United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1898 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

RAYMOND NEGRÓN, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 

[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Lynch, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

Bruce E. Kenna, on brief for appellant. 

Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, and Emily 

Gray Rice, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. 

September 14, 2016 
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Raymond 

Negrón appeals the United States District Court for the District 

of New Hampshire's decision to deny a retroactive reduction to his 

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Negrón had 

previously entered into plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), which "bind[s] the district court 

to a pre-agreed sentence if the court accepts the plea." United 

States v. Rivera-Martínez, 665 F.3d 344, 345 (1st Cir. 2011). 

Under so-called C-type plea agreements, a defendant is eligible 

for a sentence reduction based on a retroactive amendment to the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") only if the 

term of imprisonment specified in the agreement is "based on" a 

Guidelines sentencing range. We agree with the district court 

that the proposed sentenced in Negrón's plea agreement failed to 

meet this requirement and affirm. 

I. 

On August 22, 2012, a federal grand jury returned a ninecount indictment against Negrón.1 Negrón and the Government 

 

1 Counts one through five charged Negrón with controlled substance 

offenses in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Count six charged 

Negrón with sale of a firearm to a prohibited person in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). Counts seven through nine related to 

Negrón's possession of a Mossberg twenty gauge bolt action shotgun. 

Negrón was charged with possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 

U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5841, 5871; possession of a firearm with an 

obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k); and possession of 

a short-barreled shotgun during and in relation to a drug 
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subsequently reached a plea agreement in which Negrón pled guilty 

to counts one through eight. The Government dismissed count nine, 

which carried a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of 120 

months' imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(i). Negrón's 

plea agreement was made pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). Under so-called C-type plea agreements, 

"the parties bind the district court to a pre-agreed sentence if 

the court accepts the plea." Rivera-Martínez, 665 F.3d at 345. 

Although the plea agreement did not state a base level offense, 

applicable Guidelines range, or criminal history category ("CHC"), 

the parties stipulated that Negrón would be sentenced to 144 

months' imprisonment.

The district court conducted a sentencing hearing on 

June 13, 2013, and determined that Negrón had a total base offense 

level of 25 and CHC of I, corresponding to a Guidelines range 

sentence of 57 to 71 months' imprisonment. Noting that the 

stipulated sentence was "slightly over twice the high end of the 

advisory guideline," the district court accepted the plea 

agreement and imposed the stipulated sentence.

In 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission 

retroactively reduced the base offense level for many drug offenses 

 

trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(i).
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by two levels. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1); U.S.S.G. supplement 

to app. C amend. 782 (Nov. 1, 2014); United States v. Vaughn, 806 

F.3d 640, 643 (1st Cir. 2015). Because several of his convictions 

were for controlled substance offenses, Negrón subsequently filed 

a motion to modify his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 

The district court denied Negrón's motion, concluding that 

Negrón's sentence was not based on a Guidelines sentencing range 

affected by an amendment. This timely appeal followed. 

II. 

A district court performs a "two-step inquiry" in 

determining whether a defendant is entitled to a sentence reduction 

under § 3582(c)(2). Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 

(2010). First, the district court must determine whether any 

applicable Guidelines amendments apply to the defendant's 

sentence. Id. at 826-27. Second, if the district court concludes 

the defendant is eligible for relief, it must weigh the sentencing 

factors described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determine whether a 

reduction is warranted. Id. Here, the sole issue on appeal is 

whether the district court properly applied our decision in RiveraMartínez, 665 F.3d at 344, to conclude that Negrón was ineligible 

for relief.2 Although "[w]e review a district court's denial of 

 

2 The district court stated that, if Negrón were legally eligible, 

it would have reduced his sentence to 116 months' imprisonment.
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a motion for reduction of sentence under section 3582(c)(2) for 

abuse of discretion," United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 8 

(1st Cir. 2008), because Negrón contends the district court 

committed legal error, our review is effectively de novo, id. ("A 

material error of law is perforce an abuse of discretion."). 

Courts may reduce the term of imprisonment for "a 

defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based 

on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 

Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The term of 

imprisonment in a C-type plea agreement is "based on" a Guidelines 

sentencing range in two scenarios: (1) when the agreement "calls 

for a sentence within an identified sentencing range," RiveraMartínez, 665 F.3d at 348, and (2) when "the terms contained within 

the four corners of the plea agreement," id. at 349, "make clear 

that the basis for a specified term of imprisonment is a Guidelines 

sentencing range applicable to the offense to which the defendant 

pleaded guilty," id. at 348 (alterations omitted) (quoting Freeman 

v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 539 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 

concurring)).3

 

3 We acknowledge that since we decided Rivera-Martínez, two other 

circuits have concluded that Justice Sotomayor's concurrence is 

not the narrowest opinion in Freeman v. United States and thus 

nonbinding. See United States v. Davis, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 

324504316 (9th Cir. June 13, 2016) (en banc); United States v. 

Epps, 707 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Nonetheless, we view Rivera-
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Negrón acknowledges his term of imprisonment is not 

within a specific Guidelines sentencing range, but argues that his 

plea agreement fell into this second category. As in RiveraMartínez, however, Negrón's plea agreement lacks the "two 

essential coordinates" that show a Guidelines sentencing range 

underpins the proposed sentence. Id. at 349. In that case, we 

found that a C-type plea agreement that failed to specify a CHC 

(despite specifying a base offense level) could not be considered 

to be based on a Guidelines sentencing range. Id. Negrón's case 

is even weaker because his plea agreement contains neither a base 

offense level nor a CHC. Absent either of these two essential 

coordinates, we cannot conclude Negrón's plea agreement was based 

on a Guidelines sentencing range. Id. 

Nonetheless, Negrón contends that we can infer both 

numbers from the four corners of his plea agreement. With respect 

to the base offense level, Negrón argues his plea agreement 

contains all of the facts necessary to calculate this integer. 

With respect to his CHC, Negrón claims this number was never 

seriously contested, due to his relatively sparse criminal record, 

and is obvious from his presentence report. Finally, Negrón cites 

the fact that at his sentencing hearing the district court 

 

Martínez as controlling Negrón's appeal. 
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acknowledged that 144 months' imprisonment was equal to doubling 

the high end of the applicable Guidelines range and "rounding [up 

to] an even twelve-year sentence." Negrón views this statement 

as evidence that his plea agreement was based on a Guidelines 

sentencing range. 

Negrón's arguments run contrary to our holding in 

Rivera-Martínez. Under the Guidelines, a district court may 

accept a C-type plea agreement only if the agreement stipulates a 

sentence that is within the applicable Guidelines range or the 

district court is satisfied that the sentence departs from the 

Guidelines range "for justifiable reasons." U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(c). 

In other words, even with C-type plea agreements, the district 

court must calculate the defendant's base offense level and CHC to 

determine whether the sentence negotiated by the parties is 

acceptable. Because we have rejected the view that all C-type 

plea agreements may qualify for relief under § 3582(c)(2), we have 

held that the fact that the district court "perform[ed] [Guidelines 

calculations] before deciding whether to accept the agreement" is 

insufficient to show that the stipulated sentence is based on a 

Guidelines sentencing range. Rivera-Martínez, 665 F.3d at 349. 

The inclusion of admitted facts in Negrón's plea 

agreement does not necessarily demonstrate that that parties 

intended to base his sentence on a particular base offense level. 
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Rather, these facts merely helped the district court perform the 

Guidelines analysis necessary to its review of the agreement. 

Moreover, a sentencing court need not rely exclusively on the facts 

listed in a plea agreement when performing its Guidelines 

calculation to determine whether to accept the plea. The district 

court and Negrón both relied on his presentence report -- a 

document outside of the four corners of the plea agreement -- to 

calculate his CHC. We therefore reject Negrón's contention that 

we can infer that he and the Government had a specific base offense 

level in mind from the stipulated facts in his plea agreement. 

We also decline Negrón's invitation to find that his 

plea agreement implicitly referenced his CHC. Although the 

"obviousness" of this integer may be an explanation for its absence 

from the plea agreement, it is not the only one. The absence of 

the CHC is equally consistent with the parties simply viewing other 

factors besides Negrón's Guidelines range as important to 

determining his sentence. 

For similar reasons, we are equally unpersuaded by 

Negrón's argument that his plea agreement must have been based on 

a Guidelines sentencing range because his stipulated sentence is 

roughly double the high end of the Guidelines sentencing range. 

We have recognized that the "term of imprisonment in a C-type plea 

agreement will most often be negotiated by reference to the 
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relevant guideline provisions" and interpreted § 3582(c)(2) as 

requiring a stronger "linkage." Id. (citing Freeman, 564 U.S. at 

537). Negrón's observation falls short. Although the district 

court acknowledged some relationship between the stipulated 

sentence and the applicable Guidelines range, the district court 

also factored into its analysis the fact that the Government had 

agreed to dismiss count nine of Negrón's indictment, which carried 

a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of 120 months' 

imprisonment. In other words, non-Guidelines factors also 

explained Negrón's proposed sentence. Understanding the role the 

Guidelines played vis-á-vis the dropped charge would require us to 

"to supplement the [a]greement with . . . the parties' background 

negotiations," something Rivera-Martínez forbids. Id. We 

therefore decline to accept Negrón's invitation to infer a 

Guidelines basis for his stipulated sentence. 

Finally, Negrón claims his stipulated sentence was based 

on a Guidelines sentencing range because his plea agreement 

contains various references to the Guidelines including that 

(1) the district court was required to consider the Guidelines in 

an advisory capacity; (2) Negrón was aware that the Guidelines 

were nonbinding; (3) the United States and the United States 

Probation Office would advise the court of any inaccuracies in the 

presentence report; and (4) the Government would not "oppose an 
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appropriate reduction in [Negrón's] adjusted offense level, under 

the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, based upon [Negrón's] prompt 

recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility 

for the offense." These generic plea agreement statements are 

insufficient to show that Negrón's term of imprisonment was based 

on a Guidelines sentencing range because it is not "evident from 

the agreement itself" that the "basis for the specified term [of 

imprisonment] is a Guidelines sentencing range." Freeman, 564 

U.S. at 539 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). They simply show that 

the Guidelines would play some amorphous role in the parties' 

negotiations and the district court's analysis of the plea. This 

falls short of the linkage Rivera-Martínez requires. 

III.

Because we cannot conclude that Negrón's sentence was 

based on a Guidelines sentencing range, we agree with the district 

court that he is not eligible for a sentencing reduction pursuant 

to § 3582(c)(2). 

Affirmed.