Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices 62097

Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (Title

IX of the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Pub. L.

101–508) and part 158 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 158).

On October 24, 1997, the FAA

determined that the application to

impose and use the revenue from a PFC

submitted by the County of Humboldt

was substantially complete within the

requirements of section 158.25 of Part

158. The FAA will approve or

disapprove the application, in whole or

in part, no later than January 23, 1998.

The following is a brief overview of the

impose and use application number 97–

04–C–00–ACV.

Level of proposed PFC: $3.00.

Charge effective date: March 1, 1998.

Estimated charge expiration date:

June 30, 2004.

Total estimated PFC revenue:

$1,782,300.

Brief description of impose and use

projects at ACV: Emergency Safety Area

Erosion Control, Fire Protection System

Replacement, Taxiway ‘‘A’’ Overlay,

Fire Truck Replacement, T-Hanger

Taxiway Construction, Boarding

Assistance Device, Property Purchase,

Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF)

Building Improvements and Ramp Area

Extension.

Brief description of use project at

FOT: Pavement Rehabilitation of

Taxiway, Runway and Aprons and

Entrance Road Reconstruction and

Perimeter Fencing.

Brief description of use project at 019:

Airport Rehabilitation Including

Reconstruction of Airport Runway,

Overlay of Existing Aircraft Parking and

Construction of Additional Parking

Ramp.

Brief description of use project at

EKA: Pavement Overlay of Runway 11–

29, its Parallel Taxiway and the Main

Aircraft Parking Apron.

Class or classes of air carriers which

the public agency has requested not be

required to collect PFCs: None.

Any person may inspect the

application in person at the FAA office

listed above under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT and at the FAA

Regional Airports Division located at:

Federal Aviation Administration,

Airports Division, 15000 Aviation Blvd.

Lawndale, CA 90261. In addition, any

person may, upon request, inspect the

application, notice and other documents

germane to the application in person at

the County of Humboldt.

Issued in Hawthorne, California, on

November 4, 1997.

Herman C. Bliss,

Manager, Airports Division, Western-Pacific

Region.

[FR Doc. 97–30494 Filed 11–19–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[FRA Docket No. 87–2, Notice. No. 5]

RIN 2130–AB20

Automatic Train Control and Advanced

Civil Speed Enforcement System;

Northeast Corridor Railroads

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Proposed order of particular

applicability.

SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to issue an

order of particular applicability

requiring all trains operating on the

north end of the Northeast Corridor

(NEC) between Boston, Massachusetts

and New York, New York, to be

controlled by locomotives equipped to

respond to a new advanced civil speed

enforcement system (ACSES) in

addition to the automatic train control

(ATC) system that is currently required

on the NEC. The proposed order also

contains performance standards for the

cab signal/ATC and ACSES systems on

the NEC. The order would authorize

increases in certain maximum

authorized train speeds and safety

requirements supporting improved rail

service.

DATES: Written comments must be

received by January 20, 1998. Comments

received after the comment period has

closed will be considered to the extent

possible without incurring additional

delay. A request for a public hearing

must be received by December 22, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should

be submitted to Ms. Renee Bridgers,

Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel,

FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: W.E.

Goodman, Staff Director, Signal and

Train Control Division, Office of Safety,

FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C., 20590 (telephone

(202) 632–3353), or Patricia V. Sun,

Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400

Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.

20590 (telephone (202) 632–3183).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Statutory Authority

FRA has both discrete and plenary

legal authority to require that all trains

operating on the NEC be equipped with

automatic train control devices. FRA

has broad legal authority to ‘‘prescribe

regulations, and issue orders for every

area of railroad safety * * *.’’ 49 U.S.C.

20103. Section 20502 of Title 49, United

States Code specifically provides that

‘‘[w]hen the Secretary of Transportation

decides after an investigation that it is

necessary in the public interest, the

Secretary may order a railroad carrier to

install * * * a signal system that

complies with the requirements of the

Secretary.’’ As originally enacted and

prior to formal codification, this

provision referred to ‘‘automatic train

stop, train control, and/or other similar

appliances, methods, and systems

intended to promote the safety of

railroad operation * * *.’’ This

authority has been previously invoked

to require the installation of signal

systems on 49 specific railroads and to

require all railroads desiring to operate

at high speeds to install signal systems

of varying degrees of sophistication

consonant with those higher speeds.

Background—Development of the NEC

The National Railroad Passenger

Corporation (Amtrak) provides service

over the NEC from Washington, D.C., to

Boston, Massachusetts. Amtrak owns or

dispatches most of the NEC, which it

shares with several commuter

authorities and freight railroads.

Maximum track speeds on certain

segments of the NEC south of New York

City (the ‘‘South End’’) are limited to

125 miles per hour (mph) for Metroliner

equipment. Current speeds north of

New York City (the ‘‘North End’’) range

up to 110 mph.

Amtrak is currently undertaking a

major improvement project on the NEC,

with particular emphasis on completion

of electrification, installation of concrete

ties and high-speed turnouts,

elimination of some remaining highwayrail crossings, and other modifications

concentrated between New Haven,

Connecticut, and Boston. These

improvements are designed to facilitate

service utilizing high-speed trainsets

(HST’s) at speeds up to 150 (mph).

Similar service would also be

implemented on the south end of the

NEC, with the initial increase in

maximum speed expected to be from

125 mph to 135 mph. During 1999,

Amtrak will begin taking delivery of

HST’s expected to qualify for operation

through curves at higher levels of
62098 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices

unbalance (and thus higher speeds) than

conventional trains.

Increases in operating speeds would

be accomplished during a period of

continued traffic growth. Commuter and

intercity trains are expected to increase

in number over the next 20 years. Local

freight traffic is expected to increase on

the North End, and recent proposals for

the sale of Consolidated Rail

Corporation have given rise to the

possibility that freight operations on the

South End, particularly in Maryland,

might increase.

In its planning for implementation of

high-speed service between New Haven

and Boston, FRA recognized that a more

secure train control system would be

required to address the increased

potential for collisions associated with

increased traffic density. As planning

for South End service growth matures,

similar conclusions are likely. Although

this proposed order does not address

territory owned and dispatched by the

MTA Metro-North Railroad between

New Rochelle, New York, and New

Haven similar concerns may arise in

that territory as intercity service

increases.

FRA is concerned that planning for

high-speed service not occur in isolation

from measures that can reasonably

address increased traffic densities.

Future increases in traffic is one factor

that will drive future innovative

technology.

Proposed Signal and Train Control

Enhancements

Providing signalization for high-speed

intercity service will require

implementation of an enhanced cab

signal/speed control system. The new

system must allow for higher train

speeds while providing sufficient

gradations of intermediate speeds to

allow efficient movement of other

scheduled trains operating in the

conventional speed range. Reasonable

interoperability of existing and new onboard equipment is also desirable to

provide for the continued use of existing

on-board equipment which will be used

only at conventional speeds.

Amtrak presently uses a four-aspect

continuous cab signal/speed control

system. Amtrak proposes to replace this

system with a new nine-aspect

continuous cab signal/speed control,

referred to in this order as ‘‘cab signal/

ATC,’’ and an intermittent transponder

civil speed enforcement system

providing for train operations of up to

150 mph; intermediate speeds of 125,

100, 80, 60, 45, and 30 mph; and a

positive stop feature. Amtrak calls the

new transponder-based portion of this

system, which would provide positive

stop and civil speed enforcement

capability, the ‘‘Advanced Civil Speed

Enforcement System’’ (ACSES).

9-Aspect Cab Signal System

The cab signal/ATC portion of the

new system will employ two carrier

frequencies, 100 Hz, compatible with

existing equipment, and 250 Hz. Both

frequencies will be coded at standard

rates of 75, 120, 180, and 270 cycles per

minute. Upgraded equipment will be

able to take advantage of the 150 mph

code rate for maximum authorized

speed, the 80 mph code rate for high

speed diverging moves, and separate 45/

40 and 30 mph speed commands for

limited and medium speed turnouts.

Although existing four-aspect

equipment will not be able to take

advantage of these additional features, it

can continue to operate as it does today.

