FILED 

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 09/24/98 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-7005

Non-Argument Calendar

 

D. C. Docket No. 97-0967-AH-M

METROPOLITAN LIFE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BRUCE E. LOCKETTE,

Defendant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

 

(September 24, 1998)

Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.
1

 The petition alleged that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1332, because of the diversity of citizenship existing between petitioner and

respondent.

2

 Petitioner submits that we should employ the de novo standard of review in deciding

this case. The standard for reviewing a district court’s exercise of Colorado River abstention,

however, see Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct.

2

PER CURIAM:

I.

The litigation in this case began on April 16, 1997, when respondent, a former employee

of petitioner, brought suit in the Mobile County, Alabama, Circuit Court against petitioner and

three present or former employees of petitioner. The complaint in that case contains six causes

of action, all arising out of respondent’s employment with petitioner.

Respondent brought this state court action in violation of a binding arbitration agreement

that he made with petitioner. That agreement requires that he submit to arbitration any dispute 

arising out of his employment with petitioner. In an effort to compel respondent to arbitrate the

claims asserted in his state court suit, petitioner filed a petition to compel arbitration in the

Mobile Division of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. The

petition invoked the district court’s authority to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 4 of the

Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 4.1

 

On November 4, 1997, before any responsive pleading had been filed by respondent, the

district court decided to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction “in favor of the state court’s

sole exercise of jurisdiction,” and, acting sua sponte, issued an order dismissing the petition. 

After the district court denied petitioner’s motion to alter judgment, petitioner lodged this

appeal.2

 
1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), is abuse of discretion. See Transouth Fin. Corp v. Bell, 149 F.3d

1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998); First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. McCollum, 144 F.3d 1362, 1363 (11th

Cir. 1998). We note that our decision in this case would be the same under either standard.

3

We reverse.

II.

Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the

exception, not the rule. ‘The doctrine of abstention, under which a

District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of

its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the

duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before

it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified

under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where

the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly

serve an important countervailing interest.’

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236,

1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S.

185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1062-63, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959). 

‘In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal [pursuant to the

abstention doctrine] in the event of an exercise of concurrent

jurisdiction, a federal court may . . . consider such factors as the

inconvenience of the federal forum; the desirability of avoiding

piecemeal litigation; and the order in which jurisdiction was

obtained by the concurrent forums. No one factor is necessarily

determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into

account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the

combination of factors counselling against that exercise is

required. Only the clearest of justifications will warrant

dismissal.’

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15-16, 103 S.Ct.

927, 937, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-819, 96 S.Ct. at

1246-47 (citations omitted). In our view, the district court, in balancing these factors, failed to
3

 Moreover, we have twice recently had cause to address this very issue. See Transouth

Fin. Corp., 149 F.3d at 1293 (finding that district court abused its discretion by refusing to

exercise jurisdiction over action brought to compel arbitration); First Franklin Fin. Corp., 144

F.3d at 1365 (“In short, this case is so close to [Moses Cone] . . . that the district court abused its

discretion in abstaining.”).

4

 The contractor predicated the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction on diversity of

citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

4

give proper weight to its “obligation to exercise jurisdiction.” In particular, the court apparently

overlooked the fact that Moses Cone is on all fours with the case at hand and, thus, controlled its

decision.3 

Moses Cone involved a dispute arising out of the performance of a construction contract. 

The litigation began, as here, in state court, when the owner, a hospital, sued its contractor and

its architect. The contract between the hospital and the contractor contained an arbitration clause

that bound those parties to arbitrate the dispute. The architect, however, was not a party to that

agreement; thus, he was amenable to suit by the hospital.

Like the petitioner did in the instant case, the contractor filed a petition in federal district

court under Section 4 of the FAA to compel arbitration.4

 The hospital moved the court to

abstain from exercising its jurisdiction because, as here, the issue whether the controversy was

arbitrable was also before the state court. The district court granted the motion, and the

contractor appealed. 

The court of appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the

case with the instruction that the district court order arbitration. Mercury Construction

Corporation v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 656 F.2d 933, rehearing denied, 664 F.2d 936

(4th Cir. 1981). On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed. Addressing what appears to have
5

been the main reason why the district court in the instant case abstained – the avoidance of the

piecemeal litigation that would result if respondent’s claims against the individual defendants

were resolved in state court while his claims against petitioner were resolved in federal court (if

arbitration were ordered) -- the Supreme Court said this:

 The Hospital points out that it has two substantive disputes here –

one with Mercury, concerning Mercury’s claim for delay and

impact costs, and the other with the Architect, concerning the

Hospital’s claim for indemnity for any liability it may have to

Mercury. The latter dispute cannot be sent to arbitration without

the Architect’s consent, since there is no arbitration agreement

between the Hospital and the Architect. It is true, therefore, that if

Mercury obtains an arbitration order for its dispute, the Hospital

will be forced to resolve these related disputes in different forums. 

That misfortune, however, is not the result of any choice between

the federal and state courts; it occurs because the relevant federal

law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to

an arbitration agreement. Under the [FAA], an arbitration

agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other

persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the

arbitration agreement. If the dispute between Mercury and the

Hospital is arbitrable under the Act, then the Hospital’s two

disputes will be resolved separately – one in arbitration, and the

other (if at all) in state-court litigation. Conversely, if the dispute

between Mercury and the Hospital is not arbitrable, then both

disputes will be resolved in state court. But neither of those two

outcomes depends at all on which court decides the question of

arbitrability. Hence, a decision to allow that issue to be decided in

federal rather than state court does not cause piecemeal resolution

of the parties’ underlying disputes. Although the Hospital will

have to litigate the arbitrability issue in federal rather than state

court, that dispute is easily severable from the merits of the

underlying disputes.

Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 19-20, 103 S.Ct. at 939. Here, respondent’s claims against the

individual defendants in the state court suit are “easily severable from the merits of”

respondent’s dispute with petitioner. Moreover, as the petition to compel arbitration asserts, “the
6

remaining defendants in the underlying Circuit Court action . . . are not indispensable parties to

the determination of arbitrability by this Court.”

III.

In conclusion, we REVERSE the district court’s order dismissing petitioner’s petition to

compel arbitration, and instruct the district court, on receipt of our mandate, to grant the relief

the petition seeks. 

SO ORDERED.