a whole not just Fishermen’s sector. 

[7] Further, the data Fishermen’s disputed was not the only

National Standard 2 data the Council was allowed to rely on

in making its decision, considering the objectives of the FMP.

The Council also made reallocations based on sociological

data, which pointed towards increasing allocations to the

small gear sector that consisted mainly of coastal Alaskan residents. 

[8] Finally, it is evident that the Council examined several

potential data sets before selecting the range including 1995

to 1998. Even with regards to the selection of the years in

question, the Council determined that a smaller set of years

would produce skewed results based on a too narrow view of

market demand for cod in those years. In other words,

although the AFA legislation and Stellar sea lion protection

measures were significant variables that did threaten to render

pre-1998 data misleading, the Council “justified its choice,”

as required by 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(b)(1), to include the pre1998 data because it believed a host of other variables were

influencing catch history and a more accurate representation

could only be reached by broadening the set of years to

include all years with comparable data since allocations

began. Ultimately, any selection of data inherently places one

party at a disadvantage; Fishermen’s has failed to demonstrate

how this selection of this data was arbitrary or capricious. The

Council stated a permissible rationale for including pre-1998

data and nothing in the record of the Council’s deliberations

on this issue appears capricious or contrary to the evidence.

See Yakutat, Inc., 407 F.3d at 1067 (Council “drew a rational

line” by omitting 1999 from analysis of which boats to

include in Pacific cod fishery because those boats omitted as

a result not dependent on that one species).

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1237
D

[9] Fishermen’s argues that the Council failed adequately

to consider data from the two most recent catch years (2004

and 2005). Fishermen’s relies on the requirement that FMP’s

must incorporate new information as it becomes available

where practicable. 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(b)(2). The Secretary

concluded that, “[t]he Council and NMFS considered more

recent (2004 and 2005) harvest data from the NMFS catch

accounting database in reviewing harvest history to illustrate

recent harvest trends as that information became available,

but it was not available in the same format as the data from

1995 through 2003.” See 72 Fed. Reg. at 50793-94 (Comment

3 and Response). For 1995 to 2003, the Council had data from

Federal Weekly Production Reports and Alaska Department

of Fish and Game fish tickets. The NMFS noted that using a

set based on retained harvest from 1995-2003 was more accurate than using data from later years because the latter is

based on observer estimates. 72 Fed. Reg. at 50793. To use

observer data would be inequitable because certain sectors,

such as the AFA trawl CP group, are observed more carefully

than others who would have to rely on extrapolated data. Id.

In fact, fish tickets only became available in raw data form for

the 2004 and 2005 years in March 2006, a month prior to the

Council issuing its proposed allocations. Given the time

needed to process the information, and the fact that the Council’s deliberations were coming to a close after more than two

years, incorporating the new information was not “practicable” and so need not have been considered under National

Standard 2. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(b) (if new information

becomes available between initial drafting and NMFS review,

it “should be incorporated into the final FMP where practicable.”) (emphasis added).

The Secretary also contends that the Council did take into

account data for 2004 and 2005, even if those numbers did not

form the basis for the final historical catch numbers. As a

review of the Secretarial Review Draft of A85 demonstrates,

1238 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
data from 2004 and 2005 was analyzed. The Council noted

that the non-AFA trawl CP sector had a harvest share in 2004

that was greater than any other year. Id. at 273. However, the

NMFS noted that, despite this increase in harvest, the higher

2004 and 2005 numbers did not mean that the combined trawl

CP sector was catching its entire allocation. 72 Fed. Reg. at

50794. In part, the Council discounted this recent data

because of unusually high market demand for Pacific cod in

those years, as well as “the likelihood of competition for

Pacific cod among sectors in anticipation of this action.”

Because of its prior over-allocation, Fishermen’s belonged to

a sector that could increase its usage in response to these

incentives, unlike other sectors. The Secretary provided a

rational explanation for the Council’s action: the Council did

not wish to reward Fishermen’s sector for their prior overallocation by perpetuating it while telling the other sectors

they did not need bigger allocations because they had maximized their current allocations.

[10] The record shows that the Council also considered the

best available sociological data, which indicated that TAC

percentage needed to be subtracted from other sectors to benefit the coastal Alaskan communities. The need to maintain

consistency in data and treat all sectors equally is an ample

justification for using the 1995-2003 data. It was not practicable to include the 2004-2005 data. The Secretary’s decision in

this regard was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

E

[11] Fishermen’s point to the Council’s treatment of the

Katie Ann, an AFA trawl CP vessel, for the argument that

inappropriate political considerations interfered with rational

decision making. Regulations that are “a product of pure

political compromise” in the absence of scientific justification

will generally be viewed as arbitrary and capricious. Midwater Trawlers Co-operative v. Dep’t of Commerce, 282 F.3d

710, 720-21 (9th Cir. 2002) (specific allocation of fishing

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1239
rights to Indian tribe not based on scientific rationale in violation of MSA). While the Council had considered allocating

1.5% of the TAC to the AFA trawl CP sector, they increased

the quota to this sector to 2.3% based, in part, on the concern

that the Katie Ann would not be able to maintain its directed

cod fishery. In other words, absent an increased allocation,

ships like the Katie Ann would only be able to catch cod as

bycatch during their directed pollock fishery. A Council

member noted there were “negotiations and discussions” that

led to the increased allocation. Reading the record as a whole,

it is clear that the Council considered not just the Katie Ann

in the context of maintaining a directed cod fishery, but the

sector as a whole and its historic use. As the Secretary points

out, however, ample rational and scientific reasons supported

the final allocations, which reflected Fishermen’s historic

usage. In fact, the agency acted consistently with its original

position, which had always been to allocate the AFA trawl

sector between 0.9% and 3.7% and the non-AFA trawl CP

sector between 12.7% and 16.2%, based on historical usage.

Furthermore, the AFA trawl CP sector, with a much smaller

allocation than the non-AFA trawl CP sector, was managing

to maintain a directed cod fishery because it had less bycatch

as a proportion of its Pacific cod fishery. Under National

Standard 9, which requires bycatch to be minimized, the

Council’s decision to ensure the continuance of the directed

cod fishery had practical conservation and management

objectives, not political ones. Thus, political concerns did not

predominate as they did in Midwater Trawlers Co-operative,

282 F.3d at 720-21, where the final agency decision was pure

political compromise, as the agency did not engage in any scientific analysis.

F

[12] The AFA requires that the Council shall manage the

BSAIMA in a way to protect non-AFA vessels from adverse

impacts of the directed pollock monopoly. 16 U.S.C. § 1851,

1240 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
note, AFA 211(a).1

 Fishermen’s claims A85 has such an

adverse impact because it “robs” the non-AFA trawl CP sector to benefit the AFA trawl CP sector. Before A85, the trawl

CPs were one sector allocated 23.5% of the TAC. See 72 Fed.

Reg. at 5659. The AFA itself protected the non-AFA trawl CP

sector by allocating to the AFA trawl CP sector a “sideboard”

limit of 6.1% of Pacific cod catch. AFA § 211(b)(2)(A). A85

effectively replaces this protection by splitting the two sectors

and allocating each a set allocation, with the non-AFA trawl

CP sector limited to 13.4% and the AFA trawl CP sector to

2.3%. The substance of Fishermen’s argument is that A85

causes “adverse impact” as defined in 211(a) because the historic catch of the non-AFA sector was higher than its A85

allocation whereas the historic catch of the AFA sector was

lower than its A85 allocation. Fishermen’s argument that they

were injured in violation of 211(a) ignores the fact that 211(a)

as defined in the AFA permitted greater impact by the AFA

sector on the non-AFA sector than A85 effectuates. The AFAimposed sideboard permitted the AFA sector to fish for 26%2

of the total Pacific cod of the trawl CP sector, whereas of the

total post-A85 allocation, the AFA trawl CP sector had only

14.6%3 of the total. Thus, the AFA trawl CP sector’s supposed encroachment on the non-AFA trawl CP sector was

actually greatly reduced by A85 as compared to the AFA

itself, which is the source of rights Fishermen’s would supposedly have us rely on. The question is not whether the A85

limits on AFA vessels are less restrictive than historical

usage, but whether they are greater than the impact legally

1Fishermen’s attempts to combine the requirements of AFA 211(a) with

National Standard 4, by claiming the NMFS was required to analyze specifically any adverse impact A85 would have on the non-AFA trawl CP

sector caused by benefitting the AFA trawl CP sector. As explained

below, however, if anything, A85 had an adverse impact on the AFA trawl

CP sector, thus, there can be no reasonable expectation that the NMFS

should analyse a non-existent harm. 

2

6.1% divided by 23.5%. 

3

2.3% divided by (2.3% + 13.4%). 

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1241
allowed by the AFA. They are not. Hence, A85 does not run

afoul of the American Fisheries Act.

CONCLUSION

[13] We are persuaded that the Secretary did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in approving Amendment A85. As we

noted in Alliance, “[t]he Secretary is allowed, under [controlling precedent], to sacrifice the interest of some groups of

fishermen for the benefit as the Secretary sees it of the fishery

as a whole.” 84 F. 3d at 350. Here the interests of Fishermen’s

were sacrificed for the benefit of the fishery as a whole, as the

Secretary favored sectors that benefitted coastal Alaskan residents, and selected data that would reduce prior unintended

favoritism to the non-AFA trawl CP sector, to which Fishermen’s belonged.

AFFIRMED.

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The American Fisheries Act of 1998 (“AFA”) granted a

lucrative monopoly in pollock fishing rights to 20 vessels

operating in the BSAIMA (described as “AFA trawl CP vessels”). The AFA compensated fishing vessels not favored by

the pollock monopoly (“non-AFA vessels”) by charging the

North Pacific Council with protecting them from the monopoly’s adverse effects. Specifically, the Council’s Fishery Management Plans (“FMPs”) must “protect other fisheries under

its jurisdiction and the participants in those fisheries, including processors, from adverse impacts caused by this Act or

fishery cooperatives in the directed pollock fishery.” 16

U.S.C. § 1851, note, AFA § 211(a). I conclude that Amendment 85 (“A85”) violates this protective mandate by directly

allocating Pacific cod to the AFA sector to the detriment of

the non-AFA trawl CP sector. Additionally, the Council’s use

1242 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
of pre-AFA data to calculate “catch history” violates National

Standard 2 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (“MSA”), a requirement that FMPs employ “the best scientific information available.” 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2). As a result, I respectfully

dissent.

I. AFA § 211(a)

In A85, the Secretary and the Council abdicated their

responsibility to protect non-AFA vessels by granting the

already privileged AFA trawl CP sector, for the first time, a

direct allocation of the total authorized catch (“TAC”) of

Pacific cod. That allocation was made at the expense of,

among others, the non-AFA trawl CP sector, which of necessity relies more heavily on Pacific cod after being pushed out

of the pollock fishery by the AFA. 

Specifically, A85 grants the AFA trawl CP sector a direct

allocation of 2.3% of the Pacific cod TAC — a portion well

above that sector’s historic Pacific cod harvest. At the same

time, A85 reduces the non-AFA trawl CP sector’s allocation

to 13.4% of the Pacific cod TAC — a portion well below that

sector’s recent harvests and below even its historic average as

calculated by the Council. (As discussed below, there is reason to question the Council’s calculation.) The ahistoric character of the new allocations calls into question the Council’s

professed goal for A85 of “better reflect[ing] historic use by

sector.” More importantly, by any reasonable measure the

new allocations adversely impact the non-AFA trawl CP sector at the same time that they benefit the sector already

favored with the pollock monopoly granted under the AFA.

The majority opinion seeks to rebut this assessment of

A85’s adverse impact on the non-AFA trawl CP sector by

comparing the 6.1% “sideboard” limit formerly imposed on

the AFA trawl CP sector’s Pacific cod harvest to the smaller

allocation made by A85 to the AFA sector. Supra at 1241.

That misinterprets the function of the sideboard limit, which

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1243
imposed a hard cap on the AFA trawl CP sector’s harvest

rather than granting it a direct allocation like the one the sector now enjoys under A85. The majority opinion’s statement

that “[t]he AFA-imposed sideboard permitted the AFA sector

to fish for 26% of the total Pacific cod [allocated to the combined] trawl CP sector” is imprecise and misleading. Id.

Instead, the 6.1% sideboard allowed the AFA sector to harvest no more than 26% of the combined trawl CP sector’s

allocation; it did not actually guarantee the AFA sector any

fraction of the total trawl CP harvest. Prior to A85, the AFA

sector and the non-AFA trawl CP sector were treated as one

group, subject to a single allocation. As the Secretary

acknowledges, “[p]rior to A85, the non-AFA trawl CP sector

could theoretically [have] harvest[ed] the entire 23.5% allocation of the Pacific cod TAC that it shared with the AFA trawl

CP sector (because the AFA trawl CP sector’s 6.1% sideboard

was a limit rather than an exclusive allocation).”

In fact, the AFA sector never came close to harvesting

6.1% of the Pacific cod TAC. Between 1995 and 2003, the

years on which the Council based its reallocation, the AFA

sector’s average harvest was just 1.7% of the TAC. By contrast, the non-AFA CP trawl sector’s average harvest during

the 1995-2003 period was 13.6% of the TAC. The allocations

assigned to those sectors by A85 are 2.3% and 13.4%, respectively. Thus, even using the range of years the Council relied

on to calculate “catch history” as the basis for comparison,

A85 assigned the AFA sector a share of the Pacific cod fishery above historic levels while curtailing the non-AFA sector’s Pacific cod fishing rights below its historic share.

If attention is focused on the years since adoption of the

AFA, A85’s adverse impact on the non-AFA trawl CP sector

is even worse. In post-AFA years, between 1998 and 2003,

the AFA sector’s average harvest of Pacific cod was just

1.5%, substantially lower than A85’s allocation of 2.3%. During those years the non-AFA trawl CP sector harvested 15.7%

of TAC, yet A85 allocates only 13.4% to that group.

1244 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
These numbers contradict the majority opinion’s conclusion that “A85 had an adverse impact on the AFA trawl CP

sector” or that the non-AFA sector is complaining of a “nonexistent harm.” Supra at 1241 n.1. Instead, A85 grants the

favored AFA sector the additional boon of independence from

the formerly combined trawl CP sector’s Pacific cod allocation with a margin for expansion beyond its historic Pacific

cod harvest, and it inflicts on the non-AFA trawl CP sector an

unmitigated loss of the Pacific cod market share (both allocated and actual) that sector cultivated in the years following

its exclusion by the AFA from the pollock fishery. In sum,

A85’s redistribution of the Pacific cod TAC imposes on the

non-AFA trawl CP section an adverse impact that § 211(a)

requires the Council to guard against.

II. The Relevant History

The Council adopted the purpose of “better reflect[ing] historic use by sector” and declared “catch history” as one of

three bases for determining sector allocations. Having done

so, the Council was required by National Standard 2 to use

“the best scientific information available” in furtherance of its

stated goals. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2). Determining what time

period to consider as relevant history was obviously important

in evaluating historic use. The Council calculated catch history based on the years 1995 to 2003. That selection brings to

mind Mark Twain’s observation: 

Figures often beguile me, particularly when I have

the arranging of them myself; in which case the

remark attributed to Disraeli would often apply with

justice and force: “There are three kinds of lies: lies,

damned lies and statistics.”

1

1Mark Twain, Chapters from My Autobiography, 185 North American

Review, No. DCXVIII., July 5, 1907, at 465, 471. There is doubt as to

whether the attribution of the saying to Disraeli is correct. 

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1245
The AFA was adopted in 1998. Prior to that time, pollock

was not reserved to the chosen few fishing vessels. After the

AFA changed the rules of the game by granting the AFA sector its pollock monopoly, other fishermen were required to

focus on other species, notably including Pacific cod. To no

one’s surprise, in later years, when they couldn’t catch pollock, they caught more cod. Yet the Council defined “catch

history” to include several years before the AFA changed the

rules.

The Council’s problem statement explained its reliance on

pre-AFA data by stating that

Consideration of just three or four recent years does

not show dependency of the sectors over time and

may be unduly biased because of increased market

demand for Pacific cod in recent years for some

products, potential decreased participation due to

BSAI crab rationalization, and the likelihood of

competition for Pacific cod among sectors in anticipation of this action.

But these post-AFA market stimuli should make pre-AFA

data less, not more, useful in reallocating Pacific cod going

forward. Most importantly, the passage of the AFA in 1998

forced the non-AFA trawl CP sector to expand its Pacific cod

operations to compensate for its exclusion from the pollock

fishery, as the TAC shares discussed above confirm. That sector is still excluded from the pollock fishery by the AFA. The

fishermen cannot go back to 1995-1998 circumstances. The

Council should not pretend that they can, but that is exactly

what A85 does. Relying on pre-AFA data to calculate the

catch history of post-AFA players, without making any effort

to adjust for the impact of the AFA, is manifestly unreasonable.

The decisions of the Secretary and the Council are entitled

to great deference, but that deference is not unchecked. I

1246 FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE
would hold that in curtailing the non-AFA vessels’ rights to

harvest Pacific cod while expanding those rights in AFA vessels, the adoption of A85 violated § 211(a) of the AFA, and

in using pre-AFA data to calculate “historic” catch it violated

National Standard 2 of the MSA.

FISHERMEN’S FINEST v. LOCKE 1247