* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-20713

Summary Calendar

MAVERICK TUBE CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

DOUGLAS E. COX; et al,

Defendants,

NORTH TEXAS PIPE & STEEL, INC.; STEEL TRADING CORPORATION OF

AMERICA;

AMERICAN METALS TRADING, INC.; REPUBLIC PIPE & TUBE, INC.;

UNITED TUBULAR; ROBERT E. RICHARDSON; STEVEN HAUCK;

DONNA STEFFES TUTTLE; RICHARD HICKS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-96-CV-4219)

August 16, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Maverick Tube Corporation (Maverick) brought this cause

of action against the named defendants (Defendants) alleging2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

3 Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc. , 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir.

1993).

2 conversion. Maverick claimed the Defendants were liable for

damages Maverick suffered arising from t he theft of Maverick’s

oilfield pipe by another party and its eventual resale to the named

Defendants. The district court entered summary judgment for the

Defendants, holding that the statute of limitations for this cause

of action had expired. We affirm.

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and t he movant is entitled to

judgment as a mat ter of law. 2 We review a district court’s

decision to grant summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as the district court, and drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmovant. 3

By late November of 1994, Maverick had been notified by

Colorado Tubulars Company that suppliers were selling Maverick pipe

at below-market prices. Maverick immediately began an

investigation to determine if the pipe was counterfeit, a situation

which could potentially expose Maverick to massive product

li ability claims. After determining that the pipe was genuine,

Maverick continued its investigation, and by January 9, 1995, had

obtained a confession to a theft scheme from Maverick employee Doug

Cox.

The district court held that M averick had been put on

notice of a potential cause of action by November 29th or 30th of4 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a).

5 Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc. , 889 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. 1994).

6 Computer Associates v. Altai , 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1994).

3 199 4. The limitations period for such a lawsuit is two years. 4

Because Maverick did not file suit until December 6, 1996, the

district court held that the statute of limitations had expired.

Maverick concedes that in ordinary circumstances, the

limitations period begins to run as soon as the claimant suffers an

injury, in t his case beginning with the theft of the pipe. 5

Maverick argues that the “discovery rule” exception to this general

rule is applicable here. Under Texas law, the limitations period

does not begin to run until the injured party discovers his injury

if: (1) the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable; and

(2) the evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable. 6

Defen dants contend that the theft of 101 truckloads of

oilfield pipe can in no way be considered “inherently

undiscoverable,” and the discovery rule is therefore inapplicable.

While that argument may have some merit, we decline to adopt

Defendants position in that regard, as we hold that, even assuming

the discovery rule to be app licable, the limitations period for

filing this lawsuit expired before December 6, 1996.

During the course of the hearing on the motion for

summary judgment, the district judge made the following statement

regarding the limitations period: “It’s two years after the

company has sufficient data to be aware of a probable injury. And

there is simply no dispute here that the information Maverick had7 Record vol. 3, p. 7-8.

8 Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K.

, 107 F.3d 1137, 1140 (5th Cir. 1997)(internal citations omitted).

4 on the 29th, 30th, 31st, through the 5th, was sufficient to lead

them inexorably to a solution of their problem within the week.” 7

W e agree. We have previously held that discovery “occurs when a

plaintiff has knowledge of such facts as would cause a reasonably

prudent person to make an inquiry that would lead to the discovery

o f the cause of action.” 8 Clearly, Maverick had such knowledge

once Colorado Tubular gave them information regarding pipe for

sale at below-market prices. As Maverick failed to file suit

within two years of obtaining this information, the limitations

period expired. S ee KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous.

Fin. Corp ., 988 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. S. Ct., Mar. 20, 1999).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

.