A f e w w e e ks be fo re tr ia l, Nunc io marr ie d Fo ns e c a by pr oxy and c ha ng e d h e r l a st n a me to 1 Fonse ca. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.006 (West 1998). We will ref er to her as Nuncio in orde r to d ist inguis h b e tw e e n h e r a nd a pp e lla nt. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00480- CR

We nc e sla o F ons e c a, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 167TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 20124 73, H ONO RAB LE MICH AEL J. MCCORM ICK , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt We nc e sla o F on se c a

a pp e a ls h is c on vic tio n by a jur y fo r f e lony a ssa ult wi th family violence a

nd his sentence of ten y ear s’ conf inement. In three issues, he a rgues that (1) the vic tim ’s or a l st a te me nt t o p oli c e wa s a dmi tte d in vio latio n o f th e hear sa

y ru le and his sixth amendment r ight of confr ontation, (2) his trial counse l provided ineff ective a ssistance, a

nd (3) the
e vid e nc e is f

a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his c on vic tio n. We w ill a ff ir m.
BACK GR OUND At 11 :52 p. m. on De c e mbe r 2, 20 01 , Di ann a Nunc io c a lle d 91 1. Trav is County 1 deputy sheriff s Guillermo Martinez and Demetrio Medina were dispatched to Nuncio’s home. TheSerg eant Dar ren L ong testified that the cut on Fonse ca’ s arm appea red to be an old injury 2 that had some sca

bbing but ha d just been re opened. 2 911 operator notified them that a fa mily disturbance was in prog ress a nd g ave the m a desc ription of Fonse ca. The operator also told them that Nuncio re ported that F onseca was intox icated, that he had slapped Nunc io and broke n her ve hicle’s windshield with a sledg ehammer , and that Fonse ca ha d cut his wrist two weeks a g o and would proba bly tell the police that Nunc io had inflicted the w ound. The deputies arr ived at the scene at approximately 11:59 p.m. Martine z o bserve d Fonse ca sta

nding ne x t to a vehicle in the front y ard. N uncio and he r two childre n wer e inside a white vehicle in the driveway . The white ve hicle had a shattere d windshield and dama g e to the hood
an d r i g h t f

e n d e r . F o n s e c a w a s r a i s i n g h i s ar m i n t h e a i r , e xc l a i m i n g t h a t N u n c i o h a d c u t hi m. Martinez asked N uncio about F onseca ’s claims, and she told him that Fonse ca ha d been in a previous
acc ident that cause d the wound. 2

De pu ty Me din a te sti fi e d that as soo n as he g ot out of his c ar, he no tic e d th a t th e wh ite
car had “some pretty

serious dama g e to it.” Specifica lly , “ther e was a fairly larg e dent on the hood
and the wi nd sh ie ld o n th e dr ive r’ s si de , d ir e c tly in f ro nt o f t he ste e ri ngwh e e l, h a d a

big ho le in it and the window w as smashed.” The fe nder ha d also bee n signific antly damag ed. Nuncio tol d Medina that she ha d been sle eping in her be d with her two da ug hters whe nF o n s e c a

r e tu r n e d h o me in to xic a te d

an d d e ma n d e d th a t Nu n c io g o w it

h h im to an o ther bedroom. After she ref

used, he g rabbe d her t-shirt and beg an pulling her out of the bed. Nunc io’s daug hters woke up and beg an y elling at Fonse ca, but he drag g ed Nunc io into the kitchen wher e he g rabbe d her ha ir with one hand a nd squeezed he r jaw w ith his ot her ha nd. Eventually , Nuncio broke fre e, and she and her

daug hters ra

n outside to th e ca r. After strug g ling with F onseca at the ca r,Nu n ci o t o l d M ed i n a t h at s h e h i t t h e v eh i cl e b ec au s e s h e co u l d n o t s ee d u e t o t h e d am age 3 to the windshield. Nuncio also claimed that she did not rea liz e her written statement was made under oath and 4 that she wrote it because she wa s tired and wa nted the police to lea

ve. 3 Nuncio mana g ed to g et inside with her da ug hters; Fonse ca r emained outside kic king a nd hitting the
car . Nuncio re counted that, a fter g etting the door open, he ag ain g rabbe d her by the hair and slappe d he r t hr e e or fo ur tim e s b e fo re Nunc io c ou ld c los e the c ar d oo r. Nunc io atte mpt e d to start the c ar t o flee . Fonse ca r etrieve d a sledg ehammer from his truck, stood in front of N uncio’s ca r, and slammed the ho od of the c ar w iththe sle dg e hamme r. He the n swun g the sle dg e hamme r a t the wi nd sh ie ld i n front of the steeringwhee l. Nuncio beg an to drive awa y , sideswiped another vehicle, and stopped 3 to call 911. Nuncio told Medina that she had pain and sore ness in her he ad, jaw, ne ck, and le ft arm. Medina

observe d that Nuncio’s shirt wa s t o rn and that the ve hicles had be en dama g ed consistent with Nuncio’s ora l statement. L ater that night, Nuncio g ave a writt en stateme nt, which was substantially

identical to her

descr iption of events to Medina. F on se c a wa s arr e ste d a

nd ind ic te d f

or a g gravat e d a ssa

ult and fe lony a ssa ult wi th family violence. A t trial, deputies Mar tinez and Medina testified a bout what they

had see n and hea

rd the nig ht of the incident. Ove r F onseca ’s object i o n , Medina a lso testified about Nuncio’s or al statement to him. Fonsec a ca lled Nuncio to testify , and she r eca nted her previous stateme nts. She te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s th e on e wh o h a d h arm e d F on se c a and th at he wa s inno c e nt o f t he a ssa ult
c ha rg e s. A j ur

y fou nd Fon seca no t g uil ty of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult bu t g uil ty

of fe lony a ssa ult wi th 4 fa mil y vio le nc e , a

nd a ft e r h e ari nge vid e nc e of oth e r c on vic tio ns , sent e nc e d h im t o te n y e ars ’4

confine ment. See Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. §§ 12 .3 4, 22 .0 1( b) (2 ) ( Wes t 20 03 & Sup p. 20 05 ). Th is appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N

I n thre e iss ue s, F on se c a

c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y pe rm itt ingMe din a

to testify about Nuncio’s oral statement, that his trial counsel provided ineffe ctive assistanc e, and that the evidenc e is fac tually

insufficient to support his conviction.
Adm iss ion of N unc io’ s o r al s ta te m e nt to M e dina

I n h is f ir st i ssu e , F on se c a

argue s th a t N un c io’ s sta te me nt t o M e din a wa s im pr op e rl y admitted in violation of the hear say rule a nd his six th amendment rig ht of confr ontation. See U. S. Const. art. VI ; Tex. R . Evid. 802. There is no dispute that Medina’s te stimony was he arsa

y ; our inquiry is whether the excited utteranc e exception applies. See Tex. R. Evi d. 803(2). Hearsay We will not re verse a trial c ourt’s dec ision to admit evidenc e over objection abse nt a cle ar a buse of discr etion. Ap oli na r v . S tate , 155 S.W .3d 184, 186-87 (T ex . Crim. App. 2005) (c i t i n g Zul ian i v . S

tate , 9 7 S. W.3 d 5 89 , 5 95 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2003 )) . T he tr ia l c ourt a bu se s it s discretion when the decision lies outside the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment. Id
. (c i t i n g Cantu v. Sta te , 842 S.W .2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).

Hea rsay statements are g ener ally not admissible unless the statement falls within a
r e c o g n iz e d e xc e p ti o n to th e h e arsa y rule. See Te x. R. E vid . 8 02 ; Apolinar , 155 S.W .3d at 186. Howeve r, there is an exception for a n excited utteranc e, which is define d as “[a] statement relating5

to a startling event or condition ma de while the decla rant was unde r the stre ss of excitement cause d by the eve nt or condition.” See Te x. R. Ev id. 80 3( 2) ; Apolinar , 155 S.W .3d at 186. The e x ception is based on the a ssumption t hat the dec lara nt is not, at the tim e of the statement, ca pable of the kind of re flec tion that would enable him to fabr icate inf ormation. Apolinar , 155 S.W .3d at 186. To deter mine whether

a stateme nt is an excited utterance , trial co u rts should determine “ whether the decla rant wa s still dominated by the emoti ons, excitement, fea r, or pain of the event or condition” when the statement was ma de. Id
. (q u o t i n g Zuliani , 9 7 S. W.3 d at 59 6) ; se e Lagun as v . S tate , No. 03 -0 3- 00 56 6- CR, 20 05 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 69 57 , at *2 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin Au g us t 26 , 2 00 5, pe t. filed). F actor s that the trial court may consider include the leng th of time betwee n the occ urre nce and the s tate me n t, th e n a tu r e o f th e d e c la

r an t, w h e th e r th e s tate me n t is ma d e in r e s p o n s e to a question, and whe ther the state ment is self-ser ving. Id
. (c i t i n g Zuliani , 97 S.W .3d at 595-96). N o single fac tor is disposit ive but bear s on our ul timate deter mination. Zuliani , 9 7 S. W.3 d at 59 6; see als o La wto n v . S

tate , 913 S.W .2d 542, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Fonse ca acknow ledg es that “[c]learly , a startling event had occur red ” a n d that

“ [s]e ve ra l f

a c ts c or ro bo rate the e xiste nc e of a re c e nt d ra matic e pis od e .” Ho we ve r, he ur g e s u s to fi nd that Nunc io’ s st a te me nt w a s n ot a n e xcit e d u tte ra

nc e bu t w a s “ ind ic a tiv e of re fl e c tio n” be c a

us e Nuncio told both the 911 operator and Medina that F onseca would claim she c ut him but t hat it was not true. F urthermor e, Medina ’s re port states that the gir l s we re “a fra id, crying, [and] upset” but do e s n ot s tate tha

t N un c io w a s “ hy ste ri c a l” or “ ne rv ou s. ” He argue s tha t a lth ou g h “ the tim e fr a me betwee n the eve nt’s conclusion and the statement wa s a mere handful of minutes,” Nuncio’s injuries did no t r e qu ir e me dic a l atte nti on , she wa s abl e to ca ll 911 wi tho ut h is i nte rf e re nc e , a nd by the tim e6

polic e ar r iv e d s h e h a d a lr e a dy s e p ar a te d h e r s e lf f r o m F o n s e c a . T h e s e f

a c ts , h e c o n c lu des, do not justify admission of the hea

rsay under the excited utteranc e exception. Nunc io c a lle d 911 a t 11:5 2 p.m. De pu tie s Ma rt ine z an d M e din a

we re dis patc he d to the scene and wer e told that the incident was in pr og ress; they arr ived at 11:59. Wh en M ed i na
arr ived, he sa

w Fonse ca, Nuncio, and Nuncio’s two y oung daug hters. As he approa ched Nuncio and the g i rl s , he obser

ved that “[t]hey

wer e all pre tty

hy sterica l. They

wer e cr ying. A nd all three hu dd le d to g e the r, kin d of hug g ing e a c h othe r. ” Rig ht aw ay , Med ina no tic e d th a t N un c io w a s v isi bly injured. F onseca was standing near by and “wa s, in a

very loud voice and sw inginghis arms around in the air, he was y elling at us that she had cut him in the ar m.” Two or thre e minutes afte r the police arr ived—appr ox imately ten minutes after the assault occ urre d—Medina a sked Nunc i o wh at had happe ned. Medina noted that when he approa ched he r, she wa s “s t i l l cry ing, still very upset, and a

ppear ed to be e x tremely

afr aid”; she

“ mos t de fi nit e ly ” a

pp e are d to be “ un de r t

he stress of an e xcit e d e ve nt. ” Ap pr oximate ly tw e nty minutes after

the deputies a

rrived, se rg eant Da

rr en L ong took Nuncio’s wr itten statement. L ong testified that at the be g inning of Nuncio’s statem en t , “i t l ooked like she w as still traumatiz ed and shaking and looked like she had bee n cry ing.” The fa ct that Medina did not expressly identify Nuncio as “ hy sterica l” on the police repor t is not dispositi ve. Nuncio’s oral statement was made approxi mately ten minutes after the 911
c a ll a nd tw o o r t hr e e min ute s a ft e r p oli c e arr ive d. Me din a te sti fi e d that w he n p oli c e arr ive d, Nunc io and her daug hters were hy sterica l, cry ing, and huddled tog ether , hug g ing e ach othe r. F onseca was
near by , y elling that Nuncio had cut him. Under these circ umstances, we hold that there is suff icient
e vid e nc e tha

t N un c io w a s st ill do min a te d b y the e mot ion s, e xcit e me nt, fe ar, or pa in o f t he a ssa ult7

when he r ora l statement was made . Thus, the excited utteranc e exception applied. See Tex. R. Evi d. 803. Fur

thermore , even if

the excited utteranc e exception did not apply , the impro per admission of evi dence is not rever sible err or whe n substantially the same f

acts a re pr oven by unobjected- to testimony
. Se e Bu rk s v . S tate , 876 S.W .2d 877, 898 (Tex. Cri m . App. 1994); An de rso n v . S

tate , 7 17 S.W. 2d

62 2, 62 6- 27 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ); Hi tt v . S tate , 53 S.W .3d 697, 708 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref ’d). I n addition to Me dina’s testimony reg ardingwhat Nunc io told him , he also testified
a bo ut what th e 91 1 o pe rator wa s to ld b y

Nu nc io a nd wh a t th e op e ra

tor re po rt e d to the de pu tie s. Fonse ca did not objec t to this testimony . Moreove r, Me d i n a, L ong , and Nunc io testified without ob je c tio n a bo ut t he c on te nts of

Nunc io’ s w ri tte n s tate me nt. We h old that th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in pe rm itt ing Me din a to te sti fy a bo ut Nunc io’ s de sc ri pti on of the in cid ent. Alternatively , any

err or wa s not rever sible beca use su b s tantially

the same f

acts we re introduc ed throug h other unobjec ted-to testimony
. See B urks , 876 S.W .2d at 898.
Sixth amendme nt right t o confrontation

Next, Fonseca

argues t h at admis sion of Medina’s te stimony about Nuncio’ s oral state me nts vio late d h is s ixth a me ndme nt

r i g ht o f c on fr on tatio n b e c a us e the state me nts la c ke d in dic ia of re liability , wer e not orig inally made unde r oath, a

nd wer e later repudiated under oath at trial. See U. S. Co ns t. a

rt . V I ; Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 5 41 U. S. 3 6, 59 (2 00 4) ; Oh io v. Ro be rts , 448 U.S. 56, 6 6 (1 9 8 0 ). W e re v i ew t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g de novo
. Da v is v . S tate , 1 6 9 S. W. 3 d

6 6 0 , 6 6 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 05 , n o p e t.) ; se e Zam oran o v . S tate , 84 S.W .3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).8 Th e Con fr on tatio n Cl a

us e a pp lie s to those who “ be ar t e sti mony ” —“ [a] s ole mn decla ration or aff

irmation made for t he purpose of establishi ng or provingsome fac t.” Cra wfo rd , 5 4 1 U. S
. at 5 1 (q u o t i n g W ebster’s Am erican Dic tionary of the English L anguage (1828))
. When the decla rant a ppea rs for cross-e x amination at trial, the Confrontation Cl ause doe s not place a ny constraints on the use of his pr ior testimonial stateme nts. Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 59 (conf rontation
c la us e do e s n ot bar ad

mis sio n of state me nt as lon g a s dec lara nt is pre se nt at tr ia l to de fe nd or e xpla in i t ) ( ci t i n g Calif

ornia v. Gree n , 3 99 U. S. 1 49 , 1 62 (1 97 0) (whe re de c lara nt i s n ot a

bs e nt, bu t is pr e se nt t o te sti fy and su

bmi t to c ro ss- e xami natio n, c a se s supp or t con c lus ion that adm iss ion of his out-of-c ourt statements does not cr eate confr ontation problem)).

Even if Nunc io ’s s t atements were te stimoni al, the Confrontation Cl ause doe s not constrain the use of her

prior stateme nts b ec au s e s h e appear ed for cross-e x amination at trial. See Cra wfo rd , 5 4 1 U
. S
. a t59 ; see also Car te r v . S tate , 1 5 0 S. W. 3 d

2 3 0 , 2 4 1 n . 1 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 04 , n o p e t.) (c on fr on tatio n c la us e no t vi olate d b e c a

us e vic timof

fe lony a ssa ult on family member a ctually

testified at trial). We ove rrule F onseca ’s first issue.
Ineff ect ive assistance of counsel Next, Fonseca

argues that his trial couns el ’s fa ilure to object to Nunc io’s written statement or reque st a limit ing instruction r eg arding its use constituted ineffe ctive assist an ce of counsel. The State responds that the state ment was a dmissibl e and, a lternatively , that counsel’s failure to object did not constitute ineffe ctive ass i s tance of counse l beca use the stateme nt was cumulative of othe r evide nce, su ch as t es timony about Nuncio’ s statements to the 911 operator, which wa s admitted without objection.9 Under the Strickland

standard, Fonse ca must fir st de monstrate that his tria l counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt. Sc he an e ttev . S tate , 14 4 S.W. 3d 50 3, 50 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); see Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Next, he mus t show that his counsel’s de ficient perf ormanc e was so serious t hat i t prejudice d his defense , rende ring the trial unfa ir and the ve rdict suspect. Id . Appellate r eview of defe nse counse l’s repr esentation is highly defe rential and pre sumes that counsel’s c onduct fe ll within t he wide r ang e o f re asonable and prof essional assistance
. Sc he an e tte , 144 S.W .3d at 509 (c iting Bo nev . S tate , 77 S.W .3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). To overc o me th is p r e s u mp ti o n , th e a ll e g a ti o n s o f in e f f e c ti v e n e s s mu s t b e f

ir ml y f o u n d e d in the
rec ord, and the rec ord must a ffirmatively demonstrate the alleg ed inef fec tiveness. Ma lle tt v . S

tate , 65 S.W .3d 59, 63 (Tex . Crim. App. 2001). The f act that a nother attorney

may have pur sued a dif fe re nt t a c tic a t tr ia l is ins uf fi c ie nt t o p ro ve a

c la im o f in effecti ve a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l. Sc he an e tte , 1 4 4 S
. W
. 3 d

at 5 0 9 -1 0 (c i t i n g Mc

Fa rla nd v . S tate , 8 45 S.W. 2d

82 4, 84 4 ( Te x . Cr im. App. 1992)). Under

most c ircumstance s, the rec ord on direc t appea l will not be sufficient to show that counsel’s r epre sentation was so defic ient and so lacking in ta ctical or strateg ic dec ision-making
as to ove rcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct wa s rea sonable a nd profe ssional. Id
. (c i t i n g Bone , 77 S.W .3d at 833). Ineff ective a ssis t an ce c laims are not built on retrospe ctive speculation; rather, they

must “be firmly

founded in the r ecor d.” Id
. Fonse ca is require d to prove by a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that th e re is, in fact , no pl a us ibl e pr of

e ssi on a l r e a so n f

or his counsel’s omission. Bone , 77 S.W .3d at 836.

A m otion for new t rial was not filed i n this case , and the r ecor d does not contain a ny
e vid e nc e re g ard ingthe pr of e ssi on a l ch oic e s ma de by F on se c a ’s c ouns e l. We are no t pe rm itt e d to10

speculate about counsel’s rea sons f or not obje cting to Nuncio’s wr itten statement or not re questing
a limit ing instruc tion. Se e Sc he an e tte , 144 S.W .3d at 510. We note, however, that Fonseca does not complain about similar evidenc e beingadmitted, without o b je c ti o n , v ia

te s timony

from Mar tinez and Mendez about what the 911 operator repor ted to them. See B urks , 876 S.W .2d at 898. Wit hout any

evidenc e to over come the pr esumption, we must presume that c ounsel acte d pursuant to a r easona ble trial strate g y . Sc he an e tte , 144 S.W .3d at 510. We overrule Fonse ca’ s second issue.
Insu ff icient evidence Fonse ca admits that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that he assa ulted Nuncio and c aused he r bodily injury by g rabbingher a

nd tear ing he r t-shirt, pulling he r hair on two
occa sions, squeezing her ja w, and g rabbingher a

rm. Howe ver, he contends in his third issue that the evidenc e is fac tually insufficient to show that he c aused N u n ci o b o d i l y injury —phy sical pain—by striking her with his hand as c harg ed in count two of the indictment. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 1.07 (West 2003) (de fining bodily injury as phy sical pain). I n a fa ctual-suf

ficienc y analy sis, the evidenc e is viewed in a neutra l light. Drichas
v . S tat e , No. PD-1015-04, 2005 Te x . Crim. App. L EXI S 1775, at *9 (Tex. Crim. App. Oc tober 19, 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Cle wis v . S tate , 922 S.W .2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). There is only one question to be answe red in a fac tual-suffic iency revie w: Considering all of the e vidence in a neutra l l i g h t , w a s a j u r

y r a t i o n a l l y

j u s t i f i e d i nf i n d i n g g u i l tb e y o n d

a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ? Zun iga v . S

tate , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484-85 (Te x . Crim. App. 2004)
. T h er e ar e t wo way s in which the evide nce ma y be insufficient: either

the evidenc e supporting the finding , considere d alone, is too weak to support the11

jury ’s finding bey on d a reasonable doubt or the contravening evidenc e may be so strongthat the S t at e could not have met its burden of pr oof. Drichas , 2 0 0 5 T e x. Cr im
. A p p . L E X I S 1775, a t *9 (c i t i n g Zuniga , 144 S.W .3d at 484-85).

A per son commits the o ffe nse of a ssault if the person intentionally , knowing ly , or
re c kle ssl y c a us e s b od ily

inj ur y to a no th er. Tex. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 2 2. 01 (We st 2 00 3) . “ B od ily injury ” mea

ns phy sical pain, illn es s , o r an y i m pairment of phy sical condition. Id . § 1.07. The definitio n i s b ro ad and enc ompasses “e ven re latively minor phy sical conta cts so long a s they
co n s t i tute more than me re of fensive touc hing.” Lan e v . S tate , 7 6 3 S
. W
. 2 d 7 8 5 , 7 8 6 ( T e x. Cr im. App. 1989). Furthermo r e , a f a c t- f in d e r ma y in f e r th a t a v ic ti m a c tu a ll y

f e lt o r s u f f e r e d p h y s ic al pa in b e c a us e pe op le of

c omm on int e lli g e nc e un de rs tand

pa in a nd so me of the natur a l c a

us e s o f i t. Ra nd olp h v . S tate , 152 S.W .3d 764, 774 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pe t.). When con s i d er ing wh e the r e vid e nc e is s uf

fi c ie nt t o e sta

bli sh that a vic tim su ff

e re d “ bo dil y

inj ur y ,” jur ie s are fr e e to u se
common sense a

nd apply common knowledg e, obser va ti o n , a n d e xp e r ie n c e g ained in ordina ry aff airs of life, while g i v i n g ef

fec t to inferenc es that may rea sonably

be dra wn from e vidence
. See W awr y k ow v . S tate , 8 66 S.W. 2d

96 , 9 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —B e a

umo nt 1 99 3, pe t. r e f’ d) (a ny ratio na l f a c tfinder c ould have infe rre d that blows to head a rea “hurt” or ca

used “p h y sical pain” bey ond a
re as o n ab l e d o u

b t ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d S

tates v . H e ath , 9 7 0 F
. 2 d

1 3 9 7 , 1 4 0 2 ( 5 t h C i r . 19 92 )) ; see also Go od in v . S tate , 750 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tex. A pp.—Corpus Christi 1988, pet. ref ’d) (construing
me anin g of “ bo dil y

inj ur y ” ; pe op le of

c omm on int e lli g e nc e un de rs tand

bo th p hy sic a l pa in a

nd so me
natur a l c a us e s o f p a in, and

it i s a re a so na

ble inf e re nc e me n of co mmo n inte lli g e nc e c ou ld c e rt a inl y make that Ma cklin’s bruises a nd muscle strain c aused him “phy sical pain” ).Th e re wa s no obje c tio n or re qu e st that the state me nt b e lim ite d to imp e a c hme nt p ur po se s. 5 There fore , it was admissible for a ll purposes. Se e Ri c ha rd so n v . S tate , 7 8 6 S. W. 2 d 3 3 5 , 3 3 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1990). 12

I n th is c a se , M e din a

te sti fi e d th a t th e 91 1 o pe ra tor t o l d h i m t h a t N un c io’ s “ wi nd sh ie ld has bee n broken a

nd she has be en slappe d.” He also testified that Nu n cio t old him that Fonseca “re ache d in [ the ca

r] and g rabbe d her by the hair and sl apped her three or four tim es bef ore she was able to close the door ag ain.” Moreove r, Nuncio testified reg ardingthe statement that she wrote the nig ht o f t he a ssa ult : Q : D o y o ur e c a l l s ay i n g , “ H e t h e ns l a p p e d i nt h e f a c e [ s i c ] a

b o u tt h r e e t i m e s ?” A: Ido n’ t r e c a ll h im d oin g that, b ut i f t hat’ s w hat it

sa y s. Q: Do e s it say , “H e the n sla pp e d me in the fa c e a

bo ut t hr e e tim e s” ; do e s it

say tha t? A: Ye s. Q: And do y ou rec all telling the se rg eant this hurt at the time? A: Th a t is wh a t it

say s.
F on se c a d o e s n o tc h a l l e n g e t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a th e s l a

p p e d N u n c i o . H e m e r e ly argues that there is no evidence that the slap(s) c aused phy sical pain. Howeve r, Nunc io’s testimony about her written statement to police on the night o f t h e assault, in which she stated that the slap

“ hurt a t th e tim e ,” pr ov ide s e vid e nc e fr om whi ch th e jur y c ou ld f ind that F on se c a

c a us e d N un c io p h ys i c a l p a i nan d , t h u s , b o d i l y i n j u r y. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07. Fur thermore , the jury

was 5 entitled to draw a

n inferen ce that the slap ca used Nunc io phy sical pain. See Lane , 763 S.W .2d at 78 6; Randolph , 1 5 2 S
. W .3 d a t 77 4; W a wrykow , 866 S.W .2d at 99. The e vidence supporting the13

fi nd ing , co ns ide re d alo ne , is not to o w e a k to su pp or t th e jur y ’s fi nd ingbe y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. See Zuniga , 144 S.W .3d at 484-85.

Moreove r, althoug h Nuncio testified that he r written statement was not true, the jury was the trie r of f

act, and we g ive g reat de fer ence to its fact deter minations and its decisions about the cr edibility

of witnesses. Se e Ha nks v. S tate , 137 S.W .3d 668, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Fa ctual disputes almost alway s turn on witness cre dibilit y . Id
. We do not decide who or what the jury should have be lieved; we c onsider only whether a re asonable jury

co u l d h av e reache d that verdic t. See Zuniga , 144 S.W .3d at 484-85.

C o n s i d er i n g Nu n ci o ’s t es t i m o n y as a wh o l e, t h e fa ct t h at s h e r ef u s edt o ac kn o wl ed ge the ver acity

of her abuse alleg ations did not constitute contravening evidenc e that was so st rongthat the State could not ha

ve met its burden of

proof. Se e id . We ho ld t hat th e e vid e nc e wa s f

a c tua lly sufficie nt to support Fonsec a’s c onviction. We overrule F onseca ’s third issue.
CO NC LU SION Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d F on se c a ’s iss ue s, we a ff ir m th e or de r o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

__________________________________________ W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: De cembe r 15, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh