IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2014 WY 119

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2014

September 24, 2014

TOMMY F. DOGGETT,

Appellant

(Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 

WORKFORCE SERVICES, 

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 

COMMISSION,

Appellee

(Respondent).

S-14-0012

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County

The Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Sky D. Phifer of Phifer Law Office, Lander, WY.

Representing Appellee:

Peter Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; John D. Rossetti, Deputy Attorney 

General; Michael J. Finn, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Samantha 

Caselli, Assistant Attorney General.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE*, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

*Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be 

made before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

HILL, Justice.

[¶1] Appellant Tommy F. Doggett was fired from Strokers, Inc., a Harley Davidson 

service center in Lander, Wyoming. He applied for unemployment insurance benefits 

and after a hearing, the hearing officer determined that Doggett’s discharge was not for 

misconduct connected with his work. His employer appealed, and the Unemployment 

Insurance Commission (“Commission”) reversed the hearing officer. Doggett then 

sought review in district court, where the Commission was affirmed. This appeal 

followed.

ISSUE

[¶2] Doggett presents one issue for our review:

Was the decision of the Commission that the employee was 

properly discharged from his employment for misconduct 

supported by substantial evidence?

FACTS

[¶3] In the summer of 2011 Tommy F. Doggett, an employee of Strokers USA, Inc., a 

Harley Davidson service center in Lander, was assigned to repair a motorcycle belonging 

to Strokers owner, Jeff Martin. Martin returned from an extended summer vacation 

expecting his motorcycle to be fixed and ready to ride but that was not the case. Doggett 

had not fixed the motorcycle and claimed that he was unaware Martin wanted him to fix 

it while Martin was away.

[¶4] Doggett fixed Martin’s motorcycle immediately. In doing so, he chipped a fin on 

the motor but repaired it. Doggett did not tell Martin of his error but Martin later 

discovered it anyway. Later, problems were discovered with other motorcycles on which 

Doggett had worked, including an installed dented cylinder, a dissatisfied customer, and a 

loose rear-end on another bike.

[¶5] Doggett was discharged on October 11, 2011 after working over five years with 

Strokers. Doggett claims that Martin terminated him by telling him, “I’m taking the shop 

in a different direction. I can’t afford you anymore. I’m letting you go. Okay, I don’t 

want you here anymore, [sic] leave.” Martin, on the other hand, claims that he fired 

Doggett because of customer complaints and come backs resulting in additional costs to 

Strokers to correct Doggett’s errors. In any case, Doggett filed for unemployment 

benefits.

[¶6] In November of 2011 a deputy for the Unemployment Division determined that 

Doggett was discharged for insubordination and poor workmanship. Doggett appealed 
2

and in January of 2012 a hearing officer conducted a hearing and issued a decision 

awarding Doggett benefits, concluding that Doggett’s discharge was not for misconduct 

connected with his work. On Strokers’ appeal to the Commission the Commission 

reversed the hearing officer and ruled that Doggett was terminated for misconduct. 

Doggett sought review in district court, where the court affirmed the Commission. This 

appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶7] On appeal from a district court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision, 

we do not give any deference to the district court’s decision. State v. Laramie County (In 

re Ringrose), 2013 WY 68, ¶ 7, 302 P.3d 900, 902 (Wyo. 2013) (citing Dutcher v. State 

ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 10, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 559, 561 (Wyo. 

2010)); Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008). 

Our review is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2011):

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when 

presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 

questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 

provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the 

terms of an agency action. In making the following 

determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 

those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken 

of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 

unreasonably delayed; and

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings 

and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 

otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 

immunity;

(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or 

limitations or lacking statutory right;

(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 

or
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(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 

reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided 

by statute.

In accordance with § 16-3-114(c) we review the agency’s findings of fact by applying the 

substantial evidence standard. Dale, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d at 561. Substantial evidence means

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Bush v. State ex rel. Wyo. 

Workers’ Comp. Div., 2005 WY 120, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d 176, 179 

(Wyo. 2005) (citation omitted). Findings of fact are supported 

by substantial evidence when we can discern a rational 

premise for those findings from the evidence preserved in the 

record. Id. “We give great deference to the Commission’s 

findings of fact in light of its expertise and extensive 

experience in employment matters.” Weidner v. Life Care 

Centers of America, 893 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1995). An 

agency’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Moss v. 

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 

66, ¶ 11, 232 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2010); Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d at 

561-62.

In re Ringrose, ¶ 9, 302 P.3d at 903. “Importantly, our review of any particular decision 

turns not on whether we agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could 

reasonably conclude as it did[] based on all the evidence before it.” Davenport v. State ex 

rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Div., 2012 WY 6, ¶ 12, 268 P.3d 1038, 

1042 (Wyo. 2012).

DISCUSSION

[¶8] In Doggett’s only issue on appeal he contends that the Commission’s denial of

unemployment insurance benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. Instead he 

claims the evidence is clear that, at the time he was fired, his employer did not know about 

specific instances of misconduct. The Commission argues that its decision was supported 

by substantial evidence and asserts that the record shows that Doggett acted contrary to his 

employer’s interests and was discharged for misconduct connected to his work. See Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 27-3-311(f) (LexisNexis 2013).1

 

1 Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-3-311(f) states: 

An individual shall be disqualified from benefit entitlement beginning with the effective 

date of an otherwise valid claim or the week during which the failure occurred, until he 

has been employed in an employee-employer relationship and has earned at least twelve 

(12) times the weekly benefit amount of his current claim for services after that date, if 
4

[¶9] Misconduct is defined as

an act of an employee which indicates a disregard of (1) the 

employer’s interests or (2) the commonly accepted duties, 

obligations and responsibilities of an employee. This would 

include carelessness or negligence of such degree or 

recurrence as to reveal willful intent or an intentional disregard 

of the employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and 

obligations to his employer. Inefficiency or failure in good 

performance as the result of inability or incapacity; ordinary 

negligence in isolated instances or good faith errors in 

judgment or discretion are not deemed to be misconduct 

within the meaning of the Law.

Safety Medical Services, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Com’n of Wyoming, 724 P.2d 468, 472 

(Wyo. 1986). Also,

Unemployment compensation statutes are to be 

liberally construed in favor of the claimants. Wyoming Dep’t 

of Employment, Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Rissler & 

McMurry Co., 837 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 1992). We construe 

the term misconduct “in a manner least favorable to working 

a forfeiture” because unemployment compensation is part of 

an employee’s compensation, not “a gratuity which may be 

withheld frivolously.” Id.

Aspen Ridge Law Offices, P.C. v. Wyoming Dep’t of Employment, 2006 WY 129, ¶ 16, 

143 P.3d 911, 917 (Wyo. 2006).

[¶10] Here, the Commission found that Doggett’s employer proved that Doggett was 

terminated from his employment because he engaged in misconduct. See Wyoming Dept. 

of Employment, Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 837 P.2d 686 at 

690 (Wyo. 1992)

When an employer contends that violation of its rule

constitutes misconduct, the employer bears the burden of

establishing the existence of the rule and its violation. If the 

employer establishes these elements, the burden shifts to the 

 

the department finds that he was discharged from his most recent work for misconduct 

connected with his work.
5

employee to demonstrate either that the violation was justified 

or that the rule was unreasonable.

Thus, this Court must review the entire record and consider whether there is relevant 

evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the Commission’s decision.

[¶11] In its decision in the instant case the Commission made the following relevant 

findings of fact:

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The claimant admitted to chipping the motor fin on the 

employer’s owner’s bike but failed to inform the employer’s 

owner.

B. The claimant admitted to installing a damaged motor 

cylinder in a customer’s bike and did not immediately report 

the damaged motor cylinder to the manufacturer or the 

employer’s owner.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The claimant was discharged from his employment 

with the employer because the claimant chipped the motor fin 

on the employer’s owner’s bike and failed to inform the 

employer’s owner.

B. The claimant installed a damaged motor cylinder into a 

customer’s bike and did not immediately report the damaged 

motor cylinder to the manufacturer or the employer’s owner.

C. The claimant’s failure to inform the employer’s owner 

of the chipped motor fin and installing a damaged motor 

cylinder into a customer’s bike without reporting the 

damaged motor cylinder to the manufacturer or the 

employer’s owner demonstrate an intentional disregard of the 

employer’s interests and of his obligations as an employee.

D. The claimant was discharged from his most recent 

work for misconduct connected with his work.

[¶12] At the hearing Martin and Doggett testified extensively regarding Doggett’s work 

on the specific motorcycles with a chipped fin and a dented cylinder. About his own 

bike, Martin testified that he only discovered the chipped fin after Doggett was 

terminated and after he hired another mechanic to examine the bike.

Hearing Officer: When did you have Mr. Doggett look into 
6

your bike?

Martin: That was a motor that Tom had built for me in the 

spring of 2011.

....

Hearing Officer: Okay. And when did you find out that there 

were problems with it?

Martin: Initially the bike throughout the summer had puffed 

smoke. Uh, I ... And the ... And the motor always had a little 

excessive noise. I took into consideration that the motor was 

being broke in, so I didn’t, uh, I didn’t take too much concern 

about it, but towards the end of the summer I realized that on 

start-up how much smoke it was puffing and I’d . ... I’d 

mentioned it to Tom and we just hadn’t had a chance to get 

back into the motor yet, but uh, I paid a mechanic that I, a new 

hire that I have here now, to go back through the motor and 

there was a lot of clearance issues with the motor.

Hearing Officer: After Mr. Doggett was terminated from his 

employment, 

Martin: Yes, after. ... But the motor was having problems 

prior to ... And Tom knew about them.

Hearing Officer: Okay. Well, if you were having so many 

comebacks from other people, customers, why would you trust 

Mr. Doggett with your own bike?

Martin: Well, this was ... I know Tom’s got the talent to do 

good work and I ... don’t know why this, the year 2011 was 

just a bad year for him ... maybe Tom has those answers.

[¶13] About Martin’s bike, Doggett testified:

But the thing about his motorcycles, when he came 

back, I was unaware that he had a ride that he was wanting to 

go on. The reason why his bike wasn’t put back together by 

the, when he got back was because I wanted to talk to him 

about the fact his pistons, his cylinders had been honed enough 

that, that every time the glaze had gotten broken on them they 

get a little bit bigger so I wanted to talk to him about possibly 
7

getting a new set of pistons.

Well, he comes in and he’s got a ride he wants to go on 

in two days. All right? I don’t have the time to do that. He 

was upset because his motorcycle wasn’t together, came in, 

kind of got, uh, actually started off yelling at me, saying that it

was disrespectful that his bike wasn’t back together. Well, if 

I’d have known his bike needed to be back together, I would 

have, if he’d a got, talked to me about and called me from 

Germany and said, “Hey, I want my bike back together,” I 

would have told him, “Well, you need new pistons,” and I 

would have ordered them. He’s leaving for Colorado in two 

days, so I just put his bike back together so he could go on the 

ride. I didn’t address the piston issues because he was mad, 

you know.

Also during the hearing, Mr. Martin asked Doggett, “Did you break the fin on my 

cylinder head on my bike when you assembled the motor, and disguised it?” Doggett 

responded:

When it, I was putting it on the BGS20, it chipped that 

little section out and I repaired it so that you could ride it. Uh, 

we, uh didn’t have time to ... I had another cylinder, but I 

didn’t have time to have it powder coated and diamond cut for 

you, you know. I didn’t tell you about that because you 

wanted to go on, you was wanting to go on the ride, so I fixed 

it. 

The Commission found that Doggett admitted to chipping the motor fin on Martin’s 

motorcycle but failed to inform Martin and that Doggett was discharged from his 

employment because he had chipped the motor fin on Martin’s bike and failed to inform 

Martin.

[¶14] On appeal to the district court the court ruled and explained as follows:

A review of the record shows that, although Martin did 

not know the extent of the damage to the Employer’s Bike 

until after [Doggett] was fired, Martin did know, prior to 

[Doggett] being fired, that there were problems with the 

Employer’s Bike cause by [Doggett]. [Doggett] worked on 

the Employer’s Bike in the spring of 2011. In the process of 

putting the Employer’s Bike back together, [Doggett] chipped 

a fin. [Doggett] installed the chipped fin nonetheless. Upon 
8

Martin’s return from his European vacation, he determined 

that there were problems with the Employer’s Bike. Martin’s 

testimony demonstrates that the Employer’s Bike emitted 

smoke and had a “little excessive noise.” Martin further 

testified that [Doggett] also knew of the problems with the 

Employer’s Bike. After [Doggett] was terminated from his 

employment, Martin paid a mechanic to “go back through the 

motor.” At the time, Martin discovered the issues with the 

motor. Therefore, the uncontroverted facts in the record 

demonstrate that even though Martin did not know the chipped 

fin on the Employer’s Bike was the precise cause of the 

problems associated with the Employer’s Bike, he did know 

that the Employer’s Bike had problems. Martin also knew that 

[Doggett] was the employee responsible for working on the 

Employer’s Bike. Consequently, the record reveals that 

although Martin did not know precisely the cause of the 

problems of the Employer’s Bike, [Doggett] was discharged 

from his employment for reasons associated with the chipped 

motor fin installed into the Employer’s Bike.

Further, Martin testified that his decision to fire [Doggett] 

“was something that had been building for a couple of years 

between [Doggett] and Martin.” A review of the record shows 

that it is reasonable to conclude that [Doggett] was terminated 

from his employment because [Doggett] installed a chipped 

motor fin in the Employer’s Bike.

[¶15] Doggett claims that the Commission’s ruling is not only unsupported by the 

evidence submitted at the hearing in this matter but that the evidence submitted 

completely controverts the ruling. The evidence from the hearing shows that Doggett 

worked on Martin’s motorcycle in the spring of 2011 and that afterwards the bike had 

excessive noise and smoke. Doggett was fired in October of 2011. However, Martin did 

not know about the chipped fin at the time of the discharge nor is there any evidence on 

record that the repaired chipped fin affected the performance of Martin’s motorcycle.

[¶16] Bearing the foregoing facts in mind, we must also look to the evidence 

surrounding the customer’s motorcycle with the dented cylinder. The installed dented 

cylinder was also listed by the Commission as a portion of Doggett’s misconduct that 

resulted in his termination from Strokers. At the hearing Martin did not testify that he 

terminated Doggett due to the dented cylinder and furthermore, he testified that he did 

not know the cylinder was dented when he fired Doggett. Doggett explained at the 

hearing that if Martin would have asked, Doggett would have explained that he was not 

finished working on the bike, as the cylinder came out of the box dented, the cylinder 
9

studs were not long enough, the foot pedal had yet to be installed, and the only reason the 

cylinder was installed was to assure that the motor would fit into the frame after the 

hammering to enlarge the frame to enable a good fit.

[¶17] The Commission made findings about the dented cylinder the general gist of 

which is that Doggett admitted to installing a damaged motor cylinder in a customer’s 

bike and did not immediately report the damage to the manufacturer or Martin. The 

Commission then concluded that this demonstrated an intentional disregard of the 

employer’s interests and of his obligations as an employee and justified Doggett being 

discharged for misconduct.

[¶18] The district court had the task of determining whether there was substantial 

evidence to support the Commission’s decision. In order to do so, the court determines if 

there is “such relevant evidence as reasonable minds would accept as adequate to support 

a conclusion.” Rissler & McMurry Co., 837 P.2d at 689. Unemployment compensation 

statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the claimants. In support of its decision 

upholding the Commission’s decision, the district court stated:

The record reveals that although Martin did not know 

about the damaged cylinder specifically on the Customer’s 

Bike until after [Doggett] was fired, Martin did know that 

there were problems with the Customer’s Bike. The evidence 

and testimony also show that upon [Doggett] starting the 

Customer’s Bike it was apparent that the Customer’s Bike had 

problems because of the “excessive noise.” Problems with the 

Customer’s Bike indicated to Martin that Strokers would incur 

additional expenses in fixing the Customer’s Bike. ... 

Consequently, the record demonstrates that although Martin 

did not know precisely the cause of the problems of the 

Customer’s Bike, [Doggett] was discharged from his 

employment for reasons associated with the damaged motor 

cylinder he installed into the Customer’s Bike. 

[¶19] In both bike scenarios – the employer’s bike with the chipped fin and the 

customer’s bike with dented cylinder – the district court accepted the Commission’s 

findings, acknowledged that the “misconduct” listed by the Commission was actually 

unknown by the employer at the time of Doggett’s discharge, but then unreasonably 

affirmed the Commission with a generalized after-the-fact justification. The district court 

concluded that the Commission was justified in its decision because the employer would 

incur additional costs as a result of Doggett’s actions. However, the Commission 

specifically found that

21. The claimant told the employer’s owner that if there was 
10

to be “come backs” that resulted from something he did 

wrong, he would work on that “come back” without charging 

the employer.

22. The claimant believed he tried his best to do the work he 

did for the employer because his own professional reputation 

was a stake.

[¶20] The conclusion by the district court seems to be in direct contradiction of the 

Commission’s findings. While the record does reflect that Martin was clear that his bike 

was producing “excessive noise” and stated so prior to terminating Doggett, the 

Commission’s findings were specific to the chipped fin and the dented motor. Those 

precise instances of misconduct were not discovered until after Doggett’s termination.

[¶21] In other cases where we have determined that misconduct was proven pursuant to 

the unemployment statute,

there was evidence of a known obligation or responsibility and 

a willful and intentional failure to comply. For example, in 

Koch, ¶ 21, 294 P.3d at 894, the evidence established that 

shoveling snow was an “outstanding expectation” of the 

employee’s job duties, the employee was aware of the duty, 

and he admitted that he did not perform that task on the day 

before he was terminated. On the other hand, when the 

evidence demonstrates the employee did not willfully and 

intentionally violate a known work responsibility, we have 

consistently held that the employee did not commit 

misconduct justifying a denial of unemployment insurance 

benefits. To illustrate, an employee’s inadvertent violation of

a company policy prohibiting visitors from leaving the mine 

check-out station without being logged in did not amount to 

misconduct in Safety Medical Services, 724 P.2d at 473, and a 

law firm employee’s failure to complete an affidavit in a 

timely fashion was an isolated instance of ordinary negligence 

which did not constitute misconduct in Aspen Ridge, ¶ 18, 143 

P.3d at 917-18. Even seemingly more egregious occurrences 

have been considered good faith errors in judgment rather than 

misconduct. In SF Phosphates, 976 P.2d at 202-03, the 

employee was entitled to unemployment benefits even though

he made threatening statements against a former manager.

In re Ringrose, ¶ 17, 302 P.3d 900 at 905.

[¶22] Similar to the previous cases there is no evidence of a known obligation or 
11

responsibility and a willful and intentional failure to comply. As mentioned above, our 

task is not to determine whether we agree with the outcome of the case. Dale, ¶ 22, 188 

P.3d at 561. Our review is limited to whether, based upon all of the evidence presented 

before it, the agency could reasonably conclude as it did. Id. We conclude that the 

Commission’s decision that Doggett engaged in misconduct by chipping the motor fin on 

his employer’s bike, and by installing a dented cylinder on a customer’s bike is not a 

reasonable decision based upon the evidence that was before it. Given the testimony 

elicited at the hearing, the employer did not know about the chipped fin or the dented 

cylinder at the time of Doggett’s discharge. The hearing testimony does not support the 

standard for dismissal. For that reason, the decision of the Commission is unsupported 

by the record.

CONCLUSION

[¶23] We reverse the district court’s decision to deny Tommy F. Doggett’s 

unemployment compensation benefits and direct that benefits should be restored to him. 

The district court’s decision is reversed and remanded for entry of an order reversing the 

Commission’s decision.