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65–053PDF 2011

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND SECURITY: 

EVALUATING TSA’S SPOT PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 

OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 6, 2011 

Serial No. 112–11 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Date of Hearing 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................... 18 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20 

Witnesses: 

Mr. Stephen Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26 

Mr. Larry Willis, Program Manager, Homeland Security Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 39 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 40 

Peter J. DiDomenica, Lieutenant Detective, Boston University Police 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 44 

Dr. Paul Ekman, Professor Emeritus of Psychology, University of California, 

San Francisco, and President and Founder, Paul Ekman Group, LLC 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 48 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 50 

Dr. Maria Hartwig, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, John 

Jay College of Criminal Justice 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 70 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 71 

Dr. Philip Rubin, Chief Executive Officer, Haskins Laboratories 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 79 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 80 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Mr. Stephen Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 114 

Mr. Larry Willis, Program Manager, Homeland Security Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security ........................................................................................................ 118 

Dr. Paul Ekman, Professor Emeritus of Psychology, University of California, 

San Francisco, and President and Founder, Paul Ekman Group, LLC .......... 127 
Page

IV 

Dr. Maria Hartwig, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, John 

Jay College of Criminal Justice .......................................................................... 130 

Dr. Philip Rubin, Chief Executive Officer, Haskins Laboratories ....................... 131 

Peter J. DiDomenica, Lieutenant Detective, Boston University Police ............... 134 

Appendix II: Additional Materials Submitted for the Record 

Mr. Stephen Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 140 
(1) 

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND SECURITY: 

EVALUATING TSA’S SPOT PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul C. Broun 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 
3 

1 Aviation Security: Efforts to validate TSA‘s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational 

Challenges, Government Accountability Office, May 2010. Available at http://www.gao.gov/ 

new.items/d10763.pdf 2 Ibid. 

3 Ibid. 

4 Congressional Budget Justification FY2012, Department of Homeland Security. 

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS & OVERSIGHT 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Behavioral Science and Security: 

Evaluating TSA’s SPOT Program 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2011

10:00 A.M.—12:00 P.M. 

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose 

The Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight meets on April 6, 2011 to examine the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to incorporate behavioral science into its transportation security architecture. The Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) has been criticized for failing to scientifically validate the 

Screening of Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT) program before operationally deploying it. SPOT is a TSA program that employs Behavioral Detection 

Officers (BDO) at airport terminals for the purpose of detecting behavioral based indicators of threats to aviation security. 

The hearing will examine the state of behavioral science as it relates to the detection of terrorist threats to the air transportation system, as well as its utility to 

identify criminal offenses more broadly. The hearing will examine several independent reports-one by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), two by the National Research Council, and a number of Defense and Intelligence Community advisory board reports on the state of behavioral science relative to the detection of emotion, deceit, and intent in controlled laboratory settings, as well as in an operational 

environment. The Subcommittee will evaluate the initial development of the SPOT 

program, the steps taken to validate the science that form the foundation of the program, as well as the capabilities and limitations of using behavioral science in a 

transportation setting. More broadly, the hearing will also explore the behavioral 

science research efforts throughout DHS. 

Background 

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 exposed a vulnerability in the nation’s air transportation system. In order to augment other screening processes and 

procedures, TSA conducted operational testing of behavior detection techniques at 

a limited number of airports in October 2003. 1 In 2007, TSA created new BDO positions as part of the SPOT program with the goal of identifying persons who may 

pose a potential security risk by using behavioral indicators such as stress, fear, or 

deception. 2

The indicators BDOs use form a checklist with corresponding values and thresholds. These indicators, values, and thresholds are used to assess passengers while 

in line awaiting security screening. When an individual displays behaviors or an appearance that exceeds a predetermined threshold, they are referred for additional 

screening. If, during the course of this secondary screening, individuals display behaviors that exceed another threshold, they are referred to law enforcement officers 

for further investigation. 

Initially established to detect terrorist threats to the aviation transportation system, 3 the program’s mission has since broadened to include the identification of behaviors indicative of criminal activity. 4 Critics of the program have argued that this 

expansion reflects the failure of the program to identify any terrorists, and therefore 

program success could only be quantified by broadening the goals to include crimi-
4 

5Weinberger, Sharon, ‘‘Intent to Deceive’’ Can the Science of Deception Detection Help to 

Catch Terrorists?’’ Nature, Vol. 465127, May 26, 2010, available at: http://www.nature.com/news/ 

2010/100526/pdf/465412a.pdf 6Supra n.1. 7Supra n.4. 8Supra n.1. 9 Ibid. 

10 Ibid. 

nal activity which has a higher rate of occurrence. 5 This may or may not be a fair 

critique based on the extremely small sample size that terrorists would represent. 

Regardless of the rationale for the program’s expanded scope, questions remain 

about whether indicators for terrorism are the same for criminal behavior. 

As of March 2010, TSA employed roughly 3,000 BDOs at approximately 161 air- ports at a cost of $212 million a year. 6 In the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request, the Department seeks to add 175 more BDOs with an increase of $21 million - a 9.5 % increase over current funding levels. 7 In total, the five year budget profile for the SPOT program accounts for roughly $1.2 billion. 8

Relevant Reviews 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

Aviation Security: Efforts to validate TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and 

Address Operational Challenges 

In May 2010, GAO issued a report titled ‘‘Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger 

Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to 

Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges’’ in response to a Congressional request to review the SPOT program. In preparing the report, GAO analyzed ‘‘(1) the extent to which TSA validated the SPOT program before deployment, 

(2) implementation challenges, and (3) the extent to which TSA measures SPOT’s 

effect on aviation security.’’ 9

GAO issued the following findings associated with its review: 

Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is in the process of validating some aspects of the SPOT program, TSA deployed SPOT nationwide 

without first validating the scientific basis for identifying suspicious passengers 

in an airport environment. A scientific consensus does not exist on whether behavior detection principles can be reliably used for counterterrorism purposes, 

according to the National Research Council of the National Academy of 

Sciences. According to TSA, no other large-scale security screening program 

based on behavioral indicators has ever been rigorously scientifically validated. 

DHS plans to review aspects of SPOT, such as whether the program is more 

effective at identifying threats than random screening. Nonetheless, DHS’s current plan to assess SPOT is not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment 

who pose a security risk. For example, factors such as the length of time BDOs 

can observe passengers without becoming fatigued are not part of the plan and 

could provide additional information on the extent to which SPOT can be effectively implemented. Prior GAO work has found that independent expert review 

panels can provide comprehensive, objective reviews of complex issues. Use of 

such a panel to review DHS’s methodology could help ensure a rigorous, scientific validation of SPOT, helping provide more assurance that SPOT is fulfilling its mission to strengthen aviation security. 10

Additionally, GAO found issues relating to performance metrics, data integrity, 

and reach-back capabilities as well. 

TSA is experiencing implementation challenges, including not fully utilizing the 

resources it has available to systematically collect and analyze the information 

obtained by BDOs on passengers who may pose a threat to the aviation system. 

TSA’s Transportation System Operations Center has the resources to investigate 

aviation threats but generally does not check all law enforcement and intelligence databases available to it to identify persons referred by BDOs. Utilizing 

existing resources would enhance TSA’s ability to quickly verify passenger identity and could help TSA to more reliably ‘‘connect the dots.’’ Further, most 

BDOs lack a mechanism to input data on suspicious passengers into a database 

used by TSA analysts and also lack a means to obtain information from the 

Transportation System Operations Center on a timely basis. TSA states that it 

is in the process of providing input capabilities, but does not have a time frame 
5 

11 Ibid. 12 Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, 

and Enhance Revenue, Government Accountability Office, March 2011, available at: http:// 

www.gao.gov/new.items/d11318sp.pdf 13 ‘‘Credibility Assessment at Portals,’’ Portals Committee Report, April 17, 2009, available at: 

http://truth.boisestate.edu/eyesonly/Portals/PortalsCommitteeReport.pdf 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 

for when this will occur at all SPOT airports. Providing BDOs, or other TSA 

personnel, with these capabilities could help TSA ‘‘connect the dots’’ to identify 

potential threats. 

Although TSA has some performance measures related to SPOT, it lacks outcome-oriented measures to evaluate the program’s progress toward reaching its 

goals. Establishing a plan to develop these measures could better position TSA 

to determine if SPOT is contributing to TSA’s strategic goals for aviation security. TSA is planning to enhance its evaluation capabilities in 2010 to more 

readily assess the program’s effectiveness by conducting statistical analysis of 

data related to SPOT referrals to law enforcement and associated arrests. 11

Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save 

Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue 

In March of 2011, GAO issued a report to Congress in response to a new statutory requirement that GAO identify federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives, either within departments or governmentwide, which have duplicative 

goals or activities. The report contained a section on SPOT and stated: 

Congress may wish to consider limiting program funding pending receipt of an 

independent assessment of TSA’s SPOT program. GAO identified potential 

budget savings of about $20 million per year if funding were frozen at current 

levels until validation efforts are complete. Specifically, in the near term, Congress could consider freezing appropriation levels for the SPOT program at the 

2010 level until the validation effort is completed. Assuming that TSA is planning to expand the program at a similar rate each year, this action could result 

in possible savings of about $20 million per year, since TSA is seeking about 

a $20 million increase for SPOT in fiscal year 2011. Upon completion of the 

validation effort, Congress may also wish to consider the study’s results-including the program’s effectiveness in using behavior-based screening techniques to 

detect terrorists in the aviation environment-in making future funding decisions 

regarding the program. 12

Credibility Assessment at Portals Report 

In April 2009, the Portals Committee issued a report for the Defense Academy 

for Credibility Assessment titled: ‘‘Credibility Assessment at Portals.’’ 13 The committee recognized the need for ‘‘advanced and accurate credibility assessment,’’ 14

which is described as ‘‘a decision making process whereby a communication is assessed as to its veracity.’’ The Portals Committee had the following to say about 

SPOT: 

‘‘The adoption of SPOT occurred despite the fact that no study in the peer-reviewed scientific literature suggests that accurate credibility assessments can be 

made from unstructured observations. Within SPOT it appears that the observers are attempting to assess airline passengers by casual observation of facial 

micro-expressions (Wilber & Nakashima, 2007). There are several problems 

with this. First, scientific research does not support the notion that microexpressions reliably betray concealed emotion (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). Second, 

whereas brief facial activity may reveal the purposeful manipulation of a felt 

emotion (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008), the problems of interpretation of such manipulation renders the approach useless for practical purposes. Third, the 

microexpression approach equates deception with manipulated emotion. This 

conceptual confusion obscures the fact that most forensically relevant lies are 

not lies about feelings but about actions in the past, present or future. In conclusion, the use of microexpressions to establish credibility is theoretically 

flawed and has not been supported by sound scientific research (Vrij, 2008).’’ 15

JASON 

Comprised of world renowned scientists, JASON advises the federal government 

on science and technology issues. The vast majority of its work is done at the re-
6 

16Supra n.5. 17 ‘‘Field Evaluation in the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Context,’’ National Research 

Council of the National Academies , 2010, available at: http://books.nap.edu/ 

openbook.php?recordlid=12854&page=R1 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 ?Field Evaluation in the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Context,? National Research 

Council of the National Academies, March 2010, available at: http:// 

www7.nationalacademies.org/bbcss/HighlightsField%20Evaluation%20in%20the%20Intelligence%20and%20Counterintelligence%20Context.pdf 21 ‘‘Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle against Terrorists - A Framework for Program Assessment,’’ National Research Council of the National Academies, 2008, available at: 

http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordlid=12452&page=1 22 Ibid. 

quest of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community, so its reports 

are typically classified. 

However, a 2010 Nature article that discusses the SPOT program in a piece on 

deception detection provides the following: ‘‘No scientific evidence exists to support 

the detection or inference of future behaviour, including intent,’ declares a 2008 report prepared by the JASON defense advisory group.’’ 16

National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies 

Workshop Summary on Field Evaluation in the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Context 

On September 22-23, 2009, the NRC’s Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences held a workshop on ‘‘the field evaluation of behavioral and cognitive 

sciences-based methods and tools for use in the areas of intelligence and counter intelligence.’’ 17 The workshop was sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency and 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The purpose of the workshop was 

to ‘‘discuss the best ways to take methods and tools from behavioral science and 

apply them to work in intelligence operations. More specifically, the workshop focused on the issue of field evaluation - the testing of these methods and tools in 

the context in which they will be used in order to determine if they are effective 

in real world settings.’’ 18

The NRC published a report in 2010 summarizing the presentations and discussions over the 2-day period. Participants of the workshop included NRC members 

and experts in the behavioral sciences and intelligence community. The goal of the 

workshop was ‘‘not to provide specific recommendations but to offer some insight - 

in large part through specific examples taken from other fields - into the sorts of 

issues that surround the area of field evaluations. The discussions covered such 

ground as the obstacles to field evaluation of behavioral science tools and methods, 

the importance of field evaluation, and various lessons learned from experience with 

field evaluation in other areas.’’ 19

While the report identified several obstacles, one of interest to this Subcommittee 

hearing is ‘‘the pressure to use new devices and techniques as soon as they become 

available, without waiting for rigorous validation. Because lives are at stake, those 

in the field often push to adopt new methods and tools as quickly as possible and 

before there has been time to evaluate them adequately. Once a method is in widespread use, anecdotal evidence can lead its users to believe in its effectiveness and 

to resist rigorous testing, which may show that it’s not as effective as they think.’’ 20

Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists - A Framework for 

Program Assessment 

From 2005 to 2007, the NRC’s 21-member Committee on Technical and Privacy 

Dimensions of Information for Terrorism Prevention and Other National Goals held 

several meetings to ‘‘examine the role of data mining and behavioral surveillance 

technologies in counterterrorism programs.’’ 21 The ensuing NRC report provides ‘‘a 

framework for making decisions about deploying and evaluating those [programs] 

and other information based programs on the basis of their effectiveness and associated risks to personal privacy.’’ 22

The report presented 13 conclusions and 2 broad recommendations. Of interest to 

this Subcommittee hearing are the following conclusions: 

• ‘‘Conclusion 3: Inferences about intent and/or state of mind implicate privacy 

issues to a much greater degree than do assessments or determinations of capability. 

Although it is true that capability and intent are both needed to pose a real 

threat, determining intent on the basis of external indicators is inherently a much 

more subjective enterprise than determining capability. Determining intent or 
7 

state of mind is inherently an inferential process, usually based on indicators 

such as whom one talks to, what organizations one belongs to or supports, or 

what one reads or searches for online. Assessing capability is based on such indicators as purchase or other acquisition of suspect items, training, and so on. Recognizing that the distinction between capability and intent is sometimes unclear, 

it is nevertheless true that placing people under suspicion because of their associations and intellectual explorations is a step toward abhorrent government behavior, such as guilt by association and thought crime. This does not mean that government authorities should be categorically proscribed from examining indicators 

of intent under all circumstances-only that special precautions should be taken 

when such examination is deemed necessary.’’ 

• ‘‘Conclusion 4: Program deployment and use must be based on criteria more demanding than ‘it’s better than doing nothing.’’ 

In the aftermath of a disaster or terrorist incident, policy makers come under intense political pressure to respond with measures intended to prevent the event 

from occurring again. The policy impulse to do something (by which is usually 

meant something new) under these circumstances is understandable, but it is simply not true that doing something new is always better than doing nothing. Indeed, policy makers may deploy new information-based programs hastily, without 

a full consideration of (a) the actual usefulness of the program in distinguishing 

people or characteristic patterns of interest for follow-up from those not of interest, 

(b) an assessment of the potential privacy impacts resulting from the use of the 

program, (c) the procedures and processes of the organization that will use the 

program, and (d) countermeasures that terrorists might use to foil the program. 

• ‘‘Conclusion 10: Behavioral and physiological monitoring techniques might be 

able to play an important role in counterterrorism efforts when used to detect 

(a) anomalous states (individuals whose behavior and physiological states deviate from norms for a particular situation) and (b) patterns of activity with wellestablished links to underlying psychological states. 

Scientific support for linkages between behavioral and physiological markers and 

mental state is strongest for elementary states (simple emotions, attentional processes, states of arousal, and cognitive processes), weak for more complex states 

(deception), and nonexistent for highly complex states (terrorist intent and beliefs). 

The status of the scientific evidence, the risk of false positives, and vulnerability 

to countermeasures argue for behavioral observation and physiological monitoring 

to be used at most as a preliminary screening method for identifying individuals 

who merit additional follow-up investigation. Indeed, there is no consensus in the 

relevant scientific community nor on the committee regarding whether any behavioral surveillance or physiological monitoring techniques are ready for use at all 

in the counterterrorist context given the present state of the science.’’ 

• ‘‘Conclusion 11: Further research is warranted for the laboratory development 

and refinement of methods for automated, remote, and rapid assessment of behavioral and physiological states that are anomalous for particular situations 

and for those that have well-established links to psychological states relevant to 

terrorist intent. 

A number of techniques have been proposed for the machine-assisted detection of 

certain behavioral and physiological states. For example, advances in magnetic 

resonance imaging (MRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and other modern techniques have enabled measures of changes in brain activity associated with 

thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Research in image analysis has yielded improvements in machine recognition of faces under a variety of circumstances (e.g., 

when a face is smiling or when it is frowning) and environments (e.g., in some 

nonlaboratory settings). 

However, most of the work is still in the basic research stage, with much of the 

underlying science still to be validated or determined. If real-world utility of these 

techniques is to be realized, a number of issues- practical, technical, and fundamental-will have to be addressed, such as the limits to understanding, the largely 

unknown measurement validity of new technologies, the lack of standardization 

in the field, and the vulnerability to countermeasures. Public acceptability regarding the privacy implications of such techniques also remains to be demonstrated, 

especially if the resulting data are stored for unknown future uses or undefined 

lengths of time. 

For example, the current state-of-the-art of functional MRI technology can identify 

changes in the hemodynamics in certain regions of the brain, thus signaling activ-
8 

23 Ibid. 

ity in those regions. But such results are not necessarily consistent across individuals (i.e., different areas in the brains of different individuals may be active 

under the same stimulus) or even in the same individual (i.e., a slightly different 

part of the brain may become active even in the same individual under the same 

stimulus). Certain regions of the brain may be active under a variety of different 

stimuli. 

In short, understanding of what these regions do is still primitive. Furthermore, 

even if simple associations can be made reliably in laboratory settings, this does 

not necessarily translate into usable technology in less controlled situations. Behavior of interest to detect, such as terrorist intent, occurs in an environment that 

is very different from the highly controlled behavioral science laboratory.’’ 

• ‘‘Conclusion 12: Technologies and techniques for behavioral observation have 

enormous potential for violating the reasonable expectations of privacy of individuals. 

Because the inferential chain from behavioral observation to possible adverse 

judgment is both probabilistic and long, behavioral observation has enormous potential for violating the reasonable expectations of privacy of individuals. It would 

not be unreasonable to suppose that most individuals would be far less bothered 

and concerned by searches aimed at finding tangible objects that might be weapons or by queries aimed at authenticating their identity than by technologies and 

techniques whose use will inevitably force targeted individuals to explain and justify their mental and emotional states. Even if behavioral observation and physiological monitoring are used only as a preliminary screening methods for identifying individuals who merit additional follow-up investigation, Because the inferential chain from behavioral observation to possible adverse judgment is both 

probabilistic and long, behavioral observation has enormous potential for violating the reasonable expectations of privacy of individuals. It would not be unreasonable to suppose that most individuals would be far less bothered and concerned by searches aimed at finding tangible objects that might be weapons or 

by queries aimed at authenticating their identity than by technologies and techniques whose use will inevitably force targeted individuals to explain and justify 

their mental and emotional states. Even if behavioral observation and physiological monitoring are used only as a preliminary screening methods for identifying individuals who merit additional follow-up investigation, these individuals 

will be subject to suspicion that would not fall on others not so identified.’’ 23

Issues 

Detection of Emotion 

The state of science relative to the detection of emotion, deceit, and intent are 

vastly different. Decades of research have been devoted to the detection of emotion 

using verbal, nonverbal, and microfacial expressions. Each of these observational 

techniques have shown to have varying degrees of success at determining an individual’s emotion, but generally speaking, a scientific foundation does exist to support the assertion that emotion can be determined through behavioral cues. 

Detection of Deceit 

The foundation of research for detecting an expression of deceit is rooted in that 

of emotion. For example, it is posited that a deceitful person would express emotions 

such as stress, and that stress can be attributed to concealing a lie. The state of 

the science in this regard is less solid. Witnesses at the hearing will testify to the 

current strengths and weaknesses of this field. 

Detection of Intent 

Even less certainty exists regarding the ability to determine intent. This ability 

is asserted by assuming that a person who intends to do harm will be concealing 

this fact, thereby expressing deceitful behaviors - and that deceitful behavioral cues 

are founded in stress, which in turn are displayed in emotion. This chain of reasoning takes the underlying assumption that behavioral indicators exist for detecting emotion and infers that indicators can therefore be used to detect deceit, and 

therefore intent. Very little, if any, evidence exists in the scientific literature to support this hypothesis, yet this is the goal of the SPOT program - to identify individuals who may pose a threat to aviation security. 
9 

24Supra n.21. 25Supra n.1. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29Supra n.12. 30Statement of Work for the Naval Research Laboratory, Project Hostile Intent: BehavioralBased Screening Indicators Validation, U.S. department of Homeland Security, Science and 

Technology Directorate, Human Factors and Behavioral Sciences Division, PR# RSHF-11-00007. 

Laboratory vs. Operational Settings 

The vast preponderance of behavioral science research conducted relative to the 

detection of emotion, deceit, and intent has been done in a laboratory setting. As 

the National Research Council noted in its 2008 report, ‘‘Behavior of interest to detect, such as terrorist intent, occurs in an environment that is very different from 

the highly controlled behavioral science laboratory.’’ 24

Utility for Counterterrorism 

Even if one was to stipulate that a body of evidence existed to support the claim 

that one could detect intent using behavioral indicators, it remains to be seen how 

useful this would be in a counterterrorism context. In all likelihood, anyone seeking 

to cause harm would employ countermeasures designed to conceal their emotions. 

It remains to be seen what impact countermeasures will have on the ability to detect emotions, deception, or intent, but if other deception detection tools (such as the 

polygraph) are any indicator, they could severely degrade the capability. 

Utility in a U.S. Aviation Transportation Setting 

The SPOT program is loosely based on the Israeli model successfully employed by 

El Al Airlines. This highly successful program employs more agents in more locations throughout the airport, conducts multiple face to face interviews, actively profiles passengers, and operates in smaller and fewer airports. They also have much 

fewer passengers and far fewer flights than the U.S. air transportation system. 

Israeli screeners also receive more training than the four days of classroom training, 

and three days of on the job training that BDOs receive. Scaling up such an enterprise to accommodate the U.S. Aviation Transportation Sector would severely restrict the flow of commerce and passengers. 

DHS S&T Validation 

In its report, GAO states that ‘‘TSA deployed SPOT nationwide without first validating the scientific basis for the program.’’ 25 To its credit, DHS S&T initiated a 

review two and a half years ago to ‘‘determine whether SPOT is more effective at 

identifying passengers who may be threats to the aviation system than random 

screening.’’ 26 GAO goes on to point out in its report, ‘‘However, S&T’s current research plan is not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection and appearances can be effectively used to reliably identify individuals in an airport terminal 

environment who pose a risk to the aviation system.’’ 27 The report further states 

that, according to the National Research Council, ‘‘an independent panel could provide an objective assessment of the methodologies and findings of DHS’s study to 

better ensure that SPOT is based on valid science.’’ 28

These are two important points. First, the S&T review is not designed to validate 

the underlying behavioral cues, but rather to simply demonstrate whether the program, as a whole, is more successful than random sampling. As GAO stated in its 

recent ‘‘Duplication’’ report, ‘‘DHS’s response to GAO’s report did not describe how 

the review currently planned is designed to determine whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the SPOT program.’’ 29 Second, based 

on the Statement of Work associated with S&T’s review, questions remain as to 

whether or not the review is truly independent. 

The Statement of Work affirms that S&T had a direct role in selecting peer reviewers, as well as planning and structuring workshops that informed the methodology to validate the program. The Statement of Work also afforded DHS the ability 

to review and provide revision recommendations at numerous points in the process. 

Finally, the Statement of Work indicates that deliverables are to be provided to S&T 

directly. 30 Whether or not this affected the outcome is uncertain. The validation 

work was conducted by the American Institute for Research, a high respected and 

reputable firm, but ultimately they are contractually bound by the parameters and 

scope defined by Statement of Work negotiated with DHS. It remains to be seen 

whether the review was an independent assessment, as recommended by the National Research Council, or more of a collaboration. 
10 

31Supra n.1. 32Supra n.12. 

Nevertheless, S&T’s two and a half year review (at a cost of $2.5 million) was initially planned to be delivered in Fiscal year 2011, 31 then February 2011, 32 and then 

the end of March 2011. Its current release date is for April 8th, two days after our 

hearing. The Subcommittee postponed this hearing, initially scheduled for March 

17th, for a number of reasons, including allowing S&T more time to produce the report. 

Witnesses 

• Mr. Stephen Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office 

• Transportation Security Administration (Invited) 

• Mr. Larry Willis, Program Manager, Homeland Security Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland 

Security 

• Dr. Paul Ekman, Professor Emeritus of Psychology, University of California, 

San Francisco, and President and Founder, Paul Ekman Group, LLC 

• Dr. Maria Hartwig, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, John Jay 

College of Criminal Justice 

• Dr. Philip Rubin, Chief Executive Officer, Haskins Laboratories 

• Lieutenant Detective Peter J. DiDomenica, Boston University Police 
11 

Appendix 1 

Department of Homeland Security 

Science and Technology Directorate 

Human Factors Behavioral Sciences Projects 

These projects advance national security by developing and applying the social, 

behavioral, and physical sciences to improve identification and analysis of threats, 

to enhance societal resilience, and to integrate human capabilities into the development of technology. 

Commercial Data Sources Project 

Project Manager: Patty Wolfhope 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors 

Behavior Sciences Division (HFD) Commercial Data Sources Project will quantitatively assess the utility of commercial data sources to augment governmentally 

available information about people, foreign and domestic, being screened, investigated, or vetted by the Department. The use of commercial data sources may provide a valuable source of corroborating information to ensure that an individual’s 

identity and eligibility for a particular license, privilege, or status is correctly evaluated during screening. This project is part of the Personal Identification Systems 

Thrust Area and Credentialing Program within HFD. 

Community Perceptions of Technology Panel Project 

Project Manager: Ji Sun Lee 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Community Perceptions of Technology Panel 

(CPT) Project brings together representatives of industry, public interest, and community-oriented organizations to better understand and integrate community perspectives and concerns in the development, deployment, and public acceptance of 

technology. This will yield feedback to aid ongoing technology and process development and strategies to accurately inform the public of new approaches to securing 

the homeland. This is designed to better ensure acceptance of the technology within 

affected communities. This project is part of the Human Technology Integration 

Thrust Area and Technology Acceptance and Integration Program within HFD. 

Community Resilience Project 

Project Manager: Michael Dunaway 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Counter-Improvised Explosives Devices (IED) 

Community Resilience Project conducts research into methodologies for effective 

hazard and risk communications to enhance the ability of local officials to convey 

understandable and credible warnings of IED activity to the public. This project will 

help local government and civic officials understand how to properly frame risk 

warnings and post-event instructions to the public in a manner that maximizes the 

public’s understanding of the instructions provided and maintains public trust and 

confidence. HFD is executing this project as part of the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Thrust Area and Mitigate Program within Explosives Division. 

Counter-IED Actionable Indicators and Countermeasures Project 

Project Manager: Allison Smith, Ph.D. 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Counter-Improvised Explosives Devices (IED) 

Actionable Indicators and Countermeasures Project supports the intelligence and 

law enforcement communities in identifying actors that pose significant IED threats 

in the United States homeland. This project will provide practical tools through the 

synthesis of state-of-the-art social and behavioral science databases, case studies, 

surveys, and fieldwork and advanced computational modeling, simulation, and visualization technologies. It will also provide policymakers with scientifically tested 

strategies to prevent radicalization and IED attacks before they occur by examining 

how social and behavioral science principles can support the development of 

counter-radicalization efforts. HFD is executing this project as part of the Counter 

Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Thrust Area and Prevent/Deter Program. 
12 

Credentialing Project 

Project Manager: Patty Wolfhope 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors 

Behavior Sciences (HFD) Division Credentialing Project develops tamper-proof 

credentialing systems that incorporate biometric information; such as a biometricsbased card-and-reader system. The project developed a laboratory test and evaluation protocol for the transportation worker identification card (TWIC) reader and 

plans to initiate research and design activities to improve the range and reliability 

of secure contactless technologies. This project is part of the Personal Identification 

Systems Thrust Area and Credentialing Program within HFD. 

Enhanced Screener – Technology Interface Project 

Project Manager: Josh Rubinstein, Ph.D. 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors 

Behavioral Sciences (HFD) Division Enhanced Screener-Technology Interface Project 

characterizes screener-performance issues, proposes new screener technologies and 

procedures, and develops training curricula to optimize security effectiveness and reduce human fatigue and injury, while reducing training requirements and overall 

cost. This project is part of the Human Technology Integration Thrust Area and 

Transportation Technology-Human Integration Program within HFD. 

Enhancing Public Response and Community Resilience Project 

Project Manager: Michael Dunaway 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Enhancing Public Response and Community Resilience Project examines public needs (shelter, food, disaster relief, etc.) that arose 

during the evacuation from southern Texas during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 

order to enhance federal, state, local and private sector response to future catastrophic events. The goal is to capture and communicate lessons learned to enhance 

federal, state, local and private sector responses to future catastrophic events. This 

project is part of the Social and Behavioral Threat Analysis (SBTA) Thrust Area 

and Community Preparedness and Resilience Program within HFD. 

High Impact Technological Solution – Biometric Detector Project 

Project Manager: Arun Vemury 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate High Impact 

Technological Solutions (HITS) Project executed by the Human Factors/Behavioral 

Science Division (HFD) will provide efficient, high quality, contact less acquisition 

of fingerprint biometric signatures for identity management. This will result in significantly improved throughput and signal quality, thereby improving recognition 

and reducing false positive rates. The goal is to develop a fingerprint acquisition device that can be transitioned for implementation across Department components. 

This project is part of the Innovations Portfolio/Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency Program (HSARPA) within the S&T Directorate. 

Homeland Innovation Prototypical Solutions – Future Attribute 

Screening Technology (FAST) Project 

Project Manager: Bob Burns 

Project Overview: The Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency 

(HSARPA) and Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) Project 

is an initiative to develop innovative, non-invasive technologies to screen people at 

security checkpoints. FAST is grounded in research on human behavior and 

psychophysiology, focusing on new advances in behavioral/human-centered screening 

techniques. The aim is a prototypical mobile suite (FAST M2) that would be used 

to increase the accuracy and validity of identifying persons with malintent (the intent or desire to cause harm). Identified individuals would then be directed to secondary screening, which would be conducted by authorized personnel. This project 

is part of the Innovations Portfolio/Homeland Security Advanced Research Project 

Agency (HSARPA) Program within the S&T Directorate. 

Hostile Intent Detection – Automated Prototype Project 

Project Manager: Larry Willis 
13 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Hostile Intent Detection - Automated Prototype 

Project demonstrates real-time automated intent detection using non-invasive and 

culturally neutral behavioral indicators. S&T plans to transition the automated hostile intent prototype to the Transportation Security Administration, Customs and 

Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This project is a 

part of the Social and Behavioral Threat Analysis Thrust Area and Suspicious Behavior Detection Program within HFD. 

Hostile Intent Detection – Training & Simulation Project 

Project Manager: Larry Willis 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Hostile Intent Detection - Training and Simulation Project develops computer-based simulation to train behavior-based stand-off 

detection for future hostile intent using indicators from the interactive screening environment (Hostile Intent Detection - Automated Prototype) and the observational 

environment (Hostile Intent Detection - Validation) to support screening and interviewing interactions at air, land, and maritime portals. This project is part of the 

Social and Behavioral Threat Analysis Thrust Area and Suspicious Behavior Detection Program within HFD. 

Hostile Intent Detection – Validation Project 

Project Manager: Larry Willis 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Hostile Intent Detection - Validation Project 

provides cross-cultural validation of behavioral indicators employed by Department 

of Homeland Security’s operational components to screen passengers at air, land, 

and maritime ports. The project will integrate these validated behavioral indicators 

into the screening curriculum of each component’s existing training program. This 

project is part of the Social and Behavioral Threat Analysis Thrust Area and Suspicious Behavior Detection Program within HFD. 

Human Systems Engineering Project 

Project Managers: Darren P. Wilson and Janae Lockett-Reynolds, Ph.D. 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Project develops, demonstrates and evaluates a 

standardized process for implementing human systems integration. It will focus on 

defining human performance requirements in the development of systems and technology, and on methods and measures needed to evaluate existing technology in 

terms of human performance requirements. This effort also will result in greater understanding of the needs of the various Department end-user communities, as well 

as developing tools to best identify how to recruit, select, train, support, and retain 

operational staff. A systematic approach based on the integration of the human component will lead to enhanced system design, safety, efficiency, and operational performance. This project is part of the Human Technology Integration Thrust Area 

and Human Systems Research and Engineering Program within HFD. 

Human Systems Engineering Research Project 

Project Manager: Jennifer O’Connor, Ph.D. 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Science Division (HFD) projects examine human perception and ability 

to detect targets and threats as they pertain to the design of systems that maximize 

human performance, and the effectiveness of the technology operators use in the 

field. Results of this research allow the program to focus more closely on the psychological determiners that impact successful discrimination of threats and reduce false 

alarms. In addition to focusing on human perception, the project will also address 

how humans process information and how that impacts the human-machine interface. This project is part of the Human Technology Integration Thrust Area and 

Human Systems and Engineering Program within HFD. 

Insider Threat Detection Program 

Project Manager: Jennifer O’Connor, Ph.D. 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Insider Threat Detection Project will detect in-
14 

sider behavior that is likely to present or lead to a threat to critical infrastructure 

using behavioral indicators. Department of Homeland Security will collaborate with 

other U.S. agencies and international partners to move beyond the current focus on 

responses to accomplished hostile insider acts, and begin developing a greater capacity to deter and detect insider threats before substantial harm has been done. The 

immediate operational goal is to produce new and better tools to identify behavior 

patterns and characteristics identifiable before, during, and after employment that 

are associated with insider threats. This project is part of the Social and Behavioral 

Threat Analysis Thrust Area and Suspicious Behavior Detection Program 

withinHFD. 

Mobile Biometrics System Project 

Project Manager: Patty Wolfhope 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavior Sciences Division (HFD) Mobile Biometrics Project develops prototype 

technologies for mobile biometrics screening at remote sites along U.S. borders, during disasters and terrorist incidents, at sea, and in other places where communications access is limited. The goal is to demonstrate mobile biometrics screening capabilities and technologies that meet the future needs of Department operational 

users, but currently are not available with conventional biometrics systems. This 

project is part of the Personal Identification Systems Thrust Area and Biometrics 

Program within HFD. 

Multi-modal Biometrics Project 

Project Manager: Arun Vemury 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavior Sciences Division (HFD) Multi-modal Biometrics Project develops biometric technologies that accurately and rapidly identify individuals. The operational 

goal is to provide the capability to non-intrusively collect two or more biometrics 

(fingerprint, face image, and iris recognition) in less than ten seconds at a ninetyfive percent acquisition rate without impeding the movement of individuals. The 

multi-modal technology will allow the Department to compare and match biometric 

samples from different sources, collected with different sensor technologies, under 

varying environmental conditions -- a capability that eludes existing technology. 

This project is part of the Personal Identification Systems Thrust Area and Biometrics Program within HFD. 

Muslim Community Integration Project 

Project Manager: Allison Smith, Ph.D. 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Muslim Community Integration Project conducts ethnographic research to examine the experiences of Muslims and non-Muslims in several communities throughout the U.S. The project will provide insights 

into the current state of Muslim communities focusing on their role and status in 

America and their perceptions of American society. This project is part of the Social 

and Behavioral Threat Analysis Thrust Area and Community Preparedness, Response and Recovery Program within HFD. 

Predictive Screening Project 

Project Manager: Larry Willis 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Counter-Improvised Explosives Devices 

(Counter-IED) Predictive Screening Project will derive observable behaviors that 

precede a suicide bombing attack and develop extraction algorithms to identify and 

alert personnel to indicators of suicide bombing behavior. HFD is executing this 

project as part of the Counter-IED Thrust Area and Predict Program. 

Risk Prediction Project 

Project Manager: Larry Willis 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Counter-Improvised Explosives Devices Risk 

Prediction Project will develop high speed software to identify improvised explosive 

device (IED) target and staging areas based upon group-and-cultural-specific tactics, 

techniques, and procedures derived from past foreign attacks. The goal is to use this 
15 

information to prioritize the risk of likely potential targets of IED attacks within 

the United States. HFD is executing this project as part of the Counter-IED Thrust 

Area and Predict Program. 

Social Network Analysis for Community Resilence Project 

Project Manager: Michael Dunaway 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Social Network Analysis for Community Resilience Project develops a modeling capability for identifying formal and informal social networks that may be useful in enhancing preparedness and community resilience to natural disasters and terrorist events. This effort will leverage social network analysis research for understanding terrorist networks, social and financial 

transactions, and the spread of infectious diseases, and apply that knowledge to the 

construction of networks dedicated to strengthening local response capabilities and 

preparedness. It will also leverage past and on-going work from the Department of 

Defense (DOD) and other agencies. This project is part of the Social and Behavioral 

Threat Analysis Thrust Area and Community Preparedness and Resilience Program 

within HFD. 

Violent Intent Modeling and Simulation Project 

Project Manager: Ji Sun Lee 

Project Overview: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Human Factors/ 

Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD) Violent Intent Modeling and Simulation Project 

develops intelligence analysis frameworks, including extraction of terrorist intention 

signatures, systematic estimation of future terrorist behavior based on social and 

behavioral sciences, and modeling and simulations of future terrorist behavior influences. It identifies leading edge social science modeling and simulation technologies 

and advances social science modeling and data fusion capabilities in such areas as 

hybrids of neural nets, structural equations, genetic algorithms, social networks, etc. 

This project is part of the Social and Behavioral Threat Analysis Thrust Area and 

Motivation and Intent Program within HFD. 

Source: http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gcl1218480185439.shtm 
16 

Chairman BROUN. The Subcommittee on Investigations and 

Oversight will come to order. Good morning. Welcome to today’s 

hearing titled ‘‘Behavioral Science and Security: Evaluating TSA’s 

SPOT Program.’’ You will find in front of you packets containing 

our witness panel’s written testimony, biographies, and Truth-inTestimony disclosures. 

Before we get started, this being the first meeting of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee for the 112th Congress, I 

would like to ask the Subcommittee’s indulgence to introduce myself. It is an honor and a pleasure for me to chair the I&O Subcommittee for this Congress, and it is a position that I do not take 

lightly. I want all Members of this Subcommittee to know that my 

door is always open, that I will endeavor to serve all Members fairly and impartially, and that I will work to serve the best interests 

of Congress, and all Americans, to ensure that the agencies and 

programs under our jurisdiction are worthy of the public’s support. 

And I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

Today the Subcommittee meets to evaluate TSA’s SPOT program. 

Developed in the wake of September 11, 2001, it was deployed on 

a limited basis in a select number of airports in 2003. In 2007, TSA 

created new Behavioral Detection Officer (BDO) positions whose 

goal was to use behavioral indicators to identify persons who may 

pose a potential security risk to aviation. This goal expanded in recent years to include the identification of any criminal activity. 

TSA currently employs about 3,000 BDOs in about 161 airports at 

the cost of over $200 million a year. The President’s fiscal year 

2012 budget request asks for an increase of 9.5 percent and an additional 175 BDOs. Over the next five years, the SPOT program 

will cost roughly $1.2 billion. 

Outside of a few brief exchanges at Appropriations Committee 

hearings, Congress has not evaluated this program. That isn’t to 

say that Congress wasn’t paying attention, as GAO conducted a 

comprehensive review that culminated in a report on the SPOT 

program last May. In that report, GAO identified several problems 

with the program, most notably that it was deployed without being 

scientifically validated. 

This is a common theme that this Committee is increasingly 

forced to deal with. Expensive programs are rolled out without conducting the necessary analysis. This has become a trend throughout the Federal Government but particularly at the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

This Committee has a long history with the development and acquisition of the Advanced Spectroscopic—as a southerner it is hard 

to say Spectroscopic—Portal program, but other technology programs such as the Backscatter Advanced Imaging Technology, explosives trace-detection portal machines, and the Cargo Advanced 

Automated Radiography System all ran into problems because they 

were rolled out before they were ready. DHS either fails to properly 

test and evaluate the technology, does not conduct a proper risk 

analysis, or neglects to conduct a cost/benefit analysis. 

A crucial aspect that is oftentimes taken for granted by DHS is 

the nexus between those developing the technology and those actually using it. In the case of SPOT, it seems as though the operators 

got out ahead of the developers, but typically what we see is the 
17 

opposite; the scientists and engineers developing capabilities that 

do not appropriately fit into an operational environment. Unfortunately, this is an issue that the Committee is unable to address 

today because of TSA’s refusal to attend. 

The goal of this hearing is to shed light on the processes by 

which DHS created the SPOT program, to better understand the 

state of the science that forms the foundation of the program, to 

examine the methodologies by which DHS S&T is evaluating the 

program, and to identify any opportunities to improve how behavioral sciences are utilized in the security context. The goal is not 

to throw out the proverbial baby with the bath water, but rather 

to ensure that the science being used is not oversold or undersold. 

SPOT is the first behavioral science program to stick its neck out 

for evaluation. This review is an opportunity to look at how behavioral sciences can be used appropriately across the security enterprise and to understand its limitations and strengths. 

To its credit, DHS S&T is conducting an evaluation of the program for TSA. This report was due earlier this year in February, 

then at the end of March, and now is expected shortly. And hopefully we will get that shortly. While this is a good first step, I am 

eager to hear how independent this evaluation truly is. I look forward to understanding the review’s methodology, its assumptions, 

and what level of input and access DHS S&T had in its design, formulation, and findings. 

As GAO stated in its recent duplication report, ‘‘DHS’s response 

to GAO’s report did not describe how the review currently planned 

is designed to determine whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the SPOT program.’’ I hope you 

all understood that bureaucratese. 

The use of behavioral sciences in the security setting is not just 

another layer to security. There is clear opportunity costs that have 

to be paid. For every BDO employed to identify behaviors, there is 

one screener who is not looking at an x-ray of baggage, one intelligence analyst not employed, or one air marshal not in the sky. I 

realize this isn’t a one-for-one substitute, but clearly there are 

tradeoffs that have to be made in a very difficult fiscal environment. 

Also, I would be remiss if I did not address the clear privacy 

issues that this technology and other DHS technologies present. 

Privacy, along with the serious Constitutional questions I have, 

only compounds the complexity of the issue. While the focus of the 

hearing today is the science behind the program, I don’t want these 

other important issues to be forgotten. 

Now, the Chair recognizes Ms. Edwards for an opening statement. Ms. Edwards? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PAUL BROUN

Today the Subcommittee meets to evaluate TSA’s SPOT program. Developed in 

the wake of September 11, 2001, it was deployed on a limited basis in a select number of airports in 2003. In 2007, TSA created new Behavioral Detection Officer 

(BDO) positions whose goal was to use behavioral indicators to identify persons who 

may pose a potential security risk to aviation. This goal expanded in recent years 

to include the identification of any criminal activity. TSA currently employs about 

3,000 BDOs in about 161 airports at a cost of over $200 million a year. The Presi-
18 

dent’s FY12 budget request asks for an increase of 9.5%, and an additional 175 

BDOs. Over the next five years, the SPOT program will cost roughly $1.2 billion. 

Outside of a few brief exchanges at Appropriations Committee Hearings, Congress 

has not evaluated this program. That isn’t to say that Congress wasn’t paying attention, as GAO conducted a comprehensive review that culminated in a report on the 

SPOT program last May. In that report, GAO identified several problems with the 

program, most notably that it was deployed without being scientifically validated. 

This is a common theme that this Committee is increasingly forced to deal with. 

Expensive programs are rolled out without conducting the necessary analysis. This 

has become a trend throughout the federal government, but particularly at the Department of Homeland Security. This Committee has a long history with the development and acquisition of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program, but other 

technology programs such as the Backscatter Advanced Imaging Technology, explosives trace-detection portal machines, and the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System all ran into problems because they were rolled out before they were 

ready. DHS either fails to properly test and evaluate the technology, does not conduct a proper risk analysis, or neglects to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. A crucial 

aspect that is often times taken for granted by DHS is the nexus between those developing the technology, and those actually using it. In the case of SPOT, it seems 

as though the operators got out ahead of the developers, but typically what we see 

is the opposite, the scientists and engineers developing capabilities that do not appropriately fit into an operational environment. Unfortunately, this is an issue that 

the Committee is unable to address today because of TSA’s refusal to attend. 

The goal of this hearing is to shed light on the processes by which DHS created 

the SPOT program, to better understand the state of the science that forms the 

foundation of the program, to examine the methodologies by which DHS S&T is 

evaluating the program, and identify any opportunities to improve how behavioral 

sciences are utilized in the security context. The goal is not to ‘‘throw the baby out 

with the bath water,’’ but rather to ensure that the science being used is not oversold, or undersold. SPOT is the first behavioral science program to stick its neck 

out for validation. This review is an opportunity to look at how behavioral sciences 

can be used appropriately across the security enterprise and to understand its limitations and strengths. 

To its credit, DHS S&T is conducting an evaluation of the program for TSA. This 

report was due earlier this year in February, then at the end of March, and is now 

expected shortly. While this is a good first step, I am eager to hear how independent 

this evaluation truly is. I look forward to understanding the review’s methodology, 

its assumptions, and what level of input and access DHS S&T had in its design, 

formulation and findings. As GAO stated in its recent duplication report, ‘‘DHS’s response to GAO’s report did not describe how the review currently planned is designed to determine whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive 

to validate the SPOT program.’’ 

The use of behavioral sciences in the security setting is not just another layer to 

security. There are clear opportunity costs that have to be paid. For every BDO employed to identify behaviors, there is one screener who is not looking at an x-ray 

of baggage, one intelligence analyst not employed, or one air marshal not in the sky. 

I realize this isn’t a one-for-one substitute, but clearly there are trade-offs that have 

to be made in a very difficult fiscal environment. Also, I would be remiss if I did 

not address the clear privacy issues that this technology and other DHS technologies present. Privacy, along with the serious Constitutional questions I have, 

only compounds the complexity of the issue. While the focus of the hearing today 

is the science behind the program, I don’t want these other important issues to be 

forgotten. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And congratulations to 

you as you convene the first of what I hope are many oversight 

hearings to make sure that we are paying attention to the kind of 

oversight that we need to engage in on the Science and Technology 

Committee on behalf of the taxpayers. 

I would like to say that I, too, am disappointed that TSA is not 

here today, wasn’t able to provide a witness. I think they lost an 

important opportunity to inform the Congress and the public why 

they believe the SPOT program is worthy of our support. And I 

hope they will cooperate with this Committee and the Congress in 

the future. And I hope it is not terribly distracting as we get to the 
19 

witnesses. I don’t want any one of them to be identified as TSA and 

I know it is a little confusing for me up here. 

Let me just say in opening that I think each one of us has had 

an experience of instinctively sensing that something about a situation or person is wrong or it is worrying. Police officers, immigration officers, transportation security officers have those instinctive 

feelings all the time. However, it is an open question whether instinctive reactions are reliable as warnings of mal-intent. We also 

do not know whether a person can be trained to accurately sort 

through their instinctive reactions, choosing to intervene when 

faced with a potential threat and to resist reactions based on racial 

profiling. 

What the Transportation Security Administration has tried to do 

is develop behavioral training for officers so they can quickly and 

accurately assess and screen passengers. Can hunches be harnessed in service of identifying potential threats to air safety? That 

is the key question that underlies today’s hearing and I hope we 

will be able to dig deeply into those questions. 

After Richard Reid’s failed shoe bombing, some in the aviation 

security community concluded that we were spending too much 

time and money on trying to stop the bomb and not enough to stop 

the bomber. Screening of passengers by observation techniques, or 

SPOT, was viewed by TSA as a way to get some officers’ eyes off 

the scanning screens and onto the passengers. 

Those credited with helping to develop the SPOT program, some 

of whom are testifying before us today, intended the program to 

train Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) to focus on an individual’s behavior, appearance, and demeanor. An ongoing concern, 

however, with the BDOs and with law enforcement as well is that 

they not engage in racial profiling. If BDOs focus on a passenger’s 

ethnic, religious, or racial qualities, they are violating the law, and 

they are not acting to protect the flying public. 

Terrorists have come in all colors, shapes, and sizes, and if security personnel were fixated on a profiling approach to finding the 

next Mohammed Atta, then they would miss identifying the next 

John Walker Lindh, Timothy McVeigh, or Richard Reid. 

The SPOT program tries to identify a specific menu of behaviors 

that will naturally emerge due to elevated levels of anxiety or 

stress. The hypothesis is that terrorists would display those cues 

when attempting to enter a secure facility such as an airport. But 

behavioral scientists do not agree on these nonverbal cues and they 

don’t agree on whether terrorists would exhibit them. Because it is 

impossible to get a group of terrorists to participate in a doubleblind experiment, it is hard to validate the theory. 

DHS points to the program’s success in identifying people who 

have violated the law and are caught, but no one can be certain 

criminals and terrorists behave in a similar fashion. TSA relies on 

nonverbal cues to help sort through the more than one million passengers that fly into the United States each day. Nonverbal cues 

provide a filtering method to allow officers to determine who they 

should engage in discussion looking for verbal signs of deception. 

There is more agreement among social scientists that verbal interactions with individuals can actually help in detecting deception. 
20 

We would hope that a DHS-funded validation report on the 

SPOT program would be available for this hearing today. That report purportedly shows that SPOT-trained Behavior Detection Officers are much more likely to identify what TSA deems as ‘‘highrisk passengers’’ as against a purely random sample of passengers. 

We look forward to the report’s completion and its findings, but 

without it, we are missing an important initial assessment of the 

program’s performance. 

Over the past ten years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress 

has allocated billions of dollars to the Department of Homeland Security for the development of tools and technologies to keep our air 

travel secure. Too often that investment has been wasted and too 

often we have relied on technology that is not adequately tested before it is deployed. It is not based on adequate scientific evidence 

of effectiveness, and almost inevitably, the technology has proven 

costly to acquire, deploy, and service. 

So I look forward to today’s hearing and to asking questions about the more than $200 million a year that we are spending to 

make sure that we carefully evaluate SPOT’s operational merit. 

And with that, I yield. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER DONNA F. EDWARDS

Every one of us has had the experience of instinctively sensing that something 

about a situation or a person is wrong, worrying. Police officers, immigration officers, Transportation Security Officers have those same instinctive feelings all the 

time. However, it is an open question whether instinctive reactions are reliable as 

warnings of mal-intent. We also do not know whether a person can be trained to 

accurately sort through their instinctive reactions, choosing to intervene when faced 

with a potential threat and to resist reactions based on racial profiling. 

What the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has tried to do is develop 

behavioral training for officers so that they can quickly and accurately screen passengers. Can hunches be harnessed in service of identifying potential threats to air 

traffic safety? That is the key question that underlies today’s hearing. 

After Richard Reid’s failed shoe-bombing, some in the aviation security community concluded that we were spending too much time and money on trying to stop 

the bomb and not enough effort trying to stop the bomber. Screening of Passengers 

by Observation Techniques or SPOT was viewed by TSA as the way to get some 

officers’ eyes off the scanning screens and onto the passengers. 

Those credited with helping to develop the SPOT program, some of whom are testifying before us today, intended the program to train behavior detection officers 

(BDOs) to focus on an individual’s behavior, appearance and demeanor. An ongoing 

concern with the BDOs, and with law enforcement as well, is that they not engage 

in racial profiling, If BDO’s focus on a passenger’s ethnic, religious or racial qualities they are violating the law, and they are not acting to protect the flying public. 

Terrorists have come in all colors, shapes and sizes. If security personnel were fixated on a profiling approach to finding the next Mohammed Alta, then they would 

miss identifying the next John Walker Lindh, Timothy McVeigh or Richard Reid. 

The SPOT program tries to identify a specific menu of behaviors that will naturally emerge due to elevated levels of anxiety or stress. The hypothesis is that terrorists would display those cues when attempting to enter a secure facility such as 

an airport. But behavioral scientists do not agree on these non-verbal cues and they 

do not agree on whether terrorists would exhibit them. Because it is impossible to 

get a group of terrorists to participate in a double-blind experiment, it is hard to 

validate the theory. DHS points to the program’s success in identifying people who 

have violated the law, and are caught, but no one can be certain criminals and terrorists behave in a similar fashion. 

TSA relies on non-verbal cues to help sort through the more than I million passengers that fly in the U.S. each day. Non-verbal cues provide a filtering method 

to allow officers to determine who they should engage in discussion looking for 

verbal signs of deception. There does is more agreement among social scientists that 

verbal interactions with individuals can help in detecting deception. 
21 

We had hoped that a DRS-funded ‘‘validation report’’ on the SPOT program would 

be available for this hearing today. That report purportedly shows that SPOTtrained behavior detection officers are much more likely to identify what TSA deems 

‘‘high risk’’ passengers as against a purely random sample of passengers. We look 

forward to the report’s completion and its findings; without it we are missing an 

important initial assessment of the program’s performance. 

Over the past ten years, since the 9.11 terrorist attacks, Congress has allocated 

billions of dollars to the Department of Homeland Security for the development of 

tools and technologies to keep our air travel secure. Too often that investment has 

been wasted. Too often we have relied on technology that is not adequately tested 

before it is deployed, is not based upon adequate scientific evidence of its effectiveness and almost inevitably the technology has proven costly to acquire, deploy and 

service. This Subcommittee has examined some of these DRS technologies in the 

past, including the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) radiation monitors. DRS 

has been forced to withdraw other technologies and to re-scope and re-think programs, including the ASP program, SBInet, explosive detection ‘‘air puffers’’ and Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to screen passengers. Costing more than $200 million per year we need to carefully evaluate SPOT’s 

operational merit. Is the SPOT program –as it is now constructed worthwhile? 

Should it be restructured? Should it be expanded? Can it be improved–and if so, 

how? What are the ultimate costs of the program and would that money be spent 

elsewhere for greater effect helping to improve security on unsecured non-aviation 

transportation modes, for instance? 

I hope our witnesses can help address some of these issues today. I again want 

to express my disappointment at the lack of cooperation of TSA with the Committee. 

One of the reasons that it is unclear to me what training TSA provides BDOs regarding ‘‘racial profiling’’ in their SPOT program is because TSA has so far refused 

to permit Subcommittee staff to observe this training. They have also refused to provide a witness for this hearing. It is hard to make the case that the SPOT program 

is working and worthy of continued Congressional funding and support when the 

agency that runs the program refuses to participate in a hearing. I hope that the 

agency will rethink their position. I want to thank the Chairman for calling this 

hearing and I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses who are here 

today. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, those 

statements will be added to the record at this point. 

At this time I would like to introduce our panel of our witnesses. 

Mr. Stephen Lord is the GAO executive responsible for directing 

GAO’s numerous engagements on aviation and service transportation issues. Before his appointment to the Senior Executive Service in 2007, Mr. Lord led GAO’s work on a number of key international security, finance, and trade issues. Mr. Lord has received 

numerous GAO awards for meritorious service, outstanding 

achievement, and teamwork. Congratulations. 

Mr. Larry Willis is the Program Director for suspicious behavior 

detection within the Human Factors Division of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, Science and Technology 

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. Boy, your business 

card must be a big one with all that. 

Detective Lieutenant Peter J.—how do you pronounce your 

name, sir? 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. DiDomenica. 

Chairman BROUN. DiDomenica. Okay. Mine is pronounced 

Broun. My family either can’t spell or can’t pronounce, so I am very 

cognizant of people’s pronunciation. Detective Lieutenant Peter J. 

DiDomenica is employed by the Boston University Policy where he 

commands the Police Detective Division. Prior to this he served as 

a Massachusetts State Police Officer, as well as the Director of Security Policy at Boston Logan International Airport, where he developed innovative antiterrorism programs. 
22 

Dr. Paul Ekman is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at UCSF 

and is currently the President of the Paul Ekman Group. He has 

authored or edited 15 books—wow, you have been busy, sir—and 

has consulted with federal and local law enforcement and national 

security organizations. The American Psychological Association 

identified Dr. Ekman as one of the 100 most influential psychologists of the 20th century. Quite an honor, sir. ‘‘Time’’ Magazine selected him as one of the 100 most influential people of 2009. He 

is also the Scientific Advisor to the dramatic television series on 

Fox TV, ‘‘Lie to Me,’’ which was inspired by his research. I hope 

you are getting rich with all that. I love the market system. This 

is great. 

Dr. Maria Hartwig is an Associate Professor in the Department 

of Psychology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. She has 

published research on deception in a number of scientific journals, 

is on the Editorial Board of Law and Human Behavior. In 2008, 

Dr. Hartwig received an Early Career Award by the European Association of Psychology and Law for her contributions to psychological research. Congratulations. 

Dr. Philip Rubin is the Chief Executive Officer and a Senior Scientist at Haskins Laboratories, a private, nonprofit research institute affiliated with Yale University and the University of Connecticut. In 2010, Dr. Rubin received APA’s Meritorious Research 

Service Commendation. Dr. Rubin is the Chair of the National 

Academies Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences, 

and was previously the Chair of the National Research Council 

Committee on Field Evaluation of Behavioral and Cognitive 

Sciences Based Methods and Tools for Intelligence and Counterintelligence and a member of the NRC Committee on Developing 

Metrics for Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Research. 

Noticeably absent from the witness table is the Transportation 

Security Administration. TSA was invited to the initial hearing on 

March 13 that was postponed. They were invited to this hearing 

several weeks ago. In response to these invitations, DHS has refused to send a TSA representative. On another Committee hearing 

just yesterday the Department of Homeland Security refused to 

have a witness sit on a panel with other witnesses. DHS has 

staked out a claim that I think is intolerable. It is unconscionable 

that TSA will not send their representative here today to this important hearing on this program that is slated to spend $1.2 billion 

of the taxpayers’ money to talk to us about it, and I find that totally reprehensible. 

In a letter to this Committee, DHS sought to detail the Subcommittee’s interest, presumably quoting from Rule 10 of the 

House of Representatives that delineates jurisdiction. In this letter 

they state ‘‘Given the Subcommittee’s interest in scientific research, development, and demonstration in projects,’’ Larry Willis, 

Project Manager for the Hostile Intent Detection Validation Project 

at DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate, ‘‘S&T will represent 

DHS at the aforementioned hearing.’’ 

I find it highly presumptuous that DHS thinks it knows our jurisdiction better than we do. It shows their arrogance. I find it appalling. Considering this Committee was formed in 1958 and 
23 

played an active role in creating the Department of Homeland Security. While DHS surprisingly cites our black-letter jurisdiction 

under Rule 10 correctly, they must have stopped reading there. 

Under Rule 11, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

is tasked with the responsibility to ‘‘review and study on a continuing basis laws, programs, and government activities relating to 

non-military research and development.’’ 

Unless TSA and DHS are arguing that science and research 

played no role in the development of SPOT program, I see a compelling reason for their attendance here today. The nexus between 

science and operations is vitally important to understanding how 

programs were developed, why there are problems, and how they 

can improve. 

If TSA and DHS are, in fact, making a claim that science and 

research played no role in the formation of the program whatsoever, then this program should be shut down immediately for lacking any scientific basis and being little more than snake oil. If DHS 

does not value this Committee’s role in overseeing the Agency and 

if TSA does not value S&T’s scientific advice, there are a number 

of legislative options that this Committee could employ to change 

that impression. 

I will also note that DHS has sent Agency officials to testify before this Committee from Customs and Border Protection and the 

Coast Guard. I find it odd that in this instance TSA would not 

want to talk about this program. It makes me wonder what they 

are trying to hide. When DHS is asking for a 9.5 percent increase 

in the fiscal year 2011 budget request for SPOT, you would think 

that they could justify that increase to us here in Congress. 

Let me be clear. The Administration does not tell Congress how 

to run its hearings. We will likely return to this issue once again 

after the validation report is delivered. At that point we may seek 

TSA’s input once again. If that is decided, this Committee may 

seek more aggressive measures to compel TSA’s attendance, including the issuance of a subpoena. 

This Committee has not needed to issue a subpoena in almost 

two decades and has been successful in reaching accommodations 

with Republican and Democratic administrations. I am hopeful 

that TSA will determine that they have a valuable contribution to 

make to this topic in the future so that we do not find it necessary 

to go down that road. 

Now, as our witnesses should note, spoken testimony is limited 

to five minutes each, if you all would please try to hold it to the 

five minutes. If you go over a few seconds, then that will be okay. 

But if you just go on and on, then I may have to tap the gavel so 

you know please wrap up very quickly. Your written testimony will 

be included in the record of the hearing. It is the practice of the 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight to receive testimony 

under oath. Do any of you have any objections to taking an oath? 

Any of you? Okay. Let the record reflect that all witnesses were 

willing to take an oath. They all showed that by nodding their head 

from side to side indicating no. You also may be represented by 

counsel. Do any of you have counsel here with you today? No? 

Okay. Let the record reflect that none of the witnesses have counsel. Now, if you would, please, stand and raise your right hand. 
24 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth and 

nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Let the record reflect that all witnesses participating have taken 

the oath. Thank you. You all may sit down. 

I now recognize our first witness, Mr. Stephen Lord, Director of 

Homeland Security Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office. Mr. Lord, five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN LORD, DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. LORD. Thank you. Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards, and other Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss TSA’s behavior-detection program, 

also known as SPOT. 

Today, I would like to discuss two issues. First, DHS’s ongoing 

efforts to validate the program and second, TSA’s efforts to make 

better use of the information collected through this program. This 

is an important issue as the Department is currently seeking $254 

million in fiscal year 2012 funds, including 350 additional Behavioral Officer positions. And as we reported in May 2010, TSA deployed SPOT to 161 airports across the Nation before completing 

ongoing validation efforts. Thus, it is still unclear whether behavior 

and appearance indicators can be used to reliably identify individuals who may pose a threat to the U.S. aviation system. According 

to TSA, the program was deployed before these efforts were completed to help address potential security threats. 

To help ensure the program is based on sound science, our report 

recommended that TSA and DHS convene an independent panel of 

experts to review the methodology and results of the ongoing validation effort you mentioned in your opening comments. The good 

news is DHS agreed with this recommendation. However, as other 

panel members will note in their statements today, a scientific consensus does not yet exist on whether behavior detection principles 

can be reliably used for counterterrorism purposes in an airport environment. 

It is also important to note that the current DHS validation effort will not answer several important questions. For example, how 

long can Behavior Detection Officers observe passengers without 

becoming fatigued? What is the optimal number of officers needed 

to ensure adequate coverage? To what extent are the behavior and 

appearance indicators the right mix of indicators? Should the list 

of indicators be larger or should the list be smaller? Also, while Mr. 

Willis will report that SPOT is nine times more effective than random screening in identifying so-called high-risk individuals, the results of this analysis have yet to be shared with GAO or independently reviewed. 

Our report also highlighted some difficulties that TSA faced in 

capturing and analyzing the rich information that was collecting at 

airports. Thus, we recommended that TSA better collect and analyze SPOT information to help connect the dots on passengers who 

may pose a threat to the U.S. aviation system. 

For example, we recommended that TSA clarify its guidance to 

BDOs for inputting information into the database used to track 
25 

suspicious activities. We also recommended that they expand access to this database across all SPOT airports. The good news is 

TSA agreed with our recommendations and has revised its procedures accordingly. TSA also expanded access to this database to all 

SPOT airports as of March of this year. 

Our 2010 report also recommended that TSA make better use of 

information collected through airport video systems. We noted that 

16 individuals who were later charged with or pleaded guilty to terrorism-related offenses transited through eight SPOT airports on 

23 different occasions. Thus, we recommended that TSA examine 

the feasibility of using airport video systems to refine the current 

number of behaviors currently assessed and also to use this information to help refine the program going forward. We believe such 

recordings could help identify behaviors that may be common 

among terrorists or could demonstrate that terrorists do not generally display any identifying behaviors. Again, TSA agreed with 

our recommendation and is now exploring ways to better use these 

video recordings. 

In closing, behavior and appearances monitoring might be able 

to play a useful role in airport counterterrorism efforts. However, 

it is still an open question whether these techniques can be successfully applied on a large scale in the airport environment. And 

while I am encouraged that DHS has taken steps to validate the 

program, I am still surprised the Department is seeking additional 

funding for this program before the issue is fully addressed. Now, 

hopefully, today’s hearing will help clarify S&T’s future plans for 

validating the program. 

Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards, and other Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:] 
26 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND

JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Lord. I now recognize our 

next witness, Dr. Paul Ekman, Professor Emeritus—wait a minute. 

I skipped over one and I apologize. I now recognize Mr. Willis—our 

next witness, Mr. Larry Willis, Program Manager, Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Willis, you have 

five minutes. Thank you, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF LARRY WILLIS, PROGRAM MANAGER, 

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS 

AGENCY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WILLIS. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. 

I am honored to appear before you today on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, to 

discuss our evaluation of the Transportation Security Administration’s Screening Passenger by Observation Technique, or SPOT referral report, which is a checklist of predefined behavior indicators 

used by TSA to identify potentially high-risk travelers. 

For the purpose of S&T’s studies, high-risk travelers are defined 

as those passengers in possession of serious prohibited and/or illegal items or individuals engaging in conduct leading to arrest. 

For background purposes, the SPOT validation effort began in 

2007 as a result of the component-led, S&T-managed People 

Screening Capstone Integrated Product Team process that identified and prioritized capability gaps of DHS operational customers. 

As an active participant in this IPT process, TSA identified the 

SPOT Referral Report and its associated indicators as a candidate 

for the validation study. The SPOT Referral Report contains a discrete list of observable indicators which have been designated by 

TSA as Sensitive Security Information, or SSI. TSA’s Behavior Detection Officers, or BDOs, are trained to identify these indicators 

and use them to make screening decisions, such as referral for additional screening at the TSA checkpoint. 

It is important to note that the behavioral screening isn’t limited 

to aviation security and is conducted formally or informally by 

DHS agencies, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and law enforcement worldwide. The SPOT validation research is a rigorous evaluation of TSA’s SPOT Referral Report that 

supports our better understanding of the threat, the screening accuracy of the existing indicators, and advances of science of behavioral-based screening. 

S&T, in cooperation with the American Institute for Research designed the Base Rate Study to compare TSA’s SPOT Referral Report process with a random screening process. AIR is one of the 

largest non-profit behavioral science research organizations in 

North America and has performed numerous validation studies. 

Two databases were used for the study. 

The first was designed to include case information from randomly selected travelers who were subjected to the SPOT referral 

process during the Base Rate Study conducted from December 2009 

through October 2010 and included a total of 71,589 referrals from 

43 airports. To make direct comparisons between the Base Rate 
40 

database and the Operational Referrals, a second dataset was created for the 23,265 Operational SPOT Referrals collected during 

the same time and at the same locations of the Base Rate Study. 

Together, these two datasets allowed AIR to assess the extent to 

which the SPOT Referral Report of observable indicators lead to 

correct screening decisions. A key number of findings emerged from 

the analysis of the SPOT Referral Report, including the following, 

which I would like to share with you. 

One, Operational SPOT identifies high-risk travelers at a significantly higher rate than random screening. The study data indicate 

that a high-risk traveler is nine times more likely to be identified 

using Operational SPOT versus random screening. Moreover, to 

achieve this outcome, BDOs within the study were able to engage 

50,000 fewer travelers using Operational SPOT than with random 

selection methods. 

The second result is a population base rate for SPOT indicators 

is low. Among those selected for random screening the Base Rate 

Study, the most frequently observed indicator was displayed in 

only 2.8 percent of the randomly selected travelers. All of the other 

indicators were observed in fewer than two percent of the travelers 

selected during the Base Rate Study. 

In conclusion, these results indicate that the SPOT program is 

significantly more accurate than random screening in identifying 

high-risk travelers using the metrics that we employed. Our validation process, which included an independent and comprehensive review of SPOT Referral Report, is a key example of how S&T works 

to enhance the effectiveness of the Department’s operational activities. 

Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards, I thank you again 

for this opportunity to discuss the research to validate the Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique Referral Report. And 

I am happy to answer the questions that the Subcommittee may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Willis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY WILLIS, PROGRAM MANAGER FOR THE SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Introduction and Study Objective: 

Good afternoon, Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards and distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you today on behalf 

of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate 

(S&T) to discuss our evaluation of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

(TSA) Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. SPOT 

is a behavior observation and analysis program in which personnel are trained to 

identify behaviors that deviate from an established baseline that could be possible 

indicators for terrorism or criminal activity. Today, I will describe S&T’s research 

assessing the validity of the SPOT Referral Report, which is a checklist of 

predefined observable indicators used by TSA to identify potentially high risk travelers. For the purpose of S&T’s study, high risk travelers are defined as those passengers in possession of serious prohibited and/or illegal items or individuals engaging in conduct leading to an arrest. Specifically, our study offers an assessment of 

the extent to which the SPOT Referral Report of observable indicators leads to correct screening decisions at the security checkpoint. 

Research Requirements and Background: 

Approximately 1.2 million people fly within the United States daily. The SPOT 

program trains TSA personnel to serve as an additional layer of security in airports 

by providing a non-intrusive means of identifying individuals who may pose a risk 

of terrorism or criminal activity. In behavior-based screening, trained personnel at-
41 

tempt to identify anomalous behaviors by observing passengers and comparing what 

they see to an established behavioral baseline of other passengers developed in the 

same general location and within the same timeframe. It is important to note that 

behavioral screening isn’t limited to aviation security and is conducted formally or 

informally by other DHS agencies, the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and law enforcement worldwide. The SPOT validation effort appears to be 

the most rigorous evaluation of behavioral-based screening. 

The SPOT validation effort began in 2007 as a result of the component-led, S&Tmanaged People Screening Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) process that 

identified and prioritized capability gaps of DHS operational components. 

The ‘‘People Screening’’ Capstone IPT established the research requirement to 

identify and validate observable behavior indicators of threats and suspicious behaviors in a screening environment. As an active participant in this IPT, TSA identified 

the SPOT Referral Report and its associated indicators as a candidate for the validation study. Through a series of interactions with TSA, S&T determined that the 

SPOT screening process and the effectiveness of the observable indicators list was 

testable. The SPOT Referral Report contains a discrete list of observable indicators 

which have been designated by TSA as Sensitive Security Information (SSI). TSA’s 

Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) are trained to identify these indicators and use 

them to make screening decisions, such as referral for additional screening at the 

TSA checkpoint. Furthermore, TSA records each behavior-based screening event, as 

well as its corresponding indicators, screening results, and outcomes to help inform 

future screening decisions. The SPOT process leads to three possible actions: the 

traveler proceeds through the TSA checkpoint and to their flight as normal; the 

traveler is identified as possibly carrying serious prohibited/illegal items and receives additional screening at the TSA checkpoint; or the traveler is identified to 

a Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) for appropriate intervention. 

Research Approach: 

S&T, in cooperation with the American Institutes for Research (AIR), designed 

the Base Rate Study to compare TSA’s SPOT Referral Report process with a random 

screening process and to estimate the population base rate of high-risk travelers. 

AIR is one of the largest non-profit behavioral science research organizations in 

North America and has performed numerous validation studies. Two databases were 

used for this study. The first was designed to include case information from randomly selected travelers who were subjected to the SPOT referral process during the 

Base Rate Study from December 1, 2009 through October 31, 2010, including a total 

of 71,589 referrals from 43 airports. To make direct comparisons between the Base 

Rate database and the Operational SPOT Referrals, a second dataset (SPOT comparison dataset) was extracted from TSA’s SPOT Referral database to contain the 

23,265 Operational SPOT referrals collected during the same time period and from 

locations covered by the Base Rate Study. Together, these two datasets allowed AIR 

to assess the extent to which the SPOT Referral Report of observable indicators 

leads to correct screening decisions at the security checkpoint. 

Research Results: 

A number of key findings emerged from the analysis of the SPOT Referral Report, 

including four that I would like to share with you: 

1. Operational SPOT identifies high-risk travelers at a significantly higher rate 

than random screening. The study data indicate that a high risk traveler is 

nine times more likely to be identified using Operational SPOT versus random 

screening. (Operational SPOT refers to the standard operating procedure of the 

BDOs executing the referral reporting process at the checkpoint as opposed to 

the program as a whole.) Moreover, to achieve these outcomes, BDOs were able 

to engage with 50,000 fewer travelers using Operational SPOT than they did 

when using random selection methods. 

2. SPOT indicators appear to be observed and utilized consistently across varying 

airport characteristics. When we examined the consistency in implementation 

overall, we found that observable indicators within the SPOT Referral Report 

are used at relatively the same rate regardless of the year, time of year, or size 

of airport. Moreover, indicators tended to be consistently related to outcomes 

in the same ways across these characteristics, providing further evidence that 

the indicators are reliable. These results also serve as initial support for reliability in the use of the SPOT Referral Report, with little to no evidence of 

major coding variations or random fluctuations. 

3. The population base rate for high-risk travelers is extremely low. In other 

words, the large majority of travelers pose no security risks. Results of the 
42 

Base Rate Study confirm that the measurable outcomes that represent highrisk travelers are rare events. These data indicate that the estimated population parameter for: 

i. Arrested by Law Enforcement Officer is 1 in 10,000 travelers 

(or 0.01 percent). 

ii. Possession of Fraudulent Documents is 1 in 2,000 travelers 

(or 0.05 percent). 

iii. Possession of Serious Prohibited/Illegal Items is 1 in 750 travelers 

(or 0.13 percent). 

iv. Combined Outcome, or presence of any outcome (of the above), 

is 1 in 750 travelers (or 0.13 percent). 

4. The population base rate for SPOT indicators is low. Among those selected for 

random screening in the Base Rate Study, very few travelers (approximately 

8 percent) exhibited any SPOT indicators. The most frequently observed indicator (again, SPOT indicators are designated SSI) was displayed in only 2.8 

percent of the randomly selected travelers. In contrast, this indicator is exhibited in more than half of SPOT-referred travelers. All of the other indicators 

were observed in fewer than 2 percent of the travelers selected by the Base 

Rate Study. 

Conclusion: 

In conclusion, these results indicate that the SPOT program is significantly more 

effective than random screening: a high-risk traveler is nine times more likely to 

be identified using Operational SPOT versus random screening. Our validation process, which included an independent and comprehensive review of SPOT, is a key 

example of how S&T works to enhance the effectiveness of the Department’s operational activities. Expanding on these initial findings, we would like to conduct further research to assess the screening accuracy of these observable indicators in similar operational screening environments, in aviation and beyond. Additionally, we 

would like to work to identify other indicators that could further increase accuracy 

in operational screening. 

Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards, I thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program. 

I am happy to answer any questions the Subcommittee may have. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Willis. You kept your remarks 

under five minutes, and sometimes that is not done here. In fact, 

most times it is not done here. 

Our next witness is Mr. Peter DiDomenica of the Boston University Police. Thank you, Lieutenant. Appreciate it. You have five 

minutes, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF PETER J. DIDOMENICA, LIEUTENANT 

DETECTIVE, BOSTON UNIVERSITY POLICE 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. Thank you. Good morning. Chairman Broun, 

Ranking Member Edwards, and Members of the Committee, I 

thank you for this opportunity to address you today regarding the 

future of the TSA SPOT program that I originally developed. 

By way of additional background, I have trained over 3,000 police, intelligence, and security officials in over 100 federal, state, 

and local agencies in the United States and U.K. in behavior assessment. I have also been a lecturer or advisor on behavior assessment for the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, DHS, U.S. Army Night Vision Lab, Defense Department Criminal Investigations Task Force, 

and the National Science Foundation. I appear today representing 

only myself and not any of the organizations I am or have been employed by. 

On December 22, 2001, while assigned to Logan International 

Airport as a member of the State Police, I was part of a large team 

of public safety officials who responded to the airfield to meet 
43 

American Airlines flight 63, diverted to Boston from a flight from 

Paris, France to Miami. On board was a passenger named Richard 

Reid who attempted to detonate an improvised explosive device artfully concealed in his footwear that, if successful, would have killed 

all 197 passengers and crewmembers aboard. As I stood only a few 

feet away from Reid, who was now securely in custody in the back 

of a state police cruiser, it hit me that this man was the real thing, 

that the threat of another terrorist attack by Al Qaeda would not 

stop, and that we need to do more, much more, to properly screen 

passengers than merely focusing on weapons detection. Thus began 

the development of what would become the Behavior Assessment 

Screening System or BASS in the SPOT program. 

I began to explore the scientific literature in an effort to quantify 

the human capacity to detect dangerous people. My research included many disciplines including physiology, psychology, neuroscience, as well as specific research into suicide bombers. In developing the program, specific behaviors were selected that were both 

supported in the scientific literature and consistent with law enforcement experience. 

The BASS program went on to be delivered to numerous agencies, including the entire Washington, D.C., Metro Transit Police, 

Amtrak Police, and the Atlanta Police officers assigned to the 

world’s busiest airport, Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International 

Airport. In 2006, two BASS trainers and I spent two weeks in London where we set up a British version of the BASS program for the 

British Transport Police as a response to the July 7, 2005, terrorist 

attacks on the London Underground. 

During the course of training police officers around the Nation, 

the State Police BASS instructors discovered four individuals with 

suspected terrorist ties. In 2004, while conducting BASS training 

with the New Jersey Transit Police at Newark Penn Station, I observed three males exhibiting suspicious behavior using BASS 

techniques. One of the subjects was in the United States on a religious visa from a Middle Eastern country and was being escorted 

to an Amtrak train for a claimed week-long trip with no luggage. 

It was later confirmed the subject listed on the visa was on a terror 

watch list. I even intercepted a DHS inspector on a covert test of 

the screening checkpoint at Logan Airport in late 2003 with a concealed weapon through BASS techniques. 

Although I believe that the SPOT program is effective at identifying high-risk passengers, its effectiveness is limited because proper resolution of highly suspicious people discovered by the TSA 

BDOs requires a law-enforcement response by police officers 

trained in the same behavior detection and interview skills. I designed the program so that the most dangerous people would be either removed from the critical infrastructure or arrested by BASStrained police officers. I do not believe the current TSA airport 

SPOT familiarization training program is enough. The airport police, in my opinion, need to be trained in the same techniques and 

skill sets which would engender confidence in the program and 

their own ability to detect terrorist behavior and prevent additional 

devastating attacks. 

Another issue I see with the SPOT program is that the TSA has 

created too high an expectation for what it is able to achieve. The 
44 

original SPOT program I designed was not primarily for the apprehension of suspects but as a means to deny access to critical infrastructure of high-risk persons who could be involved in terrorism 

or other dangerous activity. It was to be the last and, most importantly, the best chance to prevent a tragedy when other methods 

such as intelligence and traditional physical screening have failed. 

Catching a terrorist through a random encounter in a public place 

without any prior intelligence is extremely difficult. 

By way of example, if we use the known number of terrorist suspects who boarded domestic commercial flights at airports with 

BDOs and the approximately four billion passenger enplanements 

at U.S. commercial airports from 2004 to 2009, the base rate of terrorist passengers is about 1 in 173 million. The expectation that 

the SPOT program will result in the arrest of all terrorists attempting to board a domestic flight in the United States is unrealistic and threatens its continued support. If, however, it is seen as 

part of a multi-layered approach with the primary goal of preventing terrorist access to critical infrastructure in conjunction 

with properly trained law enforcement, the program sets reasonable and attainable goals and should have the support of this Congress. 

Thank you for this opportunity to address the program and I am 

prepared to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. DiDomenica follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. PETER J. DIDOMENICA, 

LIEUTENANT DETECTIVE, BOSTON UNIVERSITY POLICE

Good morning. Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards, and Members of the 

Committee, I thank you for this opportunity to address you today regarding the future of the TSA Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program that 

I developed, which is more commonly referred to as the SPOT program. 

I am Peter DiDomenica presently employed as a Detective Lieutenant with the 

Boston University Police Department. I recently joined the Boston University force 

after serving for more than 22 years with the Massachusetts State Police where I 

retired as a Lieutenant. While a member of the State Police I served as an investigator in the Major Crime Unit, as the Director of Legal Training for the State Police 

Academy, as a staff member to five different superintendents, and as Director of Security Policy for Boston Logan International Airport in the two years after the devastating 9/11 attacks. I also served the State Police for a decade as a subject matter 

expert and lead trainer for Massachusetts police agencies in racial profiling and biased policing. In this capacity I designed statewide police training programs and the 

State Police traffic stop data collection and analysis system created to monitor enforcement efforts for indications of biased policing. I am also presently a consultant 

for EOIR Technologies of Fredericksburg, VA where I serve as an advisor on human 

behavior detection for the U.S. Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate. I am a certified instructor in the interview, behavior assessment, and deception detection programs for The Forensic Alliance, a consulting firm of forensic psychologists based in British Columbia, Canada. I am presently an adjunct instructor 

for the graduate criminal justice program at Anna Maria College in Paxton, MA. 

I am a licensed attorney in Massachusetts having earned my J.D. in 1995. I have 

trained over 3,000 police, intelligence, and security officials in over 100 federal, 

state, and local agencies in the U.S. and U.K. in behavior assessment. I have also 

been a lecturer or advisor on behavior assessment for the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, 

Department of Homeland Security, Defense Department Criminal Investigations 

Task Force, and National Science Foundation. I appear today representing only myself and not any of the organizations I am or have been employed by. 

On December 22, 2001, while assigned to Logan International Airport as a member of the State Police and as Director of Security Policy, I was part of a large team 

of public safety officials who responded to the airfield to meet American Airlines 

flight 63, diverted to Boston on a flight from Paris, France to Miami. On board was 

a passenger named Richard Reid who attempted to detonate an improvised explo-
45 

1Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 at 813 (1996). 

2 446 U.S. 544 at 554 (1980). (‘‘We conclude that a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning 

of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, 

a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’’) 

sive device artfully concealed in his footwear that, if successful, would have killed 

all 197 passengers and crewmembers aboard. As I stood only a few feet away from 

Reid, who was now securely in custody in the back of a state police cruiser, it hit 

me that this man was the real thing, that the threat of another terrorist attack from 

Al Qaeda would not stop, and that we needed to do more, much more, to properly 

screen passengers than merely focusing on weapons detection. Over the next several 

days I met with the incident commander for Reid’s arrest, Major Tom Robbins, who 

was the Aviation Security Director for Logan Airport and Troop Commander for 

State Police Troop F at the airport. One evening, while having dinner with Major 

Robbins, he wrote the words ‘‘walk and talk’’ on a dinner napkin - a reference to 

airport narcotics interdiction - and directed me to look into airport drug interdiction 

programs as a model for a terrorist behavioral profiling program to augment the 

weapons screening process. Thus began the development of what would become the 

Behavior Assessment Screening System or BASS. 

Because of my legal background and experience in training on racial profiling and 

bias policing, I knew immediately what the BASS program would not be. Whatever 

program we would create to identify potential terrorists, it would not include racial 

profiles that target people of apparent Islamic belief or Arab, Middle Eastern, or 

South and Central Asian ethnicities. As well as being illegal such profiling could 

distract security officials from detecting true threats. Moreover, the unconscious bias 

against these groups would be so strong because of 9/11 that security officials would 

need training to counter these biases. I began to explore the scientific literature in 

an effort to quantify the human capacity to detect dangerous people. My research 

included many disciplines including, physiology, psychology, neuroscience, as well as 

specific research into suicide bombers. What this literature indicated was that a person who is engaged in a serious deception of consequence or otherwise engaged in 

an act in which the person has much to lose by being discovered or by failing to 

succeed will suffer mental stress, fear, or anxiety. Such stress, fear, or anxiety will 

be manifested through involuntary physical and physiological reactions such as an 

increase in heart rate, facial displays of emotion, and changes in speed and direction 

of movement. In developing the program specific behaviors were selected that were 

both supported in the scientific literature and consistent with law enforcement experience. In addition to avoiding the legal prohibition on selective enforcement based 

on race, ethnicity, or religion 1 the program also had to ensure that police encounters with the public not meeting the standard of reasonable suspicion were voluntary under the U.S. Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Medenhall. 2 In addition to 

behavior, the program also examines: aspects of appearance unrelated to race, ethnicity, or religion; responses to law enforcement presence and questioning; and, the 

circumstances surrounding the presence of the person at a specific location. I created a simple method called ‘‘A-B-C-D’’ which means Analysis of Baseline, addition 

of a Catalyst, and scan for Deviations. Baselines are merely an evaluation of what 

was normal for a specific environment and a catalyst is the insertion into the environment of something that would be particularly threatening to a terrorist or criminal to provoke behavioral changes. 

In 2002 and 2003 I taught the BASS program to all the troopers, the primary law 

enforcement agency for Logan Airport, and developed a staff of additional instructors. We also began training other police departments In Massachusetts; in fact we 

trained the entire Massachusetts Transit Police force and a group of Boston Police 

officers in preparation for the 2004 Democratic National Convention. Because of the 

success of the program, I created a derivative program called PASS or the Passenger 

Assessment Screening System suitable for TSA screeners that eventually became 

the SPOT program. Over the course of two years I worked with TSA officials at Boston, including the Federal Security Director George Niccara, and officials at TSA 

headquarters including their Office of Civil Rights, Science and Technology, and 

Workforce Performance and Training. In 2004 my team of State Police BASS instructors conducted a training program with TSA to create two pilot SPOT programs at Portland International Jetport in Maine and T.F. Green International Airport in Rhode Island. 

One of the reasons the BASS program got the interest of TSA headquarters as 

a model for a behavior detection program was an incident that occurred in the fall 

of 2003 at Logan Airport while I was training members of the Boston Police in 

BASS. A middle-age male caught my attention due to an appearance and luggage 

deviation as well as baseline deviation in movement. When the Boston police officer 
46 

and I engaged this purported passenger in conversation he immediately produced 

credentials identifying himself as an official of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Investigations and stated he was on his way to test a screening checkpoint to see if they would discover a concealed weapon he was carrying. 

The BASS program went on to be delivered to numerous agencies including the 

entire Washington DC Metro Transit Police, Amtrak Police, and Atlanta Police officers assigned to the world’s busiest airport, Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. In 2006 Two BASS trainers and I spent two weeks in London 

where we set up a British version of BASS for the British Transport Police as a 

response to the July 7, 2005 terrorist attacks on the London Underground. 

During the course of training police officers around the nation, the State Police 

BASS instructors discovered four individuals with suspected terrorist ties. In 2004, 

while conducting BASS training with the New Jersey Transit Police at Newark 

Penn Station, I observed three males exhibiting suspicious behavior using BASS 

techniques. One of the subjects was in the United States on a religious visa from 

a Middle Eastern country and was being escorted to an Amtrak train for a claimed 

week long trip with no luggage. Another subject presented a non-government ID 

card that was designed to look like a real government ID. There were three behavior 

cues that led to the encounter followed by three non-verbal cues during the interview as well as conflicting factual statements that made these individuals highly 

suspicious. It was later confirmed that the subject on the visa was on a terror watch 

list. In 2004 at the Metro Center rail station in Washington D.C. a member of the 

BASS training team, while conducting training with the TSA, observed a suspicious 

male subject who exhibited five behavioral cues under the BASS program. The subject had a British passport with visa stamps from visits to Iraq and was in the U.S. 

to learn how to fly planes. It was later confirmed that the subject was under investigation for terrorism. Back in 2002 at Logan Airport, a BASS trainer discovered 

a suspicious subject exhibiting four BASS behavior cues and three non-verbal cues 

during an interview who had failed to report for deportation and was connected to 

Ahmed Ressam of the 1999 Millennium bombing plot of Los Angeles Airport. 

Unfortunately, since the successful pilot programs in 2004 the TSA has chosen not 

to continue my services despite my strong recommendation that I remain involved 

in training, particularly with respect to airport police officers in BASS techniques 

at airports where the SPOT program is implemented. Although I believe the SPOT 

program is effective at identifying high risk passengers, its effectiveness is limited 

because proper resolution of highly suspicious people discovered by the TSA Behavior Detection Officers, or BDOs, requires a law enforcement response by police officers trained in the same behavior detection and interview skills. I designed the program so that the most dangerous people would be either removed from the critical 

infrastructure or arrested by BASS trained police officers. So, no matter how effective the BDOs are, the most dangerous people will tend to slip through the cracks 

because of a response by non-BASS trained police officers who may discount the validity of SPOT or who may fail to follow-up with BASS techniques. In most cases 

where denials of access occur or arrests or detentions are made by police, it is because there are warrants for arrest or because contraband is discovered in the 

screening process. I do not believe the current TSA airport police SPOT familiarization training program is enough. The airport police, in my opinion, need to be 

trained in the same techniques and skill sets which will engender confidence in the 

program and in their own ability to detect terrorist behavior and prevent additional 

devastating attacks. 

Another issue I see with the SPOT program is that the TSA has created too high 

an expectation for what it is able to achieve. The original SPOT program I designed 

was not primarily for the apprehension of suspects but as a means to deny access 

to critical infrastructure of high risk persons who could be involved in terrorism or 

other dangerous activity. It was to be the last and, most importantly, the best 

chance to prevent a tragedy when other methods such as intelligence and traditional, needle in the haystack, screening have failed. Catching a terrorist through 

a random encounter in a public place without any prior intelligence is extremely difficult. By way of example, if we use the number of known terrorism suspects who 

boarded domestic commercial flights at airports with BDOs, as cited in the Government Accountability Office May 2010 report on Aviation Securitythe last and, most 

importantly, the best chance to prevent a tragedy when other methods such as intelligence and traditional, needle in the haystack, screening have failed. Catching a 

terrorist through a random encounter in a public place without any prior intelligence is extremely difficult. By way of example, if we use the number of known 

terrorism suspects who boarded domestic commercial flights at airports with BDOs, 

as cited in the Government Accountability Office May 2010 report on Aviation 

Securitythe last and, most importantly, the best chance to prevent a tragedy when 
47 

3GAO-10-763. The report cites 23 suspected terrorists having passed through SPOT airports. 

4King Downing v. Massachusetts Port Authority, et al, Civil Action No. 2004-12513-RBC. 

5 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 

6 435 F. 3d 1125. 

other methods such as intelligence and traditional, needle in the haystack, screening 

have failed. Catching a terrorist through a random encounter in a public place without any prior intelligence is extremely difficult. By way of example, if we use the 

number of known terrorism suspects who boarded domestic commercial flights at 

airports with BDOs, as cited in the Government Accountability Office May 2010 report on Aviation Security 3, and the approximately 4 billion passenger enplanements 

at U.S. commercial airports from 2004 to 2009, the base rate of terrorist passengers 

is about one in every 173 million or .0000006 percent. The expectation that the 

SPOT program will result in the arrest of all terrorists attempting to board a domestic flight in the United States is unrealistic and threatens its continued support. 

If, however, it is seen as part of a multi-layered approach with the primary goal 

of preventing terrorist access to critical infrastructure in conjunction with properly 

trained law enforcement, the program sets more reasonable and attainable goals. 

In 2004 Major Robbins and I, as well as the Massachusetts Port Authority and 

Massachusetts State Police, were sued by an African-American lawyer for the ACLU 

who served at the National Coordinator of the American Civil Liberties Union’s 

Campaign Against Racial Profiling. The plaintiff alleged that he was unlawfully detained by the State Police at Logan Airport in October of 2003 and that this unlawful detention was based on BASS training that the troopers received. It was alleged 

that the BASS training directed the troopers at the airport to detain people without 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and condoned and encouraged racial and 

ethnic profiling. After a weeklong trial in December 2008 in the Federal District 

Court for Massachusetts 4, the jury found that the plaintiff was, in fact, unlawfully 

detained by State Police officers but that the BASS program was not the cause of 

the unlawful detention. During the trial the judge asked the plaintiff what provisions of the BASS program on its face violate federal law? The plaintiff responded 

the following provision was unlawful: a provision that allows police, after reasonable 

efforts to dispel elevated suspicion have failed to escort away from critical infrastructure persons who refuse to identify themselves. The plaintiff also cited the provision allowing for a running of a records check on such persons. The judge ruled 

from the bench: ‘‘I don’t see this as on its face being unconstitutional. I mean, there 

is nothing unconstitutional about running a records check of a person, subjecting 

a person to additional consensual searches or testing [or] preventing a person 

from proceeding into the critical infrastructure or escort[ing] the person 

away from the critical infrastructure.’’ (Emphasis added) One of the key components of the BASS program is its anti-detention policy: to empower police to deny 

persons access to critical infrastructure such as commercial aircraft who display elevated suspicion after reasonable attempts to dispel the suspicion fail. The elevated 

suspicion is articulable facts and circumstances that do not necessarily have to rise 

to the level required for a lawful detention under the U.S. Supreme Court case of 

Terry v. Ohio 5. In keeping with Constitutional mandates, this denial of access in 

an extremely small number of cases of unresolved suspicion may be the best we can 

do but it may be enough to prevent a tragedy and it also may provide for the collection of crucial intelligence for an investigation and later arrest. It is important to 

note that the 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in the case of Gilmore v. Gonzales 

has ruled that ‘‘the Constitution does not guarantee the right to travel by any particular form of transportation.’’ 6 The Supreme Court has declined to review this decision. 

For SPOT to be effective there has to be a cadre of BASS trained police officers 

to bring about an appropriate resolution from an initial TSA observation. Based on 

my extensive law enforcement experience using behavioral analysis and those other 

police officers who have similar experience, as well as having a basic understanding 

of psychological, neurological, and physiological processes, I know SPOT and BASS 

techniques do work in identifying potential terrorists and other dangerous people. 

If done correctly, the process only takes a couple of minutes and is done openly in 

public areas minimizing interference with the free flow of the public and, most importantly, without interfering with civil rights. This program specifically trains TSA 

personnel and police officers to counter the effects of unconscious bias that may otherwise result in undue attention on certain ethnic and religious groups and the failure to detect suspicious behavior by truly dangerous people who do not fit the 

unstated but subconsciously present religious or ethnic profile. When the next shoe 

bomber or underwear bomber arrives at one of our airports or train stations to blow 

up one of our planes or subway trains or if they try to gain access to the Super 
48 

Bowl or other major sporting event, even when we don’t have the constitutional authority to arrest we must have the confidence to deny them access based on the 

sound principles of BASS and SPOT. This is our last and best chance of preventing 

another terrorist attack. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to address the SPOT program and I am prepared now to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Lieutenant. You did not exceed 

your five minutes either. Congratulations and thank you for being 

here and—— 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. Two seconds. 

Chairman BROUN. That is right. I recognize our next witness, Dr. 

Paul Ekman, Professor Emeritus of Psychology, University of California, San Francisco, and President and Founder of the Paul 

Ekman Group. Doctor, you have five minutes for your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL EKMAN, 

PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF PSYCHOLOGY, 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO, 

AND PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, PAUL EKMAN GROUP, LLC 

Dr. EKMAN. Thank you, Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards. I really appreciate this opportunity to testify on this very 

important issue. 

I have been working with TSA on SPOT for eight years based on 

40 years of research on how demeanor—facial expression, gesture, 

voice, speech, gaze and posture—can help in identifying lies and 

also harmful intent. My research has examined four very different 

kinds of lies: lies to conceal a very strong emotion felt at that moment, lies claiming to hold a social political opinion the exact opposite of your truly strongly held opinion, lies denying that you have 

taken money that isn’t yours, and lies in which members of extremist political groups attempt to block an opposing political group 

from receiving money. 

Now, our research focuses on real-world lies that matter to society in which each person decided for him or herself whether to lie 

or tell the truth, just as we do in the real world. No scientist comes 

out of the clouds and tells us you are supposed to lie, you are supposed to tell the truth, except in experiments published in journals. 

The person who tells the truth knows that if he or she is mistakenly judged to be lying, they will receive the same punishment of 

the liar who is caught. This makes the truthful person apprehensive and harder to distinguish from the liar, just as it is in the real 

world. And the punishment threatened is as severe and highly 

credible to those who participate in the research as we could make 

it, passed by the University IRB. 

I should mention I work in a medical school. I would never get 

it passed at Berkley, but at a medical school what I do is considered trivial. 

Now, unlike any other research team, we have performed the 

most precise comprehensive measurements of face, gesture, voice, 

speech, and gaze, and those measurements have yielded between 

80 and 90 percent identification of who is lying and who is telling 

the truth. The clues we have found are not specific to what the lie 

is about. As long as the stakes are very high, especially the threat 

of punishment, the behavioral clues to lying will be the same. It 

is this finding that suggested there would be no clues specific to 
49 

the terrorist hiding harmful intent than the money smuggler, the 

drug smuggler, or the wanted felon. 

In my written testimony I raised three questions. First, what is 

the basis for the SPOT checklist? I have explained why I believe 

our findings on four very different kinds of lies provided a solid 

basis for reviewing what was on the SPOT checklist. 

Question two, what is the evidence for the effectiveness of SPOT? 

Mr. Willis has already covered that. I won’t attempt to repeat it. 

I am very eager to see that report that you are eager to see. 

Question three, can SPOT be improved? That is a dangerous 

question to ask a scientist. We could always think that more research is necessary. But is it a wise investment compared to other 

things that the government can invest in regarding airport security? That is your decision, not mine. In my testimony I have outlined a couple of types of research that I think could be useful if 

you decide you would want to do more research. But we do not 

need to do more research now to feel confidence in this layer of security provided to the American people. 

In my written testimony I attempted to answer questions that 

have been raised by critics of SPOT. Would it have not been better 

to base SPOT on how terrorists actually behave? Wasn’t SPOT 

based on—Why wasn’t SPOT based on people role-playing terrorists? Why is SPOT catching felons and smugglers, not just terrorists? And aren’t people with Middle Eastern names or Middle Eastern appearance more likely to be identified by SPOT? 

I would be glad in responding to questions to provide brief answers to each of these that are in my written testimony. Again, my 

thanks to the Committee and the staff of the Committee for the opportunity to talk to you and to the men and women in TSA who 

make flying a safer path than it would be without their dedicated 

efforts. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ekman follows:] 
50 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL EKMAN, PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF PSYCHOLOGY, 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO, AND PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, PAUL

EKMAN GROUP, LLC 
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Doctor. I appreciate your testimony. I now recognize our next witness, Dr. Maria Hartwig, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, John Jay College of 

Criminal Justice. Dr. Hartwig, your testimony for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MARIA HARTWIG, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, 

JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

Dr. HARTWIG. Good morning. It is an honor to be here. Thank 

you for allowing me the opportunity. 

The SPOT program is based on the idea that judgments of credibility can be made on the basis of observing facial cues and nonverbal cues that indicate stress, fear, or deception. And I have been 

asked to address the scientific support for this. 

First of all, there are more than 30 years of research on deception that shows that people are quite poor at detecting deception 

on the basis of observing behavior. In a recent meta-analysis, a statistical overview of all the research, people obtained a hit-rate of 

54 percent and you should, of course, keep in mind that 50 percent 

is the hit-rate you obtain by chance alone. So why are people so 

poor at detecting deception on the basis of observation? And one 

answer is that there are very few non-verbal demeanor-based cues 

to deception and these cues of deception tend to be weak. So simply 

put, there may not be much to observe. And contrary to what 

laypeople and presume lie experts such as law enforcement believe, 

liars don’t display more signs of stress, fear, and arousal. 

And critics of this research very often say that these findings are 

due to the nature of the laboratory experiments that most research 

relies on. And the claim is that when liars—when the stakes are 

sufficiently high, these cues to deception will appear. Research has 

addressed this concern by studying high-stake lies, such as lies told 

by people suspected of serious crimes like murder and rape, and 

these studies don’t show any evidence that cues to stress and anxiety appear as the stakes increase. 

And let me turn to the issue of detecting deception from facial 

cues to emotion. So this is based on the idea that liars experience 

emotion or fear of detection and that observing these facial cues 

can help you detect lies. I don’t have time to go into details about 

the theoretical problems of that assumption, but in brief, it invites 

both missives and false alarms. It may miss travelers with hostile 

intentions who don’t experience these emotions or who successfully 

conceals them and it may generate false alarms for travelers who 

don’t have hostile intentions but experience these feelings for other 

reasons. 

Most people are quite surprised to hear that there is very little 

evidence on the issue of these so-called micro-expressions, brief displays of an underlying emotion that are revealed automatically. I 

am aware of only one study published in the peer-reviewed literature conducted by Steve Porter and his colleague, Leanne ten 

Brinke, in the Journal of Psychological Science, they examined the 

prevalence of micro-expressions in falsified and genuine displays of 

emotion. They found no complete micro-expression in any of the 

697 facial expressions they analyzed. They found 14 partial microexpressions occurring in either the lower or the upper half of the 
71 

face, but these micro-expressions occurred with similar frequency 

in true and falsified expressions. 

So this study shows that micro-expressions occur very rarely, and 

to the extent that they do occur, they occur in genuine displays as 

well. And the authors of this paper conclude that the occurrence of 

micro-expressions in true expressions makes their usefulness in 

airline security settings questionable. And they also state that the 

current training that relies heavily on the identification of fullfaced micro-expressions may be misleading. 

And finally, I would like to address a point of view expressed by 

Dr. Ekman in a recent article in Nature on the SPOT program. He 

stated that he no longer publishes all of the details of his work in 

the peer-reviewed literature because those papers are closely followed by scientists in countries such as Syria, Iran, and China, 

which the United States view as a potential threat. I object to deliberate strategy not to publish research for three reasons. 

First, in that the enemy, whoever they are, a potential terrorist 

or criminals, may be aware of results from research applies to all 

deception research, so if we took this argument seriously, we 

shouldn’t publish any lie-detection research because it may ultimately help the enemy. 

And second, it is my understanding of the theory of micro-expression that these are automatic involuntary displays, and if that is 

the case, I fail to see how knowledge about these behaviors or the 

research on these behaviors could help the person. 

And third and most importantly, these claims of micro-expressions as cues to deception or the cues included in the SPOT program, they are empirical questions that should be addressed with 

data and subjected to scientific peer review. And given the amount 

of resources that have already been spent on this program, I think 

such validation is absolutely necessary. 

So in summary, my view is that the SPOT program is out of step 

with the scientific research. It relies on an outdated view of deception and there is very little support in the peer-reviewed literature. 

And if I had more time, I would say a few words about what I 

think may be a more productive approach to assessing credibility, 

but I believe I am out of time. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hartwig follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MARIA HARTWIG, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT

OF PSYCHOLOGY, JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The TSA has implemented the SPOT program, a security screening protocol that 

relies on observation of nonverbal and facial cues to assess the credibility of travelers. In particular, the program relies on behavioral indicators of ‘‘stress, fear, or 

deception’’ (GAO, p. 2). A key question is whether there is a scientifically validated 

basis for using behavior detection for counterterrorism purposes. This testimony will 

review the relevant empirical evidence on this question. In brief, the accumulated 

body of scientific work on behavioral cues to deception does not provide support for 

the premise of the SPOT program. The empirical support for the underpinnings of 

the program is weak at best, and the program suffers from theoretical flaws. Below, 

I will elaborate on the scientific findings of relevance for this issue. 

Accuracy in deception judgments 

For several decades, behavioral scientists have conducted empirical research on 

deception and its detection. There is now a considerable body of work in this field 

(Granhag & Stro ̈mwall, 2004; Vrij, 2008). This research focuses on three primary 

questions: First, how good are people at judging credibility? Second, are there be-
72 

havioral differences between deceptive and truthful presentations? Third, how can 

people’s ability to judge credibility be improved? 

Most research on credibility judgments is experimental. An advantage of the experimental approach is that researchers may randomly assign participants to conditions, which provides internal validity (the ability to establish causal relationships 

between the variables, in this context between deception and a given behavioral indicator) and control of extraneous variables. Importantly, the experimental approach 

also allows for the unambiguous establishment of ground truth, that is, knowledge 

about whether the statements given by research participants are in fact truthful or 

deceptive. In this research, participants provide truthful or deliberately false statements, for example by purposefully distorting their attitudes, opinions, or events 

they have witnessed or participated in. The statements are subjected to various 

analyses including codings of verbal and nonverbal behavior. This allows for the 

mapping of objective cues to deception–behavioral characteristics that differ as a 

function of veracity. Also, the videotaped statements are typically shown to other 

participants serving as lie-catchers who are asked to make judgments about the veracity of the statements they have seen. Across hundreds of such studies, people average 54% correct judgments, when guessing would yield 50% correct. Meta-analyses (statistical summaries of the available research on a given topic) show that accuracy rates do not vary greatly from one setting to another (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) 

and that individuals barely differ from one another in the ability to detect deceit 

(Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Contrary to common expectations (Garrido, Masip, & 

Herrero, 2004), presumed lie experts such as police detectives and customs officers 

who routinely assess credibility in their professional life do not perform better than 

lay judges (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). In sum, that judging credibility is a near-chance 

enterprise is a robust finding emerging from decades of systematic research. 

Cues to deception 

Why are credibility judgments so prone to error? Research on behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers may provide an answer to this question. A 

meta-analysis covering 1,338 estimates of 158 behaviors showed that few behaviors 

are related to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). The behaviors that do show a systematic covariation with deception are typically only weakly related to deceit. In 

other words, people may fail to detect deception because the behavioral signs of deception are faint. 

Lie detection may fail for another reason: People report relying on invalid cues 

when attempting to detect deception. Both lay people and presumed lie experts, 

such as law enforcement personnel, report that gaze aversion, fidgeting, speech errors (e.g., stuttering), pauses and posture shifts indicate deception (Global Deception 

Research Team, 2005; Stro ̈mwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004). These are cues to 

stress, nervousness and discomfort. However, meta-analyses of the deception literature show that these behaviors are not systematically related to deception. For 

example, in DePaulo et al. (2003), the effect size d (a statistical measure of the 

strength of association between two variables) of gaze aversion as a cue to deception 

across all studies is a non-significant 0.03. DePaulo et al. state: ‘‘It is notable that 

none of the measures of looking behavior supported the widespread belief that liars 

do not look their targets in the eye. The 32 independent estimates of eye contact 

produced a combined effect that was almost exactly zero (d = 0.01)’’ (p. 93). Moreover, fidgeting with object does not occur more frequently when lying, d = -0.12 (the 

negative value suggests that object fidgeting occurs less, not more frequently when 

lying, but this difference is not statistically significant), nor does self-fidgeting (d = 

-0.01) and facial fidgeting (d = 0.08). Speech disturbances are not related to deception (d = 0.00), nor are pauses (silent pauses d = 0.01; filled pauses d = 0.00; mixed 

pauses d = 0.03). Posture shifts are not systematically related to deception either, 

d = 0.05. 

In sum, the literature shows that people perform poorly when attempting to detect deception. There are two primary reasons: First, there are few, if any, strong 

cues to deception. Second, people report relying on cues to stress, anxiety and nervousness, which are not indicative of deceit. 

High-stake lies. Some aspects of the deception literature have been criticized on 

methodological grounds, in particular with regard to external validity (i.e., the generalizability of the findings to relevant non-laboratory settings, see Miller & Stiff, 

1993) The most persistent criticism has concerned the issue of generalizing from 

low-stake situations to those in which the stakes are considerably higher. Critics 

have argued that when the deceit concerns serious matters, liars will experience 

stronger fear of detection, leading to cues to deception. There are several bodies of 

work of relevance for this concern. In a meta-analytic overview of the literature on 

credibility judgments (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), the evidence on the effects of stakes 
73 

was mixed: Within studies that manipulated motivation to succeed, lies were easier 

to tell from truths when there is relevant motivation. However, the effect size was 

fairly small (d = 0.17). However, when the comparison was made between studies 

that differed in stakes, no difference in lie detection accuracy was observed. Also, 

the meta-analysis revealed that as the stakes rise, both liars and truth tellers seem 

more deceptive to observers. That is, lie-catchers are more prone to make false positive errors - mistaking an innocent person for a liar - when judging highly motivated 

senders. 

Furthermore, research on real-life high-stake lies, such as lies told by suspects of 

serious crimes during police interrogations, shows that people obtain at best moderate hit rates when judging such material (for a review of these studies, see Vrij, 

2008). Behavioral analyses of the suspects in these studies do not support the assertion that cues to deception in the form of stress, arousal and emotions appear when 

senders are highly motivated. Vrij noted that the pattern from high-stake lies studies are ‘‘in direct contrast with the view of professional lie-catchers who overwhelmingly believe that liars in high-stake situations will display cues to nervousness, 

particularly gaze aversion and self-adaptors’’ (2008, p. 77). Moreover, he notes that 

the results ‘‘show no evidence for the occurrence of such cues’’ (2008, p. 77). 

In sum, neither the research in general nor specific results on high-stake lies support the assumption that liars leak cues to stress and emotion, which can be used 

for the purposes of lie detection. 

Verbal vs. nonverbal cues to deception 

The SPOT program seems to rely heavily on evaluation of nonverbal cues. This 

emphasis on nonverbal behavior as opposed to verbal content cues runs counter to 

the recommendations from research. A number of findings suggest that reliance on 

nonverbal cues impairs lie detection accuracy. First, the meta-analysis on accuracy 

in deception judgments investigated accuracy under four conditions: a) watching videotapes without sound b) watching tapes with sound c) listening to audiotapes and 

d) reading transcripts (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). The accuracy rates in the first condition, where people based their judgments solely on nonverbal behavior, was significantly lower than in the other three, which did not differ significantly from each 

other. Thus, the combined results of hundreds of studies on lie detection suggest 

that having access to only nonverbal cues impairs lie detection accuracy. 

Second, a number of studies have correlated lie-catchers’ self-reported use of cues 

with lie detection accuracy. The purpose of such analyses is to investigate whether 

failure to detect deception coincides with the self-reported use of a particular set of 

cues. The results of these studies are consistent: They show that the more frequently a participant reports relying on nonverbal behavior, the less likely they are 

to be accurate in detecting deception. First, Mann et al. (2004) investigated police 

officers’ ability to assess the veracity of suspects accused of murder, rape and arson. 

They found that successful lie detectors mentioned story cues (e.g., contradictions 

in the statement, vague responses) more frequently than poor lie detectors. Moreover, the more nonverbal cues the detectives mentioned (e.g., gaze aversion, movements, posture shifts), the lower their lie detection accuracy was. Second, Anderson 

et al. (1999) and Feeley and Young (2000) found that the more vocal cues lie-catchers mentioned, the more accurate they were in detecting deception. Third, Vrij and 

Mann’s (2001) analysis of accuracy in judging the statement of a convicted murderer 

showed that the participants who mentioned cues to stress and discomfort obtained 

the lowest hit rates. Fourth, Porter et al. (2007) found that the more visual cues 

participants reported, the poorer they were at detecting deception. 

It should be noted that reliance on nonverbal cues is associated not only with 

poorer lie detection accuracy, but also a more pronounced lie bias (a tendency to 

judge statements as lies rather than truths). That is, paying attention to visual cues 

increases the tendency for false positive errors - mistaking an innocent person for 

a deceptive one. This finding was obtained in one of the meta-analyses on deception 

judgments (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), as well as in a study of police officers’ judgments of suspects of serious crimes (Mann et al., 2004). 

The finding that reliance on nonverbal cues hampers lie detection is not surprising, given the research findings on cues to deception. These findings suggest 

that speech-related cues may be more diagnostic of deception than nonverbal cues 

(DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007; Vrij, 2008). For example, 

DePaulo et al. (2003) showed that liars talk for a shorter time (d = -0.35), and include fewer details (d = -0.30). Liars’ stories are also less logically structured (d = 

-0.25) and less plausible (d = -0.20). Liars and truth tellers differ in verbal and vocal 

immediacy (d = -0.55), and with respect to the inclusion of particular verbal elements, such as admissions of lack of memory (d = -0.42), spontaneous corrections 
74 

(d = -0.29) and related external associations (d = 0.35). These findings are in line 

with predictions from content analysis frameworks (e.g., Ko ̈hnken, 2004). 

Detecting deceptions from facial displays of emotion 

Theoretical concerns. Parts of the SPOT program seem to be predicated on the 

assumption that analyses of facial displays of emotion can improve deception detection accuracy. The claims of effectiveness for such approaches are not modest. In 

an interview with the New York Times, Ekman claimed that ‘‘his system of lie detection can be taught to anyone, with an accuracy rate of more than 95 percent’’ 

(Henig, 2006). However, no such finding has ever been reported in the peer-reviewed 

literature (Vrij et al., 2010). More broadly, there is no support for the assertion that 

training programs focusing on identifying facial displays of emotions can improve 

lie detection accuracy (Vrij, 2008). 

Apart from lack of empirical support for the effectiveness of training programs focusing on the analysis of facial displays of emotion, there are theoretical problems 

with the approach. The assumption behind the training program is that concealed 

emotions may be revealed automatically, through brief displays sometimes referred 

to as microexpressions. Implicit in this assumption is the notion that liars will experience emotions, and that leakage of emotions can betray their deceit. This seems 

to equate cues to emotion with cues to deceit. But what is the evidence that lying 

will entail emotions, while truth telling will not? Several scholars have noted that 

the assumption that liars will experience emotion is a prescriptive view - it suggests 

how liars should feel. Common moral reasoning suggests that lying is ‘‘bad’’ 

(Backbier et al., 1997). In line with this reasoning, Bond and DePaulo (2006) proposed a double-standard hypothesis to explain the discrepancy between people’s beliefs about deceptive behavior (that liars will display signs of discomfort and stress) 

and the actual findings on deceptive behavior (that liars typically do not display 

such signs). The double-standard hypothesis suggests that people have two views 

about lying: one about the lies they themselves tell, and one about the lies told by 

others (a form of fundamental attribution error; Ross, 1977). In the words of the authors: ‘‘As deceivers, people are pragmatic. They accommodate perceived needs by 

lying. [.] [Lies] are easy to rationalize. Yes, deception may demand construction of 

a convincing line and enactment of appropriate demeanor. Most strategic communications do. To the liar, there is nothing exceptional about lying’’ (p. 216). However, 

people’s view of the lies told by others is markedly different: ‘‘Indignant at the prospect of being duped, people project onto the deceptive a host of morally fuelled emotions - anxiety, shame, and guilt. Drawing on this stereotype to assess others’ veracity, people find that the stereotype seldom fits. In underestimating the liar’s capacity for self-rationalization, judges’ moralistic stereotype has the unintended effect of 

enabling successful deceit. Because deceptive torment resides primarily in the 

judge’s imagination, many lies are mistaken for truths. When torment is perceived, 

it is often not a consequence of deception but of a speaker’s motivation to be believed. High-stakes rarely make people feel guilty about lying; more often, they 

allow deceit to be easily rationalized. When motivation has an impact, it is on the 

speaker’s fear of being disbelieved, and it matters little whether or not the highly 

motivated are lying (pp. 231-232).’’ 

These are important points, in that they highlight the discrepancy between the 

perspective of the liar and the lie-catcher: People fall prey to an error of reasoning 

when assuming that the liars are plagued by emotions. They fail to take into account the pragmatic nature of lies, as well as the liar’s ability to rationalize their 

lie. Moreover, they may misinterpret the fear of a motivated innocent person as a 

sign of deceit. 

Beyond naı ̈ve moral reasoning about lies, is it psychologically sound to assume 

that people experience stress and negative emotion about lying? Can we expect that 

a criminal will experience guilt or shame about the actions he has committed, or 

that a prospective terrorist is plagued by negative feelings about the actions he is 

about to commit? They may, but given the double-standard hypothesis, we cannot 

be certain that this is the case. Apart from guilt and shame, it could be argued that 

liars may experience fear of not being able to convince. However, we must acknowledge the important fact that truth tellers might also experience such fear. For example, Ekman coined the term ‘‘Othello error’’ to describe how lie-catchers may misinterpret an innocent person’s fear of not being believed as a sign of deception 

(Ekman, 2001). Moreover, people may react not only with fear but also anger in response to suspicion. Indeed, one study found that truth tellers reacted with more 

anger to suspicion than did liars (Hatz & Bourgeois, 2010). For an innocent person, 

suspicion is obviously undeserved. An emotional reaction to such treatment fits with 

a large body of social justice research suggesting that people have affective re-
75 

sponses to violations of fairness (De Cremer & van den Bos, 2007; Mikula et al., 

1998). 

Empirical support. In sum, the concern raised above is that equating arousal, fear 

and stress with deception may rest on shaky theoretical grounds. If one rejects this 

concern and insists that such processes accompany lying, there is yet another hurdle 

to overcome. If people do experience affective processes, can they conceal them? 

Given the attention to microexpressions in the media, one might assume that there 

is an abundance of research published in peer-reviewed journals addressing this 

question. However, this is not the case. Porter and ten Brinke (2008) noted that ‘‘to 

[their] knowledge, no published empirical research has established the validity of 

microexpressions, let alone their frequency during falsification of emotion’’ (p. 509). 

They proceeded to conduct an analysis of people’s ability to a) fabricate expressions 

of emotions they did not experience and b) conceal emotions that they did in fact 

experience. Their results showed that people are not perfectly capable of fabricating 

displays of emotions they do not experience: When people were asked to present a 

facial expression different from the emotion they were experiencing, there were 

some inconsistencies in these displays. However, the effect depended on the type of 

emotion people were trying to portray. People performed better at creating convincing displays of happiness compared to negative expressions. This is plausibly 

due to people’s experience of creating false expressions of positive emotion in everyday life. With regard to concealing an emotion people did in fact experience, they 

performed better: There was no evidence of leakage of the felt emotion in these expressions. As for microexpression, no complete microexpression (lasting 1/5th-1/25th 

of a second) involving both the upper and lower half of the face was found in any 

of the 697 facial expressions analyzed in the study. However, 14 partial microexpressions were found, 7 in the upper and 7 in the lower half of the face. Interestingly, these partial microexpression occurred both during false and genuine facial 

expressions. That is, not only those who were falsifying or concealing emotions displayed these expressions; true displays of emotion involved microexpressions to the 

same extent. Porter and ten Brinke concluded that the ‘‘occurrence [of microexpressions] in genuine expressions makes their usefulness in airline-security settings 

questionable, given the implications of false-positive errors (i.e., potential human 

rights violations). Certainly, current training that relies heavily on the identification 

of full-face microexpressions may be misleading.’’ (p. 513). 

Passive vs. active lie detection 

If it is difficult, or even impossible to detect deception through analyses of leakage 

of cues to affect, how can lie detection be accomplished? The research reviewed here 

suggests that it is more fruitful to focus on the content of a person’s speech than 

to observe their nonverbal behavior, since the latter provides little valid information 

about deceit. The implication of this is that in order for lie judgments to be reasonably accurate, lie-catchers cannot simply observe targets. Instead, they should elicit 

verbal responses from these targets, as verbal messages may be the carriers of cues 

to deceit. 

The proposition that lie-catchers ought to elicit verbal responses from targets fits 

with an important paradigm shift in the literature on deception detection. In brief, 

this paradigm shift involves moving from passive observation of behavior to the active elicitation of cues to deception (Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). This shift in the 

approach to lie detection is based on the now well-established finding that liars do 

not automatically leak behavioral cues. However, that the behavioral traces of deception are faint is not necessarily a universal fact: it may be possible to increase 

the behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers by exploiting some of the 

cognitive differences between the two. The approaches to elicit cues to deception are 

thus anchored in a cognitive rather than emotional model of deception. This model 

assumes that lying is a calculated, strategic enterprise that may demand cognitive 

and self-regulatory resources: Liars have to suppress the truth and formulate an alternative account that is sufficiently detailed to appear credible, while being mindful 

of the risk of contradicting particular details or one’s own statement if one has to 

repeat it later on. Liars may experience greater self-regulatory busyness than truthful communicators, as a function of the efforts involved in deliberately creating a 

truthful impression (DePaulo et al., 2003). 

Departing from this theoretical framework, it is possible to identify several different approaches to elicit behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers. 

First, if it is true that liars are operating under a heavier burden of cognitive load 

than truth tellers, imposing further cognitive load should hamper liars more than 

truth tellers. This hypothesis has been tested in several studies, in which cognitive 

load was manipulated (for example, by asking targets to tell the story in reverse 

order) and cues to deception were measured (e.g., Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Mann, Leal, 
76 

& Fisher, 2010). In support of the cognitive load framework, cues to deception were 

more pronounced, and veracity judgments were more correct in the increased cognitive load conditions. 

A related line of research has investigated whether it is possible to elicit cues to 

deception by exploiting the strategies liars employ in order to convince. For example, this research has attempted to elicit cues to deception by asking unanticipated 

questions, based on the assumption that liars plan some, but not all of their responses (Vrij et al., 2009). In line with the predictions, liars and truth tellers did 

not differ with regard to anticipated questions, but when unanticipated questions 

were asked, cues to deception emerged. Moreover, liars’ verbal strategies of avoidance can be exploited through strategic use of background information, which elicits 

inconsistencies or contradictions between the target’s statement and the background 

information (Hartwig et al., 2005; 2006). For an extensive discussion on approaches 

to elicit cues to deception, see Vrij et al. (2010). 

Summary and directions for future research 

In summary, the research reviewed above suggests that lie detection based on observations of behavior is a difficult enterprise. Hundreds of studies show that people 

obtain hit rates just slightly above the level of chance. This can be explained by the 

scarcity of cues to deception, as well as the finding that people report relying on 

behavioral cues that have little diagnostic value. A wave of research conducted during the last decade suggests that lie judgments can be improved by the elicitation 

of cues to deception through various methods of strategic interviewing. This wave 

of research has been accompanied by a theoretical shift in the literature, moving 

from an emotional model of deception towards a cognitive view of deception. 

The SPOT program’s focus on passive observations of behavior and its emphasis 

on emotional cues is thus largely out of sync with the developments in the scientific 

field. The evidence that accurate judgments of credibility can be made on the basis 

of such observations is simply weak. Of course, it must be acknowledged that engaging travelers in verbal interaction (ranging from casual conversations to more or 

less structured interviews) is more time-consuming and effortful than simply observing behaviors from some distance. Still, the literature on elicitation of cues to deception suggests that this approach is likely to be substantially more effective than passive observations of behavior. 

Evaluation of the SPOT program. At the time this testimony is written, the DHS’s 

report on the validation of the SPOT program has yet to be released. Therefore, I 

cannot comment on the methodological merits of this validation study. However, as 

requested, I will briefly outline some methodological processes that I would expect 

a validation study to follow. First, it would be necessary to establish clear operational definitions of the target(s) of the program. What is the program supposed 

to accomplish? In order to evaluate the outcomes of the program, such definitions 

are crucial. Moverover, I would expect analyses of the outcomes of the SPOT program using the framework of decision theory. That is, a validation study should 

minimally provide information about the frequency of hits, false alarms, misses and 

correct rejections (to do this, one must have an operational definition of what a hit 

is). Those values should be compared to chance expectations based upon the 

baserate of the defined target condition. Then the obtained outcomes should be compared to a screening protocol that does not include the key elements of the SPOT 

program. For example, the outcome of a comparable sample of airports employing 

a random screening method may serve as an appropriate control group. 

In addition to analyzing the results using a decision theory framework, it would 

be desirable to empirically examine the behavioral cues displayed by targets who 

pose threats to security, and compare them to targets who do not. That is, 

videotaped recordings of these targets (to the extent that they are available) should 

be subjected to detailed coding to determine the behavioral indicators that indicate 

deception and/or hostile intentions as these travelers move through an airport. The 

behaviors displayed by such targets should be compared to an appropriate control 

group, for example, a random sample of innocent travelers. The purpose of such 

analyses would be twofold: First, the results would empirically establish the behavioral indicators of deception and malicious intent in the airport setting. Second, the 

results could be compared to the SPOT criteria to establish whether there is an 

overlap between the two sets of indicators. 

Moreover, it would be useful to evaluate the criteria on which Behavior Detection 

Officers rely to make judgments that a target is worthy of further scrutiny. That 

is, analyses of the behaviors of targets selected for scrutiny could be subjected to 

coding, to establish a) whether the officers rely on valid indicators of deception and 

hostile intentions and b) whether they rely on the criteria set forth in the SPOT 

training program. This would validate the SPOT program in a slightly different 
77 

manner, as it would assess to what extent the Behavior Detection Officers follow 

the protocol of their training. 

A problem of using field data is that important data will likely be missing. That 

is, while databases may include information about hits and false alarms from travelers who are subjected to further scrutiny, the data on misses and correct rejections 

are will be incomplete. For example, misses may not be detected for years, if ever. 

For this reason it may be appropriate to subject the SPOT program to an experimental test, in which the ground truth about the travelers’ status is known. The 

field and experimental approaches are obviously not mutually exclusive: It is possible (and perhaps even preferable) to conduct both types of validation studies, as 

the strength and weaknesses of each approach in terms of internal and external validity complement each other. A multi-methodological approach to validating the 

SPOT program may also provide convergent validity. If a concern with the laboratory approach is that participants in an experimental study would not be sufficiently 

motivated, it may be worth mentioning that it is possible to experimentally examine 

the effect of motivation on targets’ behaviors within the context of a laboratory paradigm. Some targets could be randomly assigned to receive a weaker incentive for 

successfully passing through the screening, while others receive a stronger incentive. Of course, it would not be possible to create a fully realistic incentive system 

due to ethical considerations. Still, such a manipulation could provide some insight 

into the role of motivation in targets’ behaviors, and to what extent motivation moderates the display of relevant behavioral cues. 

In closing, I will briefly note a few areas of relevance for the airport security 

screening settings that I believe future research ought to focus on. First, most research has examined truths and lies about past actions. In the airport setting, 

truths and lies about future actions (intentions) may be of particular relevance. A 

few recent studies have examined true and false statements about future actions 

(Granhag & Knieps, in press; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, in press; Vrij et al., in 

press). The studies reveal some findings in line with the research on true and false 

statements about past actions, for example in that false statements about intentions 

are less plausible (Vrij et al., in press). However, there are also some differences 

in these results. While research on statements about past actions shows that lies 

are less detailed than truths, this finding has not been replicated for statements 

about future actions. However, this body of work is still small, and further empirical 

attention is needed. Second, and relatedly, it would be valuable to attempt to extend 

the research findings on elicitation of cues to deception to airport settings. That is, 

it would be useful to establish to what extent it is possible to increase cues to deception using cognitive models when the statements concern future actions. Such 

knowledge could be translated into brief, standardized questioning protocols that 

could be used to establish the veracity of travelers’ reports about both their past 

actions and their intentions. 

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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Hartwig. If you want to add 

some suggestions, we would be glad to enter those in the record 

and entertain those suggestions that you may have. And hopefully, 

we can get those from you. 

Now, I would like to recognize our final witness and that is Dr. 

Philip Rubin, Chief Executive Officer of Haskins Laboratories. Dr. 

Rubin, you have five minutes for your oral testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP RUBIN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

HASKINS LABORATORIES 

Dr. RUBIN. Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards, and 

distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. My name is Philip Rubin. I am 

here as a private citizen. However, I currently serve or have served 

in a number of roles, both inside and outside of government, that 

might be relevant to today’s hearing. 

In addition to the activities previously mentioned by Chairman 

Broun, I am also a member of the Technical Advisory Committee 

that was formed to provide critical input related to analyses and 

methodologies used in the SPOT program. 

I was invited here today to describe the current state of research 

in science and the behavior and cognitive sciences related to laboratory studies and field evaluation of various tools, techniques, 

and technologies used in security and the detection of deception. 

My written testimony provides some brief historical background on 

selected activities in the behavioral sciences related to security and 

it mentions a variety of documents and reports, some of which I 

have here, include many produced by the National Academies National Research Council, such as consensus reports and other documents. But the written testimony focuses on two that I was involved with: a workshop on field evaluation in the intelligence and 

counterintelligence context, and a short set of papers on threatening communications and behavior. Because of time limitations, I 

am not able to describe these in detail and refer you to my written 

testimony. 

Regarding the field evaluation workshop summary, however, a 

number of the participants spoke about various obstacles to field 

evaluation, obstacles they believe must be overcome if field evaluation of techniques and devices derived from the behavioral sciences 

is to become more common and accepted. Perhaps the most basic 

obstacle is simply a lack of appreciation among many for the value 

of objective field evaluations and how inaccurate informal ‘‘lessons 

learned’’ approaches can be to field evaluation. 

A number of people throughout the process of developing this 

summary spoke about the pressures to use new devices and techniques once they have become available because lives are at stake. 
80 

This sense of urgency can lead to pressure to use available tools 

before they are evaluated, and it can even lead to ignoring the results of evaluations if they disagree with the user’s conviction that 

the tools are useful. 

As indicated earlier, I am a member of the Technical Advisory 

Committee for SPOT. As the GAO report indicates, the Technical 

Advisory Committee’s role is extremely limited. It focused in the 

main on determining whether or not the research program successfully accomplished the goal of evaluating whether SPOT can identify high-risk travelers—defined as individuals who are knowingly 

and intentionally attempting to defeat the airport security process. 

The advisory committee has not been asked to evaluate the overall 

SPOT program, nor has it been asked to evaluate the validity of 

indicators used in the program, not asked to evaluate consistency 

across measurement, field conditions, training issues, scientific 

foundations of the program, and/or behavioral detective methodologies, et cetera. In order to appropriately scientifically evaluate a 

program like SPOT, all of these and more would be needed. 

To summarize my written testimony, I would like to just mention 

a few points as highlights. These are some recommendations of 

how to move forward, so I am just going to hit some bullets. 

First, create a reliable research base of studies examining many 

of the issues related to security and the detection of deception. 

Peer review where and when possible is particularly important. 

Shining a light on the process by making information on methodologies and result as open as possible is necessary for determining if these technologies and devices are performing in a known 

and reliable manner. 

Incorporate knowledge on the complexities, subtleties, irregularities, and idiosyncrasies of human behavior. 

Next, understand the interplay and differences between affect, 

emotion, stress, and other factors. 

Make sure that we are not distracted or misled by the tools and 

toys that fascinate us. 

Pay serious attention to the ethical issues and regulations related to human subjects research, including 45 C.F.R. 46, the Common Rule, where applicable, and relevant emerging areas, including privacy concerns, neuro-ethics, and ethical implications of the 

deployment of autonomous agents and devices. 

Reduce conflicts of interest to the extent possible, including financial conflicts of interest. 

Develop an understanding of how urgency, organizational structure, and institutional barriers can shape program development 

and assessment. 

And support the importance of the need for independent evaluation of new and controversial projects and issues with appropriate 

scientific, technical, statistical, and methodological expertise. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rubin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PHILIP RUBIN

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HASKINS LABORATORIES

Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards, and Members of the Subcommittee 

on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science, Space, and Tech-
81 

nology, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. My name is Philip 

Rubin, a resident of Fairfield, Connecticut. I am here as a private citizen. However, 

I currently serve or have served in a number of roles, both inside and outside of 

government, that might be relevant to today’s hearing. In addition to the separate 

biography and resume that I have provided, I will mention some key positions and/ 

or responsibilities. I am the Chief Executive Officer and a senior scientist at 

Haskins Laboratories in New Haven, Connecticut, a private, non-profit research institute affiliated with Yale University and the University of Connecticut that has 

a primary focus on the science of the spoken and written word, including speech, 

language, and reading, and their biological basis. I am also an adjunct professor in 

the Department of Surgery, Otolaryngology at the Yale University School of Medicine. My research spans a number of disciplines, combining computational, engineering, linguistic, physiological, and psychological approaches to study embodied 

cognition, most particularly the biological bases of speech and language. 

Since 2006 I have served as the Chair of the National Academies Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences. I was also the Chair of the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Field Evaluation of Behavioral and Cognitive 

Sciences-Based Methods and Tools for Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, and a 

member of the NRC Committee on Developing Metrics for Department of Homeland 

Security Science and Technology Research. I am a member-at-large of the Executive 

Committee of the Federation of Associations in Behavioral & Brain Sciences. The 

American Institutes for Research (AIR), at the request of the Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology, is conducting a study to assess the validity of 

the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program’s primary instrument, the SPOT Referral Report, to identify ‘‘high risk travelers.’’ I am a member of the Technical Advisory 

Committee (TAC) that was formed to provide critical input related to analyses and 

methodologies in this project. The final report is expected shortly. The SPOT review 

is an ongoing activity and I have let this committee’s staff know that I have signed 

a nondisclosure agreement about aspects of the program. Since Feb. 2011 I have 

also been a member of the federal interagency High-Value Detainee Interrogation 

Group (HIG) Research Committee. From 2000 through 2003 I served as the Director 

of the Division of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences at the National Science Foundation (NSF). During that period I served as the co-chair of the interagency NSTC 

Committee on Science Human Subjects Research Subcommittee under the auspices 

of the Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy 

(OSTP) during both the Clinton and Bush administrations. I was also a member of 

the NSTC Interagency Working Group on Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences 

Task Force on Anti-Terrorism Research and Development during the Bush administration. 

I was invited here today to describe the current state of research and science in 

the behavioral and cognitive sciences related to laboratory studies and field evaluation of various tools, techniques, and technologies used in security and the detection 

of deception. My testimony will summarize some activities in these areas, particularly those with which I have personal experience, that might be of use to this subcommittee. 

Before describing some recent reports of significance, let me begin by noting some 

activities of particular relevance to behavioral science and security. The significance 

of the behavioral and cognitive sciences to matters of security was highlighted within the intelligence community in a number of articles written from 1978 to 1986 by 

Richards J. Heuer, Jr., an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency. These were 

later collected in a book, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Heuer, 1999), that surveyed cognitive psychology literature and suggested ways to apply these research 

findings to improve performance in various tasks. 

On Feb. 10, 2005, The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) released 

the report ‘‘Combating Terrorism: Research Priorities in the Social, Behavioral and 

Economic Sciences.’’ Produced by the Subcommittee on Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences, this was the first NSTC report on the role of the social and behavioral sciences (which include psychology, sociology, anthropology, geography, linguistics, statistics, and statistical and data mining) in helping the American public and 

its leaders to understand the causes of terrorism and how to counter terrorism. As 

a member of the NSTC Interagency Working Group on Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences Task Force on Anti-Terrorism Research and Development, I was one 

of the individuals who helped to draft the initial versions of this report. The focus 

of the report was on how these sciences can help us to predict, prevent, prepare for 

and recover from a terrorist attack or ongoing terrorists’ threats. A revised, printed 

form of the report was released in 2009. Speaking of this report, John H. Marburger 

III, then science advisor to the President and director of the Office of Science and 
82 

Technology Policy, said, ‘‘Our ability to maintain our American way of life depends 

on our understanding of human behavior, which is the domain of the social, behavioral and economic sciences. The report describes the powerful tools and strategies 

these sciences offer as we respond to the threats and actions of terrorists.’’ The report goes on to say, in part, that: 

‘‘Terrorism has enormous impacts beyond the immediate destruction, injury, 

loss of life, and consequent fear and panic. These impacts span the personal, 

organizational and societal levels and can have profound psychological, economic and social consequences. They apply not just to terrorist activity, but 

to other crises of national and/or regional import, such as natural disasters, 

industrial accidents, and other extreme events. Research in the social, behavioral and educational sciences has also provided the knowledge, tools, techniques, and trained scientists that are needed if we are to be prepared to understand, prevent, mitigate, and intervene where required in events related to 

such national crises.Lessons learned from previous research and development 

efforts are diverse and numerous. For example, research on the mental health 

consequences of disasters, including terrorist acts such as the Oklahoma City 

bombing, has produced a better understanding of the course of disruptive and 

disabling symptoms of distress, who is at risk of developing a serious mental 

illness, and helpful interventions to reduce trauma-related distress including 

depression and anxiety disorders. Basic economic research on how markets 

work was used by government economic advisors to devise policies that would 

provide the right incentives and not interfere with transitions in industries 

most affected by the changed security situation after 9/11.’’ 

Other important work related to the behavioral sciences and security included 

work by the Intelligence Science Board on the art and science of interrogation, described in the volume Educing Information (2006). Rapid developments in cognitive 

neuroimaging technologies (PET, fMRI, MEG, NIRS, EEG, etc.) and their possibility 

use in the detection of deception, attitude, and affect, have led to the beginnings 

of a cottage industry in what some have called ‘‘brain reading’’ or ‘‘brain 

fingerprinting.’’ In his 2006 book, Mind Wars: Brain Research and National Defense, Jonathan Moreno, discusses current concerns related to such developments. 

‘‘It’s especially hard to assess the plausibility that something such as mind reading or mind control is feasible through the kinds of devices I’ve described . . . Many 

of the technologies do seem hyped; just because national security agencies are 

spending money on them doesn’t mean they are a sure thing . . . With brain theory 

as inconclusive as it is, there are bound to be conflicting claims among 

neuroscientists about what’s technically possible and what isn’t. Since neuroscience 

hasn’t come close to finding the boundaries of its possibilities yet, that uncertainty 

is likely to persist for a long time.’’ (112-113) 

Things change rapidly in science and technology, however as recently as this 

month one of our leading cognitive neuroscientists, Michael Gazzaniga, while enthusiastic about the potential of work in the area, struck a note of caution in an article 

in Scientific American (April 2011) called ‘‘Neuroscience in the Courtroom.’’ Speaking from a legal perspective related to the admissibility of juvenile brain scans as 

evidence, he said, ‘‘In spite of the many insights pouring forth from neuroscience, 

recent findings from research into the juvenile mind highlight the need to be cautious when incorporating such science into the law.’’ . . . ‘‘Exciting as the advances 

that neuroscience is making everyday are, all of us should look with caution at how 

they may gradually become incorporated into our culture. The legal relevance of 

neuroscientific discoveries is only part of the picture.’’ 

The National Academies, comprised of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and their operating arm, 

the National Research Council, provide independent, objective advice on issues that 

affect all of our citizens’ lives. Often this advice takes that form of published documents known as consensus reports. A number of these are of particular relevance 

to today’s hearing, and I will list or summarize the most important ones. Most of 

these were produced under the supervision of the Division of Behavioral and Social 

Sciences and Education (DBASSE) of the NRC and the Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences (BBCSS) that I chair. Since its founding in 1997, 

BBCSS has developed and managed many major studies conducted by expert panels, involving hundreds of volunteers including scientists, policymakers, government 

employees, and public citizens. The goal has been to create a sustainable infrastructure for ongoing review of fundamental and translational research, to inform policy 

on issues of national priority, and to facilitate interactions among scholars and policymakers. Meetings and activities of BBCSS have been sponsored, in part, by: the 

National Science Foundation, Directorate for Social, Behavioral and Economic 
83 

Sciences; the National Institutes of Health, including the National Institute on 

Aging, Division of Behavioral and Social Research, the National Cancer Institute; 

and the Office of Behavioral and Social Science Research (OBSSR); the American 

Psychological Association; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); 

the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); and the U. S. Secret Service. For today’s purposes, the most relevant reports include: 

• The Polygraph and Lie Detection. (2003) • Human Behavior in Military Contexts. (2008) • Behavioral Modeling and Simulation: From Individuals to Societies. (2008) • Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience and Related Technologies. (2008) • Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists. (2008) • Field Evaluation in the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Context. (2010) • Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations. (2011) • Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social 

Sciences. (2011) • Threatening Communications and Behavior: Perspectives on the Pursuit of 

Public Figures. (2011) 

Time and space prevent a detailed description of these important documents. Instead I will focus on the Field Evaluation and Threatening Communications reports. 

Field Evaluation 

On September 22-23, 2009, the Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory 

Sciences of the NRC held a workshop on the field evaluation of behavioral and cognitive sciences-based methods and tools for use in the areas of intelligence and counterintelligence. The workshop was organized by the Planning Committee on Field 

Evaluation of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences-Based Methods and Tools for Intelligence and Counterintelligence that I chaired. Its purpose was to discuss the best 

ways to apply methods and tools from the behavioral sciences to work in intelligence 

operations. The workshop focused on the issue of field evaluation-the testing of 

these methods and tools in the context in which they will be used in order to determine if they are effective in real-world settings. The workshop was sponsored by the 

DIA and the ODNI and had considerable support from Susan Brandon, then chief 

for research, Behavioral Science Program DEO- Defense CI and HUMINT Center 

DIA, and Steven Rieber, then research director, Office of Analytic Integrity and 

Standards, ODNI. 

In 2010, the NRC published a Workshop Summary called Field Evaluation in the 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence Context. This short report summarized the 

meeting and highlighted key issues. Following [single-spaced sections] are extracts/ 

adaptations of the Field Evaluation Workshop Summary, edited for continuity [attribution quotes omitted], that detail some of these issues and illustrate weaknesses 

in our current approaches, while also considering future opportunities. 

In one of the workshop presentations, David Mandel, a senior defense scientist 

atDefence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), discussed the ways in 

which the behavioral sciences can benefit intelligence analysis and why it is 

important for the intelligence community to build a partnership with the behavioral sciences community.The intelligence community has long relied on 

science and technology for insights and techniques, Mandel noted, so one 

might wonder why it is necessary to talk about the importance of strengthening the relationship between the intelligence community and the broad community of behavioral scientists. One important reason, he said, is that there 

area number of factors that tend to weaken the relationship between the two 

communities and make analysts less likely to take advantage of what the behavioral sciences can offer. First, Mandel said, there is a natural inclination 

among most people- including those in the intelligence community-to react 

poorly to ‘‘scholarly verdicts that deal with issues such as the quality of their 

judgment and decision making, their susceptibility to irrational biases, their 

use of sub optimal heuristics, and over reliance on non-diagnostic information.’’ 

Like most people, experts have the sense that they are competent. Psychological research shows that most people believe themselves to be better than 

average at what they do. Thus, Mandel said, experts are prone to challenge 

conclusions offered by behavioral scientists with their own knowledge gained 

from personal experience and, furthermore, to believe that such a challenge is 

completely legitimate.This is a fundamental problem that behavioral scientists 

face in making contributions to any practitioner community, Mandel said, 

‘‘Their research is very easily disregarded on the basis of intuition and common sense. A second reason that analysts tend to disregard lessons from behavioral science is that it is seen as being ‘‘soft’’ science. Thus its knowledge 
84 

is considered to be less objective or trustworthy than knowledge generated by 

the ‘‘hard’’ sciences and technology, such as satellite imaging or electronic 

eavesdropping. Although that attitude is common in the intelligence community, Mandel cautioned, it is misguided and underestimates both the value and 

the analytical power of behavioral science. ‘‘When someone uses the term ‘soft 

science,’ I correct them. I say‘ probabilistic science’ and [note that] we deal 

with some very difficult problems.’’ Third,Mandel said, the relationship between the intelligence community and the behavioral science community is 

still relatively new, so analysts do not necessarily understand what behavioral 

science has to offer. Thus, he noted, forums like this workshop are important 

for exploring ways in which the partnership between the two communities can 

be developed. 

It is telling, Mandel noted, that no one else has come along since Heuer to continue his work of translating cognitive psychology and other areas of behavioral science into tools for analysis. In cognitive psychology alone there is at 

least a quarter century of new research since Heuer published Psychology of 

Intelligence Analysis that is waiting to be exploited by the intelligence community. Another way in which establishing a connection with the research community can help the intelligence community is with validation, Mandel said. 

Once knowledge and insights from behavioral science are used to develop new 

tools for the intelligence community, it is still necessary to validate them. Simply basing recommendations on scientific research is not the same thing as 

showing scientifically that those recommendations are effective or testing to 

see if they could be substantially improved. Even Heuer was unable to do 

much to validate his recommendations, Mandel noted, and, more generally, 

this is not something that the intelligence community is particularly well 

equipped to do. It is, however, exactly what research scientists are trained to 

do. Science offers a method for testing which ideas lead to good results and 

which do not. Thus, partnering with the behavioral science community can 

help the intelligence community zero in on the techniques that work be stand 

avoid those that work poorly or not at all. 

In theory, Mandel said, it would be possible for the intelligence community to 

build its own applied behavioral research capability, but that would draw significant resources away from other operational areas and add an entirely new 

focus and purpose to the intelligence community’s existing tasks. Furthermore, 

if the intelligence community were to hire behavioral scientists, it would find 

itself in competition with both academia, with its unparalleled freedoms, and 

industry, with its lucrative salaries. It makes more sense,Mandel suggested, 

for the intelligence community to develop partnerships with universities and 

other institutions that already have the expertise and capability to perform behavioral science research. A final advantage of partnering with the existing behavioral science community, Mandel said, is the ‘‘multiplier effect.’’ By working 

with scientists in academia, for example, the intelligence community is not 

only drawing on the knowledge of those subject-matter experts but on all of 

their contacts. ‘‘As a researcher in a research and development organization 

and government,’’ Mandel said, ‘‘I am very keen on partnering with academics 

because I understand that they have the ability to reach back into other areas 

of academia and connect me with other experts who could be of use.’’ There 

is a tremendous amount of such leverage that can be achieved by building relationships rather than trying to do everything in-house. 

In what ways might particular tools and techniques from the behavioral 

sciences assist the intelligence and counterintelligence community? A variety 

of devices and approaches derived from the behavioral sciences have been suggested for use or have already been used by the intelligence community. Several of these were described, with a particular emphasis on how the techniques 

have been evaluated in the field. As Robert Fein put it, ‘‘Our spirit here is to 

move forward, to figure out what kinds of new ideas, approaches, old ideas 

might be useful to defense and intelligence communities as they seek to fulfill 

what are often very difficult and sometimes awesome responsibilities.’’ To that 

end the speakers provided case studies of various technologies with potential 

application to the intelligence field. One common thread among all of these 

disparate techniques, a point made throughout the workshop, is that none of 

them has been subjected to a careful field evaluation. 

Deception Detection 
85 

People in the military, in law enforcement, and in the intelligence community 

regularly deal with people who deceive them. These people may be working for 

or sympathize with an adversary, they may have done something they are trying to hide, or they may simply have their own personal reasons for not telling 

the truth. But no matter the reasons, an important task for anyone gathering 

information in these arenas is to be able to detect deception. In Iraq or Afghanistan, for example, soldiers on the front line often must decide whether 

a particular local person is telling the truth about a cache of explosives or an 

impending attack. And since research has shown that most individuals detect 

deception at a rate that is little better than random chance, it would be useful 

to have a way to improve the odds. Because of this need, a number of devices 

and methods have been developed that purport to detect deception. Two in particular were described at the workshop: voice stress technologies and the Preliminary Credibility AssessmentScreening System (PCASS). 

Voice Stress Technologies 

Of the various devices that have been developed to help detect lies and deception, a great many fall in the category of voice stress technologies. I offered 

a brief overview of these technologies and of how well they have performed on 

objective tests. The basic idea behind all of these technologies is that a person 

who answers a question deceptively will feel a heightened degree of stress, and 

that stress will cause a change in voice characteristics that can be detected by 

a careful analysis of the voice. The change in the voice may not be audible to 

the human ear, but the claim is that it can be ascertained accurately and reliably by using signal-processing techniques. More specifically, many of the voice 

stress technologies are based on the assumption that micro tremors-vibrations 

of such a low frequency that they cannot be detected by the human ear-are 

normally present in human speech but that when a person is stressed, the 

micro tremors are suppressed. Thus by monitoring the micro tremors and noting when they disappear, it should be possible to determine when a person is 

speaking under stress-and presumably lying or otherwise trying to deceive. 

Over the years, these technologies have been tested by various researchers in 

various ways. A review of these studies that was carried out by Sujeeta Bhatt 

and Susan Brandon of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Bhatt and Brandon, 

2009). After examining two dozen studies conducted over 30 years, the researchers concluded that the various voice stress technologies were performing, 

in general, at a level no better than chance-a person flipping a coin would be 

equally good at detecting deception. In short, there was no evidence for the validity or the reliability of voice stress analysis for the detection of deception 

in individuals. Furthermore not only is there no evidence that voice stress 

technologies are effective in detecting stress, but also the hypothesis underlying their use has been shown to be false. If indeed there are micro tremors 

in the voice, then they must result from tremors in some part of the vocal 

tract-the larynx, perhaps, or the supra laryngeal vocal tract, which is everything above the larynx, including the oral and nasal cavities. Using a technique called electromyography to measure the electrical signals of muscle activities, physiologists have found that there are indeed micro tremors of the 

correct frequency-about 8 to 12 hertz-in some muscles, including those of the 

arm. So it would seem reasonable to think that there might also be such micro 

tremors in the vocal tract, which would produce micro tremors in the voice. 

However, research has found no such micro tremors, either in the muscles of 

the vocal tract or in the voice itself. So the basic idea underlying voice stress 

technologies-that stress causes the normal micro tremors in the voice to be 

suppressed-is not supported by the evidence. 

The claim is not that voice stress technologies do not work, only that there has 

been extensive testing with very little evidence that such technologies do work. 

It is possible that some of the technologies do work under certain conditions 

and in certain circumstances, but if that is so, more careful testing will be 

needed to determine what those conditions and circumstances are. And only 

when such testing has been carried out and the appropriate conditions and circumstances identified will it make sense to carryout field evaluations of such 

technologies. At this point, voice stress technologies are not ready for field 

evaluation. For the most part the intelligence community has now stayed away 

from voice stress technologies mainly because of the absence of any evidence 

supporting their accuracy. But the law enforcement community has taken a 

difference approach. Despite the lack of evidence that the various voice stress 
86 

technologies work, and despite the absence of any field evaluations of them, 

the technologies have been put to work by a number of law enforcement agencies around the country and around the world. It is not difficult to understand 

the reasons. The devices are inexpensive. They are small and do not require 

that sensors be attached to the person being questioned; indeed, they can even 

be used in recorded sessions. And they require much less training to operate 

than a polygraph. Many people in law enforcement believe that the voice stress 

technologies do work; even among those who are convinced that the results of 

the technologies are unreliable, many still believe that the devices can be useful in interrogations. They contend that simply questioning a person with such 

a device present can, if the person believes that it can tell the difference between the truth and a lie, induce that person to tell the truth. 

Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System 

With the reliability of voice stress technologies called into question, the intelligence community needed another way to screen for deception. Donald 

Krapohl, special assistant to the director of the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment (DACA), described to the how, several years ago, the Pentagon asked DACA for a summary of the research on voice stress technologies. 

DACA, which is part of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Department of 

Defense, provided a review of what was known about voice stress analysis, 

and, as Krapohl put it, ‘‘it was rather scary to them, and they decided to pull 

those technologies back.’’ 

The need for deception detection remained, however, and DACA’s headquarters organization, the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) (CIFA was 

shut down in 2008 and its responsibilities were taken over by a new agency, 

the DefenseCounterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center), was given 

the job of finding a new technology that would do the same job that voice 

stress technologies were supposed to perform, but with significantly more accuracy. There were a number of requirements in order for a device to be effective 

in the field: it had to have low training requirements, as it would be used by 

soldiers on the front line rather than interrogation specialists; ideally it would 

require no more than a week of training. It needed to be highly portable and 

easy to use for the average soldier. It needed to be rugged, as inevitably it 

would be dropped, get wet, and get dirty. 

And it had to be a deception test, not a recognition test. That is, instead of 

recognizing when someone knows something that they are trying to hide-the 

so-called guilty knowledge test-it should be able to detect when someone was 

giving a deceptive answer to a direct question. There is a great deal of research concerning the guilty knowledge test, Krapohl explained, but the test 

is not particularly useful in the field because the interviewers must know 

something about the ‘‘ground truth.’’ Deception tests, by contrast, are not as 

well understood by the scientific community, but they are far more useful in 

the field, where interviewers may not know the ground truth. 

The final requirement for the device was that it needed to be relatively accurate as an initial screening tool. It was never intended to provide a final answer of whether someone was telling the truth. Its purpose instead was to provide a sort of triage: when soldiers in the field question someone who claims 

to have some information, they need to weed out those who are lying. The ones 

who are not weeded out at this initial stage would be questioned further and 

in more detail. There are polygraph examiners who can perform extensive examinations, Krapohl explained, but their numbers are limited. ‘‘So if you could 

use a screening tool up front to decide who gets the interview, who gets the 

interrogation, who gets the polygraph examination, the commanders thought 

that would be very useful,’’ he said. ‘‘It was not designed to be a standalone 

tool. It was designed only as an initial assessment.’’ 

One of the key facts about PCASS is that it was designed specifically to detect 

deception, which made it possible, Krapohl said, to create an algorithm that 

considers all of the response data and provides a straightforward answer to the 

question of whether a person is being deceptive: yes, no, or maybe. It does not 

provide nearly as much information as a polygraph can, but that is not its purpose. The main use for PCASS is on the front lines where soldiers need help 

in determining who seems trustworthy and who seems to have something to 

hide. But the technique is not assumed to give a definite answer, only a conditional one. Because PCASS is used on the front lines, it has never been field 
87 

tested. Still, it has proved its value in various ways, he said. In a recent operation in Iraq, for example, it allowed U.S. forces to identify a number of individuals who were working for foreign intelligence services and others who were 

working for violent extremist organizations. 

Still, Krapohl said, there is more work to be done. The group at DACA thinks, 

for example, that by taking advantage of some of the state-of-the-art technologies for deception detection, it should be possible to develop more accurate 

versions of PCASS. In particular, by using the so-called directed lie approachin which those being questioned are instructed to provide false answers to certain comparison questions-it should be possible to get greater standardization 

and less intrusiveness, he said. Still, the issue of field evaluation remains, 

Krapohl said. Although the technique has been tested in the laboratory, there 

are no data on its performance in the field. ‘‘Doing validation studies of the 

credibility assessment technology in a war zone has a number of problems that 

we have not been able to figure out,’’ he said. Nonetheless, DACA researchers 

would like to come up with ideas for how PCASS and other credibility assessment technologies might be evaluated in the field. 

In later discussions at the workshop, it became clear that a number of participants had serious doubts about the effectiveness of PCASS in the field, despite 

the fact that it is in widespread use and popular among at least some of the 

troops in the field. ‘‘Everybody in this room knows that there are real limitations to it,’’ Fein said. ‘‘I think we can do better than put something out there 

that has such limitations.’’ And Brandon commented that ‘‘if we were doing 

really good field validation with the PCASS’’ then it might well become obvious 

that other, less expensive methods could do at least as good a job as PCASS 

at detecting deception. There are a number of important questions concerning 

the validity and reliability of PCASS that can be addressed only by field evaluation, and until such validation is done, the troops in the field are relying 

on what is essentially an unproved technology. 

Obstacles To Field Evaluation 

A number of the workshop presenters and participants spoke about various obstacles to field evaluation inside the intelligence community- obstacles they believe must be overcome if field evaluation of techniques and devices derived 

from the behavioral sciences is to become more common and accepted. 

Lack of Appreciation of the Value of Field Evaluations 

Perhaps the most basic obstacle is simply a lack of appreciation among many 

of those in the intelligence community for the value of objective field evaluations and how inaccurate informal ‘‘lessons learned’’ approaches to field evaluation can be. Paul Lehner of the MITRE Corporation made this point, for instance, when he noted that after the9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center 

there was a great sense of urgency to develop new and better ways to gather 

and analyze intelligence information-but there was no corresponding urgency 

to evaluate the various approaches to determine what really works and what 

doesn’t. 

David Mandel commented that this is simply not a way of thinking that the 

intelligence community is familiar with. People in the intelligence and defense 

communities are accustomed to investing in devices, like a voice stress analyzer, or other techniques, but the idea of field evaluation as a deliverable is 

foreign to most of them. Mandel described conversations he had with a military research board in which he explained the idea of doing research on methods in order to determine their effectiveness.’’The ideas had never been presented to the board,’’ he said. ‘‘They use [various techniques], but they had 

never heard of such a thing as research on the effectiveness of [them].’’ The 

money was there, however, and once the leaders of the organization understood the value of the sort of research that Mandel does, he was given ample 

funding to pursue his studies. 

One of the audience members, Hal Arkes of Ohio State University, made a 

similar point when he said that the lack of a scientific background among 

many of the staff of executive agencies is a serious problem. ‘‘If we have recommendations that we think are scientifically valid or if there are tests done 

that show method A is better than method B, a big communication need is still 

at hand,’’ he said. ‘‘We have to convince the people who make the decisions 

that the recommendations that we make are scientific and therefore are based 
88 

on things that are better than their intuition, or better than the anecdote that 

they heard last Thursday evening over a cocktail.’’ 

A Sense of Urgency to Use Applications and Institutional Biases 

A number of people throughout the meeting spoke about the pressures to use 

new devices and techniques once they become available because lives are at 

stake. For example, Anthony Veney, chief of counterintelligence investigation 

and functional services at U.S. Central Command, spoke passionately about 

the people on the front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan who need help now to 

prevent the violence and killings that are going on. But, as other speakers 

noted, this sense of urgency can lead to pressure to use available tools before 

they are evaluated-and even to ignoring the results of evaluations if they disagree with the users’ conviction that the tools are useful. 

Robert Fein described a relevant experience with polygraphs. The NRC had 

completed its study on polygraphs, which basically concluded that the machines have very limited usefulness for personnel security evaluations, and the 

findings were being presented in a briefing (National Research Council, 2003). 

It was obvious, Fein said, that a number of the audience members were becoming increasingly upset. ‘‘Finally, one gentleman raised his hand in some degree 

of agitation, got up and said, ‘Listen, the research suggests that psychological 

tests don’t work, the research suggests that background investigations don’t 

work, the research suggests interviews don’t work. If you take the polygraph 

away, we’ve got nothing.’’ A year and a half later, Fein said, he attended a 

meeting of persons and organizations concerned with credibility assessment, at 

which one security agency after another described how they were still using 

polygraph testing for personnel security evaluations as often as ever. It seemed 

likely, Fein concluded, that the meticulously performed study by the NRC had 

had essentially no effect on how often polygraphs were used for personnel security. 

The reason, suggested Susan Brandon, is that people want to have some method or device that they can use, and they are not likely to be willing to give 

up a tool that they perceive as useful and that is already in hand if there is 

nothing to replace it. This was probably the case, she said, when the U.S. Department of Defense decided to stop using voice stress analysis-based technologies because the data showed that they were ineffective. The user community had thought they were useful, and when they were taken away, a vacuum 

was left. The users of these technologies then looked around for replacement 

tools. The problem, Brandon said, is that the things that get sucked into this 

vacuum may be worse than what they were replacing. So those doing field 

evaluations must think carefully about what options they can offer the user 

community to replace a tool that is found ineffective. 

I offered a similar thought. The people in the field often do not want to wait 

for further research and evaluation once a technology is available and there 

are those out there that will exploit some of these gray areas and faults and 

will try to sell snake oil to us. The question is, How to push back? How to 

prevent the use of technology that has not been validated, given the sense of 

urgency in the intelligence field? And how does one get people in the field to 

understand the importance of validation in the first place? These are major 

concerns. Some of the most intractable obstacles to performing field evaluations of intelligence methods are institutional biases. Because these can arise 

even when everyone is trying to do the right thing, such biases can be particularly difficult to overcome. 

Threatening Communications 

In March 2011, the NRC released a small collection of papers on the subject of 

threatening communications and behavior. In my introduction (along with Barbara 

A. Wanchisen) to the volume, we say: 

‘‘Today’s world of rapid social, technological, and behavioral change provides 

new opportunities for communications with few limitations of time or space. 

The ease by which communications can be made with-out personal proximity 

has dramatically affected the volume, types, and topics of communications between individuals and groups. Through these communications, people leave behind an ever-growing collection of traces of their daily activities, including digital footprints provided by text, voice, and other modes of communication. 

Many personal communications now take place in public forums, and social 
89 

groups form between individuals who previously might have acted in isolation. 

Ideas are shared and behaviors encouraged, including threatening or violent 

ideas and behaviors. Meanwhile, new techniques for aggregating and evaluating diverse and multimodal information sources are available to security 

services that must reliably identify communications indicating a high likelihood of future violence.’’ 

The papers reviewed the behavioral and social sciences research on the likelihood 

that someone who engages in abnormal and/or threatening communications would 

actually then try to do harm. They focused on ‘‘how scientific knowledge can inform 

and advance future research on threat assessments, in part by considering the approaches and techniques used to analyze communications and behavior in the dynamic context of today’s world. Authors were asked to present and assess scientific 

research on the correlation between communication-relevant factors and the likelihood that an individual who poses a threat will act on it. The authors were encouraged to consider not only communications containing direct threats, but also odd 

and inappropriate communications that could display evidence of fixation, obsession, 

grandiosity, entitled reciprocity, and mental illness.’’ 

‘‘The papers in this collection were written within the context of protecting highprofile public figures from potential attack or harm. The research, however, is 

broadly applicable to U.S. national security including potential applications for analysis of communications from leaders of hostile nations and public threats from terrorist groups. This work high-lights the complex psychology of threatening communications and behavior, and it offers knowledge and perspectives from multiple domains that can contribute to a deeper understanding of the value of communications 

in predicting and preventing violent behaviors.’’ 

This volume focused on communication, forensic psychology, and the analysis of 

language-based datasets (corpora) to help identify and understand threatening communications and responses to them through text analysis. It serves as an example 

of the kind of synthesis of current knowledge that is useful for generating ideas for 

potential new research directions. (Chung & Pennebaker, 2011; Meloy, 2011; O’Hair, 

et al, 2011). 

TSA’s SPOT program 

The United States Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) May 2010 report, 

‘‘Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges,’’ questioned whether there was a scientifically valid 

basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. The report said 

that, ‘‘According to TSA, SPOT was deployed before a scientific validation of the program was completed in response to the need to address potential threats, but was 

based upon scientific research available at the time regarding human behaviors. 

TSA officials also stated that no other large-scale U.S. or international screening 

program incorporating behavior-and appearance-based indicators has ever been rigorously scientifically validated.’’ The GAO report also mentioned a separate report 

by the JASON group (‘‘The Quest for Truth: Deception and Intent Deception’’) that 

had significant concerns about the SPOT program. 

The GAO pointed out that a 2008 NRC report indicated that information-based 

programs, such as behavior detection programs, should first determine if a scientific 

foundation exists and use scientifically valid criteria to evaluate its effectiveness before going forward. ‘‘The report added that programs should have a sound experimental basis and that the documentation on the program’s effectiveness should be 

reviewed by an independent entity capable of evaluating the supporting scientific 

evidence. Thus, and as recommended in GAO’s May 2010 report, an independent 

panel of experts could help DHS develop a comprehensive methodology to determine 

if the SPOT program is based on valid scientific principles that can be effectively 

applied in an airport environment for counterterrorism purposes. Specifically, GAO’s 

May 2010 report recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security convene an 

independent panel of experts to review the methodology of a validation study on the 

SPOT program being conducted by DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate to determine whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate 

the SPOT program. GAO recommended that this assessment include appropriate 

input from other federal agencies with expertise in behavior detection and relevant 

subject matter experts. DHS concurred and stated that its current validation study 

includes an independent review of the program that will include input from other 

federal agencies and relevant experts.’’ According to DHS, this independent review 

is expected to be completed soon. 
90 

As indicated above, I am a member of the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) 

for SPOT. As the GAO report indicates, TAC’s role is extremely limited, focusing 

in the main on determining whether or not the research program successfully accomplished the goal of evaluating whether SPOT can identify ‘‘high-risk travelers’’ 

(i.e., individuals who are knowingly and intentionally attempting to defeat the airport security process). TAC has not been asked to evaluate the overall SPOT program, the validity of indicators used in the program, consistency across measurement, field conditions, training issues, scientific foundations of the program and/or 

behavioral detection methodologies, etc. In order to appropriately scientifically 

evaluate a program like SPOT, all of these and more would be needed. 

How to Move Forward: Some Recommendations 

• Create a reliable research base of studies examining many of the issues related 

to security and the detection of deception. Peer review, where and when possible, is particularly important. Shining a light on the process by making information on methodologies and results as open as possible (such as with devices like the polygraph, PCASS, voice-stress analysis, and neuroimaging) is 

necessary for determining if these technologies and devices are performing in 

a known and reliable manner. Clearly establishing the scientific validity of 

underlying premises, foundations, primitives, is essential. The larger the base 

of comparable scientific studies, the easier it is to establish the validity of 

techniques and approaches. A good example of this is the Bhatt and Brandon 

(2009) meta-analysis of the outcomes of studies in the literature related to 

voice stress analysis technologies. Similarly, the NRC Threatening Communications paper collection (2011) is an initial small step at establishing a body 

of literature on scientific approaches to understanding threatening communications and behavior. 

• Develop model systems, simulations, etc. The use of model organisms in biology, such as Drosophila (a small fly) for helping to understand genetics and 

development, and Aplysia (the sea slug), for understanding neurons and memory, has spurred considerable scientific progress in these areas. Different 

kinds of model systems are needed for understanding behavior at the level 

of issues such as deception. Here we should look to the law enforcement community, the criminal justice system, and possibly border security, for models, 

approaches, analogies, data, and scientific guidance. Examples of advances related to the complexity of behavior include well-known work on eyewitness 

identification (Loftus, 1996; Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). 

• Incorporate knowledge on the complexity, subtleties and idiosyncracies of 

human behavior. Progress has been made on understanding how cognitive influences (Heuer, 1996; Pohl, 2004), psychological biases, and language use affect judgment, decision making, and risk assessment (Kahneman & Tversky, 

1972; Thompson, 1999; Barrett, 2007). Also consider cultural and social contexts (Nisbett, 2003; Gordon, et al., in press). 

• Understand the interplay and differences between affect, emotion, stress, and 

other factors. We have a tendency to oversimplify, categorize, and label complex behavior. The issues related to such matters can be seen in the contentious scientific debates on emotion and deception, discussed by other participants in today’s hearing and summarized in part in a Nature article by Sharon Weinberger (2010). (See, also: Aviezer, et al., 2008; Barrett, 2006; Barrett, 

et al., 2007; Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 

1991; Ekman, et al., 1999; Ekman, 2009; Hartwig, et al., 2006; Russell, et al., 

2003; Widen, et al., in press.) 

• Make sure that we are not distracted or misled by the tools and toys that fascinate us. While technological developments often hold considerable promise, 

they can be seductive and sometimes even can be counterproductive. The desire for automaticity and scale, coupled with urgent exigencies, should not reduce our need to attend to human aspects of the process and to the importance of devoting sufficient time to adequately understand behavior and manage interpersonal interactions. 

• Pay serious attention to the ethical issues and regulations related to human 

subjects research, including 45 CFR 46 (‘‘The Common Rule’’), where applicable. Emerging areas include neuroethics (Farah, 2010) and autonomous 

agents (Wallach and Allen, 2010). 
91 

• Reduce conflicts of interest to the extent possible, particularly financial conflict of interest. The opportunity to profit from new and emerging technologies 

that have not been carefully and clearly scientifically validated and/or field 

evaluated, if necessary and possible, potentially puts our citizens, soldiers, 

and intelligence community at risk and could undermine our national security. We should have a clear understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of tools, techniques, and technologies that are either being deployed or 

considered for future use. 

• Develop an understanding of how urgency, organizational structure, and institutional barriers can shape program development and assessment. A detailed 

discussion of these issues is provided in the NRC Field Evaluation Workshop 

Summary (2010), summarized above in the Field Evaluation section. We 

should also strive to avoid the tendency to view results of the latest study 

as instantly confirming or falsifying controversial, new, or untested technologies (Mayew & Venkatachalam, in press). Consistency across multiple 

studies is essential. 

• Support the importance of and need for independent evaluation of new and 

controversial projects and issues with appropriate scientific, technical, statistical, and methodological expertise. The NRC Polygraph and Lie Detection report (2003) provides a good case study for the importance of this point and 

the preceding bullet. Other examples of such independent evaluations include 

many of the NRC reports listed in the References section, below. Another possible example is the JASON report on the SPOT program. Such reports 

should be seen as part of an iterative process that requires periodic modification and updating. 

In our desire to protect our citizens from those who intend to harm us, we must 

make sure that our own behavior is not unnecessarily shaped by things like fear, 

urgency, institutional incentives or pressures, financial considerations, career and 

personal goals, the selling of snake oil, etc., that lead to the adoption of approaches 

that have not been sufficiently and appropriately scientifically vetted. To do so 

might ultimately end up being costly and counterproductive. We must not be distracted from the need for careful, well-considered, and well-established approaches 

for evaluating programs and technologies. We must be careful and thoughtful before 

investing in speculative or premature technologies that may be used out of desperation or because of potential commercial benefit. Where and when new technologies 

appear to be promising, we should obtain truly independent scientific expertise and 

assistance to provide context and guidance for the development possibilities and, if 

needed, for the consideration of appropriate metrics and methodologies for assessment and use. We should also keep in mind human costs and unintended consequences. As we all know, freedom and privacy must be considered in the context 

of safety and security. These values and goals are not incompatible. Sacrificing freedom and privacy to purchase illusory safety and security benefits only those who 

hope to harm us. 

Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Edwards, and members of the Committee, I 

appreciate the opportunity to testify today. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have about my testimony or related issues. Thank you. 

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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Rubin. And I want to express 

my appreciation for your being here. I know you have had some recent challenges and I greatly appreciate you being here in spite of 

those. So thank you very much. 

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you. 

Chairman BROUN. And I want to thank all the panel for your testimony. Reminding Members that the Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes. The Chair at this point will open the round 

of questions and the Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

Mr. Willis, when can we expect the SPOT validation report? 

Mr. WILLIS. The report was delivered to me by AIR last night. 

It is being submitted through DHS’s review and release distribution process. I am not exactly sure what that time is or when it 

is ultimately disseminated. I can certainly get that information for 

you, sir. 

Chairman BROUN. I would appreciate getting that report to us as 

quickly as possible. 

Mr. WILLIS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman BROUN. What additional steps have to be taken before 

we get the report? 

Mr. WILLIS. I don’t know what DHS’s distribution process entails. I know that I will submitting it this morning following my 

participation here. 

Chairman BROUN. Do you have any problems in releasing the 

preliminary results? 

Mr. WILLIS. I don’t know what DHS’s policy is on that, but I am 

happy to provide whatever is consistent with DHS’s S&T’s policy 

on release. 

Chairman BROUN. I understand that the results, I assume, are 

still preliminary. There appears to be a discrepancy in the SPOT’s 

success rate. In your testimony you state ‘‘the study did indicate 

that a high-risk traveler is nine times more likely to be identified 

using Operational SPOT versus random screening.’’ Yet when you 

met with the staff from the I&O Subcommittee on March 3 you 

said that the SPOT program was 50 times more effective than random screening. One of our other witnesses, Dr. Ekman, also makes 

a similar claim in his testimony saying ‘‘malfeasance, felons, smug-
95 

glers, et cetera, identified more than 50 times as often by those selected by SPOT.’’ Can you please explain the discrepancy? 

Mr. WILLIS. Well, there shouldn’t be a discrepancy. We use four 

metrics by which to evaluate SPOT. The first one was the possession of illegal or prohibited items. The second one was possession 

of fraudulent documents. The third was LEO arrest, law enforcement arrest. And the fourth was a combination thereof. The LEO 

arrest has the higher number that you referred to in your question, 

sir. 

Chairman BROUN. The 50 times? 

Mr. WILLIS. Yes, sir. The possession of prohibited items and 

fraudulent documents is approximately four and a half times, and 

if one combines all of them, it is nine times. 

Chairman BROUN. Are those that were identified—how many of 

those were actually convicted? 

Mr. WILLIS. Sir, I would have no idea. Our effort stops at whether a decision is recorded as being arrested or not, and that is the 

information that is available through the SPOT database. It doesn’t 

go beyond that. 

Chairman BROUN. Do you have any data about false negatives? 

I mean false positives? 

Mr. WILLIS. On? 

Chairman BROUN. On the people that have been identified at the 

50 times or 9 times or 4–1/2 times? 

Mr. WILLIS. Are you talking about the false positive associated 

with arrests? 

Chairman BROUN. No, with arrest or—yes, sir, with arrest and 

with prosecution—the ultimate prosecution, et cetera. 

Mr. WILLIS. Yes, sir. We do have information available on that. 

So for example, if one looks at the false positive index, which is for 

every person that you correctly classify as a high-risk traveler, 

what is the number of travelers you misclassify? We have that information on any of the four metrics that we discussed. And so for 

example, combined outcome for every person that you correctly 

identify using Operational SPOT, 86 were misidentified. For the 

base rate or random study, for every person that you correctly identify, 794 were misidentified. 

Chairman BROUN. Wow. SPOT was initially developed as intended to stop terrorism. That is the whole point of it. Now, we see 

that the program has expanded to include criminal activity. Why 

was this done? 

Mr. WILLIS. You are asking a question about the mission. I am 

from Science and Technology, sir. I am unable to answer that. May 

I refer you to TSA? 

Chairman BROUN. Well, that is the reason TSA should be here 

and the reason that I think Ms. Edwards and I are both extremely 

disappointed that they are not here. 

Mr. WILLIS. I could, sir, talk to you about why we use metrics 

that deal more with criminal than with terrorism. 

Chairman BROUN. That would be sufficient—or helpful. 

Mr. WILLIS. Sure. 

Chairman BROUN. You have got a few seconds, so go ahead. 

Mr. WILLIS. Okay, sir. 

Chairman BROUN. My time is out. 
96 

Mr. WILLIS. The reason we use those metrics that we had just 

listed, sir, was because they were available to us through the data 

in sufficient numbers to analyze, even though they themselves are 

low base rate or extremely rare. And data directly dealing with terrorism is unavailable and, thus, can’t be used as a metric. 

Chairman BROUN. Okay. My time is up. Ms. Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as I mentioned 

earlier, I am disappointed that TSA isn’t here because I think that 

there are a number of questions that actually go to things like 

training protocols and other aspects of the SPOT program that they 

would have, you know, really useful information to share and so I 

look forward to working with the Chairman and the Committee. 

This question about who needs to appear or not is not a decision, 

really, for the Administration. Congress determines, under its Constitutional authority, who appears before the Committees and what 

the jurisdiction is. So I do share that concern. 

I want to go to this question, though, of profiling—— 

Chairman BROUN. Does the gentlelady yield? 

Ms. EDWARDS. Yes. 

Chairman BROUN. I appreciate your comment. You took up about 

almost a minute with that and I would like to give you an extra 

minute on top of that, so I don’t want to charge you that time. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. So I will give you the extra minute. So if you 

all would start her clock again, please. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I 

have a question, really, that goes to this issue of profiling. I mean, 

as an African American woman who sometimes, because I have 

short hair and I get cold, I wear a scarf on my head and that is 

true in the airports especially. I have had the experience of actually being pulled over, questioned, and it hasn’t just happened once 

or twice. It has actually happened multiple times. And, you know, 

I don’t want to make any speculation about that, but it does raise 

the question of who is identifying me and how and what I am sending off. 

I am also reminded in Dr. Hartwig’s testimony that, you know, 

I remember when I broke a lamp and I tried to glue it together and 

my mother walked in and she said what did you do? And I suspect 

that part of the reason that she could say that and she knew—and 

then I proceeded to tell her a lie, but I suspect that part of the reason that she knew I was lying is because she knew me and because 

she had had experience with me and because she had read my both 

verbal and nonverbal cues many times over, which gave her a 

much better indication of when I was doing truth-telling and when 

I wasn’t. 

We don’t have that experience in our airports, and so I have a 

question for Lieutenant DiDomenica, and that is whether it is possible to train officers of all kinds not to engage in profiling? And 

I have done police training, law enforcement training as well, and 

I think it is tough to train out culture, culture in the sense of a 

police culture and a law enforcement culture where you have to 

train against type when it comes to these issues. And so I am curious, Lieutenant DiDomenica, if you can share with us whether it 

is possible to train officers not to engage in profiling? 
97 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. I believe it is so and I have been training in 

biased policing and racial profiling for over a decade now. Principally, with the state police I designed statewide programs for the 

Massachusetts police community on racial profiling, biased policing, and it is possible to make people aware of their own unconscious bias and tendency to want to make snap decisions about people based on very superficial things. We all have this hardware, it 

is a survival instinct, and when we look at somebody, we are automatically making an opinion about them. And a lot of it has to do 

with our background and cultural influence, and a lot of those are 

negative. But, you know, this part of your brain is about survival, 

and it wants to understand what is going on very quickly. And it 

actually gets a jump on your conscious awareness. So right away 

when I walked in here and you saw me and I saw you, we made 

a decision about each other before we were even consciously aware 

of who we were and what we are. And that is going on all the time. 

And this is the source of bias. 

Now, knowing that I can’t stop my feelings about someone based 

on how they look, that initial survival reaction about whether the 

person might be dangerous or not, but I can take a few seconds, 

maybe minutes, to think about, you know, what is going on, what 

do I know objectively, and maybe even do some race transposition. 

If this person was another race, you know, how would I feel about 

the situation? And then I can make a decision. So it takes selfawareness. It takes training. It takes the ability—willing to change 

and monitor yourself. But it can be done. 

One of the foundations of the behavior assessment training I 

have done and what I initially gave to TSA for the SPOT program 

is you have to address bias and racial profiling. In fact, I call it— 

you know, it was—to me it was an antidote to racial profiling—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. Lieutenant DiDomenica, I would love to hear but 

I just have just a minute and a half left and I wanted to get to— 

I appreciate your answer. I wanted to get to Dr. Ekman because 

I have to tell you, you have been unnerving me the entire time I 

have been in here and I am sure we have been reading those cues. 

And I wonder if you have something to share with us on this issue 

of whether you can train against those kind of—what could be negative instincts in one context but train them to be positive factors 

in recognizing behavior? 

Dr. EKMAN. Yes. And thanks for the opportunity to respond to 

that. I wanted to quickly put in that we did research years ago that 

show that the better you knew someone, the worse you were in 

identifying when they lied to you because you are biased. If they 

are your friend, your spouse, et cetera, you don’t want to discover 

that they are lying. Strangers do better than close people. 

But the issue is monitoring—building into the SPOT program 

some monitoring to discover the actual incidents of racial profiling. 

And my bet is that some people show a lot more of it than others. 

Not everybody can learn everything. Not everybody can unlearn everything. What we want as BDOs are the people who have the 

flexibility of mind to benefit from that training and be susceptible 

to racial profiling. How can we find out? It is not rocket science. 

It is by having unannounced observers checking on who is it they 

pay attention to and finding out whether there are some people 
98 

who are repeatedly showing racial profiling. And you either reeducate or you reassign them to a different job. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Dr. Ekman, and thanks for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. You know, we will always be friends and I will 

always give you some variances on the time so I am not going to 

be worried about that at all. 

Dr. Benishek, you are up next for your questions. Go ahead, sir. 

Mr. BENISHEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the panel, 

as well, for being here. 

It is our job here to try to spend the money of the taxpayer the 

most efficacious way and listening to the testimony here, it is really difficult for me to determine whether this SPOT process is accurate or not. But I would like to address Mr. DiDomenica about the 

process a little bit more. From your comments today it seems as 

if there is some doubt, I mean, even after the BDO sees some kind 

of behavior, then what is the process after that? If there is someone 

there, it sounds as if you have some doubt as to the next step as 

to what is happening, the next screening step. Are those people not 

trained in the same thing? I mean I would hate to see somebody 

get missed. So I would like to know more about the exact process 

from the moment that the person gets taken out of the queue. Is 

that effective? Is it—are we doing any good? Are we missing people? I mean, this is the kind of thing I think you brought up in 

your testimony. 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. I think it is effective and I also think we are 

missing people, but I think that could be improved. The process actually starts with an observation that may indicate a person that 

is high-risk, that maybe should not get on that airplane or get onto 

that train or into that government building, whatever the critical 

infrastructure is. And based on the evaluation, this SPOT scoring, 

which I really can’t go into because that is, you know, that is sensitive information. 

But there are two levels, and one is more screening, and one is 

a law enforcement response. So for the people deemed to be the 

most high-risk, the protocol is to invite or call a law enforcement 

officer to do a follow-up interview. Now, this follow-up interview is 

the opportunity to address the false positives, because a lot of people that exhibit the behaviors that may indicate possible terrorist 

intent or criminal intent are just people that are upset or distracted or late for work or going to a funeral, whatever it is, that 

maybe a lot of people just get on the radar. And this interview, 

which really only takes a couple of minutes to do, is the opportunity to resolve that so you are not creating false positives. And 

it is also an opportunity to determine if you have got the real 

thing, that this person is high-risk. And so that is another skill. I 

mean that is the interview skill, which is another part of this process. So there are—— 

Mr. BENISHEK. Are those people skilled enough in your opinion? 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. When you say ‘‘those people’’—— 

Mr. BENISHEK. The people—the secondary person. Are there 

enough of those people? 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. I think the responsibility ultimately falls on 

police officers when there is a high-risk person. I think they are ca-
99 

pable. Every day they are making decisions around this country 

whether to arrest somebody, not to arrest somebody, use lethal 

force in some cases, deny people their freedoms, and so I don’t 

think it is too much to ask them to make a decision, is this person 

a high-risk person and do we need to slow down the process to figure out what is going on? I think they are capable of doing it. We 

are doing it—whether this program gets funded or not, cops are 

making these decisions every day. But I would like to see them get 

more training and more support to make them better at what they 

do. And this program has that potential. 

Mr. BENISHEK. All right. Thank you. I don’t know where we are 

at with the time, but I will yield back the remainder of my time, 

if any. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Doctor. I just want to say your 

questioning just shows further why TSA should be here so that we 

could answer those questions, because if they were, then you could 

direct it to the TSA individuals and it would be very instructive to 

the whole Committee, Democrats and Republicans alike, and help 

us to go forward. 

The next person on the agenda is my friend, Mr. McNerney. You 

are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. And I appreciate you calling this 

hearing. It is interesting. I have watched ‘‘Lie to Me’’ on occasion 

and I find it is compelling but not too scientific in my opinion. But 

it is good for us to examine this issue and see how much utility 

there can be from it and how much money should be expended to 

find that utility. 

Dr. Hartwig, I think I heard you say—and you can correct me 

if I am wrong—that you fail to see how knowledge of the indicators 

could be useful. 

Dr. HARTWIG. I think that is, again, an empirical question. There 

isn’t enough research on—well, there is a lot of research on demeanor cues, but as far as I know, there is no study that tests 

whether knowledge about, for example, micro-expressions help people not display them. But that would be a second step. It would be 

a good first step to establish that these expressions occur reliably. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Okay, and I was—— 

Dr. HARTWIG. So countermeasures come second. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Hartwig. And I was going 

to follow up with you, Dr. Ekman, to basically say would you agree 

that knowledge of those indicators would also be useful to potential 

wrongdoers? 

Dr. EKMAN. We don’t know. I mean you are basically asking the 

question in polygraph terms is could you develop countermeasures? 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Right. Right. 

Dr. EKMAN. A proposal I put in to the government to find out— 

I mean I have reason to believe that the Chinese know the answer 

because they were sending me questions that you would want to 

prepare on if you were going to do a training study to see whether 

you could inhibit people from showing not just micro-expressions 

but there are dozens of items on that checklist. The—our government has not decided that it is worth finding out whether you can 

beat the system. Other governments are finding out and may be selecting people who can and training them so they can. We just 
100 

don’t know. We know about the polygraph. We know countermeasures are quite successful. We know about some verbal means 

and we know they are quite successful. 

If I can have a moment more, sir. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Yeah, go ahead. 

Dr. EKMAN. You heard some complete contradictions between Dr. 

Hartwig and myself. I think if you look carefully at the literature, 

you would find that it comes out supporting me. But how can you 

know? And I think you need to do, when you get a disagreement 

among scientists, is you need to establish an advisory panel, experts, who have no vested interest and no connections to hear from 

the people who disagree and look at the literature and resolve it 

because you are really being given, in this testimony, advice that 

is 180 degrees opposite in terms of is there a scientific basis for 

what is being done? 

But you could argue—and I don’t know whether Mr. Willis 

would—that if this validity study holds up to scientific scrutiny, to 

everyone who has looked at it, to this Committee, if it is as successful as the report is, you have got to be doing something right to 

get that kind of success. So maybe it—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. It—— 

Dr. EKMAN. —is of scientific interest to find out. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Dr. Ekman. Mr. Lord is chomping 

at the bit here. Go ahead. 

Mr. LORD. I would like to respond to Dr. Ekman’s point. In fact, 

that was the key recommendation of our May 2010 report was to 

have an independent panel review the results of this current AIR 

validation effort. We think it is very important for a panel to be 

established that has no ties to the current program, that is not an 

advocate of the current program, to help weigh in on this very 

issue. I think it is very interesting that the panel today shows a 

lack of consensus, which was the basic point I made in my earlier 

statement. There is no scientific consensus—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, a subject like this you would expect to 

be—a broad range of disagreements. Has a panel—like what you 

are recommending—been suggested in one of the budgets or lined 

out somewhere or is this something—— 

Mr. LORD. Yeah, DHS agreed to establish an independent panel 

to review the methodology of the AIR validation effort, as well as 

to review the final results, but as Mr. Willis indicated, the final results of this latest validation effort have only recently been submitted. I believe he said as of last night. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. I think I have run out of time so I am going to 

yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Mr. Hultgren, five minutes. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you all for being here. 

I share the frustration with some of the others that TSA is not here 

today. I am a new Member here at Congress, along with quite a 

few others, and so have been traveling much more in the last 3 

months than I have ever traveled in my life. In fact, just on Monday, the trip out here, I had my first experience of the full treatment by TSA out of O’Hare and it was interesting. Didn’t realize 

that it involved turning your head and coughing, but I now know 

that that does—is what it is. But, you know, it is important for us 
101 

to have these discussions again to protect our liberty and freedom, 

while at the same time making sure that we have security. So I 

do thank you for your role. What I am learning is that we have got 

a lot more work to do and a lot more discussion that needs to take 

place. 

I just have a couple questions. Dr. Rubin, if I can address my 

questions to you if that would be all right. Much has been made 

about the science and research behind the ability for an individual—or in this case, BDO—to detect emotion, deceit, and intent 

in another individual based on a combination of verbal and nonverbal and micro-facial expressions. I wonder, speaking broadly 

and keeping it as simple as you can for those of us laymen, could 

you just tell us the state of the science as it relates to the detection 

of emotion, deceit, and intent of behavioral cues? 

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. In general I guess I would agree with Dr. Ekman 

in the sense that we are at the point where there are two things 

going on. If you look at something like voice stress analysis and 

look at the meta-analysis done by Sujeeta Bhatt and Susan Brandon coming out of the Defense Department. What you basically see 

in most of these studies is that the results are no different than 

chance. Agreeing with both Dr. Hartwig and Ekman, there is a lot 

of controversy here and there is very little real science and validation. 

And it is not just that field evaluation when you can’t do it. 

Again, there has been a committee established on the SPOT Program regarding the report. I am on that committee. And we have 

not been asked to do any overall scientific validation for the program, just to look at one particular thing, are the results different 

than chance? So I am agreeing here that what is really needed on 

these issues, before we continue to invest more money, is to really 

establish, without putting any information at risk, a baseline about 

what is doable, what is not doable, what is known, and what is not. 

So this is the classic issue of do you test first and then field a 

product or project? Or field it and test? And this particular instance, considering the investment, considering the intrusion on 

people’s privacy, I think it is absolutely time to be testing, validating, and scientifically exploring these things now before we continue to do significant investment. I am not saying we shouldn’t 

continue the program. I think it is important. But right now we 

need to establish on some of the known kind of things that we are 

doing without giving anything away. Is there good science behind 

it? Otherwise, we are simply throwing money down the drain. 

Mr. HULTGREN. I think kind of following up on that, one of the 

concerns that operators have is that behavioral science is not dismissed because there are issues dealing with the validation of specific cues. Can you speak for a moment on the importance of behavioral science in counterterrorism context and then what its limitations are, what its strengths are as far as our work for 

counterterrorism? 

Dr. RUBIN. Okay. Well, we are changing the topic a little bit because we are moving to counterterrorism. I think that the behavioral work is broad in counterterrorism. I think it is extremely important. Again, when we get to counterterrorism, you are broadening your argument out because you get to analysts. There has 
102 

been an excellent report from an NRC Committee chaired by Barouche Fish. There is a lot that is known. 

And again, we touched on some of this and a number of the panelists did. You are starting to get involved in behavioral issues of 

attitude, of biases. Some of this was described in the original intelligence work of Richards Heuer on cognitive biases. There is a lot 

that we know. The issue becomes structural and organizational. 

Consider, two things. What do we know? And what don’t we 

know? With the stuff that we do know, how do we make sure it 

is being most effectively used by the intelligence community and by 

whomever else needs to use it on those issues where we are not entirely clear? Where things are uncertain or controversy, how can 

we move ahead? And then there are emerging technologies that we 

are going to start to be seeing used. We see some of them in terms 

of the kind of devices like x-ray, but things like euro-imaging, remote imaging, and sensing of other things. That is where I was 

speaking of the seduction of technology. I support that stuff greatly, but we need to make sure on stuff that is new and emerging 

that we also get a handle on it. 

So I think the behavioral tools and technologies are stuff is growing rapidly, and are extremely important, but I think we are not 

developing a comprehensive approach to appropriately evaluating 

them before deploying them in the field. 

Mr. HULTGREN. I see my time is up. I do want to thank you all 

for being here. I do feel like this is a start of a discussion that we 

need to continue, so I appreciate so much all of you being here. I 

also would ask for any advice any micro-facial expressions I might 

have so I don’t have to go through that examination again. That 

would be helpful. So pass that along to me. Thank you. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Hultgren. I ask unanimous 

consent that the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, be allowed to 

sit on the dais with the Committee and participate in the hearing. 

Hearing none, so ordered. Mr. Mica, you are recognized for five 

minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you. And first of all, thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, Mr. Broun, and Ranking Member Edwards and other 

Members of the panel. 

I have great interest in the subject that you have before you. As 

you may know, I was involved in the creation of TSA when I 

chaired the Aviation Subcommittee in 2001 for some six years after 

that and watched its evolution. 

First, I might say that I am absolutely distraught that your Subcommittee would be denied by TSA the opportunity for them to be 

here and possibly learn something or participate. I don’t want you 

to feel like they are just ignoring you. They have ignored our Committee and others, so they have a history of this. And I will work 

with you and others. In fact, I think we need to convene a panel 

of Chairs of various Committees and somehow rein this Agency in. 

And it has an important mission. I am just stunned, again, that 

they would not have someone at least to hear from the excellent 

panel of witnesses you have had here today, particularly when they 

come and ask for more money. 

Let me just tell you my involvement with the SPOT program, 

again, as Chair of the Committee that created it. I followed TSA 
103 

in its successes and failures and we have deployed a lot of expensive technology out there, and unfortunately, the technology does 

not do a very good job and the personnel failure performance rate 

is just off the charts. 

And if you haven’t had the classified briefing on the latest technology, which are both the backscatter and the millimeter wave, I 

urge you to do that. I had GAO review that in December of last 

year and then the pat-down, which was sort of their backup new 

procedure, which they put in place the end of last year. And then 

I had that reviewed by GAO in January. But that failure rate is 

totally unacceptable. 

The way we got started on SPOT is I found the technology lacking in reports of performance both by screeners and the equipment 

they used as leaving us vulnerable, particularly after the Henchmen bombers. And I think we bought some puffer machines at the 

time. I remember going up, having those tested. They didn’t work 

but they promised me they would. They deployed them and they 

didn’t work. So we needed something in place. We encouraged looking at the Israeli model and you can’t really adopt the Israeli model 

because they have a much smaller amount of traffic. We have 2/ 

3 to 3/4 of all the passenger traffic in the world and that is part 

of America. You know, you get on a plane, you go where you want. 

People just have a magic carpet through aviation in this country. 

That is how we started this. I have observed their operations and 

I can’t evaluate them. We had GAO evaluate them and you have 

some representatives here to tell you that the failure rate is unacceptable. It is almost a total failure. If it wasn’t money and personnel, maybe it wouldn’t matter, but they have got 3,300 SPOT 

officers, I believe, in the program and they have got a quarter of 

a billion dollars in expenditures and asking for more. 

What I heard today is that, again, it doesn’t work. I had to leave 

before I heard all the suggestions and I would look for—. Some of 

the suggestions on the amount of time to do a verbal interview 

would improve it, but maybe finding some way to get us to a number that we could have some exchange. 

Ms. Edwards made some excellent points in her opening comments, too, that we have got to have some way to improve this and 

that unless there is some verbal exchange, I think that we are with 

this standoff observation, we are wasting time, money, and resources. So I don’t have a specific recommendation for the replacement. I do know what is in place does not work. But I can’t tell 

you how much I appreciate your Subcommittee taking time to review this matter and try to seek a better approach, a better 

science, and better application of something that is so important. 

Because we are at risk. These people are determined to take us 

out. 

I just came from another meeting, the folks that developed both 

backscatter and millimeter wave, which is two technologies we are 

using, and the scary thing there is we had witnesses in one of the 

other hearings that said that both of those technologies will not be 

able to detect either body cavity or surgical implants. And we already see that they are always going one step ahead of whatever 

we put in place. So we have got a failed system, we are spending 

a lot of money on it, it is supposed to provide us with a backup. 
104 

The information we have and the review of the performance shows 

that it is not doing that and it needs to be replaced or dramatically 

revised if it is going to be effective in keeping us from this next set 

of threats. 

So those are my comments. I would ask that if you have suggestions, we do have an FAA bill which we can include some positive 

suggestions. We couldn’t do that in the House side because of jurisdiction, but we can do it in conference and the door has already 

been opened by the Senate. And I would love to hear recommendations from you and from those who participated today how we can 

do it better. So thank you for allowing me to participate. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, thank you, Chairman Mica. I appreciate 

your being here and appreciate your comments. I can speak for Ms. 

Edwards. We both are very concerned about national security. We 

both are concerned about civil liberties. We both are concerned 

about that we make sure that the flying public are safe and I appreciate her input. And I hope that you will find some way that 

maybe we will have those terrorists subjects that we can put in a 

study so that maybe some kind of behavioral science could be developed to try to identify these folks. 

We will go to our next round of questioning. So I will recognize 

myself for five minutes for questioning. Even if SPOT is more than 

nine times more effective than random, we still are talking about 

very low base rates. Lieutenant DiDomenica who states in his testimony that the base rate for terrorism is .000000—I think one more 

0, 6—I hope I didn’t get too many zeros and did not leave that one. 

Can any of the panelists help put that into perspective? Anybody? 

Mr. Lord? 

Mr. LORD. Sure. That statistic implies that acts of terrorism are 

very rare events. That makes it very difficult to test the efficacy 

of the program and develop, as we recommended in our report, performance metrics to allow you to better judge whether the program 

works as designed. But we don’t think that should deter you from 

trying to craft what we would call proxy measures, other measures 

that help you get at this at least indirectly. And we made that very 

important recommendation, and TSA and DHS agreed to try to develop these indicators. 

There is one step we think they could take that would make this 

exercise a lot more useful, currently they use a very long list of behaviors, the exact number and the characteristics are considered 

sensitive security information. But we posed a question, how do 

you know this is the right number? And they also assign point 

scores to each of these behaviors. Again, the details are sensitive 

security information. But that would be one way that we think 

would make the program more useful in identifying potential acts 

of terrorism, validate the point system, scrub the list of behaviors, 

cull the list, and try to come up with something that is more related to an eventual arrest or a hostile act. And there are ways to 

do that statistically. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Lord. Anybody else? Mr. Willis, yes? 

Mr. WILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So first off, proxy measures are a standard part of research, especially in the area of terrorism, because again, there are no direct measures in sufficient 
105 

quantities, typically, to use for terrorism. Criminal activity is often 

used as a proxy measure. It is an accepted practice mainly because 

when one is looking for terrorism or acts of terrorism in a lot of 

transit areas, you are looking for somebody who is coming in to try 

to use some false identification or you are looking for somebody 

who is smuggling. And both of these things are represented in 

higher numbers, even though they are still low base rate numbers 

in criminal activity. And so that is why that is typically used and 

used by other organizations as proxy measures. So I want to make 

sure that we were comfortable that we had given forethought to 

that and used what is a best practice for proxy measures, sir. 

Chairman BROUN. Dr. Ekman? 

Dr. EKMAN. There are a number of organizations. I work with 

airport security in England. I have seen the videos of the bombers 

before they bombed. I have worked in Israel where they do a lot 

of, of course, security. But even within our own government, the 

different parts of DOD that deal with counterterrorism and the attempts to identify terrorists in field military situations, there is no 

sharing of information. There is a lot of information out there that 

hasn’t been brought together. It is sensitive, but it needs to be 

brought together and then with that database, take a look at what 

is on the SPOT list. I haven’t seen what is on the SPOT list for 

four years so I don’t know how it has changed and I don’t know 

how it has been informed by research findings from our group and 

other groups and from observations by Special Forces, by our counterintelligence, by NYPD. There is a lot of information in this country in separate little pockets that hasn’t been brought together. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you. My time has expired. For my 

questioning now, I recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Edwards, 

for five minutes. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go to a question that was raised by Mr. Mica’s comments when he was here. 

And I just want to be clear that from the perspective of GAO and 

the report and analysis that you have done, Mr. Lord, we don’t yet 

know if the SPOT program is ‘‘a fiasco.’’ Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. LORD. Yes, that is absolutely correct. Those were his words. 

That is not in our vocabulary. Thank you. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And just to be clear again, what metrics again 

would you use to determine the success or failure as an operational 

program? 

Mr. LORD.Since we have identified several instances of terrorists 

transiting through the U.S. system, studied the videotapes of their 

movement. Are they, in fact, exhibiting signs of stress? Are they, 

as some literature suggests, they don’t typically emote much because they believe they are going on to a more blissful state. So it 

is unclear to us at this juncture whether there would be discernible 

signs of stress or fear. But there is videotape evidence that would 

allow you to get at that and we think that would be invaluable in 

fine-tuning the program. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Yeah, I think I highlighted that in your testimony 

because there are a number of examples that we have. And I wonder, Mr. Willis, has DHS made an attempt to pull together not just 

video evidence here in the United States but with our international 

partners to do some kind of an assessment stacked up against the 
106 

screening techniques that have been identified to see whether we 

are on target? It is an awful lot of money to spend without, you 

know, putting it up against real-time data. 

Mr. WILLIS. Thank you. Again, I represent DHS Science and 

Technology, not the operational community. From a—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. This is a science question. 

Mr. WILLIS. Yeah, from a Science and Technology perspective, we 

are attempting to locate video of terrorist threats in other countries, as well as within the United States. And it is very difficult 

to try to get access to that information or to successfully get access 

to that video. And so if—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. Well, part of the reason that we pulled DHS together is because it was—you know, because it is a, you know, a 

collection of all of our, you know, sort of security and investigative 

interests under one house to work with our international partners. 

And so it is a little staggering to me to know that you have not 

had the capacity in now a decade to look at video and use it to 

make an analysis about whether the techniques that you seem to 

be employing are—would be successful. I mean that seems to me 

kind of a basic scientific question that DHS should be in a position 

with our partners internationally and here in the United States to 

get that video and, you know, conduct some real scientific analysis 

of that. So I would urge DHS to consider that. 

I want to go to Dr. Hartwig for a minute because in your testimony you indicated that there are some other recommendations 

that you might make and I wonder if you could just describe very 

briefly those to us because I don’t think you had an opportunity 

here in your testimony. 

Dr. HARTWIG. Right. I think it is roughly captured by what Mr. 

Mica said before he left, that is it important to engage a person in 

conversation to elicit cues to deception. Overall, the research shows 

that statements carry some cues to deception. And also there is an 

emerging wave of new research that focuses on how to create cues 

to deception, how to elicit cues to deception because there is such 

an abundance of research showing that people don’t just automatically leak. So my basic answer is that some form of questioning 

protocol, some kind of brief interview protocol that is based on the 

scientific research on how to elicit cues to deception, how to ask 

questions so that the liars and truth-tellers respond differently. I 

think that would be a worthwhile enterprise. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So you are not really saying—and this is a yes 

and no—saying scrap the program, but you are saying that there 

are areas where we need to significantly improve the techniques 

that we are using to take us down a track of really being able to 

identify potential terrorists? 

Dr. HARTWIG. Yes, I think if efforts would be spent on the questioning part of the program, that would put it much more in line 

with the scientific research. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. We have been 

joined by the Congresswoman from Florida, Ms. Adams. You are 

recognized for five minutes. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Willis, earlier you said 

that there had been 71,000 referrals and you made a distinction of 
107 

that, the behavior leading to arrest. How many of those were arrested? 

Mr. WILLIS. Of the 71,000? 

Mrs. ADAMS. Yes. 

Mr. WILLIS. That is the random selection method. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Correct. 

Mr. WILLIS. 71,000 were referred in the random selection. Nine 

arrests were made. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Nine? 

Mr. WILLIS. Yes. 

Mrs. ADAMS. And in the other method? 

Mr. WILLIS. Using SPOT 23,000 and a little bit were referred and 

151 were arrested. 

Mrs. ADAMS. And the types of arrests? 

Mr. WILLIS. I don’t have the nature of the arrests in the data 

that we looked at, ma’am. 

Mrs. ADAMS. So it could have been belligerency or any other 

thing for that matter? 

Mr. WILLIS. Some of them were for prohibited items that were 

on them at the time. Others could have been through outstanding 

warrants or something of that nature, ma’am. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Do you think that I have an appearance or would 

I be a target for SPOT? I mean every time I go through the airport 

I get pulled aside and searched. And the reason I ask that is because, you know, being a past law enforcement officer and trained, 

I have some concerns about the way you are identifying pulling 

people aside. Dr. Hartwig, you said you wanted—you thought the 

program would work if more tools were available. Would it be better to use a validated system as opposed to one that is untested 

and invalidated? 

Dr. HARTWIG. Well, first of all, I didn’t say that about that the 

program would work. I was talking about where I think more emphasis should be spent or put. 

Mrs. ADAMS. So even with the more emphasis do you believe that 

it would work? 

Dr. HARTWIG. I don’t know. I think we would need a properly 

conducted study to find that out. And I think it would be important 

to go beyond examining the arrest rates and to look at what are 

the actual behaviors that are displayed by these people who are arrested and to compare those behaviors with those that are in the 

list of queues. I don’t know what those queues are because it is not 

available. And to look at are the SPOT criteria actual indicators. 

So I think that—it is definitely—we need to know whether it works 

or now. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Mr. DiDomenica, you are a law enforcement officer. 

I am a past law enforcement officer. Do you believe that the TSA 

employees have enough training and the skills sets based on the 

training they are receiving to—you know, to provide this type of 

screening at this level? 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. I think with a proper follow up by trained law 

enforcement that they do. But if we don’t have the proper follow 

up by the police officers to figure out what is going on because this 

is just like an alarm. It is like going through the magnetometer 

and beeps. Well, what does that mean? So someone comes over and 
108 

pats you down. Well, the cops are like the pat-downs. All right. 

Why did this beep? And so if you have that level of follow up by 

trained law enforcement, I am comfortable with the training they 

receive. But without that level of follow up, I am not comfortable. 

Mrs. ADAMS. So would it be your opinion that there needs to be 

more training? 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. Yes. 

Mrs. ADAMS. I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Adams. Mr. Willis, I have got 

another question for you. Does TSA plan to use R and D to improve 

the SPOT program or does it believe the program cannot be improved upon? 

Mr. WILLIS. We do have some ongoing research with them and 

if I may say this is one of the beginning research elements that we 

have with TSA, sir, and in fact it was started in 2007 prior to 

GAO’s interests. Its focus is specific, not to evaluate absolutely everything going on with SPOT. That is a huge tasking of which we 

are not tasked or resourced to do. This is looking at the indicators, 

the checklist itself, the existing checklist. 

