alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### George N. ANDERSON, member of a class, Appellant, v. CITY OF CLEARWATER, a municipal corporation, Appellee.

No. 71-265.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 11, 1971.

Appeal dismissed.
Exhibit
32(b)








This
Certification is being furnished and shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise
subject to the liability of that section.  This Certification shall
not be incorporated by reference into any registration statement or other
document pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, except as otherwise stated in
such filing.








Certification
Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63


of Title
18 of the United States Code








In
connection with the Annual Report of Columbus Southern Power Company (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q (the “Report”) for the quarter ended June 30, 2008 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Holly
Keller Koeppel, the chief financial officer of the Company certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 that, based on my knowledge (i) the Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.








/s/ Holly
Keller Koeppel____


Holly
Keller Koeppel


Chief
Financial Officer








August 1,
2008








A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
American Electric Power Company, Inc. and will be retained by American Electric
Power Company, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.
#### ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY, Memorial Park, Inc., and Edward Beckhans, Appellants, v. Clara BARTLETT, as Administratrix of the Estate of Julian Clarence Bartlett, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 77-110.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 30, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 28, 1977.

Charles S. Carrere of Harrison, Greene, Mann, Rowe, Stanton & Mastry, St. Peters-burg, for appellants.

John L. McFadyen of Lloyd & Henninger, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Partial summary judgment on the issue of liability was rendered against appellants, defendants below, under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment. This interlocutory appeal ensued. We reverse.

Appellee’s decedent, Julian Clarence Bartlett, and one Nadeau were riding on the bed of a truck owned by appellant-Memorial Park, Inc. and driven by appellant Beckhans. An accident occurred in which Bartlett was killed and Nadeau seriously injured. Subsequently, Nadeau brought a negligence action against Memorial Park and Beckhans and joined appellant Zurich Insurance Company, Memorial’s carrier. Judgment was rendered in favor of Nadeau and he was awarded substantial damages.

This wrongful death action arising out of the same accident was thereafter filed on behalf of the decedent Bartlett. Plaintiff/appellee moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability contending that the negligence of appellant Beckhans had been conclusively determined in the prior action. The trial court granted the motion holding:

> “WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the partial summary judgment requested by plaintiff is granted to the effect that Edward Beckhans negligently operated the truck in which plaintiff’s decedent was riding contributing to his death.”

*922The trial court misperceived the doctrine of estoppel by judgment.

Estoppel by judgment, simply stated, is a principle of law which recognizes within the concept of res judicata that once an identical, relevant issue as *between the same parties*has been decided by a prior valid judgment that issue can never again be retried between them. Here, the previously decided issue sought to be relied upon was the negligence of the driver Beckhans in the subject accident. That issue, however, was only decided as between appellants and Nadeau — not as between appellants and the decedent Bartlett’s adminis-tratrix. The identity of parties, therefore, essential to application of the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, was not present here. *See Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Cox,*338 So.2d 190 (Fla.1976).

In view whereof the order appealed from should be and it is hereby reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

BOARDMAN, C. J., GRIMES, J., and McNULTY, JOSEPH P. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
CareView Communications, Inc. 8-K


Exhibit
10.1


December
31, 2017


Mr. Steve Johnson,
President

CareView Communications, Inc.

405 State Highway 121 Suite B-240

Lewisville, TX 75067


Dear Mr.
Johnson:


Effective
immediately, please consider this letter my resignation as Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary of CareView Communications,
Inc., a Nevada company (the "Company"), and any other offices which I may hold with any of the Company's subsidiaries
and LLCs. I am leaving to pursue other opportunities and my resignation is not the result of a disagreement with the Company or
any matter relating to the Company's operations, financial statements, policies, or practices.


Sincerely,


 


/s/ Jon Freeman 


 


Jon Freeman
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d byN i nth C i r c ui tR ul e 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2).

T he H on orabl e L aw re nce L . P i er sol , S eni or U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ct ** * Judge f orthe D i s tr i c tof

S outh D a kot a , s i tt i ng byde s i gna t i on. NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T YU B I N Z HA NG , P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 07- 74403 A ge nc yN o. A 099- 035- 753 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

a n O r de rof

the B o a r do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d Jul y12, 2011 ** P a s a d e n a , C a lif

o rn ia B e f or e : O ’ S C A N N L A I N a nd I K U T A , C i r c ui tJudge s , a nd P I E R S O L , S e ni or D i stri ctJudg e. *** Y ubi n Z ha ng, ana t i ve a nd c i t i z e n of C hi na , pe t i t i ons f

orr e vi e w of

the B u r e au o f

I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls ’ ( “B I A ” ) o r d e r s d e n y in g h is m o tio n to f ile ala te 

# FI LED JU L 18 2011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS2

br i e f a nd s um m a r i l ydi s m i s s i ng hi s appe a l . T he f a c t s a r e know n t o the pa rt i e s and n eedn o tb e rep eat edh ere ex cep tt o th e ex t en tn ecessary. W e h a v e ju r is d ic tio n to r e v ie w th e B I A ’s d e c is io n to d e n yam o tio n to f ile a n u n tim e lyap p e a l b r ie f . See Zet i no v. H

older , 6 2 2 F .3 d1 0 0 7 , 1 0 1 2 & n .2 ( 9 th C i r . 2010) . T he B I A ’ s or de rde ny i ng Z hang’ s m ot i on s t a t e s : “ W e f i nd the r e a s on s t a t e d by[ Z ha ng] i ns uf

f i c i e ntf orus t o a c c e ptthe unt i m e l ybr i e f i n oure xe r c i s e of di s c r e t i on. ” T he abs e nc e of ar e a s one d e xpl ana t i on f orde ny i ng the m ot i on p r e v e n ts u s f

r o m p e r f o rm in g a n ym e an in g f

u l ap p e lla te r e v ie w . See G arci a G om ez v. G on zales , 4 9 8 F . 3 d1 0 5 0 , 1 0 5 1 ( 9 th C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( p e rc u r i a m ) . T h e r e f o r e , we r e m a n dth e m a tte rto th e B I A f o rf u rth e rp r o c e e d in g s c o n s is te n t w ith th is di s pos i t i on. P E T I T I ON F OR RE V I E W GR AN T E D; RE MAND E D.
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed September 25, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00694-CR

EDDIE LEE HARRIS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 179th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1435603

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant entered a guilty plea to theft of property valued between $1,500 

and $20,000. In accordance with the terms of a plea bargain agreement with the 

State, the trial court sentenced appellant on July 23, 2014, to confinement for three

years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. 

Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal. 

The trial court entered a certification of the defendant’s right to appeal in 

which the court certified that this is a plea bargain case, and the defendant has no 
2

right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court’s certification is 

included in the record on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). The record supports 

the trial court’s certification. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher and Busby.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
#### Covington H. BOSWELL, Appellant, v. Doyle C. ANDREWS and Rosa Q. Andrews, husband and wife, Appellees.

No. T-199.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 7, 1974.

Rehearing Denied March 12, 1974.

Thomas G. Morton, Jr., Pensacola, for appellant.

George J. Roark, Jr., Pensacola, for ap-pellees.

PER CURIAM.

The briefs and the record on appeal having been read and given full consideration, and appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the judgment of the lower court hereby appealed is affirmed.

SPECTOR, Acting C. J., JOHNSON, J., and WIGGINTON, Associate Judge, concur.
254 La. 745

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Glenn BEARD.

No. 50123.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 22, 1969.

In re: State of Louisiana applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and review and for a stay order.

The district judge is hereby ordered to permit the witness (Jim Jones) to answer a question or questions objected to by the defense, regarding admissions allegedly made by the accused which are pertinent to this matter, and to reserve to the defendant the right to renew and urge his objection on an appeal in the event of his conviction.
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 194 

To require the Inspector General, Department of Justice, to submit a report 

to the Congress on the number of firearm transaction denials issued 

by the National Instant Criminal Background Check System that are 

referred to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

for investigation, the number of prosecutions resulting from such investigations, and the number of firearms recovered by the Bureau in cases 

in which such a denial was issued after the firearm was transferred. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 5, 2021 

Mr. BURGESS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To require the Inspector General, Department of Justice, 

to submit a report to the Congress on the number of 

firearm transaction denials issued by the National Instant Criminal Background Check System that are referred to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives for investigation, the number of prosecutions 

resulting from such investigations, and the number of 

firearms recovered by the Bureau in cases in which such 

a denial was issued after the firearm was transferred. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 194 IH

1 SECTION 1. REPORT ON FIREARM TRANSFERS DENIED AS 

2 A RESULT OF A NICS CHECK. 

3 Within 90 days after the date of the enactment of 

4 this Act, the Inspector General, Department of Justice, 

5 shall prepare and submit to the Congress a written re6 port— 

7 (1) on the number of firearm transactions with 

8 respect to which the national instant criminal back9 ground check system established under the Brady 

10 Handgun Violence Prevention Act has determined 

11 that receipt of a firearm by the prospective firearm 

12 transferee would violate Federal or State law, and 

13 which have been referred to the Bureau of Alcohol, 

14 Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives for investigation; 

15 (2) on the number of persons prosecuted by a 

16 United States attorney for an alleged violation of 

17 Federal law in connection with a transaction re18 ferred to in paragraph (1); and 

19 (3) assessing the efforts of the Bureau to seize 

20 firearms received by persons— 

21 (A) with respect to whom the system re22 ferred to in paragraph (1) of this section was 

23 contacted pursuant to section 922(t) of title 18, 

24 United States Code, in relation to a firearm 

25 transaction; 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 194 IH

1 (B) to whom a firearm was transferred 

2 after the 3-day period described in section 

3 922(t)(1)(B)(ii) of such title that applied with 

4 respect to the transaction; and 

5 (C) with respect to whom the system re6 ferred to in paragraph (1) of this section subse7 quently made the determination described in 

8 such paragraph. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 31.3


Certification of Principal Executive Officer


pursuant to


Exchange Act Rules 13a-14(a) and 15d-14(a),


as adopted pursuant to Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





I, E. Randolph Wootton III, certify that:





|   |                                                                     
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------
|1) | I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Rocket Fuel Inc.;




|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|2) | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; and




|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|3) | Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.







/s/ E. Randolph Wootton IIIE. RANDOLPH WOOTTON IIIChief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)


Date: June 21, 2016
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-7991

SAMUEL WHITEHEAD, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

 v. 

GENE M. JOHNSON, Director of the Department of Corrections, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior 

District Judge. (1:07-cv-01193-CMH-TCB)

Submitted: January 15, 2009 Decided: January 23, 2009 

Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Samuel Whitehead, Appellant Pro Se. Alice T. Armstrong, OFFICE 

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Samuel Whitehead seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. 

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge 

issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the 

constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or 

wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district 

court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 

U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We 

have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Whitehead has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas March 3, 2021 No. 04-20-00607-CV IN THE INTEREST OF A.J.D., A CHILD From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 20-0025-CV-C Honorable Thomas Nathaniel Stuckey, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R We grant appellee's motion for extension of time to file a brief. We order appellee's brief due March 15, 2021.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 3rd day of March, 2021.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
```
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 219 (Thursday, November 13, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 60910]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-29847]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health

National Institute of Child Health and Human Development; Notice 
of Meeting of the National Advisory Board on Medical Rehabilitation 
Research

    Pursuant to Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the meeting of 
the National Advisory Board on Medical Rehabilitation Research, 
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, November 24-
25, 1997, Natcher Conference Center, Conference Rooms E1-E2, Bethesda, 
Maryland.
    The meeting will be open to the public from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
on November 24 and 8:00 a.m. to adjournment on November 25. Attendance 
by the public will be limited to space available. Board topics will 
include: (1) A report on fiscal issues concerning the National Center 
for Medical Rehabilitation Research (Center) and the Institute; (2) 
reports on the program activities of the Center; (3) a discussion of 
general priority areas of research for the Center; and (4) a discussion 
of support for medical rehabilitation research by government agencies.
    Ms. Debbie Welty, Board Secretary, NICHD, 6100 Building, Room 2A03, 
National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland 20892, Area Code 301-
402-2242, will provide a summary of the meeting and a roster of 
Advisory Board members as well as substantive program information. 
Individuals who plan to attend and need special assistance, such as 
sign language interpretation or other reasonable accommodations, should 
contact Ms. Welty.

    Dated: November 6, 1997.
LaVerne Y. Stringfield,
Committee Management Officer, NIH.
[FR Doc. 97-29847 Filed 11-12-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
```
**Exhibit 21.1**

 

**SUBSIDIARIES OF ANTERO RESOURCES LLC**

 

Antero Resources Corporation

 

Antero Resources Piceance Corporation

 

Antero Resources Appalachian Corporation

 

Antero Resources Bluestone LLC, owned 100% by Antero Resources Appalachian Corporation

 

Antero Resources Pipeline Corporation

 

Antero Resources Finance Corporation is owned 43.96% by Antero Resources Corporation, 46.15% byAntero Resources Piceance Corporation, 5.49% by Antero Resources Appalachian Corporation, and 4.40% by Antero Resources Pipeline Corporation

 

----
# AVS

Quality Management System

.., Title: Domestic New Action Worksheet with SB " 

# . QPM# AIR·ANM·030·F7 O'ate: December 17, 2008 Revision 1 

## Record ofContacts 

# 02 0 /0 - 

# /3/3 FDMS Docket No.FAA~~ With whom outside the FAA has tpis 

### proposaJ been dis~ussed 

### (e,g., ATA, RAA, ALPA, CIC.)?

Organization Person Contacted Date ATA 1\1;) •.1;:L()llc~ 7/8/2UIO

,'.'

UNCONTROLLED COpy WHEN DOWNLOADED Check the Master List 10Verify That This i~ Ihe Cortec:l Revision Before Use
#### Carthel RUSHING, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 72-648.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 10, 1973.

Carthel Rushing, in pro per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., for appel-lee.

Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and CHARLES CARROLL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This court, proceeding in the manner outlined and recommended by the Supreme Court of the United States in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, having deferred ruling on a motion of the public defender to withdraw as counsel for the indigent defendant-appellant, and having furnished appellant with a copy of the public defender’s memorandum brief, and having allowed the appellant a reasonable specified time within which to raise any points that he chose in support of this appeal, and the appellant *8having failed to respond thereto, on consideration thereof upon full examination of the proceedings we conclude that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Whereupon, the public defender’s said motion to withdraw is granted, and the order or judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.
#### STATE of Florida ex rel. Bernard Martin ZIDE, Relator, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.

No. 70-662.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 23, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Habeas corpus denied.
#### Richard Kamerman et al., Appellants, v Andre O. De La Vina et al., Respondents.

[736 NYS2d 627]

In an action, inter alia, for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Hall, J.), entered June 29, 2001, as, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied specific performance to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs failed to establish that they were ready, willing, and able to close title until the lis pendens on the property was cancelled, and that the underlying action to which the lis pendens related was discontinued *(see, Huntington Min. Holdings v Cottontail Plaza,*60 NY2d 997; *Petrelli Assoc. v Germano,*268 AD2d 513). Moreover, since the lis pendens was not cancelled, and the underlying action was not discontinued as of the date of the trial, the Supreme Court was without power to grant specific performance to the plaintiffs, as “equity will not make what may prove to be a futile decree” *(Wells v Meader,*192 AD2d 827, 828; *see, S.E.S. Importers v Pappalardo,*53 NY2d 455).

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are without merit. Smith, J.P., Krausman, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.