1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., is substituted for form er Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as Respondent in this case. 

## United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________
No. 08-2760

___________ Ingrid Veronica Marroquin-Ochoma, * also known as Melissa Diaz, *

* Petitioner, * * Petition for Review of an Order of v. * the Board of Immigration Appeals.

* Eric H. Holder, Jr., 1 United States * Attorney General, *

* Respondent. *

___________ Submitted: March 10, 2009 Filed: July 28, 2009

___________ Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________ MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Ingrid Marroquin-Ochoma, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immi gration Appeals (the“BIA”) denying her application for asylum, withholding of re moval, and re lief under the Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”). We deny her petition for review.-2- I.

Marroquin-Ochoma entered the United States in May of 2005. Removal proceedings were commenced against her on March 31, 2006. Marroquin-Ochoma conceded removability, and she applie d for relief from removal on grounds of persecution on account of a particular soci al group and political opinion. In support of her application, Marroqui n-Ochoma testified and submitted evidence that she left Guatemala because gang members had threatened her on account of her position as someone with access to money and on account of an imputed anti-gang political opinion.

From 2003 until early 2005, Marroquin-Ochoma worked with three other people in the payroll department of a large export company. She describes her employment as being in a bank on the comp any premises, and she frequently handled cash in her position. Shortly after she st arted with the company, Marroquin-Ochoma began receiving threatening notes at home fro m gang members. At least one note was signed “MS,” for the gang known as Mara Sa lvatrucha. The notes demanded money and pressed her to join the gang. Gang members also called her at home and told her family to either give the gang money or turn Marroquin-Ochoma over to the gang.
The notes and calls threatened her life and the lives of her family members if the
demands were not met. She was never contacted in person. Although MarroquinOchoma did not take the threats seriously atfirst, she grew increasingly concerned as
the threats continued.

Marroquin-Ochoma informed her employer of the threats, but she did not ask for any assistance from the company’s s ecurity department, even though security officers would sometimes escort employees home. She did report the threats to the police, however. Although for a time the police sent extra patrols to her neighborhood, the police took no other acti on. The police instructed Marroquin-2 Marroquin-Ochoma’s opening brief does not present arguments challenging the BIA’s determination that the threats did not rise to the level of persecution, and the Government argues she has therefore waiv ed her past-persecution claim and cannot show a well-founded fear of future persecuti on. We decline to address this argument because, even assuming Marroquin-Ochom a has shown “persecution or a well-

-3- Ochoma to report her claims to the public prosecutor, but she did not do so because she believed the gang’s power made such efforts futile.

Approximately one year after Marroqui n-Ochoma joined the company, the threats caused her to leave her job and eventu ally flee Guatemala. The threats against her family continued even after she left, a nd gang members beat her father in reprisal for her refusal to concede to the gang’s demands.

The immigration judge (the “IJ”) f ound Marroquin-Ochoma generally credible, but he ultimately denied each of her clai ms. The IJ determined that MarroquinOchoma’s “resistance to the role of gangs ” did not constitute a political opinion. The IJ also concluded that Marroquin-Ochoma faile d to show that the threats were based on her membership in a particular social group, because “being a person in a position of responsibility and with direct access to money[,] who refused demands for money and recruitment by the gangs,” does not make someone a member of a particular social group. The IJ further held thateven if Marroquin-Oc homa had established membership in a particular social group, she had not established past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution for purposes of asylum—or established a clear probability that her life or freedom would be threatened for purposes of withholding of removal—because she had not shown that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control the gang. Finally, the IJ found that MarroquinOchoma had not shown government acquies cence, as required to support her CAT
claim. On administrative appeal, the BIA affirmed and adopted the opinion of the IJ, adding that Marroquin-Ochoma had failed to de monstrate that the threats rose to the level of persecution. 2founded fear of persecution,” her claims fail on the grounds at the forefront of her petition.

-4- Marroquin-Ochoma now argues before this court that 1) remand is necessary for meaningful consideration as to whethe r the threats were on account of an imputed anti-gang political opinion and that 2) the BIA “erred in holding that the government
of Guatemala is able to c ontrol the Mara Salvatrucha.”

II.

To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show that she is unable or unwilling to return to her country of orig in “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religi on, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a)(42)(A). “Where there has been persecution on account of political opinion, it does not matter if the applicant actually holds the political opinion that the persecutor attributes to her. Rather, we consider the political views the persecutor rightly or in error attributes to a victim.” De
Brenner v. Ashcroft , 388 F.3d 629, 635 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation and alteration omitted). It is the political opini on attributed to the victim, not the political opinion of the persecutor, that is u ltimately relevant. Turay v. Ashcroft , 405 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992)). The political opinion must be “‘at least one central reason’ for [the] persecution.” Carmenatte-Lopez v. Mukasey , 518 F.3d 540, 541 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(I)). But the persecution need not be solely, or even predominantly, on account of the imputed political opi nion. Parussimova v. Mukasey , 555 F.3d 734, 739–41 (9th Cir. 2009); cf. De Brenner , 388 F.3d at 636. Here, Marroquin-Ochoma argues that the gang members’ threats were motivated by an anti-gang political opinion that the gang members imputed to he r based on her refusal to join the gang
or otherwise succumb to their extortionate demands.-5- Where, as here, the BIA adopts the d ecision of an IJ but adds additional reasoning, we review both deci sions. Setiadi v. Gonzales , 437 F.3d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 2006). We defer to the agency’s “interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms if the interpretation is reasonable and consiste nt with the statute,” De Brenner , 388 F.3d at 636 (internal quotation omitted), and we re view the IJ’s factual findings for substantial evidence in light of the r ecord as a whole, Hassan v. Gonzales , 484 F.3d 513, 516 (8th Cir. 2007). “To reverse the finding that the alleged persecution was not based on a protected ground, it is necessary that the record compelthe finding that a protected ground motivated the [persecu tor’s] actions.” Gomez v. Gonzales , 425 F.3d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. at 481 & n.1).

At the outset, we reiterate that “careful attention to the particular circumstances surrounding the alleged persecution remains necessary even if the persecution is generally categorized as extortion or recruitment.” De Brenner , 388 F.3d at 638 n.2;
see also Zhang v. Gonzales , 426 F.3d 540, 546–47 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting “the categorical rule that opposition to government extortion cannot serve as the basis for a claim based on political opinion” and inst ead requiring “examination of the political context in which the dispute took place” (internal quotations omitted)). Motives of extortion and recruitment do not, therefore, preclude a finding of additional motives that may concern a protected ground. See De Brenner , 388 F.3d at 637.

We find little indication here, however, that the IJ imposed an impermissible “single motive” requirement at the expe nse of a meaningful inquiry. See id. (“[T]he BIA in this instance improperly de manded that the persecution occur solelydue to a protected basis.”). Rather, the IJ stated that he “[did] not believe that [MarroquinOchoma’s refusal to join the gang] r eally [was] a political opinion” because “[i]nadequate evidence ha[d] b een presented to indicate th at the gangs actually operate in a political framework, and the problems th e respondent had in no way were related to her expression of any political opinion.” He continued, “Resistance to criminal activity is not a political opinion in this context .” (emphasis added). The IJ did not-6- improperly conclude that no extortion or recruitment could be motivated by political opinion; the IJ merely concluded that Marroquin-Ochoma had presented insufficient
evidence to show that Mara Salvatrucha attributed an anti-gang political opinion to
her.

Marroquin-Ochoma argues that Mara Salvatrucha is not a “garden variety street gang” but rather is political in nature and that the mere refusal to join the gang is therefore sufficient to find an imputed politi cal opinion. At most, evidence that the gang is politically minded coul d be considered evidence that the gang members would be somewhat more likely to attribute political opinions to resisters. But even were we
to conclude that Mara Salv atrucha does in fact operate “in a political framework,” a “generalized ‘political’ motive underlying the [gang’s] forced recruitment [would be] inadequate to establish . . . the proposition that” the gang believes resistance to those
recruitment efforts is based on an an ti-gang political opinion. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. at 482 (“Even a person who supports a guerillamovement might resist recruitment for a variety of reasons—fear of combat, a desire to remain with one’s family and friends, a desire to earn a better living in civilian life, to mention only a few.”).

Marroquin-Ochoma points to no additional evidence in the record—and our review finds none—supporting her contention that the threats were on account of an imputed anti-gang political opinion. Although greater elaboration by the IJ would have been desirable, the IJ’s brevity in this case is consistent with the dearth of evidence in the record supporting a contrary conclusion. See Purwantono v. Gonzales

, 498 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating thatthere was “no evidence” of persecution on account of political belief where petitioner was beaten unconscious for resisting the recruiting efforts of a militant group); Dominguez v. Ashcroft , 336 F.3d 678, 680 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A reasonable fact finder could d ecide from this record that the guerillas were simply trying to fill their ranks and were not concerned with [the petitioner’s] political beliefs.”); see also Ramos-Lopez v. Holder , 563 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2009) (deferring to “the BIA’s determination that resistance to a gang’ s recruitment efforts-7- alone does not constitute political opinion” (alterations and internal quotation omitted)); In re S-E-G- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 588–89 (BIA2008) (concluding that the respondents “failed to show a political motiv e in resisting gang recruitment” where “there [was] no evidence in the record th at the respondents were politically active or made any anti-gang political statements”); In re E-A-G- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 596 (BIA 2007) (“[T]he respondent’s refusal to join MS, without more, does not constitute a ‘political opinion.’”). Unlike the evidence presented in De Brenner , the record here contains no evidence that the gang members considered Marroquin-Ochoma “a political enemy.” See De Brenner , 388 F.3d at 638.

Opposition to a gang such as Mara Salv atrucha may have a political dimension, but refusal to join the gang is not necessarily politically motivated. Consequently, the mere refusal to join Mara Salvatrucha, without more, does not compel a finding that the gang’s threats were on account of an imputed political opinion. MarroquinOchoma’s asylum claim thus fails.

III.

To qualify for withholding of removal, anapplicant has the burden of showing “a clear probability that [h er] ‘life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Mal onga v. Mukasey , 546 F.3d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)) (additional quotation and citations omitted). Marroquin-Ochoma’s political-opini on arguments for asylum apply equally to her withholding-of-removal claim. For the reasons discussed above, however, the record does not compel a finding that th e threats were on account of an imputed political opinion. We therefore also deny this claim.3 The IJ, relying on In re S-V- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000), stated that CAT relief does not extend to torture by entities that the government is unable to control. The correctness of this standard is not squarely before us, because the IJ ultimately concluded that the Guatemalan government was not unable to control the gang members—thus mooting his own relian ce on that standard. We note, however, that several of our sister circuits have expressly or effectively refuted this BIA precedent, indicating that evidence of unwillingness may lead to a finding of acquiescence notwithstanding that the govern ment would be unable to control the torturer even if it were willing to do so. See, e.g. , Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen. , 473 F.3d 58, 65 (3d Cir. 2007) (”[A]lthough a govern ment’s ability to control a particular group may be relevant to an inquiry in to governmental acquiescence under the CAT, that inquiry does not turn on a government’s ‘ability to control’ persons or groups engaging in torturous activ ity.”); Tunis v. Gonzales , 447 F.3d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding the fact that a government is not re sponsible for individuals whom it is unable to control “[t]rue, but irre levant” in light of eviden ce that the government condoned

-8- IV.

Unlike asylum and withholding of removal, the CAT does not require that Marroquin-Ochoma show a protected ground to be eligible for relief. Rather, to qualify for CAT relief, Marroquin-Ochoma must demonstrate that it is more likely
than not that she will be torturedif removed to Guatemala. See8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). To provide a basis for relie f, the torture must be “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acqui escence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). For purposes of CAT relief, “[a]cquiescence of a public official require s that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activ ity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(7). “This inquiry centers upon the willfulness of a government’s non-intervention. A government does not acquiesce in the torture of its citizens me rely because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it, but it does cross the line into acquiescence when it shows willful
blindness toward the torture of citizens by third parties.” Mouawad v. Gonzales , 485 F.3d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 2007) (interna l quotations and citation omitted). 3the torture).

4 Although Marroquin-Ochoma frames her argum ent in terms of the “unable or unwilling” standard relevant for her asyl um and withholding claims, she does state that she is also appealing the denial of CAT relief. Because the “acquiescence” analysis overlaps significantly with the “unable or unwilling” analysis and the two are often argued together, we consider Marroquin-Ochoma’s CAT argument sufficiently presented for appeal.

-9- Marroquin-Ochoma has submitted numerous articles and reports showing the government’s difficulty in controlling the extensive gang violen ce in Guatemala, as well as some evidence of general police reluctance to pursue gang members. Based on this evidence, she argues that the Gu atemalan government “condones” the gang’s activity. 4But the record also includes evid ence that the government aggressively prosecutes gang members. On the whole, th e record before us indicates that law enforcement is weak and inexperienced, no t that it acquiesces in gang activity. See Bartolo-Diego v. Gonzales , 490 F.3d 1024, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Even though the government’s failure to investigate and punish other individuals and clandestine criminal groups who break the law has resu lted in human rights abuses, the failure is due more to a weak and inefficient judici al system than to government acquiescence or approval.”).

Significantly, the record also includes evidence that the police did respond to her report by increasing patrols in he r neighborhood and that it was MarroquinOchoma herself who declined to formalize her complaint to the public prosecutor. The IJ concluded that “the police took a reasonable response” to her request for assistance, and substantial evidence supports the conc lusion that the police were not unwilling to control the gang members. If anythi ng, the record shows that the government attempted to protect Marroquin-Ochom a and that Marroquin-Ochoma, without adequate justification, declined to pursu e the avenues of law enforcement available
to her. Cf. Khilan v. Holder , 557 F.3d 583, 586 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (denying asylum and withholding of removal claims wh ere, inter alia, petiti oner refused to aid-10- the police investigation into petitioner’s persecutors). When paired with such countervailing facts specific to the petitione r, evidence of gene ral uncontrolled gang activity does not dictate a conclusion that the government acquiesced in the specific acts directed toward the petiti oner. Menjivar v. Gonzales , 416 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 2005).

We therefore find that substantial ev idence supports the BIA’s determination that Marroquin-Ochoma failed to establish that the Gu atemalan government condoned or acquiesced in the gang members’ threats as required under the CAT.

* * *

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

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