IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2021 WY 21

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2020

February 2, 2021

CHRISTOPHER TERRENCE 

COFFEY,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-20-0115

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County

The Honorable Kerri M. Johnson, Judge 

Representing Appellant:

Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. 

Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel

Representing Appellee:

Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 

General; Timothy P. Zintak, Assistant Attorney General; Darrell D. Jackson, 

Faculty Director, Ciara Slife, Student Director, and Edward T. Lopez, Student 

Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
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DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Christopher Coffey appeals the district court’s denial of his W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion 

for a sentence reduction. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] Mr. Coffey presents a single issue on appeal, which he states as follows:

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied 

Appellant’s motion to reduce sentence?

FACTS

[¶3] In 2018, the Wyoming Department of Family Services notified the Natrona County 

Sheriff’s Office that a minor, MC, reported that her father, Mr. Coffey, had sexually 

assaulted her. MC stated that he pulled off her clothing, made her get down on all fours, 

rubbed her chest and vagina, and placed her hands around his penis while he continued to 

rub her. During the assault, MC was in pain and she kicked and screamed. After a few 

minutes, Mr. Coffey stopped. 

[¶4] Mr. Coffey initially denied MC’s allegations, but after failing a polygraph 

examination, he confessed. He admitted that in 2010, when MC was six years old, he did 

as she reported and inserted a finger into her vagina. On May 21, 2018, the State filed an 

information against Mr. Coffey, which charged him with one count each of sexual abuse 

of a minor in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, and sexual 

abuse of a minor in the third degree. 

[¶5] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Coffey pled guilty to one count of second degree 

sexual abuse, and the State dismissed the other counts and agreed to cap its sentencing 

recommendation at fifteen years imprisonment. At sentencing, the State requested a 

sentence of thirteen and a half to fifteen years, and the court sentenced Mr. Coffey to a 

prison term of twelve to fifteen years. On February 12, 2019, the district court issued its 

final judgment and sentence. Mr. Coffey appealed, but that appeal was dismissed on his 

voluntary motion for dismissal.

[¶6] On April 6, 2020, Mr. Coffey filed a W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion for sentence reduction. 

In support of his motion, he cited the progress that he had made since his incarceration, his 

lack of a disciplinary record in prison, his plans for growth, and the support of his church 

community if he were released. He also attached multiple letters to show his progress and 

family and community support for his release. 
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[¶7] On April 14, 2020, the district court issued an order denying Mr. Coffey’s motion. 

The court noted that it had reviewed the motion and the court file, including Mr. Coffey’s 

background and criminal history detailed in the presentence investigation report, as well as 

the transcript of the sentencing hearing. The court concluded “that no sufficient showing 

has been made pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure to 

justify or require a modification of the Defendant’s sentence . . . .” Mr. Coffey timely 

appealed the denial of his motion to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] We review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 35(b) motion for sentence reduction as 

follows:

The district court has broad discretion in determining whether 

to reduce a defendant’s sentence, and we will not disturb its 

determination absent an abuse of discretion. The sentencing 

judge is in the best position to decide if a sentence modification 

is appropriate, and is free to accept or reject information 

submitted in support of a sentence reduction at its discretion. 

Our objective on review is not to weigh the propriety of the 

sentence if it falls within the sentencing range; we simply 

consult the information in front of the court and consider 

whether there was a rational basis from which the district court 

could reasonably draw its conclusion. Because of the broad 

discretion given to the district court in sentencing, and our 

significant deference on appeal, this Court has demonstrated 

many times in recent years that it is a very difficult bar for an 

appellant to leap seeking to overturn a sentencing decision on 

an abuse of discretion argument.

Mitchell v. State, 2020 WY 131, ¶ 7, 473 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Barrowes 

v. State, 2019 WY 8, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 1261, 1266 (Wyo. 2019)).

DISCUSSION

[¶9] Our rule governing motions for sentence reduction states in relevant part that:

A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, . . . within one 

year after the sentence is imposed or probation is revoked, or 

within one year after receipt by the court of a mandate issued 

upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, . . 

. . The court shall determine the motion within a reasonable 

time. Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to 
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a grant of probation shall constitute a permissible reduction of 

sentence under this subdivision. The court may determine the 

motion with or without a hearing.

W.R.Cr.P. 35(b).

[¶10] Mr. Coffey contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion because the information he provided in support of it showed that he had taken 

advantage of all opportunities to better himself and had behaved well in prison, and the 

State presented no opposition to the motion. He argues that this shows that the court failed 

to give the required consideration to the additional information that he provided and that 

the court’s only possible rationale for its decision was to punish. We disagree.

[¶11] First, nothing in Rule 35(b) requires the State to respond to a motion for sentence 

reduction. See W.R.Cr.P. 35(b). We therefore will not read anything into the State’s lack 

of a response, particularly since the district court ruled so quickly on the motion and did 

not itself give weight to the State’s lack of a response. Additionally, the court’s order 

indicates that it did consider Mr. Coffey’s motion and the supporting materials, and we do 

not require more than that.

The district court’s order denied the motion without detailing 

the judge’s decision process, but it did indicate that the court 

had considered the motion and the reasons urged in support of 

it, and that it was fully advised concerning it. The fact that the 

order does not describe the specific information Appellant 

provided in support of her request for a reduction does not 

establish an abuse of discretion. Boucher [v. State], [2012 WY 

145,] ¶ 12, 288 P.3d [427,] at 430 [(Wyo. 2012)]. Furthermore, 

this Court has elucidated that “[t]here is no authority in 

Wyoming requiring a sentencing court to demonstrate good 

cause in denying a Rule 35(b) motion.” Chapman [v. State],

[2015 WY 15,] ¶ 12, 342 P.3d [388,] at 392 [(Wyo. 2015)].

Hart v. State, 2016 WY 28, ¶ 11, 368 P.3d 877, 879 (Wyo. 2016). 

[¶12] “The purpose of Rule 35 is to give a convicted defendant a second round before the 

sentencing judge (a second bite at the apple as it were) and to give the judge the opportunity 

to reconsider the original sentence in light of any further information about the defendant.”

Mitchell, ¶ 11, 473 P.3d at 1258 (quoting Barrowes, ¶ 16, 432 P.3d at 1267). As we noted 

above, however, a sentencing court “is free to accept or reject information submitted in 

support of a sentence reduction at its discretion.” Mitchell, ¶ 7, 473 P.3d at 1257 (quoting 

Barrowes, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d at 1266). Additionally,
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[w]e have long held the view that it would be unwise to usurp 

what is properly a function of the district courts by finding an 

abuse of discretion in denying a sentence reduction motion 

simply because it was supported by evidence of a defendant’s 

commendable conduct while incarcerated.

Hart, ¶ 10, 368 P.3d at 879 (quoting Conkle v. State, 2013 WY 1, ¶ 14, 291 P.3d 313, 315 

(Wyo. 2013)).

[¶13] Finally, we find no basis for reversal in Mr. Coffey’s assertion that the district 

court’s sentence was aimed solely at punishing him to the exclusion of the other goals of a 

criminal sentence. We have said that “[t]he purpose of a sentence is one factor, among 

many, that goes into a sentencing decision, and it is the sentencing court that is in the best 

position to weigh that factor.” Hall v. State, 2018 WY 91, ¶ 12, 423 P.3d 329, 332 (Wyo. 

2018) (citing Cohee v. State, 2005 WY 50, ¶ 20, 110 P.3d 267, 274 (Wyo. 2005); Hart, ¶ 

7, 368 P.3d at 878). As long as a sentence falls within the permissible sentencing range, 

we will not reweigh its propriety. Mitchell, ¶ 7, 473 P.3d at 1257 (quoting Barrowes, ¶ 12, 

432 P.3d at 1266). Mr. Coffey’s sentence was within the sentencing range, and we 

therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of a reduction.

[¶14] Affirmed.