UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

The Inspector General 

Washington. D.C. 20230 

June 10,2011 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Jane Lubchenco 

Under Secretary ofCommerce 

for Oceans and Atmosphere and 

NOAA Administrator 

FROM: 

a .. /"*"1-3~l.­

Todd J. ZInser 

SUBJECT: NOAA's Joint Polar Satellite System Audit Observations 

As you are aware, we are conducting an audit ofNOAA's Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) 

program. We have also been monitoring the transition from the National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) to JPSS. A summary ofNOAA's polar 

satellite program before and after NPOESS restructure is presented in table 1 in attachment A. 

This memorandum is intended to provide you with our current observations concerning the JPSS 

program in the following areas: funding shortfalls, transition delays, NPOESS Preparatory 

Project (NPP) launch and ground system status, and the life-cycle cost estimate. 

1. NOAA Expects a Gap in Weather and Climate Observation Data as a Result ofCurrent 

JPSS Funding Levels 

The planned timeframe for completing NPOESS to JPSS transition activities was December 

2010. When transition activities began in February 2010, the NPOESS contract, managed by the 

Air Force Space and Missile Center in California, was still funding the instruments and ground 

system. However, the Air Force was required to set aside $84 million (one half from Air Force, 

one half from NOAA) in termination liability costs on the NPOESS contract. As a result, the 

remaining FY 2010 funds of approximately $682 million were inadequate to support both the 

ongoing development work and needed JPSS transition activities. These activities included: 

establishing the majority ofNASA contracts, transferring physical property to NASA contracts, 

and fully staffing the JPSS program office as planned. 

While the JPSS program had some success in early FY 2011 in establishing contracts for most of 

the instruments, spacecraft, and ground system, this year's funding levels under the continuing 

resolutions limited program startup activities. For example, NASA was unable to adequately 

execute these newly established contracts, except for ground system development for NPP, . 

because it lacked funding to hire sufficient technical staffor order long-lead items (long-lead 

engineering, development work, and parts needing a long-lead time to be acquired/produced) 

before the satellite launch. As a result, the program was unable to establish a realistic schedule 

and technical performance capabilities to provide continuity ofweather and climate data for the 

afternoon orbit. 
During congressional testimony in February 2011, we identified FY 2011 funding as a risk to the 

JPSS program and noted a potential gap in continuity ofNOAA's polar satellite program based 

on actual life ofsatellites, instrument operational status, and other factors.! At that time, NOAA 

assumed the FY 2011 JPSS budget would be $776 million (the FY 2010 total NPOESS funding 

level) and requested a continuing resolution (CR) anomaly to provide funding at $910 million, 

still short ofthe $1,061 million President's budget request. Yet, only $382 million was enacted 

for the program under the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (see table 2 in 

attachment A). 

Based on the current FY 2011 funding level, NOAA expects a gap in weather and climate 

observations between NPP's end oflife and the operational date ofJPSS-l. Specifically, the lack 

offunding has slowed ongoing NASA contract activities that are needed for JPSS-l 

development. Therefore, it will take longer to build the satellite than originally intended with the 

start of operations now projected beyond NPP's design life. A gap will result in a lack ofdata, 

reducing accuracy ofweather forecasts and causing a break in data needed to maintain a 

continuous climate record. Based on our analysis ofNOAA information and an assumption ofa 

JPSS-l launch as late as the winter of2018, we currently estimate that this gap will be between 

18 and 30 months in length (see figure 1 on page 3). The actual length ofthe gap depends on the 

following four major factors: 

1. whether NOAA receives additional funding in FY 2011, and the amount ofthat funding;2 

2. the FY 2012 JPSS appropriation;3 

3. how NOAA prioritizes user needs for national weather and climate data; and 

4. the actual life ofthe NPP spacecraft and instruments. 

The NPP spacecraft was designed to last 5 years and carries enough fuel to last 7 years. 

However, most ofthe NPP instruments were managed and developed under the NPOESS 

Northrop Grumman contract with limited government oversight and a history oftechnical issues. 

Additionally, NASA lacked technical oversight during instrument development, manufacturing, 

and testing, creating uncertainty as to these instruments' ability to operate as long as the 

spacecraft's design life. Although NOAA's current gap analysis assumes that NPP will have a 5­

year operational life, NOAA recognizes NASA's revised NPP mission success criteria of3 years 

ofoperation, which takes residual risk ofinstrument performance into account. 

To mitigate a gap, NOAA is assessing its options. 

1 We testified before the House Committee on Appropriations on the subject ofFY 2012 Department of Commerce 

appropriations and top management challenges on February 9, 2011, and provided answers to the committee's 

questions for the record on March 15, 2011. 

2 The Department and NOAA have met with OMB and Office ofScience and Technology Policy to request 

assistance in mitigating the gap in satellite coverage by securing additional funds in FY 2011 and the President's 

budget in FY 2012. At this point in time, no resolution has been forthcoming. 

3 Should NOAA receive its total request for FY 2012 (with no additional funds in FY 2011), then we estimate the 

gap would be reduced to between 12 and 24 months based on an earlier launch date in 4th quarter ofFY 2017 for 

JPSS-I. 

2 
Figure 1. Potential Continuity Gaps in NOAA's Polar Operational Satellite Programs 

(Expected Gap Highlighted) 

Expected Major Gap (Based on Current FY2011 Funding) 

Fiscal Year 

. "

" " <----J~'IIIIIl~lIlItJ-------l

Feb 

•

'09 

, 

I

" 

:: 

I , 

OCI"I\ I I ,

L ±-:;-= JPSS-l 

Winler'I8 

Fall'22 

Satellite Launch Date
 

(Note: ACluallaunch dale shown for NOAA-19. planned launch dale for NPP. estimated launch date 'or JPSS-l and JPSS-2)
 

Satellite Check-Out Period· Planned time before all operational data available (6-l8 month window) 

Satellite OperatIOnal Period - El<peeted penod to receIVe operational data Irom satellite based on deSign life 

(Nole: Some data is available during the satellite ched<.-oul period ) 

j"i I I PotenlJal ConltnUily Gap - Actual gap. if any. dependS on actual hIe of satellites and now well instruments are operallng. as well

lias other laetor'S ,~

Source: OIG analysis 01 NOAA dillil. as 01 May 23. 2011 

2. Transition Delays Have Exacerbated an Expected Gap between NPP and JPSS-I 

Significant contractual issues have hampered the program from moving forward. In the fall of 

2010, NASA established contracts for the instruments and spacecraft in anticipation of 

transferring the remaining property from the NPOESS contract and moving forward with JPSS 

development efforts. However, because most of the instruments were still being manufactured 

under NPOESS, NOAA and NASA have had to work tlu'ough a cumbersome process with the 

Air Force in order to implement desired development changes. In particular, one remaining 

instrument, the Advanced Teclmology Microwave Sounder (ATMS), which provides critical data 

to enable accurate weather forecasts, has still not been transferred from the NPOESS contract, 

and the program has recently submitted urgent changes to the Air Force. Also, when we testified 

in February, intellectual property settlement had not been completed and this status is 

unchanged. 

3. Any Significant Issues Could Delay Launch ofNPP, Causing a Potential Near-Term Gap 

Currently, NPP is on track to meet its launch schedule. The NPP spacecraft, integrated with all 

instruments (NPP observatory), completed envirorullental testing at the end of April. This testing 

included operation of the observatory in a simulated space environment; the NPP program found 

no issues that would prevent proceeding with the final portion of the test schedule. The 

observatory still needs to go through compatibility testing this summer to evaluate the ground 

system's ability to control the observatory, the flow of data through the ground system after 

receipt from the observatory, and the creation of weather and climate products from the data. 

However, in addition to the gap prior to the first JPSS satellite, there is some potential for a gap 

between NOAA-l 9 and NPP (see figure 2 in attaclunent A). This would occur if, for example, 

3
 
NOAA-19 experiences an early end oflife or failure, the NPP observatory requires an extended 

post-launch checkout period before all data is operationally available, or the NPP launch is 

delayed. Also, any significant issues during the rest ofthe development period could delay the 

NPP launch and increase cost. 

Such a delay could be much longer for reasons to include obtaining a new launch window within 

the existing Vandenberg Air Force Base launch schedule, and availability ofstaff and facilities 

should the delay extend into holiday periods. Additionally, depending on the length ofthe delay, 

there is a risk ofnot maintaining launch vehicle (Delta II) expertise. The cost ofsuch delays, of 

course, depends on the length ofthe delay, the nature ofthe issue, and monthly costs for launch 

services that vary.

4 

4. Ground System, Essentialfor Operation ofNPP, Appears Back on Track, but the 

Compressed Test Schedule Could Jeopardize Data Availability 

At the start of2010, our technical experts were fully engaged with the JPSS transition team. By 

spring ofthat year, we observed that a growing number ofunresolved problems with ground 

system development and testing were not getting adequate attention. Since the ground system 

must first support the NPP satellite, resolving any issues promptly is vital to maintaining weather 

and climate data continuity. 

We immediately alerted Commerce and NOAA leadership to our concerns, including the 

potential delay ofthe NPP launch because ofthe issues with the groimd system. Specifically, in 

July 2010, at least 247 issues were being considered for resolution prior to the start of a key NPP 

compatibility test to demonstrate that the ground system could properly control the satellite. This 

test, originally scheduled for August 2010, was postponed until January 2011 because the 

program was unable to complete the significant number ofsoftware' changes to address these 

issues prior to testing. Since July 2010, the program has discovered additional issues that also 

have to be prioritized and their disposition determined before launch.5 

Additionally, under the current Air Force NPOESS contract with Northrop Grumman, there were 

barriers preventing the JPSS program from effectively working with the ground system 

subcontractor (Raytheon) to complete the necessary software changes to resolve these issues. In 

particular, the delay in transitioning the ground system from the Air Force contract to NASA 

restricted the program's ability to directly communicate with Raytheon and required the program 

to go through the Air Force's contracting office in order to direct development work on the 

ground system. The ground system contract was successfully transferred to NASA September 

22, 2010, thereby mitigating this cumbersome communication. 

4 Examples are rough order-of-magnitude cost estimates. Costs for delays ofmore than 1 month are not linear with 

costs for a single-month delay. For example, cost for a single-month delay is $7.3 million; cost for a 2-month delay 

is $12.0 million (less than 2 times as much); and cost for a 5-month delay is $41.4 million (more than 5 times as 

much). 

5 According to NOAA, as ofJune 2011, the number ofissues which have not been closed is 69. Ofthese, all but 7 

have been fixed and are awaiting verification at the next compatibility test. Ofthe remaining 7 outstanding issues 

still being worked, 5 are under analysis. 

4
 
In January 2011, we observed the compatibility test that had been postponed from last August. It 

appeared to have been largely successful; however, the program had not yet finished verifying all 

the requirements the test intended to assess before it started a second test. This second test was 

designed to evaluate the flow ofdata through the ground system after it had been received from 

the satellite, as well as the creation ofproducts from the data. The test had been scheduled for 

March 2011, but the program postponed it until April in order to complete a very large number 

ofsoftware changes. 

We observed this second test as well and noted several issues, some ofwhich the JPSS program 

has decided not to address until after launch, which increase the risk ofusers not receiving 

weather and climate data products within NPP's planned 18-month checkout period after launch. 

Also, until the program completes a fmal compatibility test this summer, the total number of 

issues that must be resolved during the post-launch checkout period will remain unknown. 

Additionally, the fmal compatibility test leaves little time to address any new or remaining issues 

before the program places a planned 75-day pre-launch freeze on development activities in 

August 2011. The delays in development and testing that have occurred thus far have 

compressed the schedule and increased the risk that pre-launch requirements will not be fully 

verified. Also, any additional post-launch work to address these issues will have to be completed 

along with the previously planned checkout period activities. 

5. Life-Cycle Cost Estimate and Resulting Budget Requirements Are Uncertain 

Life-cycle cost estimates for major programs are based upon user needs reflected in a formally 

accepted requirements document; however, in order to be included in the FY 2011 President's 

budget request, the JPSS budget estimate of$Il.9 billion (pre-FY 2010 through FY 2026) had to 

be developed in a compressed timeframe without JPSS-specific requirements. (While NOAA had 

existing NPOESS requirements, it did not have time to create a set ofhigh-level requirements for 

JPSS.) In March 2010, the program formed a requirements working group, but NOAA's 

establishment ofJPSS requirements (particularly for the ground system) was further delayed 

because these requirements were dependent on Air Force's definition ofits polar satellite 

program, which did not occur until late August 2010. 

With near-final requirements, the JPSS program is developing a cost analysis requirements 

description (CARD), which is needed to produce an independent cost estimate (ICE). The CARD 

provides a description oftechnical and programmatic features ofthe program and is planned to 

be completed by July 1,2011. NOAA's Chief Financial Officer will then produce the ICE. Once 

the ICE is complete, NOAA will reconcile differences between it and the JPSS program estimate 

of$I·I.9 billion. This process will result in a more certain cost estimate. 

5
 
We greatly appreciate NOAA's cooperation during our review and the access we have been 

given to JPSS program activities. If you have any questions or would like to discuss the issues in 

this memo, please do not hesitate to call me at (202) 482-4661 or Allen Crawley at 

(202) 482-1855. 

Attachment 

cc:	 Mary M. Glackin, Deputy Under Secretary for Operations, NOAA 

Mary E. Kicza, Assistant Administrator, National Environmental Satellite, Data, 

and Infonnation Service, NOAA 

Mack Cato, Director, Office of Audit and Infonnation Management, NOAA 

Geovette E. Washington, Deputy Gener8I Counsel, Department of Commerce 

6
 
Attachment A: Polar Satellite Summary, Budget Snapshot and Potential Continuity Gaps 

Table 1. Summary ofNOAA's Polar Satellite Program Before andAfter Restructure 

Key Area NPOESS JPSS Comments 

Number of satellites 

4 

(Post NunnMcCurdy8) 

2 

6 satellites prior to NunnMcCurdy; development and 

operation through 2026 

Life-cycle cost estimate 

($ millions, as of date) 

$12,520b 

Feb 2008 

$11,929 

Feb 2010 

Air Force will now fund/ 

develop Defense Weather 

Satellite System; cost is not 

yet determined 

Cost share for program 

development and 

operation 

Approximately SO/50 

split between Air 

Force and NOAA 

NOAA responsible 

for 100% of 

development costs; 

operations costs 

shared 

Air Force satellites will be 

operated by JPSS ground 

system 

NPP Purpose Risk reduction Operational use of 

data 

Change is result of need to 

preserve data continuity 

Acquisition agent Air Force NASA 

NPOESS managed by 

Integrated Program Office 

(Air Force, NOAA, and 

NASA). NOAA-program 

management; Air Forceacquisition; and NASAdevelopmentlincorporation 

of new technologies. 

Source: OIG Summanzation of NPOESS/JPSS Program Documentation and BUdget Estimates 

a The Nunn-McCurdy provision (10 U.S.C. § 2433) requires the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when unit 

costs for a major acquisition program grow by 15 percent over its baseline estimates. In November 2005, the 

Department of Defense's Cost Analysis Improvement Group showed that cost growth for NPOESS had exceeded 25 

fercent, triggering the Nunn-McCurdy certification requirement. 

By December 2008, it was clear this estimate was not attainable given that the NPOESS acquisition program 

baseline had grown to nearly $14 billion. 

7
 
Figure 2. Potelltial Continuity Gaps ill NOAA's Polar Operational Satellite Programs 

(Near-Term Potential Gap Highlighted) 

Polenlinl Near-Term Gilp (Based on NOAA-19 Failure or NPP Issues) 

Fisenl Year 

... "

,
 

"
 " Feb -09 ",

" -------j NPP , --J o 

o 

o 

o Oct']1 o 0

L ~d JPSS-l 

Winter 'IS 

JPSS-2 

FaW22 

Satellite Launcl'l Onte
 

(Note: Actu811aunch dale shown for NOAA-19. planned launch d"te lor NPP, est,mated 13unch date lor JPSS-l and JPSS-2)
 

SaleM", Check-Oul Pe'lO<l _ P1<lnned l,me before "II operational data "vailable (6-'8 month WIndow) 

•• S8ICUII", Ope,nuonal PerIOd - Expected penoC! to rece,ve operatIonal dala from !<31ellfle baal!<l Oil design I,Ie 

• ,_ (Note: Some data;" ",'allable ouring the satellne check..,,,t Period ) 

:: Potent,al Cont'n"ity Gap - Act"al gap, il any. depends on acWall;re 01 s"telhtes lind how wea Instruments a'. ope'''t,ng. as well 

I I liS othe, raetolS ,2 So"'e<'! DIG 8r\8rysls 01 NOAA data. as of May 23. 2011 

Table 2: Budget Snapshot-Before alld After Restructure ($ milliolls) 

Fiscal Year NPOESS' JPSS" Comments 

Air Force NOAA Air Force NOAA 

2009 S290 I S288 N/A N/A 

Portion of NOAA share 

2010 S384 S382 N/A N/A applied to JPSS based on 

restructure 

JPSS funded at S382, leaving 

S679 shortfall; NOAA 

2011 

S421 

Plan before 

restructure 

S420 

Plan before 

restructure 

SO $1,061 

Request 

requested a CR anomaly to 

provide funding at $910, but 

assumed a budget of $776 

that was required to prevent 

significant change to the 

$417 

Plan before 

restructure 

program 

2012 

$416 

Plan before 

restructure 

$0 $1,160 

Request 

Total 

through $6,270 $6,250 $0 $11,929 

2026 

$12,520 NPOESS 

total 

Source: OIG Summanzatron of NPOESS/JPSS Budget Estimates 

• Based on NPOESS FY2009 President's Budget Request, February 2008 

b Based on JPSS FY2011 President's Budget Request, Febnuary 2010 

8