alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>


                                                                      Exhibit 27


                             RANGER INDUSTRIES, INC.
                       (formerly Coleco Industries, Inc.)

                             FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE
                       10-QSB for the second quarter 1998

                                   (Unaudited)
                                     -------




<ARTICLE>                               5
<LEGEND>                                This  schedule   contains   summary
                                        financial   information   extracted
                                        from   the   Balance    Sheet   and
                                        Statement   of    Operations    and
                                        Comprehensive Loss and is qualified
                                        in its  entirety  by  reference  to
                                        such financial statements.

</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000021610
<NAME>                        RANGER INDUSTRIES, INC.
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                       781,792
<SECURITIES>                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  4,642
<ALLOWANCES>                                       0
<INVENTORY>                                        0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             821,852
<PP&E>                                             0
<DEPRECIATION>                                     0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               912,855
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         20,368
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<COMMON>                                      52,886
<OTHER-SE>                                   831,210
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 912,855
<SALES>                                            0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   0
<CGS>                                              0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                108,684
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (21,849)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (84,232)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  11,099
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (95,331)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (95,331)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (.02)
        


</TABLE>
#### Charles Wesley O’BERRY, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 70-973.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 15, 1970.

Habeas corpus denied.
Order filed November 16, 2012 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-12-00710-CV

____________

MATTHEW D. WIGGINS, JR. AND D.L. HAMMAKER, Appellant

V.

AMELIA V. KELLY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 122nd District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 11-CV-0325

ORDER

No reporter’s record has been filed in this case. The official court reporter for the 

122nd District Court informed this court that appellant had not made arrangements for 

payment for the reporter’s record. On October 22, 2012, the clerk of this court notified 

appellant that we would consider and decide those issues that do not require a reporter=s 

record unless appellant, within 15 days of notice, provided this court with proof of 

payment for the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c). Appellant filed no reply. 
Accordingly, we order appellant to file a brief in this appeal on or before 

December 17, 2012. If appellant fails to comply with this order, the court will dismiss 

the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b). 

PER CURIAM
##### 



Exhibit 31.1
 Certification Pursuant to
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report of Columbia Energy Group on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 2005;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting.
 Date: November 7, 2005
    By:
    /s/ Michael W. O'DonnellMichael W. O'DonnellPresident and Chief Executive Officer
#### A. A. HOME IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, Inc. v. Mr. & Mrs. Thomas C. IRWIN.

No. 3756.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

Feb. 2, 1970.

Edward K. Pinner, Sr., New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.

Cabibi & Cabibi, Charles E. Cabibi, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.

Before REGAN, REDMANN and BAR-NETTE, JJ.

REDMANN, Judge.

On a previous appeal, reported at 203 So. 2d 888, we remanded this case for a deter*438mination of the cost of correction of defects in performance of a contract we held plaintiff had substantially performed.

From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor for the amount of the contract less the amount the trial court found it would cost to remedy defects, plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff claims the defects were not proven, nor the cost of repair, and it should therefore have judgment for the full contract amount; and it also appeals the failure of the judgment to award attorney’s fees which our earlier opinion held were due under the parties’ contract.

We believe our earlier remand held that the contract had been only substantially performed, and thus held that there were defects to be remedied. The testimony of defendant’s expert on original trial established that standard installation practice would require a water slit or drip on wooden sills, which plaintiff’s carpenter testified he did not provide. As our previous opinion noted, Hurricane Betsy had blown the windows out, and the testimony on remand of another expert for defendant adds only that the windows evidenced having been installed with finishing nails, and he saw no holes large enough for a screw to have fit in (for the first time contradicting- the carpenter’s testimony on trial that the windows had at first been screwed in). In that expert’s opinion, from the appearances he would say the windows were improperly installed. He testified the cost of removing and properly reinstalling the windows would be $95.

Plaintiff testified he could remove and replace the six windows for a cost of $12.

The trial judge’s factual conclusions that the windows were defectively installed and remedying would cost $95 are not manifestly erroneous, even though there was contradictory testimony. He resolved the conflict by accepting the testimony of defendant’s witnesses and we simply cannot say he erred in so doing.

However, our earlier opinion directed the allowance of attorney’s fees and it was error for the judgment to omit them.

Accordingly, the judgment is amended to allow plaintiff attorney’s fees of 25 percent as ordered by our previous opinion, and as amended the judgment is affirmed.

Amended and affirmed.

BARNETTE, Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

For the reasons assigned in my dissenting opinion on the first appeal in this case, A. A. Home Improvement Company v. Irwin, 203 So.2d 888 (1967), I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on this appeal.

I am still of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to full recovery.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-60164 Summary Calendar

FRONA AUSBORN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

GILMORE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; PAT HOLLOWAY; KATHY MCSHAN; CHARLES STEWART, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Mississippi

(1:95-CV-352-D-D) July 29, 1997

Before JONES, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Ausborn sued her former employer, Gilmore Memorial Hospital,
under the Age Discrimination in Employme nt Act for Gilmore’s
refusal to rehire her afte r her employment was terminated in January 1995 because she refused to continue to serve as "on call2

recovery room nurse" in the hospital. Gilmore moved for summary judgment and the district court granted such motion. We have carefully reviewed the briefs, the reply brief, the record excerpts
and relevant portions of the record itself. For the reasons stated by the district court in its Memorandum Opinion filed under date of February 24, 1997, we A FFIRM the Order granting Gilmore’s Motion for Summary Judgment entered under date of February 24, 1997.

AFFIRMED
.
.-

Docket No: FAA-2015-3661 

Directorate ID: 2015-NE-24-AD 

Disposition Comments 

Originating Office Tracking No.: SP1275BO-P 

Next Step: I8J FRAN D SNPRM 

D These comments are in 

response to an SNPRM 

IZI No Comments/Only Supportive Comments Received- -lfthis box is checked, no signatures are 

required. 

No Has the referenced service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? 

If yes, list latest revision and attach a copy. Note that changes beyond the scope of the 

previously published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point 

for guidance. Latest Revision. 

ISSUE 1: Select one of the following: Choose one . 

.if other, explain: 

Commenter(s): Click here to enter text. 

What change to the AD action is requested? ('lick here to enter text. 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? Click here to enter text. 

Do we agree? Yes/No 

If YES, we agree because Insert justification Make the following changes to the AD: List any 

changes to the AD 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with Insert text because Insert j ustitication We disagree with 

lnsert text because Insert justification Make the following changes to the AD: List any 

changes to the AD 

If NO, we don't agree because Insert our rationale 

ISSUE 2: Select one of the following: Choose one. 

lfother, explain: Click here to enter text.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-41059

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN HENRY TOPSY,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-91-CR-303-1

- - - - - - - - - -

May 12, 1999

Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

John Henry Topsy (#55462-079), has applied for a certificate

of appealability (“COA”) for an appeal from the dismissal of his

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and of his application for a writ

of audita querela. Topsy does not challenge the district court’s

conclusion that his § 2255 motion is time-barred. 

Even if it is assumed that the writ of audita querela

survives as a vehicle for challenging criminal convictions, it is

not available to Topsy because the issue he wishes to raise does

not involve a legal defense which arose after the judgment. See
United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993). The

request for a COA is DENIED AS UNNECESSARY and the appeal is

DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20

(5th Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2. 

COA DENIED AS UNNECESSARY; APPEAL DISMISSED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

FRANCIS R. CASILDO, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-30240 

D.C. No. 4:18-cr-00175-BLW-2 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 20, 2021**

Before: McKEOWN, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. 

Francis R. Casildo appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges 

the 235-month sentence imposed following his jury-trial conviction for possession 

with intent to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute a controlled 

substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (C) and 846. We have 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 29 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-30240 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

Casildo contends that the district court abused its discretion by placing

undue weight on the need for deterrence to the exclusion of the other 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The below-Guidelines sentence is 

substantively reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality 

of the circumstances, including the need to protect the public and the seriousness 

of the offense. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also United States v. GutierrezSanchez, 587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various 

factors in a particular case is for the discretion of the district court.”). Moreover, 

contrary to Casildo’s contention, the record reflects that the district court 

considered all of the § 3553(a) factors and thoroughly explained its decision to 

impose the 235-month sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“The district court need not tick off each of the 

§ 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them.”).

AFFIRMED.
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-12-00483-CR 

________________

IN RE BEULAH LEE JOHNSON

________________________________________________________________________

Original Proceeding

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator Beulah Lee Johnson filed a petition for writ of mandamus. We may grant 

mandamus relief only if the relator demonstrates that the act sought to be compelled is 

purely ministerial, and that the relator has no other adequate legal remedy. See State ex 

rel. Hill v. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Dist., 34 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2001). Although this Court provided Johnson an opportunity to amend her petition, she 

did not. Johnson has not shown that she is entitled to relief by writ of mandamus. See id. 

We deny the petition. 

PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Opinion Delivered November 28, 2012

Do Not Publish

Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v. LARRY MITCHELL LUCAS, JR. PETITION OF: PAUL WEACHTER, BONDSMAN : : : : : : : : : : : No. 150 MAL 2014 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 29th day of August, 2014, the Petition for All owance of Appeal is DENIED
.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Artesyn Technologies, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 27, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Joseph M. ODonnell, Co-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                        
|--------------------------------------------------------
|/s/    JOSEPH M. ODONNELL                              
|Joseph M. ODonnell Chairman and Chief Executive Officer



August 4, 2003
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 25, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-51137 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus LUIS ANTONIO GODINES-MELENDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. SA-02-CR-224-ALl-OG

-------------------- Before DeMOSS, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Luis Antonio Godines-Melendez appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Godines contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been alleged in his indictment. Godines maintains that he pleadedNo. 02-51137 -2- guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for that offense.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. Godines acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres , but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
#### Bienvenido LOPETIGUI, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-631.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 3, 1970.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1970.

Donald F. Frost, Miami, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Melvin Grossman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

A jury found the appellant guilty of (1) unlawful possession of a narcotic drug, and (2) unlawful sale of a narcotic drug. This appeal is from the judgment of guilty and the sentence of ten years in prison. We affirm.

Four of appellant’s eight assignments of error are devoted to rulings upon the sufficiency of the evidence. Our reading of the record convinces us that the evidence was not only sufficient but was overwhelming in support of the jury’s verdict.

The remaining assignments are directed to rulings upon the admissibility of evidence and the denial of a motion for mistrial. None of the assignments argued present reversible error.

*400Appellant has attempted to present a point directed to the denial of his motion to suppress the physical evidence seized at the time of his arrest. This point is not supported by an assignment of error. In addition the record does not contain a motion to suppress the evidence upon the same ground as that alleged on appeal.

No error appears. The judgment and sentence are affirmed.

Affirmed.