The first question that needs to be asked from a scientific perspective is does the checklist as it is currently put together and as 

it is currently deployed accomplish its mission. You would like to 

be able to compare that against random and against something else 

that has been shown to be out there and valid, but the fact is that 

there isn’t another behavioral-based screening out there employed 

by any other group that we are aware of, either in the United 

States or abroad, that has been statistically validated. And so we 

have not been able to address that. So we compared this against 

random, which is the first scientific basis. 

Chairman BROUN. So TSA is doing research? 

Mr. WILLIS. We are doing research that supports TSA. 

Chairman BROUN. Ms. Edwards, do you have another question? 

Ms. EDWARDS. I do, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to follow up with you, Mr. Willis, because I am confused. My understanding is that you shared with our staff that there is a pool video 

available of suicide bombers and the like that could be used to 

study. And I mean I would expect that if TSA were operating the 

right kind of way that would also be used for training. And so I 

am a little confused by your answer and I just want to be clear. 

Do we have video both from ourselves and perhaps from our international partners that we could use to assess the techniques that 

have been developed and the questions that—the assessment questions that have been developed so that we can make sure that we 

have a program that is working as effectively as we know it can 

work? 

Mr. WILLIS. We don’t presently have a sufficient number of videos to conduct scientific analysis on. S&T is attempting to work 

with our partners in the United States and internationally to gather these, but being a resource organization, we do not have the 

ability to compel operational organizations, much less international 

ones to provide us with that video. What we are doing is attempting to continue to collect that at—the best we can, as well as to 

conduct other kinds of supporting things such as interviews of direct eyewitnesses to suicide bombings, international subject matter 
109 

experts in the area to go beyond what the current validation study 

was, which is of the existing indicators, to try to help establish 

from a scientific perspective what is being used operationally 

abroad and, in fact, what is being witnessed by, again, eyewitnesses and subject matter experts so that we may be able to 

then bring that information back and test it to see—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. Is S&T doing that or TSA? Who—— 

Mr. WILLIS. That is S&T research, ma’am. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Okay. And so I guess I mean for the—for our Drs. 

Hartwig and Ekman, it would be useful, wouldn’t it, to have a pool, 

a real data pool to be able to assess that and develop a research 

protocol that enabled us to stack our assessment tools against that? 

And so my question, though, for Mr. Willis whether or not—what 

agency do you think is—would be the responsible one to get this 

pool together? Is it DHS? Is it TSA? Mr. Lord? 

Mr. WILLIS. I don’t know the right organization for that. 

Mr. LORD. In our report, we made 11 recommendations. One of 

the recommendations was to use and study available video recording to help refine the SPOT program. In their formal Agency comments, the Department indicated they agreed and they were taking 

steps to do that so I think the Department is already on record for 

saying they agreed. It is a good idea. We are going to do it. So I 

mean they are—they bought into this idea. To the extent they have 

actually implanted it, we will have to follow up and see the extent 

they have addressed it. But just so—to clarify, DHS has bought 

into this idea. They have already agreed to do it. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. And then finally, Mr. Lord, since you 

already have the microphone, DHS hasn’t done a cost/benefit analysis on the program or a risk assessment. And it is my understanding that they don’t do a great job actually—and I apologize 

for the critique—of either conducting cost/benefit analyses or risk 

assessments for many of their programs. How do we know if we 

even need the program? 

Mr. LORD. Well, typically, as part of our analysis, we would look 

at the cost/benefit analysis or the risk assessment to study, number 

one, how they decided—for example, you need a risk assessment, 

we would assume, to show where you needed to deploy the program. It is at 161 airports, so our question was how did you establish this number? Did you have a risk assessment? And the answer 

was no. They are in the process of ramping up the program now. 

Every year, you know, the funding has increased. We assumed that 

would be justified by a cost/benefit analysis. They don’t have one 

yet, although to their credit they have agreed to complete both a 

risk assessment and a cost/benefit analysis. But traditionally, we 

would expect to find that early at program inception, not 4 or five 

years after you deployed a program. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Well, thank you all for your testimony. And Mr. 

Chairman, I would just say for the record, it would be good to get 

a cost/benefit analysis and risk assessment before we spend another, you know, $20 million, $2 million, or $2 on the program. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman BROUN. And I agree with you, Ms. Edwards. Ms. 

Adams, you are recognized. 
110 

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The program, Mr. Willis, has 

been ongoing since 2007? Is that what I heard? 

Mr. WILLIS. The validation research study has been ongoing 

since 2007. 

Mrs. ADAMS. A validation research study since 2007. And I heard 

you say there was no system out there that you could use that was 

validated or available, is that correct? 

Mr. WILLIS. We are unaware of any behavioral-based screening 

program that is used that has been rigorously validated, yes. 

Mrs. ADAMS. What about Israel’s program? 

Mr. WILLIS. We have not located any study that rigorously tests 

that. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Did they study it? 

Mr. WILLIS. We are not provided any information—— 

Mrs. ADAMS. Did you ask? 

Mr. WILLIS. Yes. 

Mrs. ADAMS. And they have said they would not provide it? 

Mr. WILLIS. We have not been—they didn’t say they wouldn’t 

provide it. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Okay. So it is maybe the way you were—you asked 

for it maybe? I am trying to determine, since ’07 you have been 

doing a study. We don’t have anything validated. You can’t give us 

a cost/benefit analysis. We are four years out and when you say 

there is no other programs out there, there are some out there, I 

believe. Mr. DiDomenica, are there programs out there? 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. There are similar programs—excuse me. There 

are similar programs for behavior assessment, principally for law 

enforcement. I mean I have been teaching BASS. There is a DHS 

program called—it is proved by DHS called Patriot. I have another 

training course called HIDE, Hostile Intent Detection Evaluation. 

But these programs are given, it may be a few days of training, 

and then people go off and do their thing. There is no follow up, 

in other words, how successful it is. I mean people, I think, are getting good ideas, they are getting good techniques, but it is not done 

in a way where it can be measured and followed up on, and I think 

that needs to be done. 

Mrs. ADAMS. And these programs are all from DHS also? 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. There is one that is approved. In other words, 

it is approved for funding. And—but they are not DHS programs. 

Mrs. ADAMS. Okay. So they are funded but they are trying to 

then—they are kind of sent out and there is no true follow up. Is 

that what you are saying? 

Mr. DIDOMENICA. Yeah, there is no collection of data about success or failures or effectiveness. It is like a lot of law enforcement 

training, and you are probably aware of this, that you go in for a 

class, you sit there for a week, you get a certificate, and you walk 

out the door and that is the end of it. So I think, unfortunately, 

that just falls in line with a lot of the training that is done. And 

I think for this program, it is—you know, what is at—for what is 

at stake, we need to be better at how we follow up on this. 

Mrs. ADAMS. I know in my certificate we had to go back for training every so often or else we lost our certificate. So I can relate to 

having to keep your training and your skills honed. I appreciate 

that. No more questions, Mr. Chair. 
111 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Adams. I want to thank the 

witnesses for being here today. I appreciate you all’s testimony and 

I appreciate the Members, all the questions that we have had. This 

is a very interesting topic. I am, again, very disappointed the TSA 

has refused to come because there are a lot of questions that I 

know Ms. Edwards and I both would like to have asked TSA if they 

had graced us with their presence. And hopefully we don’t have to 

go down the road of requiring them to be here in the future. But 

we will look into that and they will be here at some point, I hope 

voluntarily. And I hope you will pass that along to the folks that 

are in the position to make that decision. 

Members of the Subcommittee may have additional questions for 

the witnesses, and we ask that you all will respond to those in 

writing. The record will remain open for two weeks for additional 

comments by Members. The witnesses are excused and the hearing 

is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(113) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
114 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Stephen Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, 

Government Accountability Office 
115 
116 
117 
118 

Responses by Mr. Larry Willis, Program Manager, Homeland Security Advanced 

Research Projects Agency, Science and Technology Directorate, 

Department of Homeland Security 

Questions submitted by Chairman Paul C. Broun 

Q1. Question: Does S&T’s evaluation seek to validate the underlying behavioral indicators that form the basis of the SPOT program? 

A1. Response: The scope of the study was to conduct an operational examination 

of the existing indicators contained within the Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT) Referral Report. The results of the study provide evidence 

to support the criterion-related validity (classification accuracy) of the SPOT Referral Report. In a comparison of Operational SPOT and random screening selection 

outcomes, the classification accuracy for Operational SPOT was significantly more 

accurate in identifying high-risk travelers as defined by possession of serious prohibited and illegal items (weapons, fraudulent documents, etc.) and law enforcement arrests. This finding was based upon a comparison of Operational SPOT and random 

screening at 43 airports for a period of nine months and included over 23,000 Operational SPOT screenings and 70,000 random screenings. 

Q2. Question: For the purpose of the S&T study, you describe ‘high risk travelers’ 

as ‘‘those passengers in possession of serious prohibited and/or illegal items or 

individuals engaging in conduct leading to an arrest.’’ 

a. Why is ‘terrorism’ not included in the definition of high risk travelers? 

A2 a. The number of terrorists identified as traveling through airports is too infrequent to support the inclusion of terrorists as high-risk passengers in an empirical 

comparative analysis of screening methodologies. In keeping with the best practice 

of developing proxy measures, the Science and Technology Directorate’s study defined high risk travelers using behaviors common to both terrorists and criminals, 

such as attempting to conceal identity and smuggling of potentially dangerous materials. 

b. Has the definition of high risk travelers changed from when SPOT was first implemented? If so, how? 

A2 (b.) The definition has not changed. 

Q3. At a recent Oversight and Government Reform hearing, TSA stated that it was 

introducing training for screeners to put travelers at ease while going through 

screening. 

a. What impact would this, and other countermeasures employed by travelers such 

as training to hide indicators, or anti-anxiety drugs, have on a BDO’s ability to 

identify an individual intending to cause harm? 

A2 (a.) Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) indicators are 

based on the involuntary physical and physiological behaviors that occur when a 

person has a fear of discovery. Research supports that these behaviors are difficult 

to countermeasure. First, involuntary behaviors originate in an area of the brain 

that individuals do not have control over. People cannot stop these behaviors from 

occurring; rather they must try to mask or suppress them once they are triggered. 

Second, nonverbal behavior is more complex and more difficult to control than 

verbal communication because there are many areas of nonverbal behavior an individual needs to control, such as facial expression, posture, etc. Third, deception is 

a cognitively demanding state, and this makes body movements even more difficult 

to control, because people have lower cognitive capacity when they are trying to lie. 

Research has not yet examined how medication, surgery, disguise, or drugs affect 

human behavior in these situations, and this research is needed by the scientific 

community. Even though medication or drugs may suppress some behaviors and 

body movements, they may produce other signals to suggest that the person has 

taken this medication. 

Q4. How does TSA ensure that BDOs are using indicators to screen passengers rather than something more troublesome like profiling or racial bias? 

A4. Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) and candidates are trained to identify behaviors, and work to resolve any suspicions based on the training protocols. The BDO 

training distinguishes between subjective profiling and proven scientific methods. 

They are specifically trained not to consider ethnicity or race-and or other traits 

that are not associated with behavior. Additionally, BDOs work in teams which aids 

in integrity. Furthermore, the program office regularly performs Standardization 
119 

Visits with refresher training. Finally, the Screening of Passengers by Observation 

Techniques (SPOT) Transportation Security Managers, who are the first line supervisors to the BDOs, are required to spend time on the floor monitoring the BDOs 

to ensure they are applying the behaviors in accordance with the SPOT standard 

operating procedures. 

Q5 a. On what basis was the SPOT checklist of indicators selected? 

A5 (a.) The behavioral indicators incorporated within Screening of Passengers by 

Observation Techniques (SPOT) are based on both law enforcement experience and 

the most recent scientific findings. 

Additionally, the work of Dr. David Givens, Director of the Center for Nonverbal 

Studies, was utilized in selecting the SPOT behaviors. Dr. Givens is recognized as 

an expert in nonverbal behavior. Behaviors outlined in his Nonverbal Dictionary 

were selected based on their relationship to stress, fear, and deception cues associated with the fear of discovery and integrated into the SPOT program. 

Q5 b. Why doesn’t the S&T study evaluate the validity of the indicator list? Do you 

believe this would be helpful? 

A5 (b.) The Science and Technology Directorate’s (S&T) study did directly evaluate 

the indicator list as executed through the existing Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). 

Q6. According to the GAO report, S&T officials ‘‘agreed that SPOT was deployed before its scientific underpinnings were fully validated.’’ (p. 15). Additionally, in 

discussing the S&T study, the GAO report states, ‘‘S&T’s current research plan 

is not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection and appearances can 

be effectively used to reliably identify individuals in an airport terminal environment who pose a risk to the aviation system.’’ (p. 20). Additionally, in the first 

paragraph of Dr. Maria Hartwig’s written testimony, she says, ‘‘In brief, the accumulated body of scientific work on behavioral cues to deception does not provide support for the premise of the SPOT program. The empirical support for 

the underpinnings of the program is weak at best, and the program suffers from 

theoretical flaws.’’ 

a. Prior to implementing SPOT, why did TSA not validated the science behind the 

program? 

A6 (a.) Prior to the Transportation Security Administration’s Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, no behavior-based program 

had ever been rigorously scientifically validated. The program was established on 

widely accepted principles supported by leading experts in the field of behavioral 

science and law enforcement. 

b. Why did the S&T validation study not validate ‘‘whether behavior detection and 

appearances can be effectively used to reliably identify individuals in an airport 

terminal environment who pose a risk to the aviation system?’’ 

A6 (b.) The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) sponsored study did directly 

examine the extent to which ‘‘behavior detection and appearances,’’ as represented 

in the existing Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT) indicators, can be effectively used to identify high-risk travelers, which is an examination 

of classification accuracy (criterion-related validity). Results of the study found support for criterion-related validity; that is, there is evidence that the SPOT indicators 

are accurate in identifying outcomes and is significantly more accurate in doing so 

than random screening. 

c. How do you respond to Dr. Hartwig’s comment? 

A6 c. During the recent testimony, Dr. Rubin responded to a similar question by 

stating that the published research literature on the link between behavioral, physiological, and verbal cues to deception and general suspicious behaviors is mixed, 

rather than non-supportive as represented by Dr. Hartwig. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) agrees with Dr. Rubin’s assessment. 

Q7. Who originated the SPOT program, was it Carl Maccario, as Dr. Ekman states 

in his written testimony, or was it Lieutenant DiDomenica, who says his PASS 

program was the basis for SPOT? Response: After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 

behavior recognition and analysis concepts were adapted and modified by the 

Massachusetts State Police (MSP) Troop F (Lieutenant DiDomenica) assigned to 

Boston Logan International Airport (BOS). Their program was modified to meet 

the legal, social, political, financial, and resource limitations of the United 

States and was merged with drug interdiction techniques used by United States 
120 

law enforcement. MSP named this program Behavior Assessment Screening System and trained all law enforcement officers assigned to BOS in its use as an 

enhanced security measure to the newly instituted security checkpoint screening 

system of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

The Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program was developed by TSA (Carl Maccario), with assistance from MSP, to meet TSA-specific security and public service needs, with particular emphasis on the protection of individual civil rights, privacy, and to mitigate possible complaints of racial profiling. 

a. What role did the Israeli model play? 

A7 (a.) The SPOT subject matter expert was initially trained in Israeli Behavior 

Pattern Recognition (BPR). Many of the BPR concepts are contained in SPOT such 

as informally interacting with passengers who are in line at the security checkpoint 

queue. 

b. What aspects of the Israeli model are based on behavioral science? 

A7 (b.) TSA defers to the Government of Israel to respond as appropriate, as they 

are the subject matter experts on their security model. 

Q8. Dr. Ekman distinguishes his experiments from those of his critics by emphasizing that his focus is on ‘‘high stake lies, in which the person lying has a lot 

to gain or lose by success or failure.’’ He specifically addresses the work conducted by Dr. Hartwig, stating, ‘‘She has dealt with low-not-high-stake lies 

which have little relevance to my work or to the situation faced in SPOT.’’ Conversely, Dr. Hartwig states, ‘‘Neither the research in general nor specific results 

on high-stake lies support the assumption that liars leak cues to stress and emotion, which can be used for the purposes of lie detection.’’ 

a. Given these opposing views, what is your assessment? 

A8. As Dr. Rubin stated during his testimony, the published research literature is 

mixed on the topic of behavioral, physiological, and verbal cues to deception and 

general suspicious behaviors. Ideally, one might expect greater consensus and support from the academic research base prior to fielding a screening program; however, academic research alone is insufficient. Once a screening program is fielded, 

regardless of how supportive the academic research base may be, prudent research 

requires the conduct of operational experiments to validate the effectiveness of the 

screening program and if effective, to then conduct additional research to optimize 

its effectiveness. The reality is that behavior-based screening is currently used operationally by DHS, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. intelligence community, 

law enforcement, and by numerous other countries. Increased focus should be applied to conducting field research on these programs. 

Q9. Please indicate each and every research effort that the DHS Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) is conducting on behalf of the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA). This should include all efforts the S&T Directorate is 

taking on behalf of TSA and not simply be limited to work that S&T is performing regarding the TSA SPOT program. 

Please include in this list the following information: 

• The name of the TSA effort DHS S&T is supporting. 

• The purpose of the S&T research or task. 

• The amount of financial reimbursement S&T is receiving from TSA for each effort. 

A9. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) partners with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on several research and development tasks. 

Below are the projects and associated funding from FY 2010 reimbursed by TSA: 

(NOTE: * indicates projects are funded by TSA and do not appear in S&T budget 

documents) 

Project Name: Secure Carton 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop (at the request of TSA and DHS Policy) a shipping carton 

embedded with security sensors that detects tampering or opening of the carton 

once closed. It is scalable and applicable across various shipping modalities, including maritime and air cargo, and can communicate a tamper event of the internal cargo to a radio frequency identification reader, when interrogated. The 

interaction with TSA has been to keep them informed of the project. S&T intends to test the product for inclusion on the TSA qualified products list. Secure 

Carton is a Phase-III Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) - Phases I & 
121 

II were funded by S&T SBIR Program and Phase III was funded with S&T Borders and Maritime Security Division FY09/10 project funds. 

Project Name: Secure Wrap 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Secure Wrap is being developed for TSA and DHS Policy. It is a 

flexible wrapping material that provides a visible indication of tamper evidence 

and can be deployed with little to no change to current supply chain logistics and 

processes. The interaction with TSA has been to keep them informed of the 

project. S&T intends to test the product for inclusion on the TSA qualified products list. Secure Wrap is a Phase-II SBIR with all funding provided by DHS S&T 

SBIR Program. 

Project Name: Autonomous Rapid Facility Chemical Agent Monitor Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop a low-cost, fully autonomous, chemical vapor monitor that 

is intended to ‘‘detect-to-warn’’ of the presence of up to 17 chemical warfare 

agents and high-priority toxic industrial chemicals within a single device at both 

immediately dangerous to life and health and permissible exposure limit concentrations. The monitor will be able to operate continuously in closed or partially enclosed facility 24hrs/day, 365 days/yr. 

Project Name: Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop and sustains expert reach-back capabilities to provide 

rapid support in domestic emergencies. The CSAC serves as the Nation’s first 

centralized repository of chemical threat information (hazard and characterization data) for analysis of the Nation’s vulnerabilities to chemical agent attacks. 

To ensure a cohesive effort to evaluate threats and countermeasures, CSAC conducts key analytical assessments, such as material threat assessments (MTAs), 

hazard assessments, and the Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA). The 

DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection, Office of Health Affairs, TSA, and Intelligence & Analysis are the primary DHS customers for CSAC products. CSAC 

provides completed MTAs to Health and Human Services to fulfill BioShield requirements. 

Project Name: Model Large-Scale Toxic Chem Transport Release Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: $800,000 

Description: Focus on developing an improved understanding of large-scale releases of toxic inhalation hazards. Aspects of the project include improved modeling, first responder procedures, and industrial safety in addition to the development of enhanced mitigation strategies. 

Project Name: Canine Detection R&D Project (FY10) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Assess the performance of TSA certified explosive detection canine 

teams when screening air cargo. This effort is in support of the TSA National 

Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) effort to independently 

test performance measures in operational environments in order to make decisions on concepts of operations. Independent experts collect and present the data 

from canine operational assessments and make recommendations on canine 

training or deployment to optimize canine explosives detection. 

Project Name: Homemade Explosives (HMEs) Stand Alone Detection Project 

(FY10) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Identify, evaluate, and improve HME detection technologies and 

screening methods through the collection and analysis of detection data and images from a wide variety of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) explosive detection 

systems (EDS), computed tomography, and x-ray diffraction equipment. This 

helps TSA determine how to improve screening system performance through 

hardware and software (image processing) upgrades. In addition, this project 

evaluates COTS explosives detection equipment in laboratory settings to determine detection limits, false-alarm rates, and documents unique homemade explosive (HME) properties for detection exploitation. 

Project Name: Air Cargo Project (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: FY 10 $1.1 million 

Description: Identify and develop next generation screening systems to mitigate 

the threat of explosives placed in air cargo containers. Activities include developing technologies to enable more effective and efficient air cargo screening (in-
122 

cluding break-bulk, palletized, and containerized configurations screening) with 

reduced operational costs and false-alarm rates. 

Project Name: Algorithm and Analysis of Raw Images (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop a non-proprietary database of explosive-detection images 

which will be provided to all detection-program participants. Collect and consolidate images, including those of novel explosives, from commercial vendors and 

coordinates the purchase of additional images and data from computed tomography, explosive detection systems, trace, emerging devices and other technologies. The evaluation of these images will help determine the causes of false 

alarms over many types of scanning systems. 

Project Name: Automated Carry-On Detection (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop advanced capabilities to detect explosives and concealed 

weapons in carry-on luggage. This project also will introduce new standalone or 

adjunct imaging technologies, such as computed tomography, to continue the improvement of checkpoint detection performance and the detection of novel explosives. 

Project Name: Automated Threat Recognition (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop and evaluate automated target recognition algorithms for 

advanced imaging technology in a test bed with the goal to automatically and 

reliably detect threats on passengers, eliminating the need for human interpretation in order to improve detection and false alarm performance and reduce privacy concerns. The December 25, 2009 incident clearly shows the importance of 

detecting threats hidden on passengers’ bodies. This research will guide further 

enhancements necessary to reach full-scale development and deployment. 

Project Name: Detection Technology and Material Science (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Evaluate advanced detection algorithms, improves explosives detection and develops and tests advanced materials for trace sample collection. 

Project Name: Explosives Trace Detection (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop advanced capabilities to detect explosives (including 

homemade explosives) through improved trace sampling and detection technologies. Develops trace detection standard materials that can be used as field 

performance standards for deployed trace detection systems. Characterizes trace 

explosives chemical and physical signature properties to inform advanced trace 

detector system design. 

Project Name: Checked Baggage (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: FY 10 $5.5 million 

Description: Drive commercial development of next-generation systems that 

will substantially improve performance and affordability of checked baggage 

screening. Commercial development is driven when the test results referred to 

below are incorporated into TSA’s increased performance requirements for 

screening systems. Vendors must then meet these requirements for consideration 

during TSA acquisition. Test and evaluation of these systems will focus on probability of detection, number of false alarms, and throughput. The project also 

measures affordability of these systems by evaluating initial purchasing cost, operating costs, maintainability, and other elements of the full life-cycle costs. 

Project Name: Mass Transit (formerly Suicide Bomber) (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Identify the infrastructure characteristics and security concept of 

operations for surface transportation systems in order to drive a security technology development strategy designed to combat the explosive threat within the 

operational requirements of the transportation systems. Assessments will be conducted at transit authorities to frame the technology development solution space. 

Currently fielded technologies will be evaluated for potential enhancement. 

Project Name: Next Generation Passenger Checkpoint (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: FY 10 $2.1 million 

Description: Develop the next-generation detection system architecture to 

screen passengers for explosives at aviation checkpoints. This project also investigates new emerging liquid- and gel-based explosive threats and includes them 

in a comprehensive detection system. 
123 

Project Name: Predictive Screening Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Derive the observable behavioral indicators and develops technologies to automatically identify, alert authorities to, and track suspicious behaviors that precede suicide bombing attacks. The Science and Technology Directorate will test technologies at ports-of-entry, transit portals, and special events. 

Project Name: Aircraft Vulnerability Tests (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: FY10 $6.6 million 

Description: Assess the vulnerability of narrow- and wide-body aircraft passenger cabins and cargo holds to explosives. These vulnerability assessments will 

analyze blast/damage effects of explosives and determine the minimum threat 

mass required to cause catastrophic damage to various aircraft types. The assessments will also identify the detection limits for bulk screening systems. Develop and assess hardened unit load devices (HULDs) for blast mitigation in air 

cargo. These HULD development efforts will provide reduced weight air cargo 

containers for blast protection while minimizing impact on commerce. 

Project Name: Homemade Explosives (HME) Characterization (FY10/FY11) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Determine the impact, friction, and electrostatic-discharge sensitivities of HME threats. This data facilitates the safe handling and storage of 

HME materials during research and development activities. Technology efforts 

to identify, evaluate, and improve HME detection technologies and screening 

methods through the collection of raw data and images from a wide variety of 

commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) explosive detection systems (EDS), computed tomography, and x-ray diffraction equipment are also conducted. This helps TSA 

determine how to improve EDS performance through hardware and software 

(image processing) upgrades. In addition, this project evaluates COTS equipment 

in laboratories to determine detection limits, false-alarm rates, and documents 

unique HME properties for detection exploitation. 

Project Name: Facility Restoration Demonstration Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop a systems approach to response and recovery of critical 

transportation facilities following a chemical agent release. This project develops 

remediation guidance, efficient pre-planning tools, identifies decontamination 

methods, identifies sampling methods, and develops decision analysis tools. 

Project Name: Operational Tools for Response and Restoration Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop a suite of state-of-the-science indoor-outdoor predictive 

tools to characterize the extent and degree of biological contamination, incorporating the best-available deposition, degradation, and surface viability data. 

This project will provide validated interagency sampling plans and improved statistical sampling design to support characterization and decontamination planning. 

Project Name: Bridge Vulnerability Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: None 

Description: Develop an understanding of the vulnerabilities of different types 

of bridges to terrorist threats. This project will evaluate vintage bridge components to improve understanding of explosives effects and to refine blast modeling 

tools. The approach is unique in that it examines actual bridge sections exposed 

to wear or aging instead of fabricated specimens. As a result, it will provide more 

accurate vulnerability information for aging bridges and allow for refinement of 

existing numerical models that predict failure of bridge components. The project 

is using the Golden Gate Bridge, Crown Point Bridge (New York State - Lake 

Champlain), and Manhattan Bridge (New York City East River), and the Fort 

Steuben Bridge (Ohio) for homeland security research on potential effects of an 

improvised explosive device (IED) attack and other plausible threats against a 

bridge. These efforts are in partnership with the Maine Department of Transportation (DOT), NY DOT, NYC DOT, Ohio DOT, Golden Gate Bridge Authority, 

and the Federal Highway Administration. 

Project Name: Blast/Projectile – Protective Measures and Design Tools 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: None 

Description: Identify and evaluate protective measures and design guidance for 

protecting the Nation’s most critical infrastructure assets. The project considers 

novel materials, design procedures, and innovative construction methods to aid 

in constructing or retrofitting infrastructure. This will numerically analyze pro-
124 

tective designs against blast and projectile threats and conduct physical demonstrations to assess effectiveness. 

Project Name: Advanced Incident Management Enterprise System (AIMES) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: None 

Description: Develop the next-generation incident-management enterprise system and builds upon the Unified Incident Command and Decision Support architecture and Training, Exercise & Lessons Learned framework. This will integrate all elements of the incident management enterprise to provide a secure, 

scalable, interoperable, and unified situational awareness to the responder community. 

Project Name: Rapid Mitigation and Recovery Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: None 

Description: Investigate, assess, and develop candidate technologies and methodologies that will reduce or eliminate the release of toxic inhalation hazard 

(TIH) from the two threat scenarios of interest (.50 caliber AP and small IED). 

Assess potential TIH mitigation technologies, to include development of interface 

documentation to ensure that identified technologies can be integrated into any 

existing and or future rail car design efforts. Mitigation technologies and approaches to be assessed include: Self-sealing Technologies and Blast and Fragment Penetration Resistant Materials. 

Project Name: Blast Projectile-Advanced Materials Design 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: None 

Description: Assess the risk to a tunnel or mass transit station due to a terrorist attack that has the potential of causing catastrophic losses (fatalities, injuries, damage, and business interruption). Information from Integrated Rapid Visual Screening Tool (IRVS) can be used to support higher level assessments and 

mitigation options by experts. In coordination with TSA, IRVS for Mass Transit 

Stations and Tunnels were tested in various cities: Boston (Boston Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Cleveland, St. Louis, and others. 

TSA will use the tool to enhance risk assessments of transportation hubs around 

the country. In addition to TSA, potential users include Office of Infrastructure 

Protection, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Commercial and Government Facilities, State and local governments, code officials, associations of engineers and architects, the design and construction industry. 

Project Name: Community Based CIP Institute 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: FY11 $1million 

Description: The shipment of hazardous materials provides a significant target 

for terrorists. The ability to track hazardous materials (HAZMAT) shipments on 

a real-time basis is essential for providing an early warning of an impending terrorist threat. The University of Kentucky (UK) will design and organize a functional prototype of a HAZMAT truck tracking center. This project supports a 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) program that tracks motor carrier 

shipments of security-sensitive materials. Collaborating with UK on the project 

are Morehead State University, Coldstream Digital and General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems. The prototype software is integrated with ‘‘smart 

truck’’ technology and will contain operational components that will integrate reporting and shipping information with a real-time tracking and situation display 

capability. 

Project Name: Suspicious Activity Reporting Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: None 

Description: S&T is developing an enhanced analytical tool prototype for the 

Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), Investigations Division. This application, 

now named iConnex, is a suite of analytical tools that allows investigators to 

search, find, explore, link, visualize and understand relationships within Suspicious Activity Reports and other law enforcement data sets. The iConnex application is under development using predominantly open-source technologies. The 

application’s architecture targets the technical needs of the law enforcement 

community by being able to work with an array of structured and unstructured 

data. The system is designed to be user friendly, and does not require extensive 

training or support to reach operational capabilities. Once completed, iConnex 

will be made available to any DHS component or law enforcement agency as a 

cost-free Government Open Source solution. 

Project Name: Law Enforcement Data Fusion 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: None 
125 

Description: The Science and Technology is working with Federal Air Marshal 

Service (FAMS), Investigations Division to develop a geospatial predictive analytics product that will detect, forecast, and disrupt future terrorist attacks and 

criminal activity - leveraging predictive analytic algorithms and software developed for the Department of Defense community that successfully ‘forecast’ improvised explosive device locations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This capability will provide FAMS with actionable guidance on the most effective location and allocation 

of agents to place on high risk flights as well as providing them with increased 

knowledge of the tactics and procedures of the adversary. This effort utilizes a 

cloud-computing environment in which national data (Homeland Security Infrastructure Protection Gold, among others) are being brought together and analyzed to support the FAMS mission to discern threats and forecast the location 

of attacks. As this technology matures at FAMS, the final product will be made 

available to any DHS component or law enforcement agency as a cost-free Government Open Source solution. 

Project Name: Cross-Cultural Validation of Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Provide empirical validation of existing behavioral indicators employed by DHS’ operational components to screen passengers at air, land, and 

maritime ports, including those indicators contained within TSA’s SPOT. This effort complements the automated prototype work and supports development of an 

enhanced capability to detect behavioral indicators of hostile intent at a distance. 

The project will integrate these validated behavioral indicators into the screening concept of operations through each component’s existing training programs. 

Project Name: Future Attribute Screening Technologies Mobile Module (FAST 

M2) 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop a prototype screening facility containing a suite of realtime, non-invasive sensor technologies to detect behavior indicative of malintent 

(the intent or desire to cause harm) rapidly, reliably, and remotely. The system 

will measure both physiological and behavioral signals to make probabilistic assessments of malintent based on sensor outputs and advanced fusion algorithms. 

Federal, state, and local authorities may use the fully developed FAST system 

in primary screening environments to increase the accuracy and validity of people screening at special events, airports, and other secure areas. FAST will 

measure indicators using culturally independent and non-invasive sensors. FAST 

will use an ongoing, independent peer review process to ensure objectivity and 

thoroughness in addressing all aspects of the program. 

Project Name: Hostile Intent Detection - Automated Prototype 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: N/A 

Description: Develop real-time, non-invasive, and culturally independent, hostile-intent detection video extraction algorithms to identify unknown or potential 

terrorists through an interactive process. 

Project Name: Human Systems Research 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: FY10 $1.7 million 

Description: Examine ways to maximize human performance across DHS enduser tasks and activities. Activities under this project include research on exceptionally performing (EP) screeners, development of a human factors research 

roadmap, a study of airport dynamics and the development of a cognitive assessment tool. 

*Project Name: Aviation Security Enhancement Partnership (ASEP) Evaluating TSA’s Comprehensive Airport Security Strategy 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: FY10 $1 million 

Description: The project will deliver an evidence-based assessment and a research design for a comprehensive evaluation of the efficacy of the Transportation Security Administration’s Playbook to ensure that it has the intended prevention and deterrent effects in and around U.S. airports. 

*Project Name: Intelligent Closed Circuit Television (iCCTV) Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: FY10 $400,000 

Description: Design and construct a data video collection, storage, and distribution capability to support off-line behavioral analysis. The resulting analysis will 

support an inter- and intra-reliability assessment of the SPOT indicators. 
126 

*Project Name: Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) Selection Instrument Validation Project 

Financial Reimbursement from TSA: FY09 $1.25 million (still being completed) 

Description: Design and validate a personnel selection instrument to support 

the hiring of TSA BDO. 
127 

Responses by Dr. Paul Ekman, Professor Emeritus of Psychology, 

University of California, San Francisco, 

and President and Founder, Paul Ekman Group, LLC 

Questions submitted by Chairman Paul Broun 

Q1. A Nature article from May, 2010 states that you no longer publish all of the details of your works in peer-reviewed literature because those papers are closely 

followed by scientists in countries such as Syria, Iran and China, which the 

United States views as a potential threat. A great deal of security related research is conducted in the country in a manner that follows both the principles 

of peer review as well as the security classification systems Is your work unique 

in this regard? 

A1. I have not done classified research, and I don’t know how those who do such 

research handle the matter of publishing their findings, or any part of their findings. I have been told that classified research is not published, but that is hearsay. 

Regarding our own research findings, 95% of what we call hot spots -- behaviors 

which indicate that full disclosure has not occurred -- has already been published 

in scientific journals or book chapters. We have chosen not to publish a few new 

findings on hot spots in an attempt not to disclose to potential and actual enemies 

of our country everything we have found. If we choose to publish a study and it contains these undisclosed hot spots, then we exclude those undisclosed hot spots from 

the statistical analyses that we do report. Since the incidence of these undisclosed 

hot spots is quite low, it has not changed the overall findings. Thus we are able to 

publish on the incidence of 95% of hot spots, and keep to ourselves and those we 

teach in law enforcement and national security, knowledge of the new unpublished 

hot spots. 

Q2. On pages five and six of your written testimony, you reference a couple of unpublished studies spearheaded by Dr. Mark Frank, one of which you claim 

shows ‘‘behavioral markers can be useful even in situations where the person has 

yet to commit an illegal act.’’ Did you share any preliminary results from these 

studies with either TSA or S&T? 

A2. The TSA was fully informed of Dr. Frank’s study that showed it was possible 

to detect from hot spots whether or not a person had decided to lie. Past research 

had focused on identifying lies about behavior that already had occurred. This study 

showed it was also possible to detect lies about the future intent to engage in a 

malfeasant action. 

Q3. On page seven of Dr. Hartwig’s testimony, she responds to your claim from a 

New York Times interview of being able to teach lie detection ‘‘to anyone with 

an accuracy rate of more than 95 percent.’’ She goes on to say, ‘‘However, no 

such finding has ever been reported in the peer-reviewed literature. More broadly, there is no support for the assertion that training programs focusing on identifying facial displays of emotions can improve lie detection accuracy. How do 

you respond to those observations? 

A3. Dr. Hartwig has made a mistake in what she claims I said, one of many mistakes in her testimony. What I said was that through time-consuming, careful behavioral measurement we have been able to reach accurate determination of who 

is lying with up to 95% accuracy, but this included combining some physiological 

measures as well. I also said that we teach law enforcement and national security 

personnel about our findings, attempting to train them to be able to use our findings 

in their evaluations without doing the actual time-consuming research. We have not 

claimed that those we train reach a 95% accuracy level of correct judgments in their 

work place after our training. We receive reports that they have benefited, and we 

have a paper under review by a scientific journal that shows that teaching individuals to recognize micro expressions improves their ability to judge the true emotional state of people who are lying. This in combination with a number of published 

studies (once again not cited or not known by Dr. Hartwig) -- Ekman & O’Sullivan, 

1991; Frank & Ekman, 1997; Warren, Schertler & Bull, 2008 - which show a correlation between accuracy at detecting micro expressions and accuracy at detecting 

lies. But this is found only when the lie is about something the person cares about 

and there is a threat of considerable punishment if detected. 

A meta analysis by Frank & Feeley (2003) and later updated by O’Sullivan, Frank 

& Hurley (2011) on all the published research examining whether training improves 

the ability to detect lies, found significant improvements as a result of training. Dr. 
128 

Hartwig did not know or chose not to mention these studies which directly contradict her testimony. 

The only study which evaluated training in actual real world high stakes security 

contexts is the new American Institute of Research (AIR) report. The training the 

SPOT personnel received whose decisions were found to be highly accurate in the 

AIR study included our training materials, and some of the SPOT personnel were 

trained by us. Our training is not limited to the face, but includes all of demeanor 

- gesture, gaze, voice, and speech as well as facial actions. 

Q4. You claim SPOT needs more funding and BDOs need more training. 

a. How much funding is enough for SPOT? 

b. How much training time would you devote to BDOs? 

A4 a. I believe SPOT needs to have its personnel observing line of traffic at all 

major airports. I believe our country would be safer if there were also SPOT personnel at all feeder airports, as the 9/11 hijackers boarded and went through security at feeder airports. The information I have received is that there are no SPOT 

personnel at feeder airports, and only enough personnel to conduct surveillance at 

half the lines of traffic at our major airports. I believe this is a terrible mistake, 

especially given the fact that recruiting and training enough SPOT personnel to 

have this layer of security in place at all airports would cost less than 1% of last 

year’s DHS budget. 

Although I am not fully informed of the changes in the program now underway 

I believe they include increased training time and more selective recruitment. 

A4 a. Regarding training time, since the costs of training are low and the costs of 

just one terrorist being missed are very high, I believe it merits overkill. I expect 

that 40 hours of training, spread over a few weeks, would be of benefit. But that 

is a guess as there is no research available to determine when adding training time 

stops producing benefits. 

There are many questions that could be answered by doing research to find out 

how many BDOs are needed to cover a given area, what breaks are needed and 

when to optimize performance, and are people missed who show many of the behaviors on the SPOT checklist. 

Q5. What steps should TSA have taken prior to implementing the SPOT program 

nationwide? 

A5. I believe TSA took the appropriate steps: it found out what the Israelis were 

doing; and it obtained the help and advice from those scientists who had done research relevant to its objectives, not just my work. By the time TSA consulted with 

Israel about their training, we had already provided training to the Israelis. It 

should be clear that the training included but was not limited to micro expressions. 

In our research we measure and find useful hot spots shown in gesture, voice and 

speech itself. And these too are included in TSA’s behavioral profiling. 

I believe TSA made the right judgment in adding this layer of security prior to 

research about how effective it would turn out to be in catching malfeasants. The 

recent AIR study showed it is effective, but it would have been a mistake, in my 

judgment, not to have provided the American people with this layer of security before that study was performed. 

I regret that the American people are not now being provided with all the layers 

of security which are available in England and Israel, because there simply are not 

enough trained Behavior Detection Officers. 

*Professor Mark Frank, SUNY Buffalo contributed to some of these responses. 

References 

Ekman, P. & O’Sullivan, M. (1991) Who can catch a liar? American Psychologist, 

46(9), 913-920. 

Frank, M.G., & Ekman, P. (1997) The ability to detect deceit generalizes across 

different types of high-stake lies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 

72, 1429-1439. 

Frank, M.G, Feeley, T.H., Paolantonio, N. & Servoss, T. J. (2004). Individual and 

Small Group Accuracy in Judging Truthful and Deceptive Communication. 

Group Decision and Negotiation 13(1), 45–59. 

O’Sullivan, M., Frank, M. G., Hurley, C. M., & Tiwana, J. (2009). Police lie detection accuracy: The effect of lie scenario. Law and Human Behavior 33(6), 542– 

543. 
129 

Warren, G., Schertler, E., Bull, P. (2008) Detecting Deception from Emotional 

and Unemotional Cues. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 33, 59–69. 
130 

Responses by Dr. Maria Hartwig, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, 

John Jay College of Criminal Justice 

Questions submitted by Chairman Paul Broun 

Q1. Are there any differences in the behavioral cues associated with a liar being deceitful and the behavioral cues associated with a truth-teller stressed about 

being perceived as a liar? In other words, how would one distinguish a liar from 

a truthful person who’s afraid of not being believed? 

A1. In a situation where liars fear detection, and truth tellers fear not being believed, the behavioral patterns of the two are likely to be very similar. Research 

supports this, by showing that when liars and truth tellers are highly motivated to 

be believed, they both display patterns of behavior that are likely to attract deception judgments. That is, they may both show signs of stress and fear; signs which 

an observer may interpret as indicative of deception. Simply put, it is very difficult, 

if not impossible, to distinguish between the behavioral signs of stress of a liar who 

fears exposure and those displayed by a truth teller who fears misjudgment. 

Q2. Your testimony talks about a paradigm shift in the approach to lie detection that 

involves, ‘‘moving from passive observation of behavior to the active elicitation 

of cues to deception.’’ Unlike the Israeli process, BDOs in the U.S. can’t realistically stop and interview each passenger several times prior to boarding - how 

do you propose TSA incorporate this mentality into SPOT? Should it? Is it practical? 

A2. It is true that it may not be feasible to interview every single passenger due 

to the high volume of travelers in the U.S. My suggestion is that the TSA, with the 

help of an independent panel of experts, should review theories and empirical findings on the elicitation of cues to deception, and entertain the possibility of incorporating some of these methods in their protocol for verbal interactions with travelers. Some form of screening is most likely necessary in order to select passengers 

for additional scrutiny in the form of questioning. Whether the SPOT method should 

be used for this screening ultimately depends on the findings of the validation 

study, which, to my knowledge, has yet to be released. 

Q3. What steps should TSA have taken prior to implementing the SPOT program 

nationwide? 

A3. It would have been beneficial to create and consult with a panel of independent 

experts in the relevant areas, in order to ensure that the procedures are in line with 

the scientific evidence. Moreover, it is my view that the TSA should have carried 

out a validation study prior to implementing the program nationwide. Again, a 

panel of experts could have been of assistance in designing and executing such a 

validation study. 
131 

Responses by Dr. Philip Rubin, Chief Executive Officer, Haskins Laboratories 

Questions submitted by Chairman Paul Broun 

Q1. What are the challenges that scientists need to address in order to conduct research in an operational setting? 1b. Can these hurdles be overcome? 

A1. There are numerous challenges related to conducting research in operational 

settings. I would like to focus on two of these. 

1. Evaluation and analysis both in the laboratory and in the field must be based 

on specific, testable hypotheses that derive from premises that are established 

in some sort of orderly and/or rational manner. For example, using voice stress 

analysis (VSA) to illustrate this, it is essential to first understand what is 

being measured (that is, what is the specific definition of ‘‘voice stress’’) and 

understand how these measures might related to outcome measures. In addition, in order to isolate critical variables so that then can ultimately be validated (in the lab or in the field), we also need to consider potential interactions 

of variables that might affect results and other factors that could bias or shape 

experimental results, including any critical contextual considerations. In the 

case of approaches like VSA, field tests should not be conducted prior to demonstrating a valid and reliable approach for characterizing and quantifying, if 

possible, the underlying variables. Once these have been established, it is then 

possible to move to the field. If the premises are weak or cannot be established, 

there is little point in moving to field evaluation. 

2. Laboratory studies have the advantage that they often provide for the ability 

to precisely control experimental conditions. The disadvantage is that they 

often lack what is sometimes called ‘‘ecological validity.’’ That is, what is being 

measured in the laboratory may not accurately capture the phenomena that 

you are trying to study, often because critical contexts have been removed. 

Field evaluation lets you study events in their natural environment. This has 

been standard in the ethological approach and in many other instances including primate research, research on children, and research in organizational and 

institutional settings. Unfortunately, with this greater realism sometimes 

comes a consequent loss of experimental control. 

Overall, the best approach would be to first clearly nail down a good, concrete understanding of critical variables and the premises that give rise to them. These 

should be experimentally evaluated and understood prior to field evaluation. An assessment of potentially critical contextual variables is also essential. At that point 

(but not until then), field evaluation is possible and can provide a rich and realistic 

approach for evaluating data and programs. Although there are often limitations in 

the field, clever and informed experimental design can go a long way to assisting 

with the design of studies that have great utility. If they cannot be used to fully 

study a system, they can often be informative and useful as they relate to aspects 

of the problem. 

Q2. (Regarding the comments of Dr. Ekman and Dr. Hartwig). Given these opposing 

observations, what is your analysis? 

There appears to be very little in the peer-reviewed, scientific literature to help 

differentiate high versus low-risk lying and their relationship. As both Dr. Ekman 

and Dr. Hartwig have indicated, research is needed in this area. Peer-reviewed research would be the useful to establish and solidify scientific validity of results. 

Such work can be done without jeopardizing security. 

Q3. . . . what thoughts do have on the manner in which the SPOT program was implemented? 

A3. As you have noted, I agree with Dr. David Mandel’s comments from the summary of the NRC workshop that I chaired, called ‘‘Field Evaluation in the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Context: Workshop Summary’’. 

‘‘Another way in which establishing a connection with the research community 

can help the intelligence community is with validation, Mandel said. Once 

knowledge and insights from behavioral science are used to develop new tools 

for the intelligence community, it is still necessary to validate them. Simply 

basing recommendations on scientific research is not the same thing as showing scientifically that those recommendations are effective or testing to see if 

they could be substantially improved. Even Heuer was unable to do much to 

validate his recommendations, Mandel noted, and, more generally, this is not 
132 

something that the intelligence community is particularly well equipped to 

do.’’ 

‘‘It is, however, exactly what research scientists are trained to do. Science offers a method for testing which ideas lead to good results and which do not. 

Thus partnering with the behavioral science community can help the intelligence community zero in on the techniques that work best and avoid those 

that work poorly or not at all.’’ 

Unfortunately, it appears that the SPOT program was implemented before its underlying premises, measures, indicators, etc., could be adequately scientifically evaluated and, if necessary, validated in even a remotely meaningful way. Instead, they 

appear to have been rushed into the field due to a combination of fear, zeal, passion, 

folklore, intuition, and enthusiasm about controversial scientific results, such as 

‘‘micro-expressions.’’ As of the time of the April 6, 2011 hearing, and the end of my 

contribution to the TAC report, I had not been provided with information about the 

‘‘indicators’’ used in the SPOT program, so I can only speculate about them. However, if they were things like facial micro-expressions, behavioral indicators such as 

gaze direction or head tapping, etc., then they should all be subject to scientific scrutiny. Why are such measures being selected? What is the current state of scientific 

knowledge regarding their validity? If little is known about them, can then be evaluated scientifically? If not, then they should not be used. On other possible measures 

such as excessive sweating, aberrant behavior, etc., it would be useful to understand 

the science on how these behaviors related to outcome measures. For example in 

voice stress analysis (which does not appear to be a reliable measure) which is supposedly related to changes in voice ‘‘micro-tremors’’, is the appropriate indicator 

greater or smaller magnitude of micro-tremor? 

Given the enormous stakes related to national security in transportation, and also 

to work done by our intelligence and counter-intelligence communities, my strongest 

recommendation for the Committee would be that the money currently being devoted to (and in my opinion wasted on) this program should immediately be redirected to a large-scale effort to solicit the best possible scientific and technical guidance related to the detection of deception using behavioral indicators. The end product should include a clear statement of what works, what does not, what remains 

controversial, and how to move ahead. The TAC did not have the independence, expertise, breadth of knowledge, nor latitude to take on this challenge, not was it 

asked to do so. Such a study should be broader than SPOT and should include considerations of approaches like voice stress analysis, facial expression, remote physiological monitoring, and neuroimaging. Members of such a group should have expertise in physiology, behavioral science, psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, statistics 

and methodological design, and related areas. It is essential that any group working 

on such a project be independent of DHS and TSA. Scientific evaluation of programs 

like SPOT and other programs related to the detection of deception can be done in 

a manner that does not provide unique knowledge to those who would wish to harm 

us. 

Q4. How do you respond to DHS’ preliminary assertion that SPOT is significantly 

more effective than random screening? 

A4. As a member of the Technical Advisory Committee I would have to say that 

this assertion on the part of DHS is not a meaningful or useful one. The base rate 

for outcomes is too small to be statistically reliable and/or meaningful. If DHS is 

making an assertion of this sort, then they need to more clearly define and quantify 

what ‘‘significantly more effective than random screening’’ means. In a population 

of 100,000 events are 2 observations significantly different than 1? How about 3 

versus 1? Or 100 versus 1? What does significance mean as DHS is using the term 

and what do they mean by ‘‘effective’’? Small numbers in large populations can be 

meaningless and simply part of the randomness and background noise that normally occur in most systems. Given the controversial and costly nature of this program, scientific and statistical rigor should be essential. I find such a statement to 

be misleading and potentially dangerous. Politicians, policymakers and the lay public, will hear something like ‘‘SPOT is significantly more effective than random 

screening’’ and may assume that this program is effective, useful, and has been adequately scientifically evaluated. To this point the effectiveness and usefulness have 

not been established. The scientific evaluation has been inadequate and has not 

been approached in a manner that would lead to greater knowledge regarding the 

program. Establishing scientific credibility has the potential to be helpful to programs of this sort, but that requires full, well thought out, independent, credible, 

and open scientific review. 
133 

Outcomes, which apparently are based on a combination of indicators, could result 

simply from the fact that, according to information described by CNN in a report 

on April 15, 2011, individuals are singled out for behaving arrogantly. Arrogant individuals stand a greater chance of being referred to a law enforcement official 

(LEO) than do those who not behave arrogantly. LEO referrals are related to 2 of 

the 4 the outcome measures (either by occurring individually or in combination with 

another indicator). Thus, almost by definition, the SPOT program has a higher probability of producing increases in outcome when compared with totally random selection. Positive SPOT outcomes are mostly due to observations that result in LEO 

interaction. These could be strongly related to things like ‘‘arrogant’’ behavior and 

be telling us little more than that, which is kind of a ‘‘duh?’’ result for such a serious 

investment of time and money. TAC had not been provided with enough information 

by the time of the April 6 hearing (when Mr. Willis indicated that the report had 

already been finalized) to determine significance and/or potential interaction with 

other variables. In summary, it is unclear what ‘‘effective’’ means in this context. 

The most significant outcomes in SPOT were related to LEO referrals. It is possible 

that the outcome of this program is no more than the observation that individuals 

who act like jerks might get arrested. What does that have to do with an effective, 

useful program? 
134 

Responses by Mr. Peter J. DiDomenica, Lieutenant Detective, 

Boston University Police 

Questions submitted by Chairman Paul Broun 

Q1. In your written testimony, you talk about your desire to see some sort of SPOT 

training provided for law enforcement personnel so that they can better coordinate and understand a situation when approached by a BDO who has suspicions about a traveler. Keeping in mind the limited resources we have in terms 

of federal dollars, can you expand on how critical such training would be? 

Would we be better off having fewer BDOs with more SPOT-trained LEOs? 

A1. I believe that SPOT-trained police officers working in conjunction with the TSA 

are critical to the success of the SPOT program not only because of the ability of 

law enforcement to coordinate and understand the program but, most importantly, 

because of the absolute need for effective resolution of the suspicion. The BDOs are 

not empowered to detain, arrest, or deny access and lack law enforcement training 

and experience in questioning suspicious persons. Moreover, the BDOs do not have 

direct access to the criminal databases that law enforcement officers have access. 

The success of the program relies upon law enforcement officers (LEOs) who understand and use behavioral screening who follow through with denial of access, detention, or arrest when appropriate; otherwise, terrorists or other dangerous people will 

likely pass through the system because there will nothing obvious to justify denial 

of access or arrest such as a pre-existing arrest warrant or possession of contraband. 

The dilemma is that the most dangerous people, such as the 16 suspected terrorists 

who passed through SPOT airports, are generally not actively involved in a terrorist 

operation when boarding planes so that, short of finding an arrest warrant or contraband, there will be no basis for arrest. Even if they are operational and possess 

a weapon or explosive, there are still major gaps in weapon and explosive detection 

systems that present the significant risk of such weapon or explosive getting 

through the physical screening process. In my opinion it is absolutely critical that 

behavior assessment trained LEOs are present who are in a position to develop 

probable cause to arrest and who, absent such probable cause, are in a position to 

deny access when sufficient reasonable suspicion exists allowing the time for a more 

thorough investigation. Effective and reasonable security to prevent massive casualties from a terrorist attack on venues such as airports and mass transit significantly 

depends, in my opinion, upon behavior assessment trained LEOs who have the 

knowledge, ability, and confidence to deny access, in most cases temporarily, to such 

venues. I believe the limited federal dollars available for SPOT screening would be better 

spent on training LEOs in behavior assessment and for providing federal support 

for overtime costs of deploying local and state LEOs for specific behavior assessment 

duties at airports. It seems to me that the American public will get ‘‘more bang for 

the buck’’ by enhancing the abilities of already trained and experienced law enforcement officers who can combine both the functions of being the ‘‘spotters’’ of suspicious behavior and being the ‘‘resolvers’’ of suspicious behavior. This would reduce 

the communication and understanding issues between TSA and LEOs that presently 

impede the success of the program. Moreover, the federal government would not be 

saddled with the costs of additional federal employees by contracting out the function to employees of state and local government. Such an approach would also reduce the civil liability exposure of the federal government as well. With this approach I believe there would be more effective prevention of terrorism with less expenditure of federal dollars. 

Q2. I get the impression from your testimony that after the events of 9/11, particularly in light of your closeness to the situation, you felt the nation had to do 

something to prevent terrorism in the aviation sector. Your experience with Richard Reid appears to provide further evidence of that mentality. 

a. Is that assessment of your mindset as you set about creating the program? 

b. In the NRC’s 2008 Report: Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against 

Terrorists - A Framework for Program Assessment, one of the conclusions reached 

by the 21-member Committee that published the report is: 

In the aftermath of a disaster or terrorist incident, policy makers come under 

intense political pressure to respond with measures intended to prevent the 

event from occurring again. The policy impulse to do something (by which is 

usually meant something new) under these circumstances is understandable, 

but it is simply not true that doing something new is always better than doing 

nothing.’’ 
135 

b. How do you respond to that conclusion? 

A2 (a.) I am not comfortable with the word ‘‘mentality’’ as used in the question as 

it implies, in my opinion, a certain rigidity and unwillingness to consider differing 

opinion perhaps to the point of being a zealot. I do not believe I had a ‘‘mentality’’ 

about having to do something to prevent terrorism construing the word ‘‘mentality’’ 

as I have explained. I did believe that our ability to screen passengers at airports 

was deficient and that it could be improved and that the Richard Reid example 

showed how reliance on physical screening without use of behavioral screening created a gap in security. I knew from my personal experience and from other police 

officers I worked with that persons who are engaged in dangerous or high risk activity tend to behave differently than persons not so engaged, particularly in the presence of a police officer or other official who could intercept them. I also learned 

through scientific literature that people’s behavior changes when engaged in dangerous or high risk activity and that body language, mental state and paralinguistic 

attributes can be affected. It seemed reasonable to me then as it does today to use 

the ability of trained professionals to detect a person engaged in dangerous or high 

risk activity as another of layer of security at our airports provided the training was 

proper and the public’s civil rights were protected through adhering to limitations 

on detentions and profiling based on the 4th Amendment and the Equal Protection 

Clause of the 14th Amendment. I do not believe I was under the impulse to do anything for the sake of doing anything but was motivated by addressing a gap in our 

security through reasonable, effective, and lawful means. 

A2 (b-c.) I agree 100% with the danger presented by catastrophic events that can 

compel governments to respond without due deliberation and in haste sometimes 

with troubling and even devastating consequences. I have been an instructor in racial profiling and biased policing for over a decade and have included discussion of 

excesses by the government to respond to a serious incident or crisis. For example, 

the internment of more 100,000 Japanese Americans on the West Coast, mostly U.S. 

citizens, simply based on ancestry during World War II because of fears of an invasion or sabotage represents such an overreaction to a real threat. In fact, the U.S. 

Congress formally apologized to the survivors in 1988. The divisive issue of police 

racial profiling was spawned by overreaction to the real danger of drugs being transported on our highways. Well intentioned efforts to make communities safer resulted in those very communities feeling disenfranchised from law enforcement 

through the unlawful use of selective enforcement based on race. I was well aware 

of the danger to the American public from overreaction to the real threat of Islamic 

Extremist terrorism and made efforts to ensure our response was lawful and effective and consistent with our nation’s values. I, like many security and law enforcement officials, found a gap in our aviation security and sought and found a means 

to address the gap, not because something had to be done but because something 

could be done. I would also like to point out that I was not a policy maker but a 

policy advisor and was not personally under any political pressure to do something. 

I was not an elected official nor did I directly serve elected officials. I could have 

simply carried out my duties as a police officer without having attempted to address 

the issue or passenger screening but chose to help because I felt I was the type of 

person who could balance the need for response to terrorism with the ability to do 

it effectively, lawfully, and ethically without undue haste and with proper deliberation. 

Q3. Did you consult with any scientists before implementing the BASS program? 

What scientific literature did you research prior to the program? 

a. Do you consider this review exhaustive or comprehensive? 

b. Have you ever submitted the BASS system for outside review by Behavioral Scientists? 

c. Did you encounter any criticisms– either through your research or by talking to 

people - about the validity of the BASS program? 

A3. I consulted with co-panelist Dr. Paul Ekman and Dr. Mark Frank of the State 

University of New York at Buffalo. Then Massachusetts State Police Major Thomas 

Robbins and I went to Quantico, VA and spoke with the FBI Behavioral Sciences 

Unit (Eugene Ragala and Stephen Etter). We also spoke with Dr. Jessica Stern of 

the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. 

Literature consulted included: 

• Atran, Scott, University of Michigan, The Surprises of Suicide Terrorism, Discover Magazine, Vol. 24 No. 10 (October 2003) 

• Lewis, Bernard, What Went Wrong 
136 

• The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 

• Stern, Jessica, Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, The 

Protean Enemy, Foreign Affairs, Volume 82 No. 4, July/August 2003, p. 27. 

• Stern, Jessica, Terror in the Name of God 

• Richardson, Louise, Harvard University professor, What Terrorists Want 

• Pape, Robert, University of Chicago, Dying to Win, Database of every suicide 

attack from 1980 to 2003, 315 attacks 

• Knapp, Mark, and Hall, Judith, Nonverbal Communication in Human Interaction 

• Miller, Arthur G., editor, The Social Psychology of Good and Evil 

• McDermott, Terry, Perfect Soldiers 

• Grossman, Dave, On Killing, On Combat 

• Dozier Jr., Rush, Why We Hate 

• Barber, Benjamin, Jihad vs. McWorld 

• Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why (US Government Report) 

• Zimbardo, Phillip, Stanford Prison Experiment (1971) 

• Milgram, Stanley, Obedience Experiments (1974) 

• Givens, David B, Center for Nonverbal Studies, The Nonverbal Dictionary of 

Gestures, Signs & Body Language Cues (2003). 

• Sageman, Marc, Former CIA caseworker and forensic psychologist, Study of 400 

terrorists 

• Meta-analysis on deception cues by Bella DePaulo, et al., 2003. Cues to Deception, Psychological Bulletin, 129(1):74-118, 2003 

• Mehrabian, Albert, and Ferris, Susan R. ‘‘Inference of Attitudes from Nonverbal 

Communication in Two Channels,’’ Journal of Consulting Psychology, Vol. 31, 

No. 3, June 1967, pp. 248-258 

• Mehrabian, A. (1971). Silent messages, Wadsworth, California: Belmont 

• Mehrabian, A. (1972). Nonverbal communication. Aldine-Atherton, Illinois: Chicago 

• Facial expression of emotion; seven universal expressions of emotion. Ekman, 

Friesen, & O’Sullivan, 1988. 

• Darwin, Charles, The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals 

• Testimony of Professor Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest, 

George Washington University Law School, before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Aviation, February 27, 2002. Available on the Internet 

at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/02-27-02/turley.html 

• Ekman Ph.D., Paul, Telling Lies and Human Emotion Revealed 

A3 (a.) I do not believe this review to be exhaustive but I do believe it was comprehensive. 

A3 (b.) I asked Dr. Ekman, Dr. Frank, and the FBI Behavioral Sciences Unit to look 

at the program but this was not in the nature of a formal scientific review. 

A3 (c.) I participated as a briefer for the JASON (Mitre Corporation) Summer Study 

‘‘Badguyology’’ in June 2008 in which I presented information on BASS techniques. 

Their findings where that anecdotal evidence exists that police interviewing methodologies work at detecting deception and may be able to be validated and developed 

further. However, they also found that no scientific evidence exists to support the 

detection or inference of future behavior including intent. My discussions with Dr. 

Ekman, Dr. Frank and the FBI Behavioral Sciences Unit generally indicated the 

same assessment of BASS: that there was a general scientific foundation for 

changes in behavior related to persons engaged in high risk activity who did not 

want to be detected but specific studies would be needed to validate the use of specific behaviors and their significance. 

Q4. What does the BASS/PASS training consist of? What behavior/cues/deviations 

did you look for? 

A5. The following is the training outline of the BASS program showing all the components of the training: 

INTRODUCTION 

• War in the Homeland 

• Policing in the Post 9/11 Environment 

• Rationale for BASS 

• What is BASS 

• Is BASS Profiling? 

• Benefits of BASS 
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BASS POLICY AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 

• Definitions • Prohibition on Racial Profiling • Voluntary Encounters 

BASS GENERAL GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES 

• Methods of Contact • Guidelines for Elevated and Reasonable Suspicion 

UNDERSTANDING THE TERROR THREAT 

• Islamic Fundamentalist Terror • History of Conflict • The Current Threat 

STEP (1) OBSERVATION OF BEHAVIOR 

• Theory of Behavioral Analysis • Understanding Baselines • Baseline Field Exercise • Low Level Behavioral Indicators • High Level Behavioral Indicators • Surveillance Indicators • Unusual Items in Baggage • Explosive Components • Suicide Bomber Indicators • Detecting Bomb Activity in Vehicles and Buildings • London Bombings • 9/11 hijackers • Evolving Suicide Bomber • High and Low Risk Passengers 

STEP (2) EXAMINATION OF TRAVEL DOCUMENTS 

• Resident Alien • Passport • Visa • I-94 and I-94W forms • Elevated Suspicion Factors • Terrorist Sponsoring and Terrorist Suspicious Countries 

STEP (3) INTERVIEW 

• Purpose of Interview • Format of Questions o Travel/Visit Questions 

• Vehicle Stop Questions • Question Form and Technique • Two-Step Baseline Approach to Resolving Elevated Suspicion • Signs of Deception • Analysis of Interview Videos 

• Classroom Interview Exercise 

STEP (4) RESOLUTION 

• Three Dispositions of Person 

• Case Studies 

• FIELD INTERVIEW EXERCISES COURSE CONCLUSION 

• Summary of Course 

• Q & A 

• Evaluations 

The specific behavior/cues/deviations may be protected under TSA regulations as 

Sensitive Security Information so I cannot answer this question without further 

guidance from legal counsel. 

Q5. Page two of Dr. Hartwig testimony states..How do you respond to Dr. Hartwig 

and Dr. Rubin’s testimony? 

A5. BASS is not a lie detection program: BASS is a program designed to detect behavioral changes associated with a person who is engaged in high risk or dangerous 

activity and to prevent such persons from entering critical infrastructure until the 

status of the person is resolved. Detection of deception constitutes one factor of 

many as part of an overall assessment of dangerousness and this factor, while useful, is not required for identification of potentially dangerous people. I have attended 

the following courses on interviewing that include detection of deception components 
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and this training indicates that with such interviewing training, police officers can 

improve their ability to detect deception: 

Paul Ekman Group Training Division 

Evaluating Truthfulness Train-the Trainer Workshop, February 16-18, 2006. 

Institute of Analytic Interviewing 

Interviewing, Credibility, and Emotion, January 10-14, 2005. 

Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 

Analytic Interview School, April 19-23, 1999 at State Police New Braintree. 

Wicklander - Zulawski & Associates 

The Reid Method of Criminal Interviews and Interrogation, April 16-18, 1996 at 

State Police New Braintree. 

Moreover, I am certified as a trainer in deception detection by the Paul Ekman 

Group Training Group and have conducted this training for the TSA and the Department of State. From my understanding of the research, there are techniques 

considered fairly reliable in detection of deception and that if used as part of an integrated approach that considers both emotional and cognitive aspects of deception 

and memory, the seriousness of the potential deception, alternative explanations for 

perceived cues, and evaluation of subject baseline, can allow police officers to be 

more effective and accurate in the assessment of credibility. I believe the DHS 

SPOT validation study provides striking evidence for the effectiveness of the SPOT/ 

BASS techniques I designed: A high-risk traveler is nine times more likely to be 

identified using operational SPOT versus random screening and that this result was 

achieved by BDOs engaging 50,000 fewer passengers than the random selection 

process. When it came to arrests in this study, the SPOT program was found to be 

50 times more effective than random screening. Moreover, the research by Dr. 

Frank cited in Dr. Ekman’s testimony indicates that, ‘‘In a situation set up to resemble an airport security context, we could predict at 90% accuracy who intended 

to lie about an action which s/he had not yet taken. This was accomplished by analysis solely on their emotional reaction, eye contact, and nervous body behaviors. 

These are the types of actions security officers look for in behavioral observation 

programs. These results are the first study to show that intentions can be detected 

from behavior.’’ Combining my training and experience and this recent research I 

am confident that properly trained LEOs have a significantly better than chance 

ability to detect potential terrorists and other dangerous people. 

I agree with Dr. Rubin’s testimony that shows there is an inclination by those 

who are involved in evaluations in the criminal and homeland/national security 

arena to be dismissive of scholarly research that may contradict their views. This 

is an aspect of basic human nature that we all tend to become defensive when our 

basic assumptions are challenged and this includes police officers, scientists, and 

congressmen. Nobody likes being told they are wrong. I have always tried to keep 

an open mind in my professional work and my work in developing SPOT/BASS was 

done in this way to the best of my ability. Most of what I learned and experienced 

pointed to the programs going in the right direction and I always welcomed review 

and advice. I welcome continued research and testing and know there is a great deal 

more to be learned. I agree with the GAO report 10-763 of May 2010 that called 

for more scientific validation of SPOT and I am personally disappointed that TSA 

did not do more to validate the program after I left in 2004. To be blunt in my opinion, TSA dropped the ball in its efforts to validate SPOT and, as a result have put 

many people and entities on the ‘‘spot’’ to defend it and to question it including myself, DHS, and this Subcommittee. But as Chairman Broun stated at the April 6, 

2011 hearing, ‘‘The goal is not to throw out the proverbial baby with the bath 

water.’’ I believe SPOT/BASS programs provide a critical layer in our multifaceted 

approach to aviation security and the effort to validate the programs, however belated, is worth our time and expense. 

Thank you for this additional opportunity to address the Subcommittee. 
(139) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY MR. STEPHEN LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND

JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
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