IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Personal 

Restraint of:

CLINTON DOYLE HECK

Petitioner.

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No. 79654-2-I (Consolidated

with 79385-3-I)

DIVISION ONE

PUBLISHED OPINION

HAZELRIGG, J. — In 2018, Clinton Doyle Heck filed a personal restraint 

petition (PRP) raising due process challenges to a serious infraction proceeding 

that occurred in the Department of Corrections (DOC) in 2010. Heck was found 

guilty of the infraction and received a sanction that included 30 days in disciplinary 

segregation and the loss of 270 days of earned good time credit. He sought review 

of the finding and sanction pursuant to an internal prison appeal process and it 

was upheld in early 2011. Heck asserted that he filed the present petition 

immediately after first learning that the process was available as a means to further 

appeal a prison disciplinary proceeding. DOC responded that the petition was time 

barred and offered three alternative bases for either a one- or two-year time limit 

on such a petition. We hold that Heck’s petition is time barred under RCW 

4.16.130 and decline to reach the merits.
No. 79654-2-I/2

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FACTS

Clinton Heck is currently incarcerated, serving a 171 month sentence. His 

earned early release date is February 27, 2021. On December 7, 2010, DOC staff 

member Jeff Ellison completed an “INITIAL SERIOUS INFRACTION REPORT.” 

The report alleged that sometime between October 4th and 8th, 2010 Heck violated 

WAC 137-25-030(603) (Rule 603): “[p]ossession, introduction, use or transfer of 

any narcotic, controlled substance, illegal drug, unauthorized drug, mind altering 

substance, or drug paraphernalia.”1 According to the report, the evidence in 

support of the allegation was that Heck admitted “he was in possession and used 

(on multiple occasions) a controlled substance (Methamphetamine).” The full 

narrative of Ellison’s report states:

On 12-06-10 WCC IIU completed an investigation that determined 

Offender Heck, C. #807946 did have possession of contraband 

during the week of 10-4-10 to 10-8-10.

WCC IIU in conjunction with Mason County Sheriff’s Office 

conducted an interview of Offender Heck for an ongoing separate 

case on 10-27-10. During the interview Offender Heck offered an 

explanation in rebuttal to the allegation made against him of the 

events that occurred in and around his cell in Receiving Unit #5. 

Offender Heck admitted he was in possession and used (on multiple 

occasions) a controlled substance (Methamphetamine), an illegal 

drug which is a violation of WAC 137-[25-030] (#603).

This is a summary of confidential information.

In the section of the form labeled “Evidence Taken” and “Photos Submitted” both 

boxes were checked “No”.

 

1 Heck’s notice of infraction incorrectly cites the code for general infractions, which did not 

contain a “Rule 603,” but then expressly adds that rule number in a parenthetical. The parties 

appear to agree that Heck was infracted for use or possession of a controlled substance, which is 

consistent with Rule 603 contained in WAC 137-25-030(603), Serious Infractions.
No. 79654-2-I/3

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On December 7, 2010 Lieutenant Clan Jacobs filled out a document entitled 

“INFRACTION REVIEW CHECKLIST” in which he checked off the boxes indicating 

that evidence was taken and photos and supporting documentation regarding 

witnesses, injuries, property damage, and other supplemental information was 

submitted. However, Heck claims that he received no evidence or documents of 

the sort.

Heck received notice of the disciplinary hearing on December 9, 2010. The 

notice contained standardized advice as to procedures and rights associated with 

the disciplinary process, such as requesting witness statements, or presenting 

witness testimony, with certain limits due to safety or security concerns. The 

document further informed Heck that he had the right to review certain reports and 

“a summary of any confidential information.” (Capitalization omitted). The notice 

also advised Heck that he had the right to appeal the disciplinary decision of the 

hearing officer to the prison Superintendent or their designee. None of the 

documents provided to this court reference an offender’s ability to further appeal 

the determination of the Superintendent or facility supervisor.

The disciplinary hearing occurred on or about December 13, 2010 with Heck 

present.2 A document entitled “DISCIPLINARY MINUTES AND FINDINGS” was 

signed by the hearing officer. The form indicates “No” as to “Witness Statements 

Returned” and “Witness/Statement Denied” in check boxes following each 

statement. (Some capitalization omitted). Underneath the check boxes, lines are 

 

2 There is a discrepancy between the briefing and exhibits provided to this court as to 

whether the hearing occurred on December 13 or 14, 2010. The precise date of the hearing does 

not impact the outcome of this appeal.
No. 79654-2-I/4

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provided to write in the reason for those answers, which noted only “none 

requested.” A section labelled “Summary of Testimony” includes instructions for 

the hearing officer to “list witnesses testifying/evidence used/findings/reasons for 

continuances, decisions, and sanctions/any relevant information.” (Some 

capitalization omitted). There, the hearing officer handwrote:

I never admitted to any of this. I did not use any drugs. They have 

misconstrued what I said.

Note: The confidential information submited [sic] was reviewed and 

deemed reliable and credible. The C.I. info and infraction report 

support one another.

The hearing officer found Heck in violation of Rule 603. Handwritten in the space 

provided for the reason for the finding as to Rule 603 was “infraction report” and 

“confidential information.”

Heck prepared a Disciplinary Hearing Appeal form within days of the 

hearing. In that petition for review, Heck repeated his assertion that his statement 

about drug use was taken out of context and he challenged the use of the 

confidential information. In a Disciplinary Hearing Appeal Decision document 

dated January 5, 2011, the Superintendent’s designee found:

In reviewing your infraction paperwork & the confidential information, 

it WAS determined you were in possession of contraband. You DID

admit to staff you were in possession and used an illegal drug. Your

sanction is appropriate.

However, the designee also checked a number of boxes on the form affirmatively 

indicating that the following determinations were made during the review of Heck’s 

appeal:

The disciplinary hearing process was conducted in accordance with 

Due Process and WAC 137-28.
No. 79654-2-I/5

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At least 24 hours advance written notice was provided or you waived 

the 24 hour advance notice in writing/with witness.

You were provided an opportunity to call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence on your behalf. If witness(es) were 

denied, the Hearing Officer provided you with written reason(s) 

for the denial.

The finding was made by an impartial (i.e., not viewed as biased or 

having witnessed the incident being heard) Hearing Officer.

A written statement of the finding(s) and sanction(s) imposed was 

provided to you and includes the evidence relied upon and the 

reason(s) for the decision.

Sanction(s) are in accordance with Presumptive Sanction Guidelines

WAC 137-28.

(Emphasis added). Heck pursued no other action on the sanction until filing this 

PRP on November 19, 2018. He stated in his pro se petition that he was unaware 

of a PRP as further avenue for relief and filed his petition immediately upon 

learning that it was an option. He initially filed in Division Two under the case 

number consolidated here. He refiled in Division One and counsel was appointed. 

Both Heck and DOC submitted supplemental briefing and Heck narrowed his 

challenge to sufficiency of the evidence.

ANALYSIS

The primary, and dispositive, question in this case is whether Heck’s PRP

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a prison disciplinary hearing 

conducted nearly ten years ago is timely. It is not.

The parties agree that the standard time bar statute for collateral attacks on 

judgment, RCW 10.73.090, does not apply as a prison disciplinary proceeding is 

not a judgment. Heck argues that there simply is no time limit for such a petition 

and DOC proposes two different statutory bases with two different time limits and, 
No. 79654-2-I/6

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as a final alternative, suggests that this court could apply the common law doctrine 

of laches to dismiss Heck’s PRP as untimely.

Despite the parties varied arguments for their respective positions, the 

answer to this question is not as labyrinthine as presented. “Prison disciplinary 

proceedings are not criminal prosecutions or judicial proceedings but are civil and 

remedial in nature.” In re Higgins, 152 Wn.2d 155, 163, 95 P.3d 330 (2004).

Further, a PRP to seek relief from that original proceeding is a civil action. In re 

Troupe, 194 Wn. App. 701, 706, 378 P.3d 239 (2016). Both Heck’s petition and 

the underlying disciplinary proceeding are civil in nature. 

RAP 16.1(a) provides, “[t]he rules in this title establish the procedure for 

original actions in the Supreme Court and in the Court of Appeals.” Personal 

restraint petitions are a specialized form of original action established by this 

state’s highest court. See RAP 16.1(c). The parties concede that there is no 

statute that expressly establishes a time bar for a PRP challenging a prison 

disciplinary decision. Since the petition is an original action established by the 

Supreme Court, the petition is civil in nature, and no other statute or court rule 

expressly addresses time limits on filing in this context, we find that RCW 4.16.130

applies.

RCW 4.16.130 is the two-year “catch all” statute of limitations created by 

the legislature that provides, “[a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, 

shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” 

The Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he court’s fundamental objective is to ascertain 

and carry out the Legislature’s intent, and if the statute’s meaning is plain on its 
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face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of

legislative intent.” Dept. of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-

10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). The language of RCW 4.16.130 is clear: it is meant to 

capture civil actions not addressed by other statutes. We agree with the parties 

that no other statute or court rule directly addresses the procedural posture 

presented here. As such, RCW 4.16.130 limits Heck’s civil action, a PRP, 

challenging his prison infraction which resulted in time in disciplinary segregation 

and the loss of good time credit. Given that his petition was filed nearly eight years 

after his internal appeal to the prison Superintendent, it is untimely. Accordingly, 

the petition is dismissed.

WE CONCUR: