NO. 96-503 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1997 

DANNY A. ARLEDGE, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

vs. 

STATE OF MONTANA, et.al, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Powell, 

The Honorable Ted L. Mizner, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Danny A. Arledge, Deer Lodge, Montana (pro se) 

For Respondent: 

Lois Adams, David L. Ohler, Diana P. Leibinger, 

Department of Corrections, Helena, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: December 5, 1996 

Decided: January 9, 1997 

;:" ‘2 
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as 

precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document 

with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result 

to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company. 

This is an appeal from a July 29, 1996 Order of the Third 

Judicial District Court, Powell County, denying the motion of Danny 

A. Arledge (Arledge) for a temporary restraining order. We affirm. 

Background 

Arledge, an inmate law clerk, pro se, filed in the Montana 

Third Judicial District Court, Powell County, his complaint 

alleging personal injury and violations of 42 U.S.C. 5 1983. 

Arledge claims that various Department of Corrections employees 

unlawfully retaliated against him in connection with his 

preparation for other inmates' grievances against prison staff. 

After amending his complaint, Arledge filed a motion for a 

temporary restraining order requesting that the District Court 

restrain the prison authorities from administratively disciplining 

him. 

A hearing was held on Arledge's motion on May 2, 1996. 

Arledge appeared, represented himself, and testified. The 

Defendants appeared by counsel and offered testimony through 

Wil .liam Perry, Unit Manager for the Maximum Security Uni .t at the 
Montana State Prison. At the conclusion of the hearing, Ax-ledge 

orally requested a temporary restraining order issue pending the 

court's decision on preliminary injunctive relief. The court 

orally declined any temporary relief. Arledge's motion for a 

temporary restraining order was subsequently denied by written 

order dated July 29, 1996. Arledge timely filed a notice of 

appeal, stating that he was appealing from the District Court's 

denial of his motion for preliminary injunction. 

Discussion 

Whether the matter at issue involves strictly a motion for 

temporary restraining order and/or a request for preliminary 

injunction is somewhat confused. What is apparent is that Arledge 

petitioned for some sort of injunctive relief pending prosecution 

of this lawsuit and that request was ultimately denied. We address 

the trial court's decision and Arledge's appeal in this context. 

The sole issue before this Court is whether the District Court 

abused its discretion when it denied Arledge's motion for temporary 

or preliminary injunctive relief. The grant or denial of 

injunctive relief is a discretionary ruling of the trial court 

which we will not overturn absent an abuse of discretion. The 

party seeking injunctive relief must prove his right to the 

injunction. Smith v. Electronic Parts, Inc. (1995), 274 Mont. 252, 

256, 907 P.Zd 958, 960 (citing Sebena v. State (1994), 267 Mont. 

359, 366, 883 P.2d 1263, 1267). See also First Brands Corp. v. 

Fred Meyer, Inc. (9th Cir. 1987), 809 F.2d 1378, 1381. 

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Inasmuch as Arledge's Amended Complaint was filed pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. 5 1983, the District Court properly concluded that, in 

the context of this action, a temporary restraining order is an 

extraordinary remedy, requiring demonstration of exceptional 

circumstances and a clear showing of necessity for protection of 

constitutional rights. See NAACP v. Gallion (5th Cir. 1961), 290 

F.2d 331, 342 (vacated on other grounds). 

As to preliminary injunctive relief the federal district court 

in McClaflin v. Pearce (D.Or. 1990), 739 F. Supp. 537, set forth 

the applicable standards for the issuance of a preliminary 

injunction in a § 1983 action as follows: 

The factors we traditionally consider in determining 

whether to grant a preliminary injunction in this circuit 

are (1) the likelihood of plaintiff's success on the 

merits; (2) the possibility of plaintiff's suffering 

irreparable injury if relief is not granted; (3) the 

extent to which the balance of hardships favors the 

respective parties; and (4) in certain cases, whether the 

public interest will be advanced by the provision of 

preliminary relief. To obtain a preliminary injunction, 

the moving party must show either (1) a combination of 

probable success on the merits and the possibility of 

irreparable injury or (2) that serious questions are 

raised and the balance of hardships tips in his favor. 

These two formulations represent two points on a sliding 

scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm 

increases as the probability of success decreases. 

McClaflin, 739 F.Supp. at 539 (quoting United States v. Odessa 

Union Warehouse Co-op (9th Cir. 1987), 833 F.2d 172, 174). 

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has stated that, 

with respect to the requirement of irreparable harm, the threat of 

injury must be direct, real and immediate, and not conjectural or 

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hypothetical. "[Plast exposure to illegal conduct does not in 

itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive 

relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse 

effects." Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983), 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 103 

S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675, 684 (citations omitted). 

Here, the District Court concluded that Arledge had not met 

his burden of proof in that he had failed to show that his 

probability of success on the merits of his suit was high and in 

that he had failed to show irreparable injury. The court also 

concluded that Arledge's allegations are speculative; that any 

future harm is dependent upon actions solely within his control; 

that he has failed to show that there are serious questions raised; 

and that the balance of hardships tip in his favor. 

On the matter at issue here and without drawing any 

conclusions one way or the other about the merits of Arledge's 

underlying suit, we agree with the trial court that neither 

temporary (nor preliminary) injunctive relief is merited in this 

case. 

The essence of Arledge's demand for injunctive relief, as he 

frames it, is that the respondents have, and will in the future, 

punish him for use of the prison grievance system. The testimony 

given at the May 2, 1996 hearing on Arledge's motion was anything 

but conclusive, however. While Arledge contended that he was the 

subject of retaliatory disciplinary action, he also agreed on 

cross-examination that he was not retaliated against since he was 

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not found guilty of the Class 2 misconduct violations with which he 

was charged but rather he was found guilty of lesser, and 

relatively insignificant, Class 3 violations. Moreover, the 

evidence on what Arledge stated to the correctional officers that 

prompted the disciplinary write-up in the first place was disputed. 

There is no evidence that we can glean from the record, save 

Arledge's own conclusory, speculative and conjectural statements to 

the contrary, that he will suffer irreparable harm or be the 

subject of future unlawful treatment or violation of his 

constitutional rights by prison officials if temporary or 

preliminary injunctive relief is not granted. There is no evidence 

of any direct, real and immediate threat of injury or of any 

continuing, present adverse effects suffered by Arledge. 

In short, on basis of our review of the record submitted to 

this Court on appeal, we agree with the District Court that Arledge 

failed in his burden to demonstrate the sort of exceptional 

circumstances and clear necessity that would justify the 

extraordinary remedy of temporary or preliminary injunctive relief 

in this case. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Arledge's motion for 

temporary or preliminary injunctive relief. 

Affirmed. 

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we concur: