In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00183-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 432nd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1583147

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

PHILLIP JAY STERLING JR., Appellant

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Phillip Jay Sterling Jr., proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal his conviction and 

sentence for aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(2)(B), (e). Sterling pleaded guilty to that offense pursuant to a 

plea-bargain agreement, and the trial court sentenced him to seven years’ confinement 

in accordance with that agreement. As part of the plea-bargain process, Sterling signed 

written plea admonishments affirming, among other things, “I waive all rights of 

appeal in this case.”

The trial court’s “Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal” states that this 

“is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal” and that “the 

defendant has waived the right of appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d). We 

notified Sterling by letter of the certification and informed him that unless he or any 

party wanting to continue the appeal filed a response within ten days showing grounds 

for continuing the appeal, we could dismiss it. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d), 44.3.

Sterling contends that his guilty plea and his right-of-appeal waiver were

involuntary and “unintelligibly done.” He also states that he wants to appeal the denial 

of his pre-plea motion to compel and motion to recuse the trial-court judge.1

1

We previously dismissed for want of jurisdiction Sterling’s attempted 

interlocutory appeal from the order denying his motion to disqualify or recuse the 

trial-court judge because that order was neither a conviction judgment nor an 

appealable interlocutory order. See Sterling v. State, No. 02-23-00193-CR, 2023 WL 

6300591, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication).
3 

A criminal defendant has a right to appeal. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 

art. 44.02. But “[b]y its express terms, Rule 25.2(a)(2) places limitations on a 

defendant’s right to appeal from a plea bargain agreement that was followed by the 

trial court.” Jackson v. State, 168 S.W.3d 239, 242 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no 

pet.) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)). When a defendant pleads guilty and the 

punishment does not exceed the plea agreement’s recommended punishment, the 

defendant may appeal only (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed 

and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or 

(C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute. Tex. R. App. P. 

25.2(a)(2).

Relevant here, a valid right-of-appeal waiver prevents a defendant from 

appealing without the trial court’s permission. Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794, 796 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “A valid waiver of the right to appeal is one that was made 

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Id. at 796–97. When a defendant waives his 

right to appeal as part of an agreement on sentencing and the trial court follows the 

terms of that agreement, the waiver is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

See id. at 797–99; Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Such a 

waiver can be made orally or in writing. See Moreno v. State, 327 S.W.3d 267, 268–69

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.). And although Rule 25.2(a)(2)(A) allows a 

defendant who pleads guilty as part of a plea bargain the right to appeal matters raised 

by written motion and ruled on before trial, the defendant may waive such a right, if
4 

the waiver is made “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Marsh v. State, 444

S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (first citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 1.14; and then citing Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009)). 

According to the plea admonishments, Sterling—“in open court and joined by 

counsel”—affirmed that he could read English; that he fully understood each of the 

trial court’s admonishments and the written admonishments’ “statements and 

waivers”; that he was “aware of the consequences of [his] plea”; that he was “mentally 

competent, and [his] plea [was] knowingly, freely, and voluntarily entered”; and that 

he waived “all rights of appeal in this case.” Sterling’s counsel also signed the 

admonishments, averring that he “had fully reviewed and explained to [Sterling] the 

[c]ourt’s admonishments and [Sterling’s] statements and waivers” and that counsel 

was satisfied that Sterling was “legally competent and ha[d] intelligently, knowingly, 

and voluntarily waived his rights and that [Sterling] . . . plead[ed] guilty . . . aware of 

the plea’s consequences.” Consistent with these averments, the trial court found that 

Sterling was mentally competent to enter his plea and that he understood the plea’s 

consequences. It further found that Sterling’s “plea, statements, and waivers were 

freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.”

We must dismiss an appeal if the trial court’s certification, as supported by the 

record, does not show the defendant has a right of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d); see

Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Here, the plea 
5

admonishments show that Sterling made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver 

of his right to appeal, and according to the trial court’s certification, the trial court did 

not give him permission to appeal. We thus dismiss his appeal.2 See Chavez v. State, 183 

S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, while having 

jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant . . . is permitted to appeal by [Texas Rule 

of Appellate Procedure] 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further 

action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”); see also Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f).

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr

Elizabeth Kerr

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 15, 2024

2

We also dismiss all pending motions as moot.

Our dismissing Sterling’s appeal does not prevent him from pursuing habeas 

relief, a procedure that is “not only adequate to resolve claims of involuntary pleas[ ] 

but [is] superior to appeal in that the claim may be supported by information from 

sources broader than the appellate record.” Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2001); see Anderson v. State, No. 07-17-00090-CR, 2018 WL 2437592, at *2 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo May 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (“Appellant may be entitled to relief by filing a post-conviction writ of 

habeas corpus and developing a record to support his claim that his plea may not have 

been voluntary. A writ of habeas corpus may be supported by information from 

sources broader than the appellate record before us.”).