Filed 1/25/23 P. v. Maddox CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

QUINTON MADDOX, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B317642

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. KA088924)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.

Tracy J. Dressner, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Nicholas J. Webster, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
2

Quinton Maddox appeals from an order summarily 

denying, without appointing counsel, his petition for resentencing 

under Penal Code former section 1170.95.1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Maddox of second degree murder in 2011. 

In our opinion on his direct appeal, we set forth the following 

facts, which we include here solely to provide background and 

context for the parties’ arguments; we do not rely on them to 

resolve this appeal: 

On March 26, 2009, eight to 10 people, including Maddox 

and Ocie May, gathered in an alley in the City of Covina. A fight 

broke out between May and another individual, at the end of 

which Maddox drew a gun and shot May, killing him. (People v. 

Maddox (Nov. 8, 2012, B233872) [nonpub. opn.].)

An information charged Maddox with one count of first 

degree murder and alleged pursuant to section 12022.53, 

subdivision (d) that Maddox personally and intentionally used a 

firearm, which proximately caused great bodily injury and death.

On the firearm enhancement, the jury was instructed with 

CALCRIM No. 3150, which stated that to find the allegation true, 

the jury had to find that “the People also have proved the 

defendant’s act caused great bodily injury to or the death of a 

person.” The jury was not instructed on the felony murder rule or 

any theory of vicarious liability.

Maddox’s first jury, in a trial presided over by Judge Mike 

Camacho, found him not guilty of first degree murder, and 

1 Undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal 

Code. Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was 

renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, 

ch. 58, § 10). 
3

deadlocked on second degree murder. In Maddox’s retrial, 

presided over by Judge Steven Blades, the jury found him guilty 

of second degree murder and found on the verdict form that he 

“personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun, 

which caused great bodily injury and death to Ocie Daniel May.”

Judge Blades sentenced Maddox to forty years to life in prison.

On October 8, 2021, Maddox filed a petition for

resentencing under former section 1170.95. He checked the boxes 

stating that he “was convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder 

pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine,” that he requested counsel, and that he 

“was convicted of 2nd degree murder under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine or under the 2nd degree felony 

murder doctrine.” 

On November 22, 2021, Judge Camacho summarily denied

the petition, without appointing counsel, on the ground that the 

jury found Maddox was the actual killer, making him ineligible 

for relief as a matter of law. In the course of denying the petition 

Judge Camacho made two misstatements: That he had presided 

over the trial in which Maddox was convicted, and that the 

conviction was for first degree murder. In fact, Judge Camacho 

presided only over the first trial, in which the jury deadlocked, 

and Maddox was convicted only after a second trial, and only of 

second degree murder.

Maddox appeals. 

DISCUSSION

Maddox contends that several procedural errors—that the 

petition was not assigned to his sentencing judge as required by 

subdivision (b)(1) of former section 1170.95; that the trial court 

failed to appoint counsel or wait for briefing by the prosecution 
4

before denying the petition; and that the stated reasons for 

denying the petition were factually erroneous—mandate reversal. 

We disagree.

Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted in 2018 to “amend the 

felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is 

not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act 

with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 

underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human 

life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It accomplished this 

by amending section 188, subdivision (a)(3), to require that all 

principals to murder must act with express or implied malice to 

be convicted of that crime, except for felony murder under section 

189, subdivision (e). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)

For a felony murder conviction under section 189, 

subdivision (e), Senate Bill No. 1437 required that the defendant 

be the actual killer, an aider and abettor to the murder who acted 

with intent to kill, or a major participant in the underlying felony 

who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 1015, § 3.)

In 2021, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed 

into law Senate Bill No. 775, which amended subdivision (a) of 

former section 1170.95 to permit relief for certain petitioners 

convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine,” resolving an ongoing issue in the courts. 

(Sen. Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) at § 2.) The amended 

former section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(3), states that relief for 

individuals convicted of attempted murder may be available if 

they could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted 
5

murder because of changes that Senate Bill No. 1437 made to 

sections 188 and 189 in 2018. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-3.)

Section 1172.6 now permits a person convicted of either 

murder or attempted murder under a felony murder or natural 

and probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing 

court to vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining 

counts if the person could not be convicted of murder or 

attempted murder under the new section 188 or 189. (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (a).) A petition for relief under section 1172.6 must include: 

“(A) A declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible for 

relief under this section, based on all the requirements of 

subdivision (a). [¶] (B) The superior court case number and year 

of the petitioner’s conviction. [¶] (C) Whether the petitioner 

requests the appointment of counsel.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1).)

If the petition contains the required information, the court 

must appoint counsel and then conduct a prima facie analysis, 

with briefing by the parties, as to the petitioner’s eligibility before 

determining whether to issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (c); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961-970 (Lewis).) 

Here, Respondent concedes that the superior court erred in 

by denying Maddox’s petition at the prima facie stage without 

appointing counsel.

However, any error is subject to review for harmless error 

under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, which asks whether 

it is reasonably probable that the petitioner would have obtained 

a more favorable outcome if counsel had been appointed and 

proper procedures followed. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 

972-974.) This standard is not met where the record of conviction 

shows as a matter of law that the petitioner was convicted under 
6

a theory of murder that remains valid after Senate Bill No. 1437.

(People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 864.)

Here, the jury was given no instruction on felony murder or 

any theory of vicarious liability. Instead, it was instructed on the 

firearm enhancement that to find the allegation true, it had to 

find that “the People also have proved the defendant’s act caused 

great bodily injury to or the death of a person.” The jury so 

found, stating on the verdict form that Maddox “personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun, which caused 

great bodily injury and death to Ocie Daniel May.”

By finding that enhancement true, along with the murder 

conviction, the jury necessarily found that Maddox was the actual 

killer, rendering him ineligible for relief under former section 

1170.95. (People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 57-58 

[jury’s true finding that appellant personally used and discharged 

a firearm in the commission of the murder within the meaning of 

section 12022.53 and 12022.5, subdivision (a) constitutes implicit 

finding that petitioner was the actual killer and thus 

indisputably ineligible for relief]; People v. Garrison (2021) 73 

Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)

Therefore, any error in failing to appoint counsel and 

summarily denying Maddox’s petition at the prima facie stage 

was harmless. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971, 973-974.)
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DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.