[Cite as State v. Hartman, 2011-Ohio-6112.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsTREVOR A. HARTMAN 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

: Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. CT2011-CA-19 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Muskingum 

County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

2010-CR-193 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 21, 2011 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

MICHAEL HADDOX ERIC J. ALLEN 

MUSKINGUM COUNTY PROSECUTOR Law Offices of Eric J. Allen, Ltd. 

27 North Fifth 713 South Front 

Zanesville, OH Columbus, OH 43206 
[Cite as State v. Hartman, 2011-Ohio-6112.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant–appellant Trevor A. Hartman appeals from the imposition of a 

five year prison sentence upon his convictions in the Muskingum County Court of 

Common Pleas on one count of gross sexual imposition of a child under the age of 

thirteen, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) and one count of 

attempted gross sexual imposition of a child under the age of thirteen, a felony of the 

fourth degree in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A)(4) and R.C. 2923.02. Plaintiff-appellee is 

the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE1

{¶ 2} A child, under the age of thirteen, was brought to Genesis Hospital in 

Muskingum County for an infection. The hospital determined that the child had been 

sexually assaulted and that she had a communicable disease. Upon interview, she 

disclosed that the appellant had touched her vagina underneath her clothes. The child 

further claimed that appellant masturbated while he touched her. 

{¶ 3} On September 15, 2010, an indictment was filed in the Muskingum County 

Common Pleas Court, charging appellant with one count of Rape of a person under the 

age of thirteen and one count of Gross Sexual Imposition of a person under the age of 

thirteen. 

{¶ 4} On April 1, 2011, appellant entered guilty pleas to one count of Gross 

Sexual Imposition of a person under the age of thirteen and one count of Attempted 

Gross Sexual Imposition of a person under the age of thirteen. At a sentencing hearing 

 1

 A detailed statement of the facts underlying appellant’s conviction is unnecessary to our 

disposition of this appeal. Any facts needed to clarify the issues addressed in appellant’s assignment of 

error shall be contained therein. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-CA-19 3 

held on May 2, 2011, the trial court merged the two counts for sentencing purposes. 

The state elected to have appellant sentenced on the Gross Sexual Imposition charge 

contained in Count 2 of the Indictment. The trial court thereafter sentenced appellant to 

five (5) years in prison. 

{¶ 5} Appellant timely appeals his sentence raising the following assignment of 

error: 

{¶ 6} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 

THE DEFENDANT TO THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS FOR 

ATTEMPTED [SIC.] GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION.”2

I. 

{¶ 7} In his sole Assignment of Error appellant argues the trial court's imposition 

of a maximum sentence was an abuse of discretion because it failed to consider all of 

the required factors under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. We disagree. 

{¶ 8} In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court of Ohio established a two-step 

procedure for reviewing a felony sentence. State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-

Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124. The first step is to "examine the sentencing court's 

compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine 

whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law." Kalish at ¶ 4. If this 

first step "is satisfied," the second step requires the trial court's decision be "reviewed 

under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Id. 

{¶ 9} As a plurality opinion, Kalish is of limited precedential value. See Kraly v. 

Vannewkirk (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 627, 633, 635 N.E.2d 323 (characterizing prior case 

 2

 We note that appellant was sentenced on the felony of the third degree, Gross Sexual 

Imposition contained in Count 2 of the Indictment, and not Attempted Gross Sexual Imposition, a felony of 

the fourth degree. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-CA-19 4 

as "of questionable precedential value inasmuch as it was a plurality opinion which 

failed to receive the requisite support of four justices of this court in order to constitute 

controlling law"). See, State v. Franklin (2009), 182 Ohio App.3d 410, 912 N.E.2d 1197, 

2009-Ohio-2664 at ¶ 8. "Whether Kalish actually clarifies the issue is open to debate. 

The opinion carries no syllabus and only three justices concurred in the decision. A 

fourth concurred in judgment only and three justices dissented." State v. Ross, 4th Dist. 

No. 08CA872, 2009-Ohio-877, at FN 2; State v. Welch, Washington App. No. 08CA29, 

2009-Ohio-2655 at ¶ 6. 

{¶ 10} Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court of Ohio provides further guidance 

on the issue, we will continue to apply Kalish to appeals involving felony sentencing.

State v. Welch, supra; State v. Reed, Cuyahoga App. No. 91767, 2009-Ohio-2264 at n. 

2; State v. Ringler, Ashland App. No. 09-COA-008, 2009-Ohio-6280 at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 11} In the first step of our analysis, we review whether the sentence is 

contrary to law. In the case at bar, appellant was sentenced on a felony of the third 

degree. Upon conviction for a felony of the third degree, the potential sentence that the 

trial court can impose is one, two, three, four or five years. R.C. 29.14(A) (3). In the 

case at bar, appellant was sentenced to five years. 

{¶ 12} Upon review, we find that the trial court's sentencing on the charge 

complies with applicable rules and sentencing statutes. The sentence was within the 

statutory sentencing range. Furthermore, the record reflects that the trial court 

considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and the seriousness and 

recidivism factors as required in Sections 2929.11 and 2929.12 of the Ohio Revised 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-CA-19 5 

Code and advised appellant regarding post-release control. Therefore, the sentence is 

not clearly and convincingly contrary to law. 

{¶ 13} Having determined that the sentence is not contrary to law we must now 

review the sentence pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. Kalish at ¶ 4; State v. 

Firouzmandi, supra at ¶ 40. 

{¶ 14} In Kalish, the court discussed the affect of the Foster decision on felony 

sentencing. The court stated that, in Foster, the Ohio Supreme Court severed the 

judicial fact-finding portions of R.C. 2929.14, holding that “trial courts have full discretion 

to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to 

make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than 

the minimum sentences.” Kalish at ¶ 1 and 11, citing Foster at ¶100, See also, State v. 

Payne, 114 Ohio St. 3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E. 2d 306; State v. Firouzmandi, 

Licking App. No. 2006-CA-41, 2006-Ohio-5823. 

{¶ 15} “Thus, a record after Foster may be silent as to the judicial findings that 

appellate courts were originally meant to review under 2953.08(G)(2).” Kalish at ¶ 12. 

However, although Foster eliminated mandatory judicial fact-finding, it left intact R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12, and the trial court must still consider these statutes. Kalish at 

¶13, see also State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1; State 

v. Firouzmandi, supra at ¶ 29. 

{¶ 16} Thus, post-Foster, “there is no mandate for judicial fact-finding in the 

general guidance statutes. The court is merely to ‘consider’ the statutory factors.” Foster

at ¶ 42. State v. Rutter, 5th Dist. No. 2006-CA-0025, 2006-Ohio-4061; State v. Delong,
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-CA-19 6 

4th Dist. No. 05CA815, 2006-Ohio-2753 at ¶ 7-8. Therefore, post-Foster, trial courts are 

still required to consider the general guidance factors in their sentencing decisions. 

{¶ 17} There is no requirement in R.C. 2929.12 that the trial court states on the 

record that it has considered the statutory criteria concerning seriousness and 

recidivism or even discussed them. State v. Polick (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 428, 431; 

State v. Gant, Mahoning App. No. 04 MA 252, 2006-Ohio-1469, at ¶ 60 (nothing in R.C. 

2929.12 or the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court imposes any duty on the trial court 

to set forth its findings), citing State v. Cyrus (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 164, 166; State v. 

Hughes, Wood App. No. WD-05-024, 2005-Ohio-6405, at ¶10 (trial court was not 

required to address each R.C. 2929.12 factor individually and make a finding as to 

whether it was applicable in this case), State v. Woods, 5th Dist. No. 05 CA 46, 2006-

Ohio-1342 at ¶19 (“... R.C. 2929.12 does not require specific language or specific 

findings on the record in order to show that the trial court considered the applicable 

seriousness and recidivism factors”). (Citations omitted). 

{¶ 18} Where the record lacks sufficient data to justify the sentence, the court 

may well abuse its discretion by imposing that sentence without a suitable explanation. 

Where the record adequately justifies the sentence imposed, the court need not recite 

its reasons. State v. Middleton (Jan. 15, 1987), 8th Dist. No. 51545. In other words, an 

appellate court may review the record to determine whether the trial court failed to 

consider the appropriate sentencing factors. State v. Firouzmandi, 5th Dist No. 2006-

CA41, 2006-Ohio-5823 at ¶ 52. 

{¶ 19} Accordingly, appellate courts can find an “abuse of discretion” where the 

record establishes that a trial judge refused or failed to consider statutory sentencing 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-CA-19 7 

factors. Cincinnati v. Clardy (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 153, 385 N.E.2d 1342. An “abuse 

of discretion” has also been found where a sentence is greatly excessive under 

traditional concepts of justice or is manifestly disproportionate to the crime or the 

defendant. Woosley v. United States (1973), 478 F.2d 139, 147. The imposition by a 

trial judge of a sentence on a mechanical, predetermined or policy basis is subject to 

review. Woosley, supra at 143-145. Where the severity of the sentence shocks the 

judicial conscience or greatly exceeds penalties usually exacted for similar offenses or 

defendants, and the record fails to justify and the trial court fails to explain the 

imposition of the sentence, the appellate court's can reverse the sentence. Woosley,

supra at 147. This by no means is an exhaustive or exclusive list of the circumstances 

under which an appellate court may find that the trial court abused its discretion in the 

imposition of sentence in a particular case. State v. Firouzmandi, supra. 

{¶ 20} In the case at bar, the court had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation 

report. We also note that we do not know the specific contents of the pre-sentence 

investigation report or victim impact statement as appellant did not make them a part of 

the record. In State v. Untied (March 5, 1998), Muskingum App. No. CT97-0018, we 

addressed the issue of failure to include the pre-sentence investigation report and 

stated: 

{¶ 21} “Appellate review contemplates that the entire record be presented. App. 

R. 9. When portions of the transcript necessary to resolve issues are not part of the 

record, we must presume regularity in the trial court proceedings and affirm. Knapp v. 

Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 197, 400 N.E. 2d 384. The pre-sentence 

investigation report could have been submitted “under seal” for our review. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-CA-19 8 

{¶ 22} “Without the cited information and given the trial court (sic) findings on the 

record, we cannot say appellant’s sentence was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, or ‘contrary to law’.” Id. at 7. See also, State v. Mills (September 25, 2003), 

5th Dist. No. 03-COA-001 at paragraph, 13-15. Appellant has the responsibility of 

providing the reviewing court with a record of the facts, testimony, and evidentiary 

matters that are necessary to support the appellant's assignments of error. Wozniak v. 

Wozniak (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 400, 409, 629 N.E.2d 500, 506; Volodkevich v. 

Volodkevich (1989), 48 Ohio App.3d 313, 314, 549 N.E.2d 1237, 1238-1239. 

{¶ 23} There is no evidence in the record that the judge acted unreasonably by, 

for example, selecting the sentence arbitrarily, basing the sentence on impermissible 

factors, failing to consider pertinent factors, or giving an unreasonable amount of weight 

to any pertinent factor. We find nothing in the record of appellant's case to suggest that 

his sentence was based on an arbitrary distinction that would violate the Due Process 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

{¶ 24} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole Assignment of Error. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2011-CA-19 9 

{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Muskingum County Court 

of Common Pleas, Ohio, is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Wise, J., and 

Edwards, J., concur 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JOHN W. WISE 

 _________________________________ 

WSG:clw 1104 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS 
[Cite as State v. Hartman, 2011-Ohio-6112.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

TREVOR A. HARTMAN : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. CT2011-CA-19 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment 

of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Ohio, is affirmed. 

Costs to appellant. 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JOHN W. WISE 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS