### NUM BER 1 3-09 -002 13-CV



## C O U R T O F AP P E AL S

T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS

C O R P U S C H R I S T I

- 

## E D I N B U R G

UNIQUE S TA FF LEA SI NG, LLC, A ND UNIQUE S TA FF LEA SI NG I, LTD., A ppell ants,

v.

RICHA RD ONDER, A ppell ee.

On a ppeal fr om the County Court a t La w No. 3 of Nueces County , Texas.



## M E M O R AN D U M O P I N I O N

Before Chi ef Justi ce Val dez and Just ic es Benavides and Ve la M emor andum O pini on by Chi ef Justi ce Val dez

App ellant s, Unique Sta f f Lea sing, LLC, and Unique Sta f f Lea sing I, Ltd

. (collectiv ely
“Uniq ue”), challen ge the jury ’s v erdict in a brea ch of cont ract c a s e in f avor of app ellee,

Richard Ond er. By f our issues, Unique argues tha t: (1) the statu te of f raud s bars Ond er’sclaims f or brea ch of an oral agreem ent f or f utu re com mission s; (2) the statu te of f raud s

bars Ond er’s claim f or brea ch of a w ritten agreem ent to pay f utu re com mission s beca use

Ond er could not esta blish tha t such a docu me nt existed and w as signed by Unique, the

party charged und er the agreem ent ; (3) the evidence is legally and f actu ally insuf f icient to

supp ort Ond er’s recovery f or brea ch of cont ract; and (4) if any agreem ent bet w een Unique

a nd Ond er existed, Unique w as excused f rom perf ormin g beca use Ond er com mit t e d a
prior m ate rial breach of the pu rported con tract. W e a f f irm as mo dif ied.

I. B A C K G R O U N D

A

. A greem ents Betw een Onder a nd Unique

T his dispu te cent ers on w het her an “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com mission

Agreem ent ” tha t Ond er and Unique purp orted ly e x ecut ed in 200 5 and an earlier oral

agreem ent to pay com mission s a re enf orcea ble. Unique is a “prof ession al em ployer

organiz ation ” tha t pro v ides “sta f f leasin g” an d othe r em ploymen t serv ices to bu sinesse s,

includin g “hum an resou rces, payroll, w orkers c o m p e n sation

, hea lthcare

, pen sion plan s,

sa f e t y [ and ] risk m ana geme nt, and claims serv ices.” Unique is base d in Corpus Christi,

T exas, but has bran ch of f ices in Housto n, San Ant onio

, and McAllen, T exas. Bradf ord and

his w if e own Unique; Ernest W ayne Judge serv ed as Unique’s Regional Vice-Preside nt of

Sale s; an d Gre g Maisal is Unique’s Vice-Presid ent of Sa les an d Market ing.

In Februa ry 200 2, Ond er w as hired by Unique as a salesm an. Ond er w as taske d 1

w ith soliciting a nd bringing n ew com pan y clients to Unique. Judge re c o mm end ed hiring

A t t r i a l

, O n d e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t J u d g e t o l d h i m w h e n h e w a s h i r e d t h a t U n i q u e h a s a c o n t i n u i n g 1

c o m m i s s i o n s p r o g r a m , w h i c h p r o v i d e d t h a t U n i q u e w o u l d c o n t i n u e t o p a y c o m m i s s i o n s t o a s a l e s m a n w h o l e f t U n i q u e , e i t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y o r i n v o l u n t a r i l y , f o r c l i e n t s w h o c o n t i n u e t o d o b u s i n e s s w i t h U n i q u e

. O n a p p e a l

, U n i q u e a d m i t s t h a t s u c h a p r o g r a m e x i s t s b u t a r g u e s t h a t o n l y B r a d f o r d h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o e n r o l l a s a l e s m a n i n t h e p r o g r a m a n d t h a t B r a d f o r d n e v e r a u t h o r i z e d O n d e r t o b e i n c l u d e d i n t h e p r o g r a m

. 2Ond er beca use the tw o knew each oth er. Ond er w as classif ied as an at-w ill em ployee of

Unique’s, and

, on July 30, 200 4, he signed an “At-W ill Agreem ent ,” w hich include d a non

com pet e clause lasting f or one ye a r. In his plea dings, Ond er asserte d tha t he w as
origi nally hired b ased on verbal agreem ent s an d th at, on July 30 , 20 04, Unique required

tha t he signed the “At-W ill Agreem ent .” Ond er ackno w ledged at trial tha t mo st discussion s
regardin g h is com pen sation w ere don e v erba lly ; in an af f idavit, Ond er not ed tha t the

partie s a gr e e d h e w ould be paid “a salary of abo ut a tho usan d dollars per w eek, hea lth

insuran ce and ben ef its, reimb ursem ent f or milea ge and a one [-]pe rcent com mission f or

sales. The comm ission w as to be paid mon thly in [an] am oun t . . . b ased up on a clien t’s
payroll f or th e p rev ious m ont h.”

On Decem ber 31, 200 4, Unique sent Ond er a lette r term inatin g his em ploymen t w ith

Unique. I n th is lette r, Unique sta ted tha t:

You f ailed to me et the $6, 000 ,00 0 gr oss payroll sales obje ctiv es out lines f or 200 4. You only me t 8% of the state d goals. On Octob er 5, 200 4[,] y ou w ere place d on a 90-d ay prob ation ary re vie w period and enco uraged to me et a
rev ised $90 0,0 00 payroll goal by the end of Decem ber 200 4. You w ere f ully
aware of the com mu nicate d expectat ions and conse quence s relate d to low prod uction levels. Your f ailure to at t a in t he state d sales obje ctiv es is
una ccept able an d is th e b asis f or your em ploymen t te rmina tion.

Ne verthe less, Unique app aren tly desired to ma intain a w orking relation ship wit h

O n d e r. As such, Bradf ord sent Ond er an e-ma il on Janu ary 3, 200 5, w ith an unsi gn e d

2

“Inde pen den t Con tracto r and Com mission Agreem ent ” atta ched . In his e -mail, B radf ord

instructe d On der t o rea d, sign, a nd return the docum ent to Bradf ord so that O nde r could

rema in em ployed by Unique as an inde pen den t cont ractor. Ond er printe d the agreem ent

, signed it, and ma il e d it b a c k t o Bradf ord f rom a local UPS store. T he record doe s not

T e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i t w a s c o m m o n f o r U n i q u e t o e n t e r i n t o a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r 2

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h r e c e n t l y
- t e r m i n a t e d s a l e s p e o p l e

. 3cont ain a copy of t h e a gr e e m ent signed by Ond er, Bradf ord, or an aut horized

represe nta tiv e of Unique; instea d, an unsigne d c o p y of the agreem ent is include d in the

record. At trial, Bradf ord den ied tha t the alleged signed v ersion of the cont ract could have

bee n lost by Unique em ployees. Ond er asserte d tha t shortly the reafter, he w as cont acte d
by Maisel f or ta x

inf orma tion so th at O nde r could get set up in Unique’s p ayr oll system.

T he partie s app aren tly ope rat e d und er the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and

Com mission Agreem ent ” f or app rox ima tely tw o y ears, unt il Februa ry 7

, 2 0 0 7

, w hen

Bradf ord se nt O nde r a let ter te rmina ting his serv ices. In this le tter, Bradf ord n ote d th at: 3

A t t r i a l

, B r a d f o r d t e s t i f i e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g r e g a r d i n g O n d e r ’ s c o m m i s s i o n s : 3

Q [ O n d e r ’ s t r i a l c o u n s e l ] : I f y o u d i d n o t h a v e

— i f y o u k n e w y o u d i d n o t h a v e a s i g n e d

c o n t r a c t w i t h M r

. O n d e r w o u l d y o u h a v e p a i d h i m
c o m m i s s i o n s ?

A [ B r a d f o r d ] : N o

. I w o u l d n o t

.
Q : W h e n y o u s e n t h i m t h e l e t t e r t e r m i n a t i n g h i s c o m m i s s i o n i n F e b r u a r y o f 0 7

, d i d y o u t h i n k y o u h a d a s i g n e d c o n t r a c t

a t t h a t t i m e ?

A : Y e s

. I d i d

.
Q : A n d t h a t w a s b e f o r e t h i s l a w s u i t w a s f i l e d ?

A : Y e s

.

. . . .

A : Y o u k n o w , y o u c a n b e a w o r d s m i t h a s m u c h a s y o u w a n t

. Y o u k n o w , w e f e l t l i k e p a r a g r a p h f i v e i n t h e i n d e p e n d e n t

c o n t r a c t s t a t e s

. . . t h a t y o u ’ r e g o i n g t o h a v e t o s e r v i c e t h e
c l i e n t s

. . . . I d o n ’ t g i v e f r e e m o n e y t o n o b o d y

.

. . . .
Q : T h a t ’ s r i g h t

. B u t y o u j u s t s a i d y o u d o n ’ t p a y o u t f r e e
m o n e y

. I n o t h e r w o r d s , a l l t h e e f f o r t s t h a t M r

. O n d e r w e n t t h r o u g h t o l a n d t h e s e c l i e n t s a n d b r i n g t h e m t o y o u , c l i e n t s t o U n i q u e t h a t U n i q u e f o r t h e m o s t p a r t

, y o u k n o w , h a s
e n j o y e d s i n c e t h e t i m e o f h i s t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f h i s c o m m i s s i o n , y o u k n o w , t h a t t h a t ’ s

— h i s e f f o r t s a r e n ’ t

w o r t h a n y t h i n g ?

4Every year[,] we aud it ea ch clien t of Unique to f ind o ut h ow w ell w e
are doin g[.] [T ]his aud it incl u d e s h ow w ell w e are delivering serv ices to include direct cont act b y ou r ma rketing represe nta tiv es.
Greg Maisal p h o ned all active clients brou ght to Unique as a result of y our ma rketing ef

f orts. Each client inf orme d Greg tha t y ou did not cont act the m during th e ca lend ar year 200 6.

Paragraph f ive (5) of the Ind epe nde nt Contra ctor and Com mission Agreem ent state s “that y ou w ill cont inue to b e paid com pen sation f or
accou nts brou ght to Unique provided y ou actively ma rket or serv ice accou nts f or Unique.”[ ] T his ha s no t ha ppe ned

.

4

Ef f ective March 1, 200 7[,] w e w ill no longer pay y ou com mission s f or busin ess b rought t o Unique as a result of you[r] m arketin g ef

f orts.
(Emp hasis in origin a l. ) Un ique discon tinue d paying Ond er com mission s, even tho ugh

som e o f Ond er’s clients cont inue d to do bu siness with Unique.

B. Proce dural Ba ckground

Ond er later f iled an origi nal pet ition alleging tha t, by ref using to cont inue paying him

com m is s io n s f or his clients tha t rema ined w ith Unique, Unique had brea ched the

“Inde pe nd en t C on tr acto r and Com mission Agreem ent ” and the oral agreem ent s tha t Judge

and Ond er e n t e re d into w hen Ond er w as f irst hired by Unique. Ond er also asserte d 5

c la ims f or unju st enrichm ent and atto rney’s f ees and sought a decla ration f rom the tria l

A : M r

. T y n a n [ O n d e r ’ s t r i a l c o u n s e l ]

, h e w o u l d s t i l l b e b e i n g [ s i c ] p a i d t o d a y i f h e h a d c o n t i n u e d t o h o n o r t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t w e s e t f o r t h t o h i m

. H e w a s p a i d h a n d s o m e l y f r o m t h e d a y h e b r o u g h t t h o s e c l i e n t s o n t o u s
u n t i l I c a n c e l l e d t h a t c o n t r a c t

.

C o n t r a r y t o B r a d f o r d ’ s a s s e r t i o n s i n h i s F e b r u a r y 7

, 2 0 0 7 l e t t e r , p a r a g r a p h f i v e o f t h e “ I n d e p e n d e n t 4 C o n t r a c t o r a n d C o m m i s s i o n A g r e e m e n t ” p r o v i d e s t h a t “ [ t ] h e s a l e s c o m m i s s i o n s h a l l b e p a i d m o n t h l y , n o l a t e r t h a n t e n ( 1 0 ) d a y s f o l l o w i n g t h e e n d o f t h e m o n t h i n w h i c h t h e S a l e s C o m m i s s i o n w a s e a r n e d

. R i c h a r d O n d e r
w i l l c o n t i n u e t o b e p a i d c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r a c c o u n t s b r o u g h t t o U n i q u e p r o v i d e d h e a c t i v e l y m a r k e t s o r s e r v i c e s p r o s p e c t i v e a c c o u n t s f o r U n i q u e

. ” ( E m p h a s i s a d d e d

. )

B r a d f o r d w a s n a m e d a s a p a r t y t o t h e s u i t ; h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e O n d e r d i d n o t s u b m i t q u e s t i o n s t o t h e 5 j u r y r e g a r d i n g B r a d f o r d ’ s l i a b i l i t y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r d e r e d t h a t O n d e r t a k e n o t h i n g f r o m B r a d f o r d

. A c c o r d i n g l y , B r a d f o r d i s n o t a p a r t y t o t h i s a p p e a l

. 5court tha t he w as ent itled to the com mission s at is s u e pursu ant to the “Inde pen den t

Contra ctor an d C om mi s s i on Ag r eeme nt.” Unique f iled its origi nal answer generally den y ing

Ond er’s allegation s and asserte d coun terclaim s f or atto rney’s f ees and a decla ration tha t

Ond er is no longer ent itled to the payme nt of com mission s und er t h e “I nde pen den t

Contra ctor and Com mission Agreem ent ” consid ering he w a s term inate d. Unique also

plea ded tha t the cont ract v iolate d the statu te of f raud s and w as, the ref ore, une nf orcea ble.

T here af ter, Unique f iled a traditio nal mo tion f or partia l sum ma ry judgme nt, arguing

tha t: (1) the com plaine d-of cont ract w as gov ern e d b y t h e s t atu te of f raud s; (2) the

co m p la ined -of cont ract did not satisf y the statu te of f raud s; and (3) Ond er’s brea ch of

cont ract claim f ailed as a ma tter of law

. Af ter a hea ring, the trial court den ied Unique ’s

mo tion f or sum ma ry

judgm ent

.
In early Sep tem ber 200 8, trial c o m m e n d e d in this ma tter. Af ter several days of

testim ony, the jury returne d a v erdict f avorable to Ond er. Spe cif ically

, the jury conclu ded

tha t: (1) Ond er and Unique agreed tha t Ond er w ould cont inue to be paid com mission s (the

agreem ent alleg edly ent ered into by Judge and Ond er w hen Ond er w as f irst hired), even

af ter his em ploymen t w ith Unique w as term inate d; (2) Unique f ailed to c o m p ly w ith the

com mission s agreem ent ; (3) Unique’s f ailure to com ply w ith the oral com missi o ns

agreem ent w as not excused; (4) the partie s inten ded to cond uct b usine ss elect ronically,

and bot h partie s agreed to be bou nd by the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com mission

Agreem ent” ; ( 5) U nique f ailed to com ply w ith the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com mission

Agreem ent ”; and (6) Unique’s f ailure to com ply w as not excused. Giv en its liability f indings,

6the jury awarded Ond er $52 ,02 5.1 1 in lost com mission s. T he trial court signed its f inal 6

judgme nt ado pting the ju ry’ s f indings on Janu ary 26, 200 9, and awarded Ond er an

add itiona l $3, 117 .96 in pre-judgm ent intere st, $21 ,75 0 in atto rney’s f ees f or trial

prep aratio n, $ 15, 000 in a ttorn ey’s fe es f or an ap pea l to t his Court, atto rney’s f ees f or an

app eal t o th e su prem e co urt, a nd intere st in t he am oun t of 5% per a nnu m.
Unique subse quently f iled a mo tion f or new trial, w hich w as overruled by ope ration

of law. See T E X

. R. C I V

. P. 329 b(c). T his ap pea l f ollowed.

II. T H E S T A T U T E O F F R A U D S

In the ir f irst and secon d issues, Unique argues tha t the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and

Com mission Ag reem ent ” and the oral agreem ent s bet w een Judge and Ond er v iolate the

statu te o f f raud s an d a re th eref ore u nen f orcea ble b ecau se th e a gr eem ent s cou ld no t be
perf orme d w ithin one y ear of their ma king and w ere not signed by the party charged w ith

the agreem ent —Unique. Unique also cont end s tha t the partie s did not inten d to cond uct

busin ess electro nically, and the atta chm ent of the unsigned cont ract to an e-ma il in w hich

Bradf ord type d h is n a m e doe s not const itute an electro nic signature or satisf y the

requireme nts f or an enf orcea ble electro nic transa ction. Ond er coun ters by arguing tha t the

cont ract is not subje ct to the statu te of f raud s beca use the agreem ent could be perf orme d

T h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s j u d g m e n t r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e j u r y a w a r d e d O n d e r $ 5 1

, 9 8 3

. 6 6 i n d a m a g e s f o r h i s b r e a c h 6

o f c o n t r a c t c l a i m a n d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a d o p t e d t h e j u r y ’ s f i n d i n g s

. H o w e v e r , t h e j u d g m e n t d o e s n o t c o i n c i d e
w i t h t h e j u r y ’ s a n s w e r t o “ Q u e s t i o n N o

. 7 " o f t h e j u r y c h a r g e , w h i c h a s k s a b o u t t h e a m o u n t o f d a m a g e s O n d e r
s u s t a i n e d

. I n r e s p o n s e t o “ Q u e s t i o n N o

. 7

, ” t h e j u r y a n s w e r e d t h a t O n d e r s u s t a i n e d $ 5 2

, 0 2 5

. 1 1 i n d a m a g e s

. B e c a u s e w e h a v e s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d

, w e r e f o r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s j u d g m e n t t o r e f l e c t t h e d a m a g e s a w a r d e d t o O n d e r b y t h e j u r y

— $ 5 2

, 0 2 5

. 1 1

. S e e U M L I C V P L L C v

. T & M S a l e s a n d E n v t l

. S y s

. , I n c

. , 1 7 6 S

. W

. 3 d 5 9 5

, 6 1 0 ( T e x

. A p p

. – C o r p u s C h r i s t i 2 0 0 5

, p e t

. d e n i e d ) ; G X G

, I n c

. v

. T e x a c a l O i l & G a s , 9 7 7 S

. W

. 2 d 4 0 3

, 4 2 3 ( T e x

. A p p

. – C o r p u s C h r i s t i 1 9 9 8

, p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t i f a t r i a l c o u r t e r r s i n c o m p u t i n g d a m a g e s , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t m a y r e f o r m t h e a m o u n t o f d a m a g e s ) ; s e e a l s o T r a v e l e r s I n s

. C o

. v

. M a r t i n , 2 8 S

. W

. 3 d 4 2

, 4 7 ( T e x

. A p p

. – T e x a r k a n a 2 0 0 0

, n o p e t

. ) ( “ A r e v i e w i n g c o u r t h a s t h e p o w e r t o m o d i f y t h e a m o u n t

o f r e c o v e r y a n d r e f o r m a d a m a g e s a w a r d

. ” )

. 7w ithin one y ear of its ma king, in accord ance w ith its own term s. Ond er f urthe r argues tha t 7

the cont ract w as electro nically signed by Bradf ord and tha t Ond er accep ted Unique’s of f er

of em ployme n t a s an inde pen den t cont ractor by signing the agreem ent and returnin g a

hard copy to Unique by ma il, as Unique requeste d. In the altern ative, Ond er asserts tha t

if the cont ract f alls w ithin the statu te of f raud s, Unique partly perf orme d und er the cont ract

and cann ot accep t the ben ef its of Ond er’s perf orma nce “and now u rg e tha t the cont ract

is not en f orcea ble p ursua nt t o th e [s] tatu te o f [f]raud s.”

A

. A pplica ble La w

T he statu te of f raud s exists to prevent f raud and perjury in c e rt a in kinds of

t ra nsact ions by requiring agreem ent s to be set out in w riting and signed by t h e p a rt ie s

.
Haase v. Glaz

ner , 62 S.W .3d 795

, 799 (Te x

. 200 1); Barran d, Inc. v. W hat abu rger, Inc.

, 214

S.W .3d 12 2

, 1 4 2 (T ex. App .–Corp us Christi 200 6, pet

. den ied). It bars enf orcem ent of

cont racts tha t c a n n o t b e perf orme d w ithin one y ear unle ss the cont ract is in w riting and

s ig n e d by the party to be charged w ith the prom ise. T E X

. B U S

. & C O M

. C O D E A N N

. §

26. 01(a ), (b)(6) (Verno n 200 9); see Schroe der v. Tex. Iron W orks, Inc. , 813 S.W .2d 483

,
489 (Te x

. 199 1), overrule d o n o t h e r grou nds by In re United Servs. Aut o. Ass’ n , 307

S.W .3d 299 (Te x

. 201 0); see also G a rr od Invs., Inc. v. Schle gel

, 139 S.W .3d 759

, 763
(Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi 200 4, no pet .). Gen erally

, w het h e r a c ont ract f alls w ithin the

statu te of f raud s is a question of law

. Bratch er v. Doz ier

, 162 T ex. 319

, 346 S.W .2d 795

,
796 (196 1); Lathem v. Kr u s e , 290 S.W .3d 922

, 926 (Te x

. App .–Dallas 200 9, no pet .);

Beve rick v. Koch Pow er, Inc.

, 186 S.W .3d 145

, 149 (Te x

. App .–Hou ston [1st Dist.] 200 5,

pet

. den ied); Choi v. McKenz ie

, 975 S.W .2d 740

, 743 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi 199 8, pet

.

O n a p p e a l

, O n d e r d o e s n o t r e s p o n d t o U n i q u e ’ s c o n t e n t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e a l l e g e d o r a l a g r e e m e n t s 7 b e t w e e n J u d g e , a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f U n i q u e , a n d O n d e r

. 8den ied). W e rev iew question s of law de novo. El Paso Natura l Gas Co. v. Minco Oil &

Gas, Inc.

, 8 S .W .3d 309

, 312 (Te x

. 199 9); Rittm er v. Garz a , 65 S.W .3d 718

, 722 (Te x

. App .–Hou ston [14 th Dist.] 20 01, no pe t.).

T he statu te of f raud s in an af f irmative def ense , w hich is w aived if not plea ded

. See

T E X

. R. C I V

. P. 94; see also P hillips v. P hillips , 82 0 S .W .2d 785, 791 ( T ex. 199 1); Garrod

I n vs., Inc.

, 139 S.W .3d at 763

. T he party plea ding the statu te of f raud s bea rs the in it ia l

burd en in esta b li s h in g it s app licability

. See Otto Veh le & Reserve Law Officers Ass’ n v.

Brenn er , 590 S.W .2d 147

, 152 (Te x

. Civ

. App .–S an Ant onio 197 9, no w rit). Once it is

esta blished tha t the statu te of f raud s app lies

, t h e burd en of proo f shif ts to the plaint if

f to

esta blish f acts w hich w ould take the oral cont ract out of the statu te, thu s allowi ng the oral

prom ise to be en f orcea ble. See id. “ W het her the circumsta nces of a p articular ca se f all

w ithin an exception to the statu te of f raud s is generall y a qu e s t io n of f act.” Ada m s v.

Pet rade Int’ l, Inc.

, 754 S.W .2d 696

, 705 (Te x

. App .–Hou ston [1st Dist.] 198 8, w rit den ied);

see Brenn er

, 590 S.W .2d at 152 (stating tha t a plaint if f mu st esta blish f acts w hich take an

oral cont ract out side the statu te of f raud s). T he party seekin g to ben ef it f rom an exception

to t he statu te o f

f raud s be ars th e b urde n o f plea ding an d p rov ing an e x cept ion. Mann v.

NCNB Tex. Nat’

l Ban k

, 854 S.W .2d 664

, 668 (Te x

. App .–Dallas 199 2, no w rit). In add ition,

unle ss the evidence conclu siv ely esta blishes an exception

, a party mu st secure a f avorable

jury f inding on the exception

. T E X

. R. C I V

. P. 279 ; Barbo uti v. Mund en , 866 S.W .2d 288

,
2 9 5 (T e x

. App .–Hou ston [14 th Dist.] 199 3, w rit den ied), overruled on oth er grou nds b y

Form osa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng ’ rs & Contracto rs, Inc.

, 960 S.W .2d 41 (Te x

.
199 8).

T o satisf

y the statu te of f raud s, the re mu st be a w ritten me mo rand um w hich “must

9be com plete w ithin itself in every ma terial det ail and mu st cont ain all the essen tial elem ent s

of the agreem ent

, so tha t the cont ract can be ascerta ined f rom the w riting w ithou t resorting

to oral testim ony.” Garrod Invs., Inc.

, 139 S.W .3d at 763 (citing Cohe n v. McCutchin

, 565

S.W .2d 23 0, 2 32 (Te x . 19 78)); see Frost Nat’ l Ban k v. Burge

, 29 S.W .3d 58 0, 5 94 (Te x

. App .–Hou s t o n [ 14t h Dist.] 200 0, no pet .); Bach m an Ctr. Corp. v. Sale

, 359 S.W .2d 290

,
294 (Te x

. Civ

. App .–Dallas 196 2, w rit ref ’d n.r.e .) (“[T]h e essen tial elem ent s of a cont ract

required to be in wr iting ma y ne v er be sup plied by parol [e v iden ce].”).

B. The “Independe nt Contractor and Commiss ion A gr eem ent” and the A pplica bility

of the Statute of Frauds

Here, Unique time ly plea ded its statu te of f raud s af f irmative def ense ; thu s, it bore the

initial burd en of proving the app licability of the statu te of f raud s to this dispu te. See T E X

. R.

C I V

. P. 94; Phillips , 82 0 S .W .2d at 791 ; see also Brenn er , 59 0 S .W .2d at 152

. Am ong its

argume nts o n a ppe al, Unique cont end s that th e a gr eem ent is no t en f orcea ble b ecau se a

copy of the cont ract signed by Unique and Ond er, the parti e s t o t h e cont ract, w as never
prod uced at trial. T his cont ent ion is prem ised on the assum ption tha t the statu te of f raud s

app lies and tha t the agreem ent nee ded to be in w ri t in g and signed by the partie s. See

Haase , 62 S.W .3d at 799 ; see also B arrand , In c. , 21 4 S .W .3d at 142

.
T he record cont ains a copy of t h e “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com mission

Agreem ent ,” w hich w as not sig ned by eithe r party. Ond er testif ied tha t this cont ract is the

agreem ent b e t we e n Unique and him regarding his inde pen den t-cont ractor statu s and

com mission s. T he record also cont ains an e-ma il sent f rom Bradf or d t o O n d er w ith the

com plaine d-of cont ract atta ched

. In this em ail, Bradf ord state d the f ollowi ng: “Please read

and sigh [sic]. If y ou have any question s[,] do not hesita te calling. Garry .” Ond er replied

10t o B ra df ord’s e-ma il with an e-ma il o f his own. T he f ollowi ng are the cont ent s of Ond e r’ s

e-ma il respon se:

Dear Garry

, T h ank You so mu ch f or e[-]m ailing me the cont ract[.] I w ill be
rev iew ing it to sign in the next day or tw o. One correctio n I im m edia tely caught, w as my z ip code nee ds to be corrected

. It is 782 31. W ill cont act y ou shortly. T han ks again f or th is opp ortun ity [.] Richa rd On der.

Ond er testif ied tha t he signed the cont ract and ma iled it back to Unique, as w as requeste d.

In dep osition testim ony, Bradf ord den ied ever receivi ng the signed cont ract f rom Ond er and

den ied tha t the docu me nt ma y have bee n misp laced or lost. How ever, in his trial testim ony,

Bradf ord allude s to t h e “I n d e pen den t Contra ctor and Com mission Agreem ent ” as the

cont ract the p a rt ie s ope rated und er f rom Janu ary 3, 200 5 to Februa ry 7, 200 7.

Furthe rmore , in the Februa ry 7, 200 7 term inatio n lette r tha t he drafted

, Bradf ord recogniz ed

the existence of the cont ract w hen he explicitly ref eren ced para gr aph f iv e of the cont ract

as the gr oun ds f or term inatin g O n d e r. Ne v erthe less, w het her Ond er signed the cont ract

a n d w het her Unique received the cont ract w ere f act issues f or the jury to det ermin e , a n d

w ith its v e rd ict, the jury conclu ded tha t Ond er signed the cont ract; Ond er ma iled it to

Unique; Unique received the cont ract; and Unique and On der accep ted the term s of the

cont ract a nd began pe rf ormin g, thus ma king the cont ract e nf orcea ble.

Despite the ju ry’s conclu sions, Unique argues tha t the cont ract is une nf orcea ble

beca use Ond er and a represe nta tiv e f rom Unique did not sign the cont ract. Even assum ing

tha t the statu te of f raud s app lies, w e hold

, base d on the record bef ore us, tha t a reaso nab le

juror could have conclu ded tha t Ond er signed the cont ract and ma iled it back to Unique, as

w as requeste d, and tha t Unique accep ted the cont ract by perf ormin g in accord ance w ith the

cont ractua l term s f or app rox ima tely tw o y ears as if Ond er had actu ally accep ted the term s

11of the cont ract by signing. See Ing ram v. Deere

, 288 S.W .3d 886

, 893 (Te x

. 200 9) (stating

tha t, w e credit e vid ence f avorable to the jury ’s v erdict if a reaso nab le juror could have so

f oun d and disrega rd cont rary evidence unle ss a reaso nab le juror could not have so

f oun d—th e stan dard f or legal suf f iciency) ; Colum bia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogu e ,
271 S.W .3d 238

, 248 (Te x

. 200 8) (same ); City of Keller v

. W il s o n , 168 S.W .3d 802

, 827
(Te x . 20 05) (sam e). Fu rtherm ore, Bradf ord a dm itted i n his testim ony tha t he be liev ed he

had an enf orcea ble c o n tract w ith Ond er. T exas courts have held tha t “[a] cont ract

cont aining mu tua l obligation tha t h a s b e e n re duce d to w riting and signed by one of the

partie s can be accep ted by the non -sig ning party by the ir cond uct, thu s ma king it a bind ing

agreem ent on bot h partie s.” MG Bldg

. Materials, Inc., v. Moses Lop ez Custom Hom es, Inc.

,
179 S.W .3 d 5 1

, 62 (Te x

. App .–S an Ant onio 200 5, pet

. den ied) (citing Hearth shire

Braesw ood

Plaz a Ltd. P’ ship v. Bil

ly Kelly Co. , 849 S .W .2d 38 0, 3 92 (Te x . App.– Housto n
[14 th Dist.] 199 3, w rit den ied); Vela sque z v. Schu ehle

, 562 S.W .2d 1, 3 (Te x

. Civ

. App .–S an

Ant onio 197 7, no w rit) (“To const itute a v alid cont ract in w riting[,] it is not nece ssary tha t the

agreem ent be signed by both pa rties, f or i[f ] on e p arty signs, the oth er ma y accep t by h is

acts, cond uct, or acquiescen ce in the term s of the cont ract.”)). Base d on the evidence, w e
reject Un ique’s argume nt t hat the con tract is une nf orcea ble b ecau se th e reco rd is de v oid

of a co py of

the con tract signed by Unique. See MG Bldg

. Materials, Inc.

, 179 S.W .3d at

62; Billy Kelly Co. , 84 9 S .W .2d at 392 ; Vela sque z , 56 2 S .W .2d at 3.

W e f urthe r reject Unique’s cont ent ion tha t the cont ract is une nf orcea ble beca use it

c a n n o t b e c o m plete d w ithin one y ear. In arriv ing at this conclu sion, w e mu st look to the
specif ic language cont aine d in the agreem ent

. T he agreem ent expressly provides tha t the

term of the agr eem ent “is f or one y ear com me ncing on the ef f ective dat e of this

12Agreem ent .” T he agreem ent f urthe r provides tha t it:

shall aut om atically ren ew f or add itiona l one [-]y ear term s unle ss eithe r party giv es six ty (60) days w ritten not ice to the oth er party bef ore the expiration of any term of the ir desire to term inate this Agreem ent f or cause

. Richard Ond er shall be ent itled to cont inue t o re ceive the tota l com pen sation (as def ined belo w ) f rom Unique f or custo me rs tha t Richard O n d er delivered to Unique during the term of this Agreem ent or any rene w ed term f or so long as Richard Ond er com plies with para gr aph f iv e.
Paragraph f iv e o f

the agreem ent stat es, in relevant p art, t hat :

Richard Ond er shall be paid bet w een .50 %-1.00 % of each custo me rs[’] gr oss payroll on busin ess boo ked b a s e d on cont ract quotes f rom client
com pan ies.

. . . T h e sales com mission shall be paid mo nth ly

, no later tha n ten (10) days f ollowi ng the end of the mo nth in w hich the Sale s Com mission
wa s e a rned

. Richard Ond er w ill cont inue to be paid com pen sation f o r
accou nts brou ght to Unique p ro vid ed he actively ma rkets or serv ices prosp ective accou nts f or Unique.

T he plain language o f

the agreem ent clearly sta tes t hat the term of the agreem ent

is f or on e year, m ean ing that it could be perf orme d, by its own t erms, w ithin one year. “If

a cont ract can, f rom the term s of the agreem ent

, be perf o rm e d wit h in one y ear[, ] it is not

w ithin the [s]ta tute of [f ]raud s.” Mill er v. Riata Cadillac Co

. , 5 1 7 S.W .2d 773

, 775 (Te x

.
1 9 7 4 ); see Niday v. Niday

, 643 S.W .2d 919

, 920 (Te x

. 198 2) (“[W ]he re the agreem e n t

,

e it her by its term s or by the nat ure of the requ ired acts

, cann ot be com plete d w it h in o n e

y ear, it f alls w ithin the statu te [of f raud s] and mu st t here f ore be in w riting.”) (emp hasis in

origi nal); Hall v. Hall

, 308 S.W .2d 12, 14 (Te x

. 195 7) (st a t in g th at a cont ract doe s not f all

w ithin th e s t a t u t e o f f raud s unle ss it app ears “f rom the term s of the cont ract tha t
perf orma nce cann ot be com plete d w ithin one y ear”); see also Cheva lier v. Lan e’ s , 147 T ex.

106

, 213 S.W .2d 530, 532 ( 194 8) ( not ing tha t the statut e of frau ds does not apply “w here

the agr eem ent ma y , by its own t erms, be f ully perf orme d w ithin the y ear”). T he supre me

court also state d tha t “w h e re [ a ] c o ntract om its the perf orma nce term s, dura tion ma y

13prop erly be imp lied f rom extri nsic evidence. If tha t evidence conclu siv e ly proves tha t the

cont ract canno t be com plete d within on e year . . . the . . . contract v iolate d the [s]tat ute of

[f ]raud s as a ma t t e r o f la w .” Niday

, 643 S.W .2d at 920 (citing Krueg er v. You ng , 406

S.W .2d 751

, 755 -56 (Te x

. Civ

. App .–E astlan d 196 6, w rit ref ’d n. r.e.)). Here, the cont ract

has specif ic perf orma nce term s tha t can be com plete d w ithin one y ear of its ma king; thu s,

w e co nclud e th at t he “Inde pen den t Con tracto r and Com mission Agreem ent ” doe s not f all

w ithin t he statu te o f

f raud s. 8

Unique has repe ate dly argued tha t the term of the agreem ent exceede d one y ear in

dura tion, since the purp orted ef f ective dat e of the agreem ent w as Janu ary 3, 200 5, and the

agreem ent w as f inally term inate d by Unique on Fe b ru a ry 7

, 200 7. In supp ort of this

cont ent ion, Unique relies hea v ily o n this Court’s decision in Barran d

. W e do not f ind

Unique ’s argume nt to be persu asive, and w e f ind the Barran d case to be distinguisha ble

f rom the f acts in this ca se.

T he dispu te in Barran d perta ined to a settle me nt agreem ent bet w een W hat abu rg er

an d va ri ous f ranch isees, includin g Barran d. See 214 S.W .3d at 127

. T he settle me nt

agreem ent arose f rom a prior law suit brou ght by several f ranch isees regarding an “improp er

reba te program bet w een W hat abu rg er and the supp liers tha t sell goods to W hat abu rg er’s

f ranch isees.” I d

. T he settle me nt agreem ent dictat ed tha t f ranch isees receive v ary ing

am oun ts of

cash reimb ursem ent s an d b e a llow ed to execute new f ranch ise agr eem ent s.

Id. T he new f ranch ise agreem ent s, oth erw ise ref erred to as mo di f ied f ranch ise agreem ent s,

B e c a u s e t h e “ I n d e p e n d e n t C o n t r a c t o r a n d C o m m i s s i o n A g r e e m e n t ” p u r p o r t e d l y e n c a p s u l a t e s t h e 8

o r a l a g r e e m e n t s a l l e g e d l y e n t e r e d i n t o b e t w e e n J u d g e a n d O n d e r a n d O n d e r a p p e a r s t o a s s u m e a s s u c h i n h i s a p p e l l a t e b r i e f

, w e n e e d n o t a d d r e s s U n i q u e ’ s a r g u m e n t p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e o r a l a g r e e m e n t s , g i v e n o u r d i s c u s s i o n a n d d i s p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e “ I n d e p e n d e n t C o n t r a c t o r a n d C o m m i s s i o n A g r e e m e n t

. ” S e e T E X

. R

. A P P

. P

. 4 7

. 1

, 4 7

. 4

. 14gr ant ed the f ranch isees the rig ht to ope rate restau rants und er the W hat abu rg er sy stem f or

an initial ten -y ear period and gr ant ed the f ranch isees the righ t to rene w the ir f ranch ise

agreem ent s f or t wo successive f iv e-y ear term s. Id. T he language include d in the

settle me nt agreem ent beca me the basis f or the law suit f iled by W hat abu rg er. Id. Barran d

f iled coun terclaim s against W hat abu rg er, w hich include d a c la im involv ing a purp orted

cont ractua l rig ht to develop new restau rants. Id. at 140 -42. Barran d alleged tha t it ent ered

into v arious oral agreem ent s in 199 4 and 199 8, w ith W hat abu rg er to d e ve lo p new

restau rants. W hat abu rg er, in an answer to B arrand ’s coun terclaim s, argued tha t th e o ral

agreem ent s w ere une nf orcea ble u n d e r t h e statu te of f raud s beca use the y could not be

com plete d w ithin one y ear. Id. at 141 -42. It w as undisp ute d that “the agreem ent [s] could

not be perf orme d w ithin one y ear beca use [the y ] ent ailed a ‘perm ane nt’ obligati on f or

W hat abu rg er to allow new store developm ent .” Id. at 141

. I n re s p o n s e to Barran d’s

coun terclaim s, W hat abu rg er f iled a mo tion f or sum ma ry judgme nt, w hich was granted by

the trial court. Id. at 127 -28. On app ea l, Barran d claime d tha t sum ma ry judgme nt w as
imp rope r beca use W hat abu rg er “f ailed to prod uce any evidence to esta blish tha t the

agreem ent [s] could not be perf orme d w ithin one y ear.” Id. at 141

. W e note d that the first

purp orted oral agreem ent bet w een Barran d and W hat abu rg er too k place in 199 4, the

alleged brea ch of the agreem ent too k place in 200 1, and the oral a gr eem ent w as relate d

to the ten -y ear s e t t le me nt agreem ent and conclu ded tha t the oral agreem ent s bet w een

Barran d a nd W hat abu rg er f ell w ithin t he statu te o f f raud s. Id. at 141 -42.

W e f ind the f acts in Barran d to be distinguisha ble f rom the prese nt case beca use

Barran d adm itted tha t W hat abu rg er’s obligatio n s t o a llo w f ranch isees to develop new

restau rants w ere “perm ane nt” and “the agreem ent could not be perf orme d w ithin one y ear.”

15Id. at 141

. Here, the specif ic language of the Ind epe nde nt Contra c t o r a n d Co mm ission

Agreem ent provides f or one -y ear term s w ith a u t o m a t ic rene w als f or add itiona l one -y ear

term s, unle ss an inten t to term inate is time ly expressed in w riting. T hus, the com plaine d-of

cont ract ca n b e co mp leted w ithin o ne y ear.
Unique argues tha t the partie s’ testim ony at trial dem onst rates tha t the y inten ded f or

the cont ract to last several y ears, as long as clients stayed w ith Unique. Unique directs us

to testim ony tha t, on average, clients stayed w ith Unique f or f iv e y ears. T his evidence,

howev er, is irrelev ant giv en tha t the language of the cont ract gov erns and the c o n t ra c t is

the em bod ime nt of t h e p a rties’ inten t. Unique’s atte mp t to use paro l evidence, i.e. the

p arties’ testim ony, to cont radict the una mb iguous term s of the cont ract is imp ermissible

.
See Nat’ l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Ind us., Inc.

, 907 S.W .2d 517

, 521 (Te x

. 199 5) (stating

tha t, und er the paro l evidence rule, extri nsic evidence is ordina rily not adm issible to add to,

v ary , or cont radict the term s of a w ritten cont ract tha t is clear on its f ace); see also Villarreal

v. Art Inst. of Housto n, Inc.

, 20 S.W .3d 792

, 796 -97 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi 2 0 00, no
pet .) (sam e).

Furthe rmore , Unique has not cited, nor are w e aware of

, bind ing aut hority statin g tha t

w e ignore the express term s of the purp orted agreem ent and

, instea d, f ocus on how ma ny

rene w al term s w ere executed or how long the agreem ent actu ally r em aine d in f orce. See

Hampto n v. Lum

, 5 4 4 S.W .2d 839

, 841 (Te x

. Civ

. App .–T exarkana 197 6, no w rit)
(conclud in g t h a t t h e “t erm” in a w ritten lease f or the conveyance of real prop erty has a

tech nical me anin g a nd tha t th e te rm in the lease w as f or two y ears when the langua ge of

the lease provided tha t the origi nal lease term w as f or one y ear w ith an aut om atic rene w al

16opt ion of one y ear) ; see also Sulliva n v

. L e o r E nergy LLC

, 600 F.3d 542

, 547 (5th Cir. 9

201 0) (pertain ing to an em ploymen t cont ract and statin g tha t “und er T exas law

, a cont ract

f or a state d te rm lon ger than on e year i s not taken out of the statute of f raud s w hen the re

is a me re possib ility of term inatio n w ithin one y ear due to cont ingent events set f orth in the

cont ract, includin g term inatio n by a party.

. . . [T ]he possib ility tha t a party to a cont ract
might die less tha n a y ear af ter a cont ract w ith a term of m o re tha n one y ear w as

consu mm ate d doe s not take the agr eem ent out of the statu te of f raud s”); Gulf Coast Mar.

Assocs. v. C-Port Galvest on , Civ il Action No. G -04-30 8, 2 005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 279 50, at

*5 (S. D. T ex. Nov. 8, 200 5) (inv olvi ng a w ritten lease f or real esta te). Base d on the

f oregoing, we c o n c lude tha t the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com mission Agreem ent ”

could have bee n perf orme d w ithin one ye a r a n d

, thu s, w as not subje ct to the statu te of

f raud s. See T E X

. B U S

. & C O M

. C O D E A N N

. § 26. 01(a ), (b )(6); see also Schroe der

, 813

10

W e f i n d t h e H a m p t o n v

. L u m d e c i s i o n t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e b e c a u s e t h e 9 d i s p u t e i n v o l v e d a l e a s e g o v e r n i n g t h e c o n v e y a n c e o f r e a l p r o p e r t y ; f u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e n e w a l o p t i o n w a s
e x e r c i s e d b y a l e s s e e v i s

- a

- v i s t h e l e s s o r

. 5 4 4 S

. W

. 2 d 8 3 9

, 8 4 0 ( T e x

. C i v

. A p p

. – T e x a r k a n a 1 9 7 6

, n o w r i t ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t t h e a u t o m a t i c r e n e w a l o p t i o n i s “ t r e a t e d a s a p r e s e n t d e m i s e f o r t h e f u l l p e r i o d o f t i m e t o w h i c h t h e l e a s e m a y b e e x t e n d e d s u b j e c t t o d e f e a s a n c e b y a c o n d i t i o n s u b s e q u e n t ” )

. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e
a g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e l e a s e w o u l d a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e n e w f o r a n a d d i t i o n a l o n e

- y e a r t e r m ; h o w e v e r , i t g a v e b o t h p a r t i e s t h e r i g h t t o t e r m i n a t e t h e a g r e e m e n t a f t e r g i v i n g p r o p e r n o t i c e

. M o r e o v e r , t h e a g r e e m e n t i n t h i s
c a s e d i d n o t i n v o l v e t h e c o n v e y a n c e o f r e a l p r o p e r t y

. S e e T E X

. B U S

. & C O M

. C O D E A N N

. § 2 6

. 0 1 ( b ) ( 4 ) ( V e r n o n 2 0 0 9 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t a c o n t r a c t f o r t h e s a l e o f r e a l e s t a t e m u s t c o m p o r t w i t h t h e s t a t u t e o f f r a u d s )

, ( b ) ( 5 ) ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t a l e a s e o f r e a l e s t a t e f o r a t e r m l o n g e r t h a n o n e y e a r m u s t c o m p l y w i t h t h e s t a t u t e o f f r a u d s
o r , i n o t h e r w o r d s , m u s t b e i n w r i t i n g a n d s i g n e d b y t h e p a r t i e s c h a r g e d w i t h p e r f o r m a n c e )

.

B e c a u s e w e h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t : ( 1 ) t h e “ I n d e p e n d e n t C o n t r a c t o r a n d C o m m i s s i o n A g r e e m e n t ” 10 i s n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e s t a t u t e o f f r a u d s ; ( 2 ) r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r s c o u l d h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t O n d e r s i g n e d t h e
a g r e e m e n t a n d m a i l e d i t t o U n i q u e , a s r e q u e s t e d ; a n d ( 3 ) U n i q u e a c c e p t e d t h e t e r m s o f t h e a g r e e m e n t b y p e r f o r m i n g u n d e r t h e a g r e e m e n t f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w o y e a r s , i t w a s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t U n i q u e s i g n t h e
c o n t r a c t i n o r d e r t o b e b o u n d b y t h e c o n t r a c t

. S e e T E X

. B U S

. & C O M

. C O D E A N N

. § 2 6

. 0 1 ( a )

, ( b ) ( 6 ) ( V e r n o n 2 0 0 9 ) ; S c h r o e d e r v

. T e x

. I r o n W o r k s , I n c

. , 8 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 3

, 4 8 9 ( T e x

. 1 9 9 1 )

, o v e r r u l e d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s b y I n r e U n i t e d S e r v s

. A u t o

. A s s ’n

, 3 0 7 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 9 ( T e x

. 2 0 1 0 ) ; G a r r o d I n v s

. , I n c

. v

. S c h l e g e l

, 1 3 9 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 9

, 7 6 3 ( T e x

. A p p

. – C o r p u s C h r i s t i 2 0 0 4

, n o p e t

. ) ; s e e a l s o M G B l d g

. M a t e r i a l s , I n c

. , v

. M o s e s L o p e z C u s t o m H o m e s , I n c

. , 1 7 9 S

. W

. 3 d 5 1

, 6 2 ( T e x

. A p p

. – S a n A n t o n i o 2 0 0 5

, p e t

. d e n i e d ) ; H e a r t h s h i r e B r a e s w o o d P l a z a L t d

. P ’s h i

p v

. B i l l y K e l l y C o

. , 8 4 9 S

. W

. 2 d 3 8 0

, 3 9 2 ( T e x

. A p p

. – H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 1 9 9 3

, w r i t d e n i e d ) ; V e l a s q u e z v

. S c h u e h l e , 5 6 2 S

. W

. 2 d 1

, 3 ( T e x

. C i v

. A p p

. – S a n A n t o n i o 1 9 7 7

, n o w r i t )

. F u r t h e r m o r e , w e c a n n o t

s a y t h a t t h e j u r y w a s u n r e a s o n a b l e i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e d t o t r a n s a c t b u s i n e s s e l e c t r o n i c a l l y , e s p e c i a l l y w h i l e O n d e r w a s d e s i g n a t e d a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r

. S e e T E X

. B U S

. & C O M C O D E A N N

. § § 3 2 2

. 0 0 5 ( a ) ( “ T h i s c h a p t e r d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a r e c o r d o r s i g n a t u r e t o b e c r e a t e d

, g e n e r a t e d

, s e n t

, 17S.W .2d at 489 ; Garrod Invs., Inc. , 139 S.W .3d at 763

. Accordin gly , w e ov errule Uniq ue’s

f irst tw o issue s.

III. L E G A L A N D F A C T U A L S U F F I C I E N C Y
By t heir third and f ourth issues, Unique and Bradf ord assert tha t the evidence

supp orting the jury ’s v erdict is le gally an d f actu ally

insuf f icient. W e d isagree.

a. Standard of Review and A pplica ble La w

An app ellate court w ill susta in a legal suf f iciency or “no-evidence ” challen ge if the

record shows: (1) the com pl e t e a b s ence of a v ital f act; (2) the court is barred by rule s of

law or evidence f rom giv ing w eight to the only evidence of f ered to prove a v ital f act; (3) the

evidence of

f ered to prove a v ital f a c t is n o m o re tha n a scintilla; or (4) the evidence

esta blishes conclu siv ely th e opp osite of the v ital f act. City of Keller

, 168 S.W .3d at 810

.
In cond ucting a legal suf f iciency rev iew

, w e mu st consid er the evidence in the lig ht mo st

f avorable to the jury ’s v erdict a nd indu lge every reaso nab le inf eren ce th at su ppo rts it. Id.

at 821 -22; Harris Coun ty v. Verna gallo

, 181 S.W .3d 17, 24 (Te x

. App .–Hou ston [14 th Dist.]

200 5, no pet .); Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Brooks

, 180 S.W .3d 694

, 705 (Te x

. App .–Hou ston

c o m m u n i c a t e d

, r e c e i v e d

, s t o r e d

, o r o t h e r w i s e p r o c e s s e d o r u s e d b y e l e c t r o n i c m e a n s o r i n e l e c t r o n i c f o r m

. ” )

, 3 2 2

. 0 0 7 ( b ) ( “ A c o n t r a c t m a y n o t b e d e n i e d l e g a l e f f e c t o r e n f o r c e a b i l i t y s o l e l y b e c a u s e a n e l e c t r o n i c r e c o r d

w a s u s e d i n i t s f o r m a t i o n

. ” ) ( V e r n o n 2 0 0 9 )

. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s s u p p o r t e d b y O n d e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y t h a t m o s t o f h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h U n i q u e m a n a g e m e n t f r o m 2 0 0 5 t o 2 0 0 7 w a s b y e

- m a i l

, t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s s e v e r a l e

m a i l s d o c u m e n t i n g c o n v e r s a t i o n s b e t w e e n U n i q u e m a n a g e m e n t a n d O n d e r , a n d t h e f a c t t h a t U n i q u e u t i l i z e d

e l e c t r o n i c m e a n s t o s e n d O n d e r t h e i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r a g r e e m e n t

. S e e i d

. § 3 2 2

. 0 0 5 ( b ) ( “ W h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e t o c o n d u c t a t r a n s a c t i o n b y e l e c t r o n i c m e a n s i s d e t e r m i n e d f r o m t h e c o n t e x t a n d s u r r o u n d i n g
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e p a r t i e s ’ c o n d u c t

. ” ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. W e d o n o t e t h a t B r a d f o r d t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e d o e s n o t r e g u l a r l y e x e c u t e c o n t r a c t s e l e c t r o n i c a l l y a n d t h a t h i s i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y d i d n o t a l l o w h i m t o s i g n
c o n t r a c t s e l e c t r o n i c a l l y ; h o w e v e r , t h i s t e s t i m o n y i s d u b i o u s c o n s i d e r i n g B r a d f o r d l a t e r a d m i t t e d t h a t h e b e l i e v e d h e h a d a v a l i d c o n t r a c t w i t h O n d e r a n d U n i q u e p a i d O n d e r c o m m i s s i o n s f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w o y e a r s

. U n i q u e d i d n o t c o n t e n d t h a t t h e “ I n d e p e n d e n t C o n t r a c t o r a n d C o m m i s s i o n A g r e e m e n t ” w a s a n u n e n f o r c e a b l e
c o n t r a c t u n t i l O n d e r f i l e d h i s l a w s u i t

. S e e G o l d e n E a g l e A r c h e r y , I n c

. v

. J a c k s o n , 1 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 7

, 7 6 1 ( T e x

. 2 0 0 3 ) ( “ I t i s a f a m i l i a r p r i n c i p l e t h a t i n c o n d u c t i n g a f a c t u a l s u f f i c i e n c y r e v i e w , a c o u r t m u s t n o t m e r e l y
s u b s t i t u t e i t s j u d g m e n t f o r t h a t o f t h e j u r y

. I t i s a n e q u a l l y f a m i l i a r p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e j u r y i s t h e s o l e j u d g e o f t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f w i t n e s s e s a n d t h e w e i g h t t o b e g i v e n t o t h e i r t e s t i m o n y

. ” ) ( c i t i n g P o o l v

. F o r d M o t o r C o

. , 7 1 5 S

. W

. 2 d 6 2 9

, 6 3 5 ( T e x

. 1 9 8 6 ) ; J o n e s v

. T a r r a n t U t i l

. C o

. , 6 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d 8 6 2

, 8 6 6 ( T e x

. 1 9 8 2 ) )

. 18[14 th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). T he evidence is legally suff icient if it w ould enable r easo nab le

and f air-mind ed peo ple to reach the decision und er rev iew

. See City of Keller

, 168 S.W .3d

at 827 -28; Verna gallo

, 181 S.W .3d at 24; Brooks

, 180 S.W .3 d a t 7 0 5

. W e mu st credit

f avorable evidence if a reaso nab le trier of f act could have so f oun d, and disregard cont rary

evidence unle ss a reaso nab le trier of f act could not have so f oun d. Ing ram , 288 S.W .3d at

893 ; Hogu e , 271 S.W .3d at 248 ; City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 827

. T he trier of fact is the

sole judge of the w itnesse s’ credibility a n d the w eight to be giv en the ir t estim ony. City of

Keller

, 168 S.W .3d a t 8 1 9 ; Verna gallo

, 181 S.W .3d at 24; Brooks

, 180 S.W .3d at 705

. Moreover, in rev iew ing the suf f iciency of the evi d e n c e, w e ma y not subst itute our own
judgme nt f or tha t of the trier of f act, even if w e w ould reach a dif f eren t answer on the

evidence. See M

ar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis , 971 S.W .2d 402, 407 (Te x

. 199 8); Scog gins

Constr. Co. v. Dealers Elec. Sup ply Co.

, No. 13-0 6-00 368 -CV, 200 9 T ex. App

. LEXIS 817 1,

at * 9 (T ex. App .–Corp us Christi Oct . 22 , 20 09, pe t. d enie d) (me m. op . on rem and ).

In rev iew ing the f actu al suf f iciency of the evidence, w e consid er and w eigh all of the

evidence in the case and set a side t he v erdict a nd rema nd the cause fo r a new trial, i f w e

conclu de, v iew ing the evidence in a neu tral lig ht, tha t the v erdict is so against t he gr eat

w eight and prep ond eran ce of the evidence as to be ma nif estly unju st, regardless of w het her

the record cont ains so m e “e viden ce of prob ative f orce” in supp ort of the v erdict. See

Golde n Eag le Archery, Inc. v. Jackson

, 116 S.W .3d 757

, 761 -62 (Te x

. 200 3); see also Cain

v. B a in

, 7 0 9 S.W .2d 175

, 176 (Te x

. 198 6) (per curiam ). T he evidence supp orting the

v erdict is to be w eighed alon g with the oth er evidence in the case, includin g th at w hich is

cont rary to the v erdict. Jackson

, 116 S.W .3d at 761 -62. If w e det ermin e tha t the evidence

supp orting the jury ’s v erdict is not supp orted by f actu ally suf f icient evidence, w e mu st “deta il

19the evidence relevant to the issue” and “state in w hat regard the cont rary evidence gr eat ly

out w eighs the evidence in supp ort of the v erdict.” Dow Chem Co. v. Francis

, 46 S.W .3d

237 , 24 2 (T ex. 200 1) (per cu riam).

In orde r f or a cont ract to be enf orcea ble, the re mu st be an of f er, an accep tan ce in

strict com pliance w ith the term s of the of f er, a me eting of

the minds, each party’ s consent

to the term s, and execution and delivery of the cont ract w ith the inten t tha t it be mu tua l and

bind ing. See ABB Kraft we rke Aktie nge sellschaf t v. B row nsville Ba rge & Crane, Inc.

, 115

S.W .3d 287

, 291 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Ch ri sti 200 3, pet

. den ied); see also John son v.

Aransa s Coun ty Naviga tion Dist., No. 1 , No. 13-0 6-60 1-CV, 2 008 T ex. App . LE XIS 732 4,

at *8 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi Oct. 2, 200 8, pet

. den ied) (mem

. op. ). All of the se elem ent s

mu st be met in ord er f or th e co ntract to be enf orcea ble. See Brownsville Barge & Crane,

Inc. , 11 5 S .W .3d at 291

.
On the oth er hand , to r ecover f or brea ch o f con tract, a p laintif

f must prove: ( 1) the

existence of a v alid cont ract; (2) perf orma nce or ten dere d perf orma nce by the plaint if f ; (3)

brea ch by the def end ant ; and (4) harm to the plaint if f as a result of the brea ch. See Ada m s

v

. H&H Meat Prods.

, Inc.

, 41 S.W .3d 762

, 771 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi 200 1, n o p e t

. );

see also Beckh am Resou rces, Inc. v. Mantle Resou rc es, L.L .C.

, No. 13-0 9-00 083 -CV, 201 0

T ex. App . LE XIS 132 3, a t *2 2 (T ex. App .–Corp us Christi Feb . 25 , 20 10, pe t. f iled).

b. Discus sion

In the instan t case, the jury c o n c lu d e d tha t Unique brea ched the “Inde pen den t

Contra ctor and Com mission Agreem ent ” by discon tinuin g the payme nt of comm issions to

Ond er and tha t Unique’s brea ch w as not excused. T he jury did not conclu de t hat Ond er

brea ched the agreem ent

. How ever, o n app eal, Unique argues tha t the evidence

20esta blishes tha t: (1) Unique did not a gr e e to pay Ond er com mission s to not serv ice the

clients or, in oth er w ords, a va lid

, enf orcea ble cont ract did not exist; (2) Unique did not

brea ch any agreem ent s w ith Ond er; (3) the com plaine d-of brea ches, if any, w ere excused

or justif ied b y go od cause ; and (4) Ond er f ailed to introd uce legally suf f icient evidence of

recoverable dam ages. T he ma jority of Unique’s suf f iciency argume nts are prem ised on the

allegation tha t Ond er did not serv ice his clients in com pliance w ith the “Inde pen den t

Contra ctor and Com mission Agreem ent ”; the ref ore, Unique w as justif ied in term inatin g the

cont ract. W e wil l ana ly z e th ese cont ent ions f irst.

1. The Purported Ma terial Brea ch of the Contract by Onder

In orde r to ana ly z e Unique’s cont ent ions regarding Ond er ’s p u rp o rt e d b reach of

cont ract, w e mu st examine the cont ent s of the agreem ent

. Bradf ord’s Februa ry 7

, 2 0 07

term inat io n lette r to Ond er state d tha t Ond er f ailed to com ply w ith para gr aph 5 of the

“Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com mission Agreem ent .” As not ed earlier, para grap h 5 of

the agreem ent provides th at:

Richard Ond er shall be paid bet w een .50 %-1.00 % of each custo me rs[’] gr oss payroll on busin ess boo ked base d on cont ract qu o t e s f rom client
com pan ies.

. . . T he sales com mission shall be paid mo nth ly

, n o la ter tha n ten (10) days f ollowi ng the end of the mo nth in w hich the Sale s Com mission

w as ea rn e d

. Ri chard Ond er w ill cont inue to be paid com pen sation f or
a c c oun ts brou ght to Unique provided he actively ma rkets or serv ic e s prosp ective acco unt s f or Unique.
(Emp hasis add ed. ) Unique argues tha t the languag e of the cont ract directing Ond er to

serv ice “p ro s p ective accou nts” me ans tha t Ond er w as required by cont ract to actively

serv ice all clients he brou ght to Unique; oste nsibly, Unique argues tha t the language of the

cont ract is am biguous and seeks to explain the inten t of the partie s to the cont ract by using

paro l evidence—t he testim ony of Bradf ord and Judge. T o prop erly ana ly z e this argume nt,

21w e m ust re sort to the rules o f con tract in terpret ation in order to de term ine wheth er On der

brea ched t he agreem ent and

, thu s, com mitt ed a prior ma terial brea ch w hich reliev ed
Unique of

pe rf ormin g unde r the con tract.

T he rules of cont ract const ruction are w ell-estab lished. See Am

. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Scha efe r

, 124 S.W .3d 154

, 157 (Te x

. 200 3) (“An am biguity exists only if the cont ract

language is suscep tible to tw o o r mo re reaso nab le interp retat ions.”). Conf licting

interp retat ions of a cont ract, and even uncle ar or unce rtai n la n gu age, do not nece ssarily

me an a cont ract is am biguous. See Kurtz v. Jackson

, 859 S.W .2 d 6 09, 611 (Te x

. App .–Hou ston [1st Dist.] 199 3, no w rit); see also Shie lds v. Delta Lake Irrigation Dist.

, No.

13-0 1-62 2-CV, 200 6 T ex. App

. LEXIS 408 2, at *14 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi May 11,

200 6, pet

. den ied) (mem

. op. ). “Th e la n gu a ge in a n agreem ent is to be giv en its plain

gr am ma tical me anin g unle ss to do so w ould def eat the partie s’ inten t.” DeW itt Coun ty Elec.

Coop

., Inc. v. Parks

, 1 S

. W

. 3 d 9 6

, 100 (Te x

. 199 9). Furthe r, “[w ]he n a cont ract is not

am biguous, the const ruction of the w ritten instrum ent is a question of law f or the court

. . . .”

MCI Teleco m m s. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co.

, 995 S.W .2d 647

, 651 (Te x

. 199 9); see City

of P ineh urst v. Spo one r Add ition W ate r Co. , 43 2 S .W .2d 51 5, 5 18 (Te x . 19 68).

Gen erally

, w here an una mb iguous w r i ti ng has bee n ent ered into bet w een the partie s,

courts w ill giv e ef

f ect to the inten tion of the part ie s a s e xp re s sed or as app aren t in the

w riting. See Spo one r Add ition W ate r Co.

, 432 S.W .2d at 518 ; see also Shie lds

, 200 6 T ex.
App

. LEXIS 408 2, at *30

. Usually, t h e in s t rume nt alon e w ill be dee me d to express the

inten tions of t h e p a rt ie s f or it is the obje ctiv e, not subje ctiv e, inten t tha t cont rols. See

Spo one r Add

ition W ate r Co.

, 432 S.W .2d at 518 ; see also Shie lds

, 200 6 T ex. App

. LEXIS

408 2, at **30 -31. Our prima ry c o n c ern interp reting the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and

22Com mission Agreem ent ” is to giv e ef f ect to the inten tions of the partie s as expressed in the

instrum ent

. See R & P Ent er. v. Lag uarta

, Gavrel & Kirk

, 596 S.W .2d 517

, 518 (Te x

. 198 0);

see also S hields , 20 06 T ex. App . LE XIS 408 2, a t * 3 1.

Af ter rev iew ing the “Inde pen dent C on tr ac to r an d C om mi s s i on Ag r ee me nt ,” w e c annot

say tha t the cont ractu a l la n gua ge is am biguous. As not ed earlier, the cont ract w as

prom ulgated by Unique and se nt t o On der f or acce pta nce. See AT&T Co rp. v. Rylande r ,
2 S

. W .3d 546

, 559 (Te x

. App .–A ustin 199 9, pet

. den ied) (“As a general rule, w ritings a re

const rued strictly against the aut hor and in a ma nne r so as to reach a reaso nab le result tha t

is consiste nt w ith the inten t of the partie s.”); see also Lara Ene rgy, Inc. v. Yuma Pet roleum

Co.

, No. 13-9 8-43 5-CV, 200 0 T ex. App

. LEXIS 194 2, at *9 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi Mar.

23, 20 00, pe t. d enie d) ( not designated for pub lication) (“ T he rule of construction urg ed by

Lara in the prese nt app e a l, i.e., tha t a cont ract is const rued against its drafter, doe s not

app ly unle ss the cont ract is f oun d to be am biguous. ”) (citing Rylande r , 2 S.W .3d at 558 -59;

GTE Mobilne t of S. Tex. Ltd

. P’ ship v. Telece ll Cellular, Inc.

, 955 S.W .2d 286

, 290 (Te x

. App .–Hou ston [1st Dist.] 199 7, w rit den ied); Kinca id v. Gulf Oil Corp.

, 675 S.W .2d 250

, 256
(Te x

. App .–S an Ant onio 198 4, w rit ref ’d n.r.e .)). T he specif ic language of the cont ract only

requires Ond er to serv ice “prospe ctiv e accou nts.” No wh e re in the cont ract is language

requiring Ond er to servi ce a ll clients h e b rought t o Unique. 11

Used in its ordina ry cont ext, the te rm “prospe ctiv e” is def ined as “[a]n ticipate d or

T h e “ I n d e p e n d e n t C o n t r a c t o r a n d C o m m i s s i o n A g r r e m e n t ” a l s o i n c l u d e s a l a t e r

- m e n t i o n e d 11

c l a u s e

— t h e “ M i s c e l l a n e o u s ” c l a u s e a t t h e e n d o f t h e c o n t r a c t

— w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h a t : “ T h i s a g r e e m e n t i n c l u d e s
a l l c u s t o m e r s c u r r e n t l y o b t a i n e d b y R i c h a r d O n d e r a n d t h o s e o b t a i n e d i n t h e f u t u r e b y R i c h a r d O n d e r u n d e r t h i s a g r e e m e n t o r a n y o t h e r p r i o r a g r e e m e n t

. A l l b u s i n e s s w r i t t e n b y U n i q u e i s o u r b u s i n e s s

. ” B a s e d o n o u r
r e a d i n g o f t h e f o u r c o r n e r s o f t h e c o n t r a c t

, w e d o n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s c l a u s e s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e s O n d e r t o
s e r v i c e a l l c l i e n t s h e b r o u g h t t o U n i q u e

. F i r s t

, t h e “ M i s c e l l a n e o u s ” c l a u s e d o e s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r t o t h e
s e r v i c i n g o f a n y c l i e n t s

. S e c o n d

, B r a d f o r d

, i n h i s F e b r u a r y 7

, 2 0 0 7 l e t t e r , s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r e n c e d p a r a g r a p h f i v e o f t h e a g r e e m e n t a s t h e b a s i s f o r O n d e r ’ s t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d

, a s n o t e d e a r l i e r , p a r a g r a p h f i v e o n l y r e q u i r e d O n d e r t o s e r v i c e “ p r o s p e c t i v e a c c o u n t s

. ” 23expected ; likely to com e abo ut.” B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 134 2 (9th ed. 200 9); see

M E R R I A M W E B S T E R ’ S C O L L E G I A T E D I C T I O N A R Y 937 (10th ed. 199 6) (def ining “prospe ctiv e” as
“likely to com e abo ut” or “likely to be or beco me ”). Furthe r, Bradf ord testif ied v ia dep osition

tha t “[p]rosp ective accou nts w ould be if h e ’s [Ond er] out ma rketing to bring on new

busin ess” and tha t “[a]n active accou nt w ould be one tha t w as brou gh t t o u s by e ither an

in d e p e n d ent cont ractor or by a n em ployee of Unique.” T here f ore, base d on the cont ract

and the ordina ry me anin g of the term “prospe ctiv e,” w e disagre e w ith Unique’s interp retat ion

tha t the specif ic language of the cont ract required Ond er to serv ice all of th e c li e n t s he

brou ght to Unique. Inste ad, the contract only required On der t o se rv ice th ose clients t hat

w ere “anticipa ted ,” “ex pect ed, ” or li k e ly to beco me clients of Unique. See B L A C K ’ S L A W 12

D I C T I O N A R Y at 134 2; see also M E R R I A M W E B S T E R ’ S C O L L E G I A T E D I C T I O N A R Y at 937

. Giv en

this conclu sion, w e mu st now det ermin e w het her the evidence supp orting the jury ’s imp licit

conclu sion tha t Ond er did not brea ch the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com m is s ion

Agreem ent ” is suf

f icient.

Regarding Ond er’s purp orted brea ch of the cont ract, Unique argues the y w ere

ent itled to te rm in a te the purp orted cont ract beca use Ond er com mitt ed the f irst ma terial

brea ch b y

f ailing to “service his clients. ” W e d isagree.

“In the stan dard cont ract dispu te, one party cance ls the cont ract or ref uses to pay

due to alleged brea ches by the oth er; in such circumsta nces, jurors w ill of ten f ind bot h

partie s f ailed to com ply wi th the cont ract

. . . un less instru cted tha t th ey must de cide w ho

com mitt ed the f irst ma terial brea c h.” Mustan g Pipe line Co. v. Driver Pipe line Co.

, 134

T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e c o n t r a c t i s s u p p o r t e d b y t e s t i m o n y f r o m O n d e r , J u d g e , a n d B r a d f o r d 12

s p e c i f y i n g t h a t U n i q u e h a s a v e r y p r o a c t i v e a n d d i l i g e n t c u s t o m e r s e r v i c e d e p a r t m e n t t h a t r e g u l a r l y c a l l s
c l i e n t s a n d a s s i s t s c l i e n t s w i t h t h e i r p r o b l e m s

. 24S.W .3d 195

, 200 0 (Te x

. 200 4) (citing Mead v. John son Group

, Inc.

, 615 S.W .2d 685

, 689

(Te x

. 198 1) (stating tha t def ault by one cont racting party excuses perf orma nce by the

oth er)). Furthe r, “[i]t is a f und am ent al principa l of cont ract law tha t w hen one party com mits

a ma terial brea ch of tha t cont ract, the oth er party is discha rg ed or excused f ro m f u rt h e r
perf orma nce. ” Mustan g P ipeline Co. , 13 4 S .W .3d at 196

. Here, the jury w as not specif ically asked w het her Ond er brea ched the p u rp orted

cont ract. Rathe r, the jury w as asked the f ollowi ng: “W as Unique Sta f f Lea sing’s f ailure to

com ply w ith the agreeme nt, if any , ex cused ? Failure to com ply by Unique S taf

f [L]easin g

is excused by Richard Ond er’s f ailure to c o m p ly, if any, w ith a ma terial obligation of the

sam e agreem ent .” T o this question

, the jury conclu ded tha t Unique’s f ailure to com ply w ith

the agreem ent w as not excused; thu s, the jury imp licitly det ermin ed tha t Ond er did not

brea ch the purp orted cont ract, mu ch less com mit the f irst ma terial brea ch of the cont ract.

Unique argues tha t the jury ’s decision is cont rary to the evi d e n ce in the record beca use

Ond er adm itted tha t he did not call h is c li e n ts on a mo nth ly basis and som e of Ond er’s

clients ackno w ledged tha t the y had not hea rd f rom him in som e time

. Ond er explained tha t

he did n ot co nta ct m ost o f his clients regularly

because he w as not instructe d that he had

to, and he wa s preo ccupie d w ith a divorce. Just prior to Ond er’s term inatio n, Maisel

cont acte d all of Ond er’s clients to see if Ond er had recen tly cont acte d the m. Maisel ma de

not es of the cont ent s of his cal ls t o O nde r’s clients, and the se not es w ere ent ered into

evidence. Maisel’s n ote s indica ted that: (1) several of Ond er’s clients did n ot re spon d to

Maisel’s calls and me ssages; and (2) a f ew of Ond er’s clients had not hea rd f rom him in a
long time

. Maisel adm itted in his testim ony, howev er, tha t a coup le of Ond er’s clients had

in f act bee n cont acte d by Ond er. In his testim ony, Ond er state d tha t the cont ract provided

25tha t he ne e d ed only cont act and serv ice “prospe ctiv e clients” rathe r tha n clients alread y

doin g b u s in e s s w ith Unique and tha t Unique had an excellent custo me r serv ice staf f tha t
regularly called and assisted clients tha t Ond er had alread y br o u gh t to Unique. Judge,

Bradf ord, and Maisel each tried t o cont radict Ond er’s testim ony by not ing tha t Bradf ord

regularly cond ucte d me etings w ith inde pen den t co n t ra ctors and enco uraged the

inde pen den t cont ractors to regu la rl y c o nta ct the ir clients. See David J. Sacks, P.C. v.

Hade n , 266 S.W .3d 447

, 450 (Te x

. 2 0 08) (holdin g tha t an una mb iguous cont ract w ill be

enf orced as w ritten, and paro l evidence w ill not be received f or the purp ose of creatin g an

am biguity or to giv e the cont ract a me anin g dif f eren t f rom tha t w hich its language imp arts);

see also Ne t ra n a , L

. L.C. v. TXU Bus. Servs. Co.

, No. 13-0 8-00 264 -CV, 200 9 T ex. App

.
LEXIS 875 4, at *14 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi Nov. 12, 200 9, no pet .) (mem

. op. ) (same ).

How ever, neith er Judge, Bradf ord, nor Maisel inf orme d Ond er exactly how of ten he shou ld

cont act the clients. T he record ref lects tha t Ond er brou ght clients to Unique during the

relevant time period —Janu ary 200 5 to Feb ru a ry 2 007 —and tha t Unique com pen sate d

On der accord ing to the com pen sation provisi on of the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and

Com mission Agreem ent .”

In lig ht of our earlier ana ly sis of the language of the cont ract, spec if ic a ll y the term
“prospe ctiv e,” we cann ot say th at a reaso nab le f act-f inde r could reject Ond er’s test imo ny

and the una mb iguous language of the cont ract in lig ht of Bradf ord, Jud ge, and Maisel’s

testim ony or Maisel’s not es. Clearly

, the cont ract only required Ond er to serv ice
“prospe ctiv e accou nts,” not the clients tha t he had alread y secure d f or Unique

. Unique’s

custo me r serv ice dep artm ent w as d e s igned to serv ice the nee ds of existing clients.

T here f ore, base d on the una mb iguous language of the cont ract, it is irrelev ant w het her

26Ond er provided serv ice to pre-existing Unique custo me rs. As such, w e cann ot say tha t the

jury w as unre ason able in imp licitly conclu ding tha t Ond er did not com mit a ma terial brea ch

of the con tract.

2. Unique’s Damage s A rgument

As a sub-issue

, Unique also asserts tha t the evidence supp orting Ond er’s claim f or

dam ages is legally insuf f icient. I n p a rt icu lar, Unique cont end s tha t Ond er imp rope rly

13

subm itted ben ef it of the bargain da m a ge s rathe r tha n the app ropriate me asure of

dam ages—reliance dam ages. W e f irst n o t e t h at Unique’s ent ire dam ages argume nt is

prem ised upo n a f inding tha t the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com mission Agreem ent ” is

subje ct to the statu te of f raud s, a cont ent ion tha t w e have rejecte d earlier in t h is o p in ion,

and the app lication of the partia l perf orma nce excep t io n t o t h e s tatu te of f raud s. In any

event, Unique relies on the decision s in Quigle y v. Ben net t

, 227 S.W .3d 51, 54 (Te x

. 200 7)

and Exxon v. Breez evale Ltd

. , 82 S.W .3d 429

, 441 (Te x

. App .–Dallas 200 2, no pet .) to

supp ort its dam ages argume nt and asserts tha t it is gr ossly unf air to award Ond er
$52 ,02 5.1 1 in dam ages f or cont acting a f ew clients on the telep hon e and spea king f or less

O n d e r c o n t e n d s t h a t U n i q u e w a i v e d i t s d a m a g e s a r g u m e n t b y f a i l i n g t o o b j e c t t o t h e q u e s t i o n i n 13
t h e j u r y c h a r g e p e r t a i n i n g t o d a m a g e s

. S e e W i l g u s v

. B o n d

, 7 3 0 S

. W

. 2 d 6 7 0

, 6 7 2 ( T e x

. 1 9 8 7 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t

“ [ a ] p a r t y o b j e c t i n g t o a c h a r g e m u s t p o i n t o u t d i s t i n c t l y t h e m a t t e r t o w h i c h h e o b j e c t s a n d t h e g r o u n d s o f h i s
o b j e c t i o n ” a n d h o l d i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a i v e d h i s a r g u m e n t s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e s u b m i s s i o n o f d a m a g e s i n a j u r y
c h a r g e b y n o t o b j e c t i n g i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ) ; A m

. T r a n s f e r & S t o r

a g e C o

. v

. R e i c h l e y , 5 6 0 S

. W

. 2 d 1 9 6

, 1 9 9

- 2 0 0 ( T e x

. C i v

. A p p

. – A m a r i l l o 1 9 7 7

, w r i t r e f ’ d n

. r

. e

. ) ( “ U n l e s s a p a r t y o b j e c t s t o t h e c h a r g e o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t i t

s u b m i t s a n i m p r o p e r m e a s u r e o f d a m a g e s , h e w a i v e s t h e o b j e c t i o n a n d c a n n o t c o m p l a i n o n a p p e a l t h a t t h e
c h a r g e p e r m i t t e d t h e j u r y t o f i n d d a m a g e s b a s e d o n t h e w r o n g m e a s u r e

. ” )

. U n i q u e c o u n t e r s b y a r g u i n g t h a t t h e s u p r e m e c o u r t

, i n Q u i g l e y v

. B e n n e t t

, “ e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t e d ” O n d e r ’ s w a i v e r a r g u m e n t a s i t p e r t a i n e d t o t h e
s u b m i s s i o n o f d a m a g e s i n t h e j u r y c h a r g e

. S e e 2 2 7 S

. W

. 3 d 5 1

, 5 4 ( T e x

. 2 0 0 7 )

. I n Q u i g l e y , t h e s u p r e m e
c o u r t n o t e d t h a t t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t h e l d t h a t Q u i g l e y ’ s c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t t h e s u b m i s s i o n o f d a m a g e s w a s
w a i v e d b y Q u i g l e y ’ s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t

. I d

. a t 5 2

. W i t h o u t e x p r e s s l y a d d r e s s i n g t h e c o u r t o f

a p p e a l s ’ w a i v e r a n a l y s i s , t h e s u p r e m e c o u r t e x a m i n e d t h e d a m a g e s u b m i s s i o n a n d c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e
e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g a p o r t i o n o f t h e j u r y ’ s d a m a g e s a w a r d w a s l e g a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t

. I d

. a t 5 4

- 5 5

. W e d i s a g r e e

w i t h U n i q u e ’ s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e s u p r e m e c o u r t “ e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t e d ” O n d e r ’ s w a i v e r a r g u m e n t ; h o w e v e r , c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s u p r e m e c o u r t r e v e r s e d t h e a p p e a l s c o u r t s ’ c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e d a m a g e s a r g u m e n t w a s
w a i v e d

, w e w i l l

, o u t o f a n a b u n d a n c e o f c a u t i o n , r e j e c t O n d e r ’ s w a i v e r a r g u m e n t a n d a d d r e s s U n i q u e ’ s d a m a g e s a r g u m e n t

. 27tha n a n h our.

In Quigle y , a geologist, Ben net t, atte mp ted to secure com pen sation f rom a

lease hold er, Quigley

, w ho decid ed to sell his intere st in oil and gas lease s. 227 S.W .3d at

52-5 3. Ben net t assisted Quigley in ma rketing the lease s to oil and nat ural gas com pan ies,

w hich include d the creatio n of color gr aph s and ma ps of the lease s

. I d

. a t 5 2. Quigley

purp orted ly

told Benne tt, “Don’t w orry Be nne tt, I ’ll take ca re of y ou. ” Id. T he lease s w ere

eventua lly

sold to Coasta l Oil & Gas, w ith Qu igl ey retaining an ov erriding roy alty intere st.

Id. at 52-5 3. At tha t time

, Ben net t and Quigley brief ly discusse d Ben net t’s com pen sation

,
tho ugh not in dep th. Id. at 53. Ben net t’s com pen sation w as never put in w riting. Id. at 52.

W hen Quigley ref used to pay Ben net t, Ben net t sued and argued tha t “g eolo gists are usua lly

com pen sate d by receivi ng overri ding roy alty intere sts in the prosp ects the y generat e.” Id.

at 5 3. T he supre me cou rt det ermin ed tha t evidence of the v alue of the roy alty int erest to

the oil and gas lease cann ot be giv en any w eight or ef f ect and cann ot be consid ered as

evidence supp orting the jury ’s v erdict beca use the statu te of f raud s barred recovery

. Id. at

54. T he supre me court specif ically not ed tha t allowi ng the recovery of ben ef it-of -the bargain

dam ages in a case w here an agreem ent is not me mo rializ ed in w riting circumvents the

prote ctions of

the stat ute of

f raud s. Id. It is clear to this Cou rt tha t th e h olding in Quigle y

as to dam ages is prem ised upo n the app licability of the statu te of f raud s; thu s, w e conclu de

tha t th e Quigle y

case is inap posite

. See id.

T he f acts in Breez evale also perta in to an oral cont ract involv ing an intere st in an oil

and gas lease . 8 2 S .W .3d at 434 -35. T he court of app eals conclu ded tha t the statu te of

f raud s applied to the oral agreem ent involv ing an oil and gas lease

. Id. at 437

. T he court

of app eals also rejecte d tw o exception s to the statu te of f raud s—prom issory esto ppe l and

28partia l perf orma nce—t hat the jury conclu ded w ere app licable. Id. at 439 -41. In ana ly z ing

the pa rtial pe rf orma nce exception to the stat ute of f raud s, th e co urt o f

ap pea ls not ed tha t

“the doct rine of partia l perf orma nce also requires tha t the party acting in reliance on the

a gr e em ent suf

f er a subst ant ial det rimen t f or w hich the re is no ade quate reme dy.

. . . I f

Breezevale w ere successf ul in remo v ing the oral agreem ent f rom the statu te of f raud s

beca use of

partial perf orma nce, Breez evale w ould be entitled to only reliance dam ages.”

Id. at 441

. Like Quigle y , we d o n o t f ind Breez evale to be app licable in this ma tter. T he

dispu te in Breez evale perta ins to an agreem ent involv ing the conveyance of intere sts in real

prop erty, and the cour t ’s decision is prem ised upo n a f inding tha t the statu te of f raud s

app lies. Furthe rmore , the Breez evale court’s ana ly sis of dam ages hinges upo n a f inding

tha t t h e s tatu te of f raud s and the partia l perf orma nce exception app lies. Here, the jury

conclu ded

, a n d we have af f irmed

, tha t the statu te of f raud s doe s not app ly ; thu s, it w as

unn ecessa ry to det er mi ne w hether the partia l perf orma nce exception to the statu te of f raud s

app lies. Moreover, the dispu te in the instan t case doe s not perta in t o an intere st in real

esta te, w hich, as not ed earlier, requires tha t the agreem ent be in w riting. T here f ore, base d

on the f oregoing, w e conclu de tha t the f acts in Breez evale are distinguisha ble f rom the f acts

in th is case.

T he norm al me asure of dam ages in a brea ch of cont ract case is the ben ef it-of -thebargain me asure

. See Abraxa s Pet roleum Corp

. v. Hornbu rg , 20 S.W .3d 741

, 760 (Te x

. App .–E l Paso 200 0, no pet .); see also Doss v. Home c o min gs Fin. Netw ork, Inc.

, 210

S.W .3 d 7 0 6

, 713 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi 200 6, pet

. den ied). Ben ef it-of -the-ba rg ain

dam ages are tho se “ben ef its [tha t] w ould have arisen only if ” the alleged cont ract had bee n

hon ored

. Baylo r Univ. v. Son nichse n , 221 S.W .3d 632

, 636 (Te x

. 20 0 7 ). Ben ef it-of -the29bargain dam ages com put e “the dif f eren ce bet w een the v alue as represe nte d and the v alue

received.” Form osa Plastics Co rp. USA , 96 0 S .W .2d at 49 (citing Arthu r And ersen & Co

.

v. Perry Equ ip Cor

p

. , 945 S.W .2d 812

, 817 (Te x

. 199 7); Leye nde cker & Assocs.

, Inc. v.

W echt er , 683 S.W .2d 369, 373 ( T ex. 198 4)). “Under the ben ef it-of -the-ba rg ain me asure , lost prof its on the bargain ma y be r ecovered if

such dama ges are proved w ith reaso nab le

certain ty.” Id. at 50.

In the instan t case, it is und ispute d tha t Ond er’s claim against Unique w as f or brea ch

of cont ract, specif ically brea ch of the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor an d Co mm ission

Agreem ent .” In supp ort of his da m a ges claim, Ond er subm itted several sprea dshe ets,

w hich docu me nte d the nam es and payrolls of all of Ond er’s clients f rom Februa ry 200 7 to

the dat e of trial, July 200 8. Ond er mu ltiplied each client’s tota l payroll f igure f or each mo nth

by 1%, w ith the exception of one client w hose payroll f ig u re wa s mu ltiplied by .65 %, in

accord ance w ith para gr aph f iv e of the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com mis s ion

Agreem ent .” A sum ma tion of the calculat ions y ielded “the dif f eren ce bet w een the v alue as

represe nte d [in the “Ind epe nde nt Contract or and Comm ission Agr eem ent ”] an d th e value

received” as $52 ,02 5.1 1. See Form osa Plastics Corp. USA

, 960 S.W .2d at 49; see also

Arthu r And ersen & Co.

, 945 S.W .2d at 817 ; Leye nde cker & Assocs.

, Inc.

, 683 S.W .2d at

373

. T his sum ma tion is the exact a m o u nt of dam ages awarded by the jury f or Ond er’s

brea ch of cont ra c t c la im. T here f ore, base d on the evidence cont aine d in the record, w e

conclu de tha t the jury w as reaso nab le in arriv ing at its dam ages award. See City of Keller

,
168 S.W .3d at 827 -28; Verna gallo , 18 1 S .W .3d at 24; Brooks , 18 0 S .W .3d at 705

.
Beca use Unique’s suf

f icienc y a rg um ent s do not tou ch on any of the rema ining

elem ent s of On d e r’s brea ch of cont ract cause of action

, w e nee d not add ress tho se

30elem ent s. See T E X

. R. A P P

. P. 47. 1, 47. 4. T here f ore, in rev iew ing the evidence in the lig ht

mo st f avorable to the jury ’s v erdict, w e conclu de tha t the jury w as reaso nab le in det ermin ing

tha t Unique brea ched the “Inde pen den t Contra ctor and Com mission Agreem ent ” and tha t

Ond er susta ined $52 ,02 5.1 1 in dam ages as a result of the brea ch. See City of Keller

, 168

S.W .3d at 827 -28; Verna gallo , 181 S.W .3d at 24; Brooks

, 180 S.W .3d at 705

. Furthe r, in

rev iew ing the evidence in a neu tral lig ht, w e cann ot say tha t the jury ’s conclu sions are

ma nif es t ly unju st or against the gr eat w eight and prep ond eran ce of the evidence. See

Golde n Eag le Arche ry

, I n c

. , 116 S.W .3d at 761 -62; see also Cain

, 709 S.W .2d at 176

.
Accordin gly , we overr ule Un ique’s third a nd f ourth issues.

IV. C O N C L U S I O N

Havi ng overruled all of Unique’s issues on app eal and having conclu ded the record

cont ains su f

f icient e v iden ce to ref orm the trial cou rt’s judgme nt, w e a f f irm as mo dif ied.

ROGEL IO V ALDEZ Chief Justice

Deliv ered an d f iled th e 9 th day of Decem ber, 201 0.

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