### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Marc h 18 , 200 4 S es sio n TO N Y A P ET R EC E R A Y v. WI LL IA M M A R TI N R A Y v. S TE P HE N ER IC STA GGS
A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 99D-662 The Honorable Carol Solom an, Jud ge

No. M2003- 01158-COA-R 3-CV - F iled May 18, 2004

Natura l father

of minor twin children a ppeals trial c ourt' s final orde r of c ustody and visitation on multipl e g rounds, alleg ing primarily that (1) the trial court e rre d in awar ding visitation to stepfathe r; (2) the trial court e rre d in refusing to c hang e children' s surname to that of their natura l father ; and (3 ) the tr ia l c ou rt

imp ro pe rl y

ba se d it s o pin ionon a

se a le d p sy c ho log ic a l r e po rt . We a ff ir m in pa rt , reve rse in part, and re mand. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t, Reve rsed in Par t and Rem anded
W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.
C l ark L ee S h aw , Na s h v i l l e, Fo r A p p el l an t , S t ep h en E ri c S t aggs Randle W. Hill, J r., Na shville, For Appe llee, Tony a Petre ce Ra y (Holland)
J ohn M. L . Br own, Nashville, F or Appe llee, Willi am Martin Ray
OP IN ION The pre sent ca se is befor e this Court for a third time. During the pendenc y of this liti g ation, the app e lle e , T on y a

Pe tr e c e Ra y , h a s r e marrie d. F or the pu rp os e s o f this app e a l, w e wi ll refer to Tony a Petre ce Ra y

as “Mr s. Holland.” Appe llant Stephen Eric Stag g s also marrie d , and has since chang ed his last name to “Moore ,” taking his wife’ s maiden name as his own. For the purposes of this appea l, we will ref

er to Stephen Eric Stagg s as “Mr. Moore.” As in the previous opinions , we will continue to refe r to appe llee Willi am Martin Ray as “Mr . Ray .”-2-

The pe rtinent fac ts and proce dural i n f o rma tion were aptly

summarized by

the Middle Section of this Court in the Rul e 10 appe al, Ray v. Ray , N o
. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 5 5 3

- CO A -R10-CV, 2 0 0 2 WL 1466095 (Tenn. Ct. App. July9, 2002):

Tony a Petre ce Ray

g ave birth to twins on Dec ember 19, 1997. Even thoug h she wa s marrie d to Wi lliam Martin Ray at the time, the c hil dr e n’ s u nd isp ute d biol og ic a l f a the r w a s Ste ph e n E ri c Sta g g s w ith wh o mM s
. R ay h a d h ad a r o m an t i c t ry s ti n ea rl y 1 9 9 7

. M r. S t aggs int e rv e ne d in the Ra y s’ 19 99 div or c e pr oc e e din g to fo rm a lly e sta bli sh his pa re nta g e of the tw ins a nd to obt a in cu sto dy . T he Ra y s v ig or ou sly o p p o s e d M r
. S t a g g s ’ s r e q u e s tf o r c u s t o d y. Following a bench trial, the trial court conclude d that Ms. Ray w a s u n f it to h a v e c u s to d y

o f h e r c h il d r e n
. T h e c o u r t th e n a w arded custody of the twins to Mr. Ray beca use he w as compa

ratively more fit than Mr. Stag g s. After Mr. Stag g s’s lawy er pointed out th at the trial court ha d used the wr ong custody standard, the trial court e ntere d an o t h er order

concluding “by

very clea r and c onvincing proof that there is a substantial risk and dang er of g reat ha rm to these childre n if place d with the natura l pare nts.” Notwithstanding this finding , the trial court g rante d Mr. Stag g s week l y supervised visitation and extended unsupervised visitation d u ri ng the summer of 2000 a nd appar ently

the summer of 2001.
Mr . St a g g s app e a le d the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c us tod y de c isi on to this court. On O ctober

5, 2001 , we i ssued an opinion vac ating the c us tod y or de rs . We c on c lud e d, in p art , th a t:
The e vidence prese nted at the Dec ember 1999 hearing re g arding Mr. Stag g s does not clea rly and c on vin c ing ly

de pic t a pe rs on wh o w ou ld be a n u nf it pare nt. By

the time of the he aring , Mr. S t aggs had held a we ll-pay ing job f

or over eig hteen months and had ea rned the trust and re spect of his e mploy er. H e [was] also married to a woman he had bee n dating for app ro xima te ly

e ig hte e n mo nth s, a ndhe ha d b e e n f ull y int eg rate d into her fa mily . He ha d earned the a dmi ration and re sp e c t of his wi fe ’s pa

re nts fo r h is honesty and tena city . He ha d also g ained e x perie nce withy o u n g c h il d r e n a n d w a s s e r v in g a s a v o lu n teer coac h for a YMCA y outh basketball prog ram. In light of this evidence , we f

ind that the tr i al court placed undue we ight on Mr. Stag g s’s past conduc t rather than-3- on his curr ent fit ness t o have custody of his children. [ Ra y v . Ray , 83 S.W .3d 726, 737 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2 0 0 1 )

. ]
Ba sed on this conclusion, we vacated the portions of the J anuar y 1 2 , 2000 and April 3, 2000 orders de ny ing Mr . Stagg s’s petition for custody

of the twins and

rema nd[ed] the ca se to the trial court with directions to c on du c t a

he ari ng c on sis te nt with th is o pin ionto determine whether Mr. S tag g s is curr ently fit to have custody of his children and whether g ranting Mr. Stagg s custody

will expose his children to substantial ha rm . Pe nd ing thi s h e ari ng , t he tria l c ou rt sh a ll pr e sc ri be app ro pria te vis itatio n f or Mr . St a g g s a ndhis children. [Id . at 738.] Mr. Ray filed a Te nn. R. App. P. 11 a p p l i ca t ion for permission to appea l on N ovember 30, 2001, which has not y et bee n a c te d o n b y

the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt

. On April 29, 2002, Mr. Stag g s fil ed a motion re questing e xten de d s umm e r v isi ta tio n d uring 20 02 on e sse nti a lly the sa me terms as his unsupervised visit ation during the s ummers of 2000 and 20 0 1 . The trial c ourt hea rd ar g ument on this mot ion on May 31, 2002. Acc ording to an uncontra dicted acc ount of the May 31, 2002 pr oc e e din g fi le d w ith thi s c ou rt by Mr . St a g g s:
2. J udg e S o l o m an stated that acc ording to the Ap p el l ate Court opinion, she fe lt that she could not g ive Mr. Moore [S tag g s] an ex tended visi tation beca use she f elt that Mr. M o ore w as a dang erous person, that the minor twin children would be e x posed to substantial risk of harm, that Mr. M oore was a ba d pe rs on , a nd that she tho ug ht the Cou rt of Ap pe a ls f

e lt that Mr. Moore w as an unfit pare nt and that ac cording t o t h ei r o p i n i o n , J u d ge S o l o m an d i d n o tgo fa r e n o u gh in her order. J udg e Soloman acknow ledg ed that she had allowe d the extended summer visitation for the previous two y ear s, but she stated that she f elt the Ap pe llate Cou rt , in the ir op ini on , did no t w a nt h e r t o allow any unsupervised visitation bec ause Mr. Moore wa s a dange rous per son. J udg e Soloman stated that-4- sh e w a s h a v in g [a ] d if

f ic u lt ti me in te rp r e ti ng the Cou rt of Ap pea ls [s ic ] opi nio n a ndthat sh e ke pt a c o p y o f t h e d e c i s i o n n e ar h e r a l l t h e t i m e
. J o h n M

. L. Br own, attorne y for Mr. Ray , stated that in last y ear ’s ag ree d order

allowing Mr. Moore to ha ve an e x tended summer visitation with t he minor chi l d re n, Mr. Ray stated that he r eluctantly

ag ree d to allow t he minor children to go w ith Mr. Moore. Mr. B rown stated that M r. Ray was opposed to Mr. Moor e having any summer or holi day

visitation wit h the minor children.
3. M r
. M o o r e ’ s c o u n s e l a s k e d th a t h e b e ab le to see the childre n on Father’s D ay for a n e xtended visitation and Judge Soloman aske d Mr. Ray what he had planned to do with the children for F ather ’s Day . Mr. Ra y state d th a t he wa s g oin g to s pe ndthe day wi th them, then he further stated that he wa s g oing to take them out of

town. J udg e Soloman then stated that the chil dren w ould also be able to see Mr. Ray ’s father, and then of

fer ed to al l o w M r. Moore to spend one hour o f s u pervised visitation with the children at McDona ld’s for dinner on Father’s D ay . Mr. Moore declined. Judge Soloman state d that Mr. Ray was the min or c hil dr e n’ s f

a the r, a ndthat Mr . M oo re wa s th e ir n a t u r a l f a t h e r
. M r
. S h a w o b

j e c t e d t o t h a tt e r m i n o l o g y.

******************************************
5

. J udg e Soloman sua spon te in d ic a te d th a t M r. Moore c ould not have an e x tended visitation with the min or tw in c hildren un ti l he u nd e rw e nt a psy cholog ical eva luation and the minor c hildren underw ent a psy cholo g ical eva luation determining what h ar m , i f any , it would cause the children. She sug g ested Ray

Potts and sua spon te order ed Mr. Ray to make an a

ppointment fo r the c hildren. Mr. Shaw asked the Court to se t a time limit and Judge Soloman ref used but she did se t another court date for J uly 19, 2002. J udg e Soloman stated she would take the issues under a dvisement until the ev aluations had be en completed.-5- On J une 19, 2002, Mr. S tag g s filed a petition to hold Mr. Ray in contempt for r efusing to permit his reg ular Sunday visitation on J une 16, 2002. Thetrial court summarily declined to or der Mr . Ray to show cause and dismissed the petition. On J une 27, 2002, the court filed an order direc ting Mr. Ray to “ take the sub j ec t ch i l dren immediately

for a thoroug h psy cholog ical eva luation” and or dering Mr . St a g g s to “ make a n app oin tme nt a nd

.. . su bmi t him se lf to a fu ll and complete psy cholog ical eva luation” once the childre n have be en evaluated. The trial court also suspended all of M r. S t ag g s’s visitation “pending the outcome [of] the psy cholog ical eva luations presc ribed a

bove” and set the matter “ for r eview” on J uly 19, 2002.
Mr . St a g g s f

ile d a n a pp lic a tio n for e xtra or din ary app e a l w ith this court on J uly

1, 2002, along with a motion fo r stay of the orde r suspending visitation and to remove the trial judg e fr om the case on the g round of bias. I n response to this court’s order, Mr . Ray filed a response to M r. Stagg s’s application and motions on J uly 8, 2002. Whil e he did not take issue with Mr. Stagg s’s ac count of the May 31, 20 02 pr oc e e din g s, Mr . Ray a sse rt s th a t a n e xtra or din aryapp e a l is unnece ssary

beca use the “ trial court ha s done nothing mor e than show conce rn for

the welf are of the subjec t children.” Ray , 2002 WL

1466095 at *1-3.
I n ruling upon Mr. Moore’ s extraordinary appea l of the trial court’ s J une 27, 2002 orde r, the court stated:
T h e t ri al court’s J une 27, 2002 orde r re prese nts a clea r d ep ar t u re fr o mt h e a cc ep t ed an d u s u al co u rs e o f j u d i ci al p ro ce ed i n gs for three rea sons. First, it is based on a palpa ble misinterpretation of our October 5, 2001 opini on. Nothing in this opinion concludes, or even intimates, that Mr. Stag g s is an “unfit per son,” that the trial co u rt d id not “g o far

enoug h” in its origina l order de ny ing Mr

. Stagg s’s reque st for custody , or that t h i s court “ did not want ... [t he trial court] to allow any

unsupervised visitation beca use ... [ he] was a dang erou s person.” To the contra ry , we he ld that the evidenc e “does not c lear ly

and convinc ingly depict a per son who would be a n u n fi tp ar en t ” an d t h at t h e t ri al co u rt ’s re as o n s fo r d en y i n g M r. S t aggs c us tod y of hi s c hil dr e n “ pla c e d u nd ue we ig ht o n M r. Sta g g s’ s p a st c on d u c t r a t h e r t h a n o n h i s c u rr e n t f i t n e s s t o h a v e c u s t o d y o f his child re n
. ” A cc o rd i n gl y , we v ac at ed t h e d en i al o f M r. S t aggs ’s custody reque st and rema nded the c ase w ith inst ructions to conduct a hearing into Mr. Stagg s’s curr ent fitness to have custody of hi s children.T h e trial c o u rt’s o rd e r in c lud e s the ju d g e ’s ha n d w ritten no te tha t M r. M o o re a g re e d in o p e n c o u rt to “su b m it 1 h i ms el f t o a f u l l a n d c ompl et e ps y ch ol og i ca l ev al u at i on
. ” T h e r ec or d on appe al i n cl u des a s ec on d or der , f i l ed Ju l y 12, 20 02 , di rec t i ng M r
. M oo r e “ t o m eet wi t h D r
. M ar gar et Smi t h on Jul y 17, 200 2 at 2: 00 p. m. for a ps y chol ogi cal eval uat i o n. ” T he t ri al co urt subseq uent l y vacat ed i t s Jul y 12 , 20 0 2 ord er af t er consi d eri ng t hi s C o urt ’ s o p i ni o n i n Ray
v. Ray , N o
. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 5 5 3

- C O A

- R 1 0

- C V , 20 0 2 W L 1 4 6 6 0 9 5 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. Jul y 9, 20 0 2 ). -6- Pe nd in g t his he ari ng , w e su c c inc tly dir e c te d th e tr ia l c ou rt to “pre scribe a

ppropriate visitation for Mr. Stag g s and his children.”
The sec ond defe ct in the re asoning in the J une 27, 2002 order is that it is not ba sed on any materia l e vidence reg arding Mr. Stag g s’s curr ent fitness to exercise unsupervised visitation with his children....

******************************************************
The third defec t in the J une 27, 2002 orde r is the trial court’s d ec i s i o n , ap p ar en t l y

o n i t s o wn i n i t i at i v e, t o re q u i re t h at M r. S t aggs a ndthe tw ins be su bje c te d to ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio ns
. Whil e 1 Te nn . R. Ev id. 70 6 p e rm its a tr ia l cou rt to ap po int e xpe rt wi tne sse s, these ap p o i n t ments should not be made without some fac tual predic ate f

or the ne cessity

of such a n unusual step. The f actua l pr e dic a te fo r r e qu ir ing pa re nts a ndc hil dr e n to su bmi t to psy cholog ical examinations under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35 is discusse d at some leng th in Odom v. Odom , N o
. M 1 9 9 9

- 0 2 8 1 1

- CO A

- R3- CV, 2001 WL 1543476, at *4-9 (T enn. Ct. App. Dec . 5, 2001), pet. reh’g denied , (T e nn . Ct . A pp . Jan . 8 , 2 00 2) (N o T e nn . R. Ap p. P. application filed) . The re cord indicates that the trial court lacked a fa ct u al b as i s fo r o r d e ri n g t h at M r. S t aggs an d t h e c h i l d re n u n d er go ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio ns
. Acc ording ly , we va cate the J une 27, 2002 order and r emand the c a se fo r f

urthe r pr oc e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith thi s o pin iona ndthi s court’s O ctober

5, 2001 opinion. At the hearing c urre ntly schedule d for J uly 19, 2002, the trial court is dire cted to pr ovide the parties an op po rtun ity

to p re se nt e vid e nc e bo th in fa vo r o f and in o pp os iti on to Mr. Stag g s’s reque st for extended summer visitation an d to make a decision re g arding this request for visitation based o n the evidenc e. At this j uncture , we de ny Mr. Stag g s’s reque st to remove the tria l judge from thi s case beca use errors in re asoning and failure to follow established proc edure s do not ne cessa rily indicate bias, e ither in favor o f o r a g a i n s ta p ar t i c u l ar

p ar t y. Id . at *4-5.-7-

A hea ring was held on J uly

19, 2002, during which the tria l court wa s primarily conce rned with identify ing a s uitable evaluator t o conduct psy cholog ical ex aminations of Mr. Moore and the ch i l d re n
. By

o rd er en t er ed Au gu s t 7 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e tri al co u rt s et fo rt h t h e f o l l o wi n g p er t i n en tfi n d i n gs fr om the he ari ng : [Mr . M oo re ] wil l ha ve e xten de d v isi ta tio n w ith [the tw ins ]

from 6 : 00 p.m. on Aug ust 9, 2002, [ until] 6:00 p.m. on August 18, 2002.

****************************************************** The pa rties have agr eed in open court that psy cholog ical e v a l u a t i o n s ar e ap p r o p r i a t e
. T o n ya P e tr e c e R a y , W i l l i a mM ar t i n R a y, a ndSte ph e n Er ic Sta g g s ( Mo or e ) w ill the re fo re pa rt ic ipate in ps y c ho log ical e va luatio ns , in c lud ing e va luatio ns of pa re nti ng sk ill s a ndpr op ens ity

to a bu se . [Mr . H oll a nd ] an d E mil y Mo or e [(“ Mr s. Moore” )] may

submit t o such eva luations if they wish to do so. Such eval uat ions w ill be pe rf orme d b y

Dr . V ic tor

Pe str ak w ho wi ll determine whether

the twins need to be evaluated an d , i f so, by wh om.
On A u g u s t 2 1 , 2 0 0 2 , M r
. M o o r e f i l e d a m o t i o n f

o r t h e a s s e s s m e n t o f c o u r t c o s ts. Sho rt ly there afte r, Mr. Ray filed a motion see king execution of the unpaid bala nce ow ed by Mr. Moore on the ch i l d s upport arr ear ag e judg ment of $7,906.00, and of the court’s J anuary

2000 judgme nt direc ting Mr. Moor e to pay to Mr. Ray

$585

. 0 0, repr esenting the cost of pa renta g e testing . Mr. Ray ’ s mo ti o n f

u r th e r s o u g h t a

ju d g me n t a g a in s t M r
. M o o r e “ inth e a mo u n t o f $ 1 , 5 00.00, repr esenting the attorne y

fee s awa rded in the order of J anuary 12, 2000 [which was neve r] reduce d to judgment.”
Mr . M oo re ne xt fi le d a

mot ion fo r “ a dd iti on a l, a pp ro pri ate vi sita tio n” wi th the tw ins in acc ordanc e with t his Court’s October 5, 2001 and J uly 9, 2002 opinions. The motion further stated that Mr. Moore ha d arr anged fo r an appointment with Dr. Pestrak to under g o psy cholog ical evaluation. On September 5, 2002, Mr. Moore filed a motion asking the court to “vacate its order re qu ir ing him

to s ub mit

to ps y c ho log ic a l te sti ng a nd to or de r the tr a ns fe r o f c us tod y of [the tw ins ] to their fathe r, E ri c M o o re, a s indicated by the opinions, orders, a nd direc tives of the Te nnessee Court of Appea ls.”
A hea ring was he l d o n S ep t ember 13, 2002 to discuss court costs, execution on prior judgme nts in favor of Mr. Ray , and Mr. Moore’ s reque st f or additional visitation. No testimonyor su bs ta nti ve e vid e nc e wa s int ro du c e d re g ard ing the iss ue of wh e the r M r. Mo or e wa s c ur re ntl y fi t to a c t a s th e c us tod ia l pa

re nt fo r the tw ins or wh e the r g ranti ng c us tod y to M r. Mo or e wo uldpo se a ri sk of su bs ta nti a l harm to the tw ins

. On Se pte mbe r 26, 20 02 , the tr ia l c ou rt fi le d a n o rd e r s e tti ng fo rth t h e f o l l o wi n g fi n d i n gs fr o mt h e S ep t em b er1 3 , 2 0 0 2 h ea ri n g:-8- (1) Mr. [Moore] will have supervised visi tation with the twins ever y o th e r w e e k e n d f

r o m 6 :0 0 p
. m. o n F r id a y [u n ti l] 1 1 a
. m. on Saturday

.... (2) Asse ssment of court c osts incurred a fter January 12, 2000, will be held in abey ance until the fi n al h ea ri n g of this cause . I n no e ve nt, ho we ve r, wi ll M r. [Moo re ] be re qu ir ed to pa y fo r c os ts incurre d by Mr. and Mrs. Ray in their orders of prote ction that wer e litigated at the commence ment of this case

. (3 ) T he c ourt has be e n ta sk e d b y the Cou rt

of Ap pe a ls t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r

t h e t w i n s w o u l d b e s u b s t a n t i a l l y h ar m e d b y a tr a ns fe r o f c us tod y

fr om Mr . Ray to M r. [Moo re ]. I n o rd e r t o d o th is, the tr ia l c ou rt des ir e s th a t Mr . [Mo or e ] an d th e c hil dr e n s ub mit to ps y c ho log ical e va luatio ns to e ns ur e that no su bs ta nti a l ha rm re su lts to the children a s a re sult of such transfe r. Mr. [Moore] w ill therefor e submit t o a psy cholog ical eva luation, as previously order ed by

the co u rt and ag ree d to by

him. Such evaluation will be per formed by previous orde r. The children will be evaluated by Dr. James Walker, V a n d e r b il t [ ( “ D r
. Wa lk e r ” ) ]. (4) The issue of whe ther Mr. Ray is e ntitled to ex ecute on the arr ear ag e judg ment here tofore a war ded in his favor and ag ainst Mr. [ M o o re ] i n t h i s ca u s e i s re s er v ed fo r t h e f i n al h ea ri n g. (5) Mr. Ra y

is entitled to ex ecute on the j udg ment for $585.00
a wa rd e d to him anda g a ins t Mr . [Mo or e ] in the fi na l de c re e of thi s cause . I ntere st may

be ca lculated f

rom J anuary

12, 2000. (6) In [p ar a g r ap h ] 9 o f th e f in a l d e c r e e in th is c a u s e , Mr. [Moore] was ordere d to pay Mr. Ray an attorne y ’s fe e of $1,500.00, but that awar d was not re duce d t o j u d g ment. Mr. Ray is theref ore awa rded a judgme nt a g ainst Mr. [Moore] in the amount of $1,500.00, with pre-judg ment interest fr om J anuary 12, 2000.
On October 17, 2002, Mr. Moore f iled sever al motions seeking , inte r a lia , the assessment of court costs acc rued a fter the trial court ’s J an u ary 12, 2000 ruling , attorney ’s fe es, and pay ment of fe es incurr ed for

the psy cholog ical eva luations of Mr. Moore and his children.
An oth e r h e ari ng wa s h e ld o n N ov e mbe r 7 , 2 00 2, a t w hic h the p sy cho log ic a l r e po rt s completed with re g ard to the twi n s an d M r. Moore were admitted into evidence . The c ourt questioned Mr. Moore reg arding his curre nt wife’s a bilityto control her be havior de spite an ea rlier vio le nt c on fr on ta tio n w ith Mr . Ray ou tsi de of the c ou rt

ro om, a nd the tw ins ’ r e la tio ns hip wi th the ir-9-

stepmother. The court a lso questioned Mrs. Holland about her curr ent employ ment status and future car eer aspirations, her new husba nd, and the spe cifics of her c urre nt residenc e. The court’s or der, e nte re d N ov e mbe r 2 2, 20 02 , s ta te d in pe rt ine nt p a rt :
This cau s e came to be he ard on the 7th day of Nove mber, 2002, befor e the Honora

ble Carol Soloman, f

or the determination of custody and visitation issues as directe d by the C ourt of Appeals. The Cou rt is i mpr e sse d w ith Dr . Jam e s Wa lke r, Ph. D. , a ndfoun d h is report to be very

helpful and va luable.
Ba sed on Dr. Walker ’s s ug g estion of a g radua l transition, the Court finds it to be in the children’s be st interest, af ter the acquie scenc e of Mr . Ray

to the chang e of visitation and to t he custody of Mr . M oo re a s f

oll ow s:
Mr . M oo re sh a ll h a ve c us tod y of the tw o (2) min or

tw in children....

****************************************************** During t he we ek of F ebrua ry 10, 2003, Mr. Moore w ill take the childre n to Dr. Walker f or further counseling and/or examination, and re quest a re port to be filed under se al with this Court byFe bruary 20, 2003, prior to the re view on F ebrua ry 21, 2003.
No ne of the p art ie s, no r the ir

ma te s, sh a ll d o a nythi ng to c omp ro mis e the g oo d me nta l he a lth a nd pe a c e fu l tr a ns iti on of the se babies. I f t hey do, it will indicate serious problems t o this Court. The ste p- mothe r, Mr s. Mo or e , sha ll not a dmi nis te r c or

po ra l pu nis hme nt.

******************************************************
Further, the twins last name shall remain Ray as their two (2) slightly older siblings whom they have resided with their entire life.
The c hild support, cost and attorney ’s fees shall be a ddresse d in a subsequent or der.... (empha sis in original).
The trial court’s order further set forth a temporary schedule of vi sitation for Mrs. Holland and Mr. R a y s o a s t o e a s e t h e t w i n s ’ tr a n s i t i o n i n t o M r
. M o o r e ’ s c u s t o d y.-10-

On Dec ember

20, 2002, the trial court filed an a mended or der of custody and vi s itation, specific ally deny ing Mr. Moore’ s reque st f or attorney ’s fee s on g rounds that Mr. Mo o re wa s “t he i n t er l o p er i n t h i s m arri age ” a n d t h at “[ h ] i s h an d s ar e c o l o re d wi t h t h e s h am e o f i m p re gn at i n g a [marrie d w oman].” Th e c ou rt ’s or de r i nc lud e d th e fo llo wi ng a dd iti on a l a me nd me nts :

Fu rt h er , t h e s u p p o rt p ai d b y M s
. [ Ho l l an d ] t o M r. R ays h al l go to Mr. Moore immediat el y
. T here has not bee n a re quest for any other support. Mr. [Moore] owes t o M r. R ay a lar g e judg ment for child support that he has willfullyfailed to pay . Mr. Ray shall deduct $50.00 per month from the ar rea rag e judg ment beg inning January 1, 2003 , f o r c h il d s u p p o r t f

o r h is s te p c h il d r e n a s lo n g a s h is v is ita tion [of ] at le a st 2 da y s a

mont h is e xer c ise d. Al so , $ 50 .0 0 p e r m on th shall be deduc ted from the judg ment until further notice . Howeve r, the jud g me nt m a y

be e xec ute d u po n a ny

re ma ini ng su ms p lus int e re st w i t h n o t i c e t o M r
. [ M o o r e ’ s ] a t t o r n e y.

******************************************************
Fur th e r , th e tw in s ’ la s t n a me s h a ll r e main Ray , th e s a me as their two (2) slightly

older siblings, w ith whom they have r esided the ir e nti re liv e s. Al tho ug h th e c hil dr e n ar e sti ll of y ou ng a g e , th e ir brother and sister are the only stable thi n gs in their lives outside of their former father. This Court envisions a traumatic e ffe ct upon the ch i l d re n u n d er go i n g s o m an y s t ar t l i n g ch an ges , t h at t h e n am e c h an ge could potentially adver sely aff ect the children. The children’ s mother wa s n a me d “Ray .” Th e re is no emba rr a ssm e nt with th is n a me , b ut t o take a name of a man not r elated to the children, to w it the father of the wife Mr. [Moore] seems absurd at be st

. Mr. [Moore] was not born with the name of Moore , but chose it wi t h i n t h e last y ear . He now wants these children to follow sui t

. T h ere is no stabilit y of respe ct in taking any one’s name who is in the children’s lives with no history of long evity

in the name chosen by Mr. [Moore]. Aga in, Mr. [ M o ore’ s] name has only been Moor e for

a very short time. From Mr. [Moore’s] jump from one relationship t o another this Court i s not comforta ble in making the childre n chang e their name with Mr. Stagg s-Moore.
Further, a ll cost [ sic] accr ued fr om J anuary

21, 2000, to the e nte ri ng of

thi s order

sh a ll b e pa id 2 /3 b y

[Mr . M oo re ], 1/ 3 to Wil liam Ray

due to the majority of the c osts arising f rom the numerous I nterlocutory

Appea ls rather

than from one appeal of the f i n a l o r d e r , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.-11-

(empha sis in original).
The trial court filed a

second a mended or der of

custody and visitation on Dece mber 30, 2002, de le tin g the state me nts a ndre a so ns of fe re d in su pp ort of

its de cis io n to k e e p th e tw ins ’ l a st n a me a s “ R a y. ” T h e c o u r t e d i t e d i t s f i n d i n g t o s t a t e o n l y t h a t

t h e t w i n s ’ l a s tn a m e s h o u l d r e m a i n “ R a y” so a s to re inf

or c e or ma int a in the c hil dr e n’ s c on ne c tio n w ith the ir tw o o lde r s ibl ing s o f the sa me la st na me , a ndwi th w ho m th e y ha d li ve d th e ir

e nti re liv e s.
A final he aring was held on Fe bruary 21, 2003, wher eat Mr. Moor e ele cted to proc eed pr o se du e to h is c ou ns e l’ s u na vo ida ble abs e nc e a ndde sp ite the tr ia l c ou rt ’s of fer to allo w h im t o continue the pr ocee dings until such time as c ounsel would bec ome ava ilable. At the hea ring , the trial court ref

used to r evea l the content of D r. Walker’ s follow-up eva luation of the twins, to which no ne of the pa rt ie s o bje c te d, a ndc ho se on ly to dis c los e Dr

. Wal ke r’ s fi nd ing that the tw ins we re in need of further counseling

. The c ourt moreove r consider ed, inte r a lia , th e sp e c if ic iss ue s o f M rs
. Ho lla nd ’s pa

re nta l f itn e ss f or the pu rp os e of a wa

rd ing or g ranti ng stand ardvis itatio n w ith the tw ins , a ndhe r c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio ns
.

The c ourt hea

rd testimony

from Mrs. Holland’ s curr ent husband, Willi am Ray Holland (“ Mr. Holland”) , conce rning the twins’ alleg ed contac t w ith a purportedly abusive re lative, and the g ener al c are that he a ndMr s. Ho lla ndpr ov ide a nd /or are wi lli ng to pr ov ide fo r the c hil dr e n. Ms. An ne tte Christine Kaiser ( “Ms. Kaise r”) , a co- worke r and friend of Mrs. Holland, testified that Mrs. Holland maintains a comfortable home with adequate room for the twins and other c hildren, and f urther note d that the childre n appea

r to have a g ood relationship wit h both Mrs. and Mr

. Holland. Ms. Kaiser stated th a t, to h e r

k n o w le d g e , th e r e w e r e n o c o n d it io n s o r in d iv id u a ls p r e s e n t i n M r s
. H o ll a n d ’s ho me that w ou ld p os e a

thr e a t of ha rm to the tw ins

. Mrs. Holland t estified that she had been exercising he r visitation rights with the twins and a ve rr e d th a t sh e wa s n o lo ng e r an un fi t pa re nt andwa s th e re fo re e nti tle d to stand ardvis itatio n w ith the childre n. Mrs

. Ho l l and dis cussed se vera l chang ed cir cumstance s in her life, inc luding he r marria g e to M r. Ho lla nd , a re c e nt his tory of ste a dy a ndg a inf ul e mpl oyme nt, a

re ne we d in te re st i n e du c a tio n a ndc are e r, a nda pr ov e n a bil ity to m a int a in a

sa fe a ndsta

ble ho me e nv ir on me nt.
I n an orde r filed April 25, 2003, the trial court set for th its findings from the F ebrua ry 21, 2 0 0 3 h ea ri n g, s t at i n g:
The c ourt consider ed the state ments of counse l, testimonyof

the parties and their witnesses; the report of J ames Walker, Ph.D., a nd the entire rec ord in this cause, f rom all of which the court finds a nd ORDERS a s f

oll ow s: (1 ) D r. Wal ke r’ s re po rt wa s d e liv e re d to the c ou rt un de r s e a l, and it will remain unde r seal. Ne ither the pa rties nor their c ounsel-12- may rea d the re port without first having obtained an or der f rom the c ou rt

. (2) The afor ementioned report sug g ests that the two childre n wh o a r e t h e s u b

j e c to f t h i s l i t i g a t i o n ( “ t h e t w i n s ” ) ar e i n s o me emotional stress, and Dr . Wa l k er r ecommends the assistance of a child psy chiatrist or psy cholog ist to help allevia t e the stress. Mr. Moore will t h er ef

o re make ar

rang ements to take the children f or c ou ns e lin g wi th p os sib ly Dr . Cathy

Grif fi n, wi th t he lat te r t o de te rm ine the du ratio n a ndint e ns ity of the c ou ns e ling. Th e a du lt parties to this case will make themselve s av ai l able to attend suc h counselin g i f re quested to do so by the counse lor. Costs of such c ou ns e lin g that are no t c ov e re d by ins ur a nc e wi ll b e div ide d e qu a lly by Mr. Moore and Ms. Holland. (3) Ms. Holland ha s a duty to pay child s u p p o rt for f

our children, v iz , the twins, and t h e t wo older c hildren of Mr. Ray and Ms. Holland. The c ourt has pre viouslydetermined that g uidelines support for f

our childre n, based on Ms. Holland’ s income, is $622.00
a month. Beg inning in Mar ch 2003, and c ontinuing in ea ch ca lender month therea fter, Ms. Holland w ill pay $311.00 to Mr. Moore f or the support of the twin s , and she w ill pay $311.00 to Mr. Ray

for the support of the two older

children.... (4 ) M r. Mo or e ’s du ty

to p a y c hil d s up po rt , a s p re vio us ly order ed, is terminated a s of Novembe r 30, 2002. (5) Fr om the evidenc e adduce d at the hea ring , the court finds that Ms. Holland i s no longe r an unfit pare nt. She has re marrie d and is g a inf ull y e mpl oy e d, a ndsh e g ive s e ve ry ind ic a tion th a t sh e is t ak i n g h e r p ar e n t i n g d u t i e s s e r i o u s l y.

****************************************************** (7 ) N e ith e r M s. Ho lla nd ’s hu sb a ndor Mr

. Mo or e ’s wi fe wi ll administer cor

poral punishment to the twi n s
. Al l of the parties and all persons in active conce rt and participation with them are enjoined from spea king derog atorily about eac h other in the prese nce of any of the childre n. (8) F ollowing the twins’ birth, Mr. Ray believed himself to be the ir natur a l f a the r. I n f

a c t, a s w a s lat er det ermine d, he wa s th e ir-13- ste pf a the r b y virtue of his marria g e to M s. Ho lla nd wh o wa s th e n h is wife. ( 9 ) T

. C

. A

. § 3 6

- 6

- 3 0 3 p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n tp ar t , t ha t a steppare nt “...may

be granted rea sonable visitation rig hts ... upon a finding that such visitation rig hts would be in the best intere sts of the minor child[ren] and that suc h s teppar ent is actua lly providing or contributing towards the support of such child[ren].” (10) The court specifica lly finds that the best intere sts of the tw ins wou ld be se rv e d b y pe rm itt ing Mr . Ray

to h a ve c e rt a in vis itatio n rig hts wi th the m. (11) Mr. Ra y

has evide n ced a willingne ss to provide or c on tr ibu te tow ardthe su pp ort of the tw ins

. He is the re fo re or de re d to pay t he sum of $50.00 a month as his contribution towards the su pp ort of

the tw ins

. (1 2) Ra the r tha n p aythe a fo re me nti on e d $ 50 .0 0 a mon th direc tly to Mr. Moore, [Mr. Ray ] will deduct $50.00 a month from the judgme nt previously

awa rded to him and a g ainst Mr. Moore f or unpaid child support. For so long a s Mr. Ray continues to apply

such monthlycre dits agai n st the judgme nt, he will not seek to issue execution or otherwise attempt to collect the unpaid balanc e owe d on the judg ment. Should he later de termine that he wishes to collect the balanc e owe d on the judg ment, he will take no a ction without having fi rs t g ive n M r. Mo or e a t le a st 30 da y s’ no tic e of his int e nt t o in sti tut e c oll e c tio n p ro c e du re s. (13) The phrase “we ekend visitation,” as used in thi s order , m e a n s 6 : 0 0 p
. m
. o n F r i d a y, u n t i l 6 : 0 0 p
. m
. o n S u n d a y. (14) Ms. Holland will have wee kend visitation with the twins on e ve ry oth e r we e ke nd , c omm e ns ur a te wi th h e r w e e ke ndvis its wi th the two older c hildren. (15) Mr. Ra y

will have one w eeke nd visit with the twins every month on the first wee kend of eac h cale nder month when t h e o l der children a re w ith him. His firs t s u ch visit will be on Febr uary 28 - Marc h 2, 2003, and visitation in succee ding months will beg in on the first Friday

of ea ch calender month when he is g oing to have the older children on that weeke nd.-14- (16) Mr. Ra y

may tel ep h o n e the twins at Mr. Moore ’s residenc e, provide d that his c alls are rea sonable as to f reque ncy , time, a nddu ratio n. Mr . Ray a nd Ms. Ho lla ndma y make oc c a sio na l vi sit s to the tw ins ’ da y c are or sc ho ol, in or de r to ha ve lun c h with the tw ins

. They will do this inf

re q u en t l y so as not to disrupt the twins’ school activities. Mr. Moore will advise day car es and sc hools of the court’s order in this reg ard.

****************************************************** (18) Mr. Ra y

will have vis itation with [t he] twins from 6:00 p.m. on Dece mber 26 until 6:00 p.m. on Dece mber 28 e very y ear
. (19) The twins’ summe r re sidential schedule w ill be as fo llo ws : (a) The twins will be with Mr

. Ray for a n uninterrupted w eek beg inni n g at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday next foll owing the end of the school y ear
. (b ) A t t he c on c lus ionof

Mr . Ray ’s we e k, Ms. Ho lla ndwi ll ha ve the tw ins fo r f

ou r week s, e nd ing a t 6: 00 p. m. o n th e fo urth F ri da y fo llo wi ng the e ndof

Mr . Ray ’s vis it. (c ) D uring the fo ur

we e ks wh e n th e tw ins are to be wi th M s. Ho lla nd , M r. Mo or e wi ll h a ve a we e ke ndvis it at the e nd of the fi rs t wee k and at the e nd of the third we ek. (d) At the c onclusion of Ms. Holland’s f o u r-week e x tended visit, t he twins will be with Mr. Ray for a n additional wee k. (e) At t he conc lusion of Mr. Ray ’s additional wee k, Mr. Moore will have the twins for the re mainder of the summer vac ation, except that Ms. Holland will have we ekend visit at ion at the end of Mr. Moore’ s second we ek. (f) Standard visitation, as presc ribed elsewher e in t his order, wi ll b e g in o nc e [the ] sc ho ol y e ar b e g ins

. (g ) M r. Ra y ’s month ly

we e ke ndvis its wi ll r e c omm e nc e in September.

******************************************************-15- (21) Court costs accr u i n g since De cembe r 30, 2002, will be divided equally

betwee n Mr. Moore and Ms. Holland.
Mr. Moore f

iled a timely

notice of a

ppeal of the trial court’s Apr il 25, 2003 order, a nd pr e se nts e le ve n is su e s f

or re vie w, wh ic h w e re state a s f oll ow s:
1. Whether the trial court committed r ever sible err or i n aw arding visitation t o Mr. R ay , a non-r elated, third pa rty , absent a

finding “that denial of s u ch visitation presented a risk of substantial harm to the children.
2. Whether the trial c ourt committed reve rsible er ror in finding , sua sp ont e , that Mrs. Holland was a fit pare nt, “without pleading s or [an] ev i d en t i ar y

h ea ri n g” t o s u p p o rt t h e f i n d i n g.
3. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt erred in ref

us ing to c ha ng e the tw ins ’ surname f rom “Ray ” to “Moore .”
4. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inits div isi on of

c ou rt c os ts.
5. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in denying Mr. Moore’ s reque st for attorney ’s fe es for

litigation in this matter.
6. Whe t h e r

t h e tr i a l c o u r te rr e d i n r e s tr a i n i n g o r p r o h i b i t i n g Mr s. Mo or e fr om a dmi nis te ri ng c or po ra l pu nis hme nt t o th e tw ins

. 7. Whe the r t he tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that Mr . M oo re faile d to tim e ly pay child support arr ear ag es “wa s not supported by the evidenc e and should be stricken [from the r ecor d] alo n g wi t h the [court’s] order allowing execution with 30 day s notice.”
8. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in using or rely ing upon Dr. Walker’ s seale d report in rendering its opinion.
9. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inor de ring Mr . M oo re to o btain ps y c ho log ic a l c ou ns e lin g fo r the tw ins

. 10. Whether the trial c ourt co m m i tted reve rsible er ror by using inc or re c t in c ome fi g ur e s to c a lc ulate Mr s. Ho lla nd ’s mon thl y c hil d support obligations to Mr. Moore.
11. “Whether Mr . Moore is entitled to attorney ’s fe es fr om his appeal in this m atter.”-16-

Since this case w as tried by the court sitt ing w ithout a jury , we r eview the case de novo upon the re cord w i t h a p re s u m p t i o n of cor rec tness of the finding s of fa ct by the trial court. Unless the evidenc e preponderates ag ainst the findi ng s, we must aff irm, absent error of law. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). I. Th e fi rs t is su e pr e se nte d for re vie w is whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d ina wa

rd ing vis itatio n to Mr . Ray . T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d § 36 -6 -3 03 (1 99 6) state s:

Vi s i ta ti on rights of

stepparents. – (a ) In a su it f or a nn ulm e nt, divorce or s epar ate maintenance w here one (1) party is a steppar ent to a minor child born to the other party , such steppar ent may be g rante d r e a so na

ble vis itatio n rig hts to s uc h c hil d during its min ority by the court of compete nt jurisdictio n u p o n a finding that such visitation rig hts would be in the best interests of the m inor child and that such steppar ent is actua lly providing or contributing towards the support of such c hild. (b) S u ch d ecr ee sha ll remain within the control of the court an d b e s u bject to such c hang es or modification as the exigenc ies of the ca se re quire.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi na l or de r s e t f orth the fo llo wi ng pe rt ine nt f ind ing s: (10) The court specific ally finds that the best intere sts of the tw ins wo ul d be se rv e d b y pe rm itt ing Mr . Ray

to h a ve c e rt a in vis itatio n rig hts wi th the m. (1 1 ) Mr. Ray

has evide nced a

willingness to provide or c on tr ibu te tow ardthe su pp ort of the tw ins

. He is the re fo re or de re d to pay the sum of $50.00 a month as his contribution towar ds the su pp ort of

the tw ins

. I t is appare nt from the above- quoted ex cer pt that the t rial court made the pr oper f indings re quired un de r T .C. A. § 3 6- 6- 30 3( a ). We n ote , ini tia lly , that the e vid e nc e in the re c or d d oe s n ot p re po nd e rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding that visitation wit h Mr. R ay wa s in the twins’ best interests. The re c or d on ap pe a l is sp ars e wi th re g ard to sub stanti ve e vid e nc e , an d doe s n ot i nc lud e a ny tr a ns c ri pts from hearings conducte d prior to July 19, 2002. The court’s final orde r of April 25, 2003, states that the court “consider ed the state ments of counse l, testimonyof the pa rties and t h ei r wi t nesses; the r e p o r to f D r
. J a m e s W a l k e r , P h

. D

. , a n d t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d i n t h i s c a u s e ” i n r e n d e r i n g i t s d e c i s i o n
. In Coa kle y v . D ani e ls , 840 S.W .2d 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), this Court noted:
Whe re the iss ue s raise d g o to the e vid e nc e , th e re mus t be a tr a ns c ri pt. I n the abse nce of

a tra n s cr i p t of the e vidence , there is a conc lusive-17- presumption that there was suff icient evidenc e befor e the tria l court to s u p p o r t i ts ju d g me n t, a n d th is Co u r t mu s t th e r e f o r e a f f irm the judgme nt. McKinn ey v. Educator and Executive Insurers, In c. , 569 S.W .2 d 829, 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). T his rule likewise a pplies wher e ther e is a statement of the evidenc e which is incomplete . The burden is upon the appellant to show that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Capital City Ban k v. Baker , 59 Tenn. App. 477, 493, 442 S.W.2d 259, 266 (1969). The bur den is likewise on the appe llant to provide the Court w ith a transcript of the evidenc e or a statement of the e vidence from which this Court ca n determine if the evide nce doe s prepond er at e for or ag ainst the finding s of the trial c ourt.
Id . at 370. See als o Scarbrough v. Scarbrough , 752 S.W .2d 94, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (“When the tr ia l c ou rt

he ars the e vid e nc e , b ut the e vid e nc e is n ot i nc lud e d in the rec or d o n a pp e a l, i t is presumed that the evidence s u p p o rt s t he ruling of the trial c ourt.”). We thus pre sume that the evidenc e pre sented to the court in the hearing s prior to J uly 19, 2002, which the court re lied upon in initi ally

desig nating Mr. Ray as the custodial pare nt f or the twins, supports the ruling of the c ourt that visitation wit h Mr. Ray is in the best interests of the twins.
Wit h reg ard to Mr. Ray ’s pre sent support of the twins, we re iterate that Mr. Ray was the custodial pare nt for the twins at the tim e of the court’s final ruling, or immediately prior ther eto, and thus we log ically

conclude that he wa s “providing or contributing towards the s u p port” of the children. F or these r easons, we find that the trial court did not err i n awarding Mr. Ray visitation wi th the tw ins

. We note, moreove r, that Mrs. Holland did not and doe s n o t o p p o se the trial c ourt’s aw ard g ranting Mr. Ray

visitation wit h the twins. Mrs. Holland did not b ri ef the issue of step-pa rent visitation on appe al, but r ather “def er[red] to Mr

. Ray ’s ar g ument in this reg ard.” Mrs. Holland’s decision to withh o l d o pposition t o the trial court’s visitation award, a nd her de fer ral to Mr. Ray ’s arg ument, can log ically

be construe d or i nterpre ted as he r belief that visitation wit h Mr. Ray is in the children’ s best interests.
Mr. Moore a

rg ues that the tr i al co urt err ed in awa rding Mr. Ray

visitation wit h the twins wher e the tria l court made no finding that denial of suc h visitation would present a risk of substantial harm to the children. I n support of his a rg ument, Mr. Moore relies specific ally upon the ca s e of Enge l v . Young , No. M2001-00734-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 1129451 (Tenn. C t

. App. Mar. 14, 2003), whe rein the tria l court g rante d visitation t o the adult half- siblings of a mi nor child. The minor child’s natura l mot h er ap p ealed the trial court’s decision, and the Middle Section of this Court re v er s ed t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g as t o t h i rd p ar t y v i s i t at i o n , s t at i n g:
I n Haw k v. Hawk , 855 S.W .2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) , the Tenne ssee Supre me C o urt held that Article I , Section 8 of the-18- Te nn e sse e Con sti tutio n p ro te c ts t he priva c y

int e re sts of

pa re nts in their child-r ea ri n g decisions, as long as those par ental dec isions do not substantiallyen d an ger the welfa re of their childre n. “Abse nt so me ha rm to the c hil d, we fi ndthat th e st a te la c ks a su ff ic ie ntl y compelling justification f or interfe ring with this fundamental rig ht.” Haw k , 855 S.W .2d at 582. Among thos ec h il d-re aring decisions left to par ents is the rig ht to decide w ith whom a child associate s and with whom the child may be re sponsiblyleft for

brief pe riods of time. I n Haw k , for e x ample, the i ss ue inv olv e d v isi ta tio n w ith g rand pa re nts , a ndthe Sup re me Court held that courts could not aw ard visitation to gr andpar ents over the objection of the pare nts in the absence of a finding that the fa ilure to awar d such vi sitation would result i n substantial harm to the child. Where a court orde r has g iven primary or sole legal cust ody

to one pare nt, the rig ht t o make c hild-rea ring decisions re sts with the custodial pare nt. Rust v . Rus t , 864 S.W .2d 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

******************************************************
In s u m m ar y,
A court may

not awa rd a non- pare nt visit ation unless the non-pa

rent c an show that denial of visitation pres en ted a risk of substantial harm to the ch i l d. Se e Simm ons v . Si mm ons , 9 0 0 S. W. 2 d 6 8 2, 685 (Tenn. 1995) . I f an order g ranting visitation does no t in c lud e a

fi nd ing on the iss ue of su bs ta nti a l ha rm , that order is invalid. See In re Askew , 993 S.W .2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1999)

. Wil lia ms v . T hra ilk ill , No. W1999-01032-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Te nn. Ap p. LEX I S 71 8, a t *1 1 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. Oc t. 23 , 20 00 ) (n o T e nn . R. App. P. 11 application filed).
Id . at *4-5.
We do not find Engel

to b e c on tr oll ing un de r the pa rt ic ula r f a c ts o f this c a se . F ir st, we no te that T.C.A. § 36-6-303 does not require the court to make a finding of subs tantial harm in support of a steppa

rent visitation awar d. The plain lang uag e of the statute requir es a c ourt to find (1) that vis itatio n w ith a

ste pp are nt i s inthe be st i nte re sts of the c hil dr e n, a nd (2) that th e ste pp are nt i s making contributions to the support of the childre n. As discussed, both of these f actor s are prese ntIn Wi l l i a ms , t he cas e r el i ed upon by t he E ngel cour t as t he bas i s for i t s s ummary j udgment , t hi s Co ur t va cat ed 2

a ju d g m e n t o f t h e trial c o u rt g ra n ting visita tio n rig h ts to the m ino r c h ild ’s au n t. Wi l l i a ms , 2000 W L 33191365 a t * 4. -19- in the case at ba

r. More over, Engel involves a g rant of visitation to half-sibling s who neve r ac ted as par ents to the minor child, and neve r enjoy ed or e x erc ised custody over the child. 2
The evidenc e in the rec ord indicates that Mr. Ray , in his role as stepfather, raised the twins a s h is o wn fo r se ve ra l y e ars
. Mr . Ray ha s r e ma ine d a

ste a dy , p os iti ve , a ndlov ing pa re nta l f ig ur e in the lives of two y oung children w ho have a lrea dy suffe red more than t heir fair share of disruption, uncertainty , and instability . We theref ore a ffirm the tria l court’s ruling g ranting Mr. Ray visitation wi th the tw ins . M r. Mo or e ’s iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

II. Mr

. Mo or e ne xt p re se nts fo r r e vie w the iss ue of wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt

“ c omm itt e d r e ve rs ibl e e rr or in d e c lari ng [Mr s. Ho lla nd ] a fi t pa re nt wi tho ut ple a din g s or a n e vid e nti ary he ari ng .” We q uo te M r
. M o o r e ’ s ar g u m e n ti n s u p p o r to f h i s i s s u e i n i t s e n t i r e t y:
“It is a fundame ntal rule of law that in or der to re ceive relief , a p ar ty mu s t p le a d it , r e q u e s t it , a n d p r o v e it in c o urt with the opposing pa

rty having the opportunity

to o ff er pr oof opposing the items requeste d.” Le wis v . L e wis , No. 89-287-II , 1990 WL 14022, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 16, 1990) ( no Tenn

. R

. App. P. 11 application filed) . [ S e e a lso ] Wes t v. We st , No. M1998-00725-COA- R3-CV, 2000 WL 64268, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. J an. 27, 2000). The Le wis Cou rt c on tin ue s:
A Court of Chance ry has no jurisdiction of any matter not sub m i t t ed to i t in a pleading for a dju dic a tio n; n or

c a n th e de fe nd a nt b e c a ll e d o n to respond to anything not alleg ed ag ainst him. Neither can a Court consider a n y ev i dence which does not direc tly , or indirec t l y , tend to prove or disprove the alleg ations contained in the ple ading s. A d ecr ee c an neither be based on alleg ations without corre sponding pr oo f, no r o n p roo f wi th ou t co rres po nd in g all egati on s. All decr ees must be the c oncurrin g result of alleg ations justified by

proof, a nd proof justified by alleg ations. A dec ree based on ple ading s wi t h out pro o f, w il l b e r e v e r s e d o n ap p e a l, b u t w il l b e g ood ag ainst collatera l attack. A de cre e b as ed on proof,-20- without pleading s, will not onl y b e reversed on appea l, but w i ll also y ield to a collater al attac k be c a us e su c h a

de c re e is c o r

a m no n j ud

ice , and a b s o l u t e l y

v o i d

. T h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e C o u r tis circ umscribed by

the pleading s, and the plea dings a re circ umscribed by

the L aw.
Th is f un da me nta l rule of

la w h a s bee n u ph e ld by the c ou rt s o f T e nn e sse e
. Th e Sup re me Cou rt de a lt with this i ssue in Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co . of New York v. Jackson , 181 S.W .2d 625 (Tenn. 1944) , c iti ng a cat a log ue of

Te nn e sse e c a se s f

oll ow ing thi s rule a nd quoting 15 R.C.L ., at p. 604: [A ] j u d g m e n tw i l l b e v o i d w h i c h is a departur e fr om the pleading s, and based upon a case not aver red the rein, since if a llowed to stan d i t would be a l t o g e t h e ra r b it r a r y a n d u n j u s t a nd c onc lud e a p oin t up on wh ic h the parties had n ot b een h eard .... The re fo r e the rule is f irmly established th a t irrespective of what m ay be proved a c ourt cann ot decre e t o a n y p l a i n ti f f mo re t h a n h e c l a ims in h is b ill or ot

her pleadings

. (empha s is added) 181 S.W.2d 625 at 629. [ Id .] at *4.
I n th e c a se a t ba

r the c hi ldre n’ s mo the r d id n ot “

.. . p le a d it , reque st it, or prove it in co urt with the opposing pa rty having the op po rtun ity

to o ff e r p ro of op po sin g...” a s to he r p re se nt f itn e ss a s a pare nt. The Trial Court merely found sua spon te without proof that the c hil dr e n’ s n a tur a l mo the r w a s a fi t pa re nt. Th us , th e de c re e is ba se d o n p ro of

, w ith ou t pl ead ing s a ndmus t be re ve rs e d o n a pp e a l. I t is a lso su bje c t to c oll a te ra l a tta c k b e c a us e it i s coram non j udice , and absolutely

void.
I n the instant matter, Mrs. Holland’ s pare ntal fitness is rele v an t o n l y t o the question of wh e the r s he is e nti tled to sta nd ardvis itatio n w ith the tw ins . H ow e ve r, Mr . M oo re fails to sp e c if ic a lly app e a l th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s g rant o f sta nd ard or tr a dit ion a l visit a tio n to Mr s. Ho lla ndin h is brie f, op tin g , ra the r, to fo c us his arg ume nt sol e ly on the c ou rt ’s a lle g e d e rr or in r e -c on sid e ri ng Mr s.-21-

Ho lla nd ’s pa

re nta l f itn e ss. We f

indthat a n is su e re g ard ing Mr s. Ho lla nd ’s pa re nta l f itn e ss i s irr e le v a n t w h e r e M r
. M o o r e f a il s to s p e c if

ic a ll y c h a ll e n g e o r ap p e a l th e tria l c o u rt’s aw ard of visitation to the mother. This c ourt is not require d to c onsider issues not properly befor e it, nor ar e w e c h ar g e d w ith th e d u ty o f in te rpre ti n g o r

d e c ip h e r in g a n is s u e to th e p o in t o f r e le v a n c y
. We the re fo re fi ndMr . M oo re ’s iss ue wi tho ut m e ri t. III
. Mr. Mo ore ’s thi rdiss uefo r r e vie w i s w he the r t he tr ia l c ou rt

c omm itt e d r e ve rs ibl e e rr or in ref using to leg ally

chang e the twins’ surname from “ Ray ” to “Moore .”
I n Bar ab as v . Roge rs , 8 68 S.W. 2d283 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. 19 93 ), the Mid dle Se c tio n o f this Court stated:
Parties see king to c hang e a c hild’s surname be ar t h e burden of

showing g ood cause for the c hang e.

******************************************************
The c our ts s houl d no t c hang e a c hild ’s sur name u nle ss t

he c hang e pr

omote s the c hild ’s be st inte re sts

. Halloran v. Kostka , 778 S.W. 2d 45 4, 45 6 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 88 ); see also In re Marriage of Schiffm an , 1 69 Ca l.R ptr . 9 18 , 921 , 620 P.2 d 5 79 , 5 82 (1 98 0) ; In re Cardin al , 6 11 A. 2d[515 , 51 7 (Del. F a m. C t. 1 99 1) ]; Krist ine C. Karnezis, Annotation, Rights a nd Re medi e s o f P are nts I nte r Se With Respect to the Nam e of Their Ch ildren , 92 A.L .R.3d 66 § 8.5 (Supp. 1992). Among the criteria for determining whether c hang ing a child’s surnam e wi l l b e in t he child’s be st interests are : (1) the child’ s p r e f

e r e n c e , ( 2 ) th e c h a n g e ’ s p o te n ti a l e f f e c t o n th e c h ild’ s relationship wit h eac h pare nt ( 3) the leng th of time the child has had its present surna me, (4) the deg ree of community respe ct associated w i t h t h e p r e s e n ta n d p r o p o s e d s u r n a m e , a n d ( 5 ) t h e d i f f i c u l t y, hara ssment, or embar

rassment that the c hild may experience from bearing e ither its present or its proposed surname. In re Saxton , 309 N. W.2 d 2 98 , 3 01 (M inn . 1 98 1) ; Bob o v . J e we ll , [38 Ohio S t. 3d 330, 52 8 N .E .2 d 1 80 , 1 85 (1 98 8) ]; Dave s v. Nastos , 105 Wash.2d 24, 711 P.2d 314, 318 (1985). The pa rent see king to ch ang e the c hild’s surname ha s the b u rd en of proving that the chang e will further the child’s best interests. In re Petition of Schidlm eier , 344 Pa. Super. 56 2, 49 6 A .2 d 1 24 9, 12 53 (1 98 5) ; In re M.L.P. , 6 2 1 S. W. 2 d 430, 431 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
Id . at 285-86; 287 (e mphasis added)

.-22-

The rec ord on appea l in the prese nt c ase does not inc lude a petition, motion, o r f o rm al re qu e st f or a c ha ng e of the tw ins ’ su rn a me fr om “ Ra y ” to “ Mo or e .” F urthe r, the re c or d in c lud e s o nly the following discussion be t ween Mr. Moore’ s counsel and thetrial court r eg arding Mr. Moore’ s desire to ha ve the twins’ surname cha ng ed to “Moore ”:

MR. SHAW : Oh. And the childre n’s name. THE COURT: Oh, the c hildren’s na me.
MR. SHAW : Obviously , Mr. Moore w ants his c hildren to be na med Moore.
A brief discussion of Mr. Moore’ s rea sons for taking his wife’s maide n name e nsued. Up on ou r r e vie w of the re c or d a nd the pa rt ic ula r c ir c ums ta nc e s o f this c a se , w e fi ndthat it is in the best interests of the twins to chang e their surname f rom “Ray ” to “Moore .” We note that Mr . M oo re faile d in his bu rd e n to int ro du c e su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e int o th e re c or d s ho wi ng g oo d c aus e for the c hang e. I n fac t, Mr. Moore in t roduced no specif ic substantive evidenc e to indicate g ood c a us e fo r the re qu e ste d c ha ng e , b ut r a the r r e lie d s ole ly on c ou ns e l’ s a sse rt ion that Mr. Mo or e wants the tw ins ’ s urna me c ha ng e d in su pp ort of his arg ume nt.
De sp ite the la c k o f e vid e nc e in the re c or d s pe c if ic a lly pe rt a ini ng t o w he the r g oo d c a us e e xists to r e qu ir e a

c ha ng e of

the tw ins ’ s urna me , o ur

pr e e min e nt c on c e rnin this c a se is the be st i nte re sts o f t h e c h i l d re n
. Fo r t h e f o l l o w i n g re as o n s , we fi n d th at i ti s i n t h e t wi n s ’ b es ti n t er es t s t o ch an ge their surna me to “Moore .” First, Mr. Ray is not the biologica l father for these children, nor

is he the custodial pare nt. Second, Mrs. Holland, no longe r car ries Mr. Ray ’s surname; thus, ne ither of the twins’ biologica l pare nts curre ntly have the surname “ Ray .” Third, Mr. Moor e is the natura l father a ndc us tod ia l pa

re nt o f the tw ins . In li g ht o f the c on fu sio n a ndins tabi li ty that ha s in e xcu sa bly wre aked ha voc in the twins’ y oung lives, we find that the c hildren’s intere sts would be best serve d by c e me nti ng or affi rm ing the ir bo ndto the ir

natur a l f a the r andc us tod ia l pa

re nt b y a c ha ng e in surnames. Finally , in his brief, Mr. Ray states that he “wa nts w hat is be st f or th e c h i l d re n , ” a nd c on c e de s th a t “ [w]hi le he wo uldlik e fo r the m to c on tin ue t o bear his na me , . .. a

na me c ha ng e is probably appropriate under

the circ umstances.”
To be fr ank, we are left with few options with reg ard to t h i s i ssue. None of the parties involved have be en a pic ture or model of stability

. Mr. Ray , the party we f ind to be the most stable, is not the twins’ natura l fathe r, nor is he the custodial pare nt. Moreove r, as noted, he concede s that “a na me c h a n g e is p r o b ab ly ap p r o p r iate u n d e r th e c ir c u ms tan c e s
. ” T h u s , in th is c o u r t’ s v ie w , we are left to choose only betwee n the curr ent surnames of the children’ s biologica l pa rents. None of the parties contend that the twins’ surname should be c hang ed to “Holland,” nor do we f ind it to be in the children’ s best interest to g ive them the surna me of a mother and stepfather with whom they do no t r e sid e . T he re fo re , we are e sse nti a lly c on fi ne d to c on c lud e that th e c hil dr e n s ho uldc arry the ir natura l fathe r’s curre nt surname of “Moore .” Despite evidence that Mr. Moore ha s made a conce rted-23-

e ff ort to c le a n u p h is a c t a ndis c ur re ntl y invol ved in a

c omm itt e d ma

ri ta l un ion , w e are de e ply conce rned by

his historyof re lationship inst ability and the possibilitythat future ma rital discord could cause more suf

fering, co n fusion, and uphea val in these y oung children’ s lives. We note, h o we v er , t h at M r. Moore states in his brief that he and his wife “ made a very thoughtf ul decision reg arding the name they would both be ar for the rest of their lives and came to the conc lusion that “Moore ” as [ s i c] t he name they would choose f

or themselves and their childre n,” and w e find no evidenc e to the contr ary . We are thus incl i ned to trust that Mr. Moore ha s made the de cision that he believe s to be in the best intere sts of his children.
Ba sed upon t he for eg oing disc ussion, we find that the trial c ourt err ed in determining that the tw ins ’ s urna me sh ou ld r e ma in “R a y ,” a nd the re by re ve rs e the c ou rt ’s Ap ri l 25, 200 3 ord e r, a nda ll previous orde rs, to the extent that they deny Mr. Moore’ s reque st for a c hang e in surname

. IV.
The fourth issue presente d for r eview is whe ther the “ trial court c ommitt ed re versible e rror in the division of court costs.” Mr. Moor e’s a rg ument, as stated in his brief , rea ds in pertinent part a s f oll ow s:
Simi larly , in the case at bar , Mr. Ray , as previously noted by

thi s Co urt, v ig or ou sly

op po se d all of

the Ap pe llant’ s a tte mpt s in fo rm ing a re la tio ns hip wi th h is c hil dr e n an d “.

.. c arrie d the battl e to his wi fe’ s lo ve r at e ve ry

turn. ” Mr . Ray

ob se ssi ve ly

pu rs ue d th e se proce eding s with unwarr anted a lleg ations, which sig nificantly added to their expense and he ultimately did not carr y the day . Appellant should not be burdene d with a l arg e court cost judg ment from the f our plus y ear s of litigation, which was prolong ed by Mr. Ray ’s obsessive use of the judicia l sy stem reg arding custody of t wo children who are no t hi s.
I n an Or der e ntere d J anuary 12, 2000, the trial court stated that the c ou rt c os ts w ou ld b e div ide d b etwee n [Mr . M oo re ] an d [Mr s. Holland]. I n an Orde r enter ed September 26, 2002, the trial court states, “( 2) Assessment of c ourt costs incurr ed af ter J anuary

12, 2000, will be held in abey ance un t i l t h e fi n al hearing of this cause . I n no e ve nt, ho we ve r, wi ll [Mr . M oo re ] be re qu ir e d to p a y fo r c os ts incurre d by

[Mr. Ray and Mrs. Holland] in their order s of protec tion that wer e litigated at the commence ment of this c ase.” I n another Or de r e nte re d D e c e mbe r 2 0, 20 02 , th e tr ia l c ou rt state s, “ F urthe r, a ll c os t a c c ru e d f

ro m Jan ua

ry 21 , 20 00 , to the e nte ri ng of thi s o rd e r s ha ll be pa id 2 /3 b y

Eric Sta g g s- Mo or e , [a nd ] 1/3 to Wi ll iam Ray du e to the majority

of the c osts arising f

rom t h e n umerous Interlocutory Appea ls rather

than from on e appeal of the final orde r, for which-24- e xe c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y
. ” I n t h e f i n a l O r d e r e n t e re d A pr il [25] , 2003, the trial court states, “21. C o u rt costs acc ruing since Dec ember 30, 2002, will be divided equally betwee n Mr. Moore a nd Mrs. Holland.”
I n the ca se at ba

r, the trial c ourt intends to punish Appellant by re qu ir ing him

to p a y the c ou rt c os ts. Th e tr ial cou rt ha s g ro ssl y abused he r discre tion by

allowing her pe rsonal fe eling s [s ic] ge t in the a way [sic ] of the la w. Th e tr ia l c ou rt se e ms t o h a ve ta

ke n it pe rs on a lly

that A pp e lla nt h a s f

ile d n ume ro us int e rl oc uto ry app e a ls, but Appellant would insist that if the trial court had f ollowed the law and s to p p e d M r
. Ray in h is r id ic u lo u s r a mp a g e , h e w o u ld not have been f orce d to file the interlocutory appea ls.
Mr . M oo re ’s brie f g e ne ra lly app e a ls the tr ia l cou rt ’s “ div isi on of c ou rt c os ts; ” ho we ve r, it i s appar ent that he is only

challeng ing the trial court’ s division of court costs as betwe en him and Mr. Ray for c osts accr

ued fr o m J anuary

21, 2000 throug h Dec ember 20, 2002. There fore , we a re not conce rned w ith the trial court’s division of court costs betwee n Mr. Moore and Mrs. Holland.
The trial c ourt is af

fo rd ed discretion in taxing and a ssessing c osts. Lo ng v . L ong , 957 S.W. 2d82 5, 83 3- 34 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 97 ). On app e a l, the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to a wa rdc os ts w ill be re verse d if the trial court abused that discr etion. Id . We fi nd that the tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its discretion in its divisi on of co u rt co sts among Mr . Moore a nd Mr. Ray for c osts accr

ued fr om J anuary 21, 2 0 0 0 t h ro u g h Dec ember 20, 2002, and spec ifically note that there is absolutely no evidenc e in the re cord to indicate that the trial court assessed court c osts ag ainst Mr. Moore a s a form of punishment. Moreove r, the evidenc e in the rec ord does not support Mr . Moore’ s char acte rization of Mr. Ray ’s efforts t o obtain or m aintain custodyof the twins’ a s a “ridiculous rampag e.” We thus fi ndMr . M oo re ’s iss ue wi tho ut m e ri t.
V. Mr . M oo re ne xt pr e se nts fo r r e vie w the iss ue of wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d inre fu sin g to g rant him an a war d of attorne y ’s fe es.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

is ve ste d with wi de dis c re tio n in the a llo wa nc e of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, a ndwe wi ll not interfer e exce p t u p o n a s howing of an a buse of this discre tion. Thr e ad gil l v . T hre ad gil l , 740 S.W .2d 419, 426 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). While we r efuse to adopt the re asoning expressed by the tr ia l c ou rt in su pp ort of its ru lin g , w e no ne the le ss f indthat th e c ou rt

didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n in ref using to g rant Mr. Moor e an a war d of attorney ’s fees. All of the pa rties’ involved in this matter are to bla me for the prolong ed dispute, and thus must share in the costs and expenses of litig ation. De sp ite Mr . M oo re ’s arg umen t to the c on tr ary , w e fi ndno e vid e nc e that Mr . Ray e ng a g e d in inappropriate, frivolous, or unwa rra nted conduc t for the pur pose of pr olonging the dispute. Moreove r, Mr. Moore ’s counse l’s own brief, oral arg ument, and mul tiple motions for r ecusa l appea r-25-

to sugg est or explain that his tum ultuous re lationship with the trial court hindere d timely resolution of this matter.
We the re fo re fi ndMr . M oo re ’s iss ue wi tho ut m e ri t.
VI
. This Court nex t considers whe ther the tria l court er red in p ro h i b i t ing Mr s. Moore (s te pmo the r) fr om a dmi nis te ri ng c or po ra l pu nis hme nt t o th e tw ins

. Tenne ssee has long rec og nized the rig hts of natura l pa rents to r aise their children wi t h o ut interfe renc e fr om the state. I n Haw k v . Ha wk , 855 S.W .2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) , our Supreme Court rea ffirme d Tenne ssee’ s strong commitment to protec ting parenta l rig hts in holding that a pare nt’s rig ht to raise his or her

child without state interfe renc e is subject only to a showing that the par ent’s decisions pre sent a ri s k of substantial harm to the c hild. I n holding that pa renta l rig hts are a fundame ntal liberty

in ter est under A rticle I , Section 8 of the Te nnessee Constit ution, the Haw k Court noted that “the right to re ar one ’s childre n is so firmly rooted in our c ulture that the United States Sup re me Cou rt

ha s h e ld i t to be a fun dam enta l li be rt y int e re st p ro te c te d b y

the F ou rt e e nth Amendment to the United States Constituti on.” Id . at 578.

As t h e t wins’ natura l father , Mr. Moore ha s a rig ht to determine the r easonable and noabusive methods of discipline to be administered to hi s children. As the children’ s natural mother , Mrs. Holland is also entitled to a say as to the ty

pe and sc ope of r easona

ble discipline inflicted upon her children. I n the unpublished ca se of Wilson v. Wilson , No. E2000-01374- COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 70 38 81 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . Jun e 22 , 20 01 ), the Ea ste rn Se c tio n of thi s Cou rt c on sid e re d th e so le issue of whe ther the e vidence in the rec ord pre ponderated ag ainst the lower co u rt ’s findi ng “of a ma te r ia l c h a n g e o f c ir c u ms tan c e s u c h th a t th e r e e xis te d a r is k o f s u b s tan ti a l h ar m to the minor children suf

ficient to nec essitate a c hang e in re sidential custody .” Id . at 1. T he c ou rt sp e c if ic a lly considere d the stepfathe r’s use of corpor al punishment on the minor children despite th e n at ural fathe r’ s a da ma nt o bje c tio n to su c h d isc ipl ine , f ind ing :
Whil e we rec og nize that children should b e disciplined and that ste p- pa re nts sh ou ld b e a llo we d to dis c ipl ine the c hil dr e n r e sid ing in thei r household, ther e ar e other means of punishing children tha n whipping the m with a “hickor y ” when one of the ir pare nts has sp e c if ic a lly state d a pr e fe re nc e a g a ins t th e us e of su c h p un ish me nt.
Id . at *6.
The c ourt did not find that the s tepfather’s use of corporal punishm ent alone “r[o]se to the level of a chang e in circ umstance such that a chang e in custody is require d to preve nt substantial harm to the minor children[;] ” howe ver, the court noted that this evidence wa s co n s istent with testim ony-26-

indicative of the mother and stepfathe r’s poor judgme nt, and supported a c hang e of c ustody to the natura l father

. Id . at *6-9.

I t is clea r from Mrs. Holland’s brief that she does not w ish f or Mrs. Moore to administer corpor al punishment to the twins. W e do not find Mrs. Holland’ s reque st to be u n re asonable and there fore conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that Mrs. Moore is pr ohibited f rom using corpor al punishment to discipline the t wins. Our finding does not fore close or e ffe ct Mrs. Moore ’s ability to discipline the child re n in a re asonable , non-cor poral, non-a

busive manner . Moreove r, should Mr. Moore ha ve a rea sonable basis for asking that Mr. Holl and refrain from administering c or po ra l pu nis hme nt t o th e tw ins , w e fi ndthat he wo uldbe e nti tle d to su c h a re qu e st.
VI I. Mr. M oore nex t asks t his Court to determine whether the t rial court err ed in finding that Mr. Moore f ailed to timely pay child support to Mr. Ray . Mr. Moore f ailed to ra ise this issue in either of his fir st t wo app e a ls d e sp ite thefa c t th a t th e iss ue wa s a va ila ble to h im at th e tim e of

his fi rs t appea l. We are there fore unwilling to consider this issue. Moreove r, we note t hat Mr. Moore is no longe r oblig ated to pay

Mr. Ray child support now that Mr. Moore is the custodial pare nt of the tw ins . Rathe r, the c ou rt de te rm ine d that $5 0. 00 wo uld be de du c te d f ro m th e du e a ndow ing c hil d support arr ear ag es ea ch month as support paid by Mr. Ray to Mr. Moore.
Mr. Moore’ s assertion or e rror i s based solely

upon his contention that the trial court incorre ctly

found, sua sp ont

e , that he failed to ti m el y p ay ch i ld support in accor dance with the court’s order. Mr. M oore did not, and does not, appea l his obligation to pay child support, nor does he dis pu te the a mou nt o f c hil d su pp ort ow e d. We d e e m a ll o the r c on c e rn s to be imm a te ri a l to thi s matter, a nd there fore find Mr. Moore ’s issue without merit.
VI II. Mr. Moore’ s eig hth issue asks this court to determine whether the trial court erre d in basing its final order of

custody and visitation on Dr. Walker’s psy ch o logic al re port, wher e said re port rema ined under

seal and was not a vailable for revie w by counsel. Mr. Moore’ s arg ument is based upon three primary

assertions: (1) the trial court did not have the pr oper f actua l predicate to order the tw ins to un de rg o p sy c ho log ic a l e va luatio n b y Dr . Wa lke r; (2 ) the re po rt c on sti tut e s in a dmi ssi ble hear say not cover ed b y an y rec og nized ex ception; and ( 3) the trial c ourt improperly prohibited counsel fr om review ing the report prior to rende ring its decision.
To brie fl y re ite rate the pe rt ine nt pr oc e du ra l his tory , the c ou rt fi rs t or de re d the tw in s to underg o psy cholog ical ev aluation by Dr. Walker in a n order

enter ed September

26, 2002, for the appar ent purpose of

determining whether the children w ould be substantially harme d by

a tra nsfer o f c u s t o d y
. On No v em b er 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e tri al co u rt en t er ed an o rd er o f cu s t o d y an d v i s i t at i o n fi n d i n g, inte r a lia :-27- During the wee k of F ebrua ry 10, 2003, Mr. Moore will take the childre n to Dr. W alker for f urther c ounseling and/or e x amination, and re quest a re port to be filed unde r se al with this C ourt by Fe bruary 20, 2003, prior to the re view on F ebrua ry 21, 2003. (empha sis in original).
I t is appare nt that the court a cted of its own volit ion in ordering further counseling for the c hildren, as there was no discussion at the November 7, 2002 hearing r eg arding additional counseling or the fac t that any

report ge nerated from suc h counseling would rema in under sea l.
At the final he aring of F ebrua ry 21, 2003, the t rial j udg e made the following statements from the be nc h r e g ard ing Dr . Wa lke r’ s se a le d r e po rt :

THE COURT: Now, let me t ell y ou all, befor e we g et started, Dr. Walker f

iled with [t ]he Court, under sea l, a – a r eport. The fee for Dr . Wa lke r i s $ 1, 47 5, it’ s to be div ide d three way s, so I do want t o make copies of that for e ach of y ou, and we ’ll – we’ll – that won’ t be un de r s e a l.
B ut I do no t w a nt any on e , e xce pt by c ou rt or de r, to r e a d th is report. I think it’s im portant for

the childre n to think that when they talk to a doctor that what they say is in private.
B ut the on e thi ng I

c a n d isc los e to y ou is th at Dr. Wal ke r i s mos t c on c e rn e d a

bo ut the me nta l he a lth of the se c hil dr e n. He sa id they have some signific ant problems. And that he r ecommends that – th a t th e famil y , M r. Mo or e a ndhis wi fe a ndthe c hil dren, need to ha ve pr of e ssi on a l a ssi stanc e in deal in g w ith thi s a dju st – wi th this a dju stm e nt, a ndthat th e c hil dr e n d e sp erat e ly ne e d a c hil d ps y c ho log ist

or ps y c hiatr ist , h e re c omm e nd s.
But as I understand it, a psy chiatrist could, per haps, g ive them medicati on. Hopef

ully , Dea r God, they ’re not going to need me dic a tio n. Wha t I

wo uldsu g g e st i s y ou a ll a g re e on a g oo d c hil d psy c h o lo g is t. A n d th e r e p o r ts ar e to b e ma d e to me , b u t u n d e r sea l and no one’ s to see them but me.
I t’s

– He did recommend that Mr. and Mrs. Moore de velop some assistance in – need some assistance – I ’m sorry – in developing po sit ive dis c ipl ina

ry str a te g ie s.M r
. M oor e v ol u n t ar i l y pr oce ede d pro s e a t t h e F e b ru a ry 2 1 , 2 0 0 3 he a rin g d e sp ite th e t r ia l co u rt’s o ff e r to 3 al l o w a co nt i nuance. A l t ho ugh pro s e lit iga n ts a re e n tit le d to fair a n d e q u a l t re a tm e n t, W hi taker v . W hi r l pool Cor

p. , 3 2 S .W .3 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 7 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 0 ), pro s e lit iga n ts a re n o t en tit le d to sh ift the b u rd e n o f l iti g a ting the ir c a se to the c o u rts. Id . at 2 2 2

. P ro se l i t i gan t s ar e n ot ex cus ed f r om comp l y i ng wi t h t he s ame subst ant i ve and pr ocedur al
re q u ire m e n ts th a t m u st b e a d h e re d to b y o the r re p re se n te d p a rtie s. Id

. at 222

. W e t hu s f i nd t hat M r
. M oo r e wa s ch ar ged
w ith the re sp o n sib ili ty o f o ff e rin g a p ro p e r o b je c tio n to the trial c o u rt’s ru ling a t t h e F e b ru a ry 2 1 , 2 0 0 3 he a rin g
.
T o bri ef l y addres s M r
. M oo r e’ s hea r s ay al l ega t i on, we not e t hat nei t her he nor hi s couns el en t er ed a pr op er 4

a n d ti m e ly o b je c tio n to D r. W a lke r’s re p o rt a s ina d m issib le he a rs a y. F a ilure to inte rp o se p ro p e r a n d se a so n a b le ob j ect i ons t o hea r s ay eq ual s a wai ver and s t at ement s o r recor ds t hat wo ul d l i kel y be ex cl uded un der a pr op er he ar s ay o b je c tio n b e c o m e su ff

ic ie n t ev id e n c e a b se n t suc h o b je c tio n
. -28- I ’l l be g la d to sh are thi s w ith wh a te ve r p sy c ho log ist y ou a ll c ho os e , b ut I

do n’ t w a nt t o sha

re it w ith the pa

rt ie s, I do n’ t th ink

it helps. All I

can te ll y ou is that the children a re in serious distress and t h at t h i s d o ct o r s ay s t h eyn ee d p s y ch o l o gi ca l co u n s el i n g. And, of c ourse, I

don’t think t h is is any thing that we , as a du lts , did not e xpe c t. I wa s hop ing it w ou ld n ot c ome to p a ss, bu t it did. I t’s g oing to be under seal; unless y ou can c onvince me that the attorney s need to re ad it, it will rema in that way , unless by court orde r it’s open.
S o , I w a n tt h e c h i l d r e n t o g e tc o u n s e l i n g i m m e d i a t e l y.
The trial court’s initial order of custody

and visitation and ea ch of thesubsequent ame nded order s reiter ated its finding that Mr. Moore w as re quired to take the twins to Dr. Walker for additional counseling , and that the doc tor’s re port from the c ounseling session should be filed unde r seal with the court. Mr. Moore did not file any pleading or motion objec ting t o an yo f t h e t ri al court’s or ders r equiring the twins to underg o additional counseling wit h Dr. Walker and further direc ting that the doc tor’s re port from the se ssion be filed under seal with the c ourt, nor did he enter an ora l objection to the court’s f inding or direc tive at the Fe bruary 21, 2003 hearing. A party who 3 invites or waives e rror , or who fails to take rea sonable steps to cure an er ror, is not entitled to relief o n appea l. See T e n n
. R. A p p
. P. 3 6 ( a ) , c mt

. a
. We th e r e f o r e f in d th a t M r
. M o o r e ’ s issue is not 4 pr op e rl y be fo re thi s Co urt.

I n the eve nt that this C ourt is deemed to ha ve a duty to c onsider Mr. Moore’ s arg ument that the trial court improperly relied upon D r. Walker’ s sealed r epor t in rende ring its final decision of custody and visitation, we find his issue to be without merit. We note, initially , that the trial court ap t l y s u m m ar i z ed t h e co n t en t s o f Dr

. W al k er ’s re p o rt t o t h e p ar t i es att h e F eb ru ar y 2 1 , 2 0 0 3 h ea ri n g. F urthe r, we ha ve e xami ne d D r. Wal ke r’s seale d r e po rt a ndfi ndno thi ng in h is e va luatio n to c o n tr a d ic t th e c o u r t’ s f

in d in g s w ith r e g ar d to v is it a ti o n , c u s to d y , a n d c o n ti n u e d counseling

. We ther ef o re fi nd the court’s failure or re fusal to permit counsel acc ess to or re view of D r. Walker’ s report to be harmless e rror
.-29-

As a fi nal no te , w e str e ss that D r. Wal ke r’ s r e po rt sh ou ld h a ve be e n ma de a va ila ble to counsel whe re the court’s de cision was base d, at least i n part, upon this evaluation. Shoul d Mr. Mo or e or Mr s. Ho lla nd , a s the natur a l pa re nts of the se c hil dr e n, de sir e to r e a d o r r e vie w the c on te nts of Dr . Wa lke r’ s r e po rt , th e y sh ou ld f ile a pr op e r m oti on re qu e sti ng the un se a lin g of sa id d oc ume nt.
IX. We ne xt c on sid e r the re la te d iss ue of wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt “ c omm itt e d r e ve rs ibl e e rr or in requiring [Mr. Moore] to s eek c ounseling for the [t wins].” Mr. Moore is a ppare ntly challeng ing the trial court’ s April 25, 2003 order wher ein the court found: [Dr. Wa lk e r ’ s s e a le d ] r e p o r t s u g g e s ts th a t th e tw o c h il dren wh o are the su bje c t of thi s lit ig a tio n (“ the tw ins ” ) are in so me emotional stress, and Dr . Walker reco mmends the assistance of a child psy chiatrist or psy cholog ist to help alleviate this stress. Mr. Moore will there fore m ak e arrang ements to take the children f or c ou nselin g wi th p os sib ly Dr . Cathy

Grif fi n w ith the la tte r t o de te rm ine the du ration a ndint e ns ity of the c ou ns e lin g . T he a du lt parties t o t h i s case will make themselves a vailable to attend suc h counseling if reque sted to do so by the counse lor. Co s t s of such c ou ns e lin g that are no t cov e re d by ins ur a nc e wi ll b e div ide d e qu a lly by Mr. Moore and Ms. Holland.
The c ourt brief

ly discussed the need for continued counseling during the Fe bruary 21, 2003 hearing w ithout objection from Mr. Moore. We find that the t rial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Mr. M oore to seek further counseling for the twins. Dr. W alker ’s s eale d report indicates that th e tw ins , e sp e c ia lly

the y ou ng bo y , ha ve “ ha d so me sig nif ic a nt pr ob le ms a dju sti ng e mot ion a lly to th e ir n e w h o me
. ” I n h is in it ia l r e p o r t d a te d O c to b e r 1 8 a n d 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , D r

Wa lk e r n o te d th a t “ [i ]f undue distress persists afte r [the] transfe r [of custody ], appropriate c onsultation and/or counseling with a child psy cholog ist should be sought.” This report w as enter ed as an e x hibit at trial without objection, and wa s made a vailable to both parties.
I n her te stimony at t he Februa ry 21, 2003 hearing, Mr s. Holland stated that the twins we re ha vin g a dif fi c ult tim e a dju sti ng to the c ha ng e in c us tod y , n oti ng : Q. Would y ou p l ea s e tell [ t] he Court g ener ally how that visitation [ wi t h t h e t wi n s ] wa s go i n g? A. At first, it was not very well at al l

. [The twins] had a lot of questions, they

wer e, like, asking me “[W] hy do I have to g o.” And, y ou kn ow , th e – Y ou r H on or ha s o rd e re d u s n ot t o, y ou kn ow , d isc us s the court with them, and my expression to them was that they ’re very lucky children, the y

have f our people who love them very much.-30- TH E CO UR T: I

re a d th a t. I

tho ug ht that w a s b e a uti fu l. [Q. (MR. HI LL ):] And it –
THE COURT: Very

g ood.
A. – was ve ry

difficult to – for – for [ my twin daug hter]. At first, she w o u l d g o a n d h i d e
. S h e

– s h e g o t m a d a t [ m y t w i n s o n ] , a c t u a l l y, be c a us e he tol d o n h e r h idi ng pla c e , it wa s u nd e r the bu nk

be d.

.. . So we we nt t o try

a ndfi ndhe r, a ndsh e g ot a wf ull y up set with –

wi th [he r b ro the r] b e c a us e he g a ve a way he r h idi ng sp ot.
But the – her – her reason f or doing this is because she didn’t want to g o to Mr. and Mrs. Moore’ s house. S he could not under stand wh y sh e ha d to go. So I

ha d to sit do wn a nde xpla in t o h e r the be st [way ] t hat I

could – possibly

could. [Myson’s] first visitation from Mr. and Mrs. Moore ’s house, he kicked me, he scre amed [ at m e] and called m e the B-wor d, which I have ne ver e ver in my

entire life experience d out of my son.

****************************************************** [My son] is not loving any more, he does not just run up and say “I love y ou, mommy ,” like he use d to do, or “I [m issed] y ou.” [Mydaug hter], she seems c onfused on c alling me “mama” or [Mrs.] Moore “ mama.”
Mr . H oll a ndte sti fi e d th a t th e tw ins are no t in iti a lly a s a ff e c tio nate tow ards h im a ndMr s. Holland, or their stepsisters, during their visits, but not ed that they warm to the family

members a fter a c ou pl e of ho urs. Ms . K a ise r t e sti fi e d th a t th e c hil dr e n a re mor e wi thdra wn sin c e the c ha ng e in c u s t o d y. N o e v i d e n c e w a s o f f e r e d i n r e b u t t a l t o t h i s t e s t i m o n y. On the basis of t h e ab o v e testimonyand Dr . Walker’s re ports, we f ind that continued c ou ns e lin g is in the tw ins ’ be st int e re sts , a nd the re by c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n in re qu ir ing Mr . M oo re to s e e k fu rthe r c ou ns e lin g fo r the c hil dr e n. Mr . M oo re ’s iss ue is the re fo re wi tho ut m e ri t.
X. We next consider Mr . Moore’ s arg ument that the trial court incorre ctly calc ulated or base d Mrs. Holland’s c hild support obligations to appellant upon he r 1999 income.-31-

I n its order of A pril 25, 2003, the trial court directe d Mrs. Holland t o pay to both Mr. Moore and Mr. Ray

$311.0 0 p er m o n t h in child support for support of he r four children. The court’s support awa

rd cove red the twins and Mrs. Hol l and’s two children with Mr. Ray , and wa s further based upon a n income of $622.00 pe r month. The only evidenc e in the re cord r eg arding Mrs. Holland’s income is a single pay stub from her employ er, Kessler Rehabilitation Services, listing he r net bi-we ekly income for

the pay period ending Dec ember

7, 2002, as $757.59, and Mrs. Holland’s base assertion that she makes $12.50 per hour. Ther e is no evidenc e in the rec ord to indicate the a vera g e number of hours that Mrs. Holland wo rk s pe r we e k, or that the pa y stu b su bmi tte d int o e vid e nc e is re pr e se ntative of h er bi -wee kly earnings. The re is no evidence in the record that either Mr. Moore or his attorney ever questioned Mrs. Holland as to her

income at the time of

this appeal.
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 36-5- 101(a) (1) ( Supp. 2002) pro v i d es in pertinent part as fo llo ws : (a) (1) Whether the marriag e is dissolved absolut el y , or a perpe tual or temporary separ ation is de cre ed, the court may make a n order and dec ree for the suitable support and maintena nce of either spouse by the other spouse , or out of either spouse’s prope rty , and of the childre n, or any of them, by either spouse or out of such spouse’s property , acc ording to the nature of the c ase and the circ umstances of the parties, the order

or dec ree to remain in the c ourt’s control; and, on application of either party for spousal suppor t, the court m ay de c re e an inc re as e or

de c re as e of

suc h al low an ce on ly upo n a sho wing of a sub sta ntia l and mate ria l c hang e of c irc umstanc e s. In c as e s inv olv ing c hild

sup po rt, upo n ap

plic ati on o

f e ithe r p ar

ty , th e court shall decre e an increase or decre ase of such allowan ce when the re is f ound to b e a si gn if icant v ar ian c e , a s d e fine d in the c hild sup po rt g uid

e line s e sta bli

she d b y sub se c tio n (

e ), be twe e n the gui de line s a nd t

he amount of sup

po rt c urre ntly or

de re d unl e ss t he variance has resulted from a previously court-ordered devi ation fr om the gui

de line s a nd t

he circumsta nc e s whic h c aus e d th e deviation have not changed. The necessity to provide for the child’s health ca re ne eds shall also be a basis for modification of the amount of the orde r, re g ardle ss of whethe r a modif i ca t i on in the amount of child support is nece ssary
. (empha sis added).
Mr. Moore ha s prese nted no evide n ce of Mrs. Holland’s e x act or near -exact monthly

or annual income , nor is there any evidenc e in the re cord t o s h o w a“s u b s t an t i al an d m at er i al ch an ge of circ umstances” such as to jus tify an incr ease in Mrs. Holland’s child support oblig ations. We thus fi ndMr . M oo re ’s iss ue wi tho ut m e ri t.-32-

I f any va ri a nc e e xists a s re qu ir e d by the Chi ld Sup po rt Gu ide lin e s, Te nn
. Comp. R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 , M r. Mo or e ma y fi le a pr op e r pe tit ion to mod if y Mr s. Ho lla nd ’s c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio ns
. We n ote that Mr . Ray

do e s n ot a

pp e a l th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g re g ard ing c hil d s up po rt

.

XI
. Mr. Moore’ s final issue is whether he is entitled to rec over attorney ’s fe es fr om Mr. Ray for his appea l in this matter.
The recor d indicates that this matter has been prolong ed unnecessarily by the parties by

many petty and somewhat i rr el ev an t i s sues. Althoug h it appear s that the parties do love these c hildren, the y ha ve no t sh ow n a

wi lli ng ne ss t o p ut the int e re sts of the se chi ld ren fi rst a ndse t a sid e the ir individual animosit y

toward e ach othe r. Also, it seems that the appar ent animosity of Mr. Moore’ s c ou ns e l to wa

rdthe tr ia l ju dg e ha s a dd e d to the strif e a ndina bil ity of the pa rt ie s to wo rk

thi ng s o ut. Considering the re cord as a whole, and the matters that ha ve tra nspired, we do not find that the trial court a bused its discretion in any manner in refusing to awar d attorney ’s fe es to Mr. Moore

. XI I.
I n concl u s i on, the trial court’s order is rever sed to the extent that it denies the reque st that the twin’s surname s be cha ng ed to Moore and it is ordered that such ch ang e be ma de by the trial court on remand. The order of the t rial court is affirme d in all other re spects and c osts of this appeal ar e a s s e s s e d a g a i n s tt h e ap p e l l a n t , S t e p h e n E r i c M o o r e a n d h i s s u r e t y.

__________________________________________ W. F RA NK CRA WF OR D, P RE S I DI NG J UDG E, W.S.