alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 224 (Thursday, November 20, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62073-62074]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-30540]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


Notice of Lodging of Partial Consent Decree Under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

    Notice is hereby given that on October 30, 1997, a proposed partial 
consent decree in United States v. North American Group Ltd., et al., 
Civil Action No. 3:97-CV-191-H was lodged with the United States 
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.
    The partial consent decree resolves claims under 107(a) of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a), as amended, against The North American 
Group Ltd., North American Environmental Corp., Federal Environmental 
Services, Federal Services, M.D. Babcock, Speer Mabry IV and Mark Odum, 
for response costs that were incurred by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency in connection with the release and 
threatened release of hazardous substances at the Cherokee Site 
(``Site'') in Charlotte, North Carolina.
    The proposed consent decree provides that the aforementioned 
settling defendants will pay $400,000 according to a payment schedule 
set forth in the partial consent decree. The proposed consent decree 
also requires the settling defendants to pay $15,000 as a civil penalty 
for violating Section 104(e)(5) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(e)(5), 
for failing to comply with two information requests issued by EPA.
    The Department of Justice will receive for a period of thirty (30) 
days from the date of this publication comments relating to the partial 
consent decree. Comments should be addressed to the Assistant Attorney 
General of the Environment and Natural Resources Division, Department 
of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, and should refer to United States 
v. North American Group Ltd., et. al. D.J. Ref. 90-11-2-1173
    The partial consent decree may be examined at the Office of the 
United States Attorney, Suite 1700 Carillon Building, 227 West Trade 
St., Charlotte,

[[Page 62074]]

North Carolina, at U.S. EPA Region IV, 61 Forsythe St., N.E., Atlanta, 
GA 30303, and at the Consent Decree Library, 1120 G Street, N.W., 4th 
Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005, (202) 624-0892. A copy of the partial 
consent decree may be obtained in person or by mail from the Consent 
Decree Library, 1120 G Street, N.W., 4th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005. 
When requesting a copy, please enclose a check in the amount of $9.00 
(25 cents per page reproduction cost) payable to the Consent Decree 
Library.
Joel Gross,
Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural 
Resources Division.
[FR Doc. 97-30540 Filed 11-19-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-15-M
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COMMERCIAL TRUCK COMPANY CO 

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CON GLOBAL INDUSTRIES 

ACCT NO 04-08011050-02 & 04-08011053-02)

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CON GLOBAL INDUSTRIES 

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CONCORD TOYOTA 

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Not for P ubl ication in West's Fe deral Report er Citation Limit ed P ursuan t to 1st C ir. Loc. R. 32.3 

# U nit edSta tes C ou rt o f A pp eal s

For t h e Firs t C ircu it

No. 05-2529 MERSSI HEYDEMANS, Petitioner,

v. ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before Selya, Circuit Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Merssi Heydemans on brief pro se. Peter D. Keisler, Assis t a n t Attorney General, Greg D. Mack, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Jeffrey A. McLellan, Trial Attorney, on brief for appellee.

August 31, 2006-2- Per Curiam . Merssi Heydemans seeks review of a Board of
I mm i gration Appeals (BIA) order affirming a decision by an immigration jud g e ( I J) that found him ineligible to apply for asylum and denied h i s application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. For the following reasons, we deny his petition for review.

1. We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ's determination that Heydemans is ineligible for asylum because his application seeking asylum was untimely and he did not qualify for an exception. Hayek v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 501, 506-07 (1st Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

2. In its decision dated September 15, 2005, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ's decision dated April 14, 2004, and so we review the reasoning in the IJ's decision. Id. at 506. The IJ relied on the correct legal standards, and substantial evidence of record supports her decis i o n ( she described that evidence in her decision, and we do not repeat it here). Accordingly, the decision to deny the application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture must be upheld. Cf. Nikijuluw v. Gonzalez, 427 F.3d 115, 122 (1st Cir. 2005) (sustaining the denial of an asylum claim by an Indonesian Christian whose church had been burned down because his church was being rebuilt, his Christian family members continued to live safely in Indonesia, and-3-

the country conditions report confirmed that anti-Christian violence had declined significantly).

3. Heydemans offers new materials to support his petition, but we may not consider them because our review is limited to the materials in the appellate record. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).

The petition for review is denied.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1865 

To amend the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to provide for 

grants in support of training and education to teachers and other school 

employees, students, and the community about how to prevent, recognize, 

respond to, and report child sexual abuse among primary and secondary 

school students. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 11, 2021 

Ms. WILD (for herself, Mr. MCCAUL, Ms. STEVENS, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. 

RASKIN, Ms. SCANLON, and Mr. LAMB) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To amend the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 

to provide for grants in support of training and education to teachers and other school employees, students, 

and the community about how to prevent, recognize, 

respond to, and report child sexual abuse among primary 

and secondary school students. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Jenna Quinn Law’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1865 IH

1 SEC. 2. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AWARENESS FIELD INITI2 ATED GRANTS. 

3 Section 105(a) of the Child Abuse Prevention and 

4 Treatment Act (42 U.S.C. 5106(a)) is amended by adding 

5 at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(8) CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AWARENESS FIELD

7 INITIATED GRANTS.—The Secretary may award 

8 grants under this subsection to entities, for periods 

9 of up to 5 years, in support of field-initiated innova10 tion projects that advance, establish, or implement 

11 comprehensive, innovative, evidence-based or evi12 dence-informed child sexual abuse awareness and 

13 prevention programs by— 

14 ‘‘(A) improving student awareness of child 

15 sexual abuse in an age-appropriate manner, in16 cluding how to recognize, prevent, and safely 

17 report child sexual abuse; 

18 ‘‘(B) training teachers, school employees, 

19 and other mandatory reporters and adults who 

20 work with children in a professional or volun21 teer capacity, including with respect to recog22 nizing child sexual abuse and safely reporting 

23 child sexual abuse; or 

24 ‘‘(C) providing information to parents and 

25 guardians of students about child sexual abuse 

26 awareness and prevention, including how to preVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:01 May 03, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1865.IH H1865

pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1865 IH

1 vent, recognize, respond to, and report child 

2 sexual abuse and how to discuss child sexual 

3 abuse with a child.’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

Wniteb ~tate~ (!Court of ~peaI~

for tbe jfeberaI <!Circuit

JAMES W. STANLEY, JR.,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee.

2012-7121

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for

Veterans Claims in case no. 09-4142, Judge William A.

Moorman.

ON MOTION

ORDER

Eric K. Shinseki moves without opposition for a 14-

day extension of time, until December 3, 2012, to file his

principal brief.

Upon consideration thereof,

Case: 12-7121 Document: 15 Page: 1 Filed: 12/03/2012
JAMES STANLEY, JR. V. SHINSEKI

IT Is ORDERED THAT:

The motion is granted.

s27

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Jan Horbaly

Jan Horbaly

Clerk

2

Case: 12-7121 Document: 15 Page: 2 Filed: 12/03/2012
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

JUDGMENT

Justin Eugene Clark, Appellant

No. 06

- 13

- 00155

- CR v.
The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 204th District Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. F

1261948

- Q ). Opinion delivere d by Chief Justice Morriss, Justice Carter and Justice Moseley participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court

below

. We affirm the judgment of the trial co urt

. We note that the appellant, Justin Eugene Clark, has adequately indicated his inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED MA Y 21, 2014 BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-1570 

JASON S. CRAIG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FOLDFAST, INC. and HSN, L.P., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

 Stanley B. Kita, Howson & Howson LLP, of Fort Washington, Philadelphia, argued 

for plaintiff-appellant. 

 Martin B. Woods, Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., of Fort 

Lauderdale, Florida, argued for defendants-appellees. With him on the brief was Mark D. 

Bowen. 

Appealed from: United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 

Judge K. Michael Moore 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-1570 

JASON S. CRAIG, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FOLDFAST, INC. and HSN, L.P., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

Judgment 

ON APPEAL from the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

 

In CASE NO(S). 06-CV-61009. 

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

Per Curiam: (MAYER, GAJARSA and MOORE, Circuit Judges): 

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36. 

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT 

DATED: _March 4, 2008____ / s / Jan Horbaly

 Jan Horbaly, Clerk
**Exhibit 12.2**

** **

** **

**Chief Executive Officer Certification**

 

 

 

I,Marcos Marcelo Mindlin, certify that:

 

1.      Ihave reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Pampa Energía S.A.;

 

2.      Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.      Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of thecompany as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.      Thecompany’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the company andhave:

 

(a)    Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries,is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b)    Designedsuch internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal controlover financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to providereasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and thepreparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance withgenerally accepted accounting principles;

 

(c)    Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(d)    Disclosedin this report any change in the company’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, thecompany’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.      Thecompany’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company’sauditors and the audit committee of the company’s board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a)    Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the company’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

 

 

 

----
---

EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 302 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Cherry Cai, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-K of Secure
Luggage Solutions, Inc;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure
controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to
the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this
report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness
of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this
report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any
change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that
occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies
and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not
material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant
role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

|                        | By: | /s/
      Cherry Cai              
|----------------------- | --- | ----------------------------------
|Date: February 25, 2011 |     | Cherry Cai                        
|                        |     | Principal Financial and Accounting
|                        |     | Officer                           

---
#### IMPERIAL BONITA ESTATES, INC., Appellant, v. Henry MINSTER, Trustee, Appellee.

No. 73-444.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Sept. 26, 1973.

Stephen E. Dalton of Pavese, Shields, Garner, Haverfield & Kluttz, Fort Myers, for appellant.

William A. Keyes, Jr., of Stewart, Stewart & Jackson, Fort Myers, for appellee.

BOARDMAN, Judge.

Appellant/defendant files this timely interlocutory appeal from an order of the trial court denying a motion for leave to amend its answer. Appellee filed his complaint seeking a right of way across the lands of appellant pursuant to the applicable Florida Statutes.

The appellee/plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the allowance of the requested amendment to appellant’s pleading would be prejudicial or harmful to his cause of action.

Upon first reading of the pertinent pleading, we thought perhaps the issue presented was a close one. Further review thereof clearly indicates that the well-established rule of permitting and allowing liberality in pleading should be applied in this case. Rule 1.190(e), RCP, 30 F.S.A., states:

> . At any time in furtherance of justice, upon such terms as may be just, the court may permit any process, proceeding, pleading or record to be amended or material supplemental matter to be set forth in an amended or supplemental pleading. At every stage of the action the court must disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which does not *139affect the substantial rights of the parties.

On authority of the Rule, supra, and the law pronounced by the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Town of Coreytown v. State ex rel. Ervin, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 482, and by our sister court in Free Bond, Inc. v. Comaza International, Inc., Fla.App.1973, 281 So.2d 61, we are of the view that the trial court erred in not allowing appellant to amend its answer.

Accordingly, the order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

MANN, C. J., and COWART, JOE A., Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
#### Annie JOINER, for herself, her minor children, and all other persons similarly situated v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS, through its Executive Director, J. Gilbert Scheib, in his representative capacity and individually.

No. 4065.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

July 6, 1970.

Joseph Meyer, Jr., Jeffrey B. Schwartz, New Orleans, for Annie Joiner, Mary H. Winder, James Henderson, Mrs. Harry Jones, Robert Taylor, Ruth Neal, Richard Wilson, Marie Burton, plaintiffs-appellants.

William J. Guste, Jr., James M. Colomb, Jr., New Orleans, for Housing Authority of New Orleans, defendant-appellee.

Joseph W. Joachim, Jr., New Orleans, for Clyde F. Bel, Sr., Constable of the First City Court, defendant-appellee.

Before BARNETTE, LeSUEUR and SWIFT, JJ.

LeSUEUR, Judge.

This controversy was first brought to trial in the First City Court of the City of New Orleans (Docket No. 71-026). There, the Housing Authority (HANO) secured a judgment on a rule for posses*197sion brought against the plaintiff. The plaintiff responded to this judgment by suing to enjoin enforcement in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, alleging improper service.

HANO lodged exceptions to the suit and these were maintained by the trial court. The plaintiffs have appealed.

The exceptions were predicated, first, upon the premise that this suit is, in its essence, a collateral attack upon the judgment of the First City Court of the Parish of Orleans, and that it is, as such, untenable. Second, and reciprocally, the exceptions rest upon the assertion that the First City Court had and retains exclusive jurisdiction. These exceptions are well taken.

There is no question that original jurisdiction lay with the City Court. Art. 7, Sec. 91, of the Constitution provides, in part, as follows:

> “A. The territorial jurisdiction of the first city court embraces all that part of the city of New Orleans on the left bank of the Mississippi River. It has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases where the amount in dispute or fund to be distributed does not exceed one hundred dollars, exclusive of interest, including suits for the ownership or possession of movable property not exceeding that amount in value, and including suits by landlords for possession of leased premises when the monthly rent does not exceed one hundred dollars. * * * ”

That Court’s judgment, as the judgment of a court of proper jurisdiction, indeed of exclusive jurisdiction, is not subject to a collateral attack in a second court. Collins v. Zachary Hardwood Lumber Company, La.App., 207 So.2d 796 (1st Cir. 1968).

This is not to suggest that the plaintiffs are without remedy. If, in fact, service of process was invalid, an action for nullity of judgment will lie in the First City Court pursuant to Art. 2002 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The action of the Court would, at that juncture, remain subject to appropriate appellate supervision.

For these reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.