J-S12006-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM MARVIN HALL 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2282 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 10, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0004596-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 08, 2020

Appellant, William Marvin Hall, appeals from the order dismissing his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the background of this case as follows:

On August 27, 2013[,] Appellant admitted to having sexual 

intercourse with a minor under the age of 16 between June and 

October 2011, and pleaded guilty to two counts of Statutory 

Sexual Assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. §3122.1). See Commonwealth v. 

Hall, CP-15-CR-0002018-2012; Guilty Plea Colloquy, 08/27/13. 

Appellant was sentenced by the Honorable William P. Mahon as 

follows: (1) Incarceration for 11.5 months to 23 months on the 

first count of Statutory Sexual Assault, (2) Incarceration for 11.5 

months to 23 months on the second count of Statutory Sexual 

Assault concurrent to the first count, and (3) Megan’s Law Lifetime 

Registration requiring notification of any change of address to the 

Pennsylvania State Police. [Appellant did not file a direct appeal. 

Subsequently, on January 8, 2014, Appellant filed a PCRA petition, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S12006-20

- 2 -

and PCRA counsel was appointed. The PCRA court dismissed the 

petition on July 7, 2014. Appellant did not appeal the PCRA court’s 

determination.]

Appellant was paroled on April 6, 2015 to the City Gate 

Mission (“the Mission”). It was reported to Appellant’s parole 

officer that Appellant had left the Mission on May 29, 2015[,] and 

never returned. No forwarding address was provided to the 

Pennsylvania State Police as required pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

4915.1. Although Appellant had met with law enforcement after 

May 29th and explained his absence from the Mission, his place of 

residency remained uncertain and he failed to report any 

information related to his residency. He was arrested on June 14, 

2015 and charged with failure to register his residence as required 

under Megan’s Law. Appellant was found in violation of the 

registration requirements by Judge Mahon on September 3, 2015.

Appellant was again paroled on September 10, 2015[,] and 

registered his residency at the Atkins Mission Shelter (“the Atkins 

Mission”). However, Appellant failed to appear for a required 

mental health evaluation and physical. Upon further 

investigation, it was determined that he failed to return to his 

registered address at the Atkins Mission. Appellant was located 

by law enforcement at the Brandywine Hospital on October 1, 

2015. Upon his release from the hospital, he could not be located. 

On October 12, 2015, law enforcement located Appellant and 

determined that he had been residing with three minor girls ages 

14, 16, and 17.

Appellant was charged with violations of Megan’s Law, 

including his Failure to Register. Appellant entered into an open 

plea agreement on May 9, 2016[,] to one count of Failure to 

Register, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §4915.1(a)(2).2 This court sentenced 

Appellant to 18 months to 36 months of incarceration. No postsentence motion or an appeal was filed.

2 This conviction is the basis of the above captioned 

matter[, CP-15-CR-0004596-2015].

Appellant filed the pending PCRA Petition on April 30, 2018. 

PCRA counsel was appointed[. On July 20, 2018, PCRA counsel 

filed an amended petition titled: “Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act and/or Habeas Corpus 

Relief under Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
J-S12006-20

- 3 -

and/or Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.”1 This] court 

subsequently dismissed Appellant’s PCRA Petition on July 10, 

[2019].

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/18/19, at 1-3.

Appellant filed this timely appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the Common Pleas Court err in denying Appellant’s Petition 

for Post-Conviction Relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act 

and/or Habeas Corpus Relief under Article I, Section 14 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution and/or Motion to Correct Illegal 

Sentence filed July 20, 2018?

2. Did the Common Pleas Court err in finding that it lacked 

jurisdiction to decide the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief under 

the Post–Conviction Relief Act and/or Habeas Corpus Relief under 

Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and/or 

Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence filed July 20, 2018?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we 

consider the record “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the 

PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant did not file a concurrent pro se PCRA petition at trial court docket 

CP-15-CR-0002018-2012. Accordingly, PCRA counsel’s amended petition was 

filed only under the instant trial court docket, i.e., CP-15-CR-0004596-2015. 

Furthermore, Appellant is no longer entitled to the appointment of counsel for 

PCRA petitions filed at trial court docket CP-15-CR-0002018-2012 because he 

previously filed a PCRA petition and received appointed counsel. See 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en 

banc) (stating, “a criminal defendant has a right to representation of counsel 

for purposes of litigating a first PCRA petition through the entire appellate 

process”).
J-S12006-20

- 4 -

2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of 

record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is 

free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 

2016). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no 

support for them in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 

1095, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Initially, we must determine whether this matter is properly before us. 

We begin by considering whether the PCRA court accurately considered 

Appellant’s petition to be a PCRA petition.

The scope of the PCRA is explicitly defined as follows:

This subchapter provides for an action by which persons convicted 

of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal 

sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action established 

in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining 

collateral relief and encompasses all other common law 

and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist 

when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus 

and coram nobis. This subchapter is not intended to limit the 

availability of remedies in the trial court or on direct appeal from 

the judgment of sentence, to provide a means for raising issues 

waived in prior proceedings or to provide relief from collateral 

consequences of a criminal conviction.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (emphasis added).

The plain language of the statute demonstrates that the Pennsylvania 

General Assembly intended that claims that could be brought under the PCRA 

must be brought under that Act. Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 

1235 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis in original). Where a defendant’s claims “are 
J-S12006-20

- 5 -

cognizable under the PCRA, the common law and statutory remedies now 

subsumed by the PCRA are not separately available to the defendant.” Id. at 

1235 (citations omitted). By its own language, and by judicial decisions 

interpreting such language, the PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining 

state collateral relief. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 

1999) (citations omitted). Thus, it is well settled that any collateral petition 

raising issues with respect to remedies offered under the PCRA will be 

considered to be a PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779 A.2d 578, 

580 (Pa. Super. 2001).

The question then is whether the particular claim at issue in Appellant’s 

petition, i.e., Appellant’s allegation that he is serving an illegal sentence, is a 

claim available to him under the PCRA. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

under the Post-Conviction Relief Act and/or Habeas Corpus Relief under Article 

I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and/or Motion to Correct Illegal 

Sentence, 7/20/18.

We have reiterated that “the PCRA statute is intended as the sole means 

of collaterally challenging a sentence.” Commonwealth v. Concordia, 97 

A.3d 366, 372 (Pa. Super. 2014). In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 

516 (Pa. Super. 2011), this Court held that a defendant’s motion to correct 

an illegal sentence was properly addressed as a PCRA petition, stating broadly, 

“[A]ny petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will be 

treated as a PCRA petition.” Id. at 521.
J-S12006-20

- 6 -

Appellant’s petition, filed on April 30, 2018, raises a challenge that is 

cognizable under the PCRA regardless of the caption of the filing. Accordingly,

Appellant is precluded from seeking relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus

and/or a motion to correct illegal sentence. Therefore, the PCRA court 

properly considered he April 30, 2018 pleading as filed under the PCRA. Thus, 

the PCRA court had no authority to entertain the claim except under the 

strictures of the PCRA.

We next address whether Appellant satisfied the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA. A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of 

the date that the judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct 

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 

States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time 

for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). This time requirement is 

mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in 

order to reach the merits of the petition. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 

79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).

However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to 

the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and 
J-S12006-20

- 7 -

(iii), is met.2 See Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (to properly invoke a statutory exception to the one-year timebar, the PCRA demands that the petitioner properly plead all required 

elements of the relied-upon exception).

As previously noted, Appellant’s judgment of sentence in the abovecaptioned matter was entered on May 9, 2016. However, Appellant did not 

file a direct appeal. Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became 

final on June 8, 2016, thirty days after the time for filing a direct appeal with 

this Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (providing that “a judgment 

becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review 

in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”); Pa.R.A.P. 

____________________________________________

2 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
J-S12006-20

- 8 -

903(a). Thus, Appellant had until June 8, 2017, to file a timely PCRA petition. 

The instant PCRA petition filed on April 30, 2018, is patently untimely.

As stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA petition, his petition 

may be received under any of the three limited exceptions to the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts 

one of these exceptions, he must file his petition within sixty days of the date 

that the exception could be asserted.3 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

Appellant appears to argue that the “newly recognized constitutional 

right” exception to the time-bar under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) applies herein. 

However, Appellant’s argument fails to satisfy this exception by arguing that 

the registration requirement imposed upon him pursuant to the Sexual 

Offenders Notification Act (“SORNA”) is unconstitutional under our Supreme 

Court’s July 19, 2017 decision in Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (holding SORNA’s 

registration provisions are punitive and retroactive application of SORNA’s 

provisions violates the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution).

Regarding this exception, our Supreme Court explained:

____________________________________________

3 On October 24, 2018, the General Assembly amended section 9545(b)(2), 

extending the time for filing a petition from sixty days to one year from the 

date the claim could have been presented. 2018 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2018-

146 (S.B. 915), effective December 24, 2018. The amendment applies only 

to claims arising one year before the effective date of this section, which is 

December 24, 2017, or thereafter. Here, Appellant’s alleged claim arose on 

July 19, 2017, the date that the decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 

A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), was filed. Therefore, the amendment is inapplicable 

because the decision in Muniz preceded December 24, 2017.
J-S12006-20

- 9 -

Subsection (iii) of Section 9545(b)(1) has two requirements. 

First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right 

that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time provided in this 

section. Second, it provides that the right “has been held” 

by “that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must 

prove that there is a “new” constitutional right and that the right 

“has been held” by that court to apply retroactively. The 

language “has been held” is in the past tense. These words 

mean that the action has already occurred, i.e., “that court” 

has already held the new constitutional right to be 

retroactive to cases on collateral review. By employing the 

past tense in writing this provision, the legislature clearly 

intended that the right was already recognized at the time 

the petition was filed.

Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646, 649-650 (Pa. 2007) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 812 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. 2002)) 

(emphases added).

We have held that Muniz created a substantive rule of constitutional 

law that must apply retroactively in timely PCRA proceedings. 

Commonwealth v. Rivera–Figueroa, 174 A.3d 674, 678 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

Thereafter, in Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402 (Pa. Super. 2018), 

appeal denied, 195 A.3d 559 (Pa. 2018), we stated the following:

[W]e acknowledge that this Court has declared that, “Muniz

created a substantive rule that retroactively applies in the 

collateral context.” Commonwealth v. Rivera-Figueroa, 174 

A.3d 674, 678 (Pa. Super. 2017). However, because Appellant’s 

PCRA petition is untimely (unlike the petition at issue in RiveraFigueroa), he must demonstrate that the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court has held that Muniz applies retroactively in order to satisfy

section 9545(b)(1)(iii). See [Commonwealth v.] AbdulSalaam, [812 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. 2002)]. Because at this time, 

no such holding has been issued by our Supreme Court, Appellant 

cannot rely on Muniz to meet that timeliness exception.
J-S12006-20

- 10 -

Murphy, 180 A.3d at 405-406. Thus, in Murphy we concluded that the 

substantive rule recognized in Muniz does not establish a timeliness exception 

to the PCRA.4 Hence, no exceptions apply to exempt Appellant from failing to 

meet the timeliness requirement of the PCRA.5

In conclusion, because Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely and no 

exceptions apply, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the issues 

presented and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 

398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear 

untimely petition). Likewise, we lack the authority to address the merits of 

any substantive claims raised in the PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

4 Even if Appellant could rely on Muniz to establish a timeliness exception, his

petition had to have been filed within sixty days of the decision, or by 

September 18, 2017. It was not filed until over seven months later, on April 

30, 2018. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Consequently, for this additional reason, 

Appellant would not be entitled to invoke the timeliness exception.

5 To the extent Appellant attempts to argue that the PCRA court had 

jurisdiction to address his claim under Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 

57 (Pa. 2007) (granting relief outside of the PCRA pursuant to an exception 

to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505), Appellant’s Brief at 27-29, we observe that Holmes is 

distinguishable because the issue addressed in Holmes concerned whether 

the trial court could modify a sentence sua sponte. The Holmes Court did not 

address whether a claim by a PCRA petitioner that his sentence is illegal could 

overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements inherent in the PCRA.
J-S12006-20

- 11 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/8/2020