If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 18, 2020

v No. 346512

Wayne Circuit Court

SHARON PATTERSON, LC No. 03-011321-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: METER, P.J., and FORT HOOD and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In 2004, defendant Sharon Patterson was convicted of first-degree, premeditated murder, 

MCL 750.316(1)(a), as a juvenile and was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence without the 

possibility of parole.1 Almost a decade into serving her sentence, the United States Supreme Court 

decided Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), holding that 

“mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.” “In response to Miller, our 

Legislature enacted MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a, which address life-without-parole offenses 

committed by minors and the option of imprisonment for a term of years.” People v Meadows, 

319 Mich App 187, 189; 899 NW2d 806 (2017), citing 2014 PA 22. “MCL 769.25a applie[s] to 

closed cases for which appeals had been exhausted or were no longer available, but only if the 

Michigan or United States Supreme Court were to hold in the future that Miller was retroactively 

applicable.” Id. In Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US ___; 136 S Ct 718, 732; 193 L Ed 2d 599 

 

1 Although this Court denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal an order denying 

her motion for relief from judgment, People v Patterson, unpublished order of the Court of 

Appeals, issued September 20, 2011 (Docket No. 303425), defendant did not otherwise appeal. 

We note that this Court issued an opinion affirming her codefendant’s convictions and sentences 

in People v Collier, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 12, 2005 

(Docket No. 255125). 
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(2016), the United States Supreme Court did exactly that, holding that Miller was to be applied 

retroactively.

Based on Miller, Montgomery, and MCL 769.25a, defendant was scheduled for 

resentencing. In resentencing briefs, defendant argued in favor of a 25-to-60-year sentence, and 

the prosecution argued in favor of a 40-to-60-year sentence. See MCL 769.25(9). The 

resentencing judge ultimately resentenced defendant to a term of 40 to 60 years’ imprisonment, 

the maximum amount of time for a defendant being resentenced in such a situation under Michigan 

law. Defendant now contends that the trial court did not adequately consider the distinctive 

attributes of youth, and that, in light of the many factors attributable to defendant’s status as a 

minor at the time of the murder, the resentencing judge should have been more lenient. We 

disagree. 

A trial court’s ultimate determination regarding what sentence to impose is reviewed for 

an abuse of discretion. People v Garay, 320 Mich App 29, 43-44; 903 NW2d 883 (2017), 

overruled in part on other grounds by People v Skinner, 502 Mich 89; 917 NW2d 292 (2018). “A 

trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and 

principled outcomes” or “when it makes an error of law.” People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 722-

723; 835 NW2d 399 (2013). 

At the resentencing hearing, the resentencing judge, who was assigned to the case in 2017, 

indicated that she intended to have defendant provide a statement, to have both attorneys argue, 

and then to announce her decision from the bench in a separate hearing to be scheduled several 

days later. At that second hearing, the resentencing judge began by indicating that she had 

reviewed this Court’s opinion in People v Wines, 323 Mich App 343; 916 NW2d 855 (2018), in 

which this Court generally held that, when resentencing a defendant who was originally sentenced 

to life in prison without the possibility of parole as a juvenile, courts should be guided by the 

objectives set forth in People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972), which, in turn, 

necessarily “take into account the attributes of youth, such as those described in Miller.” Wines, 

323 Mich App at 352. Thus, the resentencing judge explained, her decision took into account 

Wines, the Snow objectives, and the Miller factors, suggesting that she considered the “reformation 

of the offender” and the “protection of society,” which necessarily include an analysis of “youth’s 

‘diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,’ ” as well as the “punishment of the 

offender” and the “deterrence of others from committing like offenses,” which necessarily include 

an analysis of “the ‘dimish[ed] . . . penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences 

on juvenile offenders[.]” Id. at 351-352 (citations omitted). 

Defendant specifically argues that the resentencing judge placed too much emphasis on the 

statements contained in defendant’s allocution at resentencing rather than on the attributes and 

characteristics of youth. We note, however, that while Wines, 324 Mich App at 352, requires the 

trial court to “take into account the attributes of youth,” it does not require the trial court to consider 

youthful attributes in a vacuum as a blanket award of leniency. Consistent with our system of 

individualized sentencing, the trial court’s sentence should reflect the entirety of the circumstances 

surrounding the offense committed and the youthful offender who committed it. People v 

Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 474; 902 NW2d327 (2017); People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 
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461 NW2d 1 (1990).2 Moreover, we note that a trial court is required to consider updated 

information at resentencing. People v Triplett, 407 Mich 510, 515-516; 287 NW2d 165 (1980). 

See also Wines, 323 Mich App at 356 (Consideration of defendant’s postsentencing conduct and 

state of mind is . . . consistent with the rule that at resentencing, a trial court may consider the 

defendant’s conduct since his original sentencing.”). On this record, we cannot conclude that the 

trial court failed to consider the attributes of youth when sentencing defendant, or abused its 

discretion by failing to afford them adequate weight. 

Rather, the trial court did consider the attributes of youth but found that these attributes 

were not the basis for the crime and therefore did not warrant leniency during resentencing. And 

indeed, when, as here, the offender does not display the typical attributes of youth, the trial court 

is not required to treat the offense as a product of youth.3 More importantly, we agree with the 

trial court that defendant’s failure to express any remorse for her crime at the resentencing hearing 

indicated that her crime was not a product of any youthful characteristics; rather, the crime was an 

expression of innate character flaws which transcended defendant’s youth. These considerations 

were not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and instead, reflected the court’s 

thoughtful balancing of the circumstances surrounding the offender—both at the time of the 

offense and in the years since—and the offense. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood 

/s/ James Robert Redford 

 

2

It is also noteworthy that, consistent with the trial court’s observations, at the time of the offense, 

our Legislature considered persons of defendant’s age—17 years and four months—as adults for 

purposes of the penal code. Indeed, even under Miller and recent changes to our code, defendant 

was only some eight months from statutory adulthood. 

3 The trial court noted that defendant was living an adult lifestyle at the time of the offense, and 

that defendant likely would have “strenuously” argued that she was an adult at the time. We are 

not confident that thinking of oneself as an adult is necessarily at odds with the distinct attributes 

of youth. However, the trial court also relied on the incredibly brutal and grotesque nature of the 

crime—defendant was convicted of murdering an elderly woman by striking her multiple times in 

the back of the head with a claw hammer—to conclude that this crime was not a manifestation of 

her youth.