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73–922 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–369

IRAN’S INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITY

IN LATIN AMERICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE 

CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 16, 2012

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE

CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Arnson, Cynthia J., Ph.D., director, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC ............................................................................... 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Berman, Ilan, vice president, American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38

Farah, Douglas, senior fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1

Noriega, Hon. Robert F., former Assistant Secretary of State for Western 

Hemisphere Affairs, former Ambassador to the Organization of American 

States, Washington, DC ....................................................................................... 30

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 32

Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement .................... 3

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Op-ed by Senator Richard G. Lugar ‘‘Growing Risk Posed by Iran-Venezuela 

Axis,’’ Miami Herald, February 15, 2012 ........................................................... 55

(III)

(1)

IRAN’S INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITY

IN LATIN AMERICA 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

PEACE CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez and Rubio. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Good morning. This hearing of the Western 

Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs Committee 

will come to order. Let me welcome all of you to our hearing on 

Iran’s influence and activity in Latin America. I want to thank all 

of our panelists for coming today and I look forward to hearing 

your assessment of the growing and multilayered relationship 

between Iran and countries in Latin America. 

Iran is seizing headlines around the world as its leadership pursues a singular agenda, to achieve nuclear weapons capacity. Fortunately, the world is largely united in its view that such a development would be devastating to our national security, to that of 

our allies, and to the stability of the region. Most of our allies agree 

that Iran cannot be permitted to succeed in this endeavor and, 

thanks to the leadership of this Congress and the Obama administration, more pressure has been placed on the Iranian regime than 

ever before. 

In December, the Senate voted unanimously to impose biting 

sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran that have led to a 25-percent 

drop in the Iranian currency, the reconsideration of millions of dollars in purchases of petroleum from Iran, and the passage of similar sanctions and an oil embargo by the EU nations. Earlier this 

month, the Senate Banking Committee further tightened the noose 

by approving the Iran Sanctions Accountability and Human Rights 

Act, which imposes sanctions on joint energy ventures and uranium 

mining ventures, including some Iran has concluded with countries 

in this hemisphere, and support sanctions on the National Iranian 

Oil Company, which has also extended its reach into this hemisphere. 

2

As we tighten the noose around the Iranian regime, we must pay 

close attention to where President Ahmedinejad’s increasing isolated government looks for friends and resources. Unfortunately, 

there are some countries in this hemisphere that, for political or 

financial gain, have courted Iranian overtures. They proceed at 

their own risk—the risk of sanctions from the United States and 

the risks of abetting a terrorist state. 

Within 4 years of President Ahmedinejad’s election in 2005, Iran 

opened six new embassies in Latin America, including Bolivia, 

Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, in addition to 

the five embassies Iran already had. Iran has announced its intention to form a joint oil company with Venezuela, signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in oil activities and personnel training with Ecuador, and been awarded the right to explore 12 oil and gas blocks in Bolivia. 

In October we learned of Iran directing a plot to assassinate the 

Saudi Ambassador on United States soil using individuals it 

believed to be members of the Zetas drug cartel, and 2 months 

later the Spanish language network Univision aired a documentary 

that depicted a 2007 cyber attack plot by the Iranian Ambassador 

in Mexico, in conjunction with diplomatic officials from the Embassies of Venezuela and Cuba, to infiltrate U.S. Government computer systems in the White House, FBI, CIA, and two nuclear 

facilities. The Venezuelan official profiled in that documentary was 

later reposted to the Venezuelan consulate in Miami, until the 

State Department compelled that she be dismissed for her actions 

while serving in Mexico. 

Furthermore, an investigation into the Lebanese Canadian Bank 

profiled by the New York Times discovered a complicated web of 

high-ranking Hezbollah officials involved in South American 

cocaine trafficking trade, as well as an extensive network of money 

laundering for Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. 

When you view this in conjunction with the fact that travel 

between Iran and both Venezuela and Bolivia does not require 

visas despite weak commercial and tourist ties between the countries, and the fact that partnering with Venezuelan banks allows 

Teheran to seek to circumvent financial sanctions, it is impossible 

to say this issue does not merit more United States attention. 

Ahmedinejad has said, ‘‘When the Western countries were trying 

to isolate Iran, we went to the U.S. back yard.’’ We cannot ignore 

the geostrategic significance of Iran forming alliances with countries in the Western Hemisphere, particularly with anti-American 

leaders like Hugo Chavez and Daniel Ortega. This is especially 

threatening in light of the recent plot to assassinate an ambassador 

on United States soil, which our intelligence community believes is 

evidence that the leadership in Teheran feels increasingly 

emboldened in its plan to undermine American interests and those 

of our allies. 

As expressed by our own Director of National Intelligence, James 

Clapper, in testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee 

this month, the Iranian leadership is now, ‘‘more willing to conduct 

an attack on the United States in response to real or perceived 

U.S. actions that threaten the regime.’’

3

Iran is a terrorist state whose behavior poses a significant global 

threat. In the last week, we suspect that Iran has instigated 

attacks in India, Georgia, and Thailand. Iran has a terrorist history even in Latin America, directing the bombing of the Israeli 

Embassy and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in the 

1990s. 

So what do countries in the hemisphere hope to gain from a relationship with a country as isolated, repressive, and dangerous as 

Iran? Some may argue that Iranian influence in this hemisphere 

has yet to materialize, that what Iran actually brings to the table 

is unfulfilled promises, factories unbuilt, ports undredged, humanitarian aid undelivered; that Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and 

Bolivia allow themselves to be courted by Ahmedinejad to stick a 

proverbial finger in America’s eye, and that may be true. But at 

the same time, we cannot ignore the possibility, given Iran’s worldwide terror escapades, that there is more to the story or that, at 

a minimum, there will be. 

So I called this hearing to sift through the facts, discuss with the 

experts before us what about Iran’s relationship with the nations 

of our hemisphere should be of serious concern, and discern the 

appropriate United States response. 

With that, I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses, 

and will turn to the distinguished ranking member and my colleague, Senator Rubio. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I echo everything you’ve just said and I just wanted to add a 

few things. 

First let me thank the witnesses. We have a great panel. Thank 

you all for being a part of this. I’ve already read all of your 

statements, so I look forward to hearing them and answering your 

questions. 

As you’ve described, Mr. Chairman, the regime in Iran does pose 

an international threat, not just to the United States, but to the 

world, and the purpose of this hearing is to examine the increasing 

role they’re playing in the Western Hemisphere and what’s behind 

it. 

I think we need to begin by making sure we don’t exaggerate 

things. Iran really is not capable of doing much on its own in the 

region. All these promises they make about things they’re going to 

build, they very rarely keep any of them. In fact, they haven’t kept 

almost any of them. So a reminder to the people of these countries 

that the cost-benefit analysis of being associated with Iran isn’t 

necessarily on the benefit side. 

I would go on to say, however, that, while it’s important to not 

exaggerate the role they’re playing, we need to understand why it 

is that they’re doing what they’re doing, and we clearly need to 

identify that Iran is working in the hemisphere with nations like 

Venezuela and Cuba and with other governments like the ones in 

Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador. These leaders of these countries 

are basically putting their nations at the service of Iran for the detriment of their people and to their future. 

4

So I think one of the things I hope to hear today is why they’re 

doing it, and I think what I hope you’ll explore further in your testimony is a few of the reasons. The first is they’re obviously looking—Iran is looking to avoid isolation. They want to be able to 

point to the world and say, look, we’re not alone, these are these 

other countries that are aligned with us, this is really a Western 

nation versus a rest of the world type argument, and they want to 

point to these nations as being part of some sort of new axis that 

they’re helping or they’re trying to create. 

The second is they’re looking for allies to help them circumvent 

sanctions, allies and other countries that have access to the international banking system that will allow them to circumvent some 

of the international sanctions that are increasingly growing on 

Iran. 

But the third is the one that I think is most dangerous of all, 

and that is ultimately they seem to be establishing a platform to 

potentially carry out asymmetrical attacks against the United 

States in the region, and it’s something that we need to be cognizant of. Now, that may sound farfetched, except that the evidence 

is increasingly clear that Iran is much bolder in their willingness 

to attack the United States through terrorism than anyone had 

ever imagined. 

In an open hearing on January 31, the Director of the National 

Intelligence, James Clapper, acknowledged when he said: ‘‘Iranian 

officials, probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have 

changed their calculus and are now willing to conduct an attack in 

the United States.’’ That’s his assessment of Iran, a nation who is 

now beginning to see its footprint even more clear in the capitals 

and in these countries that we’ve outlined just a moment ago. 

The history and the lessons of history are even more startling. 

Let’s remember that it was senior Iranian officials that were linked 

to the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that 

killed 30 people, a 1994 bombing at the Argentine-Israeli Mutual 

Association that killed 85 people. 

In October of this year we uncovered a plot by the Quds Force 

to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the United States 

in this very city. And earlier this year, the Univision television network had a documentary that showed an Iranian diplomat 

colluding with what they believed to be Mexican students that were 

interested in carrying out terrorist attacks against national security targets inside of the United States. It showed the Venezuelan 

consul in Miami, Livia Acosta Noguera, asking for information and 

advising the students. Obviously, she was expelled, but it just 

shows the lengths of which this continues to develop. So you look 

at all these things and we have cause for concern. 

So let me close by saying that I hope the message of today’s hearing and the actions moving forward, which I believe are shared by 

both parties—and I, by the way, would encourage everyone to read 

an op-ed piece today that ran in the Miami Herald by our esteemed 

colleague, Senator Lugar, which I really think outlines the challenge before us. I think it’s important to send a message to the 

leaders of both Venezuela and Cuba and to their puppets, the leaders of Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador, that, No. 1, your people 

and your nations don’t agree with you. They certainly do not want 

5

to be associated with a pariah regime like Iran and they recognize 

that their benefits they get for being associated with a pariah are 

far outweighed by the cost of being associated with these 

individuals. 

The second message I hope they’ll take from today and moving 

forward is that the leaders of these countries are playing with fire. 

They’re playing with fire because they’re associated with an unpredictable group. One thing is to say these ridiculous statements 

about how great Moamar Qadafi was and what a good hero Assad 

is. Another thing is to actually give these people operating space 

in your own country from which they can do things that you can 

never imagine, and the consequences will be extraordinary. They 

are playing with fire. It’s a very dangerous game they’re playing. 

Their people deserve better and I hope they’ll reconsider. 

So thank you for holding this hearing on this important topic, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

Let me introduce our panelists. First we’ll hear from Dr. Cynthia 

Arnson, the director of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Arnson recently 

edited a publication titled ‘‘Iran and Latin America, Threat or Axis 

of Annoyance,’’ and since joining the center’s Latin American program in 1994 she has focused on questions of democratic governance, conflict resolution, human rights, the international relations 

of Latin America, and U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. 

Next we welcome Mr. Douglas Farah, an adjunct fellow at the 

Americas Program at CSIS and a senior fellow at the International 

Assessment and Strategy Center. He is an expert on transnational 

criminal organizations, insurgencies, ungoverned spaces, illicit 

money flows, and resource exploitation in Latin America. In recent 

years he has written extensively about Iran’s growing influence in 

Latin America, the Bolivarian revolution, and transnational criminal and terrorist networks in the region. 

We’d also like to welcome Ambassador Roger Noriega back to the 

committee. He coordinates the American Enterprise Institute’s program in Latin America and has served as our Assistant Secretary 

of State for the Western Hemisphere Affairs, as well as U.S. 

Ambassador to the Organization of American States, and is a 

former staff member of this committee. 

Finally, we welcome Ilan Berman, vice president of the American 

Foreign Policy Council. An expert on regional security in the 

Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has consulted for both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. 

Department of Defense, and recently returned from an extended 

fact-finding trip to examine Iran’s growing influence in Latin 

America. 

So thank you all for your willingness to share your expertise 

with the committee. We welcome you and ask you that you limit 

your testimony to approximately 5 minutes. 

Your full testimony will be included in the record. 

With that, we’ll begin with Dr. Arnson. 

6

STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, LATIN 

AMERICAN PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. ARNSON. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez, and 

thank you, Senator Rubio, for the invitation to testify on this difficult subject. This is obviously a highly charged topic. International tensions over the purpose and the lack of transparency of 

Iran’s nuclear program have escalated dramatically in recent 

weeks. The subject of Iran’s involvement in Latin America is additionally difficult precisely because there’s so little transparency in 

Iran’s economic, security, or intelligence dealings with the region. 

This is compounded by a parallel or similar lack of transparency 

among its principal allies in the region, the countries of the socalled ALBA bloc. 

The allegations about Iran’s activities in Latin America, which 

both you and Senator Rubio have just outlined, especially those related to its nuclear ambitions and support for terrorism, deserve to 

be treated with the utmost seriousness. As you mentioned, there is 

a track record. Five Iranian officials, including the current Defense 

Minister, along with an operative of Hezbollah, have been accused 

by the Government of Argentina, and those arrest warrants have 

been validated by Interpol, for masterminding the two most devastating terrorist attacks in recent Latin American history, the 

1992 bombing in Buenos Aires of the Israeli Embassy, and the 

1994 bombing of the Jewish Community Center, the AMIA. 

This is a political year in the United States, however, and it’s 

easy to see how hot-button issues of Iran and its intentions in the 

Middle East or in Latin America can become the subject of heated 

debate and partisan contention. When one adds to this mix the 

polarizing and stridently anti-United States figure of President 

Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the whole mix becomes especially 

volatile. 

I would argue, however, that the politicization of this issue will 

not and rarely leads to good policy. The assessments of intentions 

as well as capabilities are by definition hard to make, all the more 

so when they involve both state and nonstate actors who endeavor 

to keep their activities secret. Vigilance is essential at this time, as 

is evidence-based consideration of these difficult issues. 

President Ahmedinejad recently concluded a trip to the region, 

prompted by an invitation to visit Nicaragua to attend the inauguration of President Daniel Ortega. As much as the Iranian President might have derived some satisfaction from this trip, showing 

up again, as Senator Rubio has indicated, on the United States 

doorstep, showing that he could poke the United States in the eye, 

I think that in a broader sense the trip was a major failure, 

demonstrating mostly that Iran has lost political ground in the 

hemisphere. 

Ahmedinejad was rebuffed by Brazil, which is Iran’s largest trading partner in Latin America, in sharp contrast to reciprocal visits 

by the Iranian and Brazilian Presidents in 2009 and 2010. The new 

government of President Dilma Rousseff has voted against Iran in 

the United Nations, for the first time supporting the sending of a 

special rapporteur. She has called Iranian human rights violations, 

7

including the proposed stoning of a woman convicted of adultery, 

a ‘‘barbarity’’ and ‘‘a medieval practice.’’

Argentina, which is Iran’s second-largest trading partner, was 

also not on the itinerary. And despite previous trips to Bolivia, 

Ahmedinejad did not stop in La Paz, most likely because in May 

2011 the Iranian Defense Minister, Vahidi, who was in fact one of 

those accused of involvement in the terrorist bombings in Argentina, visited Bolivia at the invitation of the defense ministry. 

Following an outcry, Bolivian President Evo Morales publicly 

apologized, calling the invitation to Vahidi a ‘‘grave error’’ and 

apologizing to the Jewish community in Argentina, saying that the 

visit was a mistake. 

There were rumors that Ahmedinejad would attend the inauguration of Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina, which took 

place at the same time that he was in the region, and I believe that 

his failure to show up indicates that Guatemalan authorities 

backpedaled very substantially to prevent that visit from taking 

place. 

Finally, I think it’s important to note that Ahmedinejad remains 

very unpopular in Latin America as a whole. According to the polling firm Latinobarometro, the citizens of the region rank Iran last 

out of nine countries about which they were asked if they had a 

favorable opinion. It is interesting and important to note that the 

United States ranked first. 

I’m almost out of time, but I’ll say that the economic relationship 

between Iran and Latin America has grown in recent years, but its 

significance is easy to exaggerate. The media use words like 

‘‘surge’’ or ‘‘increasing sevenfold’’ to characterize Iran’s trade relationship with Brazil, but Iranian-Brazilian trade is a mere 0.6 percent of Brazil’s total foreign trade. Iran-Venezuela trade is less 

than 0.02 percent of Venezuela’s total trade. My testimony includes 

some charts that indicate this. 

I share the concern about the efforts of Iran to establish perhaps 

a military, intelligence, and security presence. The Manhattan district attorney’s office has launched an ongoing investigation of 

Venezuelan collaboration in procuring financing and materials for 

alleged weapons production in Iran, in violation of United States 

sanctions. As Doug Farah has written and I’m sure will tell us 

more, the Iranian financial presence in Caracas potentially serves 

as a way to bust sanctions. 

Both of you have indicated the number of actions that the U.S. 

Government has taken to sanction Venezuelan diplomats who have 

served allegedly as facilitators and fundraisers for Hezbollah. The 

U.S. Government has also sanctioned the Venezuelan oil company, 

PDVSA, for deliveries of gasoline components in defiance of sanctions against Iran. As you have noted, the U.S. Government implicated an Iranian citizen in an alleged plot to assassinate the Saudi 

Ambassador in Washington. We can go on and on. 

At the same time, I think it’s important, as much as we attempt 

to investigate with the greatest seriousness the various bits and 

pieces of information that have come out, most of which are quite 

alarming, I think it’s important to keep this issue in perspective. 

There are other pressing human security concerns in the hemisphere, including the tens of thousands of people killed in the past 

8

several years, primarily in Mexico, but also in Central America, in 

violence related to narcotrafficking, and the threat to democratic 

institutions posed by transnational crime. 

We should also be careful—this is now the second or third hearing——

Senator MENENDEZ. If I could ask you to summarize. 

Dr. ARNSON. Final point—that we not allow this issue to overshadow attention to the broader dynamics in the hemisphere, 

which are marked by economic growth, the fight against poverty 

and inequality, the emergence of Brazil as a global power, the 

region’s expanding relations with China and Asia, all of which are 

issues central on the Latin American agenda. Our failure to pay 

attention to the issues that are important in the region will serve 

to isolate the United States from our allies in the hemisphere, as 

much as the issue of Iran’s activities in Latin America deserves the 

utmost serious consideration. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Arnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA J. ARNSON

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity 

to testify on Iran’s relationship with Latin America.1

This is a highly charged as well as difficult subject. 

It is highly charged in that international tensions over the purpose and lack of 

transparency of Iran’s nuclear program have escalated dramatically. Indeed, just as 

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made yet another trip to the region last 

month, Iranian authorities threatened to close down the Strait of Hormuz if sanctions were adopted against its sale of oil; Iranian judicial authorities sentenced to 

death a dual Iranian-American citizen and former U.S. Marine accused of espionage; 

and speculation about possible military strikes by Israel or the United States 

against Iran’s nuclear installations has increased exponentially. The recent assassination in Tehran of yet another Iranian scientist working on the country’s nuclear 

program—for which Iran blames the Israeli Government—and assassination attempts against Israeli diplomats in India and Georgia—for which Israeli officials 

blame Iran—have contributed to the thickening of tensions. 

The subject of Iran’s involvement in Latin America is difficult precisely because 

there is so little transparency in Iran’s economic, security, or intelligence dealings 

with the region; this problem is compounded by a similar lack of transparency 

among its principal allies in the region, the countries of the so-called ALBA bloc.2

What is assumption, speculation, or suspicion and what is hard evidence based on 

reliable sources? The allegations are many and serious but the ability to verify definitively is often lacking. There are disagreements within and outside the U.S. Government about the precise contours of the relationship. For example, in April 2010, 

a Department of Defense report to Congress indicated that the elite unit of Iran’s 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Quds Force, had increased its presence in 

Latin America, particularly in Venezuela. Yet shortly thereafter, General Douglas 

Fraser, head of the U.S. Southern Command, stated that Iran’s growing interest in, 

and engagement with, Venezuela was diplomatic and commercial, not military. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in 2009 that Iran was building a large embassy in Nicaragua; the report turned out to be false. 

The allegations about Iran’s activities in Latin America, especially those related 

to its nuclear program and support for terrorism, deserve to be treated with the utmost seriousness. There is a track record: five Iranian officials, including the current Defense Minister, along with an operative of Hezbollah have been accused by 

the Government of Argentina—and arrest warrants have been issued by 

INTERPOL—for masterminding and staging two of the most devastating terrorist 

attacks in recent Latin American history: the 1992 bombing in Buenos Aires of the 

Israeli Embassy, and the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center known as 

the AMIA. One hundred fourteen people died in those attacks and hundreds more 

were wounded. 

In this political year in the United States, however, it is easy to see how the hotbutton issues of Iran and its intentions—in the Middle East or Latin America—can 

become the subject of heated debate and partisan contention. When one adds the 

9

polarizing and stridently anti-U.S figure of President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, 

the mix becomes especially volatile. Politicization of issues, however, rarely leads to 

good policy. Assessments of intentions as well as capabilities are by definition hard 

to make, all the more so when they involve activities that state and nonstate actors 

endeavor to keep secret. Vigilance is essential, as is evidence-based consideration of 

difficult issues. 

Iran’s relationship with the Western Hemisphere goes back half a century or 

longer. Venezuela and Iran were founding members of OPEC in the 1960s, and for 

decades pursued a common agenda around keeping oil prices high. Iran also sought 

to expand commercial relations with Mexico and Brazil, and through the NonAligned Movement established friendly relations with a number of Latin American 

countries. The overtly political aspects of the current relationship deepened after the 

1979 Iranian revolution, the same year in which the Sandinistas took power in 

Nicaragua. The election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 and 

his promotion of an ‘‘aggressive foreign policy’’ to counter Iran’s international isolation marked a new phase in Iran’s relationship with Latin America, and it is this 

current phase that has been of greatest concern to the Washington policy community.3

The relationship between Iran and several Latin American countries since in 2005 

is driven by multiple factors. These include, for both sides, economic self-interest—

the search for new trade partners and markets—the desire to assert foreign policy 

independence and sovereignty and diversify international partners beyond the 

United States, and for some, a shared anti-U.S., ‘‘anti-imperialist’’ agenda. Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program served as an opportunity for Brazil during the 

Lula administration to project its own global ambitions, even if such efforts were 

highly controversial within Brazil and in the United States at the time. (As described below, the government of current President, Dilma Rousseff, has adopted a 

significantly different posture.) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has most actively courted Ahmadinejad, using the relationship to express antipathy to, and 

score propaganda points against, the United States. He has facilitated Iran’s relationships with ALBA allies such as Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia, whose governments similarly exploit antagonism with the United States for internal political purposes, albeit to a degree far less than Venezuela. 

President Ahmadinejad’s most recent trip to the region in January 2012 was organized around an invitation to attend the Presidential inauguration of Daniel Ortega 

in Nicaragua; the agenda also included Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba. 

Ahmadinejad may have derived some political satisfaction from the trip; he showed 

up once again on the U.S. doorstep, attempted to demonstrate that Iran was not 

entirely isolated internationally; and was joined by leaders in Caracas and Quito in 

rejecting claims that Iran’s nuclear program was for anything but peaceful purposes. 

In a broader sense, however, the trip was a major failure, demonstrating that Iran 

has lost political ground in the region:

• Ahmadinejad was rebuffed by Brazil, Iran’s largest trading partner in Latin 

America, in stark contrast to the visits by Ahmadinejad and Lula to each other’s capitals in 2009 and 2010, respectively. In March 2011, the government of 

President Dilma Rousseff voted against Iran in the United Nations for the first 

time in a decade, supporting a resolution in the Human Rights Council to send 

a special rapporteur to Iran to investigate human rights violations. As President-elect, Rousseff condemned the sentence—death by stoning—of an Iranian 

woman convicted of adultery, calling the proposed punishment a ‘‘barbarity’’ and 

a ‘‘medieval practice.’’ Brasilia ultimately abstained when the rapporteur’s final 

report on human rights in Iran was brought to a vote. But a spokesman for 

Ahmadinejad in Tehran publicly criticized Rousseff for ‘‘destroying years of good 

relations’’ built up under President Lula. 

• Argentina, Iran’s second-largest trading partner, was also off the itinerary.

Despite a growth in bilateral trade, the issue of Iran’s role in the two terrorist 

bombings in the 1990s precludes a deeper relationship.4

• Despite previous visits to Bolivia, Ahmadinejad did not stop in La Paz. In May 

2011, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi—accused by the Argentine Government of involvement in the AMIA case—visited Bolivia at the invitation of 

the Defense Ministry. Following an outcry in Argentina, Bolivian President Evo 

Morales publicly apologized, calling the invitation to Vahidi a ‘‘grave error.’’ 

Morales also apologized to representatives of Argentina’s Jewish community, 

saying that the visit was a ‘‘mistake.’’

• Ahmadinejad did not attend the inauguration of Guatemalan President Otto 

Perez Molina, even though its timing coincided with the trip to the other four 

countries, and even though reports in the Guatemalan press indicate that 

10

Ahmadinejad had been invited, along with the Presidents of all countries with 

which Guatemala has diplomatic relations. 

• The relationship with Cuba also manifests some important areas of divergence. 

Fidel Castro has openly condemned the IranianGgovernment’s anti-Semitism 

and denial of the Holocaust. 

• Finally, Ahmadinejad remains extremely unpopular in Latin America as a 

whole. According to the polling firm Latinobarometro in 2011, citizens of the region ranked Iran last out of nine countries about which they were asked if they 

had a favorable opinion. (The United States ranked first.)5

The economic relationship between Iran and Latin America has grown in recent 

years, but its significance is also easy to exaggerate (see Table 1). The media use 

words like ‘‘surge’’ and ‘‘sevenfold’’ increase to characterize Iran’s trade relationship 

with Brazil. Yet the $2.1 billion in bilateral trade in 2010 constituted less than 0.6 

percent of Brazil’s total foreign trade (see Table 2). Similarly, Iran-Venezuela trade 

is less than 0.02 percent of Venezuela’s total trade. According to IMF statistics 

reported by the European Commission, Iran ranks 27th among Brazil’s trading partners, and ranks only 48th for Venezuela. Of Iran’s major trade partners, Brazil 

appears in 18th place, and Argentina is in 34th place (both are dwarfed by Iran’s 

trade with the United Arab Emirates, China, India, Japan, Turkey, and South 

Korea). Notably, none of the countries of the ALBA bloc figures among Iran’s top 

50 trading partners.


arn10.eps
11

Similar exaggeration characterizes Iran’s aid and investment to its closest allies 

in Latin America. Scores, if not hundreds, of cooperation agreements have been 

signed and billions upon billions have been pledged, in areas as diverse as energy, 

infrastructure and port development, agriculture, cement, textiles, and mining. Most 

of the projects have not and will never come to fruition, in no small measure because they are unpopular in Iran. The Iranian Parliament must approve funding for 

such projects and opposition is stiff in light of the economic pain inflicted by international sanctions. 

Iran’s behavior in the international system, from the support of terrorist movements to the defiance of the international community with respect to inspections of 

its nuclear program, raises the most concern and alarm about its increased activities in Latin America. Several years ago the Manhattan District Attorney’s office 

launched an ongoing investigation of Venezuelan collaboration with Iran to procure 

financing and materials (including uranium) for weapons production in violation of 

U.S. and international sanctions. The Iranian financial presence in Caracas, 

through the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BID) and the Banco Binacional 

Irani-Venezolano, raise concerns about Iran’s use of the Venezuelan banking system 

to avoid sanctions. Indeed, the Toseyeh Saderat Iran Bank, the primary shareholder 

in the BID, was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2007 as a vehicle 

for the funding of Hezbollah.6

There is every reason to be watchful and vigilant, and treat allegations about 

Iran’s military and intelligence activities in the region with the utmost seriousness. 

As mentioned earlier, the secrecy and lack of transparency that characterize the behavior of the Iranian regime, including its dealings with allies in Latin American 

on economic as well as military matters, heighten the level of concern. The U.S. 

Department of Treasury in 2008 accused a Venezuelan diplomat who had served in 

Lebanon and Syria of acting as a facilitator and fundraiser for Hezbollah.7 In May 

2011, the U.S. Government sanctioned the state-owned Venezuelan oil company 

PdVSA for deliveries of gasoline components to Iran in defiance of sanctions. In 

October 2011, the U.S. Government implicated an Iranian citizen in an alleged plot 

to arrange the assassination of the Saudi Ambassador in Washington. In January 

2012, the Obama administration expelled Venezuela’s consul in Miami, Livia Acosta, 

following the airing of a television documentary linking her to the planning of cyber 

attacks on the United States. 

Allegations about Iranian efforts to obtain uranium in Venezuela and Bolivia are 

more difficult to substantiate, but these, along with questions raised about an increased presence of the Quds Force in Iranian diplomatic missions, should be further investigated. At the same time, counterevidence should also be weighed seriously. For example, in 2011 a reporter writing for the Wilson Quarterly attempted 

to learn more about the direct flights between Caracas and Tehran inaugurated in 

2007. But when he visited the office of the Venezuelan airline, Conviasa, to inquire 

about purchasing a ticket, he was told that the service had been canceled ‘‘about 

a year ago.’’ Similarly, the same reporter who visited a car dealer to inquire about 

purchasing a vehicle made by the joint Venezuelan-Iranian car and tractor manufacturer Veniran was told there weren’t any and that there was a waiting list from 

2010 of more than 4,000 customers.8 Is this the definitive word? Probably not. Sifting through what is real and what is not is an important and indeed urgent task. 

At the same time, other pressing human security concerns in the hemisphere, including the tens of thousands of people killed in the past several years in violence 

related to narcotrafficking or the threat to democratic institutions posed by 

transnational crime also deserve serious attention. Attention to this issue should not 

overshadow the broader dynamics in the hemisphere, marked by economic growth, 

the fight against poverty and inequality, the emergence of Brazil as a global actor, 

expanded relations with China and other Asian countries, democratic deepening, 

and a growing clamor for the United States to reform its immigration and 

counterdrug policies. Losing sight of the concerns and priorities of Latin American 

countries themselves risks isolating the United States from important allies in the 

hemisphere; these countries will look elsewhere for global partners who share their 

priorities and are willing to act on a common agenda. 

Thank you for your consideration.

—————————

End Notes

1 I am grateful to Adam Stubits, Program Associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and interns Julie Anderson, Melissa Nolan, and Hanif Zarrabi-Kashani for research assistance. 2The Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of our America (ALBA) was founded in 2004 and includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the 

Grenadines, and Venezuela. 

12

3For additional background on Iran’s foreign policy toward the region, see Farideh Fahri, 

‘‘Tehran’s Perspective on Iran-Latin American Relations,’’ in Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari, 

and Adam Stubits, eds., ‘‘Iran in Latin America: Threat or ‘Axis of Annoyance’?’’ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program and Middle East Program, 2009, 

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/IranlinlLA.pdf 4Press reports that the Argentine Foreign Ministry was contemplating a warming of relations 

with Iran and a softening of the position vis-a-vis the 1990s bombings caused a firestorm. Whatever the validity of the reports, the Argentine Government’s position remains unchanged. 5The United States had a 72-percent favorable rating, followed by Spain (71 percent). Ranked 

more favorably than Iran were the European Union, China, Canada, Venezuela, Cuba, Israel. 6See Douglas Farah, ‘‘Iran in Latin America: An Overview,’’ in Cynthia Arnson, Haleh 

Esfandiari, and Adam Stubits, eds., op.cit. 7 In January 2011, a Congressional Research Service report on Hezbollah noted that ‘‘there 

is little credible evidence of the present activity of operational Hezbollah cells in Latin America,’’ 

but indicated that Hezbollah and its supporters and sympathizers were involved in illegal activities such as drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, and other forms transnational crime. 8 Joshua Kucera, ‘‘What is Hugo Chavez Up To?’’ Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring 

2011.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Farah. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you, Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Rubio and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity 

to testify today on an issue I feel is of profound importance. 

Latin America is undergoing significant changes as numerous 

extra-regional state actors with little history in the region engage 

there in trade, military sales, resource extraction, and intelligence 

collection on an unprecedented scale. These include China, Russia, 

and Iran. While the interests of Russia and China will often 

diverge from those of the United States, the interests of Iran, a 

state sponsor of terrorism and sponsor of a terrorist group operating in the region, are directly and openly antagonistic. 

Iran’s interests lie in strengthening ties to the highly criminalized states in the Bolivarian axis. Iran and the Bolivarian 

states, led by Hugo Chavez, including Rafael Correa of Ecuador, 

Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Ortega in Nicaragua, bring a significant and dangerous new set of threats to the region as they work 

together with transnational organized criminal groups and terrorist 

groups. This threat includes not only drug trafficking, but also the 

potential for WMD-related trafficking. 

These activities are carried out with the participation of regional 

and extra-regional state actors who have a publicly articulated doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its 

allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use of WMD in that 

struggle. This is still a statement of intentions, not of capacity, but, 

given Iran’s past terrorist activities, this intent must be taken 

seriously. 

The goal of Iran’s presence in the region is twofold in my opinion: 

to develop the capacity and capability to wreak havoc in Latin 

America and possibly the United States homeland if the Iranian 

leadership views this as necessary to the survival of its nuclear 

program; and to develop and expand the ability to blunt international sanctions that are crippling the regime’s economic life. 

These corrosive activities are accelerating the weakening of states 

and hollowing out of many of the first generation democracies in 

13

Latin America and setting a predicate for the reassertion of authoritarian rule in these states and their neighbors. 

The relationship between Iran and the Bolivarian states is built 

on a shared perception of history and grievances against the 

United States that leads directly to the doctrine of asymmetrical 

warfare and the embrace of the concept of justified use of WMD 

against their enemies. While Iran’s rulers view the 1979 Iranian 

revolution in theological terms as a miracle of divine intervention 

against the United States, the ‘‘Great Satan,’’ in which they 

defeated the Great Satan, the Bolivarians’ view this as a roadmap 

of how to defeat the United States through asymmetrical means. 

Among the first to articulate the merging of radical Shiite 

Islamic thought with Marxist aspirations of destroying capitalism 

and U.S. hegemony was Ilich Sanchez Ramirez, better known as 

‘‘Carlos the Jackal,’’ a Venezuelan citizen who until his arrest in 

1994 was one of the world’s most wanted terrorists. Sanchez Ramirez writes that Islamism and Marxism combined could form a 

global anti-imperialist front that would definitively destroy the 

United States, globalization, and imperialism. In his seminal 2003 

book ‘‘Revolutionary Islam,’’ written from prison where he is serving a life sentence, Sanchez Ramirez praises Osama bin Laden and 

the 9–11 attacks and warns that, ‘‘from now on terrorism is going 

to be more or less a daily part of the landscape of your rotting 

democracies.’’

The public praise of Chavez for Sanchez Ramirez is a crucial element in Bolivarian ideology. In a 1999 letter to Sanchez Ramirez, 

Chavez greeted the terrorist as a distinguished compatriot and 

wrote that, ‘‘Swimming in the depths of your letter of solidarity, I 

could hear the pulse of our shared insight that everything has its 

due time, a time when you can fight outright for principles and a 

time when you must choose the proper fight.’’ He signs off: ‘‘with 

profound faith in our cause and our mission, now and forever, 

Hugo Chavez.’’

Chavez has adopted as his military doctrine the concepts and 

strategies articulated in ‘‘Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary 

Islam: Origins, Rules, and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare,’’ by 

Spanish politician and ideologue, Jorge Verstrynge. I have a copy 

of the book here if you’d like to look at it later. 

The tract is a continuation of Sanchez Ramirez’s thought, incorporating the endorsement of the use of WMD to destroy the United 

States. Chavez liked Verstrynge’s book so well that he had a special pocket-sized edition—I also have a copy of that here—printed 

and distributed to his officer corps, with the Venezuelan flag 

imprinted on the cover, and making it the official military doctrine 

of the Venezuelan military. 

To further ingrain this teaching and eradicate any vestiges of 

U.S. military doctrine in the region, Chavez and other Bolivarian 

leaders, in conjunction with Iran, have recently opened a new military academy to teach Bolivarian military doctrine, operating in 

Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Iran’s interest in the project was made clear 

when Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi arrived in Bolivia 

for the school’s inauguration. He had to leave, of course, before it 

was actually inaugurated when his presence caused an international outrage. 

14

Iran and its Bolivarian allies systematically engage in a pattern 

of financial behavior, recruitment exercises, and business activities 

that are not economically rational and could be used for the movement and/or production of WMD and the furthering of Iran’s stated 

aim of avoiding international sanctions. 

These include significant investments in financial institutions in 

the region that can easily be used to move money from Iran to 

banks around the world through third parties. Among the most 

important are the Banco Internacionale de Desarrollo, the Export 

Development Bank of Iran, the Fondo Binacional Venezuela–Iran, 

established in 2008 with a capital of $1.2 billion, and FONDEN, 

the Fondo de Desarrollo Nacionale, which is most interesting because it receives direct injects from the PRVSA, and in 2010 official 

government figures showed that FONDEN had received $15 billion 

in money that was not officially part of the state coffers. From 2005 

to 2010, an estimated $63 billion had been put into that fund and 

disappeared from public accounting. 

Finally, Iran’s Sadra Marine Industry Company, which operates 

illicit shipping or sanctioned shipping companies around the world, 

is also owned by the Revolutionary Guard and operates out of 

Venezuela. 

Finally, I would like to say that one of the most significant new 

developments I’ve found is Panama’s role in helping Iran avoid 

sanctions, often through Venezuelan front companies operating in 

the Colon Free Trade Zone. Iranians traveling in the region often 

use identity cards issued by Bolivarian states, particularly Ecuador 

and Venezuela, to move freely across the region. 

I’d welcome your questions afterward. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH

Thank you Chairman Menedez, Ranking Member Rubio, and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today on an issue that I feel is of profound 

importance to the security of the Homeland as well as the survival of democracy 

in Latin America. 

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

In order to understand Iran’s role in the region it is important to understand the 

overall context in which its diplomatic, military, intelligence and economic expansion is taking place. Latin America is undergoing significant changes as numerous 

extra-regional state actors with little history in the region engage there in trade, 

military sales, resource extraction, and intelligence collection on an unprecedented 

scale. 

These include China, Russia, and Iran. While the interest of Russia and China 

will often diverge from those of the United States in the region, the interests of 

Iran—a state sponsor of terrorism and sponsor of a terrorist group operating in the 

region—are directly and openly antagonistic. Iran’s interests lie in strengthening 

ties to highly criminalized states in the ‘‘Bolivarian’’ axis1, whose leaders, while 

espousing 21st century socialism, are deeply involved in transnational organized 

crime (TOC) enterprises, particularly the cocaine trade. 

The Bolivarian bloc of nations—led by Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, includes Rafael 

Correa of Ecuador, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua—seeks 

to break the traditional ties of the region to the United States. 

To this end, the Bolivarian alliance has formed numerous organizations and military alliances—including a military academy in Bolivia to erase the vestiges of U.S. 

military training from the militaries—which explicitly exclude the United States.2

What the academy, partly financed by Iran, is teaching in its place, as I will discuss 

later, is a military doctrine explicitly based on a concept of asymmetrical warfare 

15

modeled on Hezbollah, the terrorist group in Lebanon that receives extensive financing and support from Iran. 

Iran and the Bolivarian states bring a significant and dangerous new set of 

threats to the region as they work together with TOCs and terrorist groups. This 

threat includes not only traditional TOC activities such as drug trafficking and 

human trafficking, but also the potential for WMD-related trafficking. These activities are carried out with the participation of regional and extra regional state actors 

whose leaders are deeply enmeshed in criminal activities. These same leaders have 

a publicly articulated doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States 

and its allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use of weapons of mass 

destruction in that struggle. 

This is, at this point a statement of intentions and not one of capacity. But, given 

Iran’s past terrorist activities, including the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina, the 

intent of the statement should be taken seriously. Given the publicly stated intent 

of the Bolivarian nations to not comply with the United Nations trade sanctions on 

Iran, expressed at a joint meeting of Foreign Ministers in Tehran on July 14, 2010, 

it is safe to assume, I believe, that the economic ties with Iran will deepen. 

In a joint statement, the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and other members of the Chavez-led ALBA alliance vowed to ‘‘continue and 

expand their economic ties with Iran.’’ ‘‘We are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism,’’ 

Venezuelan Foreign Minister David Velasquez said at a joint press conference in 

Tehran.3

Each of the Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for Iranian citizens, 

thereby erasing any public record of the Iranian citizens that transit these countries. Given the extremely small number of tourists that ply the routes from Iran 

to Latin America, and the relatively small number of businessmen who are not tied 

to the Iranian state, one can assume most of the travel is related to Iranian officials. 

According to data I have collected, many hundreds of Iranian citizens, if not thousands, travel to Latin America on undisclosed business. More than 400 Iranians 

traveled just to Panama in 2011, and an even higher number travel regularly to 

Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. 

Panama is a significant new player in helping Iran avoid sanctions, often through 

Venezuelan front companies operating in the Colon Free Trade Zone. Iranians traveling in the region often use identity cards issued by Boliviarian states, including 

Ecuador and Venezuela, to move freely across the region. 

The intentions of Iran in the region have long been a subject of debate; but today 

there is a much clearer indication available, to both the intelligence community and 

investigators on the ground, that the goal of Iran’s presence in the region is twofold: 

to develop the capacity and capability to wreak havoc in Latin America—and possibly the U.S. homeland—if the Iranian leadership views this as necessary to the 

survival of its nuclear program; and, to develop and expand the ability to avoid 

international sanctions that are increasingly crippling the regime’s economic life. 

As James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence recently stated, ‘‘some 

Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have changed 

their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States 

in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime. We are also 

concerned about Iranian plotting against U.S. or allied interests overseas.’’ 4

A recent Univision documentary ‘‘La Amenaza Irani’’ (The Iranian Threat) showed 

Iranian diplomats in Mexico, working with their Venezuelan and Cuban counterparts, to try to develop the capacity to carry out a sophisticated cyber attack against 

U.S. military, nuclear, and economic targets. The documentary shows military training provided by Hezbollah to Venezuelan militias directly under the control of Chavez, with weapons and ammunition provided by the Venezuelan military. It also 

identifies by name the leaders of Hezbollah in Venezuela.5

Some of what is happening in Latin America in terms of TOC is deeply rooted 

and goes back several decades. Significant TOC organizations, principally drug trafficking groups, have posed serious challenges for U.S. security since the rise of the 

Medellin cartel in the early 1980s, the growth of the Mexican drug trafficking organizations in the 1990s, and continuing to the situation we see in Mexico and Central 

America today. 

This emerging combination of threats comprises a hybrid of criminal-terrorist, and 

state- and non-state franchises, combining multiple nations acting in concert, and 

traditional TOCs and terrorist groups acting as proxies for the nation-states that 

sponsor them. These hybrid franchises should now be viewed as a tier-one security 

threat for the United States. 

These franchises operate in, and control, specific geographic territories which enable them to function in a relatively safe environment. The franchises comprise 

16

pipelines, or recombinant chains of networks, which are highly adaptive and able 

to move a multiplicity of illicit products (cocaine, weapons, humans, bulk cash) 

which ultimately cross U.S. borders undetected thousands of times each day. The 

actors along the pipeline form and dissolve alliances quickly, occupy both physical 

and cyber space, and use both highly developed and modern institutions, including 

the global financial system, as well as ancient smuggling routes and methods. 

The threat increases dramatically with the nesting of criminal/terrorist groups 

within governments that are closely aligned ideologically, such as Iran and the 

Bolivarian states in Latin America; and, when TOC becomes an instrument of state 

power. The primary nonstate actors in this case are the Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–FARC) and 

Hezbollah; both are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations with significant involvement in TOC activities. 

These corrosive activities, taken together, are accelerating the weakening of 

states, hollowing-out of many of the first-generation democracies and their constitutional and civil society processes, and setting a predicate for a reassertion of authoritarian rule and ruin in these states and their neighbors. These states’ survival and 

growth are critical to long-term regional and U.S. security. 

Concurrently, we see the further empowerment, training, and technological support of the oppressive internal security apparatuses in the increasingly undemocratic Bolivarian states provided by the Iran-Hezbollah-ICRG/Quds forces combine. 

Other outside powers, notably China and Russia further compound these efforts. 

However Iran, Hezbollah, and the ICRG/Quds forces are the sharpest edge of this 

sword at present, and the one most openly aimed at the U.S., and least tractable 

to diplomacy. 

All of this comes at the expense of U.S. influence, security and trade—including 

energy security, and hence economic and infrastructure security (Venezuela is the 

fourth-largest supplier of U.S. petroleum imports, just behind Mexico; indeed Latin 

America is our second-largest source of petroleum imports overall, only slightly behind the Middle East). While this hearing focuses on Hezbollah, the nonstate, armed 

branch of radical Shiite Islamists, one cannot ignore the direct relationship of this 

organization to state sponsors. As the DIA noted in 2010:

The Qods Force stations operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and 

religious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often 

building on existing socio-economic ties with the well-established Shia diaspora. At the same time, it engages in paramilitary operations to support extremists and destabilize unfriendly regimes. The IRGC and Quds Force are 

behind some of the deadliest terrorist attacks of the past three decades, including the 1983 and 1984 bombings of the U.S. Embassy and annex in Beirut, the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the 1994 attack 

on the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, the 1996 Khobar 

Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and many of the insurgent attacks on coalition and Iraqi security forces in Iraq since 2003. Generally, it directs and 

supports groups actually executing the attacks, thereby maintaining plausible deniability within the international community. 

Support for these extremists takes the form of providing arms, funding, 

and paramilitary training. In this, Quds Force is not constrained by ideology; many of the groups it supports do not share, and sometimes openly 

oppose, Iranian revolutionary principles, but Iran supports them because of 

common interests or enemies. 

The Quds Force maintains operational capabilities around the world. It 

is well established in the Middle East and North Africa, and recent years 

have witnessed an increased presence in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela [author emphasis]. As U.S. involvement in global conflicts deepens, 

contact with the Quds Force, directly or through extremist groups it supports, will be more frequent and consequential.6

As the DIA notes, many groups, including the Quds Force, are no longer constrained by ideology or theology, but work with whomever they have a common, 

though perhaps temporary, common interest. This growing TOC threat in multiple 

theaters was recognized in President Obama’s recent ‘‘Strategy to Combat 

Transnational Organized Crime,’’ released in July 2011. It was the first such strategy released since the end of the Clinton administration, an indication of how other 

priorities have eclipsed TOC in recent times.7 The strategy states that TOC networks ‘‘are proliferating, striking new and powerful alliances, and engaging in a 

range of illicit activities as never before. The result is a convergence of threats that 

have evolved to become more complex, volatile and destabilizing.’’ 8

The Strategy also noted that

17

Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to crime and criminal 

networks for funding and logistics. In FY 2010, 29 of the 63 top drug trafficking organizations identified by the Department of Justice had links to 

terrorist organizations. While many terrorist links to TOC are opportunistic, this nexus is dangerous, especially if it leads a TOC network to facilitate the transfer of weapons of mass destruction material to terrorists.9

The profits of global TOC activities, even before factoring in the growing efficiencies derived from state sponsorship and protection, are enormous. The sheer 

scale of the enterprise, and the impact it has on legal economies, argues for sustained national and international attention and resources as a tier-one security 

threat. These new factors further increase the threat. 

The most recent comprehensive studies of global criminal proceeds demonstrate 

the magnitude of the challenge. The White House estimates in its 2011 ‘‘Transnational Organized Crime Strategy’’ that money laundering accounts for $1.3 trillion 

to $3.3 trillion—or between 2 percent and 5 percent of the world GDP. Bribery from 

TOCs adds close to $1 trillion to that amount, while drug trafficking generates an 

estimated $750 billion to $1 trillion, counterfeited and pirated goods add another 

$500 billion, and illicit firearms sales generate from $170 billion to $320 billion. 

This totals to potentially $6.2 trillion—fully 10 percent of world GDP—placing it behind only the U.S. and E.U., but well ahead of China, in terms of global GDP ranking.10 Other estimates of global criminal proceeds range from a low of about 4 percent to a high of 15 percent of global GDP.11

Understanding and mitigating the threat requires a whole-of-government 

approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement, policy and programming. 

No longer is the state/nonstate dichotomy viable in tackling these problems, just as 

the TOC/terrorism divide is increasingly disappearing. 

THE BOLIVARIAN AND IRANIAN REVOLUTIONS: TIES THAT BIND

Iran, identified by successive U.S. administrations as a state sponsor of terrorism, 

has expanded its political alliances, diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, and military and intelligence programs in the Bolivarian axis. 

This press for expanded ties comes despite the almost complete lack of cultural 

or religious ties to the region, linguistic affinity, or traditional economic logic and 

rationale in the relationships. The relationship, in fact, is built on a common perception of history and grievances against the United States that lead directly to the 

doctrine of asymmetrical warfare and the embrace of the concept of justified use of 

WMD against its enemies. 

The most common assumption among those who view the Iran-Bolivarian alliance 

as troublesome (and many do not view it as a significant threat at all), is that sole 

points of convergence of the radical and reactionary theocratic Iranian Government 

and the self-proclaimed socialist and progressive Bolivarian revolution are: (1) an 

overt and often stated hatred for the United States and a shared belief in how to 

destroy a common enemy; and (2) a shared acceptance of authoritarian state structures that tolerate little dissent and encroach on all aspects of a citizen’s life.12

These assumptions are true but do not recognize the broader underpinnings of the 

relationship. While Iran’s revolutionary rulers view the 1979 revolution in theological terms as a miracle of divine intervention in which the United States, the 

Great Satan, was defeated, the Bolivarians view it from a secular point of view as 

a roadmap to defeat the United State as the Evil Empire. To both it has strong political connotations and serves a model for how asymmetrical leverage, when applied 

by Allah or humans, can bring the equivalent of David defeating Goliath on the 

world stage. 

Ortega has declared the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions ‘‘twin revolutions, 

with the same objectives of justice, liberty, sovereignty, and peace . . . despite the 

aggressions of the imperialist policies.’’ Ahmadinejad couched the alliances as part 

of ‘‘a large anti-imperialist movement that has emerged in the region.’’

Among the first to articulate the possible merging of radical Shite Islamic thought 

with Marxist aspirations of destroying capitalism and U.S. hegemony was Illich 

Sanchez Ramirez, better known as the terrorist leader ‘‘Carlos the Jackal,’’ a Venezuelan citizen who was, until his arrest in 1994, one of the world’s most wanted 

terrorists. 

In his writings Sanchez Ramirez espouses Marxism tied to revolutionary, violent 

Palestinian uprisings, and, in the early 2000s after becoming a Muslim, militant 

Islamism. Yet he did not abandon his Marxist roots, believing that Islamism and 

Marxism combined would form a global ‘‘anti-imperialist’’ front that would definitively destroy the United States, globalization, and imperialism. 

18

In his seminal 2003 book ‘‘Revolutionary Islam,’’ written from prison where he is 

serving a life sentence for killing two French policemen, Sanchez Ramirez praises 

Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks on the United States as a ‘‘lofty feat of arms’’ 

and part of a justified ‘‘armed struggle’’ of Islam against the West. ‘‘From now on 

terrorism is going to be more or less a daily part of the landscape of your rotting 

democracies,’’ he writes.13

In this context, the repeated, public praise of Chavez for Sanchez Ramirez can be 

seen as a crucial element of the Bolivarian ideology and an acceptance of his underlying premise as important to Chavez’s ideological framework. Chavez ordered his 

ambassador to France to seek the release of Sanchez Ramirez and on multiple occasions referred to the convicted terrorist as a ‘‘friend’’ and ‘‘true revolutionary.’’ 14 In 

a 1999 letter to Sanchez Ramirez, Chavez greeted the terrorist as a ‘‘Distinguished 

Compatriot’’ and wrote that

Swimming in the depths of your letter of solidarity I could hear the pulse 

of our shared insight that everything has its due time: time to pile up 

stones or hurl them, to ignite revolution or to ignore it; to pursue dialectically a unity between our warring classes or to stir the conflict between 

them—a time when you can fight outright for principles and a time when 

you must choose the proper fight, lying in wait with a keen sense for the 

moment of truth, in the same way that Ariadne, invested with these same 

principles, lays the thread that leads her out of the labyrinth. . . . 

I feel that my spirit’s own strength will always rise to the magnitude of 

the dangers that threaten it. My doctor has told me that my spirit must 

nourish itself on danger to preserve my sanity, in the manner that God intended, with this stormy revolution to guide me in my great destiny. 

With profound faith in our cause and our mission, now and forever! 15

In fact, the Bolivarian fascination with militant Islamist thought and Marxism 

did not end with the friendship between Chavez and the jailed terrorist. Acolytes 

of Sanchez Ramirez continued to develop his ideology of Marxism and radical 

Islamism rooted in the Iranian revolution. 

The emerging military doctrine of the ‘‘Bolivarian Revolution,’’ officially adopted 

in Venezuela and rapidly spreading to Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador, explicitly 

embraces the radical Islamist model of asymmetrical or ‘‘fourth generation warfare,’’ 

and its heavy reliance on suicide bombings and different types of terrorism, including the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD. This is occurring at a time when 

Hezballah’s presence in Latin America is growing and becoming more identifiable.16

Chavez has adopted as his military doctrine the concepts and strategies articulated in ‘‘Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of 

Asymmetrical Warfare’’ (Guerra Periferica y el Islam Revolucionario: Origenes, 

Reglas y Etica de la Guerra Asimetrica), by the Spanish politician and ideologue 

Jorge Verstrynge.17 The tract is a continuation of and exploration of Sanchez Ramirez’s thoughts, incorporating an explicit endorsement of the use of weapons of mass 

destruction to destroy the United States. Verstrynge argues for the destruction of 

United States through series of asymmetrical attacks like those of 9/11, in the belief 

that the United States will simply crumble when its vast military strength cannot 

be used to combat its enemies. 

Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not written directly in relation 

to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge moves beyond Sanchez Ramirez to embrace all strands of radical Islam for helping to expand the parameters of what 

irregular warfare should encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear 

weapons, along with the correlated civilian casualties among the enemy. 

Central to Verstrynge’s idealized view of terrorists is the belief in the sacredness 

of the willingness of the fighters to sacrifice their lives in pursuit of their goals. 

Before writing extensively on how to make chemical weapons and listing helpful 

places to find information on the manufacture of rudimentary nuclear bombs that 

‘‘someone with a high school education could make,’’ Verstrynge writes:

19

We already know it is incorrect to limit asymmetrical warfare to guerrilla 

warfare, although it is important. However, it is not a mistake to also use 

things that are classified as terrorism and use them in asymmetrical 

warfare. And we have super terrorism, divided into chemical terrorism, bioterrorism (which uses biological and bacteriological methods), and nuclear 


farah4.eps
20

terrorism, which means ‘‘the type of terrorism uses the threat of nuclear attack to achieve its goals.’’ 18

In a December 12, 2008, interview with Venezuelan state television, Verstrynge 

lauded Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda for creating a new type of warfare that is 

‘‘de-territorialized, de-stateized and de-nationalized,’’ a war where suicide bombers 

act as ‘‘atomic bombs for the poor.’’ 19 In his interview with Univision, Verstrynge 

said his model was specifically modeled on Hezbollah. 

Chavez liked the Verstrynge book so well that he had a special pocket-sized edition printed and distributed to the officer corps with express orders that it be read 

cover to cover. It has since been adopted as official Venezuelan military doctrine. 

Even more worrisome, copies of the book have been found over the past year, for 

the first time, in FARC camps in Colombia, indicating the doctrine is being passed 

on to Venezuela’s nonstate proxy. 

According to Colombian military sources the new FARC leadership is more open 

to a tactical alliance with radical Islamist groups.20 Given the FARC’s longstanding 

desire and capacity to build alliances, and exchange technologies and lessons 

learned with other terrorist and criminal groups (ETA of Spain, Irish Republican 

Army, the Sinaloa cartel of Mexico),21 one can assume the group is open to an alliance with Hezbollah and other radical Islamist organizations. 

To further ingrain this teaching, and explicitly to eradicate any vestiges of U.S. 

military doctrine in the region, Chavez and other Bolivarian leaders, in conjunction 

with Iran, have recently opened a new military academy to teach Bolivarian military doctrine, operating in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. The ALBA Defense School is going 

to teach the ‘‘beautiful projects and experiences that unite our military,’’ said Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela’s Foreign Minister. This includes, he said, the doctrines of 

Jose Marti, the hero of Cuban independence; Simon Bolivar, the hero of South 

American independence; Eloy Alfaro, an Ecuadoran revolutionary; Augusto Cesar 

Sandino, a Nicaraguan revolutionary.22

Bolivian President Morales at the inauguration of the facility said the School 

would prepare the peoples of the region to defend against ‘‘imperialist threats, 

which seek to divide us.’’ He said that the ‘‘Peoples of the ALBA are being besieged, 

sanctioned, and punished by the imperial arrogance just because we are exerting 

the right of being decent and sovereign.’’ He added that, ‘‘We must not allow that 

the history of colonization repeats and that our resources are the loot of the empire.’’ 

An official Bolivarian Web site report on the inauguration stated that

Facing this aggressive power (the United States) the countries and peoples of the region have no choice but to seek ways to defend themselves. 

The just struggles of the Latin American peoples for independence, freedom, 

and social progress deserve the support of everyone.23


farah5.eps
21

Iran’s interest in the project was made clear when Iranian Defense Minister, 

Ahmad Vahidi, arrived in Bolivia for the school’s inauguration, despite having an 

Interpol Red Notice issued for his arrest for his alleged participation in the 1994 

AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires. His public appearance at a military ceremony the 

day before the school’s inauguration set off an international scandal and sharp protests from Argentina, which had asked Interpol to emit the Red Notice. Vahidi 

quietly slipped out of the Bolivia.24

This ideological framework of Marxism and radical Islamic methodology for successfully attacking the United States is an important, though little examined, underpinning for the greatly enhanced relationships among the Bolivarian states and 

Iran. These relationships are being expanded and absorb significant resources 

despite the fact that there is little economic rationale to the ties and little in terms 

of legitimate commerce. 

For Iran, however, the benefits are numerous, particularly in building alliances 

with nations to break its international isolation. It also affords Iran the opportunity 

to mine strategic minerals for its missile and nuclear programs, position Quds Force 

and Revolutionary Guard operatives under diplomatic cover, greatly expand and enhance its intelligence gathering, and operate state-to-state enterprises that allow for 

the movement of just about any type of goods and material. 

One glimpse at the type of shipments such a relationship can be used for came 

to light in 2009, when Turkish authorities randomly inspected some crates being 

shipped from Iran to Venezuela at the port of Mersin. The 22 crates were labeled 

‘‘tractor parts’’ but in fact carried equipment for manufacturing explosives.25

One need only look at how rapidly Iran has greatly increased its diplomatic, economic, and intelligence presence in Latin America to see the priority it places on 

this emerging axis—given that it is an area where it has virtually no trade, no historic or cultural ties and no obvious strategic interests. The gains, in financial institutions, bilateral trade agreements and state visits (nine state visits between Chavez and Ahmadinejad alone since 2006), are almost entirely within the Bolivarian 

orbit and, as noted, the Bolivarian states have jointly declared their intention to 

help Iran break international sanctions. 

Iran is also spending scarce resources on expanding its cultural influence. Part 

of the effort through a strong Spanish language, Latin American-based Internet 

presence, with Web sites in most countries. The sites generally laud Hezbollah, offer 


farah6.eps
22

the teachings of Iran’s revolutionary leaders, extol the peaceful nature of its nuclear 

program, as well as offer Spanish language literature on Shia Islam.26 What is of 

particular concern is that many of the bilateral and multilateral agreements signed 

between Iran and Bolivarian nations, such as the creation of a dedicated shipping 

line between Iran and Ecuador, or the deposit of $120 million by an internationally 

sanctioned Iranian bank into the Central Bank of Ecuador, obey no economic rationale.27

The most recent salvo by Iran is the launching of a Spanish language satellite 

TV station, Hispan TV, aimed at Latin America. Bolivia and Venezuela are collaborating in producing documentaries for the station. Mohammed Sarafraz, deputy 

director of international affairs, said Iran was ‘‘launching a channel to act as a 

bridge between Iran and the countries of Latin America was a need to help familiarize Spanish-speaking citizens with the Iranian nation.’’

He said that Hispan TV was launched with the aim of reinforcing cultural ties 

with the Spanish-speaking nations and helping to introduce the traditions, customs, 

and beliefs of the Iranian people. Attempting to show the similarities between Islam 

and Christianity the first program broadcast was ‘‘Saint Mary,’’ depicting ‘‘the life 

of Saint Mary and the birth of Jesus Christ from an Islamic point of view.’’ 28

There is growing evidence of the merging of the Bolivarian Revolution’s criminalterrorist pipeline activities and those of the criminal-terrorist pipeline of radical 

Islamist groups (Hezbollah in particular) supported by the Iranian regime. The possibility opens a series of new security challenges for the United States and its allies 

in Latin America. The 1994 Hezbollah and Iranian bombing of the AMIA building 

in Buenos Aires, Argentina, is a useful reminder that these groups can and do operate in Latin America. 

As noted above, Operation Titan provides clear evidence of the merging relationship among drug trafficking organizations with strong ties to the FARC and purchasers and money launderers with close ties to Hezbollah. 

A clear example of the breadth of the emerging alliances among criminal and terrorist groups was Operation Titan, begun by Colombian and U.S. officials in 2006 

and still ongoing. Colombian and U.S. officials, after a 2-year investigation, dismantled a drug trafficking organization that stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, West Africa, the United States, Europe and the Middle East. 

Colombian and U.S. officials say that one of the key money launderers in the 

structure, Chekry Harb, AKA ‘‘Taliban’’ acted as the central go-between among 

Latin American DTOs and Middle Eastern radical groups, primarily Hezbollah. 

Among the groups participating together in Harb’s operation in Colombia were 

members of the Northern Valley Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups and the 

FARC. 

This mixture of enemies and competitors working through a shared facilitator, or 

in loose alliance for mutual benefit, is a pattern that is becoming more common, and 

one that significantly complicates the ability of law enforcement and intelligence 

operatives to combat these groups.29

A more recent example was the alleged October 2011 plot by elements of the Quds 

Force, the elite arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, to hire a hit man 

from a Mexican cartel to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in the United States. 

The plot could be the first time members of an official Iranian institution, albeit a 

secretive one long known to support terrorist activities, dealt directly with a Mexican cartel to carry out an attack in the United States.30

While there has been little public acknowledgement of the Hezbollah ties to Latin 

American TOC groups, recent indictments based on DEA cases point to the growing 

overlap of the groups. In December 2011, U.S. officials charged Ayman Joumaa, an 

accused Lebanese drug kingpin and Hezbollah financier, of smuggling tons of U.S.-

bound cocaine and laundering hundreds of millions of dollars with the Zetas cartel 

of Mexico, while operating in Panama, Colombia, the DRC and elsewhere. 

‘‘Ayman Joumaa is one of top guys in the world at what he does: international 

drug trafficking and money laundering,’’ a U.S. antidrug official said. ‘‘He has interaction with Hezbollah. There’s no indication that it’s ideological. It’s business.’’ 31

Other cases include:

• In 2008, OFAC designated senior Venezuelan diplomats for facilitating the 

funding of Hezbollah. 

One of those designated, Ghazi Nasr al Din, served as the charge ́ d’affaires 

of the Venezuelan Embassy in Damascus, and then served in the Venezuelan 

Embassy in London. According to the OFAC statement in late January 2008, 

al Din facilitated the travel of two Hezbollah representatives of the Lebanese 

Parliament to solicit donations and announce the opening of a Hezbollah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela. The second individual, Fawzi 

Kan’an, is described as a Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter and a ‘‘signifiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:28 May 08, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2012IS~1\021612-B.TXT BETTY
23

cant provider of financial support to Hezbollah.’’ He met with senior Hezbollah 

officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, including possible 

kidnappings and terrorist attacks.32

• In April 2009, police in the island country of Curacao arrested 17 people for alleged involvement in cocaine trafficking with some of the proceeds being funneled through Middle Eastern banks to Hezbollah.33

• A July 6, 2009, indictment of Jamal Yousef in the U.S. Southern District of New 

York alleges that the defendant, a former Syrian military officer arrested in 

Honduras, sought to sell weapons to the FARC—weapons he claimed came from 

Hezbollah and were to be provided by a relative in Mexico.34

Such a relationship between nonstate and state actors provides numerous benefits 

to both. In Latin America, for example, the FARC gains access to Venezuelan territory without fear of reprisals; it gains access to Venezuelan identification documents; and, perhaps most importantly, access to routes for exporting cocaine to 

Europe and the United States—while using the same routes to import quantities of 

sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. In return, the Chavez government offers state protection, and reaps rewards in the form of financial benefits 

for individuals as well as institutions, derived from the cocaine trade. 

Iran, whose banks, including its central bank, are largely barred from the Western financial systems, benefits from access to the international financial market 

through Venezuelan, Ecuadoran, and Bolivian financial institutions, which act as 

proxies by moving Iranian money as if it originated in their own, unsanctioned 

financial systems.35 Venezuela also agreed to provide Iran with 20,000 barrels of 

gasoline per day, leading to U.S. sanctions against the state petroleum company.36

In addition, Chavez maintains his revolutionary credentials in the radical axis 

comprised of leftist populists and Islamic fundamentalists, primarily Iran. As a head 

of state, he is able to introduce external (nonregional) actors into the region for a 

variety of purposes, some of which directly benefit nonstate actors. 

Iran is not the only extra-territorial actor that Chavez has courted and whose interests diverge notably from U.S. interests. Of primary concern are Russia and 

China, with Russia acting in a dual capacity as weapons facilitator and the provider 

of choice for nuclear development in conjunction with Iran. China has served as 

both a market for goods from all of Latin America, as well as provider of billions 

of dollars in investments, loans, military sales, and advanced satellite services. 

In late September 2008, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of Russia and Chavez announced joint plans to build nuclear plants in Venezuela. Atomstroyexport—the 

same company building the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran—will be the 

project operator.37 In September 2009, Chavez announced that Venezuela and Iran 

would jointly build a ‘‘nuclear village’’ in Venezuela and pursue nuclear technology 

together.38 Ecuador and Russia also inked an agreement on civilian nuclear power 

cooperation and uranium exploration,39 and Russia has offered similar assistance to 

Bolivia. In 2009, Ecuador and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding to 

carry out joint mining activities and geological mapping.40

None of these agreements violate international sanctions, but the constellation of 

actors and the fervor with which the agreements have been embraced raise many 

questions. Given the opaque nature of the agreements, and the history of some of 

the principals involved in supporting the use of WMD to annihilate states viewed 

as the enemy (Israel and the United States), and flaunting international regulatory 

regimes, it is both reasonable and prudent to approach these developments warily. 

MAJOR FINDINGS

The assumptions and framework presented above were arrived at through IASC 

research in the region. The following summary was first prepared for the Department of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency ‘s (DTRA) Advanced Concepts 

office, which released this UNCLASSIFIED summary.41

The level of concern for WMD proliferation issues in this context has risen over 

time, in part because it has become increasingly clear that many of the Iranian instruments used in the region are closely linked to its ongoing and systematic efforts 

to acquire banned nuclear material and have already been identified and sanctioned 

as part of Iran’s proliferation efforts.

(1) Iran and its Bolivarian allies (Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador) in 

Latin America are systematically engaged in a pattern of financial behavior, recruitment exercises and business activities that are not economically rational and could 

be used for the movement and/or production of WMD and the furthering of Iran’s 

stated aim of avoiding international sanctions on its nuclear program. As shown 

below, those Iranian financial institutions engaged in the region have been designated by the United States and/or the United Nations for their participation in 

24

Iran’s proliferation efforts or to support Hezbollah and other designated terrorist 

entities. These actions include:

i. Significant investments in financial institutions in the region that can easily be used to move money from Iran into the world financial sector through 

the use of banks and joint investment corporations. The financial institutions 

being used enjoy special protection from the states in which they operate and 

have no oversight from banking commissions, the congressional branch, or the 

public. 

ii. Among the most important are: the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo 

(BID) in Venezuela, a wholly owned Iranian bank operating in Venezuela 

which, after several years of operation, was formally sanctioned by the U.S. 

Treasury Department but continues to operate; The Economic Development 

Bank of Iran (EDBI), under U.S. sanction for working its role in helping Iran 

evade nuclear sanctions and one of the main Iranian owners of BID. EDBI 

signed agreements with the Central Bank of Ecuador (2008) and the Central 

Bank of Bolivia (2009) to finance the purchase of Iranian goods (including helicopters and military materiel in the case of Bolivia). 

iii. According to internal documents obtained in Venezuela, the BID’s profits 

have plummeted 96 percent in early 2010, perhaps an indication that U.S. sanctions are having an impact. It maintains only one office in Venezuela (8th Floor, 

Edificio Dozsa, Avenida Francisco de Miranda, El Rosal, Caracas, telephone +58 

212 952 65 62). It still offers a wide variety of banking services, including international transfers, investment advising, automobile loans and others. The board 

of directors is composed of seven Iranian nationals, while the legal representative is a Venezuelan (identities available from author). It remains exempt from 

taxes and is, at least on paper, one of the smallest banks in the country, with 

one office, 14 employees, and 313 depositors. Most of its loans are given to Iranian citizens living in Venezuela. However, it does not appear that BID has 

been completely shut out of the international banking system.

According to local banking industry sources, BID operates correspondent accounts 

through another government bank, BANDES, which is unsanctioned. This allows 

BID to move money as if it were of Venezuelan rather than Iranian in origin or from 

BID.


farah7.eps
25

iv. Perhaps replacing BID as a major financial vehicle for Iran is the Fondo 

Binacional Venezuela-Iran (FBVI), established in May 2008 with an initial capital of $1.2 billion. Each country provided half of the initial capital. This institution is directly managed by Ricardo Menendez, the Minister of Science, Technology and Industry, which is responsible for Venezuela’s nascent nuclear 

program. It is an especially opaque institution, and none of its expenditures 

pass through the National Assembly or any other outside body for approval or 

auditing. 

v. The FBVI is only one of a host of para-state institutions the Chavez government has set up that are accountable only to the executive. Others include 

FONDEN, FONDESPA, El Fondo Chino (Chinese Fund), the Belarus Fund and 

others. Among these, FONDEN (Fondo de Desarrollo Nacional or National 

Development Fund) is by far the most important because it receives direct funding injects from the state petroleum company. So far in 2010 government figures show FONDEN received $15 billion in money that does not officially form 

part of the state coffers. Since 2005 an estimated $63 billion has been put into 

the fund, and then virtually disappeared from all public accounting. 

vi. Playing a crucial role in Iran’s economic activity in the region is the Economic Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), an Iranian financial institution designated by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control as 

part of Iran’s illegal nuclear proliferation network. The designation states that: 

‘‘EDBI provides financial services to multiple MODAFL-subordinate entities 

that permit these entities to advance Iran’s WMD programs. Furthermore, the 

EDBI has facilitated the ongoing procurement activities of various front companies associated with MODAFL-subordinate entities. Since the United States and 

United Nations designated Bank Sepah in early 2007, the EDBI has served as 

one of the leading intermediaries handling Bank Sepah’s financing, including 

WMD-related payments. In addition to handling business for Bank Sepah, the 

EDBI has facilitated financing for other proliferation-related entities sanctioned 

under U.S. and U.N. authorities.’’ 42

The BID is reportedly a Venezuelan bank, which the EDBI would have no influence over. In fact, BID, sanctioned by OFAC at the same time as the EDBI, 

and is wholly owned by Bank Saderat, an Iranian bank under U.S. and U.N. 

sanction. The BID was sanctioned because it was deemed by the Treasury 

Department to be acting on behalf of EDBI. According to an OFAC statement: 

‘‘Bank Saderat has been a significant facilitator of Hizballah’s financial activities and has served as a conduit between the Government of Iran and 

Hizballah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General 

Command, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 

‘‘Another primary banking relationship is between the Export Development 

Bank of Iran (EDBI) and the Central Bank of Ecuador, according to an agreement signed in November 2008 but not made public until almost a year 

later.’’ 43

The heart of the deal is for EDBI to deposit some $120 million in Ecuador’s 

state bank, to be used to foment export and import activity between the two 

countries.44 This sum seems unusually high for legitimate commercial activity 

since total trade between the two nations has never exceeded $2.3 million, a 

sum reached in 2003. In 2006 and 2007 Ecuador registered zero exports to Iran 

and imports of $27,000 and $16,000 in those years.45

There is a significant part of the agreement that demonstrates how interlinked 

these banking institutions (EDBI and BID) are, despite Venezuela’s public denial of 

any linkages. Point 6 of the ‘‘Protocol of Cooperation’’ between the Central Bank of 

Ecuador and EDBI,‘‘EDBI manifests its readiness to establish a branch of Banco 

Internacional de Desarrollo (BID) in the Republic of Ecuador.’’ 46

The BID is reportedly a Venezuelan bank, which the EDBI would have no influence over, including where it opened branches. In fact, EDBI can open branches of 

BID as part of EDBI. 

Despite later assurances by the Ecuadoran Government to the U.S. Embassy in 

Quito that the deal was not consummated, and that a branch of BID was not 

opened, at least not publicly, Ecuadoran banking sources say that Iran is, in fact, 

using the Ecuadoran Central Bank to hold Iranian Government funds.

(2) Iran has sought to establish independent binational agreements in Ecuador 

and Venezuela to establish joint shipping lines to these countries. The primary company that is used is Sadra Iran Marine Industrial Company, which is majority 

owned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Khatam al-Anbia force.47 It is 

part of the IRGC’s shipping conglomerate, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 

26

Lines (IRISL), a entity, along with all its constantly shifting components, that have 

been designated by OFAC for aiding Iran’s missile and nuclear programs. 

As Stuart Levey, the Treasury Department’s Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence said: ‘‘Iran has consistently used its national maritime carrier, 

the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), to advance its missile programs 

and to carry other military cargoes. Some shipments have been stopped, and were 

clear violations of Security Council resolutions—including arms shipments believed 

to have been destined for Syria, for transfer to Hezbollah.’’ Levey stated that the 

sanctioning of IRISL was to ‘‘sharpen the focus on another sector that is a critical 

lifeline for Iran’s proliferation and evasion: shipping. Some of Iran’s most dangerous 

cargo continues to come and go from Iran’s ports, so we must redouble our vigilance 

over both their domestic shipping lines, and attempts to use third-country shippers 

and freight forwarders for illicit cargo.’’48

The importance of the shipping lines may have grown since the weekly flights between Caracas and Tehran appear to have been cancelled. The reasons for the cancellation were not clear, but it removes another state-protected method for moving 

significant amounts of resources between the two countries. 

Despite this work by Treasury there is very little reporting on Iran’s shipping 

activities in Latin America, despite the fact that Iran makes little effort to hide its 

actions (see picture below, taken at a public Iran-Venezuela trade exposition in 

Caracas). This area is of particular concern because of the increased reports of 

Iran’s increased interest in mining strategic minerals in the Boliviarian states, particularly minerals that can be used in missile programs and nuclear fusion facilities. 

Given the state-to-state nature of the shipping lanes, the cargo on the ships moving to and from Iran can be used to move virtually anything either state wants to 

move, as there will be no Customs checks and no need to declare the contents of 

the shipping containers. Unlike illicit or contraband activity outside of state control, 

where the state may actually be interested in hindering the process, movements 

under state control can easily be used to further the movement of sensitive, 

undeclared goods. 

Iran’s efforts to establish dedicated shipping lines with individual countries, such 

as Ecuador,49 where there is virtually no commerce and certainly not enough to sustain a shipping line, raises serious questions in light of Levey’s statements. Given 

Iran’s already demonstrated capacity and capability to move materiel banned by 

international sanctions, this LOE by Iran should be of significant concern.

27

(3) Iran appears to be engaged extensively in increasing mining activities in Latin 

America of minerals that have WMD and/or weapons uses. These include tantalum 

(Bolivia) and thorianite (Guyana-Brazil-Suriname). Thorianite, a radioactive rare 

earth mineral with nuclear applications as part of the thorium group, is being 

mined in an area where gold is traditionally mined, but the increasing number of 

Iranians in the region and a sharp increase in requests for gold mining permits has 

brought some notice to the new mining. Tantalum is used in highly heat resistant 

alloys and high-powered electronic resistors. These are minerals that are found elsewhere, but seem to be being acquired in Latin America, perhaps in order to avoid 

scrutiny


farah8.eps
28

(4) The Bolivarian states appear to be laying the groundwork for public (internal 

and international) acceptance of the acquisition of nuclear power, always carefully 

couched as for peaceful uses. This seems to be aimed at developing a political acceptance for the unusual activities, if they become too big to remain clandestine, as 

part of a normal development of bilateral and multilateral relations. 

Bolivian President Evo Morales visited Tehran shortly after Venezuelan President 

Chavez visited Iran and several other staunchly anti-U.S. countries, including Syria. 

Both publicly declared their intentions to acquire, in the shortest time possible, nuclear capabilities. This bodes ill for the region, particularly given Iran’s ability to 

keep international inspectors at bay for many years. While much of the current talk 

may be bluster, it also signals the clear intention of these groups to work with rogue 

nations to acquire nuclear capacity. 

CONCLUSION

Iran and its proxy force Hezbollah are engaging in a widespread and multifaceted 

effort to expand their influence along with their intelligence capabilities, military capacities, and sanction-evasion methods. In this effort they are allied with the 

Boliviarian states of Latin America led by Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, and his proxy 

force, the FARC. Both Hezbollah and the FARC, as designated terrorist entities that 

engage in extensive TOC activities, are instruments of statecraft. 

This alliance of state and nonstate actors, engaged in terrorism and TOC, has an 

expressed doctrine of asymmetric warfare that endorses the use of WMD against the 

United States, viewed by both blocs as the primary enemy. Iran has taken concrete 

steps to enhance its ability evade international financial sanctions through numerous financial institutions acting on its behalf in the Bolivarian states. It also engages in extensive purchases of dual use equipment and other purchases through 

the Bolivarian states and Panama. All of Iran’s activities in the region, and the activities of the Bolivarian nations to help, are designed to be as opaque as possible 

and all oversight and accountability. Such basic data as the number of accredited 

diplomats Iran has in the Bolivarian countries are not obtainable by the Congresses 

of those nations. 

Given the nature of the actors, the deliberate opaqueness of the activities and 

public articulation of a military doctrine to strike the United States, one can only 

conclude that Iran’s aims and intentions are hostile and that the Bolivarian states 

are aiding and abetting Iran in these efforts despite clear violations of international 

sanctions regimes and clear ties to TOC activities.

————————

End Notes

1The self-proclaimed ‘‘Bolivarian’’ states (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua) take 

their name for Simon Bolivar, the revered 19th century leader of South American independence 

from Spain. They espouse 21st century socialism, a vague notion that is deeply hostile to free 

market reforms, to the United States as an ‘‘imperial power,’’ and toward traditional liberal 

democratic concepts, as will be described in detail. 2These include recently founded Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 

(Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribenos-CELAC), and the Bolivarian Alliance for 

the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America-ALBA). 

The military school in Warnes, in the department of Santa Cruz, is called the Escuela de 

Defensa de la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (Defense School for the 

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America. 3 ‘‘Venezuela/Iran ALBA Resolved to Continue Economic Ties With Iran,’’ Financial Times Information Service, July 15, 2010. 4 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, ‘‘Unclassified Statement for the Record: 

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 2012, p. 6. 5 Univision, ‘‘La Amenaza Irani,’’ aired December 8, 2011. 

6Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘‘Iran’s Military 

Power,’’ Statement before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 14, 

2010. 7 National Security Council, ‘‘Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing 

Converging Threats to National Security,’’ Office of the President, July 2011. The Strategy grew 

out of a National Intelligence Estimate initiated by the Bush administration and completed in 

December 2008, and is a comprehensive government review of transnational organized crime, 

the first since 1995. 8 ‘‘Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,’’ Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, July 25, 2011. 9 ‘‘Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,’’ Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, July 25, 2011. 10 ‘‘Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,’’ op. cit. 11On the lower end, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime estimate TOC earnings 

for 2009 at $2.1 trillion, or 3.6 percent of global GDP. Of that, typical TOC activities such as 

29

drug trafficking, counterfeiting, human trafficking, weapons trafficking and oil smuggling, account for about $1 trillion or 1.5 percent of global GDP. For details see: ‘‘Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other Transnational Organized Crimes,’’ 

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, September 2011. On the higher end, in a speech 

to Interpol in Singapore 2009, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Ogden cited 15 percent of world 

GDP as total annual turnover of transnational organized crime. See: Josh Meyer, ‘‘U.S. attorney 

general calls for global effort to fight organized crime,’’ Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2009, 

accessed at: http://articles.latimes.com/print/2009/oct/13/nation/na-crime13. 12For a more detailed look at this debate see: ‘‘Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of 

Annoyance?,’’ op cit., in which the author has a chapter arguing for the view that Iran is a significant threat. 13 ‘‘ ‘Jackal’ book praises bin Laden,’’ BBC News, June 26, 2003. 14See, for example: Associated Press, ‘‘Chavez: ‘Carlos the Jackal’ a ‘Good Friend’ ’’ June 3, 

2006. 15Paul Reyes (translator) and Hugo Chavez, ‘‘My Struggle,’’ from a March 23, 1999, letter to 

Illich Ramirez Sanchez, the Venezuelan terrorist known as ‘Carlos the Jackal,’ from Venezuelan 

President Hugo Chavez, in response to a previous letter from Ramirez, who is serving a life sentence in France for murder. Harper’s, October 1999, http://harpers.org/archive/1999/10/0060674. 16 In addition to Operation Titan there have been numerous incidents in the past 18 months 

of operatives being directly linked to Hezbollah have been identified or arrested in Venezuela, 

Colombia, Guatemala, Aruba, and elsewhere in Latin America. 17 Verstrynge, born in Morocco to Belgian and Spanish parents, began his political career on 

the far right of the Spanish political spectrum as a disciple of Manuel Fraga, and served as a 

national and several senior party posts with the Alianza Popular. By his own admission he then 

migrated to the Socialist Party, but never rose through the ranks. He is widely associated with 

radical antiglobalization views and anti-U.S. rhetoric, repeatedly stating that the United States 

is creating a new global empire and must be defeated. Although he has no military training 

or experience, he has written extensively on asymmetrical warfare. 18 Verstrynge, op cit., pp. 56–57. 19 Bartolome, op cit. See also: John Sweeny, ‘‘Jorge Verstrynge: The Guru of Bolivarian Asymmetric Warfare,’’ www.vcrisis.com, Sept. 9, 2005; and ‘‘Troops Get Provocative Book,’’ Miami 

Herald, November. 11, 2005. 20Farah interviews with senior Colombian officials and recent FARC deserters. 21Douglas Farah, ‘‘The FARC’s International Relations: A Network of Deception,’’ NEFA 

Foundation, September. 22, 2008. 22 Juan Pauliler, ‘‘Que busca la academia military del ALBA?’’ BBC Spanish Service, June 15, 

2011. 23 ‘‘ALBA School of Defense and Sovereignty Opens,’’ Anti-Imperialist News Service, June 14, 

2011. Accessed at: http://www.anti-imperialist.org/alba-school-of-defense-opensl6. 24 Robin Yapp, ‘‘Iran Defense Minister Forced To Leave Bolivia Over 1994 Argentina Bombing,’’ The Telegraph (London), June 1, 2011. 25 ‘‘Turkey holds suspicious Iran-Venezuela shipment,’’ Associated Press, June 1, 2009. http:/

/www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3651706,00.html. 26For a fuller examination of the use of Web sites, see: Douglas Farah, ‘‘Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish-Speaking Latin America,’’ Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 

Florida International University, September 2011. 27For a more complete look at Iran’s presence in Latin America, see: Douglas Farah, ‘‘Iran 

in Latin America: An Overview,’’ Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Summer 

2009 (to be published as a chapter in: ‘‘Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance?’’, 

edited by Cynthia J. Arnson, et al. 2010. For a look at the anomalies in the economic relations, 

see also Farah and Simpson, op. cit. 28Tehran Times, ‘‘Hispan TV begins with ‘Saint Mary,’ ’’ December 23, 2011, accessed at: 

http://www.tehrantimes.com/arts-and-culture/93793-hispan-tv-begins-with-saint-mary. 29While much of Operation remains classified, there has been significant open source reporting, in part because the Colombian Government announced the most important arrests. For the 

most complete look at the case see: Jo Becker, ‘‘Investigation Into Bank Reveals Links to Major 

South American Cartels,’’ International Herald Tribune, December 15, 2011. See also: Chris 

Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, ‘‘Colombian Cocaine Ring Linked to Hezbollah,’’ Los Angeles 

Times, October 22, 2008; and ‘‘Por Lavar Activos de Narcos y Paramilitares, Capturados 

Integrantes de Organizacion Internatcional,’’ Fiscalia General de la Republica (Colombia), October 21, 2008. 30 Evan Perez, ‘‘U.S. Accuses Iran in Plot: Two Charged in Alleged Conspiracy to Enlist Drug 

Cartel to Kill Saudi Ambassador,’’ Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2011. 31Sebastian Rotella, ‘‘Government Says Hezbollah Profits From U.S. Cocaine Market Via Link 

to Mexican Cartel,’’ ProPublica, December 11, 2011. 32 ‘‘Treasury Targets Hizbullah in Venezuela,’’ United States Department of Treasury Press 

Center, June 18, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1036.aspx. 33Orlando Cuales, ‘‘17 Arrested in Curacao on Suspicion of Drug Trafficking Links With 

Hezbollah,’’ Associated Press, April 29, 2009 34 United States District Court, Southern District of New York, The United States of America

v Jamal Yousef, Indictment, July 6, 2009. 35For a look at how the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan banks function as proxies for Iran, particularly the Economic Development Bank of Iran, sanctioned for its illegal support of Iran’s nuclear program, and the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, see: Farah and Simpson, op cit. 36Office of the Spokesman, ‘‘Seven Companies Sanctioned Under Amended Iran Sanctions 

Act,’’ U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/

164132.htm. 

30

37 Russia Izvestia Information, September 30, 2008, and Agence France Presse, ‘‘Venezuela 

Wants to Work With Russia on Nuclear Energy: Chavez,’’ Sept. 29, 2008. 38Simon Romero, ‘‘Venezuela Says Iran is Helping it Look for Uranium,’’ New York Times, 

September 25, 2009. 39 Nikolai Spassky, ‘‘Russia, Ecuador strike deal on nuclear power cooperation,’’ RIA Novosti, 

August 21, 2009. 40 Jose R. Cardenas, ‘‘Iran’s Man in Ecuador,’’ Foreign Policy, February 15, 2011, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/15/iranslmanlinlecuador. 41Douglas Farah, ‘‘Iran and Latin America: Strategic Security Issues,’’ Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Concepts Office, May 2011. 42 United States Department of Treasury, ‘‘Export Development Bank of Iran Designated as 

a Proliferator,’’ Press office of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, October 22, 2008. 43 Copies of the agreement described here were presented to ASCO in the October update 

briefing. 44 ‘‘Banco Irani Que Despierta Dudas se Asocia con el Central,’’ Hoy (Ecuador), September 7, 

2009. 45Montufar, op cit. 46Document in possession of the author. 47 Ardalan Sayami, ‘‘1388: Year of Militarization of Iran’s Economy,’’ Rooz Online, March 23, 

2010, accessed at: http://www.payvand.com/news/10/mar/1213.html. 48Stuart Levey, ‘‘Iran’s New Deceptions at Sea Must be Punished,’’ Financial Times, August 

16, 2010. 49On December 7, 2008, Ecuador’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, Maria Isabel 

Salvador, and her Iranian counterpart, Masoud Mir Kazem, signed a ‘‘Memorandum of Understanding For the Study of a Maritime Shipping Line’’ between the two countries. A copy of the 

MOU is attached.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Noriega. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. NORIEGA, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

AFFAIRS, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE ORGANIZATION OF 

AMERICAN STATES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning. I applaud you and Senator Rubio for initiating 

this review of Iran’s growing shadow in Latin America. 

You made reference to General Clapper’s very startling statement that Iranian officials at the highest levels are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States. General Clapper’s 

statement represents a significant break with the skeptics in the 

foreign policy establishment, including too many U.S. diplomats, 

who have failed to appreciate the dire implications of Iran’s activities in the Western Hemisphere. 

I coordinate a project at the American Enterprise Institute to 

monitor and expose Iran’s activities in Latin America, in order to 

inform the public as well as policymakers who are responsible for 

protecting our national security. Our team has conducted dozens of 

interviews with experts from throughout the world and with eyewitnesses on the ground in the region. We also have obtained 

reams of official Venezuelan and Iranian documents, some of which 

we have published to support our conclusions. I want to share with 

the committee some of the essential conclusions that we have made 

to date. 

Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez and Iranian leader 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are conspiring to wage an asymmetrical 

struggle against United States security and to abet Iran’s illicit 

nuclear program. Iran has provided Venezuela conventional weapons capable of attacking the United States and our allies in the region. On this subject, I would suggest that United States officials 

focus on the military-to-military cooperation and, in particular, the 

Iranian companies that are involved, that are associated with the 

Quds Force. Iran has used $30 billion in economic ventures in 

31

Venezuela to launder money and to evade international financial 

restrictions. 

I also refer the committee and U.S. officials to the work of the 

district attorney of New York, Cyrus Vance, Jr., whose office has 

continued to look into this important issue and the implications for 

our security. 

Iran discovered vast uranium deposits in Venezuela in 2005 and 

it is conducting suspicious mining operations in uranium-rich areas 

in Venezuela, Ecuador, and other countries. Two terrorist networks, one home-grown Venezuelan clan and another cultivated by 

radical Iranian cleric, Mohsen Rabbani, proselytize, fundraise, 

recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in 

numerous countries in the Americas. 

The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates regular 

service from Caracas to Damascus and Teheran, providing Iran, 

Hezbollah, and associated narcotraffickers a surreptitious means to 

move personnel, weapons, contraband, and other material in and 

out of our hemisphere. 

Mr. Chairman, our project has shared substantial information 

about these aforementioned threats with U.S. Government officials. 

Quite frankly, too often the attitude we have encountered among 

these career officers has been one of skepticism or indifference. To 

offer just a couple of brief examples. 

About 6 months ago we provided U.S. officials the name and contact information of a reliable Venezuelan source with privileged 

information about the Conviasa flights between Caracas and the 

terrorist states of Syria and Iran. To this day, that source has 

never been contacted. That’s fine. I’m sure that the U.S. Government has many, many sources. However, congressional staff members tell us that executive branch officials are unable to answer the 

simple question of whether those Conviasa flights are continuing. 

Our source reassures us that that critical logistical link is still in 

service, and as a matter of fact there are reports that it may 

extend its service to Ecuador. 

Another brief example: Almost 7 years after the first reports that 

Iran discovered or was seeking uranium in Venezuela, United 

States officials are still unable or unwilling to say clearly whether 

Iran is mining uranium in Venezuela, notwithstanding documentation revealed by our project over a year ago regarding Iranian mining in the uranium-rich Roraima Basin in eastern Venezuela. 

Mr. Chairman, quite frankly, the risk we are running today is 

not that we exaggerate the threat, but that we’re ignoring it. I 

believe—and I’m sure you will agree because of the work that 

you’ve done in this area—that the executive branch, beginning in 

the waning days of the last administration and continuing today, 

has been slow to recognize and respond to this multidimensional 

threat. 

We believe that congressional scrutiny is essential to encourage 

executive branch agencies to act. The dangerous activities of Iran 

and Hezbollah so near our borders demand a whole of government 

strategy, beginning with an interagency review to understand and 

assess the transnational, multifaceted nature of the problem, to 

mobilize friendly governments to respond, and to insist on inspection of suspicious operations and military inventories. 

32

This is all being carried out against the backdrop of Hugo 

Chavez dying of cancer. We have reports from our sources that on 

February 12 after a military parade he collapsed, was unconscious, 

and it took an hour and a half for his medical staff to stabilize his 

condition. So the transition that will be under way will be very 

dangerous. It may include chaos and create a very troubling environment where our enemies are at work. Our government must be 

prepared to implement effective measures unilaterally and with 

willing partners to disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and to 

neutralize unacceptable threats. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Noriega follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROGER F. NORIEGA

Mr. Chairman, I applaud you and other members of the subcommittee for initiating a review of Iran’s activities in Latin America. 

Since you announced your inquiry, the Director of National Intelligence, James 

R. Clapper, testified earlier this month that ‘‘Iranian officials’’ at the highest levels 

‘‘are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States. . . .’’ General 

Clapper also reported that Iran’s so-called ‘‘Supreme Leader’’ Ali Khamenei was 

probably aware of the bizarre plot discovered last October to conspire with supposed 

Mexican drug cartel leaders to commit a terrorist bombing in the heart of our 

Nation’s capital.1 Only because American law enforcement officials were willing to 

set aside conventional wisdom about how and where Iran would wage war against 

us were they able to thwart that attack. 

Iranian officials have made no secret of the regime’s intention to carry its asymmetrical struggle to the streets of the United States and Europe. For example, in 

a May 2011 speech in Bolivia, Iran’s Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, promised a 

‘‘tough and crushing response’’ to any U.S. offensive against Iran.2 In the same week 

in early January that Iran caught the world’s attention by threatening to close the 

Strait of Hormuz and brandishing shore-to-sea cruise missiles in a 10-day naval 

exercise, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced a five-nation swing through Latin 

America aimed at advancing its influence and operational capabilities on the U.S. 

doorstep.3

To comprehend what Iran is up to, we must set aside conventional wisdom about 

its ambitions, strategies, and tactics and follow the evidence where it leads. General 

Clapper’s public statement represents a dramatic break with the skeptics in the foreign policy establishment—including too many U.S. diplomats—who have failed to 

appreciate the breadth and depth of Iran’s activities in the Western Hemisphere. 

The Intelligence Community’s fresh assessment of Iran’s willingness to wage an attack on our soil leads to the inescapable conclusion that Teheran’s activities near 

our homeland constitute a very real threat that can no longer be ignored. 

The next logical question is, ‘‘What is that hostile regime doing with the support 

of its trusted allies very close to our borders?’’ In my capacity as a Visiting Fellow 

at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), I am coordinating an ongoing effort to answer that very question. I cooperate with a team of 

experienced experts who are committed to monitoring and exposing Iran’s activities 

in Latin America in order to inform the public as well as policymakers who are responsible for protecting our national security. 

To date, we have conducted dozens of interviews with experts from throughout the 

world and with eyewitnesses on the ground in the region. We also have obtained 

reams of official Venezuelan and Iranian documents, only a few of which we have 

published to support our conclusions. 

Our exhaustive work leads us to the following conclusions:

• Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez and Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are conspiring to wage an asymmetrical struggle against U.S. security and 

to abet Iran’s illicit nuclear program. Their clandestine activities pose a clear 

and present danger to regional peace and security. 

• Iran has provided Venezuela conventional weapon systems capable of attacking 

the United States and our allies in the region. 

• Iran has used $30 billion in economic ventures in Venezuela as means to launder money and evade international financial sanctions. 

33

• Since 2005, Iran has found uranium in Venezuela, Ecuador, and other countries 

in the region and is conducting suspicious mining operations in some uraniumrich areas. • Two terrorist networks—one home-grown Venezuelan clan and another cultivated by Mohsen Rabbani, a notorious agent of the Quds Force of the Iranian 

Revolutionary Guard Corps—proselytize, fund-raise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas. • Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in South America as a 

means of raising resources and sharing tactics. • The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates regular service from 

Caracas to Damascus and Teheran—providing Iran, Hezbollah, and associated 

narcotraffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel, weapons, contraband, 

and other materiel.

Mr. Chairman, our project has shared substantial information about these aforementioned threats with U.S. Government officials—either directly or through Members of Congress. Quite frankly, too often the attitude we have encountered has 

been one of skepticism or indifference. 

To offer just two examples, we understand that U.S. executive branch officials 

have continued to misinform Members of Congress about the existence of Conviasa 

flights between Venezuela and the terror states of Syria and Iran. Many months 

ago, we provided U.S. officials the name and contact information of a reliable Venezuelan source with privileged information about those ongoing flights. Unfortunately, that source was never contacted. And congressional staff members tells us 

that executive branch officials continue to provide vague or misleading answers to 

direct questions on this relatively simple subject of whether those Conviasa flights 

continue. 

Another example of this official indifference: Almost 7 years after the first reports 

that Iran was seeking uranium in Venezuela, U.S. officials are still unable or unwilling to state clearly whether Iran is mining uranium in Venezuela—notwithstanding documentation revealed by our project over a year ago regarding Iranian 

mining in the uranium-rich Roraima Basin in eastern Venezuela. That U.S. officials 

do not know whether Iran is supporting its illicit nuclear program with uranium 

from Venezuela is incomprehensible. That they do not care enough to find out is unacceptable. 

I believe that the executive branch—beginning in the waning days of the last administration and continuing today—has been slow to recognize or respond to this 

multidimensional threat. At long last, it is time for our national security agencies 

to get smart and get busy. 

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that congressional attention, such as this hearing, 

is essential to encourage executive branch agencies to act. For example, sanctions 

last year against Venezuela’s state-owned petroleum company for transactions with 

Iran were the direct result of pressure by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

acting in part on information provided by my project. Representative Jeff Duncan 

(R–SC) has introduced H.R. 3783, the ‘‘Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere 

Act of 2012,’’ which will require the executive branch to report to Congress on Iran’s 

activities in a host of areas and to provide a strategy for countering this threat. 

I believe that such a thorough, congressionally mandated review will require the 

executive branch to apply additional needed intelligence resources to collect on subject matters in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and beyond. Once they understand the 

scope and depth of the problem, I hope for a whole-of-government response to protect our security, our interests, and our allies against the threat posed by Iran, 

Hezbollah, and their support network in the Americas. 

Of course, my project at AEI is prepared to cooperate with this policy review by 

providing the subcommittee documents and analysis regarding suspicious transactions and installations operated by Iran in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere in the region. 

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

Iran’s push into the Western Hemisphere is part of a global strategy to break its 

diplomatic isolation, develop new sources of strategic materials, evade international 

sanctions and undermine U.S. influence. To these ends, Iran expanded the number 

of its embassies in the region from 6 in 2005 to 10 in 2010.4 The real game-changer, 

however, has been the alliance developed between Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 

and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. 

In the last 7 years, Iran has begun to take full advantage of its Venezuelan partner. Chavez’s petro-diplomacy has paved the way for Ahmadinejad to cultivate partnerships with anti-U.S. regimes in Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, et al. Today, 

34

a shadowy network of commercial and industrial enterprises in several countries 

affords Iran a physical presence in relatively close proximity to the United States. 

Iran is well-positioned to use its relationships with these countries to pose a direct 

threat to U.S. territory, strategic waterways and American allies. Iran also has provided the Venezuelan military with weapon systems that give Chavez unprecedented capabilities to threaten its neighbors and the United States. 

Chavez’s support for terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia is notorious. In recent years, Chavez’s most trusted security officials—

from senior to operational levels—have provided material support to Hezbollah. 

Today, Venezuela’s Margarita Island has eclipsed the infamous ‘‘Tri-Border Area’’ 

(TBA) in South America as the principal safe haven and center of Hezbollah operations in the Americas. 

Indeed, wherever Iran goes, Hezbollah is not far behind; Latin America has been 

no exception. Research from open sources, subject-matter experts and sensitive 

sources within various governments has identified at least two parallel, collaborative terrorist networks growing at an alarming rate in Latin America. One of 

these networks is operated by Venezuelan collaborators, and the other is managed 

by the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. These networks encompass more than 80 operatives in at least 12 countries throughout the region 

(with their greatest areas of focus being Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile). 

The Nassereddine Network 

Ghazi Atef Nassereddine Abu Ali, a native of Lebanon who became a Venezuelan 

citizen about 12 years ago, is Venezuela’s second-ranking diplomat in Syria. 

Nassereddine is a key Hezbollah asset because of his close personal relationship to 

Chavez’s Justice and Interior Minister, Tarik El Aissami, and because of his diplomatic assignment in Damascus. Along with at least two of his brothers, 

Nassereddine manages a network to expand Hezbollah’s influence in Venezuela and 

throughout Latin America. 

Nassereddine’s brother, Abdallah, a former member of the Venezuelan Congress, 

uses his position as the former vice president of the Federation of Arab and American Entities in Latin America and the president of its local chapter in Venezuela 

to maintain ties with Islamic communities throughout the region.5 He currently resides on Margarita Island, where he runs various money-laundering operations and 

manages commercial enterprises associated with Hezbollah in Latin America. 

Younger brother Oday is responsible for establishing paramilitary training centers 

on Margarita Island. He is actively recruiting Venezuelans through local circulos 

bolivarianos (neighborhood watch committees made up of the most radical Chavez 

followers) and sending them to Iran for follow-on training. 

The Rabbani Network 

Hojjat al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, who was the cultural attache ́ at the Embassy 

of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Buenos Aires, Argentina, oversees a parallel 

Hezbollah recruitment network.6 Rabbani is currently the international affairs advisor to the Al-Mostafa Al-Alam Cultural Institute in Qom, which is tasked with propagation of Shia Islam outside Iran.7 Rabbani, referred to by the important Brazilian 

magazine Veja as ‘‘the Terrorist Professor,’’ 8 is a die-hard defender of the Iranian 

revolution and the mastermind behind the two notorious terrorist attacks against 

Jewish targets in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 that killed 144 people.9

At the time, Rabbani was credentialed as Iran’s cultural attache ́ in the Argentine 

capital, which he used as a platform for extremist propaganda, recruitment and 

training that culminated in the attacks in the 1990s. In fact, he continues to exploit 

that network of Argentine converts today to expand Iran’s and Hezbollah’s reach—

identifying and recruiting operatives throughout the region for radicalization and 

terrorist training in Venezuela and Iran (specifically, the city of Qom). 

At least two mosques in Buenos Aires—Al Imam and At-Tauhid—are operated by 

Rabbani disciples. Sheik Abdallah Madani leads the Al Imam mosque, which also 

serves as the headquarters for the Islamic-Argentine Association, one of the most 

prominent Islamic cultural centers in Latin America. 

Some of Rabbani’s disciples have taken what they have learned from their mentor 

in Argentina and replicated it elsewhere in the region. Sheik Karim Abdul Paz, an 

Argentine convert to Shiite Islam, studied under Rabbani in Qom for 5 years and 

succeeded him at the At-Tauhid mosque in Buenos Aires in 1993.10 Abdul Paz is 

now the imam of a cultural center in Santiago, Chile, the Centro Chileno Islamico 

de Cultura de Puerto Montt. Another Argentine convert to radical Islam and 

Rabbani disciple is Sheik Suhail Assad, who lectures at universities throughout the 

region and recruits young followers to the cause.11

35

A key target of the Rabbani network—and Hezbollah in general—is Brazil, home 

to some 1 million Muslims. Rabbani travels to Brazil regularly to visit his brother, 

Mohammad Baquer Rabbani Razavi, founder of the Iranian Association in Brazil.12

Another of his principal collaborators is Sheik Khaled Taki Eldyn, a Sunni radical 

from the Sao Paulo Guarulhos mosque. Taki Eldyn, who is active in ecumenical activities with the Shia mosques, also serves as the secretary general of the Council 

of the Leaders of the Societies and Islamic Affairs of Brazil.13 A sensitive source 

linked that mosque to a TBA network cited by the U.S. Treasury Department as 

providing major financial and logistical support to Hezbollah.14 As far back as 1995, 

Taki Eldyn hosted al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, and 9/11 mastermind, Khalid 

Sheik Mohammed, in the TBA region. According to Brazilian intelligence sources 

cited by the magazine Veja, at least 20 operatives from Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and the 

Islamic jihad are using Brazil as a hub for terrorist activity.15 The fact that Brazil 

is set to host the FIFA World Cup tournament in 2014 and the Summer Olympics 

in 2016 makes it an inviting target for international terrorism. 

WAKING UP TO A THREAT

Bracing for a potential showdown over its illicit nuclear program and emboldened 

by inattention from Washington in Latin America, Iran has sought strategic advantage in our neighborhood. It also is preparing to play the terrorism card—exploiting 

its new ties with Venezuelan operatives, reaching into Mexico, and activating a decades-old network in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. 

Even as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) affirmed in a recent 

report that foreign support is crucial to Iran’s capability of developing a nuclear 

weapon,16 U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and security agencies apparently are in the 

dark on whether Iran is extracting ore from vast uranium basins in Venezuela, 

Ecuador, or Bolivia or whether Argentina has resumed nuclear technology-sharing 

with Teheran. 

An important exception to executive branch neglect of this troubling phenomenon 

is the work of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury to sanction numerous Venezuelan officials and entities for their complicity with and support for Iran 

and international terrorism. Again, according to sources in these agencies, State 

Department officers systematically resist the application of sanctions against 

Venezuelan officials and entities, despite the fact that these suspects are playing an 

increasingly important role in Iran’s operational capabilities near U.S. territory. 

CONCLUSION

President Obama declared in December 2011, ‘‘We take Iranian activities, including in Venezuela, very seriously, and we will continue to monitor them closely.’’ 17

Merely monitoring Iran’s foray into Latin America is the very least the United 

States must now do to frustrate Teheran’s plans to threaten U.S. security and interests close to home. 

The dangerous activities of Iran and Hezbollah so near our borders demand a 

whole-of-government strategy, beginning with an interagency review to understand 

and assess the transnational, multifaceted nature of the problem; educate friendly 

governments; and insist on inspection of suspicious operations and military compounds. Our government must be prepared to implement effective measures—unilaterally and with willing partners—to disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and 

neutralize unacceptable threats. 

Ahmadinejad’s January visit to Venezuela and elsewhere in the region was clearly 

intended to shore up Iran’s interests in Latin America as Chavez loses ground in 

his fight with cancer. Iran can be expected to make common cause with Cuba, Russia, and China to protect their Venezuelan haven—if necessary, by encouraging 

Chavez’s leftist movement to scuttle the October 2012 elections. If the United States 

were to be more vigilant at this critical post-Chavez transition phase, it might be 

possible to spoil Iran’s plans by supporting a peaceful, democratic solution. If not, 

Washington may find itself confronting a grave and growing Iranian threat that it 

can neither diminish nor evade.

————————

End Notes

1 ‘‘Notorious Iranian Militant Has a Connection to Alleged Assassination Plot Against Saudi 

Envoy,’’ by Peter Finn, The Washington Post, October 14, 2011. 2 ‘‘Sanction Shows U.S. Weakness, Says Iran Minister,’’ Iranian Students’ News Agency, June 

1, 2011; ‘‘Iran Warns of Street War in Tel Aviv If Attacked,’’ Fars News Agency, November 8, 

2011. 

36

3 ‘‘Iran Seeking To Expand Influence in Latin America,’’ by Joby Warrick, The Washington 

Post, January 1, 2012. 4General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF, ‘‘Posture Statement,’’ Testimony before the 112th Congress, House Armed Services Committee, March 30, 2011. 5This organization was founded in Argentina in 1972 to unite Muslims, namely the Syrian 

and Lebanese communities, in Latin America and has spread rapidly throughout Latin America, 

with offices in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Guadalupe Island, Antigua, and Uruguay. It is overtly anti-Israel; supportive of anti-American regimes in the Middle East and Latin 

America; and used as a platform for Hezbollah to raise money, recruit supporters, and solicit 

illegal visas. 6 ‘‘Reis-Jomhour-e Arzhantin Dar Sazeman-e Melal: Tehran Ba Mohakemeh-ye Maqamatash 

Dar Keshvar-e Sales Movafeqat Konad’’ [The President of Argentina: Tehran Should Accept 

Trial of Its Authorities in a Third Country], Asr-e Iran (Tehran), September 25, 2010, 

www.asriran.com (available in Persian, accessed September 29, 2011). 7 ‘‘Din va Siasat Dar Amrika-ye Latin Dar Goftegou Ba Ostad Mohsen Rabbani’’ [Religion and 

Politics in Latin America in Conversation with Professor Mohsen Rabbani], Book Room 

(Tehran), May 3, 2010. 8 ‘‘The Terrorist ‘Professor,’ ’’ Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011. 

9Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nissman, Office of Criminal Investigations: AMIA 

Case (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General, 2006), 

www.peaceandtolerance.org/docs/nismanindict.pdf (accessed September 27, 2011). 10 ‘‘Goftegou Ba Sarkar-e Khanom-e Ma’soumeh As’ad Paz Az Keshvar-e Arzhantin’’ [Conversation with Lade Ma’soumeh As’ad Paz From Argentina], Ahlulbayt (Tehran), June 13, 2011. 11Marielos Marquez, ‘‘ ‘El Islam es una forma de vida’: Sheij Suhail Assad,’’ DiarioCoLatino, 

August 27, 2007. 12 ‘‘Sourat-e Jalaseh’’ [Agenda], Iranianbrazil (Brazil), March 17, 2010. 13 ‘‘Aein-ha-ye Ramezani Dar Berezil’’ [Ramadan Traditions in Brazil], Taghrib News (Qom), 

September 5, 2010. 14 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘‘Treasury Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies 

Supporting Hizballah in Tri-Border Area,’’ news release, June 10, 2004. 15 ‘‘The Terrorist ‘Professor,’ ’’ Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011. 16 ‘‘IAEA Says Foreign Expertise has Brought Iran to the Threshold of Nuclear Capability,’’ 

by Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, November 6, 2011. 17 ‘‘El Universal Interviews President Obama on U.S.-Venezuela Relations,’’ by Reyes Theis, 

El Universal (Caracas, Venezuela), December 20, 2011.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Berman. 

STATEMENT OF ILAN BERMAN, VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 

FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Rubio, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to 

discuss this very important topic. 

I’d like to take a somewhat different tack than my colleagues 

before me and discuss, rather than Iran’s activities themselves, the 

motivations that underlie them. In the discussions in Washington 

that have predominated about Iran’s presence and activities in the 

Western Hemisphere, many times the missing part of the puzzle is 

identifying and soberly assessing what Iran wants in the hemisphere—and whether or not it’s succeeding in getting it. 

I think when you look at the level of activity that Iran is carrying out in the region, it’s possible to discern four distinct strategic motivations that the Iranians have with regard to their presence and their activities in our hemisphere. The first, of course, is 

diplomacy and coalition-building. Outreach to Latin America is 

seen by Iran first and foremost as a means to lessen its deepening 

international isolation, an isolation that’s gotten deeper as a result 

of recent sanctions passed by the United States and by the European Union. The Iranian response—and we have seen this from the 

start of international efforts to pressure Iran’s nuclear program in 

2003, but certainly these efforts have escalated in recent times—

has been to observe and interact with sympathetic regimes beyond 

their immediate periphery as a way of skirting and diluting sancVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:28 May 08, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2012IS~1\021612-B.TXT BETTY
37

tions and attempting to preserve the continuity of their nuclear 

program. 

Due to its favorable geopolitical climate, which is typified by vast 

ungoverned areas and widespread anti-Americanism, Latin America has emerged as an important focal point of that effort. Most 

prominent, obviously, with regard to Iran’s regional contacts is the 

relationship that Iran has built with Venezuela since Mahmoud 

Ahmedinejad’s inauguration in 2005. That’s a relationship that has 

gone from, if I may say, zero to 60 practically overnight in foreign 

policy terms, and now boasts billions of dollars of concrete investment, as well as activities that both support Iran’s efforts to skirt 

sanctions that have been imposed upon its dealings with the international financial system, as well as the activities of Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah. 

But Iran’s activities are not simply centered on Venezuela. They 

extend beyond it to a burgeoning relationship with Evo Morales in 

Bolivia, to a growing relationship with Rafael Correa and Ecuador, 

and beyond that to a softening of the anti-Iranian position that one 

is witnessing in places such as Buenos Aires. 

I think it would be premature to suggest that the Iranian presence in the region is diminishing, or in decline. I think it is very 

much a work in progress. But it’s important to point out that this 

presence is not simply pragmatic, and it’s not simply defensive. In 

fact, Iran has engaged in a systematic outreach to regional states 

in a way that suggests that it sees the Western Hemisphere as a 

strategic theater where it can expand its own influence and dilute 

that of the United States. This can be called an antiaccess strategy 

on the part of the Iranians, wherein they sew up and engage 

regional regimes so it is more difficult for the United States to do 

so. 

Beyond diplomacy, Iran is engaged in a quest for strategic 

resources. Conventional wisdom has it as Iran’s nuclear program 

has progressed and matured to the point that it has become well 

nigh self-sufficient, but this, in fact, is not the case. The opposite 

is actually true. As Iran’s stockpile of uranium centrifuges has expanded, so has its need for the critical raw material that will be 

placed in those centrifuges: uranium ore. 

Iran itself runs a deficit of naturally occurring uranium, and 

when the Shah launched a national nuclear endeavor in the 1970s 

he was forced to procure a large-scale supply from South Africa. 

Four decades on, that supply is mostly depleted and of poor quality, and as a result recent years have seen a widening Iranian 

quest to procure uranium from abroad. 

Iran can now be said to be looking extensively for uranium in 

two places: in sub-Saharan Africa, where it’s engaging with regimes such as Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo; 

and in Latin America. We heard from Ambassador Noriega about 

the expanding evidence that Iran is mining extensively in the 

Roraima Basin adjacent to Venezuela’s border with Guyana. But 

also you have a burgeoning relationship on the strategic resources 

front with the government of Evo Morales in Bolivia. Regional officials that I talked to when I was in the region last month suggested that there are no fewer than 11 sites in eastern Bolivia, 

adjacent to the industrial capital of Santa Cruz, in which Iran is 

38

suspected to be mining. Not coincidentally, it is rumored that the 

Conviasa flight that Ambassador Noriega talked about could soon 

have an additional leg that will go from Caracas down to Santa 

Cruz, suggesting that there is certainly at least something of interest in Santa Cruz that the Iranians desire. 

Beyond that, Iran has been involved in building a surprisingly 

robust asymmetric presence in the region. This involves not only 

Iran’s exploitation of grey and black markets and free trade zones, 

such as the ‘‘Triple Frontier’’ and Venezuela’s Margarita Island, 

but increasingly a paramilitary presence as well. Regional officials 

that I spoke with suggested that there were between 50 and 300 

Iranian trainers linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard present 

in Bolivia at this particular time. 

There is not a great deal of clarity as to what they’re doing, or 

their level of activity. I would point out, however, that Iran has 

provided at least some of the seed money for the regional defense 

school recently set up by the ALBA bloc, which was inaugurated 

by Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi when he was in Bolivia 

in the late spring/early summer last year. 

This asymmetric capability has created a latent operational capability. The conventional wisdom in this town has long been that 

Iran uses the region opportunistically rather than operationally. In 

fact, as you pointed out, the failed plot to assassinate Saudi 

Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir in Washington in October suggests that 

there has been a significant strategic shift in Iranian thinking and 

that Iran now begins to look at the region operationally. 

General Clapper concluded his recent testimony to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence by saying that: ‘‘The Iranian regime has formed alliances with Chavez, Ortega, Castro, and Correa 

that many believe can destabilize the hemisphere. These alliances 

can pose an immediate threat by giving Iran directly through the 

IRGC, the Quds Force, or its proxies like Hezbollah a platform in 

the region to carry out attacks against the United States, our interests, and our allies.’’

In conclusion, I think it’s important to reiterate that Iran’s presence in the region is very much a work in progress. Iran has not 

managed to firmly entrench itself, or to operationalize the relationships that it’s seeking to build. But the interests and the strategic 

imperatives that drive them are clear, and they’re worth our attention. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ILAN BERMAN

Chairman Menendez, Senator Rubio, distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss an issue of growing importance 

to the national security of the United States: that of Iran’s activities and influence 

in the Americas. 

Although Iran’s inroads into the Western Hemisphere have recently garnered considerable attention among experts and the press, the motivations behind them remain poorly understood. Yet in tracing Iran’s pattern of behavior in the region over 

the past several years, it is possible to discern four distinct strategic objectives. 

I. DIPLOMACY AND COALITION–BUILDING

Outreach to Latin America is seen by Iran first and foremost as a means to lessen 

its deepening international isolation. Since 2003, when its previously clandestine 

39

nuclear program became public knowledge, the Islamic Republic has faced mounting 

global pressure over its nuclear ambitions. The Iranian regime has sought to mitigate the resulting political and economic restrictions levied against it by the United 

States and its allies through intensified diplomatic outreach abroad. 

Due to its favorable geopolitical climate—typified by vast ungoverned areas and 

widespread anti-Americanism—Latin America has become an important focal point 

of this effort. Over the past decade, Iran has nearly doubled the number of its embassies in Latin America (from 6 in 2005 to 10 in 2010).1 It also has devoted considerable energy to forging economic bonds with sympathetic regional governments. 

Far and away the most prominent in this regard has been Venezuela. Since Hugo 

Chavez became its President in 1999, alignment with Iran has emerged as a cardinal tenet of Venezuela’s foreign policy. The subsequent election of Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad to the Iranian Presidency in 2005 kicked cooperation into high gear, 

with dramatic results. Today, Venezuela and Iran enjoy an extensive and vibrant 

strategic partnership. Venezuela has emerged as an important source of material assistance for Iran’s sprawling nuclear program, as well as a vocal diplomatic backer 

of Iran’s will to atomic power. The Chavez regime also has become a safe haven and 

source of financial support for Hezbollah, Iran’s most powerful terrorist proxy.2 In 

turn, Iran’s feared Revolutionary Guards have become involved in training 

Venezuela’s secret services and police.3 Economic ties between Caracas and Tehran 

likewise have exploded—expanding from virtually nil in 2007 to an estimated $40 

billion today.4

Just as significantly, Venezuela has served as Iran’s ‘‘gateway’’ for further economic and diplomatic expansion into the region. Aided by its partnership with Caracas and bolstered by a shared anti-American outlook, Iran has succeeded in forging 

significant strategic, economic, and political links with the regime of Evo Morales 

in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Even Iran’s relations with Argentina, 

where Iranian-supported terrorists carried out major bombings in 1992 and 1994, 

have improved in recent times, as the government of President Cristina Fernandez 

de Kirchner has hewed a more conciliatory line toward Tehran.5

It would be a mistake, however, to view these contacts as simply pragmatic—or 

strictly defensive. Iran’s sustained systematic outreach to regional states suggests 

that it sees the Western Hemisphere as a crucial strategic theater wherein to expand its own strategic influence and dilute that of the United States. Indeed, a 2009 

dossier prepared by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that ‘‘since 

Ahmadinejad’s rise to power, Tehran has been promoting an aggressive policy aimed 

at bolstering its ties with Latin American countries with the declared goal of ‘bringing America to its knees.’ ’’ 6 This view is increasingly shared by the U.S. military. 

In its 2010 report on Iranian military power, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

noted that ‘‘Iran seeks to increase its stature by countering U.S. influence and expanding ties with regional actors’’ in Latin America.7

To this end, Iran is ramping up its strategic messaging to the region. Late last 

month, on the heels of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s very public fourcountry tour of South America, the Iranian regime formally launched HispanTV, a 

Spanish-language analogue to its English-language PressTV channel. The Bolivianheadquartered television outlet has been depicted by Ahmadinejad as part of his 

government’s efforts to ‘‘limit the ground for supremacy of dominance seekers’’—

a thinly veiled reference to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere.8

As Ahmadinejad’s statement indicates, Iran is pursuing an ‘‘anti-access’’ strategy 

in Latin America—one that promotes its own ideology and influence at the expense 

of the United States. In this endeavor, Iran has been greatly aided by Venezuelan 

strongman, Hugo Chavez, who himself has worked diligently to diminish America’s 

political and economic presence in the region under the banner of a new 

‘‘Bolivarian’’ revolution. 

II. A QUEST FOR STRATEGIC RESOURCES

Since the start of the international crisis over Iran’s nuclear ambitions nearly 9 

years ago, the popular perception has emerged that Iran’s atomic program are now 

largely self-sufficient—and that its progress is therefore largely inexorable. This, 

however, is far from the case; in fact, the Iranian regime currently runs a considerable, and growing, deficit of uranium ore, the critical raw material needed to fuel 

its atomic effort. 

According to nonproliferation experts, Iran’s indigenous uranium ore reserves are 

known to be both ‘‘limited and mostly of poor quality . . .’’ 9 Thus, when Iran’s Shah 

mapped out an ambitious national plan for nuclear power in the 1970s, his government was forced to procure significant quantities of the mineral from South Africa. 

Nearly four decades later, however, this aging stockpile reportedly has been mostly 

40

depleted.10 As a result, Iran in recent years has embarked on a widening quest to 

acquire supplies of uranium ore from abroad. In 2009, for example, it is known to 

have attempted to purchase more than 1,000 tons of uranium ore from the Central 

Asian republic of Kazakhstan at a cost of nearly half-a-billion dollars.11 In that particular case, deft diplomacy on the part of the United States and its European allies 

helped stymie Iranian efforts—at least for the time being. 

However, Iran’s search has not abated. In February of 2011, a new intelligence 

summary from a member state of the International Atomic Energy Agency reaffirmed to the international community that the Islamic Republic continues to 

search extensively for new and stable sources of uranium to fuel its nuclear program.12 Today, this effort is focused in two principal geographic areas. The first is 

Africa, where in recent years Iran has made concerted efforts to engage a number 

of uranium producers (such as Zimbabwe, Senegal, Nigeria, and the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Congo).13 The second is Latin America, where Tehran now is 

exploring and developing a series of significant resource partnerships. 

The most well-known of these is with Venezuela. Cooperation on strategic resources has emerged as a defining feature of the alliance between the Islamic 

Republic and the Chavez regime. Iran is currently known to be mining in the 

Roraima Basin, adjacent to Venezuela’s border with Guyana. Significantly, that geological area is believed to be analogous to Canada’s Athabasca Basin, the world’s 

largest deposit of uranium.14

Bolivia, too, is fast becoming a key source of strategic resources for the Iranian 

regime. With the sanction of the Morales government, Iran is now believed to be 

extracting uranium from as many as 11 different sites in Bolivia’s east, proximate 

to the country’s industrial capital of Santa Cruz.15 (Not coincidentally, it is rumored 

that the now-infamous Tehran-Caracas air route operated jointly by Conviasa, Venezuela’s national airline, and Iran Air will be extended in the near future to Santa 

Cruz.16) Additionally, a series of cooperation agreements concluded in 2010 between 

La Paz and Tehran have made Iran a ‘‘partner’’ in the mining and exploitation of 

Bolivia’s lithium, a key strategic mineral with applications for nuclear weapons 

development.17

Iran even appears to be eyeing Ecuador’s uranium deposits. A $30 million joint 

mining deal concluded between Tehran and Quito back in 200918 has positioned the 

Correa regime to eventually become a supplier for the Islamic Republic. 

Regional experts note that Iran’s mining and extraction efforts in Latin America 

are still comparatively modest in nature, constrained by competition from larger 

countries such as Canada and China and by Iran’s own available resources and 

know-how.19 However, the region is unquestionably viewed as a target of opportunity in Iran’s widening quest for strategic resources—both because of its favorable 

political operating environment and because states there (especially Bolivia) represent unknown quantities in terms of resource wealth. This raises the possibility 

that Latin America could emerge in the near future as a significant provider of strategic resources for the Iranian regime, and a key source of sustenance for Iran’s expanding nuclear program. 

III. AN ASYMMETRIC PRESENCE

Iran’s formal political and economic contacts with regional states are reinforced 

by a broad web of asymmetric activities throughout the Americas. 

Illicit financial transactions figure prominently in this regard. Over the past several years, Iran’s economic ties to Venezuela have helped it skirt the sanctions being 

levied by the international community, as well as to continue to operate in an increasingly inhospitable global financial system. It has done so through the establishment of joint companies and financial entities, as well as the formation of wholly 

Iranian-owned financial entities in Venezuela and the entrenchment of Iranian commercial banks there.20 Experts note that this financial activity exploits an ‘‘existing 

loophole’’ in the current sanctions regime against Iran—one that leverages the freedom of action of Venezuelan banks to provide the Islamic Republic with ‘‘an ancillary avenue through which it can access the international financial system despite 

Western pressure.’’ 21

Iran is also known to be active in the region’s ubiquitous gray and black markets, 

as well as its free trade areas—operating both directly and via terrorist proxy 

Hezbollah.22 Most notoriously, these include the so-called ‘‘Triple Frontier’’ at the 

crossroads of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, as well as Venezuela’s Margarita 

Island. 

Iran also boasts an increasingly robust paramilitary presence in the region. The 

Pentagon, in its 2010 report to Congress on Iran’s military power, noted that the 

Quds Force, the elite paramilitary unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, is now 

41

deeply involved in the Americas, stationing ‘‘operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often 

building on existing socio-economic ties with the well-established Shia diaspora,’’ 

and even carrying out ‘‘paramilitary operations to support extremists and destabilize unfriendly regimes.’’ 23

This presence is most pronounced in Bolivia. Iran has been intimately involved 

in the activities of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) since the formation of that Cuban- and Venezuelan-led geopolitical bloc—which also encompasses 

Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and a number of other nations—in the early 2000s. As 

part of that relationship, Iran reportedly provided at least some of the seed money 

for the establishment of the bloc’s ‘‘regional defense school’’ outside Santa Cruz, 

Bolivia. Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi reportedly presided over the 

school’s inauguration in May 2011, and Iran—itself an ALBA observer nation—is 

now said to be playing a role in training and indoctrination at the facility.24

Regional officials currently estimate between 50 and 300 Iranian ‘‘trainers’’ to be 

present in Bolivia.25 Notably, however, a personal visit to the facility found it to be 

largely unattended, at least at the present time. 

IV. A LATENT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

Conventional wisdom in Washington has long held that Iran’s activism in the 

Americas is opportunistic—rather than operational. Yet the growing asymmetric 

capabilities being erected by Iran throughout the region have the potential to be directed against the U.S. homeland. 

This was hammered home in October 2011, when U.S. law enforcement agencies 

succeeded in foiling a plot by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to assassinate Adel alJubeir, Saudi Arabia’s envoy to the United States, on American soil. That attack, 

if it had been successful, would potentially have killed scores of U.S. citizens in the 

Nation’s capital. The incident marks a significant development; as Director of 

National Intelligence James Clapper observed in his recent testimony before the 

Senate, in response to mounting international pressure and asymmetric activity 

against their nuclear program, it appears that ‘‘Iranian officials—probably including 

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have changed their calculus and are now willing 

to conduct an attack in the United States.’’ 26

Latin America figures prominently in this calculus. The foiled October 2011 plot 

is known to have been both orchestrated and facilitated via South America, suggesting that Iran increasingly finds the region to be an advantageous operational 

theater. Moreover, as Iran’s influence and activities there intensify, the Islamic 

Republic will be able to field a progressively more robust operational presence in 

the Americas. Clapper concluded his Senate testimony with an ominous warning. 

‘‘The Iranian regime has formed alliances with Chavez, Ortega, Castro, and Correa 

that many believe can destabilize the Hemisphere,’’ he noted. ‘‘These alliances can 

pose an immediate threat by giving Iran—directly through the IRGC, the Quds 

Force, or its proxies like Hezbollah—a platform in the region to carry out attacks 

against the United States, our interests, and allies.’’ 27

OPPORTUNITY WITHIN ADVERSITY

Understanding these motivations is essential to assessing the significance of Latin 

America in Iran’s strategic calculus, and to determining whether or not its efforts 

there are in fact succeeding. 

For the moment, Iran’s regional inroads still represent a work in progress. The 

Iranian regime has demonstrated a clear interest in Latin America over the past 

decade, and is now striving to expand its influence there. As of yet, however, it has 

not succeeded in solidifying this presence—or in fully operationalizing its regional 

relationships and institutionalizing its influence. As experts have noted, although 

Iran’s promises of economic engagement with regional states have been abundant, 

precious little of this aid has actually materialized, save for in the case of Venezuela.28 Moreover, despite increasingly robust cooperation with regional states on 

mining and extraction, there is as yet no indication that Latin America in and of 

itself can serve as the answer for Iran’s strategic resource needs. 

Furthermore, an expansion of Iran’s footprint in the region is not necessarily inevitable. Over the past year, the health of Iran’s most stalwart ally in the region, 

Hugo Chavez, has become increasingly critical, and the Venezuelan strongman is 

now believed to be in the terminal stages of cancer. Significant ambiguity abounds 

over Venezuela’s future direction—and, as a result, about the durability of the partnership forged between Caracas and Tehran under Chavez. 

Iran’s expanding regional activism therefore can be understood at least in part to 

be contingency planning of sorts; an effort to broaden contacts and ensure the surVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:28 May 08, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2012IS~1\021612-B.TXT BETTY
42

vivability of its influence in the Americas in a post-Chavez environment. In this 

context, the regimes of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador figure 

prominently, with Correa in particular increasingly looked at as a potential successor to Chavez as a standard bearer of the new ‘‘Bolivarianism’’—and as an 

inheritor of cooperation with Iran.29 Iran’s future progress in solidifying and expanding those partnerships will serve as an important barometer of the long-term 

survivability of its bonds to the region as a whole. 

Since October 2011, policymakers in Washington have begun to pay serious attention to Iran’s activities in the Western Hemisphere. But they have done little concrete to respond to it, at least so far. Despite heartening early steps (such as the 

‘‘Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012’’ recently introduced in the 

House by Representative Jeff Duncan), a comprehensive strategy to contest and dilute Iranian influence in the Americas remains absent. Unless and until such a 

strategy does emerge, Iran’s efforts—and the threats posed by them to American interests and the U.S. homeland—will only continue to expand.

—————————

End Notes

1General Douglas M. Fraser, Posture statement before the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, March 30, 2011, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?

Filelid=fcc6b631-6b51-4bdb-b0a0-6b97ea36cb58. 2Martin Arostengui, ‘‘U.S. Ties Caracas to Hezbollah Aid,’’ Washington Times, July 7, 2008, 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jul/07/us-ties-caracas-to-hezbollah-aid. 3 ‘‘Iran Using Venezuela To Duck U.N. Sanctions: Report,’’ Agence France Presse, December 

21, 2008, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h1fferlbgjsi06XFgTklru3hbatA. 4 Erick Stakelbeck, ‘‘Iran, Hezbollah Tentacles Reaching Latin America,’’ CBN, December

12, 2011, http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/December/Iran-Hezbollah-Spread-Tentacles-toLatin-America/. 5Louis Charbonneau, ‘‘Exclusive: Argentina Flirts With Iran As West Watches Nervously,’’ 

Reuters, December 5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/05/us-iran-argentina-idUSTR

E7B408T20111205. 6 ‘‘Israel: Ties to South America Aiding Iran’s Nuclear Program,’’ Yediot Ahronot (Tel Aviv), 

May 25, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3721335,00.html. 7 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘‘Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,’’ April 2010, http://www.iranwatch.org/government/us-dod-reportmiliary

poweriran-0410.pdf. 8 ‘‘Ahmadinejad Lauds Launch Of Iran’s Spanish-Language Satellite TV As Blow To U.S. 

‘Dominance,’ ’’ Associated Press, January 31, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/

iran-launches-spanish-language-satellite-tv-channel-in-outreach-to-latin-america/2012/01/31/

gIQAITlIeQlstory.html. 9George Jahn, ‘‘Iran Hunts for Uranium Supplies, Finds Scrutiny,’’ Associated Press, 

February 24, 2011, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2011/02/24/iranlnuclearlcapacityl

zimbabwe. 10 Vivienne Walt, ‘‘Is Iran Running Out of Uranium?’’ TIME, April 27, 2010, http://www.time.

com/time/world/article/0,8599,1984657,00.html. 11 ‘‘Report: Iran Seeking to Smuggle Raw Uranium,’’ Associated Press, December 29, 2009, 

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34622227/ns/worldlnews-mideast/nlafrica/. 12 Jahn, ‘‘Iran Hunts for Uranium Supplies, Finds Scrutiny.’’ 13 Ibid. 14 Bret Stephens, ‘‘The Tehran-Caracas Nuclear Axis,’’ Wall Street Journal, December 15, 

2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704869304574595652815802722.html. 15 Author’s interviews, La Paz, Bolivia, January 23–25, 2012. 16 Author’s interviews, Santiago, Chile, January 20–21, 2012. 17 ‘‘Iran ‘Partner’ In The Industrialization Of Bolivia’s Lithium Reserves,’’ MercoPress, October 

30, 2010, http://en.mercopress.com/2010/10/30/iran-partner-in-the-industrialization-of-bolivia-slithium-reserves. 18 ‘‘Memorando De Entiendimento Entre El Ministerio De Minas Y Petroleos De La Republica 

Del Ecuador Y El Ministerio De Industrias Y Mineria De La Republica Islamica De Iran En 

El Sector Geologico Minero,’’ December 3, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fpl

uploadedldocuments/3lAC%20IRAN%20MINERIA%20Y%20NAVEGACION.PDF. 19 Author’s interviews, Santiago, Chile, January 20, 2012. 20See, for example, Norman A. Bailey, ‘‘Iran’s Venezuelan Gateway,’’ American Foreign Policy 

Council Iran Strategy Brief No. 5, http://www.afpc.org/files/getContentPostAttachment/213. 21 Ibid. 22 Rex Hudson, ‘‘Terror and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South 

America,’’ Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, December 2010, http://www.loc.gov/

rr/frd/pdf-files/TerrOrgCrimelTBA.pdf; U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, ‘‘Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,’’ April 2010, http://www.iranwatch.org/

government/us-dod-reportmiliarypoweriran-0410.pdf. 23Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘‘Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran.’’ 24 Author’s interviews, Santiago, Chile and La Paz, Bolivia, January 20–24, 2012. 25 Author’s interviews, Santiago, Chile, January 20, 2012. 26 James Clapper, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 

2012. 

43

27 Ibid. 28 Bailey, ‘‘Iran’s Venezuelan Gateway.’’ 29 Jose R. Cardenas, ‘‘Iran’s Man In Ecuador,’’ Foreign Policy, February 15, 2011, http://

shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/15/iranslmanlinlecuador.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. Thank you all very much. A lot’s 

been said here that’s valuable and I’d like to explore it with you. 

So let me start off. 

Let me just make sure I understand. Dr. Arnson, you’re not suggesting that a hearing of this sort is a politicalization of the topic? 

I assume if that’s the case you wouldn’t have accepted our invitation; is that correct? 

Dr. ARNSON. That is absolutely correct. But I do think that it’s 

no secret we’re in a political year, and this is a kind of issue—some 

of the other witnesses have indicated that they do not consider the 

Obama administration to have taken sufficiently seriously the allegations that have been made. 

I know that you’ll be meeting with people from the administration later this afternoon, and I suggest that those are questions 

better put to them. I’m not in a position to independently verify 

whether or not the administration is paying attention to it. It says 

that it is. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Our concern here is obviously substantive 

and we think that it is important to review all of the views that 

exist, to understand the depth of Iran’s intentions and clarify their 

participation. So when you reference politicalization I wanted to 

make sure you weren’t referring to this hearing. 

From my perspective, I do believe the Obama administration has 

actually engaged in more sanctioning activities and enforcement of 

sanctions activity than ever before, and I think they are fully 

engaged and understand the nature of the threat. Our goal here is 

to determine another dimension of that potential threat here in the 

hemisphere. 

Could we have even envisioned, in the last decade, that 

Ahmedinejad would have been able to visit anywhere in Latin 

America? I mean, a decade ago would you have thought that 

Ahmedinejad would have had an open door, maybe other than inside of Cuba? 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I can jump in, I 

think the extraordinarily important point of inflection here has 

been the hospitality offered by Chavez. They have absolute impunity to operate in Venezuelan territory. They have a partner, they 

have an ally in terms of evading sanctions, obtaining uranium, and 

carrying out activities to support Hezbollah. 

They have a willing partner that seeks to acquire military capabilities and deploy those military capabilities on Venezuelan soil. 

They have a petro-rich economy that carries out a very vigorous 

diplomacy, that has opened doors for Teheran in other countries in 

Latin America. 

So I think the critical ingredient here has been Chavez. The only 

thing he has in common with that Islamic Republic is unrelenting 

hostility to the United States. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Berman, let me ask you. You ended on 

a note that I’m interested in. The question is Iran’s motivation in 

the hemisphere, its interests and its abilities. Iran may not have 

it now, but is it seeking operational capacity in the Western 

44

Hemisphere? Does it have the potential resources, if it has the 

right set of allies in the hemisphere, to seek to effectuate operational capacity? 

When you see Univision’s ‘‘airing’’ of that which they received 

about cyber attacks against the United States, when you know 

about the facts that are pursued by our own Justice Department 

on the attempted assassination of the Saudi Ambassador, when you 

hear General Clapper’s statements—this is not someone who would 

cavalierly suggest that it is something to be concerned. I’d like to 

hear your opinion, Is the search for operational capacity something 

that we should be concerned about? 

Mr. BERMAN. I think so, sir. Here, I think it’s useful to point out 

two things. First of all, Iran’s presence in Latin America long 

predates the current debate over Iran’s nuclear program. Iran was 

instrumental in helping Hezbollah put down roots initially in the 

Tri-Border region and beyond beginning in the early 1980s. So 

Iran’s presence in the region is far more historic than we give it 

credit for. 

Second, that presence has become an important part of Iran’s 

strategic mix as the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program has deepened. We here in town are still debating what the next steps will 

be with regard to Iran’s nuclear program if diplomacy, if economic 

sanctions, are insufficient. 

From the Iranian perspective, however, warfare, at least of an 

asymmetric variety, has already been joined, as manifested 

through Stuxnet, the malicious cyber worm, and other variants 

that have attacked their nuclear program. In this context, a peripheral strategy, in which Iran has the ability both to build and then 

to leverage asymmetric capabilities in various regions, is certainly 

smart strategic planning. While, as you pointed out, they might not 

have that capability yet, it is certainly one that they’ve paid increasing attention to as the international crisis over their nuclear 

program has deepened. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Several of you mentioned uranium exploration. This is something that we have sought to address in the 

Iran sanctions bill that passed out of the Banking Committee, that 

was inspired by my legislation earlier this month, requiring the imposition of sanctions on persons who knowingly participate in joint 

ventures with Iran’s Government, firms or persons acting on behalf 

of the Government of Iran in the mining, production, or transportation of uranium anywhere in the world. 

Obviously, there are responsible state actors who will look at not 

just the United States, but the world community, the EU and others, and say, we want to live within an international order that 

says that Iran’s march to nuclear weaponry is a concern and that 

uranium production for them is incredibly important toward that 

goal, and therefore we’re going to follow the international effort to 

eliminate or dramatically reduce their ability to obtain uranium. 

But some countries may very well not care. You both mentioned 

the possibilities of uranium mining in our hemisphere. Isn’t this a 

potential opportunity for Iran to work with countries who may not 

necessarily be concerned by the sanctions consequence? 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Well, apparently Bolivia and Venezuela 

are engaged with Iran companies and allowing mining activities to 

45

go on in their countries. Edhasse Sanat is an Iranian company that 

has industrial installations in both countries and operates mines in 

both countries. We can provide details about that. These countries 

may not care about the U.S. law, but they’re obligated under U.N. 

sanctions to deny Iran access to material that could encourage its 

rogue nuclear program. 

So I think there needs to be a considerable amount of attention 

paid to these activities that are going on and to hold these governments accountable, and I applaud you for the legislation that you 

have pushed in the Senate on this subject. But we can investigate, 

even though this is sort of denied territory—Venezuela and Bolivia 

being relatively unfriendly governments—we can nevertheless investigate the international financial transactions, dollar-denominated transactions, that are going on to this very day supporting 

Iran’s activities in both of these countries. 

Mr. BERMAN. Sir, if I may, a quick point. I think this is also in 

many ways an answer about the credibility of our sanctions threat. 

I commend you for passing legislation that begins to look at Iran’s 

uranium activities and begins to counter them. But historically I 

think it’s fair to say that our application of biting sanctions against 

Iran has lagged behind the Iranian threat, and as a result over 

time more than a few countries have come to view business with 

Iran as a calculated risk; they believe they can essentially get away 

with business as usual without facing serious censure from the 

United States. 

I fear that with that as historical precedent, these uranium sanctions will face the same high hurdle in terms of credibility. If 

Bolivia or Venezuela, which are not predisposed to cooperate with 

the United States and help isolate Iran, sense that, while Congress 

is seized of the need to sanction them because of this uranium activity, there is no concrete followthrough, they’re likely to continue 

business as usual. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m going to turn to Senator Rubio, but I 

think that the amendment that I authored and was passed 100 to 

nothing on sanctioning the Central Bank of Iran and sanctioning 

entities that deal with the Central Bank of Iran should send a 

pretty clear message to those who think they’re making a calculated risk and business decision, that it’s far more than a risk. So 

far, the administration’s enforcement of that has been one that I 

applaud. I look forward to its vigorous fulfillment as the different 

elements of the law come to pass. I think that is our last best 

chance at the end of the day to deter Iran’s behavior. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

First of all, the entire panel kind of continues to bring more clarity to this issue. I think we understand the Iranian side of this 

equation pretty clearly, based on your testimony, that what they 

get out of this is, No. 1, the ability to avoid sanctions or trying to 

avoid sanctions, particularly economic sanctions; No. 2 is access to 

uranium and other raw materials that they need for their ambitions; and the third is an operational platform, to have—this is a 

country that clearly uses terrorism as part of its foreign policy 

mechanisms, and they are, according to your testimony, increasVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:28 May 08, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2012IS~1\021612-B.TXT BETTY
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ingly trying to develop an operational platform in the region. We 

don’t know what stage that’s in, but any stage is not a good one. 

I want to focus for a moment on what these countries get out of 

it, and in particular what these governments in these countries. 

There’s clearly not a religious affinity here. I mean, they don’t 

share that. So what are—and my sense is, both from talking to 

expatriates from these countries and even people living there now, 

that it’s not like Iran is a beloved country by the Nicaraguan 

people, the people of Bolivia, the people of Ecuador, the people of 

Venezuela. 

In fact, in Venezuela there is a lot of resistance to the Cuban 

presence. You can only imagine the resistance there would be to 

the Iranian presence there. 

What does Hugo Chavez get out of this and what do the other 

leaders of these countries get out of this arrangement? Because 

they’re not getting the kind of economic support that Iran is promising. I don’t know who wants to go first, but I think that’s to the 

whole panel. 

Mr. FARAH. I would just say that what Venezuela is looking for 

and the Bolivarian states, I think as time has gone on they’ve become clearly increasingly criminalized as governments, particularly 

in the cocaine trade. I think the driving impetus has been for 

Chavez, from the letters I’ve read and stuff, his fascination with 

this ability to destroy the United States. If you read his letters to 

Carlos the Jackal, they’re really magnificently megalomaniacal: I 

am here, destined to do great things, and I hold your hand as we 

go forward into history together, et cetera, et cetera. 

So I think his personal view is of himself as this transcendent 

revolutionary figure, and I think that—but as time has gone on, I 

think they’ve become increasingly obsessed with the need to hang 

onto power at any cost. I think one of the fascinating things if you 

look at the Bolivarian trajectory is that they start out as elected 

and then over time they take over the judiciary, all the levers of 

government, destroy civil society, free press, et cetera. 

But it’s driven by the impetus that they know they can no longer 

leave power without facing consequences. 

I think that one of the things that Chavez finds, besides his deep 

attachment to this revolutionary, romantic idea that radical Islam 

and Marxism can coexist in the South-North conflict and defeat the 

United States, is the tremendous drive to hang onto power. 

I think that you mentioned terrorism as a foreign policy, a part 

of Iran’s foreign policy. The FARC is a part of Chavez’s foreign policy, and I think one of the great dangers you see in the region is 

the coalescing not only just of the state-to-state relationship, but 

the coalescing of the nonstate proxy relationship which you’re 

already seeing. 

This book, which was written, designed on Hezbollah’s strategy, 

has recently been found in FARC camps for the first time, which 

shows the transmission of one type of military doctrine into 

another state proxy. 

So I think long term they want to defeat the United States. I 

think that’s very real in their minds, whether it’s rational or not. 

And they really want to hang on to power more than anything else. 

I would say those are the two of the driving forces. 

47

Dr. ARNSON. If I could address this for a moment, there’s obviously a huge political benefit that Chavez and other countries in 

the region get from publicly appearing with Ahmedinejad. It’s an 

opportunity not only to assert independence from the United 

States, but actually to show their opposition to U.S. policy. I think 

that the mutual interests of the Iranians in showing up in the socalled United States backyard has a flip side, which is the interest 

of these governments in showing that they will oppose the United 

States and act to undermine its interests. I think that’s——

Senator RUBIO. Do you think there’s a domestic political benefit 

to appearing with Ahmedinejad, for example, for Chavez, or an 

international? In essence, do you think he looks like a bigger leader 

to his own people when he does this or do you think that’s more 

from an international perspective? 

Dr. ARNSON. I think it’s more from an international perspective. 

I mentioned the poll that was taken by Latinobarometro. It’s very 

clear that Iran is not popular in the region. Venezuela is partly a 

Caribbean country. The idea that women walk around in head 

scarves and covered, I mean, it’s just a foreign culture. So I don’t 

think that there’s any political benefit to the countries in Latin 

America for this kind of relationship, other than a kind of an assertion of nationalism and sovereignty in showing that they’re standing up to the ‘‘Yankee empire.’’

Senator RUBIO. I think, unless someone disagrees with what Mr. 

Farah said, we can add to that, but what about these other countries? Are they doing it because of Chavez, or what does Nicaragua 

get out of this? What does Bolivia get out of this? 

Ambassador NORIEGA. I think there are some material benefits 

that they’re getting from the associations, no doubt. I think a lot 

of it is political. They’re united, motivated by hostility to the 

United States and defiance of the United States. 

When we look at these regimes, and particularly Chavez, we 

have to sort of think in his mindset and what we might regard as 

irrational, provocative, or irresponsible he sees as just one more act 

of defiance and, more importantly, creating the means to threaten 

the United States in an asymmetrical struggle. 

So that’s what makes the fact that he’s dying so extraordinarily 

important right now, because there’s a real struggle that will go on 

in the next 12 months about whether the hard-liners will hold on 

to power in Venezuela and might continue to be hospitable to Iran 

or whether a democratic transition has some sort of a chance. 

That’s why we definitely need to be engaged. 

I would say that the U.S. Government really needs to pay attention to the military-to-military cooperation and what quite literally 

Venezuela is getting out of the Iranian relationship. I think we will 

be startled by what you find. 

Mr. BERMAN. As an Iran expert rather than a Latin American 

subject matter expert, I can only add a brief nuance. Ambassador 

Noriega talked in his testimony, at least in passing, about the 

transition that’s taking place in Venezuela. From the Iranian perspective, we have a situation that represents both crisis and 

opportunity. Iran, in seeking to entrench itself in the region, is 

very concerned about succession in Venezuela. It’s very concerned 

about its post-Chavez operating environment in the region. And, as 

48

a result, over the last 12 months it has stepped up its diplomatic 

and political contacts with the regime of Evo Morales in Bolivia, as 

well as with that of Rafael Correa in Ecuador. 

The health of those relationships, as Chavez continues to become 

more ill and the political transition takes hold in Venezuela, will 

be a very good barometer of how entrenched and how much freedom of operation Iran has after Chavez leaves the scene. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I just have one or two other questions. When 

we talk about the ability for operational capacity—Mr. Farah, 

maybe you, with your expertise on organized crime and drug cartels in the Western Hemisphere—but I welcome anybody’s assessment. Looking at Iran’s diplomatic outreach and commercial ventures, we know the IRGC and Quds ultimately in an Iranian 

context have a big part of their commercial enterprise behind them, 

which is why I targeted the IRGC in our sanctions legislation. 

Do you think that this is an opportunity for them to establish a 

force presence in the region? Is that something that is possible, and 

what would it take to be able to operationalize that? 

Mr. FARAH. Well, I think that targeting the IRGC is exactly 

right. I think that they are the driving economic force and in the 

military-to-military relationships. I think if you look at the merging 

of state and nonstate actors, which I think you’ve seen these hybrid 

transnational organized criminal organizations now appended to 

states, and you see particularly the government of Hugo Chavez, 

but also Evo Morales, using now transnational organized criminal 

groups as instruments of state policy, particularly the FARC. 

I think if you look at how they need specific control of geographic 

territory, I think that that is what primarily their alliance with 

these transnational organized criminal organizations can do. If you 

look at how products—illicit products—move across the region, if 

you’re moving 30 kilos of cocaine or 300 AK–47s or 30 Chinese illegal immigrants, they’re going to pass through the same basic pipelines and the same basic choke points, and 95 percent of the time 

they will cross our borders undetected and unimpeded. 

So I think access into that network, that pipeline that’s able to 

move any product basically across the northern tier of South America, through Central America, across our borders, undetected is tremendously beneficial to them if they choose to use that as a way 

to move either people or elements that could be either WMD or 

whatever. 

In the report I did for DOD, that was what we were looking at: 

What is the potential for WMD movement? That was our conclusion, that even a tiny country like El Salvador, the size of Massachusetts, has 460 puntos ciegos, blind crossing border points that 

are uncontrolled completely. They have no control over their air 

space. People routinely file a flight plan to land in Comalapa, the 

main airport, and then say, as they’re flying into Salvadoran air 

space: We’d like to land in San Miguel instead. And they say, OK, 

and there’s no customs, nothing. 

So there’s a whole pipeline available to them as they plug in, and 

I think that, particularly on the sanctions-busting, if you look at 

Panama again, as one of their crucial elements now in how both, 

Chavez, but particularly Iran, is using to launder their money or 

access money and access dual-use things. 

49

I’ll just end saying I had a fascinating talk with someone who 

had just left the International Atomic Energy Agency, who knew 

nothing about Latin America, but had been focusing on Iran for 

many years. I was asking them, what is their basic MO? When 

they’re doing dual-use things and things, what do they look at? He 

said: Well, they almost always do two things: tractor factories and 

car factories. 

I was like: No kidding? We have tractor factories and car factories both in Bolivia and Venezuela. And I asked him what the 

purpose of that was, and he said because they can get so many 

things that they need in the manifests, that are tucked away, that 

are impossible to detect unless you want to spend 6 months reviewing their manifest, that they can move virtually anything with 

those two things. He said that’s what they traditionally use, and 

if you look at what’s happening in Latin America, they’re building 

tractors that no one buys, cars that no one buys, and very few of 

them, but they have the factories and the shipping component 

mechanisms in place. 

Senator MENENDEZ. It’s interesting. 

One of my concerns I mentioned in the opening statement is that 

places like Venezuela and Bolivia require no visa from Iran, despite 

relatively weak certainly touristic ties. And even in Ecuador, we 

have seen movement of Somalis coming from Ecuador up, attempting to come into the United States. So the pipeline that you talked 

about for moving anything can start with an entry point at which 

there is no visa required. Is that a legitimate concern? 

Mr. FARAH. Absolutely. I think if you look at it—I’m doing a 

study for Homeland Security right now on human smuggling and 

one of the fascinating things is that almost every non-Central 

American large contingent of migrants goes through Ecuador. 

Why? Because Ecuador listed visa requirements on everyone except 

for two or three countries in the world. So they’re suddenly inundated with Chinese organized crime, Russian organized crime. It’s 

like water running downhill. As you well know, they’ll go where it’s 

easiest to operate, and suddenly Ecuador has become overwhelmed 

with massive criminal elements because it’s so easy to get there. 

Every group of Chinese, major group of Chinese, Indians, Sri 

Lankans, Somalis, pass through Ecuador for that precise reason. 

Having the opportunity to review some internal Ecuadoran documents on immigration, they had more than 480 Iranians coming 

and going out of there unregistered, not registered in the normal 

way, out of Ecuador, which isn’t a huge number, but given the fact 

that none of them are tourists, one should wonder what the purpose is, given that their embassy supposedly has a very limited 

number of people, about 6, when they probably have much closer 

to 50. 

But anyway, there’s numerous—there’s many interesting elements to what the lack of immigration control and the lack of visas 

offer countries like Iran, as well as transnational criminal organizations. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Two final sets of questions. 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Mr. Chairman, something to recognize as 

a tactical opportunity that the Iranians and terrorist organizations 

have acquired from the association with the Venezuelan authoriVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:28 May 08, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARIN~1\112THC~2\2012IS~1\021612-B.TXT BETTY
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ties: the estimates are there have been hundreds of thousands of 

official Venezuelan documents issued to people who have no real 

association with Venezuela, who can’t even speak Spanish. 

We’ve spoken with security officials throughout the hemisphere 

who refer to persons that they arrest or detain with Venezuelan 

passports who don’t even speak Spanish. 

The other question you asked about the operational capacity to 

detect what’s going on. The DEA was able to discover this October 

2011 plot to commit a bombing here in the United States, because 

they set aside conventional wisdom about what Iran would be capable of doing. And now we know from General Clapper that this 

bomb plot was a probably decision made at the very highest levels 

of the Iranian regime. 

The IRGC was involved in that activity. They are also mysteriously involved in industrial activities in Venezuela in the petrochemical industry, for example. You have to ask, What are they up 

to there? 

Also associated with the IRGC and the Quds Force, Mohsen 

Rabbani, who I referred to, who was the cultural attache ́ of Iran 

in Argentina and who was implicated in the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires. He maintains a network on behalf of 

Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere. People that he recruited 

when he was assigned in Argentina are still operating up and down 

the South American Continent, recruiting, proselytizing, and 

radicalizing. 

His brother lives in Brazil. Rabbani has a red notice from 

Interpol. He’s not supposed to be able to travel. He has traveled to 

Brazil at least a couple of times in the last 12 months. His brother 

runs a mosque in Brazil, where they recruited dozens of people to 

his cause. 

So the IRGC footprint is there and the common denominator is 

the audacity. We really need to pay attention to this and set aside 

conventional wisdom to understand what they’re capable of. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Dr. Arnson, I see you want to comment on 

this, and then I have a question for you. 

Dr. ARNSON. Just an additional comment. Assistant Secretary—

former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Tom Shannon, replied or commented during an earlier Ahmedinejad trip to 

Latin America that ‘‘Past is prologue,’’ and he was specifically 

referring to the Iranian involvement in the bombings that took 

place in Argentina in the early 1990s. One can only surmise that 

in the 20 or so years that have passed since those took place that 

that capacity has been expanded and has developed. 

Whether it’s an offensive capacity or a defense capacity is something that I certainly am not prepared to comment on. But one 

could imagine that Iran, as it feels encircled in the world and 

threatened by military attack, would actively seek to be able to 

strike back. Many of the panelists have referred to asymmetrical 

warfare and I find that extremely plausible as something that Iran 

would try to do. Whether I have evidence that that is actually 

taking place or whether it’s on the verge of becoming operational 

is not something that I can comment on. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that. 

51

Let me ask you—in a 2010 report on Iranian military power, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense noted that, ‘‘Iran seeks to increase its stature by countering U.S. influence and expanding ties 

with regional actors in Latin America.’’ Last month the Iranian 

regime formally launched HispanTV, a Spanish language analog to 

its English language press. What do you view that effort to be? 

Dr. ARNSON. Well, obviously, having a Spanish language news 

outlet is an effort to spread propaganda, win hearts and minds in 

the region. Iran faces a sharp uphill battle in that effort. There’s 

not a great deal of sympathy among populations, but it’s an obvious 

propaganda tool. 

I think it’s notable that it was several weeks after the Iranian 

President traveled to the region most recently in 2012 that that 

was announced. It’s an obvious attempt to spread the Iranian point 

of view among what it considers to be a potentially receptive audience. How effective that will be, I think, is anybody’s guess. My 

guess is that it will not be that well received. 

Senator MENENDEZ. My final question. There have been independent sources that have stated that Hezbollah has training 

camps in the jungles of Venezuela. I’m wondering if any of you 

have any information on that? Also, are any of you aware of newspaper reports of a jointly constructed missile base planned for 

Venezuela’s Paraguana Peninsula? Any of you have any knowledge 

of that? 

Mr. FARAH. On the training, sir, I would say that I think that 

the Univision documentary, and if you read the book by Antonio 

Salas, ‘‘El Palestino,’’ it goes into great detail, by a journalist who 

specializes in going undercover for many years. He spent time in 

the Hezbollah camps in Venezuela, and I think if you look at his 

track record, I don’t know him personally, but if you look at his 

track record of investigations, they’ve been really, really outstanding. Many people in his other investigations have been convicted and gone to jail based on evidence he’s provided. So I would 

take that seriously. 

I think that what the Univision folks were able to show was that 

you have a Venezuela colonel providing weapons and ammunition 

to militias being trained by folks who were formerly of Hezbollah 

in the field in Venezuela. It’s not as direct a tie as Mr. Salas makes 

in his book, but he gives names, dates, exact locations, et cetera. 

So I would say that that to me would be a very credible threat. 

On the missiles, my people tell me they don’t have any evidence 

to support that, but others may have. 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Regarding the published reports on the 

missiles, of course, we’ve seen those very specific reports for close 

to 2 years. We’ve received specific information that’s very disturbing, that tends to corroborate the possibility. 

This would be a real escalation, because the published reports 

that we’ve read refer to ballistic missiles, which would be a real 

escalation in the region, and it would require a U.S. response. No 

country in the region really would be capable of responding to that 

sort of escalation if Venezuela has acquired that capability. The 

good news is it would also unite other countries in the region with 

us in wanting to deal with that escalation. 

52

We have some information. We’d be glad to share it with the 

committee privately on that subject. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Just for the record, it is the reports of a missile base, not necessarily missiles. But we look forward to seeing some information. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

I want to close my part of this by focusing on the capacity part, 

because one of the challenges I have found here is—and it’s hard 

to get people to believe this. When people think about terrorism 

and terrorism threats to the United States or any threats to the 

United States, Latin America, the Western Hemisphere, is just not 

what comes to mind. It’s just not been the case. It’s just hard to 

get people to take it seriously. 

So we don’t know where they are capacity-wise. I think that’s 

still a matter of debate, although we clearly know what direction 

they’d like to go. That’s what I want to focus on before we close 

today, is intent; where their mindset is. 

Before that, if I can, I want to rely on an article from the Miami 

Herald that cites extensively from the Univision network’s documentary. It says—it talks about this former consul to Miami, Liva 

Acosta Noguera, and it says that ‘‘one month’’—‘‘The decision to 

expel her came one month after Spanish-language Univision network broadcast a documentary about Iran’s alleged terrorist activities in Latin America, including a taped segment in which she asks 

an alleged Mexican hacker to give her the access code to nuclear 

facilities in the United States. In the tape, the alleged hacker’’—

who is playing a part—‘‘says that he provided the secret codes and 

the location of each of the U.S. nuclear plants to Iran, and a voice 

attributed to her is heard to say ‘You should give me that,’ she 

says, ‘so that I can send it to the president,’ ’’—meaning Chavez—

‘‘ ‘or rather, the chief of defense. The chief of presidential security 

is my friend,’ she says.’’

This tape was made while she was the cultural attache ́ at the 

Venezuelan Embassy in Mexico. Then it goes on to say: ‘‘Documents obtained by the Herald indicate that she actually performed 

other functions there as well. According to these documents, Acosto 

and Vice Consul Edgar Gonzalez Belandria, who was in charge of 

issuing passports at the Miami consulate, were registered in the 

Savings Bank of the Bolivarian Intelligence Service, all indications 

that they are in the intelligence service’s payroll.’’ ‘‘Sources close to 

Venezuelan security organizations reached Belandria, said that 

they had knowledge that Acosto was a member of the Bolivarian 

intelligence network and that she did intelligence work while working in Mexico.’’

Now, obviously this wasn’t a real hacker and this wasn’t a real 

offer. But what I think the Univision documentary shows is intent. 

I guess my question is, in your opinions, based on what you’ve 

seen, know, and heard about Iran, is this an isolated incident of 

someone trying to show off and be a big shot, or is this the kind 

of miscalculation, is this kind of stuff that we can see from 

Venezuelan officials in the future, because at the very top of that 

organization we have someone that, as you’ve described him, is not 

in touch with reality, has these illusions about being some sort of 

53

transformational historical figure, and who as a result could lead 

to someone making a very serious miscalculation that could quickly 

escalate into a very big problem. 

So my question is, Is this an isolated thing about someone trying 

to show off? Was she just trying to be a big shot, or is this the kind 

of behavior that’s going on on a repetitive basis because people are 

taking direction from the attitude coming from the top? Because if 

it is, this is a recipe for a miscalculation and a regional disaster. 

Mr. FARAH. I would say it’s, unfortunately, far from an isolated 

incident. I think we’ve had numerous. In my work with the U.S. 

Government and elsewhere, it’s clear there is a network. I think 

this is one of the primary misunderstandings we have about the 

Bolivarian Project, is we view Venezuela, we view Bolivia, we view 

Ecuador, we view Nicaragua, when in fact they’re states operating 

with a common goal, sharing resources, and with a common 

criminalized element to them, which is deeply disturbing. 

But it also implies a very concrete common intelligence apparatus. If you look at the role that Cuba plays in this alliance, what 

they bring to the table is a very structured internal military intelligence apparatus that these countries have never had. Bolivia 

never had it. They tried. They never got—even through all the military—they never got anywhere near having a competent internal 

security service. 

Ecuador is the same thing. Iran has now provided President 

Correa with specific listening technology, intercept technology, that 

runs out of his palace and is directed by him directly. 

So I think that it is far from an isolated incident. I think exactly 

what you said is—I don’t know if—I think Hugo Chavez has a 

greatly exalted view of himself, obviously. I’m not sure that—he’s 

out of touch with reality, certainly as he views it. But I think that 

that’s exactly the type of—I think that is exactly the recipe for the 

miscalculation that worries me most, is that because they’re 

wrapped up in their own world and believe certain things are possible—if you read Vertrynge’s book, it’s really rather preposterous. 

It’s not a smart manual on asymmetrical warfare. It’s a diatribe 

against the United States and where to go to find out on line how 

to make weapons of mass destruction and why we should be able 

to do this to defeat the empire. 

It’s not a rational, coherent, military doctrine as you would lay 

out in a U.S. military academy or European or even Latin American military academy. But it shows this grandiosity of intent, and 

I think that that is a profoundly dangerous element to the 

Bolivarian revolution, and when you add in the Iranian mix. We 

have multiple other cases of Venezuelan diplomats operating as 

intelligence agents. We have multiple cases of Iranian diplomats 

operating as intelligence services, and multiple cases of the Cubans 

serving as facilitators among the different Bolivarian intelligence 

structures, which are now more united than they were. 

So I think it’s far from an isolated case, and I think that it is 

profoundly dangerous to live in a world where you think you can 

launch a nuclear attack as a way of destroying the United States 

and that there would be no rational consequences to it. 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Senator, I would like to add to that. I 

agree entirely with what Doug said, of course. That Univision 

54

report also included a tape of a Mexican youth who found himself 

in Qom at a training center. We’ve talked about this recruitment 

and training of youth, and here’s a guy literally on television explaining his experience. He recognized that this was not for him 

and he essentially fled the country. He saw people around him 

from other countries in Latin America who were being trained in 

this radical Islam and in terror methods and all of that. It was an 

insight into the sort of thing that we’re talking about, that’s happening behind the headlines. 

There is an interesting aspect of the Acosta Noguera situation. 

U.S. officials supposedly had access to this tape before she was 

even accredited as consul general in Miami. Why was she even 

allowed into the United States? More to the point, her former boss 

in Venezuela’s Bolivarian intelligence system, who’s now retired, 

was just given a visa to enter the United States. I guess he’s going 

to Disneyland or something. But it’s just like we do not learn——

Senator RUBIO. Who is her former boss? 

Ambassador NORIEGA. I can get you the name. 

Senator RUBIO. OK. 

Ambassador NORIEGA. I was told by a U.S. law enforcement official, who was very frustrated that this person was given the visa 

to enter the United States. 

Senator RUBIO. Is the Disney World thing just—is that really 

what’s happening? 

Ambassador NORIEGA. I don’t know. 

Senator RUBIO. Oh, OK. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Senator Rubio has a very serious concern 

about Disney World. [Laughter.] 

Senator RUBIO. That’s right. I care who we let in there. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me close, thank the panelists and make 

an observation. After September 11, when as a Member of the 

House of Representatives I sought to invoke into law all of the recommendations of the September 11 Commission, I said: ‘‘We live in 

a new world. It is a world in which an airplane used for commercial and business travel has become a weapon of mass destruction. 

It is a world in which a letter can be used as a deadly weapon 

when it is laced with anthrax. It is a world in which we must think 

differently than we thought before September 11.’’

It is in that spirit that I view what this hearing is about; that 

we must look at the potential, the possible, think outside of the 

box, understanding that if I wanted to do harm to the United 

States, and could operationalize the ability to do that in America’s 

front yard, then I certainly would want to. 

That doesn’t mean that it will effectuate itself, but I would think 

that the desire to do so would be real, and therefore I take General 

Clapper’s comment seriously. I take the Department of Defense’s 

view of the efforts of influence here seriously. And it is in that 

spirit that we have held this hearing and will continue to pursue 

information as it relates. 

Since I assumed the chairmanship of the subcommittee, I’ve had 

it as my focus to pay attention to this part of the world, which has 

often not had the full attention of the broad scope of U.S. policy in 

a way that is in our national interest and our national security. 

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So I appreciate all of the witnesses’ attention, and we thank you 

for your insights. I thank my colleague for his full engagement. 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

OP-ED BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA AND RANKING

MEMBER OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

[From the Miami Herald, Feb. 15, 2012] 

GROWING RISK POSED BY IRAN-VENEZUELA AXIS

(By Senator Richard G. Lugar) 

The growing and deepening alliance between the mullahs of Iran and the America-bashing leader of Venezuela, Hugo Cha ́vez, poses a serious threat to U.S. 

national interests, but the Obama administration has been behind the curve in appraising these risks and forging effective policies to counter them. 

The administration’s neglect of the dangers in the Iran-Venezuela bonds assumes 

greater importance against the backdrop of the rising tensions in the Middle East. 

Iran continues to be a direct threat to U.S. national security, the security of our 

close ally, Israel, and other U.S. interests. As Iran accelerates its drive toward 

building a nuclear weapon in the face of growing U.S.-led sanctions, the probabilities grow of a major conflict in the region. 

Countries that support Teheran, such as Venezuela, could be tempted to serve as 

proxies for Iran around the world and in coordination with Iran openly challenge 

the United States. Iranian government officials have already made statements to 

the effect that any response to aggression would include the closing of the Strait 

of Hormuz, the choke point through which a fourth of the world’s oil moves. Venezuela, in sympathy with its friend Iran, could at the same time cut off its oil exports to the United States or take other steps to disrupt oil supplies. 

Yet the administration has paid little attention to Venezuela’s tightening links 

with Iran and the consequences for U.S. security. The most glaring recent example 

is President Obama’s cavalier decision last year to delay construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, which would bring Canadian oil down to Gulf Coast refineries 

that now rely heavily on Venezuelan crude. Ending our energy dependence on Venezuela would take the oil weapon out of Cha ́vez’s hands, in effect disarming him 

without firing a shot. 

Hostile Iranian actions in the Western Hemisphere are not far-fetched, they are 

a reality. Iran is seeking to establish terrorist networks around the world, and it 

sponsored a terrorist attack in Buenos Aires in 1992. The bizarre plot by Iran 

against Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington, disrupted last year, further illustrates the mullahs’ brazen intentions. 

The chances of Venezuela serving as Iran’s surrogate in the hemisphere through 

terrorism or other coordinated action are increased by its chaotic state of affairs. 

Venezuela is in the midst of a make-or-break election that will determine the survival of its democracy amid continuing doubts about President Cha ́vez’s health and 

a welcomed show of will by its diverse opposition groups. Divisions in Venezuela’s 

Russian-armed military, an inflation rate over 30 percent, a dilapidated oil infrastructure, widespread food and energy shortages, and soaring crime rates are all 

putting heavy pressure on President Cha ́vez. 

President Cha ́vez may think he would benefit from redirecting attention away 

from his domestic troubles by uniting his followers and feeding his paranoid ‘‘antiimperialist dreams’’ in a battle against the United States. 

At the same time, Iranian-Venezuelan ties are steadily growing. Iranian President 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a five-day visit last month to Venezuela and three 

other Latin American countries, his fifth trip to the region since 2005. 

If Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz in a conflict, global oil prices would 

skyrocket. Venezuela supplies about 10 percent of current U.S. imports of crude oil 

and petroleum products. In a scenario where the Strait is closed, a coordinated shutdown of Venezuela’s oil to the United States would be a double blow to the United 

States. 

I call on the Obama administration to address promptly the threats to the United 

States should Venezuela use energy as a weapon. The president should:

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• Issue an explicit warning to Venezuela that the United States would regard a 

cut off of oil exports in coordination with a belligerent Iran as a threat to U.S. 

national interests. 

• Expand strategic energy agreements with Brazil and other countries in the 

hemisphere to help assure access to supplies of petroleum, refined products and 

ethanol in the event of a crisis. 

• Immediately approve construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, as he is authorized to do under a recent law I sponsored, to supply Canadian crude to the Gulf 

Coast refineries that now depend on supplies from Venezuela.

Æ