W e no t e t hat t he co rr ect s p el l i ng of t he d efend ant ’ s m i d d l e na m e is “S e vi er. ” H o wever, we have l i st ed t he 1
d e fen d a n t’s na m e a s it a p p e a rs in the ind ic tm e n t. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 17, 200 4

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . DAVID SEVER WAT KI NS

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for White County No. CR1172 Leon Burns, Jr., Jud ge

No. M2003- 01488-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 9, 2005

The de fenda nt, David Sever Watkins, was c onvicted by a W hite County jury of sale of .5 gra ms or

1 more of a

Schedule I I

controlled substanc e, coc aine, a nd was sente nced a s a Rang e I , standard offe nder to ten y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. On appe al, he a sserts: (1) the e vidence was insufficient to sustain his c onviction; a nd (2) the trial court erre d in imposi ng a ten- y ear sentenc e. Following our re view, we aff irm the conviction and the sentenc e.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J
., delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

Da vidN. B ra dy , D ist

ri c t Pu bli c De fe nd e r; Joe L

. F inl e y , Jr. a nd John B

. Ni sb e t, II I , A ssi sta nt P ub lic De fe nd e rs , f

or the app e lla nt, Da vidSe ve r Watki ns

.
Paul G. Summe rs , Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Richard H. Duna vant, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Will iam E. Gibson, District Attorney Gene ral; and John A. Moore, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation (“TB I ”) Spec ial Ag ent Dan O g le testified that on May 22, 20 02 , whi le wo rking un de rc ov e r narc oti c s in Whit e a ndPut na m Co un tie s, he we nt t o Wh ite Cou nty to “purc hase c rac k coca ine from [th e defe ndant].” After contac ting the de fenda nt by cell phone, Ag ent Ogle met him in the parking lot of a Shell g as station off Hig hway 111. The de fenda nt pulled up a lon g sid e Ag e nt O g le ’s c ar anda sk e d him if he wa s in la w e nf or c e me nt. Whe n A g e nt O g le sa id-2-

“no,” the defe ndant g ot into Ag ent Og le’s car and they beg an discussing drug transac tions. Age nt Og le told the defe ndant that he wa nted an “ eig ht ball,” which he explained in court was a common term for approximately 3.2 to 3.5 g rams of cra ck cocaine. The defe ndant told him that he could g et an eig ht ball for $200 and that future buy s might be chea per. The defe ndant then ca lled his “source ,” whom he told to meet them at a Che vron g as station. Ag ent Og le and the de fe n d an t d rove to the Chevron, whe re a

black Monte Carlo vehicle oc cupied by two Afric an-A merica n fema les pulled up. The de fenda nt got out and approac hed their vehicle with a set of di g ital scale s he had bor rowe d from Ag ent Og le. Afte r g etting into the Monte Carlo and c onducting a tra nsaction, the de fenda nt returne d to Ag ent Ogle’ s vehicle and s howed him the crack coca ine. They then re turned to the Shell station, wh e re the de fe nd a nt g a ve Ag e nt Og le “ the e nti re c hu nk of c ra c k c oc a ine .” Ag e nt Og le ha d d if fi c ult y brea king the rock of

coca ine, so the defe ndant retrie ved from his vehicle a scre w which they

used to break off a

chunk o f the coc aine. Af ter discussing future dr

ug transac tions, the defendant took the re ma ind e r o f the c ra c k c oc a ine a ndle ft . A g e nt O g le state d th e e nti re tr a ns a c tio n to ok a “ lit tle

over a n hour.” A g ent Og le then sea led the cr ack c ocaine he had pur chase d in a plastic bag and g ave it t o h i s b ac k u p , Ag ent Danny Espinosa, to take to the c rime lab. Ag ent Espinosa had be en in a vehicle “ down the roa d,” monitoring the conve rsations betwe en the defe ndant and Ag ent Og le on

a re cording device known as a “Ke ll set.”

TBI Ag ent Danny

Espinosa testified that on May 22, 2002, he wa s employ ed with t he Putnam CountySheriff’ s Depa

rtment and wa s assig ned to the Thirtee nth J udicial Drug Task For ce. On that date, he was working as Ag ent Ogle’ s “cove r person,” following in a sepa rate vehicle and operating th e Kel l s et. Es pi no sa t oo k t he cr ack co cai ne fr omAgentOgle an d t hen del iv ered it to th e TBI Crime L ab in Nashville on May 28.
Ag ent Dianne Smit h testified that she ha d been e mploy ed with the TB I Crime L ab for

six teen y e ars a ndthat her job is to “r e c e ive e vid e nc e fr om the va ri ou s la w e nf

or c e me nt a g e nc ie s o f the Sta te of Tenne ssee” for a naly sis “to determine if it conta ins a controlled substanc e.” During those six teen y ear s, she had r

un “thousands” of

tests like the one involved in this case

. She analy zed the substance de liv e re d b y

Ag e nt E sp ino sa

us ing“ul tr avi ol et s pect rop ho to met ry , i nfr ared sp ect rop ho to met ry , ma ss spectrophotome t ry , an d

. . . g as chr omatog raphy ” tests. Her analy sis revea led that the “r ock like

su bs ta nc e ,” wh ic h we ig he d 3. 87 g ra ms, wa s c oc a ine

. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, sh e e xpla ine d th a t it was “ not standard operating proce dure” to perf orm quantitative analy sis to determine if a substance was “ pure coca ine.” I nstead, the r esults of her te sts were “strictly qualitative.” She state d that the substance in the instant c ase “may not have be en pure ” coc aine. She testified that had she take n a small sample fro m ei t h er e nd of the roc k, it would have tested positive for cocaine. Fina lly , she stated that the cocaine base in the sample she tested “wa sn’t 100 perc ent coc aine but I don’t know if it was 80 or 90 be cause I did not check the purity .”

T h e d e f e n d a n te l e c t e d n o tt o t e s t i f y.-3- AN AL YSI S

I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence

The de fenda nt asserts that beca use t he S tate did not prove tha t the controlled substanc e he sold contained “ pure” cocaine of a t least .5 g rams, the e vidence was insuffic ient to c onvict him of Class B fe lony

sale of a Sched u l e I I

controlled substanc e pursua nt to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17- 417(c) (1). We disag ree

.
Where suff

iciency of the c onvicting e vidence is challeng ed, the r eleva n t q u est ion of the revie wing court is “whe ther, a fter vie wing th e ev i d ence in the light most favor able to the prosec ution, any rational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond

a re asonable doubt.” J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2789, 61 L . Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P

. 13(e) (“F indings of g uilt in criminal ac tions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidenc e is insuff icient to support the finding s by the trier of fa ct of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.”); S tate v. Eva ns, 838 S.W .2d 185, 190-92 (Te nn. 1992); State v. Ander son, 835 S.W .2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 9 9 2 ). All questions involvi ng the

cre dibilit y

of witnesses, the w eight an d v al u e t o be g iven the evide nce, and all fac tual issues are resolved by

the trier of

fac t. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A g uiltyverdic t by

the jury , approve d b ythe trial judg e, ac cre dits the testimonyof the witnesse s for the St a te a n d r e s o lv e s a ll c o n f li c ts in f a v o r o f th e th e o r y o f th e St a te

. ” St a te v

. G rac e, 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973) . Our supre me court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the jury

see the witnesses face to fac e, hear their te stimony and obser ve their de meanor o n the stand. Thus the trial judg e and jury are the primary

instrumentality

of justice to determine the weig ht and cr edibility to be given to the t estimony of wit nesses. I n the trial forum alone is there human atmosphere a nd the totality of the

e vid e nc e c a nn ot b e re pr od uc e d w ith a writt e n r e c or d in thi s Co urt.

Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W .2d 5 2 3 (1963)) . A jury conviction re moves the pre sumption of innocence with which a defe n d ant is initi ally

cloake d and re place s it with one of g uilt, so t hat on appe al, a c onvicted defe ndant has the bur den of de monstrating that the evidenc e is insufficient. See State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

.
O u r o p in io n in St a te v

. H o w ar d K ar e e m A tkin s , No. 02C0 1

- 9 8 0 5

- CC

- 0 0 1 5 5
, 1 9 9 9 WL 241870 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr . 26, 1999), i s exactly on point and controlling for the i ssue ra ised by the de fe nd a nt:

Th e de fe nd a nt a lso c omp la ins that th e ind ic tme nt c ha rg e s h im wit h s el l ing c ocaine weig hing .5 g rams or more , but the evidenc e-4- established only

that he sold a substance containing cocaine weig hing

. 5 grams or more and it was not e stablished how much the pur e
coca ine weig hed. The defe ndant labels this as a suf fi ci en cyof the evidenc e i s s u e. T his is not a sufficienc y of the e vidence issue beca use in order to e stablish a Class B fe lony under § 39- 17-417(c ), the State need not pr ove that the pure cocaine in the co n t ra b and substance w eig hed .5 g rams or more , so long as the weig ht of the

coca ine combined with the other substanc es totaled .5 g rams or more

. See State v. Alcorn, 741 S.W .2d 135, 138 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. Thus, the State proved w hat § 39-17-417( c)( 1) re quired it to prove, that is
, th a t th e s u b s ta n c e c o n tain in g c o c a in e th a t w a s s o ld by the defe ndant weig hed .5 g rams or more

.
The de fenda nt's true point of contention is that the indictment is insufficient bec ause it alleg es he sold c ocaine weig hing .5 g rams or
mor e , r a the r tha n a su bs ta nc e c on ta ini ng c oc a ine we ig hin g .5 g rams or more, a s § 3 9 -1 7-417(c )(1) provides. The indictment, however
, c omp lie s w ith c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio ns , incl ud ing that of no tic e to the ac cused of

the crime char g ed. Moreove r, t he indictment complies with the require ments delineate d in § 40-13-202. Thus, it is sufficient to support the defe ndant' s conviction.

I d. at **1-2. The defe ndant poi nts to no authority
, nor do we know of any , for the pr oposition t hat only the weig ht of the “pur e” c ocaine in a crack coca ine m ix ture is rele vant to the determination of whether the amount sold was more or less than .5 g rams. As pointed out cle arly in Howar d Kar eem Atkin s, “ the Sta te ne e d not p ro ve that th e pu re c oc a ine in the c on tr a ba ndsu bs ta nc e we ig he d . 5 g ra ms
or mor e , s o lo ng a s th e we ig ht o f the c oc a ine c omb ine d wi th the oth e r su bs ta nc e s tot a le d . 5 g ra ms or more.” I d. at *1. The plain lang uag e of the statute states that “if the amount involved is point five (.5) g rams or more of any substance c ontaining cocaine ,” then the offe nse is a Class B felony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 417(c) (1) ( emphasis adde d). Ther efor e, the de fenda nt’s contention is without

me ri t.

L ike the def

endant in Howar d Ka re em Atki ns, the defe ndant in the pre sent appe al, at the motion for new tria l hearing conducte d at the same time a s the sentenc ing he aring , arg ued that the indictment was insufficie nt because it only alleg ed that he sold c ocai n e, rathe r than a substance

c on ta ini ng c oc a ine

. Ha vin g re vie we d the ind ic tme nt in the pr e se nt c a se , we c on c lud e that it complies with all the requir ements of Title 40, Chapter 13, Part 2 of Te nnessee Code Annotated, a s well as a ll other protections g uara nteed by the Tenne ssee Constitution. The defendant was fully put on notice of the crime w ith which he wa s char g ed.
Ag ent Og le testified that he boug ht an “e ight ba ll” rock of cra ck coc aine from the def endant for $200. Ag ent Espinosa testified that he delivere d the crack coca ine t o the TB I Crime L ab. Ag ent Smit h testi fi ed t h at she ana ly zed the contra band substance , which tested positive as c ocaine andT he B l ake l y opi ni on was r el eas ed whi l e t he pres ent appeal was pendi ng bef ore t hi s cour t and before i t ha d been 2
do cke t ed. T he defendan t f i l ed wi t h t hi s cour t a c op y of t he op i ni on as s uppl ement al aut hor i t y , ar gu i ng t hat i t af fect ed hi s sent enci ng.
-5- weig hed 3.87 g rams. B ased upon the testimonyof these w itnesses, we c onclude the pr oof wa s
su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh the de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.

II. Se nt e nc ing

The de fenda nt also challeng es his ten-y ear sentenc e, ar g uing that the trial court did not g ive enoug h weig ht to mit igating f actor s and that the sente nce is a ff ec t ed by the re cent United States Supreme Court dec ision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 2

When an ac cused c halleng es the leng th and manner of ser vice of a sentenc e, it is the duty of this court to conduct a de novo revie w on the rec ord with a presumption that “t h e d et er minations made by the court from which the a ppeal is take n are cor re ct

. ” T enn. C ode Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) (2003). This pre sumption i s “conditioned upon the a ffirma tive showing in the rec ord that the trial

c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r i n c i p l e s a n d a l l r e l e v a n tf a c t s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s

. ” S t a t e v

. A s h b y, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The presumption does not a pply t o t h e l ega l conclusions

rea ched by

the trial court in sentenc ing the acc used or to the de terminations made by the trial court wh ic h a re pr e dic a te d up on un c on tr ov e rt e d f a c ts. Sta te v. B utl e r, 90 0 S. W.2 d 3 05 , 3 11 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1994); State v. Smith, 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Bone stel, 871 S.W .2d 163, 166 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.
I n co n d u ct ing a de novo revie w of a sentenc e, this court must consider ( a) a ny evidenc e
rec eived at the trial and/or se ntencing hearing, ( b ) t he pre sentenc e re port, (c) the principles of sentenc ing, ( d) the a

rg uments of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives, (e) the nature and char acte ristics of the offense, ( f) a ny mitigating or enha ncing fac tors, (g ) any statements made by

the

acc used in his own behalf , and (h) the ac cused' s potential or lack of potential for r eha b i l i t at i o n or tr e a tme nt. Te nn . Co de An n. §§ 40 -3 5- 10 3, -2 10 ; Sta te v. Sc ott , 7 35 S.W. 2d82 5, 82 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1987). The party

challeng ing the s en t en ce i m posed by the trial court has the burde n of establishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentenc ing Commission Cmts.; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. I n this case, the de fenda nt has the burde n of illustr at ing the

se nte nc e imp os e d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

is e rr on e ou s.

The de fenda nt was convic ted of sale of .5 g rams or more o f a S chedule I I controlled substance, c ocaine , a Class B f elony , and wa s sent en ce d as a Rang e I , standard of fende r. The sentenc e ra ng e for a Class B felony , as a Rang e I , standard of fende r is eig ht to twelve y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 112(a) (2) (2 0 03). Ther e is no mathematica l formula for evaluating the enhanc ement fa ctors to ca lculate the appropriate s entenc e. See g ener ally State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 46 7, 47 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ). “ Ra the r, the we ig ht t o b e a ff or de d a n e xistin g fa c tor

is l e ft to the trial court’s discretion so long as the c ourt complies with the purposes and principles of t he 1989-6-

Sentencing Act and its fi n d i ng s are adequately supported by

the re cord.” I d. at 475-76 (c itations omitted).

J im W allace , a super vising probation of fice r with the Depa

rtment of Probation and Par ole, testified at the se ntencing hearing that he pre pare d the defendant’s presente nce report. He said the defe ndant was c onvicted of m isdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor in 1995 and felony sale of a Schedule I I

controlled substanc e, coc aine, in 1996. I n addition, the defe ndant was on parole when he committed the prese nt offense

.
The de fenda nt testified that he complete d th e Lifeline The rape utic Communi ty drug prog ram while incar cer ated in Ha

rdema n Countyand that he ha d been attending A lcohol ics Anony mous
me e tin g s. He sa id he wa s c ur re ntl y wo rking fo r h is f

a the r, wh o tr a de s mu le s, a ndfo r a “ Ms. Coffman,” who worke d at a loca l car pet business. On cr oss-examination, the defe ndant said he w as pa ro le d in 19 98 on his pr ior dr ug c on vic tio n, bu t he violate d p aro le in 2 00 0 a ndwa s r e turne d to prison. He wa s paroled a g ain in 2001, which wa s revoke d due to the cur rent drug arr est in 2002.

Thomas Sevier Watkins, the defe ndant’s fathe r, testified that the defe ndant had bee n living with him and performing some mule work since be ing r elea sed fr om prison. The def endant ha d not been in a ny

trouble as f

ar a s he knew

.
At the c on c lus ion of

the se nte nc ing he ari ng , t

h et ri a l c o urt app lie d th re e e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s: (2 ), the defend ant ha s a

pr e vio us his tory

of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns in a dd iti on to tho se ne c e ssa ry to establish the ra ng e; (9), the defe ndant has a previous history

of unwi l l i n gn es s to comply with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase in the community ; and (14)( B) , the fe lony was c ommitt ed while on any

of the following forms of re lease status if such re lease is from a prior felony conviction: parole . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2), (9), (14) (2003). The court also found one mitigating fac tor, (1) the defe ndant’s criminal conduct neither cause d nor threatened se rious bodily injury . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 3 5 -1 1 3 (1 ) (2 003). The c ourt sentenc ed the de fenda nt to ten y ear s, the midpoint i n the ra ng e.
As to the applica tion of the e nhance ment fac tors, the trial court determined the fac tors wer e “p re t t y s er i o u s l y

we i gh t ed i n t h e s ch em e o f t h i n gs ” a n d we re s u ff i ci en tt o “a d

j u s tt h e r an ge sig nif ic a ntl y up wa rdin the ra ng e of ei ght to tw e lve .” Th e c ou rt fo un d th a t th e on e app lic able mitigating fac tor had “ some bea ring ” on the c ourt’s determination and settl ed on a sentence of ten y e ars , r a the r tha n the e le ve n y e ars so ug ht b y the Sta te . We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its discretion in sentencing the def en d ant to the midpoint in t he ra ng e and that its findings wer e adequately

supported by

the re cord.
We note that the Supreme Court in B lakely clarified its ear lier holding in Apprendi v. Ne w J erse y , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. C t. 2348, 2362-63 (2000), c oncluding that “[o] ur pre cede nts make clea r .

. . that the ‘statutory maxi mum’ for Apprendi purposes is the m axim um sentence a judg e may impose solely on the basis of the f a ct s r ef l ec ted in the jury ve rdict or admitted by the defe ndant .” Blakely , 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct . at 2537. Additionally , under the Appre ndi/Blake ly scheme , prior-7-

adult convictions may

still be used to e nhance a d efendant’s sente nce. See State v. Christopher Kirkenda ll, No. W2004-00784-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 W L 2083760, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2004), applic. for perm. to a ppeal filed (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2004). I n the prese nt case , the def endant ha s one prior misdeme anor a nd one p ri o r fe l o ny conviction such that e nhance ment fac tor (2) w as proper ly applied by the trial court. We de em application of f actor (2) to be suf

ficient a lone to justify the sentenc e imposed by the trial court. Accor dingly , the B lakely decision does n o t aff

ect the defe ndant’s sente ncing which, we conclude , is supported by the re cord.

CO NC LU SION

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g a uth oriti e s a ndre a so nin g , th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is aff irmed.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE