In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: April 5, 2021

S21A0422. THOMAS v. THE STATE.

 BETHEL, Justice.

A Fulton County jury found Courtney Thomas guilty of malice 

murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of

his girlfriend, Shevonta Hardwick. Following the denial of his 

motion for new trial, Thomas appeals, arguing that his trial counsel 

provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by withdrawing a 

motion to suppress evidence obtained by the police during a search 

of Thomas’s vehicle. We affirm.1

 1 The crimes occurred on October 31, 2013. On January 28, 2014, a 

Fulton County grand jury returned an indictment charging Thomas with 

malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated 

assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At a 

jury trial held from September 14 to 16, 2016, Thomas was found guilty on all 

counts. The trial court sentenced Thomas to life in prison for malice murder 

and a consecutive term of 5 years in prison for possession of a firearm during 

the commission of a felony. The remaining counts were either vacated by 

operation of law or merged for sentencing. On September 22, 2016, Thomas 
2

1. The evidence presented at trial showed the following.

Thomas and Hardwick lived together in Hapeville in a ground-level

apartment with one of Thomas’s brothers, Dennis Thomas. The 

apartment had a balcony that was about seven feet above the 

ground. Several witnesses, including Thomas, testified that Thomas 

and Hardwick had a good relationship and that there had never 

been any violence, arguments, or aggressive behavior between them.

On the evening of October 30, 2013, Thomas and Hardwick 

were in the apartment alone together. Two upstairs neighbors 

reported hearing three loud bangs, consistent with the sound of

gunshots, coming from an apartment below them around 11:00 p.m.

One neighbor also heard a man and woman arguing inside an 

apartment prior to hearing the bangs. The neighbor testified that it 

was obvious the argument was “turning physical.”

 

filed a motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel on 

November 12, 2019. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, as amended, 

on January 9, 2020, and it denied the motion, as amended, on January 30, 

2020. Thomas filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal on June 8, 2020, which 

the trial court granted that day. Thomas filed a notice of appeal on June 12, 

2020. This case was docketed to this Court’s term commencing in December 

2020 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
3

Dennis had spent the evening at a friend’s house. He came back

to the apartment after midnight and went to sleep. He did not see 

Thomas or Hardwick when he came in. The next morning, Dennis

went into the bedroom that Thomas and Hardwick shared and found 

Hardwick’s body on the floor, against the foot of the bed and facing 

the balcony door. She was unresponsive. Dennis called Marquez 

Higgins, and they both tried unsuccessfully to call Thomas. They 

then called 911.

Hapeville police officers responded to the 911 call and began 

searching the apartment. In the bedroom, they found a receipt for 

the purchase of a firearm in Thomas’s name,2 a broken cell phone

that belonged to Hardwick, four Luger Hornady 9mm shell casings, 

one blood spot on the bed, and a bullet fragment. There were signs 

of a struggle, including clothing and personal items strewn on the 

floor, a broken shower curtain in the adjacent bathroom, and broken 

 2 A salesman from a pawn shop testified that he sold Thomas a Smith & 

Wesson handgun, model SD9VE, in August 2013.
4

wires on the bedroom television.3 It did not appear to the police that 

Hardwick’s body had been moved.

The balcony door was open when Dennis and Higgins came in 

the bedroom and when the officers searched the apartment. Beneath 

the balcony, the officers located a black left-foot Nike sandal that 

Dennis indicated belonged to Thomas. The officers also noticed that 

bushes surrounding the balcony were damaged.

Later that day, a detective from the Hapeville Police

Department obtained a court order directing Thomas’s cell phone 

service provider to release to the police certain data associated with

Thomas’s cell phone, including cell-site location information 

(“CSLI”).4 The detective then worked with the service provider to 

 3 Dennis testified that Thomas and Hardwick normally kept the bedroom 

neat and clean.

4 A “cell site” typically consists of a set of either three or six directional 

radio antennas mounted on a tower, light post, flagpole, church steeple, or the 

side of a building. See Carpenter v. United States, __ U. S. __, __ (I) (A) (138 

SCt 2206, 2211, 201 LE2d 507) (2018). Unless powered off, a cell phone 

continuously scans its environment looking for the strongest signal, which 

generally comes from the nearest cell site. See id. Each time a phone connects 

to a cell site, the connection generates a time-stamped digital record in the 

service provider’s account records that includes the particular cell site and the 

specific antenna activated (“sector” information); such records are known as 

cell-site location information. See id.
5

track Thomas’s cell phone using CSLI as the phone traveled away 

from the Atlanta area to a location on a highway near the border 

between Missouri and Iowa. The detective contacted the Iowa State 

Patrol, stated that Thomas was a murder suspect and was being 

tracked, and gave a description of the vehicle Thomas was thought 

to be driving. Minutes later, an Iowa patrol officer stopped Thomas’s 

vehicle and arrested him without incident.

After obtaining a search warrant, officers from the Iowa State 

Patrol and the Council Bluffs, Iowa, Police Department searched 

Thomas’s vehicle. They found an iPhone; two unfired Luger Hornady 

9mm rounds of ammunition, a disassembled Smith & Wesson 

handgun (model SD9VE),5 an empty 9mm handgun magazine, a 

black handgun holster, clothing, $32 in cash, and a black right-foot 

Nike sandal.

The police searched and photographed Thomas after he was 

arrested. During the search, the police found Hardwick’s bank debit

card in Thomas’s wallet. Records from the bank showed that 

 5 The handgun was found in three separate pieces.
6

Hardwick was the only authorized user of the card and that the card 

had been used on October 31 at a gas station in Tennessee. Thomas 

later admitted using the card to buy gas. Photographs of Thomas

showed that he had a bump on his forehead, a scrape on his elbow,

a swollen ankle, and other minor injuries.

Hardwick’s autopsy revealed that she was shot four times and 

that she died of multiple gunshots to the torso. The manner of her 

death was homicide. The medical examiner recovered three bullets

from Hardwick’s body during the autopsy. There was no soot or 

stippling on Hardwick’s body or clothing, which, according to the 

medical examiner, indicated that she had been shot from at least 

two feet away. The medical examiner also testified that Hardwick 

had a bruise and cuts on her right arm that appeared to have been 

caused at or near the time of her death. Hardwick had entry wounds 

on both her front and back, which were consistent with Hardwick 

turning away as she was being shot. Further, the bullets recovered 

during Hardwick’s autopsy and the bullet and cartridge casings 

found near Hardwick’s body were determined to be Hornady 9mm 
7

ammunition that had been fired from the handgun found in 

Thomas’s car.

Thomas testified at trial. He admitted shooting Hardwick, but 

he claimed he acted in self-defense. He specifically testified as 

follows.

Thomas told the jury that he owned a gun that he often kept 

on the nightstand of the bedroom he shared with Hardwick. He kept 

the gun loaded and “ready to shoot” because he was worried that 

someone could get into the apartment through the ground-level 

balcony. Thomas said that Hardwick owned a .38-caliber handgun 

that he had bought for her, but he did not know where she kept it. 

On the night of the shooting, Thomas and Hardwick got into a 

protracted argument after Hardwick became suspicious that 

Thomas was sending text messages to other women. Their argument 

escalated into a physical confrontation. Hardwick hit him in the 

face, which broke his braces and caused his mouth to bleed. Later, 

Hardwick came into the bathroom and hit him several times. 

Thomas then shoved Hardwick against the bathroom wall. She 
8

began crying, and Thomas apologized. Hardwick then stood up and 

said, “You’re dead.”

Hardwick then began rummaging through her belongings in 

the apartment. In the bedroom, she tried to pull the television from 

the wall, again told Thomas, “You’re dead,” and walked out of the 

room, slamming the door behind her. Thomas could hear her 

opening and closing kitchen drawers, and then Hardwick “busted” 

into the bedroom and again shouted, “You’re dead.” According to 

Thomas, she had her arm raised, and something was in her hand. 

Thomas was sitting on the bed. He grabbed his gun from the 

nightstand and began firing. He fired four shots and stopped firing 

when Hardwick fell to the ground next to the foot of bed. Thomas 

testified that he was not trying to kill Hardwick and was only trying 

to stop her from coming toward him.

Thomas did not check on Hardwick. Rather, he immediately 

grabbed clothes from his closet and ran out of the bedroom through 

the balcony door. He jumped over the balcony rail, went to his car, 

and drove away. As Thomas drove away from the Atlanta area, he 
9

received numerous phone calls and text messages but refused to 

answer because he was “ashamed.” While driving, he called a suicide 

hotline because he considered committing suicide. He said that he 

disassembled the gun and placed its pieces in different parts of the 

car to “sav[e] his life” and that he threw unused rounds of 

ammunition from his gun out of the car as he was driving.6

2. In his sole enumeration of error, Thomas argues that his 

trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by 

withdrawing a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the police 

during the search of Thomas’s car, the location of which was 

determined by the use of “real-time” CSLI that identified the 

location of his iPhone as Thomas was driving. Thomas argues that 

his trial counsel should not have withdrawn the motion because she 

should have been aware of then-existing case law from various state 

and federal courts before the United States Supreme Court’s 

 6 Thomas does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his convictions, and because this case was docketed to the term beginning in 

December 2020, we no longer routinely review that issue sua sponte. See 

Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 391-392 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020).
10

decision in Carpenter v. United States, __ U. S. __ (138 SCt 2206, 201 

LE2d 507) (2018), which generally requires that law enforcement 

obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause in order to 

obtain “historical” CSLI. Thomas argues that had counsel pursued 

the motion to suppress, the evidence obtained from Thomas’s car

after he was located through the use of CSLI would have been 

excluded at trial, or, at a minimum, issues relating to the search 

would have been properly preserved for appeal.

The trial court determined that Thomas’s trial counsel did not 

perform deficiently by not pursuing the motion to suppress. We 

agree.

To prevail on this claim, Thomas

has the burden of proving both that the performance of 

his lawyer was professionally deficient and that he was

prejudiced as a result. To prove deficient performance, 

[Thomas] must show that his trial counsel acted or failed 

to act in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all 

of the circumstances and in light of prevailing 

professional norms. To prove resulting prejudice, 

[Thomas] must show a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have 

been different. In examining an ineffectiveness claim, a 

court need not address both components of the inquiry if 
11

the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.

(Punctuation omitted.) Stuckey v. State, 301 Ga. 767, 771 (2) (804 

SE2d 76) (2017) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 

(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). “A strong presumption exists 

that counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of professional 

conduct.” (Citation omitted.) Ford v. State, 298 Ga. 560, 566 (8) (783 

SE2d 906) (2016).

In October 2015, Thomas’s first trial counsel filed a pre-trial 

motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of Thomas’s 

vehicle following his arrest in Iowa. In that motion, Thomas argued 

that the police had been able to locate Thomas only by unlawfully 

tracking his movements in real time utilizing CSLI. Thomas 

asserted that the surveillance constituted a search under the Fourth 

Amendment and that, although Georgia courts had yet to address 

the issue, the Florida Supreme Court had recently held that 

individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location 

data transmitted from a personal cell phone, even while traveling on 

public roads. See Tracey v. State, 152 S3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014). 
12

Thomas argued that his arrest violated the United States 

Constitution and the Georgia Constitution and that all evidence 

obtained in the arrest and the subsequent search of his car should 

be suppressed.

Thomas’s first trial counsel later withdrew from representing 

him, and Thomas obtained new counsel. At the start of Thomas’s 

trial in September 2016, his new counsel withdrew the motion to 

suppress. Counsel informed the trial court that, after reviewing the 

motion to suppress, discussing it with Thomas, and conducting 

further research, she did not believe there was a legal basis for the 

motion and specifically noted a then-recent decision from the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denying a 

defendant’s motion to suppress CSLI records based on the 

determination that the defendant in that case had no legitimate 

expectation of privacy in those records and that the Fourth 

Amendment was not violated. See United States v. Wilson, No. 1:11-

cr-53-TCB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37320, at *2 (N.D. Ga. March 19, 

2013). Later, at the hearing on Thomas’s motion for new trial, trial 
13

counsel testified that, at the time she withdrew the motion to 

suppress, it was her impression that courts had been split about 

whether a warrant would be required in order to obtain CSLI.

At trial, as noted above, Thomas admitted shooting and killing 

Hardwick and testified at length about the circumstances of the 

shooting. He claimed he did not intend to kill Hardwick and that he 

was acting in self-defense.7 In her opening statement and closing 

argument, counsel argued that Thomas made a “split second” 

decision to shoot Hardwick in self-defense when Hardwick came into 

the bedroom with her arm raised. Counsel emphasized to the jury 

that Thomas then fled from the apartment in a panic and later called 

a suicide hotline and disassembled his gun in order to protect 

himself because he was “distraught.” Counsel also emphasized that 

Thomas had cooperated with the police and was taken into custody 

 7 In addition to self-defense, at Thomas’s request, the jury was instructed 

that it could find Thomas guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense 

of malice murder and felony murder. In her closing argument, without 

conceding that Thomas was guilty, Thomas’s trial counsel referred to the 

voluntary manslaughter charge as another “option” that the jury could 

consider instead of finding Thomas guilty of murder. We express no opinion on 

whether the evidence supported a charge on voluntary manslaughter.
14

without incident.

At the hearing on Thomas’s motion for new trial, trial counsel 

testified that she abandoned the motion to suppress because 

attempting to exclude items seized in the search of Thomas’s car 

would be inconsistent with the self-defense theory she planned to 

pursue at trial. Counsel testified that, in her discussions with

Thomas, he had been “adamant” that he acted in self-defense and 

that counsel believed the evidence obtained in the search of his car 

actually furthered the self-defense theory because it demonstrated 

how “scared,” “panicked,” and “traumatized” Thomas was after 

killing Hardwick.

In light of Thomas’s decision to testify, his detailed testimony 

regarding the circumstances of Hardwick’s shooting, and his 

“adamant” claim to his counsel that he had acted in self-defense, it 

was reasonable for counsel to vigorously pursue a self-defense 

theory at trial and to characterize any evidence at her disposal in 

any way that could advance that theory. Counsel’s testimony at the 

hearing on Thomas’s motion for new trial makes clear that she 
15

believed at the time that, even if there were a legal basis for 

suppressing the evidence found in Thomas’s car, it could be 

advantageous to Thomas’s defense to have the evidence admitted 

because counsel could use it to support the self-defense claim. This 

decision was not objectively unreasonable under the circumstances 

and therefore cannot form the basis of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See Reyes v. State, 309 Ga. 660, 671 (3) (a) (847 

SE2d 194) (2020) (no deficient performance where counsel could 

reasonably determine that best defense strategy was to forgo a 

motion to suppress DNA evidence, welcome its admission, and offer 

a plausible explanation for its presence at the crime scene); Dent v. 

State, 303 Ga. 110, 118 (4) (a) (810 SE2d 527) (2018) (“[A]t the 

motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he wanted 

the video of the custodial interrogation admitted because, in his 

opinion, it assisted his client’s defense. Thus, this was a strategic 

decision which has not been shown to be professionally 

unreasonable.”); Gomez v. State, 301 Ga. 445, 459 (6) (a) (801 SE2d 

847) (2017) (no deficient performance where counsel could 
16

reasonably determine that best strategy was to forgo objection to 

certain testimony and instead use it to challenge the State’s theory 

of the case). Because Thomas has failed to show that his trial counsel 

performed deficiently by withdrawing the motion to suppress, his

claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel fails.8

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

 8 We note that this Court recently held that the exclusionary rule does 

not apply where, before Carpenter was decided, law enforcement officers relied 

on statutory law and then-binding appellate precedent to obtain CSLI without 

a warrant. See Lofton v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (__SE2d __) 2021 WL 536259, 

at *10 (Case No. S20A1101, decided Feb. 15, 2021). Because we hold that 

Thomas’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently because she had a 

reasonable strategic purpose for withdrawing the motion to suppress, we need 

not address whether her decision constituted ineffective assistance of counsel 

related to the merits of the underlying motion.