Bessie Jean Peete v. Maryland Elizabeth Peete, No. 2098, September Term 2021. 

Opinion by Wells, C. J.

FAMILY LAW — BIGAMY— STANDING TO ANNUL

Vacating a judgment of divorce leaves the parties to the divorce action still married. If one 

of the parties remarries, the second marriage is void, because it is bigamous. Further, in 

this unique circumstance, the aggrieved spouse has standing to seek to annul the second 

marriage because it is a bigamous union.

FAMILY LAW — BIGAMY— STANDING TO ANNUL — LACHES

Even though a party may have standing to annul a bigamous union, the equitable doctrine 

of laches may apply, particularly when, as here, the allegedly aggrieved party waited at 

least 13, and plausibly, almost 20 years to challenge her husband’s remarriage and did so 

admittedly not to vindicate her marital rights, but solely for financial gain.
* At the November 8, 2022, general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a 

constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 

to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. CAD2019363

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND*

No. 2098

September Term, 2021

______________________________________

BESSIE JEAN PEETE

v.

MARYLAND ELIZABETH PEETE

______________________________________

Wells, C.J.,

Arthur,

Harrell, Glenn T., Jr.

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Wells, C.J.

______________________________________

Filed: March 1, 2023
Bessie and Author Peete were married in 1971. They later divorced, at which time 

Author married Maryland.1 After Author’s death many years later, Bessie had the divorce 

judgment declared void, and then filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 

County to annul Author’s second marriage. The circuit court dismissed Bessie’s complaint 

on grounds that she lacked standing. Bessie timely appealed, raising the following two 

issues, which we have rephrased for clarity2: 

I. Did the circuit court err in holding that Bessie lacked standing to bring 

a complaint to annul Author’s second marriage to Maryland? 

II. Does laches bar Bessie’s complaint for an annulment?

We hold that Bessie had standing to bring a complaint for annulment, but we conclude,

under the unique circumstances of this case, that laches bars her complaint. Accordingly,

we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court on alternative grounds, consistent with 

this opinion.

1 Because the three people involved here, Author, Bessie, and Maryland, have the 

same last name, for ease of understanding we shall refer to them by their first names. We 

mean no disrespect by using the parties’ first names.

2 Bessie had stated her appellate issues as follows:

1. Did the Circuit Court err in deciding that improper notice of divorce 

proceedings, and subsequent revocation of the DC Superior Court 

divorce decree was insufficient to create a bigamous relationship 

which would require the Circuit Court to overturn (find void) the 

marriage between A[u]th[o]r Peete and Maryland Peete?

2. Is 21 years too late to correct an error regarding bigamous marriage?
2

BACKGROUND

On January 18, 1971, Bessie and Author were married in Washington, D.C. but

separated in the spring of 1975. Roughly 15 years after they separated, on April 9, 1991, 

Author filed a complaint for absolute divorce in the Superior Court for the District of 

Columbia. Bessie did not file an answer, nor did she appear at the subsequent divorce

hearing, during which the court took testimony from Author and the parties’ son. Finding 

that the parties had lived apart since the spring of 1975 without cohabitation, the court 

granted Author a default judgment of absolute divorce from Bessie. 

On June 13, 1992, several months after Author obtained the judgment for divorce, 

he married Maryland in Prince George’s County, Maryland. The two remained married 

until Author’s death about 15 years later, on September 9, 2007. Upon his death, the 

Orphans’ Court for Prince George’s County appointed Maryland executor of Author’s 

estate. 

On November 18, 2011, roughly twenty years after the 1991 judgment for divorce 

and four years after Author’s death, Bessie filed a motion in the Superior Court for the 

District of Columbia to vacate the judgment of divorce based on improper and ineffective 

service of process. Author was designated the plaintiff; Bessie the defendant; Maryland, as 

executor of Author’s estate, was served with a copy of the motion. Bessie alleged she had 

not received the complaint for absolute divorce. She believed she was still married to 

Author and claimed to have had marital relations with him up to the time of his death.

Bessie argued that service was ineffective because the person who signed the certificate of 
3

service, Cynthia Williams, was a minor in 1975 and did not reside in her home, as required 

by the D.C. Superior Court Rules governing service. 

A hearing followed on July 19, 2012. The court admitted into evidence an affidavit 

of proof of service that was filed on April 12, 1991, attesting that Bessie had been served 

with the divorce complaint by certified mail on April 10, 1991. The affidavit was 

accompanied by a “green card” signed by Williams, attesting that she was Bessie’s 

roommate and she had accepted the certified mail containing the complaint and summons. 

Williams testified that when she accepted the certified mail and signed the accompanying 

affidavit, she was 16 years old, dating Bessie’s son, and living in New Jersey. Williams 

testified that she lived with Bessie two or three years later when she married Bessie’s son. 

Williams further testified that it was possible she gave the certified mail to Bessie after 

signing for it, but she did not remember doing so. Bessie testified that Williams never lived 

with her. 

Because the D.C. Superior Court Domestic Relations Rule governing service

requires a third person signatory to reside with the recipient and finding that Williams did 

not reside with Bessie at the time of the service, the court ruled that service was defective

and the divorce judgment void. On July 30, 2013, the D.C. Superior Court issued a written 

order vacating the judgment for divorce.

3

 

3

In its written order, the D.C. Superior Court stated that it was making no findings 

or conclusions regarding the validity of Author’s subsequent marriage to Maryland because 

that question was not before the court. Although the court noted that “a void judgment

cannot acquire validity because of laches[,]” the court stated that if laches were to apply it 

would “almost certainly provide a valid defense to this Judgment.” The court believed that

 (Continued)
4

Roughly nine years later, on December 7, 2020, Bessie filed a complaint in the 

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County seeking to annul the marriage between Author 

and Maryland on grounds of bigamy, in other words, that Author was still legally married 

to Bessie when he married Maryland. Bessie admitted that the purpose of her action was 

to obtain a share of Author’s pension. Following a hearing, a magistrate issued a report and 

recommendation, concluding that Bessie did not have standing to annul the marriage 

between Author and Maryland. On August 9, 2021, Bessie filed exceptions. Following two 

exceptions hearings, the circuit court issued a memorandum and order holding that the 

magistrate’s findings and conclusions were not clearly erroneous. The court then overruled

Bessie’s exceptions and entered judgment for Maryland. Bessie has filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

In this appeal Bessie advances two arguments.4 First, she argues that contrary to the

circuit court’s holding, she has standing to annul the marriage between Author and 

Maryland because a bigamous marriage is void, not voidable. Next, she argues that,

because Author’s bigamous marriage to Maryland was void, not voidable, the circuit court 

Bessie’s claim that she was not aware of the divorce was “wholly” not credible based on 

the credible testimony of Author’s children; the listing of Maryland as the surviving spouse 

in the probate proceedings by Author’s children; Bessie’s actions following the divorce; 

and evidence that Bessie and Maryland had interactions related to Author’s children from 

his first marriage during his second marriage. The court also did not find credible Bessie’s 

uncorroborated claim that she and Author continued to have sexual relations after the date 

of their divorce. 

4 Maryland has not filed an appellate brief. 
5

erred in suggesting that the almost 21-year delay between the 1991 judgment for divorce 

and her 2011 filing to vacate that judgment would bar her annulment action. 

I. Standing to Annul

Standard of Review

A court of equity has jurisdiction in an action for annulment of a marriage or 

divorce. Md. Code Ann., Family Law Art (“FL”) § 1-201(b)(3), (4). “We review a circuit

court’s determination of standing for clear error.” Moulden v. State, 212 Md. App. 331, 

344 (2013) (citing Joyner v. State, 87 Md. App. 444, 451 (1991) (“The circuit court’s ruling 

on the standing issue is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.”)).

The Circuit Court’s Ruling

The circuit court’s memorandum and order began with citation to three Maryland 

statutes regarding marriage. FL § 2-201(b), provides that “[o]nly a marriage between two 

individuals who are not otherwise prohibited from marrying is valid in this State.” 

Criminal Law § 10-502(b) provides that a person may not marry another while lawfully 

married to a living person. FL § 2-202 provides that certain types of marriages are void in 

Maryland and then lists various prohibited degrees of affinity and consanguinity. Bigamy 

is not mentioned. 

Given this statutory law, the circuit court reasoned that at the time Author married 

Maryland there was no legal prohibition to the marriage. Author and Maryland were not 

within any degree of lineal or collateral consanguinity; they both consented to the marriage; 

there was no evidence of fraud; and Author possessed a valid divorce decree. Placing great 

weight on the cited Maryland statutes and finding that at the time Author married Maryland 
6

he possessed a valid divorce decree, the circuit court reasoned that the marriage between 

Author and Maryland was voidable. 

The court then analyzed Maryland case law. The court noted that Maryland courts 

recognize a distinction between “voidable” and “void” marriages, and notwithstanding the 

court’s conclusion to the contrary, noted that Maryland courts hold that “bigamous and 

incestuous marriages are void marriages[] because they are invalid regardless of the 

parties’ consent.” Morris v. Goodwin, 230 Md. App. 395, 404 (2016), cert. dismissed, 451 

Md. 587 (2017) (citations omitted). See Ledvinka v. Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. 420, 434

(2003) (a party is not competent to enter into a new marriage when already married to 

someone else and that marriage is not terminated by annulment, death, or absolute divorce. 

“It is the lack of capacity to enter into the new marriage that renders the [new] marriage 

void ab initio.”) (Citation omitted)). The court then described the resulting effect of a 

voidable and void marriage. When a marriage is voidable, only a party to the marriage may 

seek an annulment of the marriage and may only do so during the life of the parties. See 

Morris, 230 Md. App. at 406-409. When a marriage is void, a third party may seek an 

annulment to the marriage at any time. Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. at 434. Because the court 

found the marriage voidable and not void, the court reasoned that Bessie had no standing 

to invalidate Author’s and Maryland’s marriage as Bessie was not a party to the marriage 

and Author was dead.
7

Analysis

Our concern with the circuit court’s opinion is that the court looked only to 

Maryland statutory law in its determination that a bigamous marriage is voidable instead 

of void. While we agree that Maryland statutory law is perhaps unclear on this point, 

Maryland’s appellate authority (as well as case law from our sister jurisdictions) is clear 

that a bigamous marriage is void, not voidable.5 See Morris, 230 Md. App. at 404 

(“[B]igamous and incestuous marriages are void marriages, because they are invalid 

regardless of the parties’ consent.”); Townsend v. Morgan, 192 Md. 168, 173 (1949) (“A 

second marriage contracted while a first marriage exists undissolved is a nullity without 

the passage of any judicial decree declaring it void.”).

Morris is instructive. In Morris, the personal representative (and mother) of the 

deceased filed a complaint to annul her daughter’s marriage based on fraud. The circuit 

court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. On appeal, we affirmed. 

5 Gibbons v. Blair, 376 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 1985) is representative of the rulings 

in our sister jurisdictions.

The majority rule is soundly based on the public policy that regards 

the marriage contract as so uniquely personal that any action to annul or 

dissolve it cannot be commenced after the death of either of the parties to the 

marriage unless the validity of the marriage is challenged on a ground that 

made the marriage absolutely void rather than voidable. Applying the 

majority rule and rationale to the facts of this case, we hold that an action to 

annul a marriage on the ground of fraud can only be brought by the defrauded 

spouse while both parties to the marriage are living. 

Gibbons, 376 N.W.2d at 25. 
8

Although Morris concerned an action for annulment based on a fraudulent marriage, 

not a bigamous marriage, the framework we used in Morris guides us in this case. In 

Morris, we recognized that in determining whether a marriage is void or voidable, we look 

to “‘whether, with proper consent, the parties could have established a valid marriage. If 

not, the marriage is considered void.’” Morris, 230 Md. App. at 404 (quoting Cecily Fuhr, 

Cause of Action to Annul Marriage, in 65 CAUSES OF ACTION (“COA”) 2d 617 § 3, p. 

638). We stated that “‘[i]f, on the other hand, the parties could have lawfully married had

one or the other party’s consent to the marriage not been legally ineffective, the marriage 

is voidable rather than void.’” Id. (quoting Fuhr, 65 COA 2d 617 § 3, p. 638). We then 

reasoned that “bigamous and incestuous marriages are void marriages, because they are 

invalid regardless of the parties’ consent.” Id. (citation omitted). In contrast, “a marriage 

procured by duress or exertion of undue influence is voidable, because the defect in the 

marriage goes to a party’s consent.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We noted 

the distinct effect of void and voidable marriages, stating that “voidable marriages may be 

annulled only during the joint lives of the parties to the marriage.” Id. at 408. In an

accompanying footnote, we stated:

Conversely, courts have ruled that void marriages may be challenged by third 

parties after the death of one of the married parties. See In re Estate of Davis, 

55 Or. App. 982, 640 P.2d 692, 693 (1982) (“A void marriage, on the other 

hand, is invalid from the outset and may be challenged by third parties.”);

Abel v. Waters, 373 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (“Clearly, the 

contention is that this was an invalid marriage, void ab initio. It is therefore 

clear to this court that in this instance, on the grounds alleged by the personal 

representative, an annulment action can be maintained after the death of one 

of the parties.”).

Id. at 408 n.4. 
9

Here, in 2012, the D.C. Superior Court ruled that Author’s 1991 judgment of divorce 

was void and as a result the court vacated the divorce decree. The effect was to create a 

bigamous marriage between Author and Maryland. A bigamous marriage is void because 

there is no way to “fix it.” See Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. at 436. Therefore, contrary to the 

court’s ruling, Bessie has standing in this unique situation to annul the bigamous marriage 

because that marriage directly affected her marriage to Author. 

II. Laches

Bessie next argues that the circuit court erred in considering the effect the nearly 

21-year delay had on her motion to annul Author’s second marriage. She cites no case law 

to support her argument, nor does she set forth any further reasoning or argument to explain 

it. Essentially, she flatly states that the doctrines of laches or equitable estoppel do not 

apply in this case. Although we agree that generally the application of laches will not bar 

a suit to set aside a bigamous marriage, under the unique circumstances presented here, 

laches or equitable estoppel is applicable. 

We have found only one Maryland case, Townsend, previously cited, that discusses 

application of equity in the context of a bigamous marriage. In Townsend, a husband 

brought suit to annul his marriage to his second wife and to sell their jointly owned 

property. Id. at 172. He alleged that he married his first wife in 1930, and within a few 

months, they separated, and she left the State of Maryland. Id. Ten years later, he married 

his second wife. Id. Because he had not heard from his first wife since she left Maryland, 

the husband believed that he was free to marry again. Id. Several years after his second 
10

marriage, he obtained a divorce from his first wife, after which he and his second wife 

separated and he filed for an annulment. Id. at 173. His second wife answered by asserting 

that the complaint was barred in equity by the doctrine of “unclean hands.” The Court of 

Appeals, now called the Supreme Court of Maryland,

6 began its analysis by stating: 

Common-law marriages are not valid in Maryland, and therefore when a 

party who has a spouse living marries another, cohabitation under the second 

marriage after the death or divorce of the first spouse does not give validity 

to the second marriage. Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 46 [(1934)]. A 

second marriage contracted while a first marriage exists undissolved is a 

nullity without the passage of any judicial decree declaring it void. 

* * *

It is generally accepted that the equitable maxim that he who comes 

into equity must come with clean hands cannot be applied in any case where 

the result of the application sustains a relation which is denounced by statute 

or is contrary to public policy. Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 

316 [(1923)]; Simmons v. Simmons, 57 App.D.C. 216, 19 F.2d 690 [(1927)]. 

In proceedings to annul a bigamous marriage, the interest of the State is 

paramount to the grievances of the parties directly interested. The State 

sponsors the sanctity of the marriage relation and the welfare of society. In 

some cases the interests of unborn children may be affected. There is a 

difference between the ordinary case where the court refuses to aid the 

complainant in securing benefits from his own wrongdoing and the case 

where the complainant desires to have a judicial declaration that a marriage 

is null and void. When a party files a suit for annulment of his marriage, he 

is deemed as coming into court repenting of his wrongdoing and asking the 

court to correct his wrongful act as far as possible, in order to prevent any 

injurious consequences which might be cast thereby in the future upon 

innocent persons and upon the State. For these reasons the clean hands 

6 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a 

constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the 

Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. See, 

also, Md. Rule 1-101.1(a) (“From and after December 14, 2022, any reference in these 

Rules or, in any proceedings before any court of the Maryland Judiciary, any reference in 

any statute, ordinance, or regulation applicable in Maryland to the Court of Appeals of 

Maryland shall be deemed to refer to the Supreme Court of Maryland....”). The Judges of 

the Court are now called “Justices.”
11

doctrine is not applicable in a suit to annul a bigamous marriage. The 

marriage status being on a different footing from contracts generally, a party 

may be relieved from a void marriage, although fully aware of its invalidity 

when contracted. Phelps, Juridical Equity, sec. 259; 1 Bishop, Marriage, 

Divorce and Separation, sec. 722; Davis v. Green, 91 N.J.Eq. 17, 108 A. 772

[(1919)]; Arado v. Arado, 281 Ill. 123, 117 N.E. 816 [(1917)]; Kiessenbeck 

v. Kiessenbeck, 145 Or. 82, 26 P.2d 58, 60 [(1933)].

It is an unquestioned principle that a court of equity will refuse aid to 

a complainant who has acted fraudulently or gained an advantage by deceit 

or unfair means. But general iniquitous conduct, unconnected with the 

transaction alleged as the cause of action, does not deprive him of his right 

to relief in a court of equity. Equity does not demand that suitors shall have 

led blameless lives. The maxim requiring clean hands does not disqualify one 

who has not dealt unjustly in the particular matter in which judicial protection 

or redress is sought. The courts apply the maxim only where some unjust act 

of the complainant affects the equitable relations of the parties with respect 

to the matter presented for adjudication. Thus the maxim is applied, not by 

way of punishment for past violations of the law, but upon considerations 

that make for justice. Trice v. Comstock, 8 Cir., 121 F. 620 [(1903)];

Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 54 S.Ct. 146, 

148 [(1933)].

Townsend, 192 Md. at 173, 175-76 (emphasis added). Because the Court believed that 

considerations of justice did not warrant application of the doctrine of unclean hands to bar 

husband from obtaining a decree for the sale of the parties’ jointly owned property, the 

Court reversed the chancellor’s decree dismissing the complaint, and remanded the case to 

the circuit court for further proceedings. Id. at 178. We observe that the Court’s holding 

was based on principles of equity in the context of “general iniquitous conduct” and would 

not necessarily apply where the unjust act “affects the equitable relations” between the 

parties.

Very helpful to us are cases from other jurisdictions where courts have applied 

estoppel or laches to bar the suit when presented with a similar (and rare) fact pattern as 
12

the one presented here – where a first wife sought to invalidate a second marriage several 

years after the death of the husband in order to reap a financial windfall. See Self v. Self, 

893 S.W.2d 775 (Ark. 1995) (in a suit over entitlement to widow’s benefits from the 

Veterans Administration – first wife’s motion to set aside allegedly invalid divorce decree 

24 years after it was entered was barred by laches)7; Estate of Butler, 444 So.2d 477 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 451 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1984) (first wife estopped from 

claiming benefits of that marriage when she married a second man five years after she 

married her first husband; her first husband died 25-years later; and she waited six years 

after her first husband’s death to assert any rights to his estate); and Morehouse v. 

Morehouse, 111 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App. 1937) (in first wife’s suit against administrator of 

deceased husband, her motion to set aside allegedly invalid divorce decree is barred by 

equitable estoppel where she waited 13 years after it was entered). See also Annotation, 

Estoppel or Laches Precluding Lawful Spouse From Asserting Rights in Decedent’s 

Estates as Against Putative Spouse, 81 A.L.R. 3d 110, §§10A-16A (1977, 2022 Supp.)

(listing cases that have applied laches or estoppel to bar suit under similar fact patterns). 

In making a laches determination, a court shall look to the reasonableness of the 

delay and whether the delay prejudiced the opposing party. Jones v. State, 445 Md. 324, 

349-50 (2015) (citations omitted). Here, the record is unclear when Bessie learned that 

7 But see Raymond v. Raymond, 36 S.W.3d 733, 737-38 (Ark. 2001) where the 

Supreme Court of Arkansas distinguished Self by reasoning that the divorce decree there

was merely voidable, but in Raymond, the decree was void from inception where wife was

not properly served. The Court determined that laches did not apply to bar former wife

from petitioning to set aside divorce decree that was void. 
13

Author had remarried - whether it was around the time he obtained the 1991 divorce 

judgment, when he remarried in 1992, or, as she claimed, when he died in 2007. In any 

event, by her own account, she waited at least 13 years after Author’s death before asserting 

any interest in his estate in 2020. 

We conclude that the unusual set of facts before us necessitates the application of 

laches. This is particularly so where Bessie’s annulment suit was admittedly motivated 

only to gain financial rights, not to vindicate the status of the marriage. Additionally, 

because we have applied laches under similar circumstances, specifically where the 

petitioning party alleged fraud instead of bigamy, we conclude that to not apply laches in 

this case would work a grave injustice. Cf. Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224, 230-32 (1965) 

(Supreme Court of Maryland upheld a circuit court’s application of laches to bar first wife’s 

petition to vacate divorce decree on grounds of fraud, because she was not served with the 

divorce petition and neither she nor her husband resided in Maryland, when first wife 

waited 13 years before filing petition to vacate, husband remarried immediately upon filing 

of the divorce decree, and he died prior to first wife filing her petition to vacate.). 

An appellate court may issue a remand for further proceedings instead of entering a 

final order affirming, reversing, or modifying a judgment when the interests of justice and 

judicial expediency require. Md. Rule 8–604(d). See also Southern v. State, 371 Md. 93, 

103 (2002). But we exercise our discretion and decline to do so in this instance when the 

record before us is clear and undisputed. The record demonstrates that Bessie waited a 

minimum of 13 years after Author’s death before filing the annulment action. She states in 

her appellate brief that eight of those 13 years, between 2012 (when the court vacated the 
14

divorce decree) and 2020 (when she filed her annulment action), were due to her “health, 

and COVID[.]” She does not elaborate beyond that statement. Although she offers no 

further elaboration, we conclude that Bessie’s 13-year delay in asserting her marital rights

was unreasonable and unfairly prejudices Maryland (and Author). Accordingly, under the 

circumstances before us, we conclude that Bessie’s action to annul the marriage between 

Author and Maryland is barred by laches.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED ON 

GROUNDS CONSISTENT WITH THIS 

OPINION. APPELLANT TO PAY THE 

COSTS.