Instead of diverging through a high

speed turnout at 80 mph, this

equipment will diverge at 45 mph

(passenger trains) or 40 mph (freight). In

addition to the conventional dieselelectric and straight electric trains

currently traveling on the NEC, FRA

anticipates that new HST’s will be used

to minimize the run time between

Boston, New York, and Washington.

The first stage of the installation of the

9-aspect system involves conventional

electronic coded track circuits. The next

stage involves the conversion of these

electronic track circuits for use in

electrified territory. No civil speed

restrictions will be reflected in this cab

signal/ATC system. There will be no

positive stop aspect or indication

associated with the cab signal/ATC

system other than a stop signal

displayed at home signal locations. The

cab signal/ATC system provides control

based on track and route conditions

ahead. It will operate as a stand alone

system with an interface to the brake

valve to enforce speed control.

ACSES

In contrast to the modified cab signal

system, the ACSES will provide new

safety functions that—with limited

exceptions—are not currently provided.

For purposes of civil speed control,

permanent wayside transponders would

be placed in sets (normally two to a set)

at convenient, accessible locations in

the center of the track approaching

speed restriction zones. The

transponders would be passive devices

requiring no energy source other than

that transmitted from a passing train.

Each permanent transponder set would

contain encoded information about

speed restrictions ahead, including: (i)

The distance to the beginning of the

speed restriction; (ii) the target speed;

(iii) the type of speed restriction; (iv) the

average grade between the location

where the speed reduction must begin

and the location where the reduced

speed must be reached; (v) the distance

to the next permanent transponder set

location; and (vi) necessary sync and

check bytes to allow for message

verification. Since the number of

discrete codes available is large, it

would be possible to provide speed and

distance information for more than one

speed restriction at a time.

The two transponders in a set are

used to determine which message the

train should accept, determined by the

direction of the train as follows: the

train would receive the appropriate

message from the order in which the

transponders in the set are read, e.g., if

‘‘A’’ is encountered first, the message for

movement in the direction from ‘‘A’’ to

‘‘B’’ would be received; if ‘‘B’’ is

encountered first, the message for the

opposite direction, from ‘‘B’’ to ‘‘A,’’

will be received.

At distant signals prior to interlocking

home signals and control points in highspeed territory, dynamic transponders

would be provided. These transponders

would communicate the status of the

home signal providing for positive stop

enforcement.

Each locomotive, power car, and nonpowered control car would be equipped

with a transmitter/receiver, an antenna

mounted under the vehicle, an axle

generator (to measure speed and

distance traveled), an on-board

computer, and an aspect display unit.

The vehicle would continuously

transmit a signal which, when received

by a wayside transponder, would cause

the transponder to transmit back its

encoded message. The on-board

equipment would then decode this

message and the on-board computer

would calculate the braking distance

based on the present speed of the train,

the information received from the

transponder set, and the standard

Amtrak reduction braking curves with a

12.5% safety factor compensated for

grade together with an 8-second reaction

time. When the train reaches the

calculated distance from the speed

restriction, an audible alarm would

sound and the new speed would be

digitally displayed in the cab of the

vehicle. The engineer must

acknowledge the alarm. If the train is

above the speed required by the profile

generator inside the on-board computer,

the engineer would be required to bring

the train down to the required speed.

Failure to do so would result in an

automatic penalty application of the

brakes which can only be released when

the train is below the required speed.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices 62099

The on-board computer would be

programmed to calculate speed and

braking distance based on the type of

equipment it is mounted on. A high

performance train, such as a tilt body

train, would be allowed to run at a

higher speed around a curve than

conventional passenger equipment if

consistent with allowed unbalance. A

safe default speed would be provided in

the railroad operating rules in the case

of tilt body equipment failure or ACSES

failure.

Temporary speed restrictions would

be entered into the civil speed

enforcement on-board computer at the

beginning of the run. Normally the

speed restrictions would be entered by

a data radio located at strategic

entrances and locations along the NEC.

In the event that the data radio is

inoperative, the engineer would be able

to enter the information from the paper

Form D he or she receives that lists all

temporary speed restrictions.

In the fully deployed system, data

radio transmitters would be provided at

all interlockings in equipped territory,

permitting updating of temporary

restrictions and verification that onboard information is complete. Crews

would continue to receive paper Form

D’s, and temporary speed boards would

be provided. An alternative approach to

enforcement of temporary restrictions

has also been posited by Amtrak. Under

this approach, portable speed restriction

transponder sets would be utilized to

enforce temporary speed restrictions.

Temporary transponder sets would be

placed at braking distance for the worst

case trains. All trains operating at

maximum authorized speed that

encounter a temporary transponder set

would immediately begin to reduce to

the speed called for on the transponder

so distance to go, ruling grade, or

distance to the next transponder

information will not be necessary. When

a temporary transponder set is

encountered, it would not reset the

‘‘next transponder location window’’

information in the on-board computer,

and the on-board equipment would

continue to look for the next permanent

transponder set. All permanent

transponder sets are ‘‘linked’’ in that

each set identifies the location of the

next set in the chain, but temporary

transponders are not part of this linkage.

For the immediate future, only some

Amtrak power units will respond to all

of the new frequencies of the cab signal/

ATC system. Those units would receive

a maximum 125 mph speed indication

where the signal system permits.

Recently, Amtrak has indicated that

some changes to on-board equipment

would be required for other users where

Amtrak introduces the high-speed cab

signal/ATC array (in particular, use of

the 270 pulses per minute at both 100

and 250 Hz as a new 100 mph code and

use of 270 pulses per minute at 100 Hz

as a code allowing movement over #26.5

turnouts at 60 mph). Although the

changes in the cab signal code rates and

carrier frequencies form an important

backdrop for this proceeding, no

approval for these changes is required or

implied in this proposed order. At the

same time, FRA is conscious that

existing requirements for cab signal/

ATC are implicated in Amtrak’s

migration strategy; accordingly, FRA

holds open the possibility of resolving

any necessary issues in the final order

should it become apparent that they are

so interrelated as to defy separate

resolution. Further, to the extent the

proposed changes in code rates and

associated arrangements may otherwise

be considered material modifications

subject to approval under 49 CFR Part

235, FRA proposes to resolve any

related issues in this proceeding. (See

49 CFR 235.7(c)(1).)

Improvements that Amtrak would

gain with the new systems are:

—Train speeds of up to 150 mph;

—A high speed diverging aspect (80

mph);

—The efficient handling of both high

speed and conventional trains;

—New intermediate speeds between 45

mph and 150 mph;

—The capability for headway

improvement in congested commuter

areas; and

—Practical staging from present wayside

and on-board equipment

Commuter and freight railroads would

obviously benefit from enhanced safety

of Amtrak operations, given the

common operating environment.

Amtrak’s implementation of the 9-

aspect cab signal system would provide

increased flexibility to schedule high

speed intercity service in a way that

does not conflict with commuter

operations. In addition, as the ACSES is

implemented on commuter and freight

trains, the safety of those operations

would be enhanced, ensuring that those

trains do not pass absolute stop signals

or operate at excessive speed

approaching stations or bridges. To the

extent equipment design permits,

commuter operators would also be able

to take advantage of higher speeds on

curves without diminished safety

margins if flexibility for operation at

higher cant deficiencies contained in

FRA’s proposed revisions to its Track

Safety Standards in 49 CFR Part 213 (62

FR 31638; July 3, 1997) is adopted in the

final rule.

Implementation

In order to obtain the maximum

benefit from the positive stop and civil

speed enforcement system prior to its

installation on the entire NEC, Amtrak

has developed a strategy to phase-in

installation. The initial installations

would protect entry to and operations

along the high speed territory. During

the initial phase, the transponders

would not be installed on non-high

speed tracks where flanking protection

protects against possible encroachment

into the adjacent high speed tracks.

After all installations are in place on

high speed tracks and on adjacent tracks

where flanking protection does not

exist, the transponder system would be

extended to the balance of the NEC.

This phased-in installation would also

allow users of the NEC to defer

installation of the ACSES system on

some of their rolling stock while they

obtain the necessary internal or external

financing.

A specific application of this interim

installation staging strategy being

considered between New York and

Washington, D.C. is to operate the new

HST’s up to 135 mph in specific areas

where Metroliners currently operate at

125 mph and where signal spacing,

catenary and track structure are

adequate for 135 mph operation of

HST’s. For example, 135 mph operation

is possible on Tracks 2 and 3 between

‘‘County’’ Interlocking (MP 32.8, west of

New Brunswick, New Jersey) and MP

54.0 east of ‘‘Ham’’ Interlocking east of

Trenton, New Jersey. Consideration is

being given to initially installing the

‘‘ACSES’’ transponder based civil speed

and positive stop enforcement system

only on Tracks 2 and 3 between

‘‘County’’ (MP 32.8) and ‘‘Ham’’ (MP

55.7), depending on flanking protection

at ‘‘Midway’’ (MP 41.3) to divert any

possible stop signal ‘‘overruns’’ away

from the path of an HST operating over

125 mph on Track 2 or 3.

In addition to the use of flanking and

phased installation, freight trains that

are not equipped with ACSES will be

allowed to operate on the NEC at offpeak times when no high speed

passenger trains are operating in the

area. These operations would be within

windows that have been verified and

strictly adhered to. This exception

would be created to allow the smaller

entities to continue to operate prior to

the equipping of all their equipment.

This strategy would allow Amtrak to

take advantage of some of the new

HST’s capability before the ACSES

system is fully installed and before all

other vehicles can be equipped. These

initial installations would also give
62100 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices

operating personnel some solid

experience with the new system before

it is extended throughout the entire

NEC.

Other areas being considered for 135

mph operation with initial ACSES

installation in this same manner are

‘‘Morris’’ (MP 58.4) to MP 74.0 east of

‘‘Holmes’’ (MP 77.2), ‘‘Ragan’’ (MP 29.9)

to ‘‘Bacon’’ (MP 51.0) with No. 3 track

only extended on through ‘‘Bacon’’ to

MP 56.7 north of ‘‘Prince’’ (MP 57.3),

and ‘‘Grove’’ (MP 112.6) to ‘‘Landover’’

(MP 128.8). Taken together as an initial

installation in the New York to

Washington portion of the NEC, 171

track miles of ACSES could provide up

to 80 route miles of 135 mph operation

on the 225 mile run. This strategy

would provide initial valuable operating

benefits and experience without

sacrificing any of the higher level of

safety required for trains operating over

125 mph, and without (initially)

equipping any vehicles other than those

trains operating over 125 mph.

Between New York City and

Washington, D.C., Amtrak proposes for

the present to install the ACSES system

only in territory where train speeds will

exceed 125 mph. Since freight trains do

not operate on the NEC at speeds over

50 mph, and none of the existing

commuter equipment operating on the

NEC can operate at speeds exceeding

125 mph, Amtrak does not view

installation of ACSES on freight and

commuter equipment operating between

New York City and Washington, D.C. to

be necessary during the initial phase.

The installation of ACSES between New

York and Washington, D.C. would

provide transponder-based positive stop

enforcement on all main tracks where

speeds exceed 125 mph, and on all

tracks leading to high-speed tracks

where flanking protection is not

provided.

Between New Haven and Boston, the

ACSES would be installed on all main

tracks where speeds exceed 110 mph.

Ultimately, plans call for installation of

this system on all main tracks along the

NEC where speeds currently exceed the

60–80 mph range except for New

Rochelle to New Haven, a segment

controlled by the MTA Metro-North

Railroad where speeds will not exceed

110 mph.

Another interim installation concerns

the use of #26.5 straight-frog turnouts.

These turnouts are only good for

diverging moves at 60 mph. Amtrak

intends to install these turnouts at

limited locations where there is

insufficient space to install the #32.7

turnouts needed for diverging moves at

80 mph. Using the 60 mph aspect in the

9-aspect cab signal/ATC system requires

all equipment to be able to receive and

decode 270 code.

To allow for the installation of these

60 mph turnouts in territory where all

users have not yet upgraded to the full

9-aspect system, Amtrak proposes an

interim procedure. Until all users have

been equipped, Amtrak proposes that

the cab signal/ATC system will display

an 80 mph aspect for diverging moves

over these turnouts. The ACSES passive

transponder sets approaching this

location and at this location would

enforce a 60 mph civil speed restriction

for all routes through the interlocking

where the #26.5 turnout is located. An

active transponder would be located at

the distant signal prior to the locations

where trains must begin to reduce to 60

mph. This active transponder would

override the 60 mph civil speed

command when the signal system logic

determines that the interlocking is

cleared for a non-diverging move at a

higher speed than 60 mph.

This scheme requires that all vehicles

equipped with the 9-aspect cab signal/

ATC system also be equipped with

ACSES. Existing 4-aspect cab signal/

ATC systems would enforce 45 mph for

passenger trains and 30 mph for freight

trains. This interim arrangement would

also be backed up by a site specific

instruction and an appropriate

reflectorized sign on the distant signal

requiring 60 mph with the display of the

‘‘Cab Speed’’ aspect. When all vehicles

operating in the area are equipped, the

active transponder can be removed and

the 270 code for 60 mph installed.

Under Amtrak’s design, the ACSES

system would be required to have a

minimal database for the entire NEC

which would enable a train to always

know where it is within the NEC, which

track it is on, what permanent speed

restrictions apply, and where the next

temporary speed order would need to be

executed. With this capability, the

ACSES system would be able to perform

certain auxiliary functions required by

HST’s.

Regulatory Approvals Required

In general, new signal and train

control systems must comply with

FRA’s Rules, Standards and Instructions

Governing the Installation, Inspection,

Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and

Train Control Systems, Devices, and

Appliances (49 CFR Part 236). FRA will

implement any exceptions on a case-bycase basis through the waiver process as

provided by 49 CFR Part 235. Train

operations in excess of 110 miles per

hour must be authorized by FRA after

examination of pertinent safety

considerations in accordance with 49

CFR 213.9(c). Metroliner service on the

NEC is conducted in accordance with

such an authorization.

In addition, NEC operations are

subject to special requirements of the

Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988,

which mandated that all NEC trains be

equipped with ‘‘automatic train control

systems designed to slow or stop a train

in response to external signals.’’ Sec. 9,

Public Law 100–342, implemented at 52

FR 44510 (Nov. 19, 1987), 53 FR 1433

(Jan. 19, 1988), and 53 FR 39834 (Oct.

12, 1988).

Safety Performance Standards

On May 29, 1992, Amtrak informed

FRA of its intention to implement a

proposed 9-aspect cab signal/speed

control system supplemented with an

intermittent transponder civil speed

enforcement system on the NEC. On

June 23, 1992, FRA notified Amtrak that

the proposed system would have to

comply with Part 236. FRA also

suggested the following specific

performance standards for the ACSES

components:

1. The system must enforce

permanent and temporary civil speed

restrictions (e.g., track curvature,

bridges, and slow orders).

2. All trains operating over the

trackage of the proposed system must be

equipped to respond to the continuous

cab signal/speed control system and

intermittent transponder civil speed

enforcement system.

3. Conflicting aspects or indications

may not be displayed in the locomotive

cab.

4. The system must enforce the most

restrictive speed at any location

associated with either the civil

restriction or cab signal aspect.

5. The system shall include a

restricted speed command or code rate

to permit the train to continue at

restricted speed only if this command is

received. The system shall be arranged

so that if the speed command is not

received the train will be brought to a

stop and cannot be moved again until

some type of apparatus interconnected

with the train control system and

controlled by the dispatcher is used.

The train may then only travel at

restricted speed until a valid speed

command is received by the on-board

train equipment.

In a September 17, 1992 letter,

Amtrak responded to technical issues

raised at an earlier meeting between

Amtrak and FRA. Amtrak agreed with

performance standards 1, 3, and 4, but

had reservations concerning

performance standard 2 because of the

funding needed to upgrade commuter

and freight corridor users’ train control

systems. Amtrak also questioned the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices 62101

need to equip certain user vehicles with

a full microprocessor scanning system if

the user trains did not operate at speeds

in excess of 100 mph, civil speed

reductions in the territory operated were

relatively few, and civil speeds could be

controlled by the continuous cab signal

enforcement system without adversely

impacting train schedules or on-time

performance.

Amtrak also requested relief from

performance standard 5, which requires

an enforced stop at interlocking signals

with an advance track configuration that

would not establish high speed track

fouling, where the maximum authorized

speed does not exceed 45 mph through

an interlocking arrangement or terminal.

The system would still contain a

recurring 15 second audible warning

and a 20 second acknowledge

requirement while operating at

restricted speed.

At a meeting on September 20, 1994,

the Northeast Corridor Safety

Committee, a federal advisory

committee chartered pursuant to the

Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act

of 1992, considered the issue of an

enhanced NEC train control system and

agreed with draft performance

specifications similar to those set forth

above. The draft performance standards

placed before the Committee included

equipping of all movements in highspeed territory. However, the issue of

increased speeds south of New York

City was not discussed, since Amtrak

had not proposed to increase speeds on

the South End at that time. The

Committee was in general agreement

that the current cab signal/ATC system

should be supplemented, as proposed

by Amtrak, in connection with NEC

improvements.

Discussion

Safety Need

Increases in train speed, in the traffic

density planned for both intercity and

commuter service, and in the potential

for increased freight operations over a

portion of the NEC territory would

increase the risk of a severe accident on

the NEC unless compensating measures

are taken. These risks fall into four

general categories requiring separate

analysis, three of which are pertinent

here.

The first risk is of a train-to-train

collision. Although the existing cab

signal/ATC system on the NEC provides

a very high level of safety, some risks

remain. The cab signal/ATC system

currently in use on the NEC does not

enforce a positive stop at signals

displaying a stop aspect, nor does it

require acknowledgment of the

restricting aspect every 20 seconds.

Instead, the engineer receives one

warning that must be acknowledged

when a ‘‘zero’’ code rate is experienced.

Thus, the principal hazard is not that a

train operating under a restricted speed

code could strike another train. Rather,

it is that a slower train could move

through the control point into the path

of a high-speed train. This could happen

if the engineer of the train subject to the

stop signal experienced an incident of

micro sleep, accompanied by a

conditioned response of acknowledging

the warning, was distracted, or was

impaired. Less likely to occur, but still

possible, is a scenario where an

engineer or a third party acts recklessly.

This scenario must be taken seriously in

light of recent acts of domestic

terrorism.

Clearly, equipping only high-speed

trains with on-board equipment

responsive to the ACSES system is

insufficient by itself to prevent

collisions at key control points. Only by

equipping all trains can the safe

movement of high-speed trains be

reasonably ensured. Amtrak’s

observation that positive stop capability

need only be provided at locations

providing access to high-speed track

appears to have merit, however.

The second risk is of an overspeed

derailment which may result in direct

harm or harm flowing from a resulting

impact with other trains or fixed objects.

Currently, locations on the NEC where

signal speed restrictions are higher than

the overturning speed of the curve are

protected by special speed control

features specific to those locations. As

speeds rise for both intercity and

commuter trains, the number of track

segments requiring special control will

increase. Allowances for higher levels of

unbalance (implicit in the flexibilities

proposed in the July 3 Track Safety

Standards Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (NPRM)) would also create

potential exposure that does not

currently exist. The speed control

features of the ACSES will deal

effectively and economically with this

potential safety exposure, while

providing all passenger operators on the

corridor with the potential for reduced

trip times.

The third risk is of an impact with

track forces or their equipment. This

risk is endemic to all rail operations, but

increased speed drives up potential

severity and reduces the warning time

of a train’s approach. Unlike revenue

rolling stock, many pieces of

maintenance-of-way equipment will not

reliably shunt or activate a signal

system. Further, although great care is

taken to ensure that workers and their

equipment are protected from train

movements, human error in issuing or

executing such authorities can occur.

Although the recently published final

rule for Roadway Worker Safety will

help to control this risk (61 FR 65959;

December 16, 1996 ), a train control

system with the capability to provide

automatic warning to the train of the

presence of workers or equipment prior

to visual sighting could significantly

drive down the risk of harm to both

roadway workers and train occupants.

This is of particular concern on a highspeed railroad with very dense

operations and close track centers,

conditions that prevail on much of the

NEC.

The ACSES system incorporates

portable transponder technology that

can provide a second layer of safety for

roadway workers and their equipment.

Further, temporary speed restrictions

would be entered into the on-board

ACSES computer, providing for

automatic enforcement even if

temporary transponders are misplaced

or vandalized. These features should

increase the safety of those conventional

and high-speed trains that are equipped

with on-board computers.

A fourth risk accentuated by higher

speeds is increased severity of an

accident resulting from an undetected

incursion into the right of way or

clearance envelope, including possible

displacement or undermining of track

structure. This fourth risk is not

addressed in this proceeding since the

Northeast Corridor Safety Committee

will evaluate this issue in a separate

‘‘system safety’’ proceeding to be held at

a later date. However, the data radio

element of the ACSES system provides

a possible communication path for

hazard detection information (in

addition to the cab signal system).

Technical Issues

In Amtrak’s proposed system, the

brake and propulsion interface between

the ACSES and the locomotive would be

similar to that utilized in conventional

cab signal/ATC systems. The interface

would be separate and distinct from the

interface used by the cab signal/ATC

system. The failure of either the cab

signal/ATC system or the ACSES would

not prevent the remaining functioning

system from performing its intended

operation and displaying the proper onboard aspect. Both the signal speed and

the civil speed would be displayed with

the lower of the two speeds to be

enforced.

FRA questions the need or prudence

of displaying both speeds and continues

to gather information on this design.

Comment is requested regarding the
62102 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices

appropriate means of displaying system

information to the locomotive engineer.

The new transponder-based system

would provide for enforcement of

permanent civil speed restrictions

(curves, bridges, etc.) and temporary

speed restrictions (slow orders) in five

MPH increments, as well as

enforcement of stop aspects at

interlocking home signals. Once the

train is stopped, current plans call for

the system to require the train to remain

stopped for 30 seconds at which time

the engineer will operate a stop override

button and allow movement of the train,

with the audible alarm requiring

acknowledgment every 20 seconds. FRA

is aware that some locomotive engineers

may find repetitive acknowledgment of

this feature distracting during low-speed

movements through terminal areas and

requests comments regarding possible

alternative arrangements.

FRA discussed with Amtrak a feature

under which a controlled release would

be encrypted into the on-board

computer at the time of departure to

ensure that movement could not be

made past stop aspects at home signals

without a secure means of

authorization. Amtrak opposed this

approach, arguing that the train should

remain under the control of the

engineer, who may have a more

complete and current understanding of

considerations pertinent to the safety of

the train movement. For instance, if a

structure or vehicle adjacent to the

wayside was on fire, it would be

necessary to move the train to avoid a

hazard to the passengers and crew.

Nevertheless, FRA believes operation of

a train where a positive stop is required

should occur only after the engineer

cuts out or overrides the ACSES through

a mechanism located away from the

engineer’s console, the location and/or

operation of which would require

special knowledge available only to a

person authorized to operate the

override. Amtrak has endeavored to

respond to this concern in designing the

ACSES.

Text and Analysis of Proposed Orders

For purposes of clarity and

convenience, the text of the proposed

order is interspersed with explanations

and analysis. The text of the proposed

order is printed in italics. FRA reserves

the right to revise and augment the

proposed order upon final issuance and

invites comments on all issues relevant

to the subject matter of the order.

Proposed Effective Date

As discussed above, Amtrak

anticipates beginning receipt of the new

HST’s in 1999. FRA proposes to make

this Order effective on October 1, 1999,

to enable Amtrak to rapidly utilize the

new system’s improvements while

allowing other users of the NEC to

phase-in installation.

Scope and Applicability

This order supplements existing

regulations at 49 CFR Part 236 and

existing orders for automatic train

control on the Northeast Corridor (NEC).

This order applies in territory where

Amtrak has installed wayside elements

of the Advanced Civil Speed

Enforcement System (ACSES),

permitting high-speed operations under

the conditions set forth below. All

railroads operating on high-speed tracks

in such equipped territory, or on tracks

providing access to such high-speed

tracks, shall be subject to this order,

including the following entities

operating or contracting for the

operation of rail service—

Connecticut Department of

Transportation;

Consolidated Rail Corporation;

Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority;

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

(Amtrak); and

Providence and Worcester Railroad Co.

Explanation and Analysis. Amtrak

has undertaken the planning and

installation of the ACSES as part of its

capital program for intercity service on

the NEC, consistent with legislation

providing for improved rail service in

the region. The proposed order would

require all carriers operating in ACSES

territory to equip their controlling

locomotives with operative on-board

equipment. This equipment would

consist of a transponder scanner, an onboard computer, a display unit for the

locomotive engineer, and appropriate

interface with the cab signal/train

control apparatus.

The exception would be trackage on

the South End where access is barred to

non-ACSES-equipped trainsets and

where increases in the maximum speed

will be from 125 mph to 135 mph. In

this instance, only Amtrak trains would

be required to be equipped.

FRA views the distinctions between

required signal and train control

features on the north and south portions

of the NEC to be temporary. The

proposed order would allow increases

in train speeds without any reduction in

safety. Over time, the ACSES system

should be completed and used by all

operators throughout the NEC for routes

where speeds exceed 110 mph on any

segment, enhancing safety throughout

the NEC. In fact, New Jersey Transit Rail

Operations (NJT) has indicated its

intention to equip its controlling

locomotives with an Advanced Speed

Enforcement System (ASES), deriving

safety advantages both on the NEC and

on certain of its lines where the ASES

system can be used as an intermittent

train stop system. As Amtrak, North End

operators and NJT demonstrate the

benefits and reliability of the system,

progress toward universal upgrading of

the NEC signal and train control system

will be fostered. At a later date, FRA

may amend this order to require more

extensive use of this new safety

technology. This will be determined by

increases in traffic and types of

equipment used on the NEC.

Definitions. For Purposes of This

Order—

‘‘High-speed track’’ means (1) a track

on the main line of the Northeast

Corridor (NEC) between New Haven,

Connecticut, and Boston, Massachusetts

(‘‘North End’’) where the maximum

authorized train speed for any class of

train is in excess of 110 miles per hour

or (2) a track on the main line of NEC

between Washington, D.C., and New

York City, New York (‘‘South End’’),

where the authorized train speed for any

class of train exceeds 125 mph.

Explanation and Analysis. Operations

on the North End are conducted on two

main tracks, while additional main

tracks are available on portions of the

South End. Operations are already

highly dense on the North End, and

projections for the future indicate

significant increases in traffic, both

freight and passenger. Track curvature

on the North End exceeds the average

curvature on the South End, resulting in

greater potential concern for compliance

with civil speed restrictions.

Accordingly, FRA proposes to

distinguish between the two operations

for purposes of determining

applicability of new performance

requirements.

‘‘Signal and train control system’’

refers to the automatic cab signal/

automatic train control system (cab

signal/ATC) in effect on the NEC at the

date of issuance of this order, as

supplemented by ‘‘ACSES,’’ together

with such modifications as Amtrak shall

make consistent with this order.

Performance Standards

The following performance standards

and special requirements apply:
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices 62103

1. Except as provided in paragraph

10(b), the signal and train control

system shall enforce both permanent

and temporary civil speed restrictions

(e.g., track curvature, bridges, and slow

orders) on all high-speed tracks and

immediately adjacent tracks.

Explanation and analysis. The ACSES

system can prevent derailments and

collisions with fixed structures or ontrack personnel or equipment that might

result from overspeed operation.

Accordingly, permanent civil speed

enforcement and temporary speed

enforcement are proposed.

Existing features of the cab signal/

ATC system on the NEC provide

intermittent civil speed enforcement at

key locations where signal speeds

exceed overturning speeds or where

station operations require special

protection. However, as speeds are

increased, civil speed enforcement will

become an issue at additional locations.

The ACSES would permit higher

operating speeds while maintaining a

high level of safety.

The existing signal system would not

enforce temporary speed restrictions,

such as slow orders over defective track

or protections for roadway workers. By

using temporarily placed transponders,

and by entering restrictions into the onboard computer by milepost, the ACSES

could provide excellent protection for

train movements and workers and

equipment on or adjacent to live tracks.

All trains equipped with on-board

ACSES units would benefit from this

feature.

The proposed order suggests that this

requirement should be extended to

tracks adjacent to high-speed tracks. The

effective operating envelope for highspeed tracks includes immediately

adjacent tracks. Derailments on those

tracks could endanger high-speed

operations.

2. Except as provided in paragraph

10(b), all trains operating on high-speed

track, immediately adjacent track, or

track providing access to high-speed

track shall be equipped to respond to

the continuous cab signal/speed control

system and intermittent transponder

civil speed enforcement/positive stop

system. Freight trains that are not

equipped with ACSES will be allowed

to operate on the NEC at off-peak times

when no high-speed passenger trains are

operating in the area.

Explanation and analysis. As noted

above, the ACSES system could provide

potential benefits for all users of the

NEC. However, this proposed order

would only require equipping trains on

the North End, where trains are

operated on high-speed tracks, or on

immediately adjacent tracks providing

access to high-speed tracks.

The benefits of equipping high-speed

trains are obvious. The benefits of

equipping conventional speed trains

that operate on high-speed tracks

include enforcement of civil speed

restrictions, temporary speed

restrictions, and positive stop features.

The benefits of equipping conventional

speed trains that operate on

immediately adjacent tracks providing

access to high-speed tracks may derive

primarily from enforcement of positive

stop features. If a train is prevented from

inappropriately proceeding through a

junction and onto a high-speed track,

the safety of the subject train and the

safety of the oncoming high-speed train

are equally assured. As a practical

matter, FRA believes that few trains

required to be equipped under this

proposal would not make use of highspeed tracks. Again, comment is

specifically requested regarding whether

any circumstances exist under which

trains would be required to be equipped

exclusively because they operate on

adjacent tracks or on tracks providing

access to high-speed tracks. (See, also,

paragraph 10(b), below.)

3. No conflicting aspects or indications

shall be displayed in the locomotive

cab.

Explanation and analysis. The

proposed order would require that

consistent information be displayed to

the locomotive engineer. Amtrak plans

to implement this principle, while

providing information from both the cab

signal/ATC system and the ACSES, by

displaying both of the resulting

maximum speeds. The controlling (most

restrictive) limit would be displayed at

twice the brightness of the other speed.

The cab signal aspect would also be

displayed.

FRA believes that Amtrak’s proposed

display (details of which are contained

in the program description placed in the

docket of this proposed order) is

appropriate for a hybrid system such as

this. However, it should be noted that

the amount of apparently conflicting

information provided to the locomotive

engineer may be substantial. In

particular, the engineer (who may

operate non-equipped trains on certain

days and equipped trains on other days)

will have to contend with 9-aspect cab

signal information that differs from the

wayside signal and potentially the

wayside or overhead speed boards,

ACSES information, and at least two

systems requiring acknowledgment of

audible warnings (the alerting device

and the combined cab signal/ATC/

ACSES unit). Is this information

excessive? Should a simpler display of

the most safety critical information be

provided as the default condition?

4. The system must enforce the most

restrictive speed at any location

associated with either the civil/

temporary restriction or cab signal

aspect.

Explanation and analysis. This

requirement states the obvious

requirement that the most restrictive of

the limitations indicated by the cab

signal/ATC or ACSES system must be

enforced.

5. At interlocking home signals and

control points on high-speed tracks or

protecting switches providing access to

high-speed tracks, the signal and train

control system shall enforce a positive

stop short of the signal or fouling point

when the signal displays an absolute

stop. The system shall function such

that the train will be brought to a

complete stop and cannot be moved

again until the first of the following

events shall occur: (1) The signal

displays a more permissive aspect; or (2)

in the event of a system malfunction, or

system penalty, at least 30 seconds shall

have elapsed since the train came to a

complete stop, the engineer has received

verbal authority to proceed from the

dispatcher, and the engineer has

activated an override or reset device that

is located where it cannot be activated

from the engineer’s accustomed position

in the cab. The train may then only

travel at restricted speed until a valid

speed command is received by the onboard train equipment.

Explanation and analysis. Providing

for normal and extraordinary

movements past a signal that previously

required an absolute stop using a hybrid

cab signal/ATC/ACSES arrangement has

proven to be one of the most challenging

issues in the design of the new system.

As originally conceived by Amtrak, in

the normal case ACSES would enforce

a positive stop by use of an active

transponder near the distant signal that

would read the cab signal code (‘‘0’’),

recognize that the home signal is

capable of displaying an absolute stop,

and enforce a positive stop even if the

home signal actually displayed a

restricting indication (permitting

movement through the location at up to

15 mph), unless a greater than zero code

rate was detected upon reaching the

‘‘cut section’’ in which the home signal

was located. This arrangement appeared

to have several disadvantages. First,

stops would be required where

presently none are required. This could

be a significant issue in freight
62104 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices

operations, since enforcement of

unnecessary stop commands could in

some cases result in unacceptable intrain forces. Second, movements past a

stop signal that became restricting after

the stop would have to be made by

overriding the positive stop. Third,

these arrangements would inevitably

lead to demands for release of the

positive stop from the engineer’s

position in the cab, potentially defeating

the concept intended to be implemented

by FRA when conversations with

Amtrak were initiated on this subject in

1992.

To avoid distracting or fatiguing the

engineer, and to ensure that the override

function is not regarded as a feature to

be casually employed, it appears to be

more appropriate to restrict the use of

the reset or override button to that of

instances of system failures, on-board or

wayside. Efficiency also suggests

permitting the train to proceed when a

train receives an indication more

favorable than absolute stop (a

consideration of interest particularly to

those commuter authorities that would

be subject to the proposed order).

Accordingly, FRA proposed that the

train control system function in greater

harmony with the wayside signals. This

could be accomplished in a number of

ways.

First, it should be possible to place

one or more additional transponders

that derive information directly from the

circuits controlling the home signal.

Amtrak indicates that this approach

could be complicated by the varying

stopping distances of trains using the

NEC, but in principle the approach

seems feasible. If this approach were to

be employed, these transponders should

be placed to control speed approaching

the signal while providing information

concerning more favorable aspects as a

means of releasing the absolute stop

automatically. Second, it should be

possible to use a steady 250 Hz to

release the stop when the signal

upgrades to restricting. This would

require modifications to the signal

system at each home signal and control

point. Third, data radio could be used

on the wayside to provide precise signal

status (notwithstanding the zero code

read by the cab signal system) when the

signal is at ‘‘Stop and Proceed,’’ or

‘‘Restricting.’’ Any of these options

would allow the movement past a

restricting signal without the use of a

reset or override button by the engineer.

Amtrak agreed, at a June 4, 1997

meeting, to accelerate the development

of the ACSES data radio feature to

reduce the need to operate the ‘‘Stop

Override’’ button to only those instances

in which some sort of system failure has

occurred and the train must be moved.

The data radio feature located at the

interlocking and known as a Mobile

Communication Package (MCP) would

broadcast a message to the approaching

train that is track specific, direction

specific, and location specific that

would automatically release the stopoverride feature without the engineer

having to operate the ‘‘Stop Override’’

button when the home signal displays

‘‘Stop and Proceed.’’ The message

would only be transmitted and only be

effective when the train is between the

distant signal and the home signal of the

interlocking. If the signal displays

‘‘Restricting,’’ the MCP data radio would

broadcast a similar message to the

approaching train that would relieve the

train from actually having to stop. While

the additional time frame and cost to

develop the data radio encoder and to

install these encoders along with the

MCP radios at all interlockings in

ACSES territory is not yet known, it is

clear that this is the only method,

among those that have been proposed,

with long-range potential to truly

enhance the future operation of ACSES

on the Northeast Corridor. As the

additional time frame to develop the

data radio/encoder override release

feature is not yet known, and as the

schedule to begin high speed rail

operations in 1999 is very tight, FRA

recognizes that some relief concerning

operation of the ‘‘Stop Override’’ button

may be required, particularly should

Amtrak seek approval for limited

operations to 135 mph on the south end

during 1998. FRA feels that a clear plan

for migration with timetables should be

submitted prior to the granting of

increased speeds.

6. Failure modes of the system will

allow for train movements at reduced

speeds, as follows:

a. Failure of Cab Signal/ATC System:

In the event of failure of the cab signal/

ATC system on board a train, the cab

signal/ATC system will be cut out;

however, the ACSES system shall

remain operative and enforce the 79

mph speed limit. If intermediate

wayside signals are provided, the train

will continue to operate at speeds not

exceeding 79 mph subject to indications

of the wayside signal system. In territory

without fixed automatic block signals,

trains will run on special ‘‘Clear to Next

Interlocking’’ signals. When failure

occurs after a train has entered such a

block, it will proceed at restricted speed

to the next interlocking and may not

pass the home signal, regardless of the

aspect displayed, until the flashing

lunar ‘‘Clear to Next Interlocking’’ signal

is displayed. The train may then pass

the signal and proceed at 79 mph. The

speed limit shall be enforced by the

Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement

System (ACSES). At the next distant

signal the train must begin braking,

preparing to stop at the next home

signal unless a flashing lunar signal

with the letter ‘‘N’’ is displayed

indicating that the ‘‘Clear to Next

Interlocking’’ signal is already displayed

ahead.

Explanation and analysis. The cab

signal/ATC portion of the system would

be cut out under operating rules which

meet § 236.567 requirements. The

operation of trains when the cab signal/

ATC portion of the system was failed

and/or cut out would be enhanced by

the ACSES still being in operation. The

ACSES central processing unit (CPU)

would receive a message from the cab

signal/ATC CPU through a vital link

that the cab signal/ATC is cut in and not

failed. If the ACSES does not receive

this message, a speed of 79 mph is

locked in and the display is dark, other

than the 79 mph displayed in the civil

speed portion, which is enforced.

Temporary and permanent speed

restrictions and positive stop at home

signal locations would continue to be

enforced by the ACSES system.

b. ACSES failure. If the on-board ACSES

fails en route, it must be cut out in a

similar manner to the cab signal/ATC

system. The engineer will be required to

notify the dispatcher that the civil

speed/positive stop enforcement system

has been cut out. When given

permission to proceed, the train must

not exceed 125 mph (South End) or 110

mph (North End). All trains with a cut

out ACSES system will operate at

conventional train speeds.

Explanation and analysis. After

considering how to proceed when the

ACSES must be cut out on a train, the

proposed order specifies minimal

requirements, which would require that

trains fall back to existing maximum

speeds in the territories. However, this

approach cannot provide positive stop

capability or compensate for higher

curving speeds that may be allowed

using tilt HST’s. All trains with a cut

out ACSES would operate at

conventional train speeds whether they

are tilt train equipment or conventional

equipment. The vital link between CPUs

mentioned in 6.(a) above would inform

the signal CPU that the civil speed CPU

was cut out or failed. FRA has inquired

whether a default speed limit could be

‘‘enforced’’ through the signal speed

enforcement system when the ACSES is

failed and/or cut out, and Amtrak

responded that this could be

accomplished. The maximum speed to
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices 62105

be enforced by the cab signal system if

ACSES is cut out is 125 mph. This

places a premium on compliance with

operating rules developed specifically

for this purpose (copies of which are

available in the public docket).

Comment is requested regarding

appropriate measures, recognizing that

electronic failures and damage to

scanners from refuse on the track

structure will result in ACSES failures.

c. Cab signals/ATC & ACSES failure. If

the cab signal/ATC system and the

ACSES both fail en route, the systems

shall be cut out and the train shall

proceed as provided in 49 CFR

§ 236.567.

Explanation and analysis. When the

signal and train control system fails

and/or is cut out en route, § 236.567 sets

forth the procedures and restrictions

that shall be followed.

Where an automatic train stop, train

control, or cab signal device fails and/or is

cut out enroute, train may proceed at

restricted speed or if an automatic block

signal system is in operation according to

signal indication but not to exceed medium

speed, to the next available point of

communication where report must be made

to a designated officer. Where no automatic

block signal system is in use train shall be

permitted to proceed at restricted speed or

where automatic block signal system is in

operation according to signal indication but

not to exceed medium speed to a point where

absolute block can be established. Where an

absolute block is established in advance of

the train on which the device is inoperative

train may proceed at not to exceed 79 miles

per hour.

These procedures are used with present

train control systems, both on the NEC

and throughout the Nation and have

proven to be a reliable and safe method

when the signal and train control

system fails and/or is cut out.

d. Wayside signal system failure. If the

wayside signal system fails, train

operation will be at restricted speed to

a point where absolute block can be

established in advance of the train.

Where absolute block is established in

advance of the train, the train may

proceed at speeds not to exceed 79 mph.

Explanation and analysis. The

carrier’s operating rules shall effect

these requirements. In the case of a

wayside signal system failure the

ACSES would still be functioning,

giving trains an added portion of safety,

but it would still be necessary to

establish an absolute block and proceed

not to exceed 79 mph. The ACSES

would enforce the 79 mph speed, as

well as civil and temporary speed

restrictions and positive stops.

e. Missing transponder. If a transponder

is not detected where the equipment

expected to find the next transponder,

the train must not exceed 125 mph

(North End) or 110 mph (South End)

until the next valid transponder is

encountered. The 125/110 mph speed

restriction will be enforced by the

system and ‘‘—’’ will be displayed to

indicate that the civil speed is

unknown. The audible alarm for civil

speeds will sound and must be

acknowledged. Speed restrictions

previously entered into the system,

whether temporary or permanent, will

be displayed at the proper time and

continue to be enforced. If the missing

transponder is a positive stop

enforcement transponder at the distant

signal to an interlocking, then the

system will treat the missing

transponder as if it were present and a

stop will be required. Since the previous

transponder will have transmitted the

distance to the stop location, the stop

shall be enforced unless a cab signal is

received that indicates the interlocking

signal is displaying an aspect more

favorable than ‘‘Stop,’’ ‘‘Stop &

Proceed,’’ and ‘‘Restricting.’’ The 125/

110 mph speed restriction will also be

enforced regardless of whether the cab

signal aspect is being received.

Explanation and analysis. Permanent

transponders would be programmed

with information that includes distance

to the next transponder. Wheel rotations

would be logged to determine train

position between transponders. If a

transponder is missing (or is not

successfully read), speeds would be

slowed to 125 or 110 mph, depending

upon the territory involved, until the

next valid transponder is detected.

8. When it becomes necessary to cut

out the cab signal/ATC system, the

ACSES, or both, these systems shall be

considered inoperative until the engine

has been repaired, tested and found to

be functioning properly. Repairs shall

be made before dispatching the unit on

any subsequent trip.

9. Other requirements applicable to

the system are as follows:

a. Aspects in the cab shall have only one

indication and one name and will be

shown in such a way as to be

understood by the engine crew. These

aspects shall be shown by lights and/or

illuminated letters or numbers.

b. Entrances to the main line can be

protected by electrically locked derails

if the speed limit is 15 mph or less. A

transponder set shall cut in the ACSES

prior to movement through the derail

and onto the main line. If the speed

limit is greater than 15 mph, a positive

stop will be required. At entrances from

a signaled track, the ACSES shall be cut

in prior to the distant signal and a

positive stop enforced at the home

signal.

c. An on-board event recorder shall

record, in addition to the required

functions of § 229.5(g) [of FRA’s

Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards

(49 CFR Part 229)], the time at which

each transponder is encountered, the

information associated with that

transponder, and each use of the

positive stop override. These functions

may be incorporated within the onboard computer, or as a stand alone

device, but shall continue to record

speeds and related cab signal/ATC data,

even if ACSES has failed and/or is cut

out. The event recorder shall meet all

requirements of § 229.135.

Explanation and analysis. FRA has

determined that event recorders

enhance railroad safety. Whether they

are used to aid accident analysis, to

monitor locomotive engineers’

performance, or to monitor equipment

performance, event recorders provide

data that are free from bias, free from the

inconsistent powers of human

observation, and free from the possible

taint of self-interest. There has been no

question of the cab signal/ATC events

being recorded; what FRA is ensuring is

that the ACSES portion of the system is

recorded and made available as well.

10. The following maximum speeds

apply on the NEC in territory subject to

this order:
62106 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices

a. In ACSES territory where all trains

operating on high-speed tracks, adjacent

tracks, and tracks providing access to

high-speed tracks are equipped with cab

signal/ATC and ACSES, qualified and

ACSES-equipped trainsets otherwise so

authorized may operate at maximum

speeds not exceeding 150 mph. The

maximum speed over any highway-rail

crossing shall not exceed 80 mph.

b. In ACSES territory between

Washington, D.C., and New York City,

New York, where access to any highspeed track is barred by switches locked

in the normal position and a parallel

route to the high-speed track is

provided, at crossovers from adjacent

tracks, and where no junctions

providing direct access exist, qualified

and ACSES-equipped trainsets

otherwise so authorized may operate to

a maximum speed not exceeding 135

mph on such track; and provisions of

this order requiring other tracks and

trains to be equipped with the ACSES

do not apply.

Explanation and analysis. Currently

maximum speeds for trains on the

general rail system are limited to 110

miles per hour. Under a waiver, Amtrak

operates Metroliner service between

New York and Washington at speeds up

to 125 miles per hour. This proposed

order would allow Amtrak to increase

its speeds on the South End of the NEC

to 135 miles per hour by installing the

ACSES transponders on the wayside

and equipping new high-speed trainsets

with on-board scanners and computers.

Other users of Amtrak’s South End highspeed tracks would not be required to be

equipped for the present, but would

benefit from the higher level of safety

associated with Amtrak operations. As

noted above, other users have already

begun to recognize the value of the

ACSES technology, and eventual

equipping of all NEC users is expected

(but would not be required under this

order).

On the North End, maximum speeds

top out at 110 mph. No waiver exists for

high-speed service. This order would

authorize operation of qualified

trainsets at up to 150 miles per hour in

territory where Amtrak has installed

ACSES on the wayside, provided

Amtrak and other users are equipped.

This authority would apply equally to

the North and South Ends provided the

specified conditions are met.

Speeds over highway-rail crossings

would be limited to 80 mph, the

maximum speed planned under the

NEC program until very recently. This

limit is lower than the 110 mph cap

included in current guidelines for highspeed corridors (absent barrier and

presence detection systems tied into the

signal system). Density of NEC

operations and the increased possibility

that a collision with a motor vehicle

might cause a secondary collision

between trains operating at combined

very high closing speeds suggests the

need for appropriate caution. FRA

reserves the right to allow higher speeds

over individual highway-rail crossings

after demonstration by Amtrak that

appropriate safety measures have been

implemented.

The phrase ‘‘otherwise authorized,’’

as applied to trains, refers to equipment

qualified for higher speeds in track/

vehicle interaction limits proposed in

FRA’s Track Safety Standards NPRM.

Metroliner equipment is currently

authorized to operate up to 125 miles

per hour. FRA anticipates that the new

American Flyer trainsets will be

qualified to operate up to 150 miles per

hour. It is possible that other equipment

presently operating on the NEC might be

qualified to operate at higher than

conventional speeds under the

procedures of the proposed Track Safety

Standards revisions.

At present, specific regulatory action

applicable only to the NEC includes

conditional waiver authority for

operation of Metroliner equipment to

125 miles per hour and requirements for

use of the cab signal/ATC system by all

operators. FRA reserves the right to

merge some or all of these provisions in

the final order. Comment is requested

regarding the appropriateness of doing

so.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

was enacted by Congress to ensure that

small entities are not unnecessarily and

disproportionately burdened by

Government regulations. FRA certifies

that this proposed order would not have

a significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities. As

explained below in the Regulatory

Impact Analysis, the proposed order

would limit its hours of application to

minimize impact on the only small

entity affected, the Providence and

Worcester Railroad.

Paperwork Reduction Act

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act

of 1995 (PRA), Public Law No. 104–13,

section 2, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified

as revised at 44 U.S.C. 3501–3520), and

its implementing regulations, 5 CFR Part

1320, the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) does not need to approve

information collection requirements that

affect nine or fewer respondents. FRA

has determined that information

collection requirements in this proposed

order would affect only five railroads,

and that therefore OMB approval is not

required.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This rule has been evaluated in

accordance with existing policies and

procedures. It is believed that the rule

will be determined to be non-significant

under both Executive Order 12866 and

DOT policies and procedures (44 FR

11034; February 26, 1979). FRA has

prepared and placed in the docket a

regulatory analysis addressing the

economic impact of the proposed rule.

Document inspection and copying

facilities are available at 1120 Vermont

Avenue, 7th Floor, Washington, D.C.

Photocopies may also be obtained by

submitting a written request to the FRA

Docket Clerk at Office of Chief Counsel,

Federal Railroad Administration, 400

Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.

20590.

FRA has analyzed the benefits and

costs of upgrading the signal systems in

the NEC to the ACSES system. The NEC

has many unique aspects, and many of

the economic issues arising in analysis

of this proposal are extremely

complicated. It appears that there would

be significant safety costs were FRA not

to order significant upgrades to the

signal systems in the NEC.

Amtrak and NJT have sound business

reasons for adopting the proposed

transponder-based system, but safety

benefits will also accrue in large

measure to society. FRA estimates that

societal direct safety benefits will be

more than $200,000,000. The system

will cost approximately $95,000,000 (an

amount which will accrue over several

years, approximately $36,000,000 of

which will be imposed directly by this

order, implementing the first phase) so

the net benefit will be approximately

$105,000,000. There will also be

benefits beyond the direct safety

benefits, such as the ability to improve

traffic flow and to divert traffic from

modes with greater societal costs. There

will also be benefits from the

improvement and demonstration of

advanced signal technology.

This proposed order would facilitate

the orderly introduction of enhanced

passenger rail service on the NEC,

consistent with Congress’ statutory

direction. The order would recognize

Amtrak’s investment in development

and deployment of advanced technology

that will enforce civil speed restrictions

and positive stops at key locations along

the railroad. Amtrak is also making

significant investments in a new 9-
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 224 / Thursday, November 20, 1997 / Notices 62107

1Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company and

Transtar, Inc. are referred to collectively as EJE. I

& M Rail Link, LLC is referred to as IMRL.

2The responsive application filed jointly by

NYDOT and NYCEDC purports to be filed both in

STB Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 69) (this

being the sub-number docket reserved by NYDOT)

and in STB Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 54)

(this being the sub-number docket reserved by

NYCEDC). Although there are two responsive

applicants there is only one responsive application,

and we will treat this single application as if it had

been filed in STB Finance Docket No. 33388 (SubNo. 69) only.

3CSXC and CSXT, and their wholly owned

subsidiaries, are referred to collectively as CSX.

NSC and NSR, and their wholly owned

subsidiaries, are referred to collectively as NS. CRR

and CRC, and their wholly owned subsidiaries, are

referred to collectively as Conrail or CR. CSX, NS,

and Conrail are referred to collectively as the

primary applicants.

4The responsive applications filed in STB

Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-Nos. 35, 36, 39, 59,

61, 62, 63, 69, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, and 81) and

the notice of exemption filed in STB Finance

Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 83) are hereinafter

referred to collectively as the ‘‘responsive filings.’’

aspect signal system and improvements

in track and structures that will benefit

all NEC users through more efficient

operations and improved safety.

The proposed order would require

that controlling locomotives (including

electrical multiple-unit vehicles and cab

cars) on the NEC be equipped with onboard ACSES equipment. This burden

would fall on commuter railroads,

freight railroads, and Amtrak, in

proportion to the number of trains those

entities operate on the NEC. A risk

assessment study conducted for Amtrak

and discussed with other NEC interests

in the Northeast Corridor Safety

Committee illustrated the importance of

a more secure train control system in

avoiding any increase in system risk as

train movements and speeds increase on

the North End over the coming decades.

One on-board ACSES unit is expected

to cost approximately $40,000. North

End users exclusive of Amtrak are

expected to require approximately 450

units, for a total cost of about

$18,000,000. Each of these users will

experience direct benefits in safety and

liability avoidance. Potential benefits

could result from higher average train

speeds if the proposed higher levels of

unbalance in the Track Safety Standards

NPRM are adopted.

FRA has considered the proposed

system’s effect on small entities. Only

one small entity, the Providence and

Worcester Railroad (PW), will be

affected. To minimize the impact on this

small freight railroad, FRA will limit the

hours of application of the proposed

order to allow the PW to continue

operations without equipping most of

its fleet with new ACSES units.

Proceedings on This Proposed Order

FRA seeks public comment on this

proposed order and related matters,

including any authorization that may be

required for Amtrak to implement a

modified cab signal system on the NEC.

FRA has placed in the docket of this

proceeding copies of Amtrak’s program

description for the ACSES system,

proposed operating rules for use in

conjunction with the system, and other

related information, including current

Amtrak projections for operating speeds

over highway-rail crossings on the

North End.

No public hearing is presently

planned in this proceeding. However,

FRA will convene such a hearing if a

request is received within 45 days from

publication of this notice. FRA does

intend to convene the Northeast

Corridor Safety Committee following the

close of the comment period to consider

public comments received and provide

advice for resolving remaining issues.

FRA will provide notice of this meeting,

which will be open to the public, and

will include the minutes of the meeting

in the docket of this proceeding.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20501–

20505 (1994); and 49 CFR 1.49 (f), (g), and

(m).

Issued in Washington, D.C. on November

17, 1997.

Donald M. Itzkoff,

Deputy Administrator, Federal Railroad

Administration.

[FR Doc. 97–30505 Filed 11–19–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Surface Transportation Board

[STB Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No.

35) et al.]

CSX Corporation and CSX

Transportation, Inc., Norfolk Southern

Corporation and Norfolk Southern

Railway Company—Control and

Operating Leases/Agreements—

Conrail Inc. and Consolidated Rail

Corporation; et al.

AGENCY: Surface Transportation Board.

ACTION: Decision No. 54; Notice of

acceptance of responsive applications

and related filing.

SUMMARY: The Board is accepting for

consideration the responsive

applications filed: by New York State

Electric and Gas Corporation (NYSEG)

in STB Finance Docket No. 33388 (SubNo. 35); jointly by Elgin, Joliet & Eastern

Railway Company, Transtar, Inc., and I

& M Rail Link, LLC, in STB Finance

Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 36); 1 by

Livonia, Avon & Lakeville Railroad

Corporation (LAL) in STB Finance

Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 39); by

Wisconsin Central Ltd. (WCL) in STB

Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 59);

by Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad

Company (BLE) in STB Finance Docket

No. 33388 (Sub-No. 61); by Illinois

Central Railroad Company (IC) in STB

Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 62);

by R.J. Corman Railroad Company/

Western Ohio Line (RJCW) in STB

Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 63);

jointly by (i) the State of New York,

acting by and through its Department of

Transportation (NYDOT), and (ii) the

New York City Economic Development

Corporation (NYCEDC) in STB Finance

Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 69); 2 jointly

by the Belvidere & Delaware River

Railway (BDRV) and the Black River &

Western Railroad (BRW) in STB Finance

Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 72); by New

England Central Railroad, Inc. (NECR),

in STB Finance Docket No. 33388 (SubNo. 75); by Indiana Southern Railroad,

Inc. (ISRR), in STB Finance Docket No.

33388 (Sub-No. 76); by Indiana & Ohio

Railway Company (IORY) in STB

Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 77);

by Ann Arbor Acquisition Corporation,

d/b/a Ann Arbor Railroad (AA), in STB

Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 78);

by Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway

Company (W&LE) in STB Finance

Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No. 80); and

jointly by Canadian National Railway

Company (CN) and Grand Trunk

Western Railroad Incorporated (GTW) in

STB Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No.

81). The Board is also accepting for

consideration the notice of exemption

filed by GTW in STB Finance Docket

No. 33388 (Sub-No. 83). The responsive

applications filed in STB Finance

Docket No. 33388 (Sub-Nos. 35, 36, 39,

59, 61, 62, 63, 69, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80,

and 81) are responsive to the primary

application filed June 23, 1997, in STB

Finance Docket No. 33388 by CSX

Corporation (CSXC), CSX

Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), Norfolk

Southern Corporation (NSC), Norfolk

Southern Railway Company (NSR),

Conrail Inc. (CRR), and Consolidated

Rail Corporation (CRC).3 The notice of

exemption filed in STB Finance Docket

No. 33388 (Sub-No. 83) is related to the

responsive application filed in STB

Finance Docket No. 33388 (Sub-No.

81).4

DATES: The effective date of this

decision is November 20, 1997.

Comments regarding the responsive

filings must be filed with the Board by

December 15, 1997. Rebuttal in support

of these responsive filings must be filed

with the Board by January 14, 1998.

Briefs (not to exceed 50 pages) must be