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BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM:

BUDGET, PROGRAMS, AND POLICIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 18, 2012

Serial No. 112–135

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State ... 8

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement ................................................... 3

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin: Prepared statement ........................................ 10

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 32

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 33

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 35

(1)

BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM: BUDGET, 

PROGRAMS, AND POLICIES 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

Today we welcome Ambassador Benjamin back to the subcommittee for our yearly look at the State Department’s handling 

of counterterrorism issues. And while al-Qaeda has taken major 

blows in the past year, the terrorism threat itself remains very 

real. 

Late last year the committee was notified that the Office of the 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism, which has been in existence 

since 1972, would transform into the Bureau of Counterterrorism. 

According to the State Department, this elevation was natural, as 

the office’s responsibilities had outgrown the coordinator title. 

When reported to Congress, the State Department noted that 

only existing funds would be required to create the new Bureau 

and that any changes in personnel would be, in their words, ‘‘marginal.’’ Well, for this fiscal year, the Bureau is seeking to increase 

staffing by 17 percent, which is a rather unorthodox definition of 

‘‘marginal.’’

The State Department would like for this new bureau to be headed by an Assistant Secretary, and specifically by Ambassador Benjamin, our witness here. The Department could have made this 

move on its own, but it chose to take the heads of its new Energy 

and Post-Conflict Bureaus’ Assistant Secretaries instead and appoint them instead. Making that choice, and now facing a statutory 

cap for Assistant Secretary positions, the State Department is 

seeking legislative relief to allow the Counterterrorism Bureau to 

also be headed by an Assistant Secretary. 

Most Members of Congress probably think that the State Department can be run quite well by the 24 Assistant Secretaries and the 

dozens of special envoys it already has, and that is why we have 

raised this point before, our suspicions about this, and we indeed 

have found ourselves in this same conundrum with circumventing 

the cap. 

2

But more critical than title, it is the control of resources that will 

seal this new Bureau’s fate. While we have a few hundred million 

dollars in counterterrorism assistance money flowing through the 

State Department, less than half of it—less than half that amount 

is controlled by Ambassador Benjamin’s bureau. Posts and regional 

bureaus control the rest of the funds. If the Bureau of Counterterrorism is to play as robust a role as envisioned—and, by the way, 

we on this subcommittee support that role—that equation has got 

to change in terms of control of those funds. 

The counterterrorism landscape has changed substantially since 

the Ambassador’s testimony 1 year ago. Osama bin Laden and 

Anwar al-Awlaki are now dead. But senior Obama administration 

officials have gone so far as to declare that the United States is—

and I am going to quote the administration—‘‘within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda.’’

Yet just weeks before bin Laden’s death we heard testimony before this subcommittee—Ambassador Benjamin mentioned at the 

time—‘‘we continue to see a strong flow of new recruits into many 

of the most dangerous terrorist organizations.’’ So we will hear if 

that is still the case today. But a year has brought other changes 

as well. 

Radical elements have Egypt looking into the abyss, armed militias have Libya deeply factionalized, there are concerns over foreign fighters in Syria. It is hard to see how some of these developments have not harmed U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 

Other regions, like Africa and the Western Hemisphere, are of 

concern. Earlier this year this subcommittee moved legislation focused on Iran’s growing role in the Western Hemisphere, and we 

have got groups like Boko Haram, which means education is sinful, 

carrying out attacks across Nigeria, creating mayhem there. 

Pakistan, specifically its security services, and their backing of 

an array of militant groups, is a perennial concern for us. Just the 

other week, the State Department announced a reward for information leading to the conviction of Hafiz Mohammed Said, the head 

of the ‘‘army of the pure,’’ or as they are also called, Lashkar-eTaiba. That group was the outfit that carried out the attacks on 

Mumbai. 

That this individual continues to operate freely today inside 

Pakistan certainly is an indictment of Islamabad as a counterterrorism partner. Unfortunately, there are many other such individuals that are loose and maybe did not commit that particular rampage but are planning the next one, that are operating freely in 

Pakistan today as well. 

We look forward to discussing these and other issues with Ambassador Benjamin, and I will now turn to Ranking Member Sherman for an opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

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Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Chairman Royce, for holding this important hearing. In November 2011, the Congress was notified that 

the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, which had been 

in existence since 1972, would be upgraded to the Bureau of Counterterrorism. On July 4, 2012, the new bureau was announced. For 

Fiscal Year 2013, the administration has requested $238 million to 

fund various antiterrorism programs with the Bureau. 

In Fiscal Year 2011, actual spending for these programs was $286 million, and in Fiscal Year 2012 the likely amount will be 

$268 million. So the administration is actually seeking a significant 

decrease in funds available for antiterrorism programs at the State 

Department. 

I would like to hear from our witness how the transition from an 

office to a bureau has aided our counterterrorism efforts. I would 

like to thank Ambassador Benjamin for his service and look forward to his continuing service in this difficult global environment. 

I am considerably less skeptical than the chairman of the Bureau 

of Counterterrorism being in fact a bureau and not an office. And 

even if the administration was seeking an increase in funding for 

the Bureau, I, given the importance of your work, would be supportive. But it appears from the statistics I just went over that the 

administration is able to function without seeking an increase. 

One program of particular importance is the Countering Violent 

Extremism, CVE Program, that aims to prevent at-risk youth from 

turning to terrorism to contest militant propaganda and persuade 

terrorists to renounce violence and to renounce their affiliation 

with terrorist organizations. 

The State Department has identified five CVE priority countries—Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, and Pakistan. I especially want to focus on Pakistan, where I think it is very important that we reach out through the Voice of America, not only in 

the Urdu language but in other languages that are commonly spoken in Pakistan. 

This should not be interpreted by the Pakistani Government as 

being an effort toward separatism. If you are trying to sell products 

in Los Angeles, you wouldn’t dream of having your advertising program being in only one language. Walmart is not trying to separate 

any part of California from the United States, but they are trying 

to sell a product to people that speak a variety of languages. 

We have captured or killed most of the world’s dangerous—many 

of the world’s dangerous terrorists, but we have not been fully successful in the war of ideas and stemming recruitment. I know the 

creation of the CVE program was a priority for Ambassador Benjamin, and I would like the Ambassador to comment on the effectiveness of this modest program, which is now at $15 million, and 

whether it needs to be expanded either in amount spent in each 

country or to add more than five priority countries. 

To defeat terrorists long term we must take steps to reduce recruitment from—of young Muslim men into extremist, violent, and 

Islamist organizations. I agree that one of the most important missions of the Bureau of Counterterrorism will be to lead U.S. Government efforts to counter violent extremism by delegitimizing the 

extremist narrative and developing positive alternatives for young 

Muslims vulnerable to recruitment. 

6

Now, I do have one area that I would like to—where I differ from 

State Department policy, and that is with regard to the MEK and 

Camp Liberty. The U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in 2010 that the 

State Department made procedural errors in reclassifying this dissident group as a terrorist organization. 

The court opinion said that the State Department failed to accord 

the PMOI the due process protections required by law and needs 

to review the status. We would like to see the State Department 

act. I realize that Ambassador Benjamin is not in full control of 

this entire process. To consider an MEK petition for a writ of mandamus, an extraordinary remedy not often granted by the courts, 

especially not in the foreign policy area, the court has scheduled an 

oral argument for May 8, 2012. 

Ambassador Benjamin, your predecessor, Ambassador Dell 

Dailey, has recommended the MEK be removed from the list of terrorist organizations. I am not aware, and I got the classified briefings, of anything this group has done in recent years that would 

justify continued designation. 

I will note later in this excessively long opening statement that 

the Haqqani group has not been designated, and one has little difficulty identifying acts that the Haqqani group has committed. 

That should justify putting them on the list of foreign terrorist organizations. 

The State Department should not list groups as terrorist organizations and just leave them there. The purpose of the designation 

is in part to force the organization to change its behavior, and 

whatever behavior caused the MEK to be listed, and even that is 

subject to dispute. No one asserts that they have not identified—

that they have taken action in recent years that would cause them 

to be put on the list, and of course the contrast to the Haqqani network is extensive. 

I have gone on a little long. I will make a few more opening comment remarks when I am called upon for questions, and that 

means I will have even less time to hear from the witness, which 

is why I am going to listen to him so intently during his opening 

statement. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Benjamin, it 

seems to me we still have a continuous problem. Iraq does not 

want Camp Liberty to be a permanent camp for MEK residents. 

You can look at the camp and see that that is obvious. The conditions, in my opinion, are deplorable. Rudy Giuliani says it is not 

a camp; it is a concentration camp. 

The MEK residents who were all but forced out of their homes 

in Camp Ashraf don’t want to be in Camp Liberty for a long period 

of time either, and the United States, I don’t believe, wants them 

to stay for a long period of time and risk possibly another assault 

and massacre by the Iraqi Government, who I think gives into Iranian pressure. 

The problem we have is no evidence that the MEK residents will 

have anywhere to go once they are determined to be political refugees. There are 1,600 residents in the camp. After 4 months from 

when one transition—the transition process began, no one, not one 

7

person, has been resettled to a third country or even been declared 

a political refugee. 

Until people in the camp start being resettled to third countries—third party countries, why should Camp Ashraf residents 

view this as a temporary home? The center of this whole issue is 

the designation by our Government, specifically the State Department of the foreign terrorist organization of the MEK. 

Our country may be willing to take some of the refugees. But as 

long as we call them ‘‘terrorists,’’ we are not going to take them, 

and third party—or third party countries aren’t going to take them 

either. The fact is, Ambassador—and correct me if I am wrong—

we know of no country as of today that have taken or are willing 

to take MEK residents. I believe it is all because of the designation. 

I hope you can explain why it is that the reevaluation of the 

MEK’s FTO designation is taking so long. Secretary Clinton told us 

back in February that she has folks ‘‘working around the clock on 

this.’’ And I admire her if that is true, and I believe it to be true. 

But what is the hold up? Is there new evidence that is to be considered? Confusion about what the law is? Is this country worried 

about the mullahs in Iran and what they will think? What is the 

problem? Why is there no reevaluation? 

The FTO designation is not just some side issue. It is the one 

thing that affects the people in Camp Ashraf and progress being 

made to move those people to other countries in the world. I, as 

Ranking Member Sherman has said, have seen all of the evidence 

that we can be given about the FTO designation. It is not compelling that the MEK should stay on the FTO designation. 

I am willing to see any evidence. I suggest, and strongly urge, 

that the State Department, who is stonewalling this, show us the 

evidence or delist the MEK. That is what they need to do. We need 

to treat the people in Camp Ashraf like Human beings. They 

should not be confined to a concentration camp, as Rudy Giuliani 

has said. 

It is interesting—today we heard in the Foreign Affairs Committee from not the government officials but private officials that 

North Korea should be an FTO designation, but they are not. I 

think the little fellow from the desert, Ahmadinejad, he should be 

designated as a foreign terrorist organization, but not the MEK. 

Show the proof or delist the MEK. 

And I will have some more questions later. Thank you for being 

here. I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Judge Poe. 

We are joined today by Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, the State 

Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and head of the 

Bureau of Counterterrorism. Ambassador Benjamin has been the 

Senior Counterterrorism Advisor to the Secretary of State since 

2009. In the late ’90s, Mr. Benjamin served on the National Security Council as Director for Counterterrorism in the Office of 

Transnational Threats. 

Before entering government, Mr. Benjamin was a foreign correspondent for Time Magazine and for The Wall Street Journal. 

Ambassador Benjamin was the co-author of ‘‘The Age of Sacred 

Terror,’’ a book that won several awards. So we want to welcome 

you back to the committee. 

8

Your complete written testimony, of course, is going to be entered 

into the record. So we would ask that you give us a 5-minute summary here, if you could, and then we will go to questions. Please 

begin. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL BENJAMIN, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you again for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. And as you mentioned, 

I have submitted testimony for the record that provides additional 

details about the Counterterrorism Bureau’s policies, programs, 

and budget. 

Since I appeared before this committee the last time, my office 

was upgraded to full bureau status, fulfilling one of the key recommendations of the quadrennial diplomacy and development review. This change will strengthen the State Department’s ability to 

carry out its civilian counterterrorism mission around the world. 

In coordination with Department leadership, the national security staff, and other U.S. Government agencies, the Bureau develops and implements civilian counterterrorism strategies, policies, 

operations, and programs. Our efforts constitute what we refer to 

as strategic counterterrorism. It is an approach that Secretary 

Clinton has championed, and its basic premise is that United 

States CT efforts require a whole of government approach that 

must go beyond traditional intelligence, military, and law enforcement functions. 

As the national strategy for counterterrorism released last year 

makes clear, we are engaged in a broad, sustained, and integrated 

campaign that harnesses every tool of American power—civilian, 

military, and the power of our values, together with the concerted 

efforts of allies, partners, and multilateral institutions to address 

a short-term and a long-term challenge. 

Our tactical abilities, as exemplified by the extraordinary mission against bin Laden last year, answer a critical national need, 

but they are only one part of our comprehensive CT strategy, which 

also includes concerted action to reduce radicalization, stop the 

flow of new recruits, and create an international environment that 

is inhospitable for all forms of support and activities required to 

sustain international terrorist organizations, including fund raising, recruitment, illicit travel and training. And while these activities may not grab the headlines, they are wise investments against 

the long-term counterterrorism challenge. 

Achieving these ends requires smart power and the integration 

of all of our foreign policy tools—diplomacy and development, together with defense, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities. 

Only this way can we empower our partners to deal with the 

threats within their borders and regions, so that they can address 

local and regional threats before they become global ones that demand a much more costly response. The State Department has a 

prominent role to play on the strategic side, as these elements of 

our CT work are civilian-led activities. 

9

Let me now speak about capacity building. Weak states serve as 

breeding grounds for terrorism and instability. When states have 

the political will, we can assist with capacity building programs to 

build law enforcement capability and good governance. Our key capacity building programs are the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Counterterrorist Finance, and TIP/PISCES. 

Lessons learned from our ongoing capacity building efforts have 

demonstrated that sustained donor attention, partner nation political will, and sizeable investments make a difference. 

Let me talk about countering violent extremism. What sustains 

terrorist groups is the steady flow of recruits who replace terrorists 

who are killed or captured. We must undercut the ideological and 

rhetorical underpinnings that make the violent extremist world 

view attractive, while also addressing local drivers of extremism. 

To delegitimize the narrative of al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its 

adherence, the CT Bureau helps stand up the Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communications, the CSCC, an interagency body 

that works with communicators in the field to counter terrorist 

narratives and misinformation. It draws on the full range of intelligence information and analysis to provide context and feedback 

for communicators. 

The CSCC challenges extremist messages online in Arabic, Urdu, 

and Somali on forums, blogs, and social networking sites, and also 

produces and disseminates targeted, attributed videos. 

Successful CVE involves more than messaging. We are also developing programs to provide alternatives for at-risk youth, including social media programs to generate constructive local initiatives. 

And we are supporting skillbuilding, youth leadership activities, 

and mentoring efforts. 

Let me turn, finally, to multilateral engagement, and in particular the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Strengthening partnerships is at the heart of our strategic counterterrorism efforts, and 

one of our key initiatives is building the needed international architecture to address 21st century terrorism, and thereby to fill a 

critical gap; the lack of a nimble, multilateral platform to allow 

counterterrorism policymakers and practitioners to share expertise, 

experiences, and lessons learned; and of course to mobilize resources and political will. 

To this end, the Bureau created the Global Counterterrorism 

Forum. At its September launch, Secretary Clinton was quite clear. 

‘‘We don’t need another debating society,’’ she said, ‘‘we need a catalyst for action.’’ In this spirit, two deliverables announced at the 

September launch demonstrate its action-oriented nature. The first 

was approximately $100 million contributed by several members to 

develop rule of law institutions. 

The United Arab Emirates announced the second deliverable—its 

intention to host the first ever international center of excellence on 

countering violent extremism, which is slated to open in Abu Dhabi 

in the fall of 2012. The center will initially support research, dialogue, and training to strengthen the emerging international CVE 

community. 

I see that I have already gone over my time, and so with that 

in mind I will now conclude my remarks, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

10

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin follows:]


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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I am going to go to Mr. Sherman first 

for his questions. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will pick up where I left off in the opening statement about foreign terrorist organization designation. I have advocated for well over a decade that you and your predecessors—for 

any listed terrorist organization that evidences a desire not to be 

on the list, as the IRA once evidenced such a desire, lay out what 

our expectations are of that organization, and, if they do meet 

those conditions, to remove them from the terrorist list. 

I am concerned that the continued designation of the MEK first 

doesn’t meet that standard in that there weren’t clear expectations 

that we have laid out for the MEK, that they could meet and justify taking them off the list. 

The second concern I have is that maybe the process has been 

influenced by a poorly conceived notion that we will be nice to 

Tehran and Tehran will be nice to us, and that, therefore, we will 

list the enemies that they seem to hate the most as a terrorist organization. 

And then, finally, I think that the continued designation of the 

MEK negatively influences the ability of the UNHCR to promptly 

resettle people of Camp Ashraf, and to prevent violent attacks on 

them. We have seen the Iraqis justify the violent attacks on Camp 

Ashraf because of the MEK’s designation, and we have seen individuals at that camp unable to get refugee status in Europe, in 

part because of that designation. 

When reviewing potential FTO targets, the State Department 

considers terrorist acts that the groups have carried out, whether 

the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible 

future terrorism and whether it retains the capacity and intent to 

carry out such attacks. And the organization’s activities must 

threaten the security of U.S. nationals or our national security interests. 

There are times when perhaps we should add to the foreign terrorist list more quickly. We did not designate al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula until days before the attempted bombing of the airline in 2009 by one of its members. Similarly, the Pakistani 

Taliban was not designated until months after the attack on Times 

Square. 

And we have not yet designated the Afghani Taliban, and I have 

co-sponsored with Mr. Poe, who was just here, a bill to designate 

the Haqqani network, which I think the State Department should 

designate long before we get that bill passed. 

So, Ambassador Benjamin, what can we do to make the designation process more nimble, better able to carry out its purposes and 

act quickly to designate those organizations that are a real threat, 

and to remove those who either were never a threat or have 

changed their behavior appropriately? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Ranking Member Sherman, we certainly 

agree with your desire to be more nimble, or at least to be able to 

work more quickly on designations. And I would like to point out 

that in the last 2 years the office, now the bureau, has done more 

designations than in the previous 8 years combined, and we have 

significantly stepped up the pace of work. 

21

Mr. Royce spoke before about additional staff. We are trying to 

build up our staff so that we can do more in this area. We consider 

it a vital part of our business and an essential part of our national 

counterterrorism efforts. And I would add that the last year was 

in fact the most productive year we have ever had. 

But having said that, the law, nonetheless, and the practice that 

has been established by the Department over the last—over recent 

decades requires us to be extremely diligent, deliberative, and complete—comprehensive in our efforts here, and we have not yet 

found any shortcuts to providing—to compiling the kinds of baseline analyses and inventory of information necessary both to list 

and delist. 

