* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estop pel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nev ertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condition s of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 14, 2005
Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-6072 KHAMPHAY SOUVANNARATH, Defendant-Appellant. (D.C. No. CR-04-173-R) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE , LUCERO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
Khamphay Souvannarath pled guilty to being a felon in possession of two firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), an d to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of 120 months as to the first count, and a sentence of 188 months as to the second count, with the sentences to run concurrently. Souvannarath was sentenced on Februa ry 17, 2005, which was after the decision was filed in United States v. Booker , 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). On2

appeal, Souvannarath challenges his sentence as “un reasoned and unreasonable” under the Bookerstandards. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. I. Background On July 28, 2004, law enforcement officers served ano-knock search warrant at Souvannarath’s residence in Enid, Oklaho ma. Prior to serving the search warrant, officers stopped Souvannarath’s veh icle and detained him. Under the driver’s seat of Souvannarath’s vehicle, office rs found several coin bags containing a white powder. Officers also discovere d another bag with a larger amount of white powder. After chemical analysis of the substance, it was positively identified as 9.33 grams of methamphetam ine. During the search of Souvannarath’s residence, officers found two fully loaded handguns in a bedroom dresser. II. Discussion Souvannarath argues that the district court failed to adequately consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) , and as a result, it imposed an excessive sentence. Additionally, under § 3553(c), he contends that the district court failed to sufficiently articulate reasons forthe 188 month sentence. We review “the district court’s legal interpretatio n and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and review the court’ s factual findings for clear error, giving due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to1 The statutory maximum for Souvannarath’s firearms offense was 120 months. 3 the facts.” United States v. Henry , 164 F.3d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999). Moreover, we now review sentences for “reasonablene ss” looking to the factors discussed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for guidance. Boo ker , 125 S.Ct. at 766; see United States v. Morales-Chaires , No. 05-1190, 2005 WL 3307395, at *4 (10th Cir. Dec. 7, 2005) (applying the reasonableness sta ndard to a post-Booker sentencing). In light of Souvannarath’s status as a career offen der under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, a total offense level of 29, and a criminal history category of VI, the presentence report calculated his guideline range t o be 151 to 188 months. 1 Neither Souvannarath nor the government raised any objections to the presentence report. At sentencing, Souvannarath asked the dist rict court for leniency and a sentence of six years. The government made no reco mmendation. After considering the applicable guideline range, the dis trict court stated: Well, Mr. Souvannarath, I have read and considered the presentence report and your case . . . and I must say that base d upon your history, I just–I just disagree with your assessment of the case. I do understand that I’m not bound by the guidelines, bu t I think in this case I certainly have to give them deference and I think they’re appropriate in this case, and because of your histo ry of violence and your involvement with weapons and drugs, that the h igh end of the guidelines are appropriate in your case.
Vol. II at 6.4

We conclude that the district court’s statements re flect that it properly considered the sentencing factors enumerated in § 3 553(a). See United States v. Kelley , 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that we do not require the district court “to consider individually each facto r listed in § 3553(a) before issuing a sentence,” “nor do we demand that the dis trict court ‘recite any magic words’ to show us that it fulfilled its responsibil ity to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider”) (citation omitted). Similarly, we determine that the district court satisfied its bur den to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular senten ce.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). On a final note, we observe that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Souvannarath’s 188 month sentence, although at the high end of the guideline range, is unreasonable. Accordingly, Souvannarath’s sentence is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge