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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-3027

Z A C HAR

Y M UL H OL L AND, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

M ARI O N C OUNT

Y E L E C T I O N B OAR

D, Defen dant-Appellee.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the So uthern Distri ct o f Indi ana , Indi ana pol i s Divisi on. No. 1: 12 -cv-01 50 2 — Sara h Evan s Ba rker , Judg e.
A RGU E D F E B R

UAR Y 12, 2014

— D E C I D E D M ARC H 20, 2014

Before P O S N E R

, F L AUM , and H AMI L T O N

, Circ uit Judges. H AMI L T O N , Cir cui t Judge. The tw o major poli tic al parties in Mar i on County

, Indi ana, both follow a long tr adi tion of “slating” their preferr ed c a n d i d a te s in p rim a ry e l e c tions

. Those candi dates hav e the financi al a nd or gani zational backing of party leadershi p, and the parties therefore hav e an intere st in prev entin g confus i on among v ote rs as to who supp or ts whom. Acco r d ing ly

, Indi ana’s “anti-s latin g” statute makes it a cri me to di strib ute a li st endorsin g multi ple poli tic al candi dates2 No. 13-3027
duri ng a prim ary electi on unle ss all such candi dates hav e giv en thei r written consent. See Ind. Code § 3-14-1-2(a) . Mor e than a decade a go, the anti -slating law w as challen ged as violati ng the First Amendment. The plainti ff in that case w on a federal injun ct io n again st the statute’s future enforcement and a consent decree in wh i ch all parties sti pulated and the court declared that the law w as facial ly unc onsti tutional. Ogden v
. Mar

endt, No. 1:03-cv-415 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 2 9 , 2 0 03), EFC No. 40. One of the defendants then w as the same defendant before
us today : the Mar i on County Electi on Board. Havin g appar
ently changed i ts view s on the statute’s v ali di ty , the Board enforced i t again st a candi date running for state repr esentativ e in the 2012 prim a r y

. That candi date, plainti ff Zachary Mu lholland, has sued to enjo in further Electi on Boar d p ro c e e d

ings r elated to the slating violati on and to enj ointhe statute ’s f u tu re enforcement. The di stric t court di smi ssed the case u n d e r the abstenti on doctrine of Y ounger v
. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971), ci tin g a sti ll-ongoing Electi on Board inv esti gation. W e rev erse for tw o reasons. First, the Electi on Board’ s inv esti gation i s too prelim inary a proceeding to w arr ant Y ounger abstenti on, at least in the w ake of Sprin t Commun ications, Inc. v
. Jacob s , 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013). Second, ev en i f Y ounger a bstenti on w ere theor etic ally av ai lable a ft er Sprin t , the prev i ous final federal judgment again st the defendant Electi on Board holding the
same statute faci ally unc onsti tutional w ould sti ll amount to an ext rao rdin ary ci rcums tance maki ng Y ounger abstent ion inappropr i ate.No. 13-3027 3
I. Factual and Procedural Background On the mornin g of May 8, 2012, as polli ng places opened to prim ary v ote rs across Indi ana, candi date Zachary Mulholland faced a steep cli mb in hi s bi d to repr esent the state ’ s 100th Distr i ct in the Indi ana House of Representat i v es. Located o n the east si de of Indi anapoli s, the di stric t had been held b y the ret i ring Dem ocrat i c incu mbent for all but tw o of the prev i ous thi rt y-ei ght y ears. Mulholland w as running as a Democrat, but he ha d fai led to win the “slating,” the endorsement of the county party ’s leader ship. He now faced the party ’s slated candi date. Mulholland had nev ert heless k e p t up hi s fi ght for the nominati on. The morni ng of the pr i mary , he and a numb er o f campai gn v olunteer s w ent to polli ng places t o mak e last-minute appeals to v ote rs. They handed out copi es of a fly er li sting the names and pi ctures of fi v e candi dates under the heading “V

ote Democrat.” These candi dates were Barack Obama for Presi dent, Joe Donnelly for U.S. Senate , André Carson for U.S. Representat i v e, John Gregg for Gov ernor , and Zach Mulholland fo r St ate Representat i v e. The fly er noted at the bott om that i t w as pai d for by Hoosi e rs for Zachary M ul ho lland. No party has suggested in thi s appeal that a ny information on the fly er w as fraudu lent or untrue. Y et th e fl yer s w ere i llegal under Indi ana law , as Mulholland soon learned. At the county lev e l , electi ons in Indi ana are ove rs e e n b y e l e c ti on b oar ds compri sing one elected clerk of the cir cu it co urt and tw o members, one from each major party

, appoi nted by the clerk

. I nd

. Code § 3-6-5- 2. A l e r ted to the offending materials on the mornin g of the4 No. 13-3027 prim a r y , the Mar i on County Electi on Board held a bri ef meetin g in

whi ch the members rev i ewed the fly er and unani

mously a gr e e d that Mulholland had violated state electi on law

. The Electi on Board i ssu ed an or der to that effect and a ut ho

rized i ts speci al deputi es to sei ze t he fl yer s. Later that day , Mulholland and the Electi on Board’ s chai r di scu ssed the or der by telephone. The contents of their conv ersation are di sputed, but the or der remain ed in place and the rest of M ul ho l l a nd’s fly ers w ere ei ther confi scated or nev er di strib uted. Mulholland ulti mately lost t he prim ary

. Hi s o pponent went on to win t he gener al electi on. The law cri minali zing fly ers li ke Mulholland’s i s Indi ana’s anti -slating statute, whi ch makes i t a mi sdemeanor to publi sh
or di strib ute a “slate” duri ng a p r ima r y electi on wi thout fi rst receiving and the n fil ing wi th the county electi on board the wri tte n consent of all candi dates named on the slate. Ind. Code § 3-14-1 -2(a) (2)–( 3). The prov i si on defines a “slate” as “a sampl e ballot, reproduction of an offi ci al ballot, or a li sting of
ca ndi dates havin g the names or numb ers of more than o ne candi date for nominati on at a prim ary e l e ct ion; and that expr esses supp or t for more than one of the candi dates set forth
on the ballot or li st.” § 3-14-1- 2(b)

. That broad defini tion means that any candi date, intere st gr oup, o r ind i vidu al ci tizen who di strib utes a li st expr essing supp or t for multi ple prim ary ca nd idat es wi thout their wri tte n permi ssi on can be charged wi th a cri me. The effects are to be ne fit the party ’s slated candi dates, who can eas i ly c oor dinate the paper w or k needed to promo te a uni fi e d sl a t e , and to increase the tw o parties’ influ ence ov er t he outcome of primary elections

.No. 13-3027 5
Becaus e the anti -slating law r estric ts core po li tic al speech , the law has rais ed obvious consti tutional co ncerns. In 2003 a candida t e for offi ce and a poli tic al acti on commi tte e sued the Mar i on County Electi on B oar d and other defendants all eging that the statute violated the free speech claus e of the First Amendment. Then- Di stric t Judge Tinder found t hat the plainti ffs had shown they w ere li kely to suc ceed on the merits,
a nd he gr anted their motion for a prelim inary injuncti o n. Ogden v . Mar

endt, 264 F

. Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003). Applying stric t scrutiny

, Judge Tinder found that the statute w as not
narro wly tailored to adv ance the state’s legiti mate intere sts in prev entin g c ampai gn fraud or maintai ning the stabi li ty of the tw o-part y system. The state’s putativ e intere st in p r o t ecti ng candi dates from being associ ated wi th supp or ter s they w ould rat her di sown w as not a compelling justifi cati on for supp ressing p o li tic al speech

. So on after the injuncti on w as i ssu ed, th e parties settled. The court appr ov ed a final judgment in whi ch all si des sti pulated that the statute “i s declared faci ally unc onsti tutional,” and the co ur t enjo ined the Electi on Board from enforci ng i t agains t the plainti ffs

. Mulholland w as not a plainti ff in Ogden and w as not shi elded by the court’s inj unc tion, but he contends t he Ogden judgment r endered the ant i -slating law a dead letter and that i t violates the First Amendment in any ev ent. On May 30, 2012,
a few w eeks after hi s prim ary defeat, Mulholla nd sued the Electi on Boa r d in state court in M arion Co unty for an injunction again st future enforcement of the statute and for damages for the cost of hi s confi scated materials

. After fi v e months, the
case had gone nowhere. The Electi on Board i ssu ed a new or der sch eduling a meetin g to “hear fro m all intere sted persons”6 No. 13-3027
about “the acts and e ven ts occurrin g on May 8

... and take
such addi tional acti on as w arr anted by the evidenc e presented.” The E l e cti on Board mov ed the state court to stay proceedings, arg uing that the ne w Board hearin g w ould prov i de the court wi th a more complete factual recor d and mi ght lead the Board to modi fy i ts ini tial or der

. Mulholland at fi rst opposed the motion, but after fi ling the present laws ui t in federal court, he wi thdrew hi s opposi tion and the st a te court stay ed i ts proceed ing s. The Electi on Board then postponed indefini tely its sch eduled meetin g, leaving the federal sui t as the sole activ e forum for t he parties’ di spute. Mulholland’s federal complaint seeks to enjo in both future enforcement of the anti -slating statute and the Electi on Board’ s pending meetin g. (The Board has threat ened to compel hi s atte ndanc e by subp oena. See Ind. Code § 3-6-5- 27.) He has standing to co nt e st future enforcement of the statute becau se he intend s to run in later electi ons, and the case i s not moot becau se “poli tic al candid a cy , li ke preg nancy

, i s capabl e of repet i tion y et ev ades rev i ew” under or dinary moot ness rules. Ogden , 264 F

. Supp. 2d at 7 9 0 n.5, ci tin g Majo rs v
. Abell , 317 F .3d 719 , 722 (7th Ci r
. 2003); see also Norman v
. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1992) (di spute ov er electi on law not moot becau se i t w as capabl e of repet i tion and w ould ot he r wis e ev ade rev i ew). Mulholla nd also contests the Electi on Board’ s abi li ty to sub poena hi m to the meetin g insofar as the sub poena i s ba sed on the anti -slating statute he contends i s unc onsti tutional. The Board mov ed to d ismi ss the case under Y ounger, asserti ng that the federal di stric t court should defer to the ongo ing proceedings in st a t e co urt and before the Electi onNo. 13-3027 7
Board. The di stric t court ag r e ed, holding that any injuncti on li mi tin g the Board’ s abi li ty to sub poena M ulholland to a hearin g about the slating violati on w ould “clearly interfer e wi th the ongo ing state adminis tr ativ e proceedings.” The di stric t court fo und none of the recog ni zed exceptions to the Y ounger doctrine appli ed here. The c ou rt rejected Mulholland’s arg ument that the statute w as “flagrantly and patently ”
un co nsti tutional. Although the defendant Board had prev iously sti pulated to the law’s consti tutional infi rmi ty , the court viewed that consent decree as oper ativ e only betw e e n t he Board and the prev i ous p l a in ti ffs

. The court di smi ssed the case, and Mulholland has appealed. II. The Scope of Y

ounger Abstention The abstenti on doctrine set fort h in Y ounger v
. Harris , 401 U.S

. 3 7 (1971), i s an exception to the gener al rule that federal courts mus t hear and deci de cases wi thi n their jurisdi ction. The doctrine reflects a concern that fe d e ral interfer ence wi th certain t y pes of i mport ant state proceedings i s unw i se and unn ecess ary in a system of dual s ov ereigns, id. at 44, and i t requires that federal co ur ts di smi ss such cases rat her than intervene in state affai rs. As the Supreme Court has recently emphas i zed, Y

ou nger abstenti on i s called for in exactly three clas ses of cases : where federal jurisdi cti on would intrude into ongo ing state cri minal proceedings, or into certain civil enforcement proceedings (ju d i ci al or admini strat i v e) akin to cri minal prosecuti ons, or into civil proceedings “that i mpli cate
a St ate’s intere st in enforci ng the or ders and judgments of it s courts.” Sprin t Commun ications, Inc. v
. Jacob s , 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013).8 No. 13-3027
Outsi de these three “exceptional” si tuations, Y ou nger a bs tention i s not appropr i ate ev en when there i s a ris k of li tigating the same di spute in parallel and redundant state and federal proceedings. Id. at 591; Nader v
. Keith , 385 F .3d 729, 732 (7th Ci r
. 2004). (The problems posed by parallel state and federal p ro ceedings are managed under the n arr ow er abs tention doctrine of Colorado River W ater Conservation Dist. v
. United States , 424 U.S. 800 (1976), whi ch or dinarily calls for a stay rat her than di smi ss a l wh en i t appli es, but sti ll prev ents dupli cati on.) In thi s case, the di stric t court viewed the sch eduled Electi on Board meetin g and ongo ing state laws uit as the type of civil
en fo r ce ment proceedings that are close enough to a cri minal prosecuti on to w arr ant Y ounger abstenti on. See, e.g. , Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v
. Garden State Bar Ass'n , 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (admini strat i v e proceeding again st atto rney for violati on of state ethic s rules); Huff man v
. Pur s u e, Ltd. , 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (ci vil enforcement o f p ubli c nui sanc e statute). W e rev i ew t hi s deci si on de novo

. Forty One News, Inc. v
. County of Lake, 491 F .3d 662, 665 (7th Ci r . 2007). In our rev i ew under Y

ounger, Mulholland’s state sui t plays no role. Such parallel requests for reli ef by the s ame party are not subject to Y

ounger abstenti on. W

e focus instead on the proce e d ings before the Board. See Sprin t, 134 S. Ct. at 591–92 (fac t that feder al plainti ff also sought state court rev i ew of agency deci si on di d not itself i mpli cate Y ounger; proper focus

w as on the agency proceeding); New Orleans Public Serv ., Inc. v
. Counc il of City of New Orle ans , 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989) (sam e).No. 13-3027 9
W e mus t deter mine, the re for e, wh e the r the E l ecti on Board’ s planned hearing on Mulholland’s violati on of the anti -slating statute ca lls for Y

ounger abstenti on. Ci tin g language in Middlesex , we hav e sai d that abstenti on i s required when such state civil proceedings are “judi ci al in nature,” inv olv e i mpor
tant state inte r e st s, and offer an adequate oppor tuni ty to
rev i ew the federal clai m. E.g. , Majo rs v
. Engelbrecht, 1 49 F .3d 709, 711 (7th Ci r
. 1998). Thi s i s the approach ta k en by the di stric t courtand largely follow ed in the part i es’ bri efs. After the di stric t court’s deci si on and whi le bri efing in thi s appeal w a s a l r eady underw ay , the Supreme Court rephrased the questi on, at least to some ext ent, in Sprin t

. There the Court
rev ersed an appellate deci si on that had appli ed the same rea ding of Middlesex to hold that an adjudi cati v e proceeding before the Iow a Utili ties Board w arr anted Y ounger abstenti on. As the unani mo us C ourt explain ed, the “three Middlesex
co nditi ons reci ted abov e w ere not di sposi tiv e; they w ere, instead, additional fact o rs appropr i ately consi dered by the federal court before inv oking Y ounger .” 134 S. Ct. at 593. These factors remain relev ant, but the cri tic al consi derat i on in ev aluating a state civi l proceedin g is how closely i t r esembl es a cri minal prosecuti on. “Di v or ced from their quasi -cri minal context,” the Court wro t e , “the three Middlesex condi tions

w ould ext end Y

ounger to virtually all parallel state and federal proceedings, at least wh ere a party could identi fy a plaus ibly i mport ant state interest.” Id. The plann ed Electi on Boar d meeting in thi s cas e i s not the type of quasi -cri minal proceeding that w ould w arr ant Y ounger abstenti on, a t l e a st after Sprin t, whi ch inv olv ed an agency adjudi cati on of state law that w as ini tiated by one priv ate party10 No. 13-3027 again st another and that pre se nt e d no possi bi li ty of cri minal penalty

. The Board’ s hearin g in thi s case has a few features that mi ght arg uabl y g ive i t a somewhat closer resemblanc e to a cri minal adjudi cati on. The he aring w as ini tiated by the government to look into a violati on of state law , and the Board has coerci v e authority to sub poena wi tnesses. But the Board’ s authority to sanc tion offenders i s ext r e me l y li mi ted—far less than the state proceedings t hat hav e w arr anted Y ounger abstenti on in other cases

. The Board’ s hearin g could lead only to a recommendati on of prosec ut io n to a county prosecuti ng atto rney or the state atto rney gener al. Ind. Code § 3-6-5- 31. Cf. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v
. Dayto n Christian Sch., Inc. , 477 U.S. 619, 624–25 (1986) ( Y

ounger abstenti on appli ed to pending state admini strat i v e hearin g that could result in or der requiring reins tate ment of employ ee wi th backpay); Middlesex , 457 U.S. at 427 (sam e where att or ney di sci plinary heari ng c ould result in professi onal sanc tions ). The possi

bi li ty that a state proceeding may lead to a future prosecuti on of the federal plainti ff i s not enough t o t r i gge r Y ounger abstenti on; a federal court nee d not decline to hear a consti tutional case wi thi n i ts juri s d i c ti on m e re l y becau se a state inv esti gation has begun. See Steff e l v
. Thompson , 415 U.S. 452, 454, 472 (1974) ( Y

ounger does not pre vent federal declarator y relief “when a state prosecuti on has been threat ened, but i s not pending”); 520 South Michig an A v e. Associates, Ltd. v
. Devin e, 433 F .3d 961, 963 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (sug g e st ing that prosecuti on mus t be “i mminent” before court wi ll abstain). The threat of prosecuti on i s especi ally specu lativ e where as here the inv esti

gating agency mus t fi r st hand the matter ov er to a separateNo. 13-3027 11 prosecutor who has complete di screti on ov er whether to bring the case. Ev en i f the Electi on Board could sanc tion Mulholland di rectly , w e mi ght consi der t he se proceedings to be at too prelim inary a stage to w arr ant federal deference. See Louisi ana Debating & Literary Ass'n v
. City of New Orleans , 42 F .3d 1483, 1490 (5th Ci r
. 1995) (no abst e nt i on where agency notifi ed plainti ffs of ci tizen complaint but had not st art ed inv esti gation); T elco Commun ications, Inc. v
. Carbaugh , 885 F

. 2 d 1 2 25, 1228–29 (4 t h Ci r
. 1989) (no abstenti on where agency notifi ed plainti ff of speci fi c ch a rg es and held informal meetin g, but inv esti gation w as sti ll unfolding). The questi on w ould be close in thi s case, in part becau se t he r ecord i s so v ague as to the purpose of the Board’ s planned meetin g. In fi lings be fo re the state court, the Board explain ed that “Mulholland doe s not know what wi ll happen at the Electi on B oar d’s hearin g
... . And the Electi on Board does not know what wi ll happen at the Electi on Boar d’s heari ng ... . At t hi s ti me, no one kno ws.” W e don’t know ei ther

. Gi v en the u ncertain ty on that point and the lack of prosecutor i al pow er for the Electi on Board, w e see li ttle r eason for a federal cour t to abstain whi le w ai tin g to
see i f the Board refer s the anti -slating violati on to a prosecutor who mi ght then pursue the case. In i ts bri ef, the Electi on Board i mpli es that Mulholland mi ght hav e brok e n othe r electi on laws
as w ell. If the Board beli ev es that i s the case, i t i s of course free to inv esti gate those violati ons whi le the federal cour t he ars a challen ge to the anti -slating prov i si on. Y ounger i s i rr elev ant in that scenari o.12 No. 13-3027
The Electi on Board’ s other e x p l a nati on i s that i t i s si mply offerin g Mulholland the process he says he w as deni ed on electi on day

, and that i t may ulti matel y mo di fy i ts or i gin al
or der

. If that’s the case, then the meetin g’s purpose w ould be remedial rat her than coerci v e, see Day ton , 477 U.S. at 627 n.2,
so i t w ould not be the sort o f quasi -cri minal proceeding that could requi re Y

ounger abstenti on. III

. Extrao rdinary Ci r cum stances If all thi s w ere not enough to defeat Y ounger abstenti on, the second independent reason for not abst a inin g i s that the Electi on Board i s atte mpting to enforce a statute that has already been held unc onsti tutional in a final judgment again st the Board i tself. Y

ounger there fore w ould not apply ev en i f the planned Board meetin g w ere the sort of adjudi cati v e proceeding that w ould other wi se callfor abstention. The Y ounger exception to the ru l e t ha t federal courts hear the cases before them i s at bott om an equi table doctrine, and i t contai ns i ts own equi table exceptions. The abstenti on doctrine does not prev ent federal courts from enjo ining enfo r cement acti ons tha t invo lv e “bad fai th, harassmen t, or a patently inv a l id st ate statute.” Sprin t, 134 S. Ct. at 591, ci tin g Y ounger, 401 U

. S

. at 53–54. These exceptions are narro w , and the Supreme Court has “unequi v ocally held t hat faci al inval i di ty of a statute is n ot itself an exceptional c i rcums tance justi fyi ng federal interfer ence wi th state c rim in al proceedings.” Huff man , 420 U.S. at 602, ci tin g Y ounger, 401 U.S. at 53–54 (“the possi ble
unc onsti tutionali ty of a statute ‘on i ts face’ d oes not in i tself justif y an injuncti on again st goo d-fai th atte mpts to enforce i t,” but bad fai th, harassmen t, or another “unus ual ci rcums tance”No. 13-3027 13
could call for equi table relief ); see also Pincham v
. Illinois Judicial Inqu i ry B d. , 872 F .2d 1341, 1350 (7th Ci r
. 1989) (“the Court s Commi ssi on could w ell construe the rules in a manner compatible wi th the constituti on”). In thi s case, how ev er

, the Electi on Boa rd’s atte mpt to enforce t he a nti -slating law again st Mulholland goe s bey ond the mere “possi

ble unc onsti tutionali ty of a statute on i ts face.” The law w as declared faci ally unc onsti tu tional by a federal
cour t a nd i ts enforcement w as enjo ined in a final judgment again st the Board in Ogden in 2003. The di stric t court corr ectly poin ted out that the Ogden injuncti on w as li mi ted to enforcement of the ant i-s l a t ing law ag ainst t he plainti ffs in t hat case. That analysi s ov erlo oks, how ev er , t he si gni fi canc e of the declarator y port i o n of the Ogden judgment that declared the anti -slating statute faci ally uncons tituti onal. Despi te thi s ruli ng, the Electi on Board invoked the law in 2012 again st Mulholland, sei zing the campai gn li ter ature of a candi date chall engin g hi s party ’s slate in the prim ary

. The B o a rd now seeks on the basi s of the same statute to compel Mulholland’s atte nda nce at further admini strat i v e proceedings, the purpose of whi ch remain s mur k y

. This shav es v ery cl o se to harassmen t or bad fai th prosecuti on. The Elect io n Board members are w ell aw are of the Ogden l it igation and resulti ng in

jun c ti on

. And y et the Board deci ded to resurr ect the law for use against Mulholland. The Electi on Board contends that, alt ho ugh the law w as found unc onsti tutional in Ogden , Y ounger abstenti on i s appropriate becau se the law i s not “flagrantly and patently violati v e of expr ess consti tutional prohibi tions in ev ery claus e, sentence14 No. 13-3027
and paragr a p h, and in whatev er manner and again st whomev er an effort mi ght be made to apply i t.” See Y ounger, 401 U.S. at 53–54, quoting W

atso n v
. Buck

, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941). That i s no t the test. Y

ounger quoted thi s language as a suffi ci ent condi tion for rej ecti ng a bstent i on, not a necess ary condi tion, and the Court w as r e fe r r ing to a si tuation in whi ch a law’s
un consti tutionali ty seems obvious but has not y et bee n deci ded by a court. Ev en gr anti ng that the Indi ana anti -slating statute does not plumb such hyperbolic depths of unc onsti tutional offense, the Electi on Bo ard’s atte mpt to enforce a law that a federal court has already told the Board in a final judgment i s unc onsti tutional repr esents the sort o f “other unus ual ci rcums tance that

w ould call f or equi table relief.” 401 U.S. at 54. S tate d in ter ms of the equi table p r inc iples upon whi ch Y ounger i s based, the costs to comi ty and our federali sm of enjo ining state proceedings are si gni fi cantly lessen ed where a federal court has prev i ously held the same law faci ally unc onsti tutional in a final judgment agains t the same defendant. W e r ej e ct the Electi on Board’ s oxy moro ni c arg ument that the judgment in Ogden should be read to mean that the statute i s faci ally unc onsti tutional o nly as t o the Ogden plainti ffs

. W e have n ot e n c oun te red before the i dea of faci al unc onsti tutionali ty as appli ed only to a particu lar plainti ff. F a cial unc onsti tutionali ty as to one means faci al unc onsti tutionali ty as to all, reg ardless of the fact that the injuncti v e port i on of t he j udg

ment di rectly adjudi cated the di spute of only the parties before i t. See John Doe No. 1 v
. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2817 (2010) (reli ef

w ould “reach bey ond the particu lar ci rcums tances of these plainti ffs ” and to that ext ent mus t “sati sfy our standards for aNo. 13-3027 15
faci al challen ge”); Sabri v
. United States , 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004); Ezell v. City of Chicago , 651 F .3d 684, 697–98 (7th Ci r . 2011). The Electi on Board now says i t nev er w ould hav e agr eed to the Ogden consent decree i f i t had thought the result w ould apply to other candi dates. That subjectiv e mi sun der st a nding of the law is not relev ant. The fin al judgment w as un ambi guous: the anti -slating prov i si on “i s declared faci ally unc onsti tutional.” See In re T

rans Uni on Corp. Privacy Litig. , 741 F .3d 811, 8 1 6 (7 th Ci r
. 2014) (“Liti gants as w ell as t hi rd parties must be able t o rely on the clear meaning of court or ders setting out their substanti v e rights and obli gations”). In the three catego ries of cases i denti fi ed in Sprin t , Y ounger abstenti on serv es to reach an equi table accomm odation of the states’ intere st in enforci ng t he ir own laws wi th the need for federal prot ecti on of federal rights. That balanc e tips deci dedly tow ard federal adjudi cati on when a federa l court has prev i

ously held in a judgment again st a state or local agency that the law i s faci ally unc onsti tutional and the same agency then tr i es to e nforce i t r egar dless

. Becaus e the di stric t court err ed in di smi ssing the case under Y ounger, w e REVERSE that deci si on and REMAND for further proceedings, wi th the addi tional ins tr ucti on that the di stric t court consi der promptly whether to i ssu e a prelim inary injuncti on a g ainst the Board, keeping in mind the prim ary e lecti on sch eduled for May 6, 2014. Nothing in thi s opin i o n should be understood to prev ent the Electi on B o a rd from maki ng any arg um e nt s i t wi shes to make about changes in appli cable law o r other ci rcums tances pr ev entin g appli cati on of issue preclusi on based on the Ogden final judgment. Such16 No. 13-3027
arg uments, though, wi ll need to be rais ed in the federal court. The man date shall i ssu e i mmedi ately

. 1

If Bo ard memb ers or their agents were to try to enfo rce the anti -sl ating 1 statu te aga i nst other partie s at this poi nt, such as i n the May 20 14 primary el ecti ons, we expect tha t this opi nio n and the Og den judgment woul d mak e i t di ffi cul t to i nv oke the def ense of qua l i fi ed i mmun i ty to a dama ges actio n under 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83

.