ADVANCING 

STRATEGIC THOUGHT 

SERIES

Ambassador Stephen 

Krasner’s Orienting 

Principle for Foreign 

Policy (and Military 

Management) — 

Responsible

Sovereignty 

Max G. Manwaring

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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Advancing Strategic Thought Series

AMBASSADOR STEPHEN KRASNER’S 

ORIENTING PRINCIPLE FOR FOREIGN 

POLICY (AND MILITARY MANAGEMENT)—

RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGNTY

Max G. Manwaring

April 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-526-7
iii

FOREWORD

The principal security threats of the past several 

centuries—war between or among major powers—do 

not have the urgency they once did. Two new types of 

threats have been introduced into the global security 

arena. Violent nonstate actors and other indirect political, economic, and social causes of poverty, social exclusion, corruption, terrorism, transnational crime, the 

global drug problem, and gangs are a few examples of 

“new” threats to global security and stability. Today, 

even more so than in the past, the evolving concept 

of national security implies the protection—provided 

through a variety of nonmilitary and military ways 

and means—of the popular interests that provide for 

the well-being of society. This broadened definition of 

the contemporary security problem makes the concept 

so vague as to render it useless as an analytical tool. 

The genius of Ambassador Stephen Krasner, however, 

helps solve the problem.

He contends that policymakers can aspire to developing grand strategies based on a rational ends, 

ways, and means formula. They rarely succeed, however. The most obvious alternative is no strategy at all, 

or a simple “wish list.” Nevertheless, Krasner argues 

that reliance on one or more orienting principles is a 

second, better, alternative to an impossible to implement grand strategy or wish list. He thus proposes the 

concept of responsible sovereignty (legitimate governance) as the logical orienting principle for foreign 

policy and military management. In these terms, the 

nation-state and its governance (or lack thereof) becomes the primary (dependent) variable and defining 

element in operationalizing the notion of contemporary security. The concept of responsible sovereignty 
iv

makes the resultant security paradigm intellectually 

manageable and analytically useful. If successful, the 

principle of responsible sovereignty would provide a 

viable foundation for a reasonable foreign policy, relevant military management, and a safer and more just 

world. 

Dr. Manwaring, operationalizes and elaborates 

Ambassador Krasner’s orienting principle and generates a legitimate governance security paradigm to 

help policymakers and military managers understand 

why, when, and how to intervene (or not) to protect 

people, prevent egregious human suffering, and assure responsible sovereignty. The author’s analysis is 

cogent, and the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to 

offer this monograph as a part of the ongoing dialogue 

on global and regional security and stability.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING is a Professor of Military Strategy in the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of 

the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), has held the 

General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research at 

the USAWC, and is a retired U.S. Army colonel. He 

has served in various civilian and military positions, 

including the U.S. Southern Command, the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, Dickinson College, and Memphis University. Dr. Manwaring is the author and coauthor of several articles, chapters, and books dealing 

with Latin American security affairs, political-military 

affairs, and insurgency and counterinsurgency. His 

most recent book is The Complexity of Modern Irregular War, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 

forthcoming. His most recent article is “Security, 

Stability, and Sovereignty Challenges of Politicized 

Gangs and Insurgents in the Americas,” Small Wars & 

Insurgencies, December 2011, pp. 860-889. His most recent SSI monograph is The Strategic Logic of the Contemporary Security Dilemma, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2011. Dr. 

Manwaring is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College, and holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Illinois.

vii

SUMMARY

Ambassador Stephen D. Krasner reminds us that 

policymakers in great power nations such as the 

United States can aspire to realizing grand strategies 

based on a rational ends, ways, and means formula. 

They rarely succeed, however. It has proved too hard 

to align vision, policies, and resources. Moreover, 

multiple state and nonstate actors, conflicts, interests, 

changing technological dynamics, and exposure to 

unexpected political, economic, and social shocks are 

too complex for such a rational process. The most obvious alternative to a grand strategy is no strategy at 

all, or a simple “wish list.” Nevertheless, Krasner argues that reliance on one or more orienting principles 

is a second—better—alternative to a grand strategy.

The principle of responsible sovereignty focuses 

on the need to create nation-states capable of legitimate governance within their own borders, and to 

realize stability, security, and well-being for their citizens. Moreover, responsible sovereignty would have 

rhetorical traction; would point to the policy objective 

(i.e., goal, end, or aim) toward which resources might 

be directed; could accept different views about the 

threats to security; and would accommodate different 

policies and approaches to state-building. If that were 

successful, Krasner argues that the principle of responsible sovereignty would provide a viable foundation 

for a reasonable foreign policy and military management architecture, and a safer and more just world. 

Krasner’s responsible sovereignty concept, thus, has 

serious implications for the transition and relevance 

of contemporary and future armed forces and other 

instruments of state power, as well as foreign policy.
viii

To help civilian and military leaders, opinion makers, and interested citizens come to grips analytically 

with the implications and realities of the contemporary security environment, this monograph seeks to do 

four things. First, we briefly define the contemporary 

security dilemma and put the doctrines of the responsibility to protect and the responsibility to prevent into 

the context of the larger principle of responsible sovereignty. Second, we outline the major components 

of a legitimate governance paradigm as the basis for 

Ambassador Krasner’s orienting principle for foreign 

policy and military asset management. Third, we discuss some considerations for foreign policymakers, 

and those individuals responsible for military management, in dealing with indirect and implicit threats 

to stability and human well-being. Fourth, we discuss 

some considerations for military management, and 

those responsible for foreign policymaking, in dealing 

with indirect and implicit threats to stability and citizen well-being. Last, we argue that substantially more 

sophisticated security-stability concepts, policy structures, and decision and policymaking precautions 

based on Krasner’s orienting principle of responsible 

sovereignty are required for the United States to play 

more effectively in the security arena now and in the 

future.
1

AMBASSADOR STEPHEN KRASNER’S 

ORIENTING PRINCIPLE FOR FOREIGN 

POLICY (AND MILITARY MANAGEMENT)—

RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGNTY

The cerebral Ambassador Stephen D. Krasner reminds us that policymakers in great power nations, 

such as the United States, can aspire to realizing grand 

strategies based on a rational ends, ways, and means 

formula. They rarely succeed, however. It has proved 

hard to align vision, policies, and resources. Moreover, 

multiple state and nonstate actors, conflicts, interests, 

changing technological dynamics, and exposure to 

unexpected political, economic, and social shocks are 

too complex for such a rational process. The most obvious alternative to a grand strategy is no strategy at 

all, or a simple “wish list.” Nevertheless, Krasner argues that reliance on one or more orienting principles 

is a second—better—alternative to a grand strategy.1

That reasoning begins with the fact that the principal security threat of the past several centuries—war 

between or among major powers—is gone. Irresponsible governments; poorly governed, failing, and 

failed states; and violent nonstate actors now present 

the greatest threats to global security. Thus, two new 

types of threats have been introduced into the global 

security arena. They are: 1) hegemonic/violent nonstate actors (e.g., insurgents, transnational criminal 

organizations, terrorists, private armies, militias, and 

gangs) that are taking on roles that were once reserved 

exclusively for traditional nation-states; and 2) indirect and implicit threats to stability and human wellbeing (e.g., poverty, social exclusion, environmental 

degradation, and political, economic, and social expectations).2
2

These threats are really not new. What is new is 

that:

• Internal threats are now recognized to have external implications and, thus draw the attention 

of external as well as internal state and nonstate 

actors;

• External and internal international, national, 

and nonstate actors are now understood to be 

acting as new state-making or state-breaking 

institutions, and some hegemonic/violent 

nonstate actors are waging new forms of insurgency that have the potential to radically alter 

the political-economic-social structure and purposes of targeted regimes/governments; and,

• In these terms, the future will likely be dominated by 1) peace enforcement in failing and 

failed states; 2) new violent and nonviolent 

ways and means of profoundly reshaping the 

global political, cultural, and socio-economic 

landscape; and 3) new cognitive attempts to 

achieve unusually high levels of understanding of the holistic political context of a given 

security situation and the roles of the military 

and other instruments of power within it.3

Consequently, General Sir Rupert Smith (United 

Kingdom [UK], Ret.), adroitly observes that “War no 

longer exists . . . war as cognitively known to most 

non-combatants, . . . war as a massive deciding event 

in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.”4

 Western political-military elites have struggled to 

respond effectively to these new realities. Given the 

security dilemma regarding why, when, and how to 

intervene to protect peoples from hegemonic/violent 
3

nonstate actors and indirect threats to human wellbeing, another challenge is to identify an appropriate orienting principle. The intent would be that that 

principle could guide some policies, some of the time, 

rather than aspire to a grand strategy that could align 

overarching goals, policies, resources, and domestic 

and international support all the time. Thus, Krasner 

argues that the principle of responsible sovereignty 

offers the best alternative to a grand strategy in the 

contemporary global security environment.5

Responsible sovereignty focuses on the need to 

create nation-states capable of legitimate governance 

within their own borders, and to realize stability, security, and well-being for their citizens. Moreover, 

responsible sovereignty would have rhetorical traction; would point the policy objective (i.e., goal, end, 

or aim) toward which resources might be directed; 

could accept different views about the threats to security; and would accommodate different policies 

and approaches to state building. If that were successful, Krasner argues that the principle of responsible 

sovereignty would provide a viable foundation for a 

reasonable foreign policy, a military management architecture, and a safer and more just world.6

 Krasner’s 

responsible sovereignty concept, thus, has serious 

implications for the transition and relevance of armed 

forces and other instruments of state power, as well as 

foreign policy.

To help military and civilian leaders and interested citizens come to grips analytically with the implications and realities of the contemporary security 

environment, this monograph seeks to do four things. 

First, we briefly define the contemporary security 

dilemma and put the doctrines of the responsibility 

to protect and the responsibility to prevent into the 
4

context of the larger principle of responsible sovereignty. Second, we outline the major components of 

a legitimate governance paradigm as the basis for 

Krasner’s orienting principle for foreign policy and 

military asset management. Third, we discuss some 

considerations for foreign policymakers—and those 

individuals responsible for military management—in 

dealing with indirect and implicit threats to stability 

and human well-being. Fourth, we discuss some considerations for military management—and those responsible for foreign policymaking—in dealing with 

violent nonstate actors. Last, we argue that substantially more sophisticated security-stability concepts, 

policy structures, and decisionmaking and policymaking precautions—based on Krasner’s orienting 

principle of responsible sovereignty—are required for 

the United States to play more effectively in the security arena now and in the future.

THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY DILEMMA 

AND THE RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGNTY 

ISSUE: TOWARD AN ORIENTING PRINCIPLE 

FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY 

MANAGEMENT

Before World War II, especially in the West, security had been almost exclusively the province of soldiers. Security was a term primarily associated with 

possible or probable threats from other nation-states 

concerning strategic access or denial to raw materials, 

markets, lines of communication, choke points, and/

or national territory. As a corollary, strategy was generally the use of military ways and means to achieve 

those objectives of national policy.7

 In 1996, BoutrosBoutros Ghali, the Secretary General of the United 
5

Nations (UN), described the most important dialectics 

at work in the post-Cold War world as globalization 

and fragmentation. He observed that globalization 

was creating a world that has become increasingly 

interconnected, and a positive force for, inter alia, decolonization, good government, socio-economic development, human rights, and the environment. The 

Secretary General understood, too, that fragmentation 

was acting as a negative force for leading people everywhere to seek refuge in smaller groups characterized by isolationism, separatism, fanaticism, and the 

proliferation of intrastate conflict. He also recognized 

that that kind of fragmentation can act as an important 

cause—related to poverty, social exclusion, and poor 

governance—of state failure. That, in turn, exposes 

the global community to human migration, proliferation of nonstate actors (good and bad), and transnational criminal activity. At the same time, indirect and 

implicit unmet needs (e.g., poverty) lead people into 

greater and greater personal and collective insecurity.8

In response to the Secretary General’s vision of 

contemporary reality, the 2003 Organization of American States (OAS) Declaration on Security included everything the Doctrines of the Responsibility to Protect 

and to Prevent required—and more. The new legitimized external and internal threats list noted corrupt 

governance, extreme poverty, social exclusion, terrorism, transnational crime, the global drug problem, 

illicit trafficking in weapons, trafficking in persons, 

use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), attacks 

on cyber security, natural and man-made disasters, 

other health risks, and environmental degradation as 

threats to global security.9

Thus, we see new threats generated by nonstate 

perpetrators of global violence and a complicated set of 

indirect and implicit threats to international stability, 
6

security, and personal well-being.10 Accordingly, the 

current international security dialogue goes beyond 

traditional national security objectives and focuses on 

“why, when, and how to intervene to protect people 

and prevent egregious human suffering.” This, then, 

encompasses more than a redefinition of security. It is 

nothing less than a redefinition of sovereignty.11

Further Development of the Concept.

What happened then was that in 2009 Professor 

Amitai Etzioni wisely brought the notions of responsibility to protect and the responsibility to prevent together, articulating a principle of sovereignty that explicitly made sovereignty conditional—the principle 

of responsible sovereignty. With that, sovereignty has 

become more than simple control of territory and the 

people in it. Sovereignty is now the responsibility to 

prevent insecurity and instability and protect people 

from governments that do not or cannot protect the 

safety and well-being of their peoples. If governments 

do not exercise the resultant responsible sovereignty, 

they lack legitimacy and forfeit their de facto or de jure

sovereignty.12 This broadened security concept, however, is not new. Professor Etzioni worked from the 

long-existing base of international law that deals with 

intervention for humanitarian purposes. It simply 

interpolates from post-Cold War developments in International Relations and International Law (e.g., Equity Law and the 2003 OAS Declaration on Security) 

in which old rules have proved counterproductive at 

best, and murderous at worst. 

Before and after Etzioni’s thoughtful effort, political forces were at work. Merging the principles 

of protection and prevention appears to have given 
7

way to the principle of the responsibility to protect. 

At present, the related duty to prevent appears to be 

too hard to deal with, and is all but ignored. As examples, Etzioni recalls that Hillary Clinton—during her 

2008 Democratic Party presidential race and reflecting on her husband’s (President Bill Clinton) “Blackhawk down” drama and withdrawal from Somalia in 

1993—promised to operationalize the responsibility to 

protect doctrine in U.S. foreign policy. Then, in 2010, 

UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to enforce a No-Fly Zone in Libya to protect citizens. Subsequently, the Barack Obama administration invoked 

the responsibility to protect principle in its case for intervention in Libya. Since then, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and several Western countries have consistently called on the global community 

to intervene and protect Syrians who are protesting 

against the government of President Bashar al-Asad.13

Yet, since 1993, international politics and international 

law have implicitly made the responsibility to prevent 

an integral part of the responsibility to protect principle. And, as Professor Etzioni warned, contemporary 

sovereignty must be conditional on nation-states conducting themselves in a manner that would prevent 

governments from abusing their populations. Prevention of governments’ abuse of their peoples is a proverbial security dilemma from hell, but the amplified 

responsibility to protect principle (i.e., responsible 

sovereignty)—honed by the preventive aspects of experiences from Mogadishu to Tripoli (and perhaps to 

Damascus)—now appears to be well integrated into 

the concept of responsible sovereignty. 14

Thus, more and more, national security implies 

protection—through a variety of nonmilitary and 

military ways and means—of ambiguous political, 
8

economic, social, and ideological interests that add up 

to popular well-being. Additionally, the contemporary security dialogue stresses that challenges to the 

national well-being are generated by a lack of political, economic, and social development and resultant 

chronic poverty, instability, and violence. Failure of 

a government to protect and provide for the popular 

well-being is what gives a violent nonstate actor the 

opening and justification for its existence and action. 

The primary implication of this broadened concept of 

security is that it is targeted against violent nonstate 

actors, and failing and failed states.15 Violent nonstate 

actors and other indirect political, economic, and social causes of failing states, thus, represent a difficult 

multidimensional nontraditional and complex global 

security conundrum. 

Krasner’s Elusive Holy Grail.

Given the long tradition of war between or among 

nation-states adhering to generally accepted rules and 

practices initiated with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 

it is hard to equate the multidimensional responsibility to protect (responsible sovereignty) concept with 

war or conflict—say nothing of understanding how 

to respond to it. It has been considered too hard, too 

complex, and too ambiguous. This broadened definition of the contemporary security problem makes the 

concept so vague as to render it useless as an analytical tool. The genius of Ambassador Krasner, however, 

helps solve the problem.

The theoretical basis for advocating a single orienting principle (responsible sovereignty) begins with 

Professor David Easton’s now universally accepted 

and radically innovative definition of politics—“the 
9

authoritative allocation of values for a society.” In 

these terms, politics refers to a separable dimension of 

human activity—legitimate governance. The state and 

its governance (or lack thereof) becomes the primary 

(dependent) variable and defining element in operationalizing the concept of contemporary security, and 

makes the concept of legitimate governance intellectually manageable and analytically useful.16 Thomas 

Homer-Dixon, a leading authority in socio-environmental-political studies further elaborates the issue. 

He explains that the role of governance in shaping a 

society’s response to socio-economic-political stressors 

is the critical variable in determining stability or instability, development or nondevelopment, prosperity or 

poverty, and peace or conflict. In short, without the 

guarantee of legitimate state administered control of 

the national territory and the people in it, every other 

form of security is likely to remain elusive.17 Implicitly, then, because of globalization and the extra-porous 

nature of national frontiers, the security of even the 

most powerful nations can be compromised by the 

actions of irresponsible sovereigns (governments), 

violent nonstate actors, and failing and failed states. 

Legitimate governance, then, provides the theoretical foundation for Krasner’s orienting principle for 

foreign policy and military asset management, and a 

“safer and more just world.”18

THE ESSENTIAL ARCHITECTURE FOR A 

FOUNDATION OF MORAL LEGITIMACY

For a fragile or vulnerable government, the highest 

priority must be legitimizing and strengthening the 

state. The data show that there are five salient conditional indicators (i.e., independent variables) of moral 
10

legitimacy that must be implemented by virtually any 

political actor facing the nontraditional and traditional threats and internal violence inherent in the current 

global disequilibrium. These variables are not new in 

discussions dealing with the idea of state legitimacy. 

They reflect traditional theoretical concepts closely associated with the classical political-philosophical (e.g., 

Locke, Mill, Rousseau) notion of legitimacy.19

What is new is, first, the specific combination of 

variables considered to be the most powerful indicators of legitimacy. Second, the interdependence of 

these variables has not often been stressed. Third, the 

interdependence of the legitimacy dimension with the 

other principal components of our general legitimate 

governance-stability paradigm (equation) has not 

been stressed. Fourth, these variables can be used as 

objective measures of effectiveness at the macro level 

for winning or losing in the contemporary conflict 

arena. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this 

model was not conceived a priori. It was developed 

empirically and warrants confidence that the findings 

are universal and explain much of the reality of the 

contemporary security environment.20 The logic of the 

process reminds us that if too many accidents demonstrate the same phenomenon, can you still view them 

as accidents? “No. At this moment, one must admit 

that there is a rule here.”21

The five variables that explain and define the legitimizing and strengthening of the state are: 1) free, 

fair, and frequent selection of leaders; 2) the level of 

participation in or acceptance of the political process; 

3) the level of governmental corruption; 4) the level 

of security and concomitant political-economic-social 

development; and 5) the level of regime acceptance by 

major social institutions. The first indicator of legiti-
11

macy is associated with the philosophical concept of 

popular sovereignty. It is that of free, fair (open and 

transparent) and frequent selection of leaders. In this 

context, free election or selection of leaders means the 

absence of corruption in the process that is used. Free 

and fair selection of leaders also means that the process used must be culturally understood and acceptable to the people involved. It must be remembered, 

however, that elections are not an endpoint. Elections 

are only a first step in building local and national legitimacy. This universal requirement for the selection 

of leaders is a strong indicator—and measure—of 

governmental moral legitimacy. 

The second component and indicator of legitimacy 

is that of individual participation in the political process or individual support of the political process. This 

variable is also associated with the concept of popular 

sovereignty. Although the periodic free and fair selection or election of leaders is an important element in 

defining moral legitimacy, it should not be considered 

by itself as a sufficient indicator. Uncoerced popular 

participation in or acceptance of the political process 

is another key to a foundation of moral legitimacy for 

any given method of governance. Participation or acceptance subsumes the subsequent manifest support 

of the results of that process—and the government—

by a large majority of the governed. Thus, a high level 

of popular support for the political process is another 

strong indicator—and measure—of government legitimacy.

Third, the level of corruption of the political, economic, social, and security organs of a nation-state 

is closely related to the degree of strength or weakness of the state governmental apparatus. Moreover, 

corruption can be a major agent for destabilization. 
12

The corruption phenomenon has a crucial impact on 

a regime’s ability to perform its governing functions 

fairly and equitably. Experience demonstrates that the 

necessity of meeting a specific client’s needs (at the expense of the general welfare), and the intensity of the 

client’s expectations and demands, mitigates against 

legitimate governance—and against any allegiance to 

the notion of the public good or consent of the governed. As such, the level of corruption is one more 

important indicator—and measure—of stability and 

moral legitimacy.

The fourth significant component of moral legitimacy is that of security and political, economic, and 

social development. The reasons are straightforward. 

These elements are the bases for the internal strengthening of the state, developing the capability to protect 

and enhance national interests in an aggressive and 

disorderly world, and developing national and global 

socio-economic well-being. A perceived high level of 

these elements reflects a political system that is responsive to the needs of the governed. Such a system 

is inherently just and stable—and socio-economic development is measureable. 

The fifth and last component of moral legitimacy is 

that of regime acceptance by major social institutions. 

History illustrates that the problems of a society in 

transition and becoming more and more complex (i.e., 

modern) cannot be solved by a central government 

acting alone. This effort requires the cooperation of 

business and industry; urban and rural labor unions; 

educational, religious, and cultural institutions; local, 

regional, and national bureaucracies; security forces; 

and friends and allies. As a consequence, active acceptance of the existing and nascent societal institutions 

of a nation-state and its allies is a reinforcing require-
13

ment for legitimacy. A high level of social acceptance 

is the final indicator—and measure—of moral legitimacy.

All these five indicators of legitimacy in the past 

and the present focus on the moral right of a regime to 

govern. That moral right can be perceived as having 

been originally derived from the governed in the form 

of a “social contract.” The social contract as described 

in traditional political theory is maintained through 

the continuing consent of the governed, and through 

the continuing acceptance of a nation’s social institutions. That consent and acceptance depend on governments providing or creating propitious conditions for 

personal and collective security and the general wellbeing in a morally acceptable manner. If a regime—for 

any reason—breaks that contract, internal and external instability is the likely result.22

These key indicators and measures of moral legitimacy are not exhaustive, but they statistically explain 

a high percentage of the legitimacy phenomenon and 

provide the basic architecture for the common actions 

necessary to assist governments constructively in their 

struggle to survive, develop, and prosper. As such, 

these indicators constitute a strong coherent conceptual framework, or paradigm, from which policy, strategy, and operational efforts might flow. The paradigm 

is equally valid for policymakers of threatened states 

as well as policymakers of major powers supporting 

vulnerable states. The degree to which a political actor 

effectively manages a balanced mix of these five variables enables political competence. At the same time, 

these variables provide the basic foundation for the 

long term, holistic application of proactive political, 

economic, moral, informational, and security actions 

necessary for legitimizing and strengthening, and stabilizing a governing regime.23
14

The Resultant Security Equation. 

The fulfillment of a holistic (multidimensional) 

legitimate governance and stability-security (responsible effective sovereignty) equation (paradigm) consists of three principal elements that are necessary to 

strengthen government through substantive, coordinated improvement in the civil and military bureaucracies, the economy, and the society. They are derived 

from the five variables that define the legitimizing and 

strengthening of the state. The three elements are: 1) 

personal and collective security (coercive capacity); 

2) economic and social justice (infrastructural power; 

and 3) legitimacy (legitimate political competence). 