So I have a lot of people who are working very, very hard on this, 

but we haven’t yet found the work-around that will get us to an 

instant recognition of whether a group belongs on or off the list. We 

still have to do the hard work. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I know your folks are working hard, 

you have done a lot, appreciate your service, and, at the same time, 

a list that would list the MEK but not the Haqqani network is hard 

to justify to my constituents. And I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Just for the record, the overall question of elevating 

to a bureau, as you and I have discussed, we supported elevation 

to a bureau. The point was that the State Department had the capacity to do that. The point was that the State Department seeked 

to circumvent the process when there were actually three elevations to bureaus that they were attempting to negotiate. They 

had two slots. 

So at the end of the day, despite assurances in terms of what the 

overall staffing would be, you now have more personnel as a consequence, including the 17 percent increase. So that was the issue 

at hand for us, so the overall totality in terms of what the State 

Department does with its personnel positions and its ever-increasing size and scope. 

Getting down to the issues at hand, the one that I wanted to ask 

you about was a quote from a columnist last week. I don’t know 

the answer to this, but here is his question. ‘‘Osama bin Laden 

lived in five houses in Pakistan, fathered four children there, kept 

three wives . . . had two children born in public hospitals and 

through it all, the Pakistani Government did not know one single 

thing about his whereabouts? Can this possibly be true?’’ he asks. 

I don’t know what the answer to that is, but I did want to ask, 

Ambassador Benjamin, for your judgment on that. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Mr. Royce, if I may, first very briefly just 

on that 17 percent figure, I would like to just underscore that that 

figure—that projection had already been established well before the 

work to become a bureau had been——

Mr. ROYCE. And, Ambassador, you and I don’t really have an argument about that. It is the overall decision by the State Department to not live within the constraints put by the Congress in 

terms of the total number of bureaus. And the easy way for them 

to get around it was not to elevate you to bureau status within the 

existing confines—so I just want to explain that. We are good on 

that. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Okay. 

22

Mr. ROYCE. But it is the agency, it is the Department that I 

think needs to play by the rules that are set out in terms of the 

constraints. But go ahead with your——

Ambassador BENJAMIN. With regard to the issue of bin Laden’s 

presence in Pakistan during those years, I can only reiterate what 

you have heard from other officials. We do find it remarkable, but 

we still, to this point, do not have any evidence that suggests that 

the Pakistani Government per se had any knowledge of bin Laden’s 

whereabouts. 

And we have certainly looked at this many different ways, and 

it is certainly the case that there were some people—I think as 

then-CIA Director Panetta said—there was undoubtedly the case 

that there were people in Pakistan who knew where bin Laden 

was. But we have no conclusive evidence that the Pakistani Government knew where he was. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you, in Africa—get your thought here on 

Boko Haram, and especially its relationship with al-Qaeda as well 

as Mali and the problems there. After the Easter attacks by Boko 

Haram on a number of churches in Nigeria, dozens of people were 

left dead, and we had a high-ranking member of the State Department say that religion is not driving extremist violence in Nigeria. 

Then, you had following that the recent military coup in Mali, 

and Islamist fighters have now descended on the northern part of 

the country. Top leaders of al-Qaeda’s North African branch have 

been seen in the area reportedly, so I would just ask you, what is 

the outlook there? 

I had a Muslim governor of a northern Nigerian province tell me 

that he was very, very concerned with the change in the indigenous 

Islam of Nigeria as imams were being imported always with—you 

know, they bring a lot of money with them. But there was always 

an imam from the Gulf states who would then set up shop and 

begin expressing a different type of Islam than the indigenous 

Islam that he had grown up with. And he was concerned for his 

safety, his security, in northern Nigeria as a result. 

I would just like your insights here. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Thank you very much, sir. We are deeply 

concerned by what is going on in Nigeria. And while I would agree 

with whomever made the remark that religion was not the principal driver, it is certainly the case that extremism in the north 

and in Nigeria is being expressed in intercommunal and interreligious strife, and there have been lots of attacks on churches. That 

is obviously the case. 

We are deeply concerned about any connections that Boko 

Haram, which is a loosely organized organization, in fact sort of a 

cluster of organizations, may have, in particular with al-Qaeda and 

the Islamic Maghreb. And it seems clear that some of their 

tradecraft, some of their ability to carry out terrorist attacks, was 

learned from AQIM. 

We continue to encourage the Nigerian Government at the very 

highest levels to also effectively engage communities vulnerable to 

extremist violence by addressing the underlying political and socioeconomic problems in the north, and those problems are considerable. 

23

The Department is going to work through—together with other 

relevant agencies, and the Government of Nigeria and international partners, to identify ways that we can erode the capacity 

of Boko Haram to carry out terrorist attacks against the U.S., 

against such international targets as the U.N. compound that was 

bombed, and also to prevent attacks against our friends and their 

interests in Nigeria as well. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, if I could interject here in terms of putting an 

end to that, the observations he made to me, the Muslim governor 

of this northern state, is that as long as you have the importation 

of religious leaders with the students, according to him, he had 

been in this particular madrasa, so—which was across the street 

from the madrasa, so where he was educated, but with a very, very 

different curriculum. 

He said the young men were wearing Osama bin Laden T-shirts. 

If you indoctrinate and raise a generation of young kids with that 

type of ideology, just the same issue that we are talking about with 

Pakistan, as long as these deobandi schools, some 600 of these particular deobandi schools continue to do that in Pakistan, and now 

that they are doing it in Nigeria and have been doing it for a while, 

you have got to expect problems from the graduating class. 

And you talk a lot about addressing these different factors, but 

to me it seems that the brainwashing and indoctrination of this 

type of ideology so early in life, when you are teaching people to 

commit jihad, and giving them that absolutist viewpoint, which 

now this particular Boko Haram wants to—you know, if education 

itself is a sin, and the goal is simply to indoctrinate and brainwash, 

without solving that problem, without shutting that down, the rest 

of it doesn’t seem too persuasive to me. 

Our inability to get the government in Pakistan to shut down 

those 600 schools over the last generation is something that is beyond me. It is beyond me why the Pakistani Government won’t do 

it, and my concern today over what is happening in Nigeria is the 

same. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. If I may, sir, you know, the world of 

Islam is profoundly complex. And there is no doubt that there are 

elements of—there are groups, individual donors, and the like, who 

advocate beliefs that involve a strong anti-Western sentiment of 

the kind that you are describing, who are funding activities far 

from their own homes, and this is indeed a major problem. 

The ability to crowd out or to combat extremist ideologies will depend to some important extent on the ability of those—of countries 

and of their donors to provide the social goods such as education 

that will make those schools unattractive. 

Mr. ROYCE. All right. But we provided the schools in Pakistan, 

or helped do so. I went and visited some of those schools the last 

time I went back. Those schools have been blown up, I assume by 

graduates of these deobandi schools. All right? So all I am saying 

is until those schools are shut down by that government in Pakistan, this is going to be a recurring problem for Pakistanis and for 

the United States. 

And certainly for our troops in Afghanistan, for people in southern Russia, for people in Mumbai, for people in the caucuses, for 

people in Central Asia, it is a problem that is getting exported 

24

today, and the problem is the brainwashing that goes on in those 

deobandi schools, and the ineffectual effort to get the government 

to shut it down. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. If I may, sir, just one more point, and 

that is that we do approach other governments with regularity and 

intervene with them to tell them about individuals who are supporting extremism in ways that lead to violence and the unacceptable outcomes that it brings with them. 

This is an activity that we embrace, and it goes on in a number 

of different channels. It is clearly something that is going to keep 

us busy for quite some time to come, because of the considerable 

amount of churn that is going on out there in that world, and that 

has led to the kinds of rise in extremism that we have seen in some 

areas. 

But we also know that in particular there are socioeconomic 

grievances in places like northern Nigeria that do need to be addressed. And as they are addressed, extremists will have much less 

opportunity to gain a foothold. 

Now, I did also want to just mention the issue that you raised 

regarding northern Mali. I think that it is important to recognize 

that northern Mali has been a troubled area for many years. It has 

been the traditional safe haven of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

for a number of years, really since that group was largely pushed 

out of its traditional reach in Algeria. And it is a very sparsely populated area and was always only barely under the control of 

Bamako. 

The U.S. Government has invested significant resources in helping Mali and its neighbors reclaim that sanctuary and extend the 

writ of the government there. Unfortunately, those efforts are at a 

halt now, because of the coup. I would not say that there has been 

a large new influx of extremists into northern Mali. What here has 

been is a Touareg rebellion, the latest in a long series going back 

over a century. 

And this has disrupted all of our ability to work against AQIM 

in that region with our regional partners, and we have a lot of positive successes to report over the last few years in that collaboration. But we are deeply concerned about the situation in Mali and 

working in particular with ECOWAS and others in Africa to see to 

it that Mali returns to democracy, and we can return to our collaborative efforts to rid northern Mali of AQIM. 

Mr. ROYCE. I am going to go to Mr. Poe. But before I do, the profile of many of these extremists are engineers, they are people who 

have middle class backgrounds. Certainly, bin Laden is an example 

of that. The Muslim governor I know came up in a madrasa with 

1/100th of the budget of the one that—and he is not a radical. 

What has created the radicalism is the fact that we have not 

stopped these particular people from indoctrinating kids. And until 

that is done, the problem will expand. 

Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Benjamin, we meet 

again. It is kind of like Groundhog Day. Every 6 months, a year, 

we come to the same part of town and discuss the same issues. To 

my understanding, a foreign terrorist organization has got to do 

several things to be a foreign terrorist organization. 

25

First, they must be a foreign terrorist organization. They must 

engage in some kind of terrorism or terrorist activity and have the 

capability to engage in that terrorist act, and they must threaten 

the security of the United States or U.S. nationals. 

In 2004, the MEK gave up their weapons to the United States 

military. Since that time, name one terrorist act that the MEK has 

committed since 2004. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. It is not our contention that the MEK 

can be—has committed an act since the group was disarmed. 

Mr. POE. Excuse me. Let me just—I only have limited time, so 

you can’t—there has not been an act of terrorism by the MEK 

against the United States since they gave up their weapons to us. 

Is that right? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We do not allege that there was such an 

act. 

Mr. POE. Do they have the capability today—2012—to engage in 

some terrorist act against the United States? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We have not come to a conclusion on 

that. 

Mr. POE. You don’t know whether they can—I mean, you are the 

guy who is supposed to tell us about terrorism in the world. You 

don’t know whether they—MEK has the capability to commit a terrorist act against the United States? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Mr. Poe, no one has been in to inspect 

or otherwise investigate what is in Camp Ashraf right now. And we 

also cannot rule out the possibility that the MEK may have weaponry elsewhere. 

Mr. POE. You don’t know that. You don’t have any evidence that 

the MEK has a stockpile of weapons someplace. You have no evidence of that, do you? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I can’t go into the intelligence record on 

this in this setting. 

Mr. POE. Well, let me ask you this. Since I have seen all of the 

intelligence that you have furnished this committee, myself, and 

Ranking Member Sherman and others, is there any new evidence 

since the last briefing we got by your department and the CIA? 

And if there is, are we going to get a briefing on this? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Sir, we would certainly be happy to entertain a request for another briefing from the intelligence community. I think it is safe to say that there is always intelligence coming in. And, frankly, I don’t know exactly what was in the briefing 

you got, which was quite some time ago, but I will say that this 

is a deliberative process. And we are working hard on it, and we 

are not finished. 

But I do want to emphasize that as the Secretary has said, given 

the ongoing efforts to relocate the residents of Camp Ashraf to 

Camp Haria, closure of Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main paramilitary base, will be a key factor in any decision regarding the 

MEK’s FTO status. 

Mr. POE. Last year in May when you were here you told me that 

the State Department was going to, and I quote, ‘‘make a decision 

within 6 months on whether to continue the designation or to delist 

them.’’ We are a year later. How much longer is it going to be before you all can make a decision? 

26

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, I certainly regret the fact that my 

prediction on that was incorrect. I cannot give you a date certain. 

As you know, the parties are in court on that as well. We are working as fast as we can. And as I said before, and as the Secretary 

has said, the closure of Camp Ashraf will be a key factor in any 

decision. 

Mr. POE. Without going into any classified information, have you 

received any new information in the last year about the MEK’s activities as a foreign terrorist organization? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We have certainly collected more information in the last year. And, in fact, we received information from 

the MEK itself, I believe in June, and had an exchange between 

our attorneys and theirs over this issue. 

Mr. POE. So have you received any information that they are continuing—that they are a foreign terrorist organization? A specific 

question, not what you have received from them, have you gotten 

any information in the last year that the MEK, who doesn’t have 

any weapons, is a foreign terrorist organization? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Again, sir, that really does go to the 

question of intelligence, which I just can’t discuss in this setting. 

Mr. POE. We will—I am requesting the briefing through the appropriate chairman that had that confidential briefing. May I have 

unanimous consent for another minute? 

Mr. ROYCE. Granted. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very quickly, when I was 

in Iraq last year with other members of the committee, we wanted 

to go see Camp Ashraf. One reason that Maliki indignantly refused 

to allow us to go to the camp, and one reason he claimed he was 

treating the people at Camp Ashraf the way he was—in a very inhumane manner, in my opinion—was because the United States 

continues to put them on the foreign terrorist organization. 

Is the United States succumbing to the pressure of Maliki and 

the Iranian Government, the Mullahs specifically, to keep them on 

the FTO organization list? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Absolutely not. Our decision is entirely 

going to be on the merits, and we are not keeping them on the list 

because of anyone else’s concerns or views regarding the group. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Poe. Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin, may 

I ask unanimous consent my full statement be entered into the 

record? 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Without objection, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Ambassador Benjamin. The Arab Spring, I just came 

back from both Egypt and Libya over the break and have some 

views about what is happening in both of those countries. From the 

United States’ point of view, does the Arab Spring and its outcome 

so far help or hurt or have no impact on antiterrorism/counterterrorism policy? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, it is an excellent question, sir. Let 

me frame it this way. The Arab Spring, the Arab Awakening presents everyone who opposes extremism with an extraordinary opportunity. And that is to build the democracies in those countries, 

27

countries where people were denied their legitimate rights to build 

the kinds of democracies that would provide a place where people 

could express their dissent without turning to violence, where people would have a stake in the society, so that they would not want 

to turn to violence. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Ambassador, I understand that. My question 

is really very particular. Are there transitional governments in 

both Libya and Egypt, and Tunisia for that matter—do you find cooperation is about the same, improved, or actually degraded? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I would say that in the case of Tunisia 

it is undoubtedly improved significantly, and in fact my office will 

be conducting programs under the antiterrorism assistance program there. There is no question that there has been an improvement. We have a better relationship with the Tunis government. 

I would say that we have a good but nascent relationship on 

counterterrorism with Libya, and our counterterrorism cooperation 

continues with Egypt, which is obviously a state nation going 

through considerable major events. But we continue to work closely 

with them, and we are optimistic that that cooperation will continue into the future. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. With respect to 

Pakistan, I have two questions. One is, first of all, is the United 

States Government satisfied that after the tragic incident on the 

border that we are back on track in terms of cooperation and collaboration with respect to counterterrorists? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. As Secretary Clinton has said, this is a 

very complex relationship that we have with Pakistan. And there 

is no question that there has been something of a pause, an interregnum, if you will, caused by the tragic incident in Mohmand. 

We are hopeful, now that the Pakistani Parliament has concluded its deliberations, that we can continue to build the relationship and to get over the tensions of the past. We know this won’t 

be easy. There are a lot of contentious issues, but we believe that 

we are going again in the right direction. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Are they cooperating? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. On a number of issues, they certainly 

are. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. On April 12—you mentioned the Parliament. On 

April 12, Pakistan’s Parliament unanimously demanded the end of 

all U.S. drone strikes in Pakistani territory. What is the reaction 

of the United States Government to that? And if they are cooperating with us, how does—that seems to fly in the face of cooperation. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, we are still studying the resolution 

that the Pakistani Parliament passed, and we are engaging in 

talks with the government to see what the implications of that are. 

And of course this is a program that we don’t discuss in public, so 

I am afraid I can’t really go beyond that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, without discussing the program, let us just 

discuss the policy. When another legislative body unanimously does 

something that would suggest that certainly at least on the legislative side of that government they have taken a pretty firm position 

of non-cooperation, it is not a classified matter that the United 

States has deployed drones both in Pakistan and across the border. 

28

Should the Congress of the United States not read into that a resolve to end cooperation, at least with respect to the deployment of 

that technology, without getting into the deployment of that technology? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. My own view, sir, is that the prudent 

thing to do is allow us to have our conversations with the Pakistani 

Government, and to see how it wishes to act on the basis of a resolution which I believe is non-binding. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has ended, but 

I do think this is a very important development. And I understand 

the diplomatic nicety being expressed here by Ambassador Benjamin, but I would simply say for the record that I think this is 

a grave matter. And I think that while the Ambassador pleads for 

patience, and he deserves patience, patience is wearing thin I think 

in the Congress on both sides of the aisle on this matter. 

With that, I thank the chair for the time. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

I had one last question for Ambassador Benjamin. And that—just 

going through your testimony last year before the committee, you 

testified that ‘‘we continue to see a strong flow of new recruits into 

many of the most dangerous terrorist organizations.’’ And I was 

going to ask you if that strong flow is still the state of play. What 

do you see? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. It is hard to measure the flow of recruits, 

but we have a strong sense that in many different parts of the 

world the terrorist groups are indeed gaining strength. This is certainly the case in Yemen where AQAP, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has—now holds territory, as I mentioned in my statement, 

and where it has picked up membership. 

We have seen that what is going on, admittedly not in an AQ affiliate, but in Boko Harem, which you mentioned before, suggests 

that that group has grown in strength. We do believe that AQIM 

and the Islamic Maghreb has also probably added some recruits to 

its ranks. 

The exception is probably al-Qaeda core in the federally administered tribal areas. That group is in particularly difficult circumstances, as I think is well known to this subcommittee. But, 

you know, I believe that our work in strategic counterterrorism, 

and particularly in countering violent extremism, is as essential as 

ever, precisely because even though many of the peaks of this 

movement have been cut off and don’t threaten us in the way they 

did before, there remains a large number of people out there who 

are committed to violence against the United States, its values, and 

its friends. And that is why I believe that we need to do what we 

can to cut off the flow of recruits to these organizations. 

Mr. ROYCE. One of the areas where counterterrorism has been 

pretty effective is with the Philippines. The Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, do you see that continuing as it has? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Sir, I think that is a question best for 

the Department of Defense. But I would certainly agree with you 

that both on the military side and on the civilian side we have had 

very good results in the Philippines. And I think it demonstrates 

the kind of advances you can make with a robust capacity building 

29

effort, and robust coordination between our military and our others. 

And when I look around the region, in particular of Southeast 

Asia, I think that we have a strong model of what you can do with 

robust engagement with these countries, whether it is the Philippines, Indonesia, or others. And I would certainly commend that 

to the attention of the committee. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador Benjamin, and thank you for your testimony here today. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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