UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4500

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BROCK CORDERRO LEE CAMPBELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Senior 

District Judge. (1:15-cr-00012-1)

Submitted: February 28, 2017 Decided: March 7, 2017

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christian M. Capece, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Research & Writing Specialist, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Carol 

A. Casto, United States Attorney, Miller A. Bushong, III, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Brock Corderro Lee Campbell appeals the district court’s 

order revoking his supervised release, imposing a 10-month prison 

term, and ordering him to reside in a halfway house for the first 

9 months as a special condition of his 36-month term of supervised 

release. On appeal, Campbell asserts that the district court 

violated his right to due process when it relied on hearsay 

information in imposing his sentence, and that the district court

abused its discretion when it imposed the halfway house condition. 

Upon review of the record, we affirm.

To the extent that Campbell argues the district court violated 

his due process rights by improperly using hearsay testimony when 

sentencing him, we conclude this argument is unavailing. A 

sentencing court may “consider any relevant information before it, 

including uncorroborated hearsay, provided that the information 

has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its accuracy.” 

United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 1103(d)(3) 

(excluding sentencing proceedings from proceedings governed by 

Federal Rules of Evidence). 

Here, the officer who testified at Campbell’s revocation 

hearing gathered information from an informant regarding 

Campbell’s criminal activity before obtaining a search warrant. 
3

While executing the search warrant, the officer seized from 

Campbell’s bedroom a white substance believed to be crack cocaine. 

Campbell’s own admission to using hydrocodone and marijuana while 

on supervised release supports the reliability of the officer’s 

testimony and the court’s conclusion that Campbell had resumed 

dealing drugs after his original term of imprisonment ended. 

Additionally, Campbell had the opportunity to cross-examine the 

officer regarding his findings. The officer’s testimony 

concerning Campbell’s alleged drug dealing while on supervised 

release was sufficiently reliable.

Campbell next argues that the district court erred when it 

imposed as a special condition of his supervised release a ninemonth term in a halfway house. “[W]e review a district court’s 

imposition of special conditions of supervised release for abuse 

of discretion.” United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 509 (4th 

Cir. 2016). 

“A judge has significant flexibility in formulating special 

conditions of supervised release,” including the ability to impose 

a period of community confinement. United States v. Marino, 833

F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2016); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2012)

(granting district court authority to order as condition of 

supervised release “any condition set forth as a discretionary 
4

condition of probation in section 3563(b)”);* 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3563(b)(11) (2012) (providing that district courts may require 

defendants to “reside at . . . a community corrections facility”). 

Courts may order special conditions of supervised release to the 

extent those conditions (1) are “reasonably related” to the offense 

and the defendant’s history, the need to deter criminal conduct, 

the need to protect the public, and the need to provide the 

defendant with treatment or care; (2) “involve[] no greater 

deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve 

those purposes; and (3) are “consistent with any pertinent policy 

statements” in the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(D) (2012).

The record establishes that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion when it included the halfway house condition as 

part of Campbell’s supervised release. Although Campbell does not 

agree that living in a halfway house will provide him with the 

assistance he needs following his release from prison, the record 

shows that the district court relied on the supervised release 

 * The Sentencing Guidelines further provide that “[c]ommunity 

confinement may be imposed as a condition of probation or 

supervised release.” USSG § 5F1.1. “‘Community confinement’ means 

residence in a community treatment center, halfway house, . . . or 

other community facility; and participation in gainful employment, 

employment search efforts, community service, vocational training, 

treatment, educational programs, or similar facility-approved 

programs during non-residential hours.” USSG § 5F1.1, cmt. n.1.
5

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and tied those factors to 

Campbell’s specific circumstances. 

Campbell further argues that living in a halfway house for 

nine months is a significant deprivation of liberty. Yet almost 

every supervised-release condition restricts a felon’s liberty. 

Instead, the line separating a permissible condition from an 

impermissible one depends on whether, given the facts of the case, 

the particular restriction is clearly unnecessary. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Campbell’s confinement in a 

halfway house may be inconvenient for Campbell and his family.

But the condition is not clearly unnecessary, especially given the 

district court’s concern regarding Campbell’s backsliding into 

drug use and his need for a stable living environment to further 

his education and improve upon his job prospects. See United 

States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 875-76 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that 

term of 18 months in halfway house likely complied with 

§ 3583(d)(2)). Thus, the district court acted within its 

discretion when it imposed on Campbell a special condition of 

supervised release concerning the requirement to reside for nine 

months in a halfway house. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation 

judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 
6

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED