1

14-971 

Wang v. Lynch 

BIA 

Nelson, IJ 

A200 752 645 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 14th day of October, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

SUSAN L. CARNEY, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

LANYING WANG, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 14-971 

 NAC 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Matthew J. Harris, 

Brooklyn, New York.
2

FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General; 

Derek C. Julius, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; Karen 

L. Melnik, Trial Attorney; 

Tyler C. King, Law Clerk, 

Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, 

Washington D.C.

 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Lanying Wang, a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 26, 

2014 decision of the BIA, affirming the June 14, 2012 

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying her 

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re 

Lanying Wang, No. A200 752 645 (B.I.A. Mar. 26, 2014), 

aff’g No. A200 752 645 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June 14, 2012). 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

facts and procedural history in this case. 
3

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions. See Zaman v. Mukasey, 

514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The 

applicable standards of review are well established. 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 

510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). For asylum applications like 

Wang’s, governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may, 

“[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances . . . base 

a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or 

responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent 

plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account,” and 

inconsistencies in an applicant’s statements and other 

record evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the 

heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 

163-64 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Here, the agency’s 

adverse credibility determination is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

 The IJ reasonably found Wang’s testimony inconsistent 

and implausible. Wang testified to intense surveillance 
4

from family planning officials that consisted of daily 

visits to monitor her body shape and eating habits. Wang’s 

asylum application included no reference to that 

monitoring. The IJ properly relied on this omission in 

making her adverse credibility determination, since the 

kind of constant pressure Wang testified to was at the 

heart of her claim of persecution based on Chinese family 

planning policies. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see 

also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n.3 (explaining that 

inconsistency and omission are “functionally equivalent” 

for credibility purposes). 

 Furthermore, the IJ reasonably found implausible Wang’s 

testimony that family planning officials did not require 

her to undergo any gynecological exams to make sure the IUD 

remained in place. An IJ is entitled to consider whether 

an asylum applicant’s testimony is inherently implausible. 

Gas v. U.S.Atty.Gen., 400 F.3d 963, 964 (2d Cir. 2008)(per 

curiam). Our review of an IJ’s credibility finding is 

highly deferential. Id. (internal quotation marks 
5

omitted). However, the IJ’s findings must be “tethered to 

record evidence.” Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 

2007) (per curiam). 

 Here, the IJ’s finding is based on Wang’s testimony 

that family planning officials had access to medical 

facilities to perform abortions. If family planning 

officials have access to medical facilities, then it makes 

little sense to eschew those facilities in favor of daily 

monitoring. Moreover, the IJ reasonably found implausible 

Wang’s testimony that officials checked on her body shape 

multiple times a day. Wang submitted no country 

conditions evidence to show how often Chinese officials 

typically monitored violators of the family planning 

policy, and “the reasons for [the IJ’s] incredulity are 

evident.” Id. It makes little sense that officials would 

devote such manpower and resources to one individual, when 

more efficient methods of monitoring were available, such 

as periodic gynecological testing. 

 Finally, the IJ reasonably gave little weight to the 

letters from Wang’s neighbors. The letters are 
6

substantially similar to one another and contain several 

sentences that appear unaltered in each letter. 

“[S]triking similarities between affidavits are an 

indication that the statements are ‘canned.’” Mei Chai Ye 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) 

(citation omitted). Submission of a canned affidavit is 

itself a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility 

determination. Id. at 526 (“[W]illingness to submit a 

false document is in itself sufficient evidence of 

incredibility.”). Moreover, these letters were all 

submitted by Wang in support of her claim, thus increasing 

any suspicion their similarity arouses. Singh v. BIA, 438 

F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The IJ was not 

required to credit Wang’s explanation, as her statement 

that she asked for letters, but did not tell her neighbors 

what to write, did not clarify why the letters are so 

similar. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 

2005). Accordingly, the IJ reasonably found Wang’s 

supporting documents insufficient to rehabilitate her 
7

incredible testimony. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 

268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 

removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 

is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 

this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request 

for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance 

with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and 

Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 

 FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk