Motion Denied; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 8, 

2021.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-21-00103-CV

JARED DOUET AND JASALYN MOSBEY-DOUET, Appellants

V.

PAPILLON ROMERO, BOBBY SULLIVAN, AND UNITED REALTY 

ADVISORS, Appellees

On Appeal from the 157th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2018-38090

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is the second appeal brought by appellants Jared Douet and Jasalyn 

Mosbey-Douet from two orders: an order granting defendant Bobby Sullivan’s noevidence motion for summary judgment, signed August 14, 2020; and an order 

granting defendant Papillon Romero’s motion for summary judgment, signed 

August 20, 2020. That appeal was before this court as appeal number 14-20-

00632-CV. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss their appeal. The motion stated
2

defendant URE Houston, LLC, had not been dismissed or non-suited, thus the 

judgments were not final and appealable. We construed the motion as one for 

voluntary dismissal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), granted

the motion, and dismissed the appeal. We explained that “[o]ur grant of appellant’s 

motion should not be construed as a conclusion regarding this court’s appellate

jurisdiction.” After an order of non-suit dismissing appellants’ claims against URE 

Houston was signed, appellants again appealed. 

Appellee Romero has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the 

basis that the August 20, 2020 judgment was final. Romero contends the notice of 

appeal was therefore untimely filed and we are without jurisdiction. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 26.1. Appellants filed a response, to which appellee filed a reply. For the 

reasons stated below, we deny appellee Romero’s motion but dismiss the appeal 

because the record does not reflect there is a final judgment.

In their original petition, appellants named URE Houston as a defendant. In 

their First Amended Original Petition, filed March 25, 2019, appellants named 

United Realty Advisors (“URA”) as a defendant; URE Houston is not named at all. 

The parties agree that URA was not served. 

Subsequently, the trial court granted two motions for summary judgment in 

favor of the only two remaining parties, Sullivan and Romero. The August 20, 

2020, summary judgment only denies relief “as against the Defendant Papillon 

Romero.” There is no language of finality in the body of the order. See Lehmann v. 

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. 2001). The word “FINAL” was added 

in front of “ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PAPILLON REOMERO’S [sic]

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.” The docket sheet provides “ORDER 

FOR INTERLOCUTORY SUMMARY JUDGMENT SIGNED.”
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Absent language of finality, the August 20, 2020, Romero judgment is a 

final judgment “if it actually disposes of all claims still pending in the case. Thus, 

an order that grants a motion for partial summary judgment is final if in fact it 

disposes of the only remaining issue and party in the case, even if the order does 

not say that it is final, indeed, even if it says it is not final.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at

204.

URE Houston was not a remaining defendant when judgment was granted in 

favor of Romero because it had been effectively dismissed from the suit by the 

amended petition. Tex. R. Civ. P. 65; Webb v. Jorns, 488 S. W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. 

1972) (for explanation that an amended pleading acts as voluntary dismissal of 

omitted defendant).1 The issue is whether appellee URA was a remaining 

defendant on August 20, 2020. There is no dispute URA was not served, but that is 

not determinative if appellants expected to obtain service. See Youngstown Sheet & 

Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962) (summary judgment expressly 

disposing of all named parties other than party that record reflected was not served, 

did not answer, and plaintiff did not expect to obtain service upon, stood “as if 

there had been a discontinuance” as to that party, and judgment was regarded as 

final for purposes of appeal); see also M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 

674–75 (Tex. 2004) (summary judgment that failed to address claims against all 

named defendants was final when record affirmatively showed plaintiff never

intended to serve remaining defendant, did not request citation be issued for that 

defendant, and appealed judgment without indicating it was not final because she 

intended to serve remaining defendant); Broderick v. Universal Health Services, 

Inc., No. 05-16-01379-CV, 2018 WL 1835689, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 18, 

2018, no pet.). 

1 Appellants non-suited URE Houston, and the trial court signed a January 22, 2021 order 

to memorialize that, but URE Houston had already been dismissed by the amended pleading.
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In this case, it is undisputed that appellants requested service of citation. In 

considering whether there is evidence in the record before us that appellants 

expected to obtain service, we consider a case form our sister court, Taylor v. 

Jones, No. 01-16-00999-CV, 2017 WL 6327375, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] Dec. 12, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.):

Here, the summary judgment order “does not unequivocally 

express an intent to dispose of all claims and all parties” but 

specifically disposes only of Taylor's claims against AOF/Houston. 

Crites, 284 S.W.3d 841. A judgment that “expressly disposes of some, 

but not all defendants,” is final when remaining defendants have not

been served or answered and “nothing in the record indicates that 

plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, 

such that the case ‘stands as if there had been a discontinuance’ as to 

the unserved defendants.” In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tex. 

App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (quoting 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 

1962)). A failure to effect service of process against an unserved 

defendant does not, by itself, demonstrate a lack of intent to serve the 

defendant. In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d at 188.

. . .

Nothing in the record indicates that Taylor did not expect to 

obtain service on Jones or had discontinued her suit as to him. 

Accordingly, a signed, written order disposing of Taylor’s claims 

against Jones would be necessary for a final, appealable judgment. See 

Wanzer v. Mendoza, No. 04–05–00505–CV, 2005 WL 2368007, at *1 

(Tex. App.–San Antonio Sept. 28, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing 

M.O. Dental Lab. v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. 2004)). 

Because the November 21, 2016 order does not dispose of all parties 

and all claims in the trial court proceeding, we conclude that the order 

is not final and appealable.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. 

P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

Id. at *2.
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The record before us does not demonstrate that appellants did not expect to 

obtain service on URA or had discontinued their suit as to URA. See Tex. R. Civ. 

P. 161. Because the judgment against Romero contains no language of finality, and 

all parties and all claims in the trial court were not disposed of, we dismiss this

interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). Romero’s 

motion to dismiss is also denied.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Zimmerer, and Spain.