alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 4(1C)


 


SECOND AMENDMENT TO MASTER UNDERWRITING
AGREEMENT


 


This Second Amendment (this “Amendment”)
to the Master Underwriting Agreement dated as of December 31, 2013 (as previously amended, the “Agreement”), by and
between the State of Israel (the “State”) and Development Corporation for Israel (the “Underwriter”), is
entered into as of December 31, 2016. Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used herein shall have the meaning ascribed
to them in the Agreement.


 


WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 15 of the Agreement,
the State and the Underwriter agree to extend the termination date of the Agreement as set forth in this Amendment, subject to
the provisions hereof;


 


NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises
contained herein, the parties hereby agree as follows:


 


		1.	Amendments to the Agreement.



 


Section 13(a) of the Agreement shall be amended as follows:
The date “December 31, 2016” occurring in the first sentence shall be replaced with “December 31, 2018.”


 


		2.	Confirmation of the Agreement.



 


Except as herein expressly amended, the Agreement is ratified
and confirmed in all respects and shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with its terms. Each reference in the Agreement
to “this Agreement” shall mean the Agreement as amended by this Amendment, and as hereinafter amended, restated or
otherwise modified from time to time.


 


		3.	Effectiveness.



 


This Amendment shall become effective immediately upon the execution
and delivery to each of the parties hereto of this Amendment.


 


		4.	Counterparts.



 


This Amendment may be executed simultaneously in two or more
counterparts by the parties hereto, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which shall constitute one and the same
instrument.


 


		5.	Governing Law.



 


This Amendment will be governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of the State of New York, without regard to the principles of conflicts of laws thereof.


 




     


     


    

 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have
caused this Amendment to be duly executed and delivered as of the date first written above.


 


	 	STATE OF ISRAEL


 


	 	By:	/s/ Avi Braf
	 	Name: Avi Braf
	 	Title: Chief Fiscal Officer of the Ministry of 

Finance for the Western Hemisphere
	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Shay Zafran
	 	Name: Shay Zafran
	 	Title: Deputy Chief Fiscal Officer of the Ministry of 

Finance for the Western Hemisphere
	 	 	 
	 	DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FOR ISRAEL
	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Jordan Horvath
	 	Name: Jordan Horvath
	 	Title: Vice President - Legal
#### Hershell Gerald GUARNETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. R-265.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 6, 1973.

Hershell Gerald Guarnett, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Enoch J. Whitney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The briefs and the record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court hereby appealed is affirmed.

CARROLL, DONALD K, Acting C. J., and WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-7513

JAMIE RAY EVERETT,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

M. E. RAY, Warden; UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR

THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-99-1882-13D)

Submitted: February 22, 2001 Decided: March 1, 2001

Before WIDENER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jamie Ray Everett, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Jamie Ray Everett appeals the district court’s order denying

his motion for return of the appeal fee. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See

Everett v. Ray, No. CA-99-1882-13D (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 99.3

**Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with the annual report of Cenovus Energy Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Brian C. Ferguson, President & Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

 
| 1.     | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or   15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                        |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                     |
| 2.     | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all   material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the   Company. |

 

 
| By:    | /s/ Brian C. Ferguson                        |   |
|--------|----------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Brian C. Ferguson                            |   |
|   | President & Chief Executive Officer |   |

 

 

February 22, 2012

 

11

----
# App1
Order entered June 19, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 15
- 00230
- CV
GREAT AMERICAN LLOYD S INSURANCE COMPANY , ET AL., Appellant s V. VINES
- HERRIN CUSTOM HOMES L.L.C., ET AL. , Appellee s On Appeal from the 44th Jud icial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC
- 03
- 6903 

### O RDER Before the Court is appellees’ June 17, 2015 unopposed second motion for an extension of time to file a brief seeking an extension to August 24, 2015. In an order dated Jun e 17, 2015, this Court granted appellees’ June 11, 2015 motion and extended the time to file their brief to August 24, 2015. Accordingly, we DENY appellees’ motion as moot.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG

- MIERS JUSTICE
#### Lloyd L. NEEL and Nickey B. Neel, Appellants, v. SUN BANK OF EAST ORLANDO, N. A., the Rovac Corporation, James A. Burzee, Southeast First National Bank of Maitland, Appellees.

No. 76-2637.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 9, 1978.

Ronald H. Roby of Roby & O’Neill, P. A., Orlando, for appellants.

Gordon H. Harris of Gray, Adams, Harris & Robinson, Orlando, for appellee James A. Burzee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

CROSS, ANSTEAD and LETTS, JJ., concur.
#### In the Interest of R. L. G., a child.

No. 72-810.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 28, 1973.

Robert V. Shea, Coral Gables, for appellant Helen Jean Halsell.

Pierre Lee Steward of Steward & Steward, Orlando, for appellee Elbert L. Gray.

PER CURIAM.

We have reviewed the briefs, record on appeal and heard oral argument and are of the opinion that the order awarding custody to the putative father rather than the natural mother is not supported by competent substantial evidence.

The paramount consideration in the determination of the custody of a child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, is the *5best interest and welfare of the child. 17 Fla.Jur. Infants § 14. All jurisdictions recognize that within the framework of this principle the mother of an illegitimate child has a natural primary or prima facie right to the custody of a child as against a putative father unless she is proved to be an unfit person to be entrusted with such a charge. Marshall v. Reams, 1893, 32 Fla. 499, 14 So. 95; 98 A.L.R.2d 417 — “Right of Mother to Custody of an Illegitimate Child”; 37 A.L.R.2d 882 — “Right of Putative Father to Custody of Illegitimate Child”; 4 Fla.Jur. p. 637; Cornell v. Hartley, 1967, 54 Misc.2d 732, 283 N.Y.S.2d 318; Roe v. Doe, 1968, 58 Misc.2d 757, 296 N.Y.S.2d 865; Commonwealth ex rel. Gifford v. Miller, 1968, 213 Pa.Super. 269, 248 A.2d 63; Sanders v. Sanders, 1958, 232 S.C. 625, 103 S.E.2d 281. The evidence and the testimony before the Juvenile Court Judge who entered the decree awarding custody to the putative father is insufficient to demonstrate the unfitness or unsuitability of the natural mother. See Commonwealth ex rel. Gifford v. Miller, supra; Cornell v. Hartley, supra; Roe v. Doe, supra; see also Dillman v. Dillman, Fla.App. 1958, 105 So.2d 33.1

Accordingly, the order of the Juvenile Court awarding custody to the putative father is vacated and set aside and the cause remanded to the Juvenile Court for the purpose of entering an order awarding custody to the mother provided, however, that nothing herein is intended to preclude the Juvenile Court upon a proper pleading and proof from entering such other orders as may be deemed to be in the best interest and welfare of the child.

Reversed and remanded.

CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.

REED, C. J., dissents.

1

. The record, for example, indicates that investigations were made of both the natural mother and putative father by the Division of Family Services. Although the agency could make no recommendation as to whether custody should be with the putative father, the agency did recommend that custody of the illegitimate child should be *with the natural mother.*
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         Jan-02-1998                     
<PERIOD-END>                              Apr-04-1997
<CASH>                                         29,359
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  36,923
<ALLOWANCES>                                    1,301
<INVENTORY>                                    29,883
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              104,489
<PP&E>                                         55,312
<DEPRECIATION>                                 27,073
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                155,933
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          42,357
<BONDS>                                        21,185
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0 
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                       45,942
<OTHER-SE>                                     40,509
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  155,933
<SALES>                                        56,865
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               56,865
<CGS>                                          37,257
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  37,257
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               13,218
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                589
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     .10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .10
        


</TABLE>
FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 2, 2010 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM D. JONES, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. WALTER DINWIDDIE, Respondent - Appellee. No. 09-6193 (D.C. No. 09-CV-00102-C) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Before KELLY , BRISCOE , and HOLMES , Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant William D. Jones, a state inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal the district court’s judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely. To obtain a COA, Mr. Jones must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). Mr. Jones has not made the requisite showing, and therefore we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. Mr. Jones was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape, one count of second-degree rape and one count of forcible sodomy and sentenced to consecutive 100 year terms on each count. The judgment and sentence was- 2 - affirmed on direct appeal on July 28, 2004, and became final 90 days thereafter, on October 26, 2004. See Rhine v. Boone , 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Jones filed his federal habeas petition on December 20, 2008, well after the one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The district court adopted the thorough report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, which concluded that Mr. Jones’s petition was untimely, and was not saved by statutory or equitable tolling. On appeal, Mr. Jones renews his arguments, including the merits, and contends that he is actually innocent and that the state must show a lack of diligence and prejudice before it can prevail on a laches defense citing Costello v. United States , 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961). As to the laches argument, we doubt that laches applies in this context given a statutory limitation period which Mr. Jones cannot meet and the district court’s rejection of equitable tolling. See United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1999). That said, we do not think that the disposition on limitations grounds is reasonably debatable. See Slack , 529 U.S. at 483-84. We DENY a COA, IFP status, and DISMISS the appeal. Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
North American Insulation Manufacturers Association

MEETING OF NAIMA WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Conference Call Thursday, March 11, 2010

(703) 925-2440; PIN # 1441931 10:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Eastern)

.....................................................................................................................

AGENDA

1. Review of NAIMA’s Antitrust Guidelines – A. Crane (Attachment)

2. Questions About ICR (A. Crane and NAIMA)

3. Agreement To Move Forward On a Voluntary Basis (A. Crane)

4. Timeline for Preparation of Action and Schedule (To Be E-Mailed)

5. Next Meeting

6. Adjournment
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<ARTICLE> 5
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          10,980
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   15,068
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     11,898
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                50,887
<PP&E>                                          12,412
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  74,422
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           28,160
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           111
<OTHER-SE>                                      44,927
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    74,422
<SALES>                                         62,156
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                62,156
<CGS>                                           17,509
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   17,509
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                38,016
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  62
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,728
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,424
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,303
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.72
<FN>
<F1>FOR PURPOSES OF THIS EXHIBIT, PRIMARY MEANS BASIC.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
UL THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS RFflFlV/FR !M OF TF.XAS j^\1t^C,VC:1-' *TM

©OURTOFCRIMINAL APPPAl

OCT 27 2015

JOHN VINCENT CRUZ §

f 4teM60fltelGbrfc

V. § APPL Cause No.: 08-13-00297-CR

^ Tr. Cause No.: 20120D00741

STATE OF TEXAS §

ORDER

On October 14, 2015, John Vincent Cruz, TDCJ 31892578's Motion For

Extension of Time To File Petition For Discretionary Reviev/ came on to be

and it is the OPINION of this Court that said Motion should be GRANTED / DENIED,

therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the due date to file Petition For Discretionary Review

of November 5, 2015 be extended 30 days.

The new due date is December 5, 2015.

Justice Presiding

In The Court of Criminal Appeals

of Texas

FILED M

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OCT 2 9 27,j

Abel Acosta, Clerk
Honorable Abel Acosta

Chief Deputy Clerk

Court of Criminal Appeals

P.O. Box 12308

Austin, Texas 78711

la: Filing of ORDER

John Vincent...Crua

TDCJ #1892578

Boyd Unit

200 Spur 113

Teague, Texas 75860

October 15, 2015

Dear Honorable Clerk:

Enclosed, please find Appellant's ORDER, file it with the recently

filed Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition For Discretionary Review

and bring it topthe attention of the Court for disposition.

Thank you,

Sincerely,

TDOMH932573

C.z: File

\:.nc I.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

N o. 04

- 14

- 00912

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.R. , et al

.

From the 408th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2010

- CI

- 02265

Honorable Eric Rodriguez , Judge Presiding

PE R CURIAM

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 20, 2015

DISMISSED

Appellant filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The appellee was served with a copy of

Appellant’s motion; Appellee has not filed a response . Therefore, we grant the motion and dismiss

the appeal and the appeal is hereby dismissed without prejudice

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 42.1(a)( 1 ).

Costs of this appeal are taxed against Appellant. See id. R. 42.1(d).

PER CURIAM
/ , 

BRICKLAYERS AND ALLIED CRAFTWORKERS 

LOCAL #5 NEW YORK 

Including: JOINT BENEFITS FUNDS 

Welfare, Pension, Annuity, and Labor Management Coalition 

50 Charles Lindbergh Blvd. Ste 207 

Unlondale, NY 11553 

e@mP 516•740-5321 @~M 

January 25, 2017 

Secretary of the Treasury 

Department of the Treasury 

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Room 1204, Office of l<llne-Mlller Implementation 

Washington, D.C. 20220 

FAX: 516-740-5322 

RE: Withdrawal of Application for Approval of Suspension of Benefits under the Brlcklay~rs and 

Allied Craftworkers Local 5 New York Retirement Fund Pension Plan (Plan) 

As authorized Trustees of the Board of Trustees of the Plan, the sponsor of the Plan, we hereby 

withdraw the application for approval to suspend benefits flied in August 2016, under section 432(e)(9) 

of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and section 305 (e)(9) of the Employee Retirement 

Income Security Act of 1974, as amended. 

Sincerely, 

,ff~Jj)U(d/ Michael Cllfford 

Authorized Trustee 

Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Local 5 New York Retirement Fund Pension Plan 

Alan Seidman 

Authorized Trustee 

Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Local 5 New York Retirement Fund Pension Pian 

20-181009vl
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1964 

To assess the State by State impact of Federal taxation and spending. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 17, 2021 

Mr. FOSTER (for himself, Mr. TAYLOR, Mr. ZELDIN, Mrs. BUSTOS, Mr. 

GOTTHEIMER, Mr. SUOZZI, Mr. ALLRED, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, and Mr. 

GOHMERT) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Reform 

A BILL 

To assess the State by State impact of Federal taxation 

and spending. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Payer State Trans5 parency Act of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CALCULATION OF FEDERAL TAX BURDENS AND 

7 OUTLAYS. 

8 (a) STATE BY STATE CALCULATION OF FEDERAL

9 TAX BURDENS.— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1964 IH

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Commerce, 

2 acting through the Director of the Bureau of Eco3 nomic Analysis, shall calculate the Federal tax bur4 den of each State for each calendar year. 

5 (2) CALCULATION OF FEDERAL TAX BUR6 DEN.—For purposes of calculating the Federal tax 

7 burden of each State under paragraph (1), the Sec8 retary shall— 

9 (A) treat Federal taxes paid by an indi10 vidual as a burden on the State in which such 

11 individual resides; and 

12 (B) treat Federal taxes paid by a legal 

13 business entity as a burden on each State in 

14 which economic activity of such entity is per15 formed in the same proportion that the eco16 nomic activity of such entity in such State 

17 bears to the economic activity of such entity in 

18 all the States. 

19 (b) STATE BY STATE CALCULATION OF FEDERAL

20 OUTLAYS.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Office of 

22 Management and Budget, in coordination with the 

23 Council of Economic Advisers and the Secretary of 

24 the Treasury, shall calculate the total amount of 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1964 IH

1 Federal outlays received by each State in each fiscal 

2 year. 

3 (2) TREATMENT OF CONTRACT AWARDS.—For 

4 purposes of calculating the amount of Federal out5 lays received by a State under paragraph (1), a Fed6 eral contract award shall be treated as a Federal 

7 outlay received by each State in which performance 

8 under the award takes place in the same proportion 

9 that such performance in such State bears to such 

10 performance in all the States. 

11 (c) STATE DEFINED.—In this section the term 

12 ‘‘State’’ means each of the several States. 

13 SEC. 3. JOINT REPORT. 

14 Not later than the date that is 180 days after the 

15 beginning of each calendar year, the Secretary of Com16 merce and the Director of the Office of Management and 

17 Budget shall— 

18 (1) jointly submit to Congress a report con19 taining the results of the calculations described in 

20 section 2 with respect to such calendar year; and 

21 (2) publish the report on a publicly accessible 

22 website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS