UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LAWRENCE ALVIN BULLOCK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JAMES A. SMITH,

Defendant-Appellee, No. 95-7869

and

MENTAL HEALTH WARD AT CENTRAL

PRISON,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

James C. Fox, Chief District Judge.

(CA-94-255-5-F)

Submitted: March 29, 1996

Decided: April 30, 1996

Before HALL, MURNAGHAN, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Lawrence Alvin Bullock, Appellant Pro Se. Jane Ray Garvey,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Lawrence Bullock appeals the district court's grant of summary

judgment for the Defendant on Bullock's 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (1988)

claim. We affirm.

Bullock, a North Carolina prisoner, claims that Defendant James

Smith, a physician at Bullock's institution, violated the Due Process

Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and prison regulations designed to

protect his liberty interest in avoiding forced medication. Our review

of the record reveals that the single injection at issue was given to

Bullock after he exhibited behavior causing prison medical staff to

believe that he posed an imminent threat of danger to himself and others. Further, that same day Bullock was provided with notice that he

was being referred to the Involuntary Medication Committee (IMC)

to determine whether further involuntary administrations of the drug

were warranted. The IMC is an independent, neutral board consisting

of three medical professionals. Inmates whose cases are brought

before the committee are allowed to present and cross-examine witnesses and are provided personal assistance in the preparation of their

presentations.

We find that this procedure, which so closely resembles that which

gained Supreme Court approval in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.

210 (1990), provides sufficient protection to an inmate's concededly

significant liberty interest in avoiding involuntary administration of

antipsychotic medication. Bullock makes much of the emergency

exception found in the policies which allows for medication prior to

a hearing and contends that this violates the rule established in

Harper. This assertion demonstrates a misunderstanding of the

Supreme Court's holding in Harper. Harper states only that the

Washington procedures regarding involuntary medication of prison

inmates satisfied the Due Process Clause; it does not mandate that

only these procedures provide sufficient procedural protection.

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Our review of the procedures as a whole leads us to conclude that

while a requirement mandating a hearing before any involuntary

administration of medication--even an emergency--might provide

inmates with an additional modicum of protection, the emergency

exception is narrowly drawn and sufficiently structured to reduce the

possibility of erroneous deprivation and arbitrary administrations of

medication not founded in sound medical judgment. See Harper, 494

U.S. at 221, 228, 231 (explaining this fundamental concern). Further,

we find that the burdens such a procedure would place upon the Government and prison officials far outweigh the slight additional protection it would afford the inmates. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319 (1976) (providing test for determining the necessity of additional

procedural safeguards). Accordingly, we find that the Defendant's

order to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to Bullock

prior to a hearing did not violate the Due Process Clause on these

facts.

Further, we find that a single injection of a antipsychotic drug,

given nonconsensually to a patient with a history of mental disorders

who had refused medication with deleterious effects for over a month,

and who was behaving in a manner dangerous to both himself and

others, does not offend evolving standards of decency and therefore

states no Eighth Amendment violation. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 346-47 (1981).

Finally, Bullock argues that the Defendant failed to follow the

prison procedures for involuntary medication. Specifically, he points

to a regulation which provides that the proposed medication must be

"the least intrusive from a therapeutic viewpoint of the possible treatments . . . [for] an involuntary medication order [to] be issued." Bullock, however, failed to present any sworn evidence suggesting that

the involuntary medication order was not the least intrusive measure

from a "therapeutic viewpoint." The Defendant, in contrast, provided

not only his affidavit, but the affidavit of another medical doctor

explaining that, in their medical opinions, restraining Bullock without

also administering the medication would have "exposed . . . Bullock

and staff, and other patients in the mental health unit, to potential

risk." Because this was the only sworn evidence on this issue before

the court, we find that Bullock failed to demonstrate a genuine issue

of fact and that the district court's grant of summary judgment for the

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Defendant was therefore appropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

Given these conclusions, we affirm the district court's grant of

summary judgment for the Defendant.* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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*We also deny Bullock's motion for appointment of counsel as he has

failed to demonstrate the requisite extraordinary circumstances warranting the appointment. See Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir.

1984).

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