The Honor able De nny Chin, United St ates District Judge f or the Southern District of * New Y ork, sitting by

designation. 00-2527-pr J ones v. Armstrong
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT SUM M AR

Y O RD ER R U L I N G S B Y S U M M A R Y OR D E R D O N OT HA V E P RE CE DE N T I A L E F F E C T . C I T A T I ON T O A S UM M ARY O RDE R FI L E D ON OR AF T E R J ANUARY 1 , 2 0 0 7 , I S P E RM I T T E D AND I S GOVE RNE D BY FED ERA L R U LE O F A PPELLA TE PR O C EDU R E 32 . 1 AN D TH I S C O U R T’ S LO C A L RU LE 32 . 1. 1. W H EN C I TI N G A S U M M A R Y O R D E R IN A DO C U M ENT FI LED W I TH TH I S C O U R T, A PA R TY M U ST C I TE E I T HE R T HE F E D E R A L A P P E N D I X OR A N E L E C T R ON I C D A T A B A S E ( W I T H T HE N OTAT I ON “ S UM M ARY ORDE R” ) . A PA RT Y CI T I NG A S UM M ARY O RDE R M US T S E RVE A COP Y OF I T ON ANY PA R TY N O T REPR ESENTED BY CO U N SEL. At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 1 day of st Marc h, two thousand ten. Pr e se nt: ROBERT A. K ATZ MANN, GERARD E. LYNCH,

Circuit Judges , DENNYCHI

N, District Judge
. *

________________________________________________ ME LVI N JON ES, Petitioner-Appellant ,

v. No. 00-2527-pr J OHN J. ARMS TRONG,

Respondent-

Appellee
.

________________________________________________ F or Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt: S AL L Y W AS S ER MAN , New Y ork, NY-2-

For Def endant- Appellee : J O ANNE S U LIK , Senior Assistant State’s Attorney , Offic e of the Chief State’ s Attorney , Civil L itigation B urea u, Roc ky Hi ll, CT Appea l from the United States District Court for the District of Connec ticut (Drone y , J. ). ON CO NSI DE RA TIO N W HEREOF , i ti s h e r e b y OR DE RE D , AD JU DG ED , and DE CREED that th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

be and he reby is AF F IRM ED
. Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt M e lvi n Jon e s is c ur

re ntl y se rv inga lif e se nte nc e fo llo wi nghis
c onvic tio n f

or c a pit a l murd e r a

nd c arr yinga pis tol wi tho ut a

pe rm it. Jone s c ha lle ng e d h is conviction on direc t reviewin state court a nd his conviction was af

firmed by the Connecticut Appellate Court. The Connecticut Supreme Court de clined to exercise its discre tionary revie w. Jone s n owpe tit ion s f

or a writ o f h a

be a s c or pu s in fe de ral c ourt . We a ssume the pa rt ie s’ familiarity

with the fac ts and proce dural history of the c ase. On a pp e a l, t he pa rt ie s a gre e that Jone s f

a ile d to e xha

us t hi s st ate c ourt

re me die s w ith respe ct to five of the claims he now a sserts bec ause he did not present those c laims to the Conne c tic ut S up re me Court . T he pa rt ie s a lso a gre e that th e se fi ve c la ims are pr oc e dura lly defa ulted beca

use state c ourt reme dies are no longe r ava ilable. The pa rties, howeve r, disagree
over whether

J ones ca n demonstrate c ause a

nd prejudice for his proc edura l defa ult or can show
a c tua l inno c e nc e su c h th at w e may re vie w h is c on sti tut ion a l c la ims . We c on c lud e that he c ann ot. “Where a def

endant ha s proce durally

defa ulted a cla im by

failingto raise it on direc t
re vie w, the c la im m ay

be ra ise d in

ha be a s o nly if the de fe nd ant c an f

ir st d e mon str ate e ith e r c a us e and ac tual prejudice , or that he is ac tually innocent.” Bousley v . United States , 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) ( internal c itations and quotation marks omitted). “[T] he existence of c ause f or a-3-

proce dural de fault must ordinarily turn on whethe r the prisone r ca n show that some objective fac tor external to the def

ense impede d . . . eff

orts to comply

with the State’s proc edura l rule.” Murray v . Carrier , 4 77 U. S. 4 78 , 4 88 (1 98 6) ; see Coleman v . Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1 9 9 1 ) ( “‘ cau s e’ un d er

th e c au s e an d

p re j u d i ce t es tmu s tb e s o m eth i n g exte rnal to the petitioner, something that cannot fa irly be attributed to him”). E x amples of c ause inc lude a “ showingthat the fa c tua l or

le g a l ba sis fo r a

c la im w a s n ot r e a so na

bly ava ila ble to c ouns e l, o r t

hat so me interfe renc e by

officia ls made complianc e imprac ticable.” Murray , 477 U.S. at 488 (interna l
c itatio ns and

qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . Ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l in

vio latio n o f t

he Sixth Amendment is also ca

use for proce dural de fault. Id . at 488. J ones proc edura lly

defa ulted by failingto raise his substantive constitutional claims to the Connecticut Supreme Court. He argues that he c an esta blish cause on two ba ses. Fir st, he contends that his own inef fec tiveness in repr esentinghimself pro s eestablishes ca use. Second, he asse rts that the state’s unc onstitut ional failure to provide him, pursuant to Bo un ds v . S mi th , 430 U.S. 817 (1977), with ade quate a cce ss to the courts and the a ssistance of c ounsel nec essar y to e ff e c tuate his pro s ee nd e avo rs e sta bli sh e s c a us e . N e ith e r b a sis su c c e e ds
. J o n es ’s o wni n ef

fe ct i v en es s wh i l e p ro ce ed i n g pro s edo e s n ot c on sti tut e c a us e fo r h is p ro ce d ura l d ef au l tb ec au s e i ti s n o t“s o m eth i n g exte rnal to the petitioner, somethingthat cannot be fa irly attributed to him.” See Colem an , 501 U.S. at 753. It is, in fact, pre cisely the opposite, a conclusion that many

courts have rea ched. See , e.g. , Bonilla v. Hurley , 3 70 F .3 d 4 94 , 4 98 (6 th Cir . 2 00 4) (p e r c ur iam) ; Ha rri s v . M c Ad or y , 3 34 F .3 d 6 65 , 6 68 (7 th C ir . 2 00 3) ; Sherron v. Nor ris , 6 9 F .3 d 2 85 , 2 89 (8 th C ir . 1 99 5) . M or e ov e r, Jone s’ s atte mpt s to ana log ize his c a se to
on e wh e re c ouns e l ha s p ro vid e d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e , a nd the re fo re c a

us e is e sta

bli sh e d, a lso-4-

fail. The Supre me Court has held that “ a def endant who e lects to repr esent himself c annot there afte r complain that the qua lity of his own def

ense a mounted to a denial of

eff ective assistance of counse l.” Fa re tta v . Ca lif or nia , 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). F urther, Jones was not entitled to eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel in his petition for discr etionary

revie w, se eRo ss v . M

off itt , 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (“ We do not believe that the Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e re qu ir e s N or

th C aro lin a

to p ro vid e re sp on de nt w ithc ouns e l on his dis c re tio na

ry a pp e a l to the State Sup re me Court .” ), and a pe tit ion e r c ann ot d e mon str ate c a us e based on the ineffe ctiveness of his counsel wher e he w as not entitled to eff ective a ssistance, Coleman , 501 U.S. at 752-53. L ike wi se , Jon e s’ s a sse rt ion that he wa s n ot p ro vid e d a de qu ate a c c e ss t o th e c ourt s pursuant to Bo un ds v . S

mi th does not establish ca use. In Bo un ds v . S

mi th , the Supreme Court he ld t hat th e fu nd ame nta l c on sti tut ion a l r ight o f a c c e ss t o th e c ourt s r e qu ir e s p ri so n a uth or iti e s to assist inmates in the prepa ration and f

iling of me aning ful leg al pape rs by providingprisoners with adequate law libra

ries or a dequate assistance from per sons trained in the law . 430 U.S. at 828. Bounds is gro un de d in the Court ’s ac c ess to the courts jurisprude nce, how ever , and does not establish that “the State must enable the prisoner to dis c ov e r grieva

nces, a nd to lit iga te
e ffe c tiv e ly once in c ourt.” Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). Jone s’ s Bounds c la im f

a ils on the me ri ts. As an in iti a l matte r, Jone s d oe s n ot e xpla in how the assistanc e that he w as entitled to but did not rece ive re sulted in his procedura l defa ult. Instead, he seems to re ly

on the fa ct that he de faulted to a rgue that he c ould not have re ceive d adequate assistance . This is not enough. “ To establish a [ Bounds ] vio latio n, [pe tit ion e r] mus t de mon str ate that th e a lle g e d s ho rt c omi ng s in the lib ra ry or le g a l a ssi sta

nc e pr ogra

m hi nd e re d h is-5-

eff orts to pursue a le g al claim.” Bourdon v. Loughren , 386 F.3d 88, 93 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (interna l quotation marks and a lterations omitted). J ones has not demonstrated that he wa s not “fur nish[ ed] . . . with the capa bility of bring ing his c halleng es bef ore the courts.” See id. at 98. Th e burd e n is on

Jone s to e sta

bli shthat th e ina de qu a c y

of the le g a l r e so ur c e s ma de ava ila ble to him ma de it i mpo ssi ble fo r h im t o a c c e ss t he c ourt s to ra ise his c la ims . Y e t de sp ite le ngthy po stconviction litigation in the state c ourts and the a ble assistance of counse l on this appeal, he ha s been una ble to explain how any

alleg ed insuffic iency

of those re source s preve nted him from pr e se nti ngto t

he Conne c tic ut S up re me Court the ve ry argume nts he ha d c le arl y art ic ulate d in

his int e rm e diate state a

pp e a l. Mo re ov e r, the sta

te satis fi e d Jon e s’ s r ight o f a c c e ss t o th e c ourt s b y a pp ointin ga

pp e llate counsel not just once but twice . Yet, Jones fired counse l on both occasions. “[T]he appointment of counse l can be a valid mea ns of fully

satisfying a

state’s c onstitut ional obligation to provide prisoners . . . with ac cess to the c ourts.” Id . at 94. While in Bourdon , this Court “ex press[ed] no view as to whe ther the a

ppointment of counsel could a dequate ly protec t the right of ac cess to the courts of a

defe ndant who has, in a ccor dance with Fa re tta , exercised his Six th Amendment right to waive c ounsel and c onduct his own defe nse,” id. at 94 n.9, J ones, who wa s repr esente d by counsel at trial, challeng es his right of ac cess on a ppeal, whe re he had no Six th Amendment right to repre sent himself, se eMa rti ne z v . Co ur t of

Ap pe als of C

al. , F ou rth Ap pe lla teDi

st. , 5 28 U. S. 152, 163 (2000). J ones also asse rts that, despite his proce dural de fault, he ma y raise his c onstitut ional claims in fede ral c ourt bec ause he can de monstrate that he is a ctually innocent. “[I ]n an extraordinary

case , wher e a c onstitut ional violation has probably resulted in the c onviction of one-6-

who is actua lly

innocent, a f

eder al habe as cour

t may grant the writ even in the a bsence of a showingof ca

use for the proc edura l defa

ult.” Murray , 477 U.S. at 496. “To be cre dible, such a
c la im r e qu ir e s p e tit ion e r t o s up po rt his a lle g atio ns of

c on sti tut ion a l e rr or

wi th n e w r e lia

ble evidenc e—whe ther it be e x culpatory scientific e vidence , trustworthy eyewitness ac counts, or critica l phy sical evide nce—that was not prese nted at trial.” Sc hlu p v . D e lo , 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). Such a

claim may

not be “ba sed on trial evide nce, [wher e] courts presume the jury resolved e videntiary

disputes rea sonably

so long a s sufficient e vidence supports the verdic t.” Ho us ev . B e ll , 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). Jones has not presente d any new e vidence that was not prese nted at his trial. Instead, he argues that the jury place d too much emphasis on the testimonial evidence and not enough emphasis on the phy sical evide nce. T his does not make out
an a c tua l inno c e nc e c la im a llo wi ngthi s Co ur t to dis re g ard

Jone s’ s p ro c e dura l de fa

ult
. We have c onsidered the rema inder of Jones’s arguments and conc lude that they lack merit. Acc ording ly , for the f oreg oing r easons, the judgment of the district cour t is hereby AF F IRM ED
. FOR THECOURT: CA TH ERI

NE O’ HA GA

N WO L F E, CL ERK