SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4620-16T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MALIK SINGER,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted October 3, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes and Vernoia. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 08-06-

0398.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor,

attorney for respondent (Lauren R. Casale, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 18, 2018
2

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PER CURIAM 

Defendant Malik Singer appeals from an order denying his postconviction relief (PCR) petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I.

We described the facts underlying the criminal charges against defendant 

in our opinion on his direct appeal, State v. Malik Singer, No. A-5270-11 (App. 

Div. Aug. 13, 2015) (slip op. at 5-28) and briefly summarize the pertinent facts 

here.1 In 2008, defendant was charged in an indictment (No. 08-06-0398) with 

first-degree murder of Michael Love, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2), firstdegree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3,

and second-degree possession of a handgun for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-4(a). Codefendants Sa'id Kendrick and James Miller were charged in the 

indictment with the same offenses. Two years later, defendant was charged in 

a separate indictment (No. 10-03-0168) with three counts of first-degree 

conspiracy to commit murder of three potential prosecution witnesses, N.J.S.A. 

 

1

 We limit our summary of the facts to those pertinent to the three charges 

related to the murder of Michael Love. As is explained infra, defendant was 

also charged and convicted of offenses that occurred after Love's murder,

including three counts of conspiracy to murder three potential prosecution 

witnesses and three counts of conspiracy to commit witness retaliation. We do 

not summarize the facts related to those crimes because they are not relevant to 

any issues raised by defendant on appeal.
3

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2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2, and three counts of second-degree conspiracy to 

commit witness retaliation, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(b). The indictments were 

consolidated for trial.

The trial evidence showed that Love's body was found on the morning of 

May 11, 2008, outside of the Ten's Enough social club in Franklin Township. 

Police investigated, and it was later determined Love died from a single gunshot 

wound to the head.

Detectives developed information causing them to identify a "James 

Miller" and another individual with the street name or alias of "Face" as possible 

suspects. The police also determined the suspects may have been using a 

particular cellphone, which the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office determined 

was then located in Stamford, Connecticut and belonged to Anne Marie 

Pettigrew, who the police believed was associated with Kendrick. Officers 

traveled to the location of the phone in Connecticut, where they found Kendrick 

in possession of a handgun. 

On May 13, 2008, the police set up surveillance of the home of a woman 

who was reputed to be the mother of defendant's child. The police observed a 

small gray car operated by a female driver with defendant in the passenger seat. 

The police approached the vehicle and yelled, "Face, get down on the ground!"
4

A-4620-16T1

and, in response, defendant immediately got down. Defendant was handcuffed 

and said to the officers, "You homicide?" The police told defendant he was 

arrested in connection with "the shooting the other night."

Police administered Miranda2 warnings and interrogated defendant. He 

denied his nickname was "Face," but also referred to himself as "Face." 

Defendant volunteered, "I didn't kill nobody," and denied shooting Love or 

being at the Ten's Enough club on the evening before Love's body was found. 

He claimed he was with his girlfriend at a hotel during that evening. He admitted 

that on the night prior to Love's murder he had possession of the handgun that 

had been recovered from Kendrick, but explained he returned the handgun to 

Kendrick prior to the shooting. Defendant also said Kendrick's street name was 

"Face" and that Kendrick admitted he shot Love. 

Ballistics evidence showed the bullet that caused Love's death was fired 

from the gun the police recovered from Kendrick in Connecticut. Kendrick

testified at defendant's trial that, on the evening before Love's murder, defendant 

was involved in a bar fight and then asked to borrow Kendrick's gun. According 

to Kendrick, defendant returned to the bar, pointed the gun at the bar's patrons 

and left. Kendrick testified he was using his mother's cellphone that evening 

 

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5

A-4620-16T1

and loaned it to defendant, who used the phone to call for a ride. Kendrick 

explained that he saw a gray or silver Honda Accord arrive. Defendant entered 

the vehicle and the female driver then drove away. 

Miller testified his street name was "Brim" and defendant's street name 

was "Face." He stated that, on the evening before Love was murdered, he was 

at the Ten's Enough club and had an argument with his child's mother, LaToya 

Singleton, because she was drinking with Love. 

Singleton testified that she had spent time with Love at the club during 

the evening before Love's murder, and he gave her money as a present. She 

gave the money to her friend Aisha Williams to hold so Miller would not know

Love gave her money. 

Singleton explained that on the evening of Love's murder, she arrived at 

the club with Miller, Williams and Kimberly Simonson. Williams testified that 

Miller accused Singleton of "lap dancing" on Love, and that Miller and 

Singleton then argued.

Williams described that as the result of an argument among others at the 

club, she went outside and saw Miller, defendant and Love. Defendant stood

behind Love. Williams "saw defendant holding a gun, pointing it at Love's head,
6

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and pulling the trigger." On May 12, 2008, Williams selected defendant's 

photograph from a photo array and identified him as the shooter. 

Miller told the jury that he went to the Ten's Enough club on May 10,

2008, soon after 10:30 p.m. and became involved in an argument between 

Simonson and her boyfriend, Willie Pitts. He called defendant to come to the 

club as "security" or "back up" because he was concerned about Pitts. When 

defendant arrived, Miller was outside of the club. He told defendant he "would 

take care of Will[ie Pitts]" and to "back up Mr. Love." Miller explained that 

Love was the person with whom his girlfriend, Singleton, had danced the 

previous evening. Miller pointed out Love and directed defendant to go after 

him. Although he denied knowing defendant had a gun, or that he saw defendant 

shoot Love, Miller testified defendant went over to where Love was standing. 

Miller then heard a gunshot. 

Kendrick testified he went to the club and waited outside in a car while 

his cousin attempted to gain access to the club. As he sat in the parked car, he 

saw defendant, who was a close friend he knew by the name "Face," standing 

outside of the club. He saw defendant raise his arm and fire a gunshot. He 

testified he saw the victim, Love, fall. Kendrick also explained that defendant 

ran to a Honda Accord and got in the vehicle. As the Accord pulled away, it 
7

A-4620-16T1

stopped by Kendrick's car, at which time defendant returned Kendrick's mother's 

cellphone he had borrowed the previous evening. Kendrick testified defendant 

gave him a book bag the following day that contained the gun Kendrick had 

given defendant. Kendrick said that in order to "help [defendant] out," he took 

the book bag knowing it contained the gun used to murder Love.

The evidence also showed defendant made self-incriminatory admissions 

to his fellow inmates during his pretrial detention. Defendant admitted to four 

witnesses that he shot Love. He told a witness that once he arrived at the club,

a friend pointed out Love and he shot him. He told two witnesses that he 

immediately fled from the club after shooting Love, and attempted to establish 

an alibi by quickly traveling to a gas station he knew had surveillance cameras. 

Defendant presented evidence showing his presence at a gas station, his 

movements amongst various locations and cellphone data to establish he was 

not at the Ten's Enough club when Love was murdered. 

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charges that defendant 

murdered Love and possessed a handgun for unlawful purposes. The jury 

convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit Love's murder. Defendant was

also convicted of the three counts of conspiracy to murder three potential 
8

A-4620-16T1

prosecution witnesses and three counts of conspiracy to commit witness 

retaliation charged in the second indictment. 

On the conviction for first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, the court 

sentenced defendant to a twenty-five-year discretionary extended term, N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-3(a), subject to the requirements of the No Early Release Act (NERA),

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court merged defendant's convictions for the three 

counts of conspiracy to commit witness retaliation with his convictions for the 

three counts of conspiracy to commit the murders of the witnesses, and imposed 

an aggregate fifteen-year sentence subject to NERA, to be served consecutive to 

the sentence on his conviction for conspiracy to murder Love. 

We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Singer,

slip op. at 37. The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. 

State v. Singer, 224 N.J. 123 (2016).

In March 2016, defendant filed a verified pro se PCR petition, asserting 

the following facts in support of his claim: 

[inconsistency] within the witness 

statements, evidentiary hearing,

conspiracy doesn't support the conviction,

there wasn't any evidence of a conspiracy 

to commit murder to sustain a conviction. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims, on 

post-conviction review, many other 

aspect[s] of my pre-trial proceedings in 
9

A-4620-16T1

which my previous representation 

neglected to protect my rights and to 

submit proper motions, that would have 

exonerated me. 

Defendant's assigned PCR counsel filed an Amended Verified PCR 

Petition pursuant to R. 3:22. Defendant argued that "trial and appellate counsel 

were ineffective for the reasons set forth" in an accompanying brief. PCR 

counsel's brief asserted trial counsel was ineffective by "failing to call favorable 

witnesses" and by failing to argue defendant's convictions were against the 

weight of the evidence. The brief also asserted defendant's appellate counsel 

was ineffective because she did not claim on direct appeal that defendant's trial 

counsel was ineffective by failing to call favorable witnesses and argue 

defendant's convictions were against the weight of the evidence. 

After hearing argument on defendant's PCR petition, the court issued a 

written decision finding defendant failed to sustain his burden of establishing a 

prima facie case that his trial and appellate counsels' performances were

deficient or that he suffered prejudice as a result of any of their purported errors. 

The court entered an order denying the PCR petition without an evidentiary 

hearing. This appeal followed.

Defendant's counsel presents the following arguments for our 

consideration:
10 A-4620-16T1

POINT ONE

[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT 

HIS ATTORNEYS RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO 

INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT AN ADEQUATE 

ALIBI DEFENSE OR RAISE THESE ISSUES ON 

DIRECT APPEAL.

POINT TWO

[DEFENDANT'S] CONVICTION FOR 

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER IS AGAINST 

THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

In his pro se letter brief, defendant makes the following arguments:

POINT I

[DEFENDANT'S] REMEDIAL ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL AT THE TRIAL [LED] TO A GRAVE 

DENIAL OF THE U.S. CONST. 6TH AMENDMENT 

& N.J. CONST. ART. 1, PARA. 9 & 10, TO A FAIR 

TRIAL TO PROVE HIS ACTUAL INNOCENCE.

POINT II

[DEFENDANT'S] INITIAL APPELLATE COUNSEL 

AND THE PCR COUNSEL REMEDIAL 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS WELL [DENIED] 

APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO FAIRLY AND 

ADEQUATELY CHALLENGE THE CRIMINAL 

ALLEGATIONS TO PROVE HIS ACTUAL 

INNOCENCE CONTRARY TO THE U.S. CONST. 

6TH AMENDMENT & N.J. CONST. ART. 1, 9 & 10.
11 A-4620-16T1

A. NEW JERSEY CITIZEN WAS DENIED THEIR 

[sic] U.S. CONST. 1ST. AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 

WITNESSING [DEFENDANT] TO HAVE A FAIR 

PUBLIC TRIAL, WHERE THE PUBLIC CITIZEN OF 

NEW JERSEY WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN 

CONFIDENCE AND INTEGRITY IN THE JUDICIAL 

SYSTEM PROCESS.

POINT III

[THE] PROSECUTOR KNOWINGLY USED 

PERJURED TESTIMONY TO OBTAIN 

CONVICTION DENYING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT 

TO A FAIR TRIAL, DUE PROCESS AND IN 

VIOLATION OF THE 5TH AMENDMENT TO THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

A. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

B. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

POINT IV

[THE] JURY'S VERDICT AND [DEFENDANT'S] 

CONVICTION [WERE] AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF 

THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

POINT V

[THE] JUDGE FAILED DUTY AS IMPARTIAL 

TRIBUNAL VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 

TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.

A. Actual Killer Given Deal.

B. Proof of Fact.
12 A-4620-16T1

[POINT VI]

CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR AND WRONGFUL 

CONVICTION 

A. The Lack of Full Disclosure.

B. The Investigating Detective Imputed Knowledge to 

Prosecutor.

C. The Materiality Of The Undisclosed Evidence.

D. The Prejudice Of The Non-Disclosure.

E. The Prosecutorial Misconduct.

II.

We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of 

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). The de novo standard of review applies 

to mixed questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. Where an evidentiary hearing has 

not been held, it is within our authority "to conduct a de novo review of both the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id. at 421. That 

standard applies here. 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee that a defendant in a 

criminal proceeding has the right to the assistance of counsel in his defense. The 
13 A-4620-16T1

right to counsel includes "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." State 

v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 686 (1984)).

In Strickland, the Court established a two-part test, later adopted by our 

Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), to determine whether a 

defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. Under the first prong of the Strickland standard, a petitioner 

must show that counsel's performance was deficient. It must be demonstrated 

that counsel's handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness," id. at 688, and that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel 

was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment," id. at 687.

Under the second prong of the Strickland standard, a defendant "must 

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. A defendant 

must demonstrate a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A 

petitioner must establish both prongs of the Strickland standard in order to 

obtain a reversal of the challenged conviction. Id. at 687; Nash, 212 N.J. at 542;
14 A-4620-16T1

Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. A failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard 

requires the denial of a petition for PCR. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.

Defendant first contends the PCR court erred by failing to find that he 

established a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based 

on counsel's failure to conduct an investigation and concomitant failure to 

present an adequate alibi defense. We find no merit to defendant's claim.

"Bald assertions" are insufficient to sustain a defendant's burden of 

establishing a prima facie case of ineffective assistance under the Strickland

standard. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). PCR 

petitions must be "accompanied by an affidavit or certification by defendant, or 

by others, setting forth with particularity," State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 

(2014), "facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard 

performance," ibid. (quoting State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013)). 

Although a "[f]ailure to investigate an alibi defense is a serious deficiency that 

can result in the reversal of a conviction," Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 353 (2013),

where, as here, a defendant "claims his trial attorney inadequately investigated 

his case, he must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed,

supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of 
15 A-4620-16T1

the affiant or the person making the certification," ibid. (quoting Cummings,

321 N.J. Super. at 170). 

The PCR court correctly determined defendant failed to establish a prima 

facie case that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to conduct an adequate 

investigation and call alibi witnesses. Defendant's initial and amended PCR 

petitions, and other submissions, are untethered to any affidavits or 

certifications describing what the investigation he claims his trial counsel failed 

to complete would have revealed or the manner in which particular witnesses 

would have supported an alibi defense.3 Cf. State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 583 

(2015) (finding trial counsel's performance deficient where "counsel chose to 

forego evidence that could have reinforced [the defendant's] alibi"). Defendant 

 

3

 Defendant's initial and amended petitions do not identify the purported alibi 

witnesses trial counsel allegedly failed to investigate or call as witnesses. 

Defendant's appendix includes a letter from defendant to the trial court 

requesting that thirteen named individuals be subpoenaed to testify at his trial,

and in his pro se brief to the PCR court defendant renamed five of the individuals 

and claimed trial counsel was ineffective by failing to interview them. 

Defendant's PCR petitions and other submissions, however, do not include any 

affidavits or certifications based on personal knowledge describing the 

testimony of any putative alibi witnesses, demonstrating their testimony would 

have supported an alibi defense or establishing a reasonable probability that but 

for trial counsel's failure to interview or call them as witnesses, the result of 

defendant's trial would have been different.
16 A-4620-16T1

therefore did not sustain his burden of establishing that his trial counsel's 

performance was deficient. 

The record is similarly devoid of any competent evidence establishing a 

reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's purported failure to investigate 

and call alibi witnesses the result of defendant's trial would have been different. 

Indeed, defendant does not provide any evidence concerning the testimony of 

any purported alibi witness his counsel failed to call at trial or establishing a 

reasonable probability the testimony would have changed the outcome of 

defendant's trial. A defendant may show prejudice by his trial counsel's failure 

to conduct an investigation where he or she presents evidence showing the 

testimony that would have been offered by an alibi witness would "have given 

rise to reasonable doubt about [the] defendant's guilt." Id. at 588. Defendant 

makes no such showing here.4 

 

4

 Contrary to defendant's conclusory assertions, the record shows trial counsel 

asserted an alibi defense and presented evidence supporting the defense through 

his cross-examination of the State's witnesses and presentation of defense 

witnesses and evidence detailing defendant's alleged movements and locations 

before, during and after Love's murder. Defendant presents no competent 

evidence showing that any investigation beyond that which supported counsel's 

presentation of the alibi defense at trial would have yielded witnesses or 

evidence further supporting the defense. 
17 A-4620-16T1

Defendant also asserts his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to obtain 

a video recording from a convenience store that he contends would support his 

alleged alibi that he was at the store when Love was murdered. The argument 

is based on the false premise that the recording was not recovered from the store. 

In fact, the police obtained a disc from the convenience store but the disc did 

not contain a recording. In support of defendant's PCR petition, he fails to 

present any competent evidence that any error by his trial counsel resulted in the 

recovery of the blank disc or that, if his counsel had not allegedly erred in failing 

to conduct an investigation, counsel would have recovered a disc with a 

recording from the convenience store supporting defendant's putative alibi 

defense. 

The record shows defendant failed to sustain his burden under both prongs 

of the Strickland standard on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by 

failing to conduct an adequate investigation and failing to call alibi witnesses at 

trial. Because defendant did not satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard,

the PCR court correctly denied his petition, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, without 

an evidentiary hearing, Porter, 216 N.J. at 355, on his ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel claim. 
18 A-4620-16T1

We also reject defendant's contention the PCR court erred by denying his 

claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective. Defendant argues appellate 

counsel's performance was deficient because she failed to argue on direct appeal 

that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to conduct an adequate investigation 

and failing to call alibi witnesses. 

Defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of appellate counsel, but 

"appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every 

nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant." State v. Morrison, 215 N.J. 

Super. 540, 549 (App. Div.) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983));

see also State v. Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 516 (App. Div. 2007) (holding 

that appellate counsel is not "required to advance every claim insisted upon by 

a client on appeal"). Defendant's appellate counsel's performance was not 

deficient by failing to argue that trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate 

investigation and call alibi witnesses because, as noted, those claims concerning 

trial counsel lack merit. A criminal defendant's counsel is not ineffective by 

failing to raise a meritless legal argument on the defendant's behalf. State v. 

Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990). 

Moreover, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel do not 

ordinarily find an appropriate remedy on direct appeal. State v. Preciose, 129 
19 A-4620-16T1

N.J. 451, 460 (1992). Thus, defendant's appellate counsel was not deficient by 

failing to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective. Under the 

circumstances presented here, appellate counsel properly reserved the claim for 

post-conviction relief. See State v. Lewis, 389 N.J. Super. 409, 416 (App. Div. 

2007) (finding "ineffective assistance of counsel claims are best left to postconviction review"). 

Defendant also argues he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his 

conviction for conspiracy to commit murder is against the weight of the 

evidence. We reject the argument because it could have been raised on direct 

appeal. See State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002) (finding that under Rule

3:22-4, a defendant may not assert a claim in a PCR proceeding that could have 

been raised on direct appeal); see also State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 483 

(1997) (finding that PCR "is not used to challenge the sufficiency of evidence 

used to convict a defendant"); see also State v. Morales, 120 N.J. Super. 197,

200 (App. Div. 1972) (holding a "claim that the verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence can be raised only on a direct appeal; it is not a ground for postconviction relief").5

 

5

 Any argument that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence may not be 

raised on direct appeal unless the defendant first moved in the trial court for a 
20 A-4620-16T1

In addition, defendant makes no showing that his assertion of the claim 

for the first time in his PCR petition falls within one of the exceptions under 

Rule 3:22-4(a). He does not argue or establish that the grounds for relief, the 

alleged lack of evidence supporting his conviction for conspiracy to commit 

murder, could not have been reasonably raised on direct appeal, R. 3:22-4(a)(1),

or that denial of his request for relief would be contrary to a new rule of 

constitutional law, R. 3:22-4(a)(3). 

Defendant also fails to demonstrate that enforcing the Rule 3:22-4 bar 

"would result in fundamental injustice." R. 3:22-4(a)(2). "To succeed on a 

fundamental-injustice claim, the [defendant] must make '"some showing"' that 

an error or violation '"played a role in the determination of guilt."'" Nash, 212 

N.J. at 547 (citations omitted). 

Defendant cannot establish that enforcement of the Rule 3:22-4 bar would 

result in a fundamental injustice because there was ample evidence supporting 

his conviction for conspiracy to commit murder. See N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. Defendant's claim his conviction was against the weight of 

 

new trial on that basis. State v. Fierro, 438 N.J. Super. 517, 530 (App. Div. 

2015) (citing R. 2:10-1). Defendant's trial counsel made a motion for a new trial 

and argued his conviction for conspiring to murder Love was against the weight

of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion prior to defendant's 

sentencing.
21 A-4620-16T1

the evidence is based on the premise that he could not logically be convicted of 

conspiracy to commit murder because the jury was unable to reach a verdict on 

the charges that he murdered Love and possessed a weapon for unlawful 

purposes. However, consistency of verdicts in a criminal case is not necessary 

because each charge in an indictment is considered separately, and "[a] jury 

verdict, even an inconsistent one, is upheld on appeal if the evidence is sufficient 

to establish guilt on the count of conviction." Fierro, 438 N.J. Super. at 528-29. 

Thus, any perceived inconsistency between the jury's inability to reach a verdict 

on the murder and gun possession charge and defendant's conviction for 

conspiracy to commit the murder is of no moment. In addition, the record 

supports the PCR court's determination there was evidence supporting the jury's 

determination defendant conspired with Miller to commit Love's murder,

6

and 

defendant does not demonstrate otherwise. We therefore discern no basis to 

conclude that application of the Rule 3:22-4 bar to defendant's claim his 

 

6

 The evidence included testimony establishing Miller requested that defendant 

come to the Ten's Enough club to provide Miller with "back up," defendant 

brought the handgun used to murder Love to the Ten's Enough club and was told 

by Miller to "take care" of Love immediately before Love was shot, defendant 

was identified by five eyewitnesses as being present when Love was shot,

defendant fled the scene of the shooting with the handgun, and defendant 

admitted his involvement in Love's murder. 
22 A-4620-16T1

conviction for conspiracy to commit Love's murder is against the weight of the 

evidence will result in a fundamental injustice. 

We have carefully considered the arguments contained in defendant's pro 

se appellate brief, and they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in 

a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only that defendant's arguments are 

based on inaccurate statements of legal principles, a misapplication of legal 

principles, allegations of fact that are either unsupported by competent evidence 

or contradicted by the record, or are otherwise barred under Rule 3:22-4. 

Affirmed.