[Cite as Wallace v. Ganley Auto Group, 2011-Ohio-2909.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95081

APRIL WALLACE, ET AL. 

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 

vs. 

THE GANLEY AUTO GROUP, ET AL. 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-662122 

BEFORE: Keough, J., Cooney, P.J., and Rocco, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 16, 2011 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 

Ronald I. Frederick 

Ronald Frederick & Associates Co., L.P.A. 

1370 Ontario Street, Suite 1240 

Cleveland, OH 44113-1971 

F. Paul Bland, Jr., pro hac vice 

Claire Prestel, pro hac vice 

Public Justice, P.C. 

1825 K Street NW, Suite 200 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 

Paul R. Harris 

David D. Yeagley 

Ulmer & Berne LLP 

Skylight Office Tower 

1660 West 2nd St., Suite 1100 

Cleveland, OH 44113-1448 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: 

{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, April Wallace, Carolyn Murray, and Jacob 

Gordon (collectively “appellants”), appeal from the trial court’s judgment 

granting the motion to stay pending arbitration of defendants-appellees, 

Ganley Auto Group, Ganley Management Co., Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., Ganley 

Bedford Imports, Inc., and Ganley, Inc. (“Ganley” or collectively “Ganley 

defendants”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. Overview
{¶ 2} Wallace, Murray, and Gordon purchased pre-owned vehicles from 

Ganley dealerships. They subsequently filed a putative class action, alleging 

that the Ganley defendants sold them (and others) vehicles that had 

previously been titled to rental car companies and used as rental cars and 

knowingly failed to disclose their knowledge as to the history of each such 

vehicle. Appellants asserted claims for violation of Ohio’s Consumer Sales 

Protection Act (“CSPA”), R.C. 1345.01 et seq., and for fraud. 

{¶ 3} In response to the complaint, Ganley filed a motion to dismiss or 

stay pending arbitration (“motion to stay”) and asked the court to enforce the 

arbitration agreement set forth in each of the appellants’ motor vehicle 

purchase contracts. In response to the motion to stay, appellants sought 

discovery, which the trial court permitted as to “the enforceability of the 

arbitration provision at issue in this case” as related to the named plaintiffs. 

Appellants subsequently propounded interrogatories, document requests, and 

requests for admissions. They then filed a motion to compel responses to 

their discovery requests, which the trial court denied, ruling that “the 

information sought by the plaintiffs is irrelevant, and outside the scope of the 

court’s order * * *.” 

{¶ 4} Appellants then filed a brief opposing Ganley’s motion to stay and 

the matter proceeded to a hearing before the court. Wallace, Murray, and 

Gordon did not appear for the hearing nor did they present any witnesses. 
Ganley presented the testimony of Russell Harris, Ganley’s general counsel, 

regarding the origin and terms of the arbitration agreements signed by 

Wallace, Murray, and Gordon when they purchased their vehicles. 

{¶ 5} The trial court subsequently granted Ganley’s motion to stay. 

II. Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration

{¶ 6} The arbitration agreement signed separately by Wallace, Murray, 

and Gordon was prominently set out in each purchase contract in red ink in 

capital letters as a separate agreement with a separate signature line. The 

agreement signed by Wallace and Gordon stated: 

{¶ 7} “ARBITRATION: ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND 

DEALER (SELLER) WILL BE RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION. 

YOU GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO GO TO COURT TO ASSERT YOUR 

RIGHTS IN THIS SALES TRANSACTION AND ANY FUTURE SERVICE 

TRANSACTIONS WITH DEALER. (EXCEPT FOR ANY CLAIM IN SMALL 

CLAIMS COURT). YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE DETERMINED BY A 

NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR, NOT A JUDGE OR JURY. YOU ARE 

ENTITLED TO A FAIR HEARING, BUT ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 

ARE SIMPLER AND MORE LIMITED THAN RULES APPLICABLE IN 

COURT. ARBITRATOR DECISIONS ARE AS ENFORCEABLE AS ANY 

COURT ORDER AND ARE SUBJECT TO A VERY LIMITED REVIEW BY A 

COURT. SEE BACK OF THIS CONTRACT FOR ADDITIONAL 
ARBITRATION TERMS.”1 

{¶ 8} The back of the purchase contract, at the bottom of the page, 

under the heading “ADDITIONAL ARBITRATION TERMS,” contained four 

paragraphs that gave more information about the arbitration proceedings. 

Paragraph one explained that any arbitration proceeding would be conducted 

in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). 

 In addition, it stated that “[c]lass action claims or other joinder or 

consolidation of claims of multiple purchasers under different purchase 

contracts are and shall be prohibited in any arbitration proceeding.” 

{¶ 9} The second paragraph advised that “[t]he dealership hopes that 

you would first attempt to resolve any complaint you may have after purchase 

or service through the General Manager of the dealership. If you are unable 

to resolve your complaint at the dealership, you should contact Ganley 

Management Co. * * *, Attention: Russell W. Harris, General Counsel * * *.” 

 The third paragraph explained that some “small claims” could be filed in 

small claims court, but the purchaser was required to use AAA arbitration 

procedures if the claim exceeded the jurisdiction of the small claims court. It 

stated further that the “dealership will pay or reimburse you for any 

arbitration fee imposed by AAA * * *.” Finally, the fourth paragraph set 

 1

Murray signed a slightly revised version of Ganley’s arbitration clause, which did not include 

the “as enforceable” and “simpler and more limited” language. 
forth the AAA website, address, and telephone number, and advised that 

more information about arbitration could be obtained by accessing the AAA 

website or contacting AAA directly. 

{¶ 10} In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the 

trial court erred in granting Ganley’s motion to stay pending arbitration 

because the arbitration clause: (1) is void as a matter of public policy 

because it bans class action arbitration; (2) is substantively and procedurally 

unconscionable; and (3) does not apply to appellants’ claims. 

{¶ 11} This court reviews de novo whether an arbitration agreement 

alleged to be unconscionable is enforceable; however, factual findings of the 

trial court must be afforded great deference. Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. 

Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 352, 2008-Ohio-938, 884 N.E.2d 12, ¶2. 

{¶ 12} R.C. 2711.01(A) states that “[a] provision in any written contract 

* * * to settle by arbitration a controversy that subsequently arises out of the 

contract * * * shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon 

grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 

{¶ 13} Ohio courts recognize a “presumption favoring arbitration” that 

arises “when the claim in dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration 

provision.” Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 471, 700 

N.E.2d 859. Ohio’s “strong policy favoring arbitration” is consistent with 

federal law supporting arbitration, as set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. Section 1, et seq. Taylor, supra, fn.1. 

{¶ 14} Ohio law requires a stay of proceedings when an arbitrable 

dispute has been improperly brought before a court. See, e.g., McGuffey v. 

LensCrafters, Inc. (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 44, 50, 749 N.E.2d 825 (noting 

that a trial court “shall” stay proceedings pending arbitration once it is 

satisfied that an issue is arbitrable); Sasaki v. McKinnon (1997), 124 Ohio 

App.3d 613, 618, 707 N.E.2d 9 (“The Ohio Arbitration Act, which strongly 

favors arbitration, compels the court to review the arbitration clause at issue 

and, if the court is satisfied that the dispute or claim is covered by the 

arbitration clause, give effect to the clause and stay the proceedings pursuant 

to R.C. 2711.02.”) Any doubts regarding arbitration should be resolved in its 

favor. Ignazio v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 113 Ohio St.3d 276, 

2007-Ohio-1947, 865 N.E.2d 18, ¶18. 

{¶ 15} Despite this strong policy favoring arbitration, appellants contend 

that the clause at issue is void as against public policy because it bans class 

action arbitration. They argue that the class action mechanism is “critical” 

to enforcing consumer protection laws and, therefore, the CSPA contains an 

unexpressed policy favoring class actions. Therefore, they contend, the class 

action ban found in Ganley’s arbitration clause “invades the policy 

considerations of the CSPA” and is consequently void as against public policy. 

 We do not agree. 
{¶ 16} Recently, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011), 563 U.S. 

__, 131 S.Ct. 1740, __ L.Ed.2d __, the United States Supreme Court 

considered whether enforcement of arbitration clauses could be conditioned 

upon the availability of classwide arbitration procedures. The sales 

agreement involved in Concepcion provided for arbitration of all disputes, but 

prohibited classwide arbitration. When a dispute arose, the buyers sued 

AT&T and their suit was consolidated with a class action. The federal 

district court denied AT&T’s motion to compel arbitration under the 

agreement, finding the arbitration clause unconscionable because it 

prohibited classwide arbitration in violation of a California judicial rule 

classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 

unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit agreed. 

{¶ 17} The United States Supreme Court reversed. It noted that 

arbitration is a matter of contract, and thus parties may agree to limit the 

issues subject to arbitration, to arbitrate according to specific rules, and to 

limit with whom a party will arbitrate its disputes. Id. at 1748-49. It noted 

further that the FAA’s “overarching purpose” is “to ensure the enforcement of 

arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 

proceedings.” Id. at 1748. The Court found that the switch from bilateral to 

class arbitration sacrifices arbitration’s informality and “makes the process 

slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final 
judgment.” Id. at 1751. Further, the Court found that “[a]rbitration is 

poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.” Id. at 1752. 

Accordingly, the Court found that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide 

arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus 

creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA,” which “was designed to promote 

arbitration.” Id. at 1748. 

{¶ 18} Additionally, the Court found that states may not require a 

procedure, such as class-wide arbitration, that is inconsistent with the FAA, 

even if the procedure may be desirable for other reasons. Id. at 1753. Thus, 

the Court held that California’s judicial rule prohibiting class-action waivers 

in arbitration agreements was preempted by the FAA. Id. 

{¶ 19} In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Concepcion, appellants’ 

argument that Ganley’s arbitration clause is unenforceable because it bans 

class actions is without merit. Appellants would have us make a rule that, 

at least with respect to the CSPA, any arbitration agreement that bans class 

actions is unenforceable. Concepcion, however, makes clear that 

enforcement of arbitration clauses cannot be conditioned upon the availability 

of classwide arbitration. Further, it makes clear that courts may not apply 

judicial rules in a way that frustrates the purpose of the FAA, which favors 

the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms. Hence, 

even if we were to find that the CSPA contains a policy favoring class actions 
(an issue we need not decide), this court may not apply that policy in a way 

that disfavors arbitration. Appellants next argue that Ganley’s arbitration 

agreement is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. Although 

arbitration is encouraged as a way to settle disputes, an arbitration clause is 

not enforceable if it is unconscionable. Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 

Cuyahoga App. Nos. 86990 and 86991, 2006-Ohio-4500, ¶15. 

{¶ 20} “Unconscionability is generally recognized to include an absence 

of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to a contract, combined 

with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” 

Collins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 826, 834, 621 

N.E.2d 1294. It embodies two separate concepts: (1) unfair and 

unreasonable contract terms, i.e., substantive unconscionability; and (2) 

“individualized circumstances surrounding each of the parties to a contract 

such that no voluntary meeting of the minds was possible, i.e., procedural 

unconscionability.” Olah v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 

86132, 2006-Ohio-694, ¶14, citing Collins, supra. The party asserting 

unconscionabilty of a contract must prove both substantive and procedural 

unconscionability. Taylor, ¶52. 

{¶ 21} Substantive unconscionability pertains to the contract itself, 

without any consideration of the individual contracting parties, and requires 

a determination of whether the contract terms are commercially reasonable 
in the context of the transaction involved. Sikes v. Ganley Pontiac Honda, 

Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 82889, 2004-Ohio-155, ¶11, citing Collins, supra. 

“Procedural unconscionability involves factors bearing on the relative 

bargaining position of the contracting parties, such as age, education, 

intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, who 

drafted the contract, whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, 

whether alterations in the printed terms were possible, [and] whether there 

were alternative sources of supply for the goods in question.” Collins at 834. 

{¶ 22} Appellants contend that the arbitration agreements are 

substantively unconscionable because they contain “confusing” and 

“misleading” language. First, they argue that the language suggesting that 

the dealership “hopes” a consumer would first try to resolve any complaint 

with Ganley’s general counsel is confusing because it imposes a 

“pre-arbitration exhaustion requirement” that suggests to consumers that 

they must exhaust their claims with Ganley’s general counsel before 

proceeding to arbitration. But a fair reading of this language demonstrates 

there is no such requirement; the arbitration provision merely invites a 

customer to try to informally resolve a dispute before initiating formal 

proceedings. 

{¶ 23} Next, appellants contend that the arbitration agreements they 

signed are substantively unconscionable because they contain language 
similar to that found misleading and unenforceable by this court in Olah, 

supra, and Felix, supra. In Olah, this court analyzed Ganley’s arbitration 

clause and concluded: “[W]e find that the arbitration provision by its 

incompleteness is not only confusing, but misleading and thus substantively 

unconscionable. Accepting the arbitration clause as written, plaintiffs could 

not have known what being bound to arbitration really meant. The clause 

does not include some very important and material information plaintiffs 

would have needed in order to make an informed decision about whether to 

agree to arbitration. Because of the absence of any details about the 

arbitration process that plaintiffs would be bound to, we conclude that when 

they signed the purchase agreement[,] plaintiffs were substantially less 

informed than defendant.” Id., ¶26. The Felix court adopted the reasoning 

of Olah and likewise found Ganley’s arbitration clause substantively 

unconscionable. 

{¶ 24} Although the arbitration clause signed by appellants contains the 

language objected to in Olah and Felix,2 it also contains significant additional 

information regarding arbitration that was not included in the clause at issue 

in those cases. Instead of directing the purchaser to “see general manager 

for information regarding arbitration process,” as in Olah and Felix, the 

 2

The agreement signed by Murray does not contain the “as enforceable” and “simpler and 

more limited” language that the Olah court found troublesome. 
clause appellants signed directed them to four paragraphs on the back of the 

agreement, which contain specific information about the arbitration process 

that was missing in Olah and Felix. In light of this additional information, 

we do not agree that appellants “could not have known what being bound to 

arbitration really meant,” Olah, ¶26, or that they “were substantially less 

informed” than Ganley when they signed the arbitration agreement. Id. 

{¶ 25} Furthermore, the statement that “arbitration procedures are 

simpler and more limited than rules applicable in court,” which this court 

found “troublesome” in Olah and Felix, is indeed an accurate statement of the 

law. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 

(1985), 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (a party “trades the 

procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, 

informality, and expedition of arbitration”); Preston v. Ferrer (2008), 552 U.S. 

346, 358, 28 S.Ct. 978, 169 L.Ed.2d 917 (“A prime objective of an agreement 

to arbitrate is to achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.”). 

{¶ 26} Appellants also contend that Ganley’s arbitration agreement is 

substantively unconscionable because it contains hidden fees. Specifically, 

they argue that although the agreement provides that arbitration will be 

governed by AAA’s consumer rules, they seek injunctive relief, which will 

require additional fees than those required under AAA’s consumer rules. 

This argument fails as well because the agreement specifically provides that 
Ganley will pay the costs associated with arbitrating any dispute. 

{¶ 27} Because appellants failed to sustain their burden of 

demonstrating substantive unconscionability, we need not determine whether 

Ganley’s arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable. Taylor, ¶53 (the 

party challenging a contract as unconscionable must prove “a quantum” of 

both procedural and substantive unconscionability). Nevertheless, in the 

interest of justice, we address appellants’ arguments. 

{¶ 28} Appellants first contend that the arbitration clause is 

procedurally unconscionable because Ganley is “a large business operation,” 

whereas appellants are neither highly educated nor “sophisticated 

businesspeople.” 

{¶ 29} Ganley and appellants were no doubt in unequal bargaining 

positions. However, an unequal bargaining position is not, in and of itself, a 

sufficient reason to hold an arbitration agreement unenforceable. Gilman v. 

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991), 500 U.S. 20, 33, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 

L.Ed.2d 26. There must be some evidence that, as a result of the imbalance, 

the party in the weaker position was defrauded or coerced into agreeing to the 

arbitration clause. Id. Appellants make no such allegations. 

{¶ 30} Appellants also argue that the clause was procedurally 

unconscionable because it was contained in a pre-printed form and no one 

explained the clause to them. But the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a 
“showing that a contract is preprinted and that the arbitration clause is a 

required term, without more, fails to demonstrate the unconscionability of the 

arbitration clause.” Taylor, supra, ¶45; see, also, Alexander v. Wells Fargo 

Fin. Ohio 1, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 89277, 2009-Ohio-4873, ¶12. 

{¶ 31} Furthermore, the law does not require that each aspect of a 

contract be explained orally prior to signing the contract. A party to a 

contract is responsible for reading what he signs. ABM Farms, Inc. v. 

Woods, 81 Ohio St.3d 498, 503, 1998-Ohio-612, 692 N.E.2d 574; Haller v. 

Borror Corp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 10, 14, 552 N.E.2d 207. “To be sure, an 

arbitration clause in a consumer contract with some characteristics of an 

adhesion contract ‘necessarily engenders more reservations than an 

arbitration clause in a different setting,’ such as a collective bargaining 

agreement or a commercial contract between two businesses.” Taylor, ¶50, 

quoting Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 472, 1998-Ohio-294, 

700 N.E.2d 859. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court has declined to 

require more specific disclosures when arbitration is concerned, reasoning 

that form contracts lower transaction costs and benefit consumers through 

lower prices. Taylor, ¶50. Thus, Ganley had no independent duty to point 

out or explain the arbitration clause to appellants. 

{¶ 32} Our review of the arbitration agreement indicates that its terms 

were clearly laid out for appellants. The clause is written in red ink on the 
first page of the sales agreement. It explicitly states that it pertains to 

arbitration, with a separate signature line, and its terms are specifically 

listed directly above the signature line, all in upper case type. Moreover, 

above each appellant’s signature on the contract is the phrase: “Purchaser 

hereby represents that the purchaser * * * has read and understands the 

terms and conditions on the front and back of this contract.” Accordingly, 

appellants’ argument that the clause is unconscionable because they did not 

“understand” it is not persuasive. 

{¶ 33} Last, appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting 

Ganley’s motion to stay pending arbitration because the arbitration clause 

does not apply to their claims. They contend that the clause refers only to 

disputes relating to the vehicle purchase contract, and does not extend to 

claims that are “related” to that parties’ sales transaction. They argue that 

because their claims relate to Ganley’s alleged failure to disclose facts before 

they signed the purchase agreement containing the arbitration clause, their 

claims originated before the contract was signed and thus are not covered by 

the agreement to arbitrate. 

{¶ 34} “An arbitration clause in a contract should not be denied effect 

unless it may be said with positive assurance that the clause is not 

susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Melia v. 

Office Max N. Am., Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 87249, 2006-Ohio-4765, ¶15. 
Moreover, an “arbitration clause that is very broad and purports to 

encompass ‘all’ claims arising from the contract creates a presumption that 

the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes, unless the dispute is expressly 

excluded, or if there is very strong evidence to show that the claim should be 

excluded.” Burkey v. Speegle, Portage App. No. 2003-P-0113, 

2004-Ohio-4388, ¶18, citing Ohio State Dept. of Adm. Serv. v. Moody/Nolan 

Ltd., Inc. (Dec. 12, 2000), Franklin App. No. 00AP-336. 

{¶ 35} In Burkey, supra, the seller of real estate sued a realtor for breach 

of fiduciary duty based on representations made by the realtor prior to the 

sale of the property. When the realtor moved to enforce the arbitration 

clause contained in the sales contract, which covered “[any dispute] 

concerning this contract,” the seller argued that the clause was not applicable 

because her claim related to conduct that occurred before she signed the sales 

contract. The Eleventh District rejected that argument, and held “it is clear 

that [the seller’s] claim against [the realtor] arises from the formation of the 

contract for sale of the property.” Id., ¶17. The court stated that “the basis 

of [the seller’s] claim indicates why she formed the contract in question and, 

therefore, falls under a reasonable interpretation of the arbitration clause * * 

*.” Id., ¶20. 

{¶ 36} As in Burkey, it is clear that appellants’ claims arise from the 

formation of the purchase agreement: appellants allege that Ganley sold them 
rental cars without disclosing that the cars had previously been used as such. 

 But for the transactions governed by the purchase agreement, appellants 

would have no basis to institute any legal proceeding. Because the 

arbitration clause at issue broadly covers “any dispute between you and 

dealer (seller),” appellants’ claims are indeed covered by the clause. 

{¶ 37} Appellants’ first assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Motion to Compel Discovery

{¶ 38} In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the 

trial court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery. 

{¶ 39} A trial court has broad discretion on decisions regarding 

discovery matters. Dandrew v. Silver, Cuyahoga App. No. 86089, 

2005-Ohio-6355, ¶35. Absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court must 

affirm a trial court’s disposition of discovery issues. State ex rel. The V Cos. 

v. Marshall, 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 1998-Ohio-329, 692 N.E.2d 198. 

{¶ 40} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court permitted 

arbitration-related discovery, but limited it to matters relating to “the 

enforceability of the arbitration provision at issue in this case” and to the 

“plaintiffs named in the first and second amended complaints.” Appellants 

then propounded 41 separate requests for production of documents on each of 

the Ganley defendants, as well as numerous interrogatories. 

{¶ 41} Appellants’ document requests clearly exceeded the scope of the 
trial court’s discovery order. For example, appellants sought all documents 

related to “income levels, credit ratings, or credit scores” of all customers for 

the five-year period between January 1, 2004 and the present. Another 

request asked for “[t]he entire customer contracts for the transactions 

referred to in Olah v. Ganley Chevrolet and in Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet.” 

Other requests sought all documents related to all arbitrations, all small 

claims actions, and all class action proceedings between Ganley and any of its 

customers. Another request sought documents for the period January 1, 

2004 to the present regarding “the number and percentage of other auto 

dealers’ customers who financed their purchase and the percentage of the sale 

or lease price that customers of other auto dealers financed.” (Emphasis 

added.) 

{¶ 42} Appellants’ interrogatories likewise exceeded the scope of 

discovery. For instance, appellants asked Ganley to identify “each and every 

class action proceeding” and “every other court proceeding” in which it had 

been involved “[f]or the period from three years before” it started “using an 

arbitration provision” until the present. 

{¶ 43} In its judgment entry denying appellants’ motion to compel, the 

trial court ruled that the broad discovery sought by appellants was not 

relevant to how the arbitration agreement between Ganley and each 

individual appellant was unconscionable. The court ruled that “the only 
relevant information needed to determine whether the arbitration agreement 

is unconscionable pertains to the facts and circumstances surrounding each of 

the named plaintiffs only.” 

{¶ 44} We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling. As the 

trial court stated in its entry, “a determination of unconscionability is a 

fact-sensitive question that requires a case-by-case review of the surrounding 

circumstances. Brunke v. Ohio State Home Serv., Inc., Lorain App. No. 

08CA009320, 2008-Ohio-5394, ¶8.” Accordingly, the trial court properly 

limited discovery to the enforceability of the arbitration provision as it 

pertained to Wallace, Murray, and Gordon, the named plaintiffs. Appellants’ 

discovery requests far exceeded the limitations set by the court, and sought 

documents and information that were not relevant to the issue before the 

court. Furthermore, appellants’ interrogatories were served upon “The 

Ganley Auto Group,” which is not a legally cognizable entity. Hence, 

appellants’ motion to compel was properly denied. 

{¶ 45} Appellants’ second assignment of error is therefore overruled. 

Affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellants costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this 

judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, P.J., and 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR