J-S70005-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOHN CORNISH

Appellant No. 1862 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 17, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005385-2009

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 24, 2014

John Cornish appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after being found guilty in a 

non-jury trial of third-degree murder,1conspiracy to commit aggravated 

assault,2and possession of an instrument of crime (PIC).3 Cornish was 

sentenced to 20-40 years in prison and a consecutive 5-10 year sentence for 

his conspiracy conviction.4 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c).

2 18 Pa.C.S § 903.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 907.

4 No further penalty was imposed on Cornish’s PIC conviction.
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Cornish, in collusion with his co-defendant Johnson,5 was involved in 

the shooting death of fifty-seven-year-old Stephen Tucker while Tucker 

drove his gold Mercury Grand Marquis near 29th and Thompson Streets in 

the City of Philadelphia on October 5, 2008. Police uncovered several used 

gun cartridge casings at the scene of the crime, which a ballistics’ expert 

later identified as having come from two different weapons, a 9mm or 

.38mm handgun and a shotgun. No firearms were recovered from the 

scene. 

The trial court summarized the evidence as follows:

Police Officer James Miller testified that shortly before 11 p.m. 

on October 5, 2008, he was called to the area of 2900 Thomson 

Street in Philadelphia. He saw a gold Mercury Grand Marquis. 

The driver’s window appeared to be shot out. A black male, 

later identified as the decedent, Stephen Tucker[,] was slumped 

over and unresponsive. He appeared to have been shot on the 

left side. The officer took the victim to Hahnemann Hospital 

where he was pronounced dead. N.T. 1/20/12, [at] 20-24.

The Medical Examiner, Dr. Sam Guilino[,] testified that the 

victim died of a gunshot wound to his chest. The bullet entered 

the left side of his chest, and went through the left lung, the left 

subclavian artery and vein. The bullet then penetrated into the 

neck, going through the trachea, the carotid artery and the 

jugular vein. The bullet lodged in the right side of the neck and 

was recovered. N.T. 1/31/12, [at] 11-14.

Hakeen Savage testified that he was inside “Ms[.] P’s” house 

near the shooting scene when he heard gunshots. He further 

testified that after the gunfire stopped [Cornish and Johnson] 

came running into the house. One had a shotgun and one had a 

____________________________________________

5

Johnson has also appealed from his judgment of sentence at No. 2737 EDA 

2013.
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handgun. The witness testified that he could not remember 

which defendant had which weapon. He further testified that 

when they came in, one of the defendants said, “Don’t go 

outside. Somebody just got shot.” However, in a signed 

statement given to the police approximately three (3) months 

after the shooting . . . the witness gave a different version of 

events. In that statement, the witness said that right after the 

shooting both defendants came running into the house breathing 

heavily. [Johnson] was the one armed with the shotgun. 

[Cornish] said, “Don’t go outside. We just rocked someone.” 

The witness understood the word “rocked” to mean killed. [Id.

at] 98-109.

Kareen Savage was called and questioned about a statement 

that [Cornish] made to him after the shooting admitting to being 

one of the shooters. The witness denied that [Cornish] made 

any statement to him. The witness did acknowledge that he 

gave a signed statement to the police detailing the substance of 

that conversation. However the witness testified that he lied in 

his statement. In that statement [S]avage detailed a 

conversation he had with [Cornish] after the shooting. [Cornish] 

admitted to doing the killing with another person. [Cornish] 

stated that the motive appeared to be one of mistaken identity, 

as the decedent was driving a care [sic] that the intended target, 

a person named “Mansy” was known to drive. N.T. 2/1/12, [at] 

6-14 [] (testimony of Kareem Savage)[;] N.T. 2/13/12, [at] 52-

58 (testimony of Timothy Scally.)[.]

Darnell Corbitt testified that he was in the car with the decedent 

at the time of the shooting. At trial the witness testified that 

after stopping at a bar at 29th and Girard, he heard gunshots 

from more than one gun and jumped out of the car. At trial he 

denied having any more information about the shooting or the 

shooters. However, in a signed statement given to Homicide 

Detective John McNamee approximately three weeks after the 

shooting, the witness also gave a different version of events. In 

that statement the witness identified photographs of both 

defendants as the shooters. N.T. 1/31/12, [at] 40-66 

(testimony of Darnell Corbitt); N.T. 2/1/12, [at] 25-36 

(testimony of Detective John McNamee).

Dandrea Brown testified before this [c]ourt on November 4, 

2010. Her testimony was preserved prior to trial, as she was 

suffering from ovarian cancer. She lived in the house at 2907 

West Flora Street, which was used for the packaging of drugs by 
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[defendant], his co-defendant, the Savage brothers and others. 

She was upstairs at the time of the shooting. She came 

downstairs. A few seconds after the shooting [defendant] and 

his co-defendant came running inside. [Codefendant] was 

holding a shotgun and [defendant] had a handgun. 

[Codefendant] told her to clean the guns and store them. She 

complied. N.T. 11/04[/]10, [at] 4-69.

Bullet holes were observed in the driver[’]s side car door. 

Forensic evidence recovered from the crime scene outside the 

car included six (6) fired cartridge casings, three (3) bullet 

specimens and one (1) buckshot from a . 12 gauge shotgun. No 

fingerprints were recovered from the crime scene, nor was a gun 

recovered. N.T. 1/30/12, 29-48. (Testimony of Officer Fitler.) 

One additional projectile and additional bullet fragments were 

recovered from inside the car door. N.T. 1/31/12, [at] 20-35. 

(Testimony of Officer Flade.)

Police Officer Stephen Ahmie, a ballistics expert [,] examined all 

of the ballistics evidence. The ballistic evidence recovered from 

the car door consisted of two (2) types, .00 buckshot consistent 

with coming from a shotgun shell and a bullet consistent with 

being from a .38 [caliber or 9-]millimeter [weapon]. The bullet 

recovered from the victims neck also was consistent with a .38 

[caliber or 9-]millimeter [weapon]. The other ballistic evidence 

recovered at the crime scene consisted of seven (7) fired 

cartridge casings and one (1) fired shotgun shell. The fired 

cartridge casings all were [9-]millimeter and all were fired from 

the same gun. The fired shotgun shell was [a] .12 gauge and 

was consistent with ... the buckshot recovered. N.T. 2/1/12, [at] 

62-77.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/23/14, at 2-5 (footnotes omitted). 

Before trial, Dandrea Brown testified before the trial judge and was 

subject to cross-examination by both defense counsel.6 In her testimony, 

Ms. Brown testified that six weeks prior to the murder, she agreed that in 

____________________________________________

6 Because Ms. Brown had ovarian cancer, her testimony was videotaped to 

preserve it in anticipation of a future jury trial.
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exchange for $500, she would let the Defendants and the Savage brothers 

use her home for their crack cocaine operations. After Ms. Brown and the 

co-defendants were arrested for drug-dealing in January 2009, she gave the 

police a statement about the Tucker murder. She also identified both codefendants and described the guns they ran into the house with immediately 

following the shooting, which they asked her to clean and store for them. 

Cornish and Johnson were tried together and, after a four-day bench 

trial, the court found them guilty of the aforementioned crimes. Cornish was 

sentenced to 20-40 years for murder and a consecutive sentence of 5-10 

years for conspiracy. He filed timely post-sentence motions that were 

denied. Cornish now appeals, raising the following issues for our 

consideration:

(1) Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 

sustain the convictions of third-degree murder, conspiracy 

to commit aggravated assault, and possession of an 

instrument of crime.

(2) Whether the convictions of third-degree murder and 

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault should have 

merged for sentencing purposes.

Cornish claims that that the Commonwealth failed to prove the 

requisite level of intent to commit each of the crimes for which he was 

convicted. With regard to his third-degree murder conviction, Cornish 

specifically asserts that the alleged motive the Commonwealth proposed he 

had to commit the crimes is not borne out by the evidence and could not 
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support a finding of any level of intent to commit third-degree murder. We 

disagree.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must 

determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, together with all reasonable inferences 

therefrom, the trier of fact could have found that each and every element of 

the crimes charged was established beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Randall, 758 A.2d 669, 674 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Third-degree murder, a first-degree felony, is defined in this 

Commonwealth as, “[a]ll other kinds of murder of the third degree.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2502(c). Notably, section 2502(c) does not list elements or 

specify a requisite mens rea. In Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186-

(Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court noted:

The Crimes Code further provides where a statute, such as 

[section] 2502(c), does not prescribe the culpability sufficient to 

establish a material element of the offense, such element is 

established if the defendant acted "intentionally, 

knowingly or recklessly[.]" Id., § 302(c). Thus, a defendant 

who acts intentionally in attacking his victim may still be 

convicted of third[-]degree murder.

Id. at 1191 (emphasis added), citing 18 Pa.C.S § 302(c). See 

Commonwealth v. Meadows, 787 A.2d 312, 217 (Pa. 2001) (to convict

defendant for third-degree murder, factfinder need not consider whether 

defendant had specific intent to kill, nor make any finding with respect 

thereto); see also Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360 (Pa. 2005) 

(for third-degree murder conviction, Commonwealth need only prove that 
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defendant killed another person with malice aforethought; malice consists 

not only of ill-will, but also wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, 

recklessness of consequences, and mind regardless of social duty, even 

though particular person may not be intended to be injured).

Here, an eyewitness observed Cornish fire a handgun at the victim. At 

trial, several Commonwealth witnesses corroborated that Cornish was one of 

two gunmen involved in the victim’s fatal shooting. Immediately following 

the shooting, Cornish and his co-defendant burst into a house warning the 

occupants, “Don’t go outside, [w]e just rocked [another word for shot] 

someone.” Finally, a ballistics analysis confirmed that a handgun, like the 

one the eyewitness saw Cornish fire at the victim, was used to fatally shoot 

Tucker. This evidence sufficiently proves malice and, therefore, the requisite 

intent to commit third-degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Seibert, 

622 A.2d 361, 366 (Pa. Super. 1993) (malice inferred from use of deadly 

weapon on vital part of body; law infers or presumes from use of deadly 

weapon, in absence of circumstances of explanation or mitigation, existence 

of malice). 

With regard to his conspiracy conviction, Cornish claims that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove that he had the intent to enter into an 

agreement with his co-defendant to commit a crime. The murder, he 

asserts, was merely an “unexpected event” that occurred between him and 

the co-defendant who were merely “associated.”
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A criminal conspiracy may be found where there is evidence that: (1) 

a defendant intended to commit or aid in the commission of a criminal act, 

(2) the defendant entered into an agreement with another, i.e., the 

co-conspirator, to engage in a crime, and (3) the defendant or one or more 

of the other co-conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the 

agreed upon crime. Commonwealth v. Little, 879 A.2d 293 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (emphasis added). The essence of a criminal conspiracy, which is 

what distinguishes this crime from accomplice liability, is the agreement 

made between the co-conspirators. Commonwealth v. Barnes, 871 A.2d 

812 (Pa. Super. 2005). An agreement can be inferred from the 

circumstances by considering the parties’ relation, conduct, and 

circumstances. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 453 A.2d 927, 930 (Pa. 

1982)

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the judge could reasonably 

infer that the co-defendants acted in concert to kill the victim. Cornish and 

his co-defendant approached the victim together, each brandishing a gun, 

and fired their weapons simultaneously at their target. They immediately 

fled from the crime scene together, entering Ms. Brown’s house where they 

confessed to the shooting and asked Ms. Brown to clean and store their 

weapons. The evidence also established that Cornish and Johnson were 

friends who were associated in a drug operation run out of Ms. Brown’s 

home and who both believed that the victim was their drug rival. 
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Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to prove criminal conspiracy. 

Barnes, supra.

With regard to his PIC conviction, Cornish asserts that there was 

insufficient evidence to prove his intent to commit the crime. PIC is defined 

as “[the] posses[sion of] any instrument of crime with the intent to employ 

it criminally.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 907. Having found that the evidence sufficiently 

proved that Cornish used a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s 

body, this argument is meritless. Seibert, supra.

Finally, Cornish claims that his convictions for third-degree murder and 

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault should have merged for sentencing 

purposes because they are based upon the same facts. We disagree.

Pennsylvania's merger doctrine, codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 states:

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes 

arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory 

elements of one offense are included in the statutory 

elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for 

sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only 

on the higher graded offense. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. 

Kimmel, 2014 PA Super 186 (Pa. Super. filed August 29, 2014) (two 

distinct facts must be present for merger: 1) crimes arise from single 

criminal act; and 2) all of statutory elements of one offense is included in 

statutory elements of other). Moreover, the question of merger implicates 

the legality of a sentence; our standard of review is de novo and the scope 
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of our review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043, 1046 

(Pa. Super. 2013).

In Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1063 (Pa. Super. 2011), 

our Court reiterated that the courts of this Commonwealth are to apply an 

elements-based test when determining questions of merger at the time of 

sentencing. A plain language interpretation of section 9765 reveals the 

General Assembly's intent to preclude the courts of the Commonwealth from 

merging sentences for two offenses that are based on a single criminal act 

unless all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are included in the 

statutory elements of the other. Id.

Here, the statutory elements of third-degree murder were distinctly 

different from the elements of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. 

Therefore, the trial court properly determined that Cornish’s sentences for 

those offenses should not merge. Allen, supra.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/24/2014