Responsible effective sovereignty (i.e., S) depends on, 

first, an appropriately coercive police-military capability (i.e., M) to provide an acceptable level of internal 

law and order as well as external security; second, the 

economic ability (i.e., E) to generate socio-economic 

development; and, third, the political competence (i.e., 

PC) to develop a type of governance to which a people 

can relate and support. It is heuristically valuable to 

portray the relationships among these three elements 

in a mathematical formula: S = (M + E) X PC.

The political competence component of the equation is so critical that it merits a multiplier in our proposed equation. The use of the multiplier means that 

the sum of the whole can be substantially altered by 

the elements that constitute national political competence. The ultimate value of the economic and security 

elements of the equation can be reduced to nothing or 

nearly nothing if the political competence component 

is absent or weak—for example, 100 X 0 = 0.24
15

The socioeconomic (i.e., E) component of the legitimate governance-stability equation is generally 

well-understood. As an example, the Brazilian security dialogue has been attempting to define national 

well-being only in terms of economic development 

since the early 1960s. Brazilians and others, including 

U.S. policymakers, have emphasized economic development under the assumption that social and political development and personal and collective security 

would automatically follow. That has not happened. 

Clearly, in Brazil and elsewhere, the key security (M) 

and political competence (PC) components of the 

equation are not as well-understood, developed, and 

implemented as the socio-economic development (E) 

component.25 Nevertheless, the development of political competence upon a foundation of moral legitimacy and personal security is a challenge that must be 

met—the sooner the better. This paradigm, thus, provides general guidelines as to how best to deal with a 

given conflict situation based on the application of the 

three critical action components (i.e., E, M, and PC). 

This, of course, must be done within the context of the 

five variables that define moral legitimacy (legitimate 

governance/responsible sovereignty). None of this 

should be interpreted literally. As with any paradigm, 

it is necessary to grasp the essence and apply the principle. 

Another Cautionary Note.

Another cautionary note should be added here. 

That is, the difficult political problem of creating a 

foundation of legitimacy upon which to build political competence for legitimate governance cannot be 

wished away. It is a problem that ultimately must be 
16

resolved internally by indigenous leaders. Nevertheless, that effort will often require some outside help. 

Thus, when U.S. and global interests are threatened 

by events in a weak and menaced state, the main element of policy and strategy must go beyond promoting simple “democracy” (i.e., the election of civilian 

leaders) to guiding supported leaders in a long-term, 

patient, but firm and vigilant pursuit of moral legitimacy. At the same time, within that context, the illustrious George Kennan would caution us to remember 

that the only test for involvement—whatever its form 

and level—is that of self-interest.26

In this era of geopolitical change, the United States 

has the opportunity and responsibility to redirect 

policy from one that is essentially ad hoc crisis management, and too subject to the whim of television 

coverage and domestic polling, to one that is basically deliberate, proactive, and positive, and to which 

the American people can relate. By emphasizing the 

foundation of moral legitimacy, along with socioeconomic, security, and political competence factors, 

Krasner’s responsible sovereignty orienting principle 

draws on the major currents of U.S. foreign policymaking to provide a logical, feasible paradigm. It is, 

thus, a marriage of Wilsonian idealism with realpolitik.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR FOREIGN 

POLICYMAKERS—AND OTHERS 

In order to infuse some empirical life into the discussion of the principle of responsible sovereignty 

(legitimate governance/moral legitimacy), and note 

some of the pitfalls in the fusion of implicit threats with 

the threats inherent in dealing with violent nonstate 

actors, it is helpful to look at the contemporary global 
17

security arena. We note two unconventional issues associated with contemporary instability and violence, 

poorly or ungoverned populations, and failing and 

failed states. These issues have theoretical (responsible sovereignty) meaning for foreign policymakers 

and also for those responsible for the management of 

military assets. First, we see a compound complex set 

of variables (dimensions) that illustrate some of the indirect and implicit threats to stability and well-being 

that are arguably causes and consequences of instability and possible state failure. Second, we see the differences and similarities in the types of nontraditional 

(nonstate) asymmetric conflict ongoing in the world 

today. Admittedly, putting the indirect and implicit 

social needs issue and the environmental security issue together with the complex and ambiguous violent 

nonstate actor issue into the larger global stabilitysecurity context (responsible sovereignty) generates 

serious analytical and implementation difficulties. 

But, ignoring the problem or hoping it will go away, 

admits defeat and invites even worse. Thus, we begin 

the process of defining the unconventional threats and 

examining the related challenges that foreign policymakers—and others who might be responsible for 

military asset management—might face.

Violent Characteristics of Poorly Governed 

Populations.

The contemporary security dialogue stresses that 

challenges to the national well-being are generated by 

a lack of development and resultant chronic poverty, 

violence, and instability. As a consequence, security 

can no longer be considered in terms of only protecting national territory and interests against outside 
18

military aggressors. Rather, security is being defined 

as stability—and stability depends on the legitimate 

political, economic, and social development of the 

entire global community. The primary implication of 

this broadened concept is that it ultimately depends 

on eradicating the root causes of instability. In these 

terms, ecological degradation is not simply a moral 

humanitarian concern. It is also the root cause of various types and levels of conflict, and poses an indirect 

and potentially serious threat to national well-being 

and international stability. Environmental, as well as 

socio-political-economic problems or stressors, thus, 

represent a nontraditional and complex fundamental 

national security threat that requires a new look at the 

new world disorder.27

The underlying verities and implications of the 

current global security situation are clear. First, the 

world has seen and will continue to see a wide range 

of ambiguous and uncomfortable threats in the gray 

area between conventional war and peace. These conflict threats—observable in transnational organized 

crime, corruption, terrorism, warlordism, insurgency, 

civil war, regional wars, humanitarian problems such 

as disenfranchisement, poverty, racial and ethnic prejudice, large scale refugee flows and famine, and the 

horrors of ethnic cleansing—are the consequences of 

root cause pressures and problems perpetrated and/

or exploited by a variety of internal and global political actors. What these threats have in common is that 

they are motivated and complicated by misguided, 

corrupt, insensitive, incompetent governance, and/or 

no governance. Moreover, the one aspect of conflict 

(war) that remains constant over time is the ultimate 

intent of war. That intent is to compel an adversary to 

do one’s will.28
19

Second, acting separately and together, the conflict 

threats arising out of a lack of legitimate governance 

increasingly undermine the capability of governments 

to govern, to provide meaningful development, and 

to provide adequate and acceptable personal and collective security measures. These instabilities generate further disorder, cause violent internal conflicts 

that resist easy solution, and create mushrooming 

demands by ethnic and regional groups for political 

autonomy. Success in dealing with these challenges 

or threats is not determined exclusively or primarily 

by the results of police or military actions. Instead, 

success in dealing with these instability problems 

depends on a protracted, multistage use of political, 

economic, and moral as well as physical efforts to gain 

influence over or control of the society and its political system. In short, success depends on the ability to 

achieve publically perceived political competence and 

legitimacy.29

Third, in this environment of “unstable peace,” 

legitimacy issues—aggravated by religious, ethnic, racial, ideological, and financial profit motivations and 

coupled with easy access to armaments and external 

state and nonstate support—translate themselves into 

constant, subtle and not-so-subtle struggles for power 

that dominate life in many countries and regions today. These kinds of destabilizing situations become 

opportunities for exploitation by virtually any political actor—large or small, internal or external, national 

or transnational, or conventional or unconventional. 

In this context, legal national boundaries have little or 

no meaning. Additionally, there is: 1) no territory that 

cannot be bypassed or that cannot be used; 2) no national or international laws that cannot be ignored or 

used; 3) no battlefield (dimension of conflict) that can-
20

not be ignored or used; 4) no national, transnational 

or nonstate actor, or international organization that 

cannot be ignored or used; and 5) no type of weapon 

or other means—military or nonmilitary, lethal or 

nonlethal, and direct or indirect—that can be ignored 

or used in some combination.30 The fusion of the fragmenting threats associated with indirect social needs 

and violent nonstate actors means that these nonwar 

threats may be new factors constituting current and 

future warfare, and have implications for the transition and relevance of U.S. and other armed forces now 

and in the future. This also means that military operations will never again be the entire or major part of 

war. Rather, the military dimension of contemporary 

and future war is only one dimension within the totality of military and nonmilitary dimensions.

Fourth, in these terms, the enemy may not necessarily be a recognizable military entity or the traditional 

industrial/technical capability to make conventional 

war. At base, the enemy becomes the individual or organizational political actor that plans and implements 

the kind of violence that threatens national well-being 

and exploits the root causes of instability. In this context, every policy, every program, and every action 

of a “besieged” or failing state and its external allies 

must contribute directly and positively to developing, 

maintaining, and enhancing the ability and willingness of the associate government to exercise effective 

sovereignty by controlling its territory and governing its people in a responsible and morally acceptable manner. This is a major personal and collective 

security issue. That, in turn, is a legitimate governance 

(responsible sovereignty) issue. Again, this concept is 

not new. Classical Western and Eastern theorists have 

articulated this view for at least the past 2,500 years. It 

is probably best stated by Sun Tzu. He warned us that, 
21

“Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means they make their governments 

invincible.”31

Fifth, the days of delineating a successful strategic 

end-state as a short-term material, political, or compassionate objective are over. The American public 

expects U.S. efforts, especially if they involve the expenditure of large amounts of tax revenue and/or the 

expenditure of even a few American lives, to make the 

world a better place. Thus, U.S. and other policymakers have the obligation to go beyond simple short-term 

or compassionate actions, and to advocate and defend 

the principles for which America stands. To do this, 

they must combine realism and pragmatism, as well 

as idealism into the security equation, and help develop an organized and effectively enforced international system for general global peace. In these terms, 

it is necessary to understand that contemporary conflict—-at whatever level—is more a multidimensional 

socio-economic-political-security matter (i.e., legitimate governance security equation) than a unilateral 

military task. 

Lastly, this discussion leads us back to where we 

began—to the central strategic problem of legitimate 

governance in the 21st century that foreign policy and 

military asset management must address. Underlying 

this issue, however, is the problem of failed or failing states and “wars of national debilitation, a steady 

run of uncivil wars sundering fragile but functioning 

nation-states and gnawing at the well-being of stable 

nations.”32 The general task is to apply an orienting principle on the basis of a realistic calculation of 

threats, interests, and resources—in partnership with 

international organizations (e.g., the UN), allies and 

friends.33
22

Political and military leaders and opinion-makers 

all over the world have been struggling with these 

ambiguous political-psychological aspects of war 

since at least the end of the Cold War. Yet, the nature 

of the contemporary conflict/war phenomenon is still 

not well-understood. Many Western leaders tend to 

think of the legalistic and military dictums generated 

from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), and their own 

particular experiences as the only guidelines concerning war that are worth considering. As a result, there 

has been too much military-operational-tactical crisis 

management response to root cause situations that 

do not necessarily have military solutions. The best 

that can be expected militarily is to “keep a lid on the 

situation” and provide a secure and safe environment 

from which socio-economic development and a sustainable peace might be achieved. Strategic theory and 

action have played little part in the debate and actions 

involving contemporary war as a whole. As a consequence, countless people have suffered and died, 

and violence seems to remain the method of choice in 

terms of achieving one’s ends. 

Associated Threat Levels.

Threats must be understood and dealt with on four 

different levels. In these terms, it is helpful to think of 

the results/consequences of instability (e.g., increasing personal violence, strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, 

kidnappings, bank robberies, violent factory takeovers, death squads, bombings, murders/assassinations, criminal anarchy, and the beginnings of terrorism, insurgency, ethnic cleansing, and refugee flows) 

as third level threats to national and international security. Increases in third level instability; growing social 
23

violence, poverty, and disenfranchisement; and lack 

of socio-economic development must be recognized 

as second-level threats to personal and collective security and stability. Increases in third-level instability also 

tend to result in better organized social violence, and 

further socio-economic-political degradation.

The inability or unwillingness of government to 

promulgate and enforce second and third level reforms to 

develop long-term, multidimensional, and principled 

means to maintain and enhance personal security and 

national well-being must be understood as the most 

fundamental first-level threat. Government unwillingness or inability to promulgate necessary reforms and 

provide personal and collective security results in 

further weakening of institutions and infrastructure; 

more internal class and ethnic conflicts; more internal 

and external migration; and terrorism, coups d’ etat, 

warlordism, insurgency, intrastate conflict, and possible external intervention.34

Civilian and military strategic leaders and planners must contemplate all three levels of threat in 

dealing with contemporary fundamental unconventional security-stability matters stemming from ecological degradation, and indirect and implicit socioeconomic problems. At the same time, another threat 

emerges at a fourth level that is both a cause and a 

consequence of instability violence. That is, once an 

internal hegemonic or violent nonstate actor becomes 

firmly established, first-level reforms and development 

efforts aimed at second-level root causes would be insufficient to control or neutralize a third or fourth-level

(e.g., internal conflict over scarce resources, terrorism, 

insurgency, and/or possible external intervention 

through surrogates) threat. Failure to deal effectively 

with worsening socio-economic-political-security 
24

problems results in increasing turmoil, chaos, violence, and possible state failure. State failure, in turn, 

has been known to lead to the violent imposition of 

a radical political-economic-social restructuring of the 

state and its governance in accordance with the values—good, bad, or nonexistent—of the best organized 

and disciplined group left standing.35

What Is To Be Done?

General Sir Robert Thompson reminds us that a 

third or fourth-level violent internal nonstate actor—

regardless of whether or not it is sincerely trying 

to achieve specific political-economic-social-moral 

reforms, working as a proxy or surrogate for the interests of a traditional nation-state, or only trying to 

gain some visceral satisfaction—can only be dealt 

with effectively by a superior organization, a holistic 

and unified national and international approach designed to promulgate deeper and more fundamental 

reforms—and, possibly, very carefully applied deadly 

force. Accordingly, the sum of the parts of an effective 

response equals:

• The recognition at the highest levels of a destabilizing root-cause type responsible sovereignty (legitimacy) problem;

• A sure capability to coordinate (synchronize) 

national and international political-economicsocial-moral security objectives on the first and 

second levels; and, 

• A sure capability to exert morally acceptable effective hard and soft force at the third and fourth 

levels of threat.
25

Otherwise, once again, governments and the international community face the ultimate consequences of 

state failure.36

SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY 

MANAGEMENT—AND POLICYMAKERS

It is hard, but necessary, to discuss separately 

the two highly related issues of indirect and implicit 

threats to stability and security, and nontraditional 

contemporary conflict. Nevertheless, it is useful to 

note a few issues that provide more empirical meaning for military management and foreign policymaking that relate to the orienting principle of responsible 

sovereignty. The intent, here, is to bring attention to 

the implications for the transition and relevance of 

armed forces—and other instruments of power for 

now and the future. In that context, it is important 

to understand that the principle of responsible sovereignty (legitimate governance) depends as much 

on holistic international and domestic policies and 

strategies that provide for political competence (honest uncorrupted governance), social justice, economic 

progress, and personal and collective security as on 

the exercise of traditional police and military power. 

None of this, however, should be understood literally 

in a narrow manner. Again, it is necessary to grasp the 

essence and apply the principle.

Defining the Hegemonic Nonstate Actor Threat: 

A Typology of Contemporary Conflict.

Thanks to the theoretical work of Steven Metz 

and Raymond Millen, we have an excellent typology of contemporary conflict. Contemporary conflict 
26

is divided into four different groupings. The first is 

the most dangerous but most unlikely type of conflict—Conventional War. Conventional War is direct 

interstate aggression using conventional uniformed 

military forces, and generally adhering to traditional 

international norms and law. A relatively recent example would be the Malvinas/Falklands War between 

the UK and Argentina in 1982. 

The second is widespread in terms of geography 

and societies, and appears to be the direct result of 

poor governance or no governance; that is, nonstate 

or Insurgency War. It encompasses direct and indirect 

nonstate vs. state actions. International norms and law 

come into play only when they might be of advantage 

to one insurgent group or another. This is one reason 

why this kind of conflict has been called “unrestricted 

warfare.”37 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been an ongoing example in the 

Western Hemisphere from the mid-1940s to the present.

The third type of conflict is what Metz and Millen 

call Irregular War. Irregular War is differentiated from 

Insurgency War by the fact that the nonstate actor involved is acting as a proxy for a nation-state. Thus, 

Irregular War is, in fact, indirect state vs. state conflict 

(i.e., Proxy War or Surrogate War). Again, international 

norms and law come into play only when they might 

be of advantage to the proxy organization. Irregular 

War, thus, can also be considered unrestricted warfare. Hezbollah as a proxy for Iran in Lebanon vs. Israel in 2006-07 is a good example.

The fourth type of conflict is Intrastate War. Again, 

this type of war appears to be the direct result of poor 

or no governance. It involves nonstate vs. other nonstate actors. It might also involve nonstate vs. state ac-
27

tors, not as insurgents who want to compel a radical 

political change in government, but as nonstate organizations who want to control a government in order 

to have the freedom of movement and action that 

would maximize commercial/economic/ideological/

religious objectives.38 This is what the gang organizations in the Western Hemisphere (e.g., Maras and 

Zetas) and religious-oriented gangs in Iraq have been 

and continue to seek to accomplish. And, once more, 

this is an unrestricted type of war. 

Clearly, fighting insurgencies, irregular wars, and 

trying to impose order on peripheral populations have 

become the predominant types of conflict in the PostCold War world. Undeniably, new and more sophisticated security-stability concepts, political-diplomatic 

structures, and relevant military organization, force 

structure, and training must be developed to play 

more effectively in the contemporary global security 

arena. In these terms, the differences between the various types of contemporary war are important, but so 

are the analytical commonalities. These commonalities 

have proved over the years and throughout the world 

that in unrestricted warfare there is no territory that 

cannot be violated; there is no means which cannot 

be used; and there is no method that cannot be used. 

There are no rules; nothing is forbidden. This is the 

essence of contemporary Unrestricted War.

39

Further Defining the Unconventional Violent 

Nonstate Actor Threat: More Considerations for 

Military Asset Managers and Policymakers.

The basic realities of contemporary conflict have 

been articulated by General Sir Rupert Smith (UK). He 

points out that:
28

The ends for which we fight are changing from the 

hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those 

that establish conditions through which an outcome 

may be decided;

We fight among the people, not on a conventional virtually uninhabited battlefield;

Our conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending; thus, 

time has become an important instrument of power;

We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risk all 

to gain the military objective; 

The sides are mostly nonstate, comprising some form 

of multinational grouping against some nonstate party 

or parties, or vice versa; and,

The center of gravity (the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends40) is no longer easily identified military forces; it is now leadership and 

public opinion.41

It must be emphasized that this kind of war is 

fought against enemies who are firmly embedded in 

the population and cannot present a traditional strategic or operational target. This is because winning a 

trial of military strength that also alienates the population cannot possibly deliver the support of the people. 

Fundamentally, gaining the support of the people is 

the only effective objective of any use of hard or soft 

power in modern conflict. The reality of contemporary conflict is that information—not firepower—is 

the currency upon which war is conducted. As one example, Somalia’s insurgents reportedly use Twitter as 

a weapon.42 Clearly, the new instruments of power are 

intelligence, public diplomacy, the media, time, and 
29

flexibility. These are the basic tools of power that can 

ultimately capture the will and support of the people.43

This means that governments seeking to deal effectively with violent nonstate actors must generate the 

capabilities necessary to deal with a “rhizomatic” command system. Such a command system operates with 

an apparently hierarchical system above ground—visible in the operational and political arenas, and with 

another system centered in the roots underground. It 

is a horizontal system with many discrete groups. The 

system develops to suit its surroundings and purpose 

in a process of natural selection, and with no predetermined operational structure. Its basis is that of the social structure of its locale. The groups vary in size, but 

those that survive and prosper are usually small and 

organized in cells whose members will not necessarily 

know their relationship with, or the membership of, 

other cells. A cell will perform a minimum of three 

tasks: 1) direct and sometimes lead military action; 2) 

collect and hold resources such as money and weapons; and 3) direct and sometimes conduct political 

actions, which can range from bombing train stations 

or discos, to funding schools or electioneering. Cells 

will normally be allowed considerable latitude in the 

methods they adopt to suit the local circumstances—

provided the cell is both successful and no more corrupt than what is condoned by the general movement. 

In all cases, the need for security is paramount.44

The rhizomatic command system is difficult to attack, just as rhizomatic weeds are difficult to eradicate. 

General Smith cautions that rhizomes are eradicated 

by one of three methods: 1) digging them up; 2) poisoning or removing the nutrients from the soil; or 3) 

penetrating the roots with a systemic poison. Cutting 

off the visible heads of rhizomes causes them to lie 
30

dormant for a time—at best. The attack on a rhizomatic command system is done best from all three directions—operations in each direction being conducted 

to complement the others.45 This takes us to the need 

to conduct a “holistic” war with a total unity of effort.

The challenge, here, is to come to terms with the 

fact that contemporary security, at whatever level, is 

at its base a holistic political-diplomatic, social-economic, psychological-moral, and military-police effort. The fundamental mindset must be changed from 

a singular military approach to a multidimensional, 

multiorganizational, and multinational-multicultural 

paradigm. This takes us to the concept of combinations. The two Chinese colonels who authored Unrestricted Warfare, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, are 

adamant. They unequivocally argue that regardless of 

whether a war took place 2,500 years ago or last year, 

the data indicate that all victories or failures display 

one common denominator—the winner is the national 

power, international power bloc, or nonstate political 

actor that is best organized and disciplined, and has 

implemented a combination of multidimensional efforts.46 The French experiences in Vietnam and Algeria are only two examples that attest to the fact that 

the loser is the political actor that ad-hoced a generally 

singular military effort.47

The purpose of combinations is to organize a system of offensive and defensive power that is a great 

force multiplier and facilitator within the global security arena—and would deprive the enemy of the 

same advantages. This system gives new and stronger 

meaning to the idea of a nation-state or other political 

actor using all available instruments of power to protect, maintain, and achieve its perceived political-economic and security interests. That is one reason Qaio 
31

and Wang call this approach “Unrestricted Warfare.” 

The dominating characteristic of a war of this kind is 

political-military, economic-commercial, or culturalmoral. As an example, political-military war must be 

strongly supported by media (propaganda/information/moral) warfare and a combination of other types 

that might include but are not limited to psychological 

war, financial war, trade war, cyber war, diplomatic 

war, proxy war, narco-criminal war, and guerrilla 

war. Examples might include but are not limited to 

the following: Political-Military war/cyber war/media war (e.g., Georgia, 2008); Economic-Commercial 

war/media war/diplomatic war (e.g., the current Syrian situation); and, Cultural-Moral war/media war/

guerrilla war (e.g., Sendero Luminoso in Peru, to date).

Additionally, the general characteristics of contemporary conflict would also include but not be 

confined to the following: limited objectives, unlimited measures, asymmetry, minimal resources, constant multidimensional coordination, adjustments, 

and synchronized control of the entire process, wellschooled strategic civil-military leadership, as well as 

appropriate organizational structure. This is warfare 

in the age of globalization. It requires sophisticated 

and effective organizational architecture that can put 

together a combination of types of war noted above, 

and, ultimately, a mix of hard and soft power that 

equates to what Harvard Professor Joseph Nye calls 

“smart power.”48

Any one of the above types of conflict or combinations can be combined with others to form completely 

new methods and combinations of conflict. There are 

no means that cannot be combined with others. The 

only limitation is one’s imagination. As a consequence, 

politically effective contemporary warfare requires 
32

the services of civilian warriors—as well as professional soldiers and policemen—who can conduct 

persuasion-coercion-propaganda war, media war, 

economic-financial war, insurgency war, chemicalbiological-radiological war, etc. While not even close 

to unimportant, soldiers no longer have a monopoly 

on power. New civilian warriors must be included in 

the strategic architecture for contemporary conflict.49

What More Is To Be Done?

Nye makes the case that although the hard power 

of force is needed in combating violent nonstate actors, the soft power of attraction is required to win 

the hearts and minds of a population (i.e., the “new” 

center of gravity). Thus, smart power describes foreign policy and military management strategies that 

combine the resources of hard and soft power. Soft 

power, more specifically, relies on diplomacy, economic assistance, intelligence, and communications 

(information). But, wielding soft power is difficult because many of its resources reside in civil society, in 

bilateral alliances, multilateral institutions, and civil 

and military transnational contacts. Nevertheless, 

“By complementing military and economic might 

with greater investment in soft power, and focusing 

on global public goods [based on a foundation of responsible sovereignty], the United States [and other 

countries] can build the framework needed to tackle 

tough global challenges.”50

What is being advocated here is of necessity a 

long-term approach that must come after significant 

debate, and long-term decisionmaking and implementation processes. It takes time to reeducate and 

train people, create more synchronizing and relevant 
33

foreign policy and military management institutions, 

and time to build national and international trust. 

Ambassador Luigi Einaudi reminds us that it is not 

enough to know where you want to go. 

You also need to know how to get there. You need 

skilled strategic leadership. And you need friends—at 

home and abroad. Nothing will last unless the interests of all concerned are advanced. In international 

politics, there is no MapQuest where you can punch 

up directions. There is just a lot of hard work with others. Maybe we should call this approach a “diplomatic 

surge,” or a “smart power surge.”51

Some Final Thoughts.

The primary implication of the complex and ambiguous situations described above is straightforward. 

The contemporary, chaotic global strategic environment reflects a general lack of legitimate governance 

and civil-military cooperation in many parts of the 

world. Instability thrives under those conditions. Instability, violence, terrorism, and criminal anarchy 

are the general consequences of unreformed political, 

social, economic, and security institutions and concomitant poor, misguided, insensitive, or corrupt governance. Thus, inept governance is the root cause and 

the central strategic problem in the current unstable 

security arena. Ultimately, this instability—along with 

the human destabilizers who exploit it—lead to a final 

downward spiral into failing and failed state status. 

Nonetheless, we must remember that as important 

as instability might be, it is only a symptom—not the 

threat itself. Rather, the ultimate threat is state failure 

and that stems from a failure to alleviate the various 

manifestations of political, economic, and social injustice that are the root causes of instability.52
34

RECOMMENDATIONS

The realities of the global security environment 

and the fundamental tasks of regeneration and reform 

call for nothing less than a paradigm change. The primary task, then, is to come to terms with the fact that 

contemporary stability, security, and sovereignty, at 

whatever level, is at its base a holistic and long-term 

strategic-political level, and civil-military effort to preserve and enhance individual and collective security 

and stability. The corollary is to change from a singular tactical-operational level military or law enforcement approach to a multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational strategic-political paradigm that 

addresses the legitimate and meaningful preservation 

of stability and sovereignty. That, in turn, requires a 

conceptual framework (i.e., the paradigm outlined 

in the section entitled The Essential Architecture for 

a Foundation of Moral Legitimacy) and an organizational structure superior to current approaches and architecture. The intent is to promulgate unified multilateral civil-military planning and implementation of 

Krasner’s multidimensional responsible sovereignty 

concept. This should be done on the foundation of 

realistic calculations regarding threats, interests, and 

resources in partnership with international organizations, allies, and friends.

Ambassador Einaudi has already reminded us 

that the challenge and task of regeneration and reform 

takes time, and that it also takes time to develop skilled 

strategic civil-military leadership, organizational architecture, and political support at home and abroad. 

It also takes time to think-out and determine how and 

with what resources one might achieve desired legiti-
35

mate strategic political objectives.53 As a consequence, 

it is beyond the scope of this monograph to outline 

specific recommendations. Rather, we will add four 

final cautionary notes.

Final Cautionary Notes.

First, Ambassador Krasner reminds us that policy 

and management based on an orienting principle (responsible sovereignty/legitimate governance) differs 

from one motivated by a grand strategy or “wish list” 

in four ways: 1) an orienting principle focuses on specific limited but actionable issue areas; 2) policy based 

on an orienting principle is distinct from ad hocery—it 

aspires to something beyond short-or medium-term 

material or political interests; 3) the frame offered by 

the principle of responsible sovereignty is that it is 

a necessary condition for peace and prosperity both 

within and among countries; and 4) there may be no 

specific formula (model, paradigm, recipe) that can be 

applied literally in any given situation, because particular local conditions at any given time will dictate 

a given action.54 Thus, the use of innovative combinations of power is an absolute must in contemporary 

conflict situations. 

Second, Professor Etzioni explains that intervening 

powers must also apply the principle of responsible 

sovereignty with the understanding that they cannot 

bring about liberal democratic states overnight. Experience could remind us that social engineering projects are best undertaken by internal actors. Moreover, 

objectives need to be tempered to match both local 

and international political constraints. Outsiders and 

domestic leaders must rely on local customs, politics, 

and practices to establish new institutions that can 
36

move over the long-term toward international norms 

of accountable, legitimate, and democratic governance. At the same time, the earliest phases of an intervention must include a transition strategy; not an exit 

policy. Transition requires clearly delineated political 

and economic milestones, so the international and 

local authorities can focus on the broader long-term 

challenges of reconstruction, political reconciliation, 

socio-economic development, professionalization and 

modernization of the state bureaucracy, and the development of political competence on a foundation of 

moral legitimacy.55 Otherwise, declaring victory, going home, and leaving a country without consistent 

and vigilant guidance tends to result in a sectarian or 

partisan autocracy leading a state into failure and/or 

civil war, or another foreign intervention. Contemporary Iraq is a case-in-point: The United States withdrew from Iraq without a transition strategy and an 

adequate implementing mechanism.

The sectarian majority in government began the 

process of:

• Eroding judicial independence;

• Including a nonstate actor militia in the government; and

• Placing the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of National Security under 

direct control of the Prime Minister.56

This kind of scenario has been known to precipitate regimes that protect themselves rather than the 

people of the country. At the same time, the nation’s 

wealth finds its way into the hands of the political elite 

rather than into the socio-economic development of 

the country.57
37

Third, the ultimate threat of state failure is a process 

not an outcome. The process is brought on by poor, 

irresponsible, corrupt, and/or insensitive governance 

and leads to one other fundamental reason why states 

fail. That is, state failure can be a process exacerbated 

by nonstate groups (e.g., insurgents, transnational 

criminal organizations and their enforcer gangs, and/

or civil or military bureaucracies) that, for whatever 

reason, want to depose an established government or 

exercise illicit control over a given country. Violent 

actions by nonstate groups or even state authorities 

weaken government and its institutions, and they 

become progressively less capable of performing the 

fundamental tasks of governance.58 Somewhere near 

the end of the destabilization process, the state will 

be able to control less and less of its national territory 

and fewer and fewer of the people in it. Nevertheless, 

just because a state fails does not mean that it will 

go away. The diminishment of responsible governance and personal security generate greater poverty, 

violence, and instability—and a downward spiral in 

terms of development and well-being. It is a zero-sum 

game in which nonstate or individual actors (e.g., insurgents, transnational criminal organizations, and 

corrupt public officials) are the winners and the rest 

of the society is the loser. Ultimately, failing or failed 

states become dysfunctional states, dependencies, 

tribal states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, 

“new peoples’ republics,” draconian states (military 

dictatorships), or neo-populist states (civilian dictatorships). Moreover, failing or failed states may possibly dissolve and become parts of other states or may 

reconfigure into entirely new good or bad entities.59

Fourth, the venerable Carl von Clausewitz reminds 

us that war is not a mere act of policy, but a true political instrument of statecraft. The strategic-political ob-
38

jective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and 

ways and means can never be considered in isolation 

from their purpose. Consequently, 

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of 

judgment that the statesman and commander have to 

make is to establish the kind of war in which they are 

embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn 

it into, something that is alien to its nature, . . . This is 

the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.60

The main task, once again, is to begin the longterm strategic-level process of developing the sophisticated expertise, organizational architecture, military 

force structure, and other national and international 

instruments of power appropriate to counter the dual 

threats of hegemonic/violent nonstate actors and indirect and implicit threats to stability and well-being. 

All this must be accomplished with responsible sovereignty as an orienting principle for foreign policy and 

military management.61 None of this is easy or quickly 

accomplished, but better that than the probable murderous alternatives.

ENDNOTES

1. Stephen D. Krasner, “An Orienting Principle for Foreign 

Policy,” Policy Review, No. 163, Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution, 

Stanford University, October 1, 2010, available from www.hoover.

org/publications/policy-review/article/49986. 

2. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, “Global Leadership after the Cold 

War,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, pp. 86-98.

3. John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Rethinking Insurgency, Criminality, Spirituality, and Societal Warfare in the 

Americas,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, December 2011, pp. 742-
39

760. Also see Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 1994; and Max Manwaring, 

The Strategic Logic of the Contemporary Security Dilemma, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 

2011.

4. General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in 

the Modern World, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, p. 3.

5. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 1996.

6. Ibid.

7. Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. 

Korb, American National Security Policy: Policy and Process, 3d 

Ed., Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, p. 3; 

Russell F. Weigley, “The Evolution of Strategic Thought,” in B. 

Thomas Trent and James E. Harf, eds., National Security Affairs: 

Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Issues, New Brunswick, 

NJ: Transaction Books, 1982, pp. 69-71. Also see A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, DC: 

The White House, May 1997; A National Security Strategy for a New 

Century, Washington, DC: The White House, October 1998. Hereafter cited as White House. 

8. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, “Global Leadership,” March/April 

1996, pp. 86-98.

9. Available from www.oas.org/en/sms/docs/DECLARATION%

20SECURITY%20AMERICAS%20REV%201%20-%2028%20

OCT%202003%20CE00339.pdf.

10. Boutros-Boutros-Ghali, “Global Leadership,” 1996.

11. Francis M. Deng, Sovereignty as Responsibility, Washington, 

DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 33; Lee Feinstein and AnnMarie Slaughter, “ A Duty to Prevent,” Foreign Affairs, January/

February 2004, pp. 147-148; and Amatai Etzione, “Responsibility 

as Sovereignty, Orbis, Winter 2006, pp. 1-15.

12. Etzione, “Responsibility as Sovereignty,” 2006.
40

13. Nada Bakri, “UN Human Rights Official Calls for Intervention in Syria,” New York Times, December 3, 2011, p. A4.

14. Amatai Etzioni, “Changing the Rules,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, p. 173.

15. Jordan, 1982; and White House.

16. David Easton, (A former President of the American Political Science Association), The Political System: An Enquiry into the 

State of Political Science, New York: Knopf, 1963, pp. 99; 128-129.

17. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of acute Conflict,” International Security, Fall 1991, pp. 114-115.

18. Krasner, “An Orienting Principle,” 2010, pp. 2-7.

19. See John Locke, Of Civil Government, Chicago, IL: Gateway, n.d.; John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, Chicago, IL: Gateway, 1962; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The 

Social Contract, Charles Frankel, trans., New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1951. 

20. Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, “Insurgency and 

Counterinsurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach,” Small 

Wars and Insurgencies, Winter 1992, pp. 272-310. The model as a 

whole is statistically significant at the .001 level, and predicted an 

impressive 88 percent of the win/loss results of the 69 cases examined. The most salient independent variables defining the legitimacy dimension of the model are derived from a Probit Analysis 

of the data.

21. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing, China: PLA Arts and Literature Publishing House, 1999, p. 

133.

22. Rousseau, The Social Contract, 1951.

23. Krasner, “An Orienting Principle,” 2010, pp. 2-7.
41

24. Max G. Manwaring and Ambassador Edwin G. Corr, 

“Confronting the New World Disorder: A Legitimate Governance 

Theory of Engagement,” in Max G. Manwaring and Wm. J. Olson, eds., Managing Contemporary Conflict, Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, 1996, pp. 40-41.

25. Brazilian national security doctrine provides the basic architecture and the rationale for governmental allocation of values and resources for national well-being. It is the result of work 

done over the years since the early 1960s to the present. The most 

recent authoritative document is Nelson A. Jobim, Gergio W. Etchegoyan, and Joao Paulo Alsina, Seguranca Internacional: Perspectivas Brasileliras (International Security: Brazilian Perspectives), Rio 

de Janeiro, Brazil: Editora FGV, 2010.

26. George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,” Foreign 

Affairs, Winter 1985/86, pp. 205-218.

27. Daniel C. Esty et al., “The State Failure Projects: Early 

Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning,” in John L. 

Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building 

Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Sysems, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988, pp. 27-38. Also see Thomas Homer Dixon, Environment, Security, and Violence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1999, pp. 138-168. 

28. The use of the word compel, rather than force, is key. The 

word force implies military violence. The word compel implies 

that all means than can be brought to bear on a given conflict situation must be used to co-opt, urge, and/or force the enemy to 

bend to one’s will. For a more complete discussion of this North 

American definition of war, based on the concept of war being 

primarily political-psychological, see Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976.

29. Ambassador David C. Miller, Jr., “Structuring Foreign 

Policy in a Post-Cold War World,” in Max G. Manwaring and 

Wm. J. Olson, eds., Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 13-28. 

30. Qaio and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, 1999, pp. 152-169.
42

31. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans, Oxford, 

UK: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 88.

32. Leslie H. Gelb, “Quelling the Teacup Wars,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994, p. 5.

33. Manwaring and Corr, “Confronting the New World Disorder,” in Managing Contemporary Conflict, 1996, pp. 32-34. 

34. See Chap. 10, “The Environment as a Global Stability-Issue,” in Max G. Manwaring, ed., Environmental Security and Global 

Stability, New York: Lexington Books, 2002, pp. 165-181.

35. General Sir Robert Thompson, was one of the first to note 

this phenomenon. Author Interview with General Thompson, 

January 16, 1986, in Washington, DC.

36. Ibid.

37. Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, 1999, pp. 157.

38. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003, pp. 15-17.

39. Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, 1999, pp. 199, 210, 

222.

40. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Peter Paret and Michael 

Howard, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1976, pp. 595-596.

41. General Smith, 2007, pp. 271, 392, 405. Also see Clausewitz, pp. 595-596.

42. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somalia’s Insurgents Embrace Twitter 

as a Weapon,” New York Times, December 15, 2011, p. A14.

43. Ibid., p. 334.

44. Ibid., p. 332.
43

45. Ibid., pp. 332-334.

46. Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, 1999, p. 143-157.

47. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1964, p. 35.

48. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Restoring American Leadership 

through Smart Power,” Global Strategic Assessment, Washington, 

DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, 2009, pp. 474-476.

49. Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, 1999, pp. 38, 154. 

50. Nye, “Restoring American Leadership, 2009.

51. Former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American 

States, Luigi R. Einaudi, “U.S. Smart Power in the Americas: 2009 

and Beyond,” speech given at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, February 11, 2008. 

52. Esty et.al., “State Failure Project,” 1988, pp. 27-38; and 

Homer-Dixon, “Environment, Security,” 1999, pp. 138-168.

53. Einaudi, “U.S. Smart Power,” 2008.

54. Krasner, An Orienting Principle, 2010, pp. 2, 7.

55. Etzioni, “Changing the Rules,” p. 173.

56. Ayad Allowi, Osama al-Neyaifi, and Rafe al-Essawi, 

“How to Save Iraq from Civil War,” New York Times, December 

28, 2011, p. A21.

57. As only one example, note the case of Maummar Qadhafi’s Libya.

58. Steven D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State 

Failure,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, pp. 153-155. Also see 
44

Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003, pp. 32-44.

59. John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars 

Revisited, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006.

60. Clausewitz, On War, 1976, pp. 88-89. 

61. Miller, “Structuring Foreign Policy,” 1996. 
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