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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

Chie f Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED OCTOBER 22, 2002
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

v No. 121355
 

JOHN V. JONES,
 

Defendant-Appellant.
 

PER CURIAM
 

Defendant has applied for leave to appeal from the Court
 

of Appeals order directing the trial court to immediately
 

revoke his bond. He argues that his pending application for
 

a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court is an “appeal” for
 

the purpose of MCL 770.8, so that he remains entitled to be
 

free on bond. We hold that an application for a writ of
 

habeas corpus is not an appeal within the meaning of MCL
 

770.8. We thus affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
 
I
 

In 1999, defendant conditionally pleaded guilty1 to a
 

charge of possessing 225 or more grams, but less than 650
 

grams, of cocaine in violation of MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(ii), and
 

the court sentenced him to a seven-and-one-half to thirty-year
 

term of imprisonment. The plea agreement permitted defendant
 

to appeal the legality of a search warrant that led to the
 

discovery of the cocaine. The agreement also permitted
 

defendant to remain free on bond “pending appeal.” The trial
 

court accepted the plea, sentenced defendant in accordance
 

with the agreement, and entered an order that permitted him to
 

be free on bond of $50,000 or ten percent pending appeal.
 

The Court of Appeals denied defendant’s application for
 

leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented.2
 

This Court also denied leave to appeal.3 Defendant then
 

petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
 

1Conditional pleas are permitted under MCR 6.301(C)(2)


(permitting conditional pleas to preserve for appeal specified


pretrial rulings and entitling the defendant to withdraw his


plea if the specified pretrial ruling is overturned on


appeal); see also People v Reid, 420 Mich 326; 362 NW2d 655
 

(1984).
 

2Unpublished order, entered August 30, 2000 (Docket No.


228299).
 

3463 Mich 976; 623 NW2d 599, reconsideration den 463 Mich


976 (2001).
 

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certiorari, which it denied.4
 

The prosecutor then moved in the trial court to revoke
 

defendant’s bond. While that motion was pending, defendant
 

filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
 

pursuant to 28 USC 2254. The prosecutor argued before the
 

trial court that the federal habeas corpus proceeding was an
 

independent civil action rather than a continuation of direct
 

appellate review, and that the trial court therefore no longer
 

had authority to continue bond. The trial court denied the
 

prosecutor’s motion, but increased defendant’s bond to
 

$100,000. 


The prosecutor then filed an emergency application for
 

leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
 

reversed and ordered the trial court to immediately revoke
 

defendant’s bond and remand him to the custody of the
 

Department of Corrections.5 Defendant then filed in this
 

Court an application for leave to appeal and a motion for stay
 

of proceedings. We denied the motion for stay while we
 

4Jones v Michigan, 534 US 954; 122 S Ct 354; 151 L Ed 2d
 

267 (2001).
 

5Unpublished order, entered April 4, 2002 (Docket No.


239673), clarified, unpublished order, entered April 22, 2002


(clarifying that the prior order had immediate effect under


MCR 7.215[F][2]).
 

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considered the application for leave to appeal.6 We now
 

affirm.
 

II
 

Defendant argues that he is entitled to remain at liberty
 

during the pendency of his application for a writ of habeas
 

corpus because the federal proceeding is an appeal for the
 

purpose of MCL 770.8.
 

This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation
 

that we review de novo. Lesner v Liquid Disposal, Inc, 466
 

Mich 95, 99; 643 NW2d 553 (2002).
 

MCL 770.8 provides: 


During the time between the trial court
 

judgment and the decision of the court to which an


appeal is taken, the trial judge may admit the


defendant to bail, if the offense charged is
 

bailable and if the offense is not an assaultive
 

crime as defined in section 9a of this chapter.
 

This provision permits bail only during the process of
 

appeal. The statute does not define the word “appeal,” so we
 

may consult a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the term.
 

Consumers Power Co v Public Service Comm, 460 Mich 148, 163,
 

n 10; 596 NW2d 126 (1999) (citing MCL 8.3a). The Legislature
 

requires that “technical words and phrases, and such as may
 

have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,
 

6644 NW2d 762 (2002).
 

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shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar
 

and appropriate meaning.” MCL 8.3a. Because “appeal” is a
 

legal term of art, resort to a legal dictionary to determine
 

its meaning is appropriate. See Consumers Power, 460 Mich
 

163. An “appeal” is “[r]esort to a superior (i.e.,
 

appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior (i.e.,
 

trial) court or administrative agency. A complaint to a
 

higher tribunal of an error or injustice committed by a lower
 

tribunal, in which the error or injustice is sought to be
 

corrected or reversed.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed). 


This definition does not describe the instant
 

relationship in which state courts are not “inferior” to or
 

“lower” than federal courts, and federal courts are not
 

“superior” to or “higher” than state courts. Rather, such
 

courts constitute separate systems of justice. 


28 USC 2254 does not grant federal courts the power of
 

appellate review of state court convictions. Rather, it
 

provides for an original proceeding in a federal court
 

challenging the custody of a person who is detained under a
 

judgment of a state court. It sets forth a process of
 

“application” for a writ and denominates one who seeks a writ
 

as an “applicant” rather than an “appellant.” In short, the
 

statute does not provide for direct or appellate review of the
 

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state court judgment of conviction and sentence. 28 USC
 

2254(a)-(h).
 

Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has
 

explained:
 

The whole history of the writ—its unique


development—refutes a construction of the federal


courts’ habeas corpus powers that would assimilate


their task to that of courts of appellate review.


The function on habeas is different. It is to test
 

by way of an original civil proceeding, independent


of the normal channels of review of criminal
 

judgments, the very gravest allegations. State
 

prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas


corpus only upon proving that their detention


violates the fundamental liberties of the person,


safeguarded against state action by the Federal


Constitution. [Townsend v Sain, 372 US 293, 311­

312; 83 S Ct 745; 9 L Ed 2d 770 (1963), overruled


in part on other grounds Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 504


US 1; 112 S Ct 1715; 118 L Ed 2d 318 (1992).]
 

Similarly, Michigan case law has long distinguished
 

applications for the writ of habeas corpus from appeals from
 

criminal proceedings: 


Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding the main


purpose of which is to cause the release of persons


illegally confined, to inquire into the authority


of law by which a person is deprived of his
 

liberty. Application for the writ of habeas corpus


is not made in the criminal proceedings; it is made


in a new and independent civil action instituted to


enforce a civil right, the right to liberty.
 

[People v McCager, 367 Mich 116, 121; 116 NW2d 205


(1962)(citations omitted).] 


See also In re Palm, 255 Mich 632, 634; 238 NW 732 (1931)
 

(“The writ of habeas corpus cannot function as a writ of
 

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error”).
 

A federal district court considering an application under
 

28 USC 2254 is simply a trial court exercising original
 

jurisdiction over an application for a writ authorized under
 

federal law. See 28 USC 1331. That its habeas corpus
 

jurisdiction permits it, under carefully defined
 

circumstances, to scrutinize state court proceedings for
 

alleged violations of the United States Constitution and
 

federal laws does not transform the federal district court
 

into a superior appellate court with jurisdiction to reverse
 

the judgment of a prisoner’s conviction. Rather, its power is
 

limited to granting a writ that compels the release of the
 

prisoner from unlawful detention.
 

Accordingly, we hold that an application for a writ of
 

habeas corpus does not constitute a criminal “appeal” within
 

the meaning of MCL 770.8. A court’s authority to grant a bond
 

under MCL 770.8 is limited to the time during the appellate
 

process, and federal habeas corpus proceedings are not a
 

continuation of that process. 


III
 

For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the
 

Court of Appeals.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and
 

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MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
 

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