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72–745 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–309 

NOMINATION OF 

IRVIN CHARLES McCULLOUGH III 

TO BE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

KENT CONRAD, North Dakota 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia .............. 2 

WITNESS 

McCullough III, Irwin Charles, Intelligence Community Inspector GeneralDesignate .............................................................................................................. 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 20 

Prehearing Questions and Responses .................................................................... 34 

Letter from Don W. Fox, Office of Government Ethics, Dated August 23, 

2011, to Senator Dianne Feinstein Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure 

Report .................................................................................................................... 53 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF IRVIN CHARLES 

McCULLOUGH III TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in Room 

SD–138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne 

Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Udall 

of Colorado, Chambliss, Snowe, Blunt, and Rubio. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The Committee will come to order. 

We meet today in public. So, ladies and gentlemen, you are our 

public today. This doesn’t happen very often, so it’s often a special 

moment when it does. And of course this moment is to consider the 

President’s nomination of Charles McCullough to be the first Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. 

I want to welcome him here. I want to congratulate you on this 

nomination. I had the pleasure to meet with you, as I’m sure other 

Members have as well, and know that you are superbly qualified 

for this job. 

The position of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 

or IC/IG, as the techies would say, was created in the 2010 intelligence authorization bill after several years of trying to have the 

position enacted. I’d like to particularly recognize Senator Snowe. 

She was the drafter of the provision creating this position and the 

driving force behind it. And so I’m delighted that you’re here today, 

Olympia. 

The reason to have a community-wide Inspector General is similar to the reason to have a Director of National Intelligence. The 

IG is intended to review and conduct oversight on intelligence activities across the 16 agencies that make up what we call the Intelligence Community, as well as the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, the DNI, instead of having every agency and their IG 

operate within its own stovepipe. 

So this further helps unify the community and break down stovepipes. 

We have seen over recent years how the agencies have worked 

much more closely together. That’s improved performance, it’s reVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:25 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072745 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72745.TXT DPROCT
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duced duplication. But it also makes the oversight work of an individual agency’s Inspector General more difficult. 

So this Committee felt the need to create an Inspector General 

with authority and oversight of the entire community and one who 

could look at issues that cut right across the community. This view 

was reinforced by the relative weakness of the Inspector General 

position in the Office of the DNI that was authorized as part of the 

Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. 

Until now, the DNI has had the power to hire and fire his Inspector General. In public testimony from 2009, the first IG in the 

DNI’s office, Edward McGuire, said his office was, ‘‘not independent 

vis-a`-vis the DNI, because he can put us out of business. This is 

a substantial weakness,’’ he said, ‘‘in our ability to do work.’’ 

So Congress created the Inspector General of the Intelligence 

Community, to be confirmed by the Senate and given the statutory 

authorities and independence of other Senate-confirmed Inspectors 

General. The IG still operates under the supervision and direction 

of the DNI, but he has substantially more independence and authority under this new legislation. 

So it’s our hope and our expectation that, if you are confirmed, 

Mr. McCullough—and I believe you will be—you will make full use 

of these authorities—I think that’s really important—to ensure 

that the nation’s intelligence activities are legal, that they are 

keeping with relevant guidance and direction, and that there is not 

waste, fraud, or abuse in the community. 

It’s a big, big job, I think, of all of the IGs maybe the biggest, 

because this is a difficult community to surveil, so to speak. 

So I would just like to welcome you. I’d like to welcome your family here. And I’d like to recognize the distinguished Ranking Member, with whom I have the great pleasure of working with. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Well, thanks very much, Madam 

Chairman, and likewise. 

Mr. McCullough, congratulations on your nomination to be the 

first Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. You have an 

impressive background in both intelligence and law enforcement, 

which I believe will serve you well in your new assignment. 

I also welcome your family here today and thank them for their 

support of you, which means their commitment to public service. 

Now, in many instances Inspectors General are the eyes and ears 

of agency leadership throughout the government and can be for 

Congress as well. Through critical oversight of executive branch operations, they can provide useful assessments of performance and 

identify areas for improvement. 

These assessments are even more important now, given the current state of the federal budget. It is clear the old ways of doing 

business are not sustainable, especially when it comes to expensive 

programs that seem to give us little in return. 

As we conduct our own oversight and look for wise cuts across 

national intelligence program budgets, this Committee will seek 

your opinion on programs in need of oversight, scaling back, or that 

can be cut altogether. 

3 

We will also look for your input when it comes to promoting better accountability across the community. We are fortunate to have 

many solid performers among our Intelligence Community professionals, but there are occasions when those who exercise bad judgment or perform poorly must be held accountable. 

My sense is that the federal government does a mediocre job in 

removing underperformers, but the IC can and must do better. 

As the IC’s Inspector General, much of your work will of necessity be classified. This means there will most often not be a public 

airing of your assessments. As a result, Congress and the American 

people must have full confidence that your findings are objective, 

independent, and entirely supported by the facts. We expect, too, 

that you will stay within your statutory mandate in promoting efficiency and preventing or detecting fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Mr. McCullough, you and I had a very good meeting earlier this 

week and I’m very confident that you’re a person of high integrity 

and very well qualified for this job, and I look forward to further 

dialoguing with you today. 

Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

I just received a note that, Mr. McCullough, you’re prepared to 

introduce your family before proceeding with your remarks. Would 

you do so, please? 

STATEMENT OF IRVIN CHARLES McCULLOUGH III, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INSPECTOR GENERAL-DESIGNATE 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. That’s fine. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Behind me I have my mother, Barbara Jackson, and my stepfather, Terry Jackson, my son Chas and my daughter Victoria. And 

right here beside me is my wife of 18 years, Kathalyn. And I have 

my sister here, Anise, and I’ve got some very good friends of mine 

from throughout my career, my colleagues. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you, and welcome all of you. 

And I hope you’re very proud of your father. 

So please go ahead, Mr. McCullough. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and 

distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for giving me 

the opportunity to appear before you today as you consider my 

nomination to be the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community. 

I especially want to thank Senator Snowe, who has been a steadfast champion for the establishment of an IC/IG for quite some 

time. 

I am deeply honored to have been nominated by the President for 

this position, and I am grateful for the support and encouragement 

I have received from Director Clapper. 

Over the past 20 years I have been privileged to serve in a leadership capacity in law enforcement, legal and intelligence positions. 

I’m currently serving on detail from the National Security Agency 

as the Deputy Inspector General at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

Prior to that, I spent eight years as the Assistant IG for Investigations at the National Security Agency, where I supervised inVerDate Nov 24 2008 15:25 Mar 19, 2012 Jkt 072745 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72745.TXT DPROCT
4 

vestigations involving intelligence programs and personnel around 

the world. 

I served as the senior counsel for law enforcement and intelligence at the U.S. Treasury Department, and I spent 10 years as 

a special agent of the FBI handling foreign counterintelligence, 

counterterrorism, violent crime, white collar crime, narcotics, and 

personnel misconduct matters. 

As a result of these experiences, I am well grounded in intelligence policy, management, and operations. 

The FY 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act provides the IC/IG 

with the statutory authority to conduct IC-wide audits, investigations, and inspections. If confirmed, my primary goal will be to 

identify and address systemic deficiencies that cut across agency 

missions in order to positively impact IC-wide economies and efficiencies. 

Madam Chairman, I recognize that if I am confirmed you will 

have high expectations for my performance in this regard, especially given the difficult budget climate now facing the IC and the 

larger federal government. I want to express my commitment, if 

confirmed, to fully support the IC/IG’s notification and reporting 

obligations to the intelligence committees. 

I am under no illusion that fulfilling the IC-wide responsibilities 

of this new position will be easy. I fully comprehend this job will 

take and require a great amount of independence, as well as diplomacy, discretion, and judgment. If confirmed, I pledge to do my 

very best to earn your trust and confidence. 

Thank you again for giving me the opportunity to appear before 

you today. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared ststement of Mr. McCullough III follows:] 

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Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. McCullough. 

When we visited the other day, we talked a little bit about contractors, and I wanted to ask you a few questions. I think this 

Committee believes that there are many too many contractors really doing inherently governmental work within the Intelligence 

Community. I mean, literally Dana Priest says in her book, 

250,000. So it’s hard to tell, you know, really what’s fact and what’s 

fiction. 

But I want to ask you how you view the use of contractors in the 

Intelligence Community. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, I think that that topic, the use of contractors and how much that’s costing the IC in these tight budget 

times, and what they’re doing in terms of whether or not they’re 

performing inherently governmental functions is an extremely appropriate topic for this new position and this new office to undertake. I would envision and IC-wide review looking specifically at 

those things, and I think that would be a very appropriate topic to 

consider very strongly as we go forward with our work planning. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. How would you define ‘‘inherently governmental functions’’? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, it’s normally defined as the decisionmaking ability in the government—if a contractor is performing 

certain functions that would normally be reserved for a government 

employee, such as sitting on a source-selection panel or doing something that we would normally expect a government employee to be 

employed doing. 

There are certain functions that OMB has listed, actually, and 

there are certain guidelines and regulations which actually set out 

lists of inherently governmental functions. And so we would want 

to check that and crosscheck that across the IC to see how endemic 

that was. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. One last question for me. In the event that 

you requested assistance from the DNI and the DNI determined 

against your assessment, that a particular audit or investigation 

should not proceed, what subsequent steps, if any, would you take? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, I would discuss that with the DNI. The 

DNI has been extremely supportive and encouraging with respect 

to this position. The statute itself, which created the IC/IG position 

does contain a provision which allows the DNI to impede or restrict 

an IG activity, but it’s for a very narrow reason. The reason has 

to be a national security equity. 

So I would speak with the DNI about that first, but I would not 

hesitate to interact with this Committee and inform this Committee. If he sought to actually activate the procedures in the statute, it would require the Committee’s involvement and I would follow through. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I think that’s very important and I’m very 

glad to hear that, that you would alert our Committee to that fact. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Before recognizing the Vice Chairman, 

there are five standard questions. They just require a yes or no answer. If I might read them, if you would just respond and we’ll get 

you on the record. 

9 

Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other 

venues when invited? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials 

from the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to appear before the Committee and designated staff when invited? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents or any 

other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community provides such material to the Committee when requested? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to 

the fullest extent possible, all members of this Committee of the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 

Community, rather than only the Chairman and Vice Chairman? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks very much, Madam Chair. 

Mr. McCullough, let me just add to what the Chairman said. If 

you ever—without suggesting you might be so inclined to—come to 

this Committee and voice an independent opinion relative to an 

issue, I think you’ll find we’ll not only be receptive, but we’ll be extremely supportive of you in that regard. 

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, there was a concerted 

effort to remove the barriers that prevented intelligence information from being shared fully within the Intelligence Community. 

Part of this effort involved statutory changes in the USA PATRIOT 

Act, which I understand you were involved in drafting while you 

were at the Department of Treasury. 

I’m concerned, especially after the Christmas Day attempted 

bombing, that some of the old stovepipes may be reappearing. You 

and I talked a little bit about this, but for the record I want to ask 

you: Has the Intelligence Community fully addressed the issues 

that concerned you most when the PATRIOT Act was drafted? And 

secondly, where do you think improvements need to be made? And 

is there a role for you as the Intelligence Community’s Inspector 

General in this effort, as well as in the information-sharing effort? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, Mr. Vice Chair, thank you for that 

question. 

Yes, I concur that the old stovepipes that were there, from my 

perspective, are still there to a certain extent. This is something 

from an information-sharing standpoint that would be just an excellent and appropriate review, well within the ambit of the IC/IG’s 

authorities and responsibilities pursuant to the statute. 

So I would certainly think that that would be something that we 

would strongly consider to add to our work plan very early. And, 

from my own experience, I’ve seen that even within the IC/IG community, we tend to criticize other government entities for being 

10 

stovepipe, and we’re fairly stovepiped ourselves. And so that’s one 

thing I want to do with the IC/IG community also. I’m going to be 

dealing with that same issue in the IG community in terms of the 

integration of these various local IGs, the element IGs. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Is the PATRIOT Act working the way 

you intended for it to work? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, I think we have to look at that. Again, 

that would be a good topic, I think, for an audit or an inspection 

or review as to whether or not compliance with the PATRIOT Act, 

whether there were impediments to the PATRIOT Act and what 

those impediments were, and whether or not we can make recommendations to diminish them. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Okay. Unauthorized disclosures of 

classified information continue to be a big problem for the Intelligence Community, especially within Washington. While 

WikiLeaks garnered a lot of attention because of its scope, there 

continue to be other equally significant leaks of classified information, many of which go unpunished. 

Yet efforts by Congress to give the Intelligence Community more 

authority for addressing leaks of classified information have not 

been supported by the administration. Is there an appropriate role 

for inspectors general within the Intelligence Community in addressing the ongoing problem of leaks of classified information? 

And, based on your legal and law enforcement experience, what do 

you believe is the best way to deter leaks? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, the answer to the first question, Mr. 

Vice Chairman, is I do believe there’s a very appropriate role for 

the IC/IG with respect to compromises or potential compromises 

and WikiLeaks-type situations. I think that there tends to be a 

thinking that this is only a security, a counterintelligence, or a law 

enforcement issue, but clearly this is something which the fundamental tenets of IG work are fraud, waste, and abuse, and this 

would be an abuse issue. 

And so I think from an IG perspective the greatest efficacy that 

we could offer would be focusing on access controls, focusing on 

what controls are in place to allow people to get to information, and 

again doing that on an IC-wide basis to determine whether or not 

there were systemic vulnerabilities and risks out there that we 

could devise recommendations to apply across the IC. And I would 

want to work very closely with you and with this Committee in 

pursuing that. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. As you look at that—and I would 

hope that maybe that would be one of your first priorities—this 

Committee has had dialogue with the DNI, with Director Mueller, 

with the various Directors of the CIA about this issue, and trying 

to find the one case that we can use as an example from a prosecutorial standpoint has been very difficult. We’ve talked with the Attorney General about it at length also. 

So I would urge you, coming in as somewhat of an independent 

voice to take a look at this. If you have some recommendations, I 

assure you again this Committee will be very receptive to hearing 

that because we’re very cognizant of the fact that there is too much 

information getting out that shouldn’t be getting out. 

11 

And again, we appreciate your experience, your willingness to 

serve in public enterprises, and we look forward to getting you confirmed. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

The list is Wyden, Snowe, Udall, Blunt, and Rubio. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. McCullough, earlier this year, Senator Udall and I proposed 

directing an Inspector General to review the implementation of the 

FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to examine what kind of impact the 

law has had on the privacy of law-abiding Americans. 

Now, it seems to me that, if confirmed as the Inspector General, 

you could use an array of analytical techniques to provide a realistic assessment, a defensible assessment on the impact the law 

had on the privacy of law-abiding Americans. 

What’s your reaction to that? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, if I am confirmed, I envision the IC/IG 

as having a very strong intelligence oversight function—intelligence oversight in the sense that we’re looking at potential 12333 

issues, FISA issues, regulatory issues from the elements, the implementing directives in the elements. 

And so I think that’s a very proper role for the IC/IG and I would 

anticipate that we would have the expertise, and I anticipate obtaining the expertise to fulfill that function. 

Senator WYDEN. So you would say—and of course, these are always resource issues and you have to consider those kinds of factors—this is an area where you believe you could add some real 

value and some substantive analysis. Would that be fair to say? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, it would, Senator. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay. One other question, if I might, on the declassification issue, another area where Senator Udall and I have 

spent a lot of time. One of my concerns here is that it often seems 

that just plain old bureaucratic inertia gets in the way of declassifying documents that the public really has a right to know. In 

other words, it is information that’s relevant to public debate in 

this country that doesn’t compromise our national security. 

And the Public Interest Declassification Board pretty much 

agrees with that take. They issued a report several years ago, and 

I’ll just quote from the report. They said, ‘‘The latitude given departments and agencies to declassify information when the public 

interest in disclosure outweighs the risk of damage is not being seriously exercised.’’ They basically said, you know, here’s an opportunity to basically cut through the bureaucratic inertia, ensure that 

the public right to know is being satisfied without compromising 

national security. 

I’d like to hear your thoughts about what you think could be 

done to make the classification system work better. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, I think, if I’m confirmed and we stand 

up the IC/IG office, again, this is another topic, classification and 

the application of the classification guidelines IC-wide, that would 

be ripe for review. I think this is something that would clearly fall 

under the purview of the IC/IG pursuant to the statute and would 

12 

be in the IC/IG’s bailiwick. And I think doing it IC-wide, we would 

have the resources and the wherewithal to do that. 

Senator WYDEN. I’m encouraged you want to take it on because 

I think it really comes at us two ways. I mean, the point of 

classifying documents is to protect national security. And often it 

seems that documents are classified to protect somebody’s political 

security. 

And, by the way, this has gone on on both sides of the aisle for 

a long time to come. But the point that the Public Interest Declassification Board made with respect to this particular report is 

sometimes just plain old bureaucratic inertia that keeps documents 

that the public has a right to know from getting out. 

And the fact that you’re willing to dig into this and try to make 

the system work better, to try to strike the proper balance between 

matters that do have to be kept secret in order to protect the safety 

of our people, and at the same time getting everything out possible, 

that the public has a right to know about, that doesn’t compromise 

national security, encourages me. 

I’m glad you’re willing to take it on. We’ve heard good things 

about you and I’m looking forward to supporting you when Chair 

Feinstein moves ahead with the vote. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Snowe. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I welcome you, 

Mr. McCullough. It’s been seven years, so thank you for being here. 

And I want to thank the Chair and the Vice Chair and the members of this Committee for creating the IC/IG, because it is so crucial when we started this process back in 2004 to insert it in the 

original legislation when we were overhauling the Intelligence 

Community and the significant reform. 

You come with a comprehensive, extensive background in the 

area of Inspector General. And I think that that’s going to add, I 

think, tremendous confidence and credibility to the process as well, 

especially as you’re paving the way as the first Inspector General 

across the Intelligence Community. 

And your primary mission, obviously, is going to affect across 

agency accountability and management cooperation and collaboration. That’s going to be infinitely important, as the Vice Chair was 

referring to, in terms of breaking down those barriers and the parochialism, the stovepipe, the failure to inform, as we discovered in 

the aftermath of the Christmas Day bombing, and what needed to 

happen and didn’t happen. So you can be more on the front lines 

of preventing and averting any future crisis. 

Secondly, it’s a question as well in terms of The Washington Post 

series that was done last year concerning the fact that the Intelligence Community had become too unwieldy, too large, too costly, 

too many employees, many of which we couldn’t even discern the 

numbers. 

So I mentioned this article to Director Clapper during the course 

of his nomination in 2010 in terms of this is precisely how I envisioned the role of IC/IG in terms of evaluating and being able to 

assess many of the issues across the agencies in terms of cost, size, 

and also the failure to share information. 

13 

I know in your prehearing questions you were asked about how 

you conduct an investigation inspection audit. And you mentioned 

that there’s no single modus operandi that would be employed 

across the board. How will you maintain the complementary relationship, ensure that an individual agency will not assert itself in 

such a way to deter your ability to investigate, inspect, or to review 

any aspects, because Director Clapper said at the time, in response 

to my question, there will be a complementary relationship because 

there won’t be significant resources. 

In fact, it would be limited resources. So how would your approach work in this instance so that it doesn’t conflict, but at the 

same time you have to override, perhaps, even the interest of other 

Inspectors General? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. My reading of the statute is that the IC/IG 

will have authority to conduct audits, inspections, investigations 

for any matters IC-wide which are under the responsibility and 

control of the DNI. I believe that the plain meaning of that is a 

fairly broad meaning. So I would certainly, as the IC/IG, if I’m confirmed, I will also be the chair of the IC forum, which includes all 

of the element IGs. And I’m going to work with those IGs. 

And we’ve had these issues pop up in the past. There has been 

some effort to integrate this group in the past. I would work with 

those IGs in the forum to try to resolve that at that level so that 

if there were any issues about us coming in to do a review, we 

could iron those out at the forum, and actually the statute requires 

that. It requires some coordination level, as an advisory body at the 

forum. 

But there will really not be a—I don’t think that I see this as 

a one-size-fits-all situation. So there may be investigations where 

we have to go in as a singular entity into an agency and conduct 

an investigation because of the circumstances of it. 

There may be other situations where we would create sort of a 

task force type concept, where we’d be leading a review within the 

IC and we would have members from each of the component IGs 

on our task force for this particular topic. 

And I do believe that there’s receptivity to that. I know and have 

worked with, for quite some time, the other IGs in the IC and I 

do believe there’s receptivity to that kind of construct. 

Senator SNOWE. Do you visualize the IC/IG forum to be the 

mechanism by which you resolve these disputes? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I would. I think that it would be the exception that we couldn’t, frankly. This is a group of IGs from the Intelligence Community. And so my hope would be and my anticipation 

is that these types of disputes we’ll be able to work out, or these 

types of negotiations we’ll be able to work out within the forum. 

Senator SNOWE. You have notification requirements in here, in 

the event that you do decide to override, if there’s overlapping jurisdiction and you decide to do an investigation within a specific 

agency. So are those notifications sufficient? Are there limitations 

to that as far as it is laid out in the statute? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Senator, from my read of them, they appear 

to be sufficient now. It may be that when we stand the office up 

and start operating that there may be something else we need legislatively. And I certainly wouldn’t hesitate to keep a close dialogue 

14 

with you and with the Committee and approach you if that was the 

case. 

Senator SNOWE. All right. I thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. McCullough. I look forward to working with you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Good afternoon. It’s a treat to see your family here. Thank you, 

Mr. McCullough, for your service to the country in so many different capacities and agencies over the years. You clearly have 

been able to operate in both the civilian and the military sectors 

which will, I think, prove to be a very valuable set of experiences, 

if you’re confirmed. 

I want to just follow up with Senator Wyden’s questions related 

to the FISA Amendments Act and our interest in learning as to its 

effects on Americans’ privacy. As Senator Wyden explained, we’ve 

been told that it isn’t ‘‘reasonably possible’’ to count the number of 

Americans whose communications have been reviewed under this 

law. 

So he and I propose that the Inspector General review the FISA 

Amendments Act to examine its impact on Americans’ privacy. 

Senator Wyden asked you earlier whether a review of this kind is 

something you would be able to do in your role. I want to thank 

you for your positive response and I look forward to working with 

Senator Wyden and you on this issue. So I did want to have a follow-up conversation with you on this matter. 

Which IG do you think would be best positioned to conduct such 

an audit? Would it be you or the DOJ IG, the NSA IG, another IG, 

or perhaps a combination of IGs? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. It would depend. It would depend upon how 

we decide to scope the review, whether it was an audit, whether 

it was an inspection, whether there were reasons to actually conduct an investigation, perhaps, and would depend upon how broad 

the review was going to be. 

So it may be something, again, that the IC/IG, if I was confirmed 

as the IC/IG, that I would need to send a team in there as the objective outside force coming in to take a look at this. Or it may be, 

if we scoped it in such a way that it’s going to be a very narrow 

set of objectives that we’re seeking in the review, that we wouldn’t 

need to do it ourselves, but that we would actually marshal forces 

within the IC and appoint, again, a sort of a task force team to look 

at this. 

But the topic is something that I think is very appropriate for 

the IC/IG to look at and I really believe it falls within the ambit 

of the statute. 

Senator UDALL. I appreciate hearing that, and the distinction between an audit and inspection investigation, the scoping process, 

very legitimate. I know Senator Wyden and I look forward to working with you as that proceeds. 

Let me go back to FISA. As you know, the FISA Amendments 

Act of 2008 required the inspectors general of elements of the IC 

that participated in the President’s surveillance program to conduct 

a review of that program, tracing its origins and implementation, 

analyzing legal questions about its development. 

15 

This is an example of the IC/IGs working together on a crosscutting issue, but doing so at the behest of Congress. I think Senator Chambliss asked about the PATRIOT Act. But with regard to 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, especially because of the 

crosscutting nature of the issues, I assume that you intend to review these issues carefully in your new role. Is that a fair assumption? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Certainly we’re going to go through, as we 

stand up the new office, a very robust work planning process. And 

my intention for that work plan process is to coordinate closely 

with you and with this Committee. 

And so those are the types of issues, IC-wide reviews, that we’re 

going to be looking for, IC-wide deficiencies, if there are things like 

that, misapplications going on. 

That is something that we’re going to want to take a very strong 

look at. 

Senator UDALL. The joint IG review that I referenced, that review was driven by statute. To what degree do you intend to be forward-leaning in terms of taking on such reviews under your own 

initiative as opposed to being prompted by Congress to do so? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, certainly we would ask for congressional input, but I would go through the IG forum—again, this is 

a dual hat; as the IC/IG you’re also the chair of the IC forum—and 

I would liase with my counterparts and my colleagues at the IC/ 

IG forum. There’s value in obtaining their input on this. And they 

all have their own individual work plans also. So it’s a matter of 

coordinating resources. 

And, again, this would be a risk-based type of analysis that we 

would go through, looking for areas of greatest risk, looking for 

areas of greatest vulnerability, looking for areas of greatest potential economic savings and returns, redundancies, and things like 

that. 

So that’s the type of analysis we would do, and this would be 

something that would certainly be considered in that analysis. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that answer. 

I’d like, Madam Chair, to submit a further question for the 

record on the independence of the IG, but I would add one final 

comment. I think Senator Chambliss talked about stovepiping, and 

I think he was implying, if not directly suggesting, that when you 

do your job and do it as effectively as I think we all believe you 

will do it, that stovepiping can be broken down in the process of 

what you do, as well as what the heads of the various Intelligence 

Community agencies do. 

So I think you could play a key role in that regard as well. And 

in fact, function can follow form. Sometimes we’ve got to come after 

the form to make sure that it fits what we need to do to gather 

this intelligence and then disseminate it. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, Senator. 

Senator UDALL. But thanks again for your commitment to serve. 

And it’s great to see your wonderful family here. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Thank you. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Senator Blunt. 

16 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman. 

Just a couple of questions, Mr. McCullough. On the IC Inspector 

Generals forum, you’ll chair that? Is that how that will work? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. 

Senator BLUNT. Will you vote on that as well? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes. Yes. 

Senator BLUNT. And what happens to the current group you’re 

working with, the ODNI IG? Does that continue also as a functioning group or does the new IC/IG supplant, replace that? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. The amendment to Title 50, which created 

the IC/IG, contains a provision that the authority which is in Section 8(k), I believe, of the Inspector General Act, is repealed. And 

Section 8(k) is the authority which called for the existence and allowed the existence of the ODNI IG 

So when the IC/IG is confirmed, the law says that the ODNI IG 

is going to—the authority for that office will have been repealed. 

Senator BLUNT. Right. Okay. And having worked in the ODNI IG 

for a while now, you mentioned redundancies among the agencies. 

Do you see some potential to eliminate redundancies among the IG 

community in the IC? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, Senator, I absolutely do. And I’ve said to 

other people during this process that we are a group, the IC/IG 

forum, we are a group that many of our reports criticize others for 

being stovepipe and we’re a fairly stovepiped group ourselves. 

So that’s one of my primary goals, is to integrate this group and 

to do that by bringing—this group has working groups, sort of subcommittees—to bring those subcommittees together to do this riskbased analysis, but not just doing it agency by agency. We’re looking at the forest, not just the trees. 

So to encourage all of these IGs’ offices to look for IC-wide deficiencies, the systemic deficiencies that we can develop IC-wide recommendations to address. 

Senator BLUNT. And waste, duplication, that sort of thing, would 

be one of your major targets in making the IG an IG for the IG 

community that you’re dealing with as well. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, Senator. Fraud, waste, and abuse are 

the fundamental tenets of the IG’s office, and certainly that’s where 

we would start. And just about everything we’ve talked about here 

today falls within one of those categories, whether it’s fraud, waste, 

abuse, or mismanagement. 

Senator BLUNT. Those are exactly the answers I hoped you had 

and the mission I hope you’re on, and I wish you well with it. And 

thank you and your family for the commitment you’ve all made to 

public service for a long time now. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Blunt. 

It would be my intention, unless someone has additional questions, to end it with this round. We’ll leave the record open for 48 

hours. Hopefully, you’ll respond to any questions very quickly. 

We will aim a markup for our first meeting, assuming we come 

back a week from Monday, and it’s an assumption because we don’t 

know if we’re going to be out yet. But the Tuesday meeting, as a 

first order of business we will mark this up and get it out of our 

Committee. 

17 

So I want to thank you, and I want to thank your family for 

being here. And I think he’s a shoe-in. 

[Laughter.] 

In any event, thank you. And the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

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