17-2136 

Chenwu Yang v. Barr 

BIA 

Vomacka, IJ 

A205 448 034

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 31st 4 day of May, two thousand nineteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

9 GERARD E. LYNCH,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 CHENWU YANG, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 17-2136 

17 NAC 

18 WILLIAM P. BARR, 

19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Zhen Liang Li, New York, NY. 

24 

25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

26 Attorney General; Linda S. 

27 Wernery, Assistant Director; Susan 

28 Bennett Green, Senior Litigation 

29 Counsel, Office of Immigration 
2 

1 Litigation, United States 

2 Department of Justice, Washington, 

3 DC. 

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

7 is DENIED. 

8 Petitioner Chenwu Yang, a native and citizen of the 

9 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 16, 2017, 

10 decision of the BIA affirming an October 29, 2015, decision 

11 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Yang’s application for 

12 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

13 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Chenwu Yang, No. 

14 A 205 448 034 (B.I.A. June 16, 2017), aff’g No. A 205 448 034

15 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Oct. 29, 2015). We assume the parties’ 

16 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 

17 in this case. 

18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

19 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang 

20 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). 

21 The applicable standards of review are well established. See 

22 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 

23 196 (2d Cir. 2009); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 
3 

1 (2d Cir. 2009). 

2 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish 

3 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear 

4 of future persecution, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2), which 

5 requires an applicant to “present credible testimony that he 

6 subjectively fears persecution and [to] establish that his 

7 fear is objectively reasonable,” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 

8 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). To demonstrate a well9 founded fear, an applicant must show either “a reasonable 

10 possibility he . . . would be singled out individually for 

11 persecution” or that the country of removal has a “pattern or 

12 practice” of persecuting individuals similarly situated to 

13 him. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). Where a claim is “based 

14 exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the 

15 United States, an alien must make some showing that 

16 authorities in his country of nationality are (1) aware of 

17 his activities or (2) likely to become aware of his 

18 activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 138 

19 (2d Cir. 2008). 

20 “The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to 

21 sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but 

22 only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the 
4 

1 applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers 

2 to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the 

3 applicant is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see 

4 also Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 196-97. “In determining whether 

5 the applicant has met [his] burden, the trier of fact may 

6 weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of 

7 record. Where the trier of fact determines that the 

8 applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise 

9 credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the 

10 applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably 

11 obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 

12 Yang does not challenge the agency’s finding that he 

13 failed to present reasonably available corroborating 

14 evidence. Accordingly, Yang has waived any challenge to that 

15 dispositive finding. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 

16 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the 

17 briefs are considered waived and normally will not be 

18 addressed on appeal.”). In any event, as discussed below, 

19 we find no error in the agency’s conclusion. 

20 The IJ reasonably required evidence to corroborate Yang’s 

21 testimony because Yang was not responsive to all the questions 

22 posed to him—even questions his own attorney posed—and gave 
5 

1 only vague explanations about why he became a Christian. See 

2 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d 

3 at 196-97. The agency identified the missing evidence—

4 documentation or witness testimony regarding Yang’s church 

5 attendance, a letter from his parents, and country conditions 

6 evidence—and Yang did not establish that the evidence was 

7 unavailable. See Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 198-99; see also 8 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (“No court shall reverse a determination 

9 made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of 

10 corroborating evidence . . . unless . . . a reasonable trier 

11 of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating 

12 evidence is unavailable.”). Moreover, although Yang and his 

13 attorney asserted that they had filed a letter from Yang’s 

14 parents and a baptism certificate, the documents were 

15 untimely filed, never received by the IJ, and not presented 

16 to the BIA. 

17 Nor was the IJ required to continue the hearing because, 

18 given the length of time Yang had to gather evidence, he did 

19 not provide a reasonable excuse for the untimely filing. See 

20 Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 524 (BIA 2015) (“[I]t 

21 is within the discretion of the [IJ] to decide whether there 

22 is good cause to continue the proceedings in a particular 
6 

1 case for additional corroboration or for any other reason.”). 

2 As to the evidence of corroboration that Yang did submit, 

3 the IJ did not err in assigning it little weight. The only 

4 evidence Yang presented to corroborate his asserted church 

5 attendance was a photograph; however, there was no testimony 

6 or other evidentiary foundation for the photograph, and it 

7 did not show a church service. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. 

8 Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding 

9 that determination of the weight of evidence is largely matter 

10 of agency discretion). 

11 More significantly, the agency did not err in determining 

12 that the country conditions evidence failed to demonstrate a 

13 pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated 

14 individuals. As the IJ noted, the State Department report 

15 reflected varied enforcement of restrictions on Christians 

16 and identified no persecution of Christians in Yang’s home 

17 province of Fujian. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 

18 138, 149-50, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding BIA’s 

19 conclusion that when fear of persecution is based on 

20 enforcement of a policy that varies by region, it is the 

21 applicant’s burden to show enforcement of the policy in his 

22 home region). Accordingly, the agency did not err in 
7 

1 determining that Yang failed to demonstrate a pattern and 

2 practice of persecution, particularly in light of an estimate 

3 cited in the State Department report on which the IJ relied 

4 that there are 45 million Protestant Christians in China not 

5 affiliated with the government-sponsored church. See

6 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); see also Santoso v. Holder, 

7 580 F.3d 110, 112 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying petition where 

8 agency considered background materials and rejected pattern 

9 or practice claim); In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 

10 2005) (recognizing that a pattern or practice of persecution 

11 is the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of a group). 

12 The agency also did not err in finding that Yang failed 

13 to establish a reasonable possibility of being singled out 

14 for persecution. Yang did not assert that Chinese officials 

15 are aware of his religious practice. Additionally, in light 

16 of the tens of millions of unregistered Christian 

17 practitioners in China and the lack of evidence regarding the 

18 persecution of Christians in Fujian province, Yang did not 

19 demonstrate that Chinese officials are likely to discover his 

20 religious activities as required for him to establish an 

21 objectively reasonable well-founded fear. See Hongsheng 

22 Leng, 528 F.3d at 143. 
8 

1 Therefore, because the agency reasonably found that Yang 

2 failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, it 

3 did not err in denying asylum, withholding of removal, and 

4 CAT relief, since all three claims were based on the same 

5 factual predicate. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 

6 (2d Cir. 2010). Because this conclusion is dispositive of 

7 Yang’s petition, we do not address whether the adverse 

8 credibility determination provides an independent basis for 

9 the agency’s decision. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 

10 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not 

11 required to make findings on issues the decision of which is 

12 unnecessary to the results they reach.”). 

13 We have considered the remainder of Yang’s arguments and 

14 find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, 

15 the petition for review is DENIED. 

16 FOR THE COURT: 

17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk