Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 201 (BIA 2001) Interim Decision #3460 

In re Javier SOTELO-Sotelo, Respondent 

File A90 288 961 - Aurora, Colorado 

Decided October 25, 2001 

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

An applicant for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (Supp. V 1999), need not meet a threshold test 

requiring a showing of “unusual or outstanding equities” before a balancing of the favorable 

and adverse factors of record will be made to determine whether relief should be granted 

in the exercise of discretion. Matter of C-V-T-, Interim Decision 3342 (BIA 1998), clarified. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Raul R. Labrador, Esquire, Nampa, Idaho 

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Elizabeth R. Posont, 

Assistant District Counsel 

BEFORE: Board En Banc: SCIALABBA, Acting Chairman; DUNNE, Vice Chairman; 

SCHMIDT, HOLMES, HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, FILPPU, COLE, 

GUENDELSBERGER, ROSENBERG, GRANT, MOSCATO, MILLER, 

BRENNAN, ESPENOZA, OSUNA, and OHLSON, Board Members.1 

COLE, Board Member: 

In a decision dated December 15, 2000, an Immigration Judge denied the 

respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (Supp. V 1999), and 

ordered him removed from the United States. The respondent filed a timely 

appeal, which will be dismissed. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who adjusted his status to 

that of a lawful permanent resident on December 1, 1990. On July 24, 2000, he 

was convicted, in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, of 

1 Board Members Lauren R. Mathon and Philemina McNeill Jones participated in the 

deliberations concerning this case, but resigned prior to the issuance of the final decision. 

Board Members Frederick D. Hess and Roger Pauley did not participate in the decision in 

this case. 

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the following offenses: possession and passing fraudulent resident alien cards, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); failure to provide 

migrant workers with terms and conditions of employment, in violation of 

29 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) and 29 U.S.C. § 1851 (1994); and 

illegal entry or aiding and abetting illegal entry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325 

(1994 & Supp. V 1999) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The respondent was 

sentenced to 8 months of imprisonment for each of the first two offenses, and 

to 6 months of imprisonment for third offense, with all sentences to run 

concurrently. 

Evidence contained in the record indicates that between January and August 

1999, the respondent smuggled aliens into the United States for a fee of 

approximately $1,500 per person. In addition, he charged each individual 

approximately $80 per month for rent and $35 per week for transportation to 

and from work. He sold fraudulent alien registration and Social Security cards 

to the aliens for approximately $100 apiece. Moreover, the respondent was paid 

$400 per person for transporting aliens from Arizona to Idaho. 

The respondent testified that he began assisting undocumented aliens in 1998 

and continued into 1999, and that he made between $10,000 and $12,000 from 

his criminal activities. One alien who was involved in the smuggling scheme 

reported that when he and 4 others arrived, there were already 13 aliens living 

in a house owned by the respondent, most of whom were sleeping on the floor. 

At least one of the aliens who was assisted indicated that he was familiar with 

the respondent’s name, but he was unable to identify him. Other aliens were able 

to identify the respondent. 

In proceedings before the Immigration Judge, the respondent conceded 

removability as charged and applied for cancellation of removal under section 

240A(a) of the Act. The Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s application 

for relief, and this appeal followed. 

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 

On appeal, the respondent argues that the evidence he has presented 

establishes that he is worthy of a discretionary grant of relief and that the 

Immigration Judge erred in applying a heightened standard requiring 

“outstanding equities” to his application for cancellation of removal. He argues 

further that because the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not appeal 

the Immigration Judge’s decision, and the Immigration Judge decided not to 

consider the murder charge pending against the respondent in Mexico in 

assessing his eligibility for cancellation of removal, the Service waived its right 

to seek appellate consideration of the pending criminal charge. 

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III. CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL 

A. Applicable Standards 

Section 240A(a) of the Act provides as follows: 

The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible 

or deportable from the United States if the alien— 

(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than

5 years, 

(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been

admitted in any status, and 

(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.

The statutory language clearly indicates that it is within the discretion of the 

Attorney General to grant cancellation of removal to an alien who meets these 

three requirements. The respondent bears the burden of demonstrating that 

relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion. 

The parties acknowledge the applicability of Matter of C-V-T-, Interim 

Decision 3342 (BIA 1998), where we held that the general standards that were 

developed in Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978), for the exercise 

of discretion under former section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) 

(1994), are applicable to section 240A(a) of the Act. We recognize, as we did 

in Matter of Marin, that, in adjudicating an application for cancellation of 

removal, we are “required to balance the positive and adverse matters to 

determine whether discretion should be favorably exercised. . . . In some cases, 

the minimum equities inherent in [the statutory requirements for eligibility] may 

be sufficient in and of themselves to warrant favorable discretionary action.” Id. 

at 585; see also Matter of C-V-T-, supra, at 6. However, the “equities that an 

applicant . . . must bring forward to establish that favorable discretionary action 

is warranted will depend in each case on the nature and circumstances of the 

ground of [removability] sought waived and on the presence of any additional 

adverse matters.” Matter of Marin, supra, at 585. 

In any balancing test, various factors, whether positive or negative, are 

accorded more weight than others according to the specific facts of the 

individual case. More serious misconduct necessarily weighs more heavily 

against an exercise of discretion than does less serious misconduct. Therefore, 

an alien must present “additional offsetting favorable evidence” to 

counterbalance an adverse factor such as serious criminal activity. Matter of 

Marin, supra, at 585. 

In this case, as required by Matter of C-V-T-, the Immigration Judge properly 

considered the factors discussed in Matter of Marin in adjudicating the 

respondent’s application for cancellation of removal. We note, however, that 

the Immigration Judge also referred to the respondent’s need to demonstrate 

“outstanding equities.” In Matter of C-V-T-, we questioned whether this 

requirement had any continuing viability in view of the expanded definition of 

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an “aggravated felony” set forth at section 101(a)(43) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Matter of C-V-T-, supra, at 7 n.4. We 

observed that in each of the precedent decisions where we required a showing 

of “unusual or outstanding equities,” the alien would now be considered 

ineligible for relief because of a conviction for an aggravated felony, without 

any need to reach the issue of discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Arreguin, 21 I&N 

Dec. 38 (BIA 1995); Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872 (BIA 1994); Matter 

of Roberts, 20 I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991); Matter of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 

191, 195-96 (BIA 1990); Matter of Buscemi, 19 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 1988); 

Matter of Marin, supra. 

We are now presented with a case in which a respondent has criminal 

convictions for offenses that were determined to be serious by the Immigration 

Judge, but that do not fall within the definition of an “aggravated felony.” To the 

extent that the Immigration Judge’s reference to a requirement of “unusual or 

outstanding equities” may have suggested a separate test, we clarify that no 

separate threshold standard exists. 

In Matter of Edwards, supra, we clarified that our decision in Matter of 

Buscemi, supra, did not require an alien to satisfy a threshold test of showing 

“unusual or outstanding equities” before we would apply a balancing test to 

consider whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Indeed, we 

specifically stated that we find the reference to a threshold test in Matter of 

Buscemi to be “misleading, as it might be read to imply that a full examination 

of an alien’s equities can somehow be pretermitted” and emphasized that a 

“complete review of the favorable factors” in the case is required. Matter of 

Edwards, supra, at 196 n.3. 

Consistent with our clarifying statements in Matter of Edwards, supra, we 

reiterate that we will not apply a threshold test in cancellation of removal cases. 

Instead, we will weigh the favorable and adverse factors to determine whether, 

on balance, the “totality of the evidence before us” indicates that the “respondent 

has adequately demonstrated that he warrants a favorable exercise of discretion 

and a grant of cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Act.” 

Matter of C-V-T-, supra, at 10. 

B. Respondent’s Case 

In the instant case, we must weigh the respondent’s favorable factors or 

equities against the significant adverse factor of his recent criminal convictions. 

Because of this serious adverse factor, this case is not one in which the 

minimum statutory requirements for relief under section 240A(a) of the Act are 

sufficient, in and of themselves, to warrant favorable discretionary action. See, 

e.g., Matter of C-V-T-, supra; Matter of Marin, supra. Instead, we must weigh 

the evidence of the respondent’s recent disregard for lawful immigration 

procedures—particularly his 1999 convictions for criminal activities that 

involved repeated transactions, numerous undocumented aliens, and a variety of 

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fraudulent documents—against the favorable factors or equities of record to 

determine whether the latter counterbalance the former. 

The respondent’s equities include the fact that he has been a lawful permanent 

resident since 1990. Although his wife and three of his children are natives and 

citizens of Mexico, he petitioned in 1995 to have their status adjusted. He has 

one United States citizen child, who was born in 1990. All of the respondent’s 

family members speak Spanish. The respondent also has two United States 

citizen brothers, although his parents and one brother remain in Mexico. He 

owns two houses in the United States, one of which is owned without a 

mortgage. 

The respondent has been seasonally employed on a regular basis since 

entering the United States as a lawful permanent resident, and he has expressed 

remorse for his criminal acts. He desires to remain to support his family, 

provide his children with a good education, and help his family members adjust 

their status. In addition, there is no evidence that the respondent committed any 

infractions while in prison. The record contains several affidavits from relatives 

and friends supporting the respondent, which state that he is a good husband and 

father, that he is a peaceful man, that he works hard to provide for his family, and 

that his family is financially dependent on him. 

The respondent’s adverse factors include the fact that in 1998 and 1999, he 

was, by his own admission, involved in smuggling aliens from Mexico into the 

United States. Although he denied being involved in the actual entry of 

undocumented aliens into the country, he admitted assisting the aliens by 

transporting them between states to a house that was owned by him, obtaining 

employment and fraudulent documents for them, and providing them with 

regular transportation to and from work. He testified that, at one time, as many 

12 to 14 aliens lived in a house that he owned and that he earned between 

$10,000 and $12,000 in this criminal scheme. The respondent stated that he did 

it for the money and because the people were his friends. However, this 

characterization is not consistent with evidence contained in the record, which 

discloses that although some participants were aware of the respondent’s 

involvement and recognized his name, they could not identify him. 

The record also contains evidence that there is an outstanding warrant for the 

respondent’s arrest in Mexico, on a charge of murder. The Immigration Judge 

did not accord any weight to this warrant in balancing the favorable and adverse 

factors. Because we review the record de novo, we do not agree with the 

respondent’s contention that we cannot consider this warrant in our adjudication 

of his cancellation claim. However, in the absence of a conviction, we find that 

the outstanding warrant should not be considered an adverse factor in this case. 

We find that the favorable factors presented in support of the respondent’s 

application for cancellation of removal do not outweigh the adverse factors of 

record. In particular, we note the respondent’s 1999 convictions and resulting 

prison sentence, as well as his repeated disregard for lawful immigration 

procedures, as evidenced by his participation in a criminal immigration scheme 

that involved a number of individuals and included the acquisition of fraudulent 

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documents. Therefore, we agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent 

does not merit a favorable exercise of discretion. Cancellation of removal 

under section 240A(a) of the Act was properly denied in this case. Accordingly, 

the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

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