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i 

58–024 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–157] 

SPACE POSTURE REVIEW AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 21, 2010 
(II) 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 21, 2010, Space Posture Review and the Fiscal Year 2011 

National Defense Authorization Budget Request for National Security 

Space Activities .................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 21, 2010 ..................................................................................... 21 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010 

SPACE POSTURE REVIEW AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Chairman, 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee ........................................................................... 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

Butler, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber and Space 

Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense .......................................................... 6 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command, U.S. 

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 5 

Payton, Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs, U.S. Air Force .......................................................................................... 8 

Sapp, Betty, Principal Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office .......... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Butler, Robert J. ............................................................................................... 43 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert ..................................................................................... 25 

Payton, Gary E. ................................................................................................ 60 

Sapp, Betty ........................................................................................................ 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 78 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 77 

(1) 

SPACE POSTURE REVIEW AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2011 

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 21, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:15 p.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitors Center, Hon. James Langevin (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee will now come to order. Today we will take 

testimony on the Administration’s Space Posture Review (SPR) and 

the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Request for 

National Security Space Activities. 

I want to, first of all, welcome all of our witnesses here today. 

First, we have General Bob Kehler, Commander of the U.S. Air 

Force Space Command. He is responsible for organizing, training, 

and equipping space and private space forces for the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM), and other combatant commands around the world. 

Previously, he was Deputy Commander of STRATCOM. He 

served in the Air Force for over 35 years with tours in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) operations, space launch and space 

operations, missile warning, and space control. During his service, 

he earned a Master’s in Public Administration at the University of 

Oklahoma in Norman and a Master’s in National Security and 

Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode 

Island. I have heard something about that, General. Great job 

there. So welcome, General. Appreciate you coming back and testifying here once again. It is great to be with you. 

Next, Mr. Robert Butler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Cyber and Space, has agreed to appear before the committee 

today to discuss the interim Space Posture Review and the status 

of the Administration’s work on space policy. Mr. Butler is a former 

Air Force officer with over 30 years of experience in intelligence 

and communications-computer systems. He earned an MBA from 

the University of Maryland. Welcome to you, Mr. Butler. 

Our third witness, Ms. Betty Sapp, Principal Deputy Director of 

the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). It has become a tradition of the subcommittee to have an NRO witness discuss the un-
2 

classified aspects of your agency’s mission at our yearly hearing. 

And Ms. Sapp is also a former Air Force officer and previously 

served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence from 

2007 to 2009. She earned an MBA from the University of Missouri, 

Columbia. Welcome to you, Ms. Sapp. 

Finally, we will hear from Mr. Gary Payton, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, on the status of space acquisition programs. 

Mr. Payton retired as a colonel from the Air Force. In the course 

of his 23 years of service, he flew as a payload specialist onboard 

the Space Shuttle Discovery. 

He also directed the development of missile defense sensor and 

interceptor technologies while at the Strategic Defense Initiative 

Organization and, more recently, served as Deputy for Advanced 

Systems at the Missile Defense Agency. He has a Master’s Degree 

in Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering from Purdue University in Indiana. And I want to welcome you, Mr. Payton and, 

again, our entire panel here this afternoon. 

Well, in addition to thanking you for being with us here today, 

let me say that the United States has unparalleled space capabilities, as we all recognize. These capabilities are the underpinning 

of our military superiority, our global communications, and directly 

support our intelligence capabilities and, in fact, our way of life. 

At the same time, our space dominance underscores our dependence on space-based assets, which have become increasingly vulnerable as space becomes more congested and other countries develop 

the ability to hold at risk our satellites, our capabilities and, in 

fact, our operations. 

Several events in recent years have increased the urgency for an 

effective strategy to protect our military and economic advantages 

in space: as we know, in 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite 

(ASAT) test and, in 2008, a defunct Russian satellite collided with 

a commercial communications satellite, just by way of a couple of 

examples. These two events, which created unprecedented amounts 

of space debris, underscore the risk that an attack or accident could 

pose for continued effective operation and safety of U.S. space assets. 

Compiling the challenge, space is becoming more competitive. 

European nations are expanding their commercial and military 

space capabilities, while India, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Iran, 

and North Korea are all developing indigenous space capabilities. 

These developments have created challenges for protecting our assets, but also opportunities for collaboration that could support 

U.S. strategic long-term goals and interests related to security, 

commercial, and the civil sectors. 

The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2009 required the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a comprehensive review of our national security 

space posture. On March 12, 2010, the Administration submitted 

an interim report, but indicated that the final posture report cannot be completed until the White House establishes the broader, 

national space policy. As a result, we understand that the final national security posture review is not likely to be available until 

later this year, but we hope that when both the national policy and 
3 

the Military Posture Review efforts are complete, they will have 

answers to key questions about our space capabilities. 

For example, how do we adequately defend or, if need be, reconstitute our capabilities? What are the potential gaps now and in 

the future? How can we maintain the industrial base to produce 

the needed satellites, ground equipment, software, and launch vehicles that we need? Can we find ways to deliver these products 

within established schedules and budgets? And finally, how can we 

strike the balance between developing technical solutions and pursuing diplomatic approaches to ensure that U.S. space assets are 

protected from attack or disruption? 

During the hearing today, we hope to hear a variety of perspectives on the challenges that we face in national security space. 

General Kehler, as you contemplate your responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping our space forces, I am particularly interested in hearing what, in fact, keeps you up at night. 

What are the most important challenges that you face, and what 

should we be doing to ensure that you continue to deliver space capabilities to our warfighters? 

Mr. Butler, I look forward to hearing your insights on the 

progress that is being made to establish an overall national space 

policy and the work remaining to complete the national security 

space posture. We hope you can also share with us any additional 

findings from these ongoing efforts. 

Ms. Sapp and Mr. Payton, as you know, space acquisition programs have had a poor history of performance over the past decade. During your testimony today, I would like each of you, if you 

would, to provide us with your assessment of the progress being 

made to address cost and budget problems. Could you also identify 

the key challenges that remain in achieving stability in the acquisition process? 

And finally, I would be interested in the views of each our witnesses on how to best organize the national security space enterprise. Each of you has had a long and distinguished career in the 

field. We ask how we can better align the national security space 

enterprise to rapidly respond to the challenges that we face. 

With that said, I again want to welcome you here today. We appreciate you appearing before the subcommittee and we look forward to your testimony in just a few minutes. Before that though, 

before hearing from the witnesses, I would like to now turn to the 

Ranking Member for any comments that he may have. Mr. Turner 

is now recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in 

welcoming General Kehler, Mr. Butler, Ms. Sapp and Mr. Payton. 

I want to thank you all for your dedication, your expertise, and for 

being here today to be able to answer some of our questions and 

to give us highlights of the issues that you think are the most important. 

I would like to start by highlighting the interim report on the 

Space Posture Review, SPR, that the committee received in March. 
4 

It described today’s on-orbit and soon-to-be-launched satellites, but 

doesn’t describe a future space posture. One could provide the same 

critique of the interim SPR as Ranking Member McKeon did of the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). He said, ‘‘We find a QDR that 

basically reinforces the status quo despite serious threats to our 

current capability. Thus, this QDR provides a force structure that 

is built for the wars we are in today, when the purpose of review 

is exactly the opposite—to prepare for the likely conflicts of tomorrow. One must ask: what is new here?’’ 

Well, I understand that the committee will receive the final 

Space Posture Review later this summer and after a few national 

space policy and strategy issues have been reviewed and developed. 

I encourage the Administration to provide a forward-looking posture that will guide near-term and future investments in space. 

With respect to the budget requests, a major space acquisition 

program such as advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF), 

Wideband Global Positioning (WGS), Mobile User Objective System, Global Positioning System (GPS), and Space-Based Infrared 

System (SBIRS) appear funded consistent with the previous plans 

despite a 7 percent topline reduction. Finishing these acquisition 

programs and giving them on-orbit is important. Equally important 

are the investments in next-generation science and technology and 

innovation and ingenuity that can lead to new—and sometimes 

revolutionary—capabilities, yet these investments appear to be on 

the decline. How can our Nation retain its leadership in space if 

our science and technology investments are on the decline? Our 

committee required a Space Science and Technology Strategy in 

last year’s defense bill and I look forward to receiving that in the 

future. 

I would like to highlight a few other concerns that I hope our 

witnesses can address. First, I am deeply concerned about the industrial base for solid- and liquid-fueled rockets. Some defense officials have suggested that Air Force space launch costs could double 

in the out-years due to the termination of the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration’s (NASA) Constellation program because 

all infrastructure costs currently shared by the Department of Defense (DOD) and NASA may be passed on to DOD. Exacerbating 

this issue is the apparent lack of any real new development effort 

to sustain the engineering and design talent, and a lack of funding 

to sustain unique production and manufacturing capabilities, particularly for ICBM solid rocket motors. So what is the magnitude 

of this issue and how is the department—and the interagency—approaching it? 

Second, the Defense Intelligence Agency recently issued guidance 

that restricts the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 

NASIC, from doing ‘original analysis’ in certain counterspace areas. 

I understand that many of your organizations have a long history 

of reliance upon NASIC’s technological expertise and analysis. Limiting their ability to continue to provide such support cannot be in 

our best interest, especially with the Department’s increased emphasis on space situational awareness and space protection. 

Third, we saw a major change in the joint National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) weather satellite program. The committee was told that differences be-
5 

tween DOD and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)/NASA could not be resolved. The White House decided in February to restructure the program and allow each party 

to go its own way. However, neither DOD nor NOAA and NASA 

appeared to have a clear way forward. 

It has been over a year since the Transformational Satellite Communications Program was terminated, yet we still don’t have a 

plan for the way ahead in military satellite communications. I am 

concerned that we see the pattern repeat itself with the way ahead 

after NPOESS. Any insight our witnesses can share on these activities is appreciated. 

Fourth, I hope our witnesses will discuss their views on Operationally Responsive Space, ORS. Later this year, an ORS satellite 

developed in response to a United States Central Command urgent 

need is planned for launch. Last December, General Chilton issued 

an urgent need request for options to augment the missile warning 

constellation. Is this the right role and focus for ORS? 

Lastly, we are fortunate to have witnesses that are also experts 

in the cyber domain. General Kehler and Mr. Butler, I am interested in your assessments of the Department’s cyberspace capabilities and challenges. What are the Department’s goals, and does it 

have the policies, tools, people, and resources to achieve them? 

I want to thank you all again for being with us here today. You 

each possess a tremendous amount of expertise and insight into 

our Nation’s space policy and capabilities. Our Nation is better off 

as a result of your service, and I look forward to your testimony 

today. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the ranking member. We received a prepared statement from each our witnesses and these statements will 

be entered into the record without objection. So if you could, please 

summarize the key points so that we have sufficient time for questions and answers. And we will begin with General Kehler. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General KEHLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Representative Turner, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it 

is an honor to appear before you today, both as an airman and as 

the Commander of Air Force Space Command. And on behalf of the 

46,000 men and women of Air Force Space Command, thanks for 

your continued support, both of the United States Air Force and of 

the capabilities we provide to the Joint Force Commanders. 

I am very proud to lead a team of active duty airmen, Air National Guardsmen, Air Reserve Command personnel, government 

civilians, and contractors who deliver space and cyberspace capabilities to America and its warfighting commands around the globe. 

Everything we do begins and ends with the needs of the Joint 

Force Commanders, and our measure of merit is how well we contribute to the joint team, to civil needs and, in the case of GPS, a 

global user base that expands every day. 

Space and cyberspace capabilities provide our forces with the 

ability to navigate with accuracy, see with clarity, communicate 

with certainty, strike with precision, and operate with assurance. 

These capabilities are woven throughout the fabric of our joint 
6 

warfighting activities and our everyday lives. No question we have 

tough challenges ahead. Space is becoming more contested and congested, but we have rounded a few corners and are proud of the 

progress we have made since we appeared before you last year. 

Special thanks again to this committee, its leaders and its members for taking the time to understand these important issues and 

for providing the support we need to remain a critical part of the 

joint team. And with that, sir, I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General Kehler. Mr. Butler, the floor 

is yours. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. BUTLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CYBER AND SPACE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Mr. BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Turner, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am pleased and 

honored to testify today on behalf of the Department of Defense 

and Space Policy. As you mentioned in your opening statement, we 

have delivered an interim Space Posture Review which characterized the space environment in the terms of three Cs: congested, 

competitive, and contested. 

From the standpoint of congestion, we have talked about a couple 

of examples already. It is a key element of what drives and what 

will drive our response in terms of the future of our space strategy. 

It is not only about debris management, but it is also about spectrum and how we deal with that as well. 

In terms of the competitive environment, we are in an international space business of $250 billion, with 60 nations or commercial entities involved. We are working through, now, an environment where we are not at it alone, and that presents its challenges 

and we are working through responses with regards to the competitive nature. 

And then with regards to the last C, dealing with the idea of contested, we mentioned some examples about the Chinese ASAT, but 

we also have nations trying to jam our commercial signals and we 

are, again, engaged in developing responses to deal with that. That 

environment then causes us to think through the kinds of things 

that we will be focused on as we move forward with a national 

space policy, the national security space strategy, and where we 

are going in the future. 

Some of the areas that we are exploring extensively is space situational awareness. As you mentioned, the Department of Defense 

was given the responsibility for providing space situational awareness. We have, over the last year, taken on that responsibility, and 

Strategic Command in particular is now working to implement a 

concept of operations to help us with that as we move forward. 

In addition to dealing with space situational awareness and the 

sharing of that information, we are also working extensively within 

the Department to look at operations without space in a degraded 

environment, based on the fact that space is contested. 

A series of tabletops and war games, the Schriever 10, sponsored 

by General Kehler and Air Force Space Command coming up next 
7 

month provides an opportunity for us to continue to walk down 

that path and look at issues regarding replacement, augmentation 

and redundancy, a well as resiliency. 

Beyond that, we are also focused on looking at different ways of 

sharing and engaging, both on the international side and commercial side. So in response to your questions about the differences 

with regard to where we are headed, it is no longer a kind of ‘go 

it alone’ strategy. It is a foreshadowing of where we were going to 

go in terms of partnerships. 

On the international side, we have currently military-to-military 

relationships, as well as intelligence relationships. Those relationships give us the opportunity to grow in the future with helping 

each other in an interconnected world. 

Beyond that, on the commercial side, we have been involved with 

looking at commercial capabilities to help us with communications, 

as well as remote sensing augmentation to national systems, as 

well as what we are doing with expansion of wide-band communications to help us on the commercial augmentation side. 

These are just some of the themes that we are looking at as we 

move forward beyond the characterization of that environment to 

begin to address the challenges of a congested, competitive, and 

contested space. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Butler can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Butler. 

Ms. Sapp, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF BETTY SAPP, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

Ms. SAPP. Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Turner, and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. On behalf of General Carlson, I would like 

to just start with a little bit on where the NRO is today. 

You know, from launching the most technically-capable systems, 

to keeping legacy satellites flying, to developing the business practices that secured a clean financial audit for the NRO, we believe 

the NRO remains the premier space reconnaissance organization in 

the world. 

We have had significant successes in the last year, and the NRO 

is wholly focused on continuing that record of success by delivering 

the space reconnaissance capabilities the Nation requires, on time 

and on budget. 

I would like to end my opening remarks today by highlighting a 

critical mission for the NRO, which is supporting the warfighter, 

with a specific story. Last month, a helicopter went down in a remote location in Afghanistan. With no organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets available to the Army brigade involved, the brigade’s intel staff requested immediate imagery assistance from a combined NRO–National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency cell. We were able to rapidly provide multiple images of the 

area on the very low bandwidth connection that they had available 

to them. It allowed key imagery intelligence to be provided to the 

operations and rescue teams within minutes. The craft site was 
8 

quickly secured and protected, and 14 wounded soldiers were safely 

rescued. 

One of the intelligence officers involved relayed the following to 

us: ‘‘I wanted to pass on my sincere thanks for your support that 

night. An aircraft down is one of the worst things we can experience as a unit and your timely imagery support was pivotal to the 

rescue teams.’’ 

This is just one example of the NRO’s living its vision of vigilance from above. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today, and I thank you for your 

continued support to the NRO and look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Payton, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR 

FORCE 

Mr. PAYTON. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the invitation 

to appear before the committee and the opportunity to discuss the 

Air Force space program. 

2010 is an important year for us. Within a few weeks, we will 

be launching the first of the next generation of GPS spacecraft, 2F– 

1, that will provide a new civil signal for the world, a signal designed specifically for safety of life applications in a part of the 

radio frequency spectrum that is better protected from interference. 

That will launch, currently scheduled on the 20th of May. 

Later, in July, we will be launching the Space Based Surveillance System. This will provide 24–7 observations of space objects 

unhindered by atmospheric effects. Later in July, we will be 

launching the first of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

(AEHF) spacecraft. This is a large step in the protected communications constellation, offering 10 times the aggregate through-put 

of each spacecraft and five times the data rate of the legacy systems. 

Also, this is the communications system that provides the President nuclear command and control for our deterrent forces. So this 

is a critical mission and a large increase in capability. 

Finally, later in 2010, we will launch the first of the ORS spacecraft, specifically designed to satisfy an urgent need of a theater 

commander. This will satisfy a capacity shortfall in surveillance 

and reconnaissance for Central Command. 

Again, from the start of the program to the launch will consume 

only two years. And so again, as a measure of responsiveness, this 

is a huge step forward. 

Thus, in 2010, we will see Air Force expanding our capacity on 

communications constellations, improving our accuracy of the GPS 

constellation, responding to urgent warfighter needs, and large 

strides in our space situational awareness, all delivered in 2010. 
9 

And none of that would have been possible without the help from 

this committee and Congress. 

And so the Air Force thanks you and, more importantly, the joint 

warfighter thanks you. 

I eagerly await your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payton can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. To the panel, thank you very much for your opening statements. 

Let me begin with General Kehler. As I talked about in my opening comments, as you contemplate your responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping our space forces, we obviously are 

interested right now, General, in what keeps you up at night. What 

are the most important challenges that you face? And what should 

we be doing to ensure that we can continue to deliver space capabilities to all of our warfighters? 

General KEHLER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, first of all, I would tell you what doesn’t keep me awake 

at night. What doesn’t keep me awake at night are our day in and 

day out space operations. Once we put the platforms in the hands 

of our young men and women, they produce remarkable results. 

And I think Ms. Sapp’s vignette was very appropriate. We hear 

those kinds of results from the forward forces all the time. 

In addition to that, I think we let our performance in launch, 

where we have had now almost 10 years worth of launch successes, 

and we allow our performance in GPS, which has now become the 

gold standard for the world, to speak for themselves. And so what 

does not keep me awake at night are the operational activities that 

we conduct with those space capabilities that you all have supported and put in our hands. 

What does keep me awake at night, though, are a couple of 

things. One is, if we want to continue to have a world-class Air 

Force and a world-class space and cyberspace capability, we have 

to have world-class people. And this is an all-volunteer force and 

we are in competition for people. That is particularly true, and we 

have seen that over the years in the space professional ranks 

where we compete with civilian industry for our space professionals. But in particular as cyberspace is emerging, that is going 

to be an acute issue for us as we go forward, is how do we recruit 

and retain those people with the appropriate expertise in cyberspace? 

So people and recruiting and retaining—around our command, 

we call this, we want to build a world-class team of battle-ready 

professionals. And that keeps me awake at night, is are we doing 

the right things to do that? Are we stimulating the right educational incentives, et cetera, et cetera. 

The second thing that keeps me awake is the industrial base. We 

have concerns about the long-term viability of our industrial base. 

It is a far different industrial base than it has been in the past. 

There are many reports, and many folks have studied the industrial base and they all report that there is more fragility, if you 

will, in the industrial base than there has been in the past, which 

makes the industrial base more sensitive to changes than they 

have been in the past. 
10 

And so that also concerns me, that I ask myself all the time: Are 

we positioning ourselves correctly to make sure that our successors 

will be able to look back and say they have given us the right people to do the jobs that we need and they have left us the appropriate industrial base to do the job that we need to get done? And 

so those two things keep me awake at night. 

The final thing that is on my mind quite a bit, of course, is making sure that we are adjusting, and this gets to Representative 

Turner’s question about the future. No question about it: we have 

focused on deploying those things that have given us such acquisition difficulties. And we have committed ourselves to that. We have 

turned important corners. And already, as Mr. Payton just very, 

very adequately talked about, the number of things that will happen in 2010, we are there because of the dedication and hard work 

of a lot of people in the government and in the industrial base that 

supports us. 

And so we have a way forward here for the near future that is, 

essentially, the platforms that Mr. Payton just mentioned—GPS– 

2F, Advanced EHF, Space-Based Infrared System as it comes off 

the factory floor later this year, and I have got confidence that it 

will come out of the factory floor, et cetera. 

The question is: What comes next? And it is time for us now to 

start thinking about what comes next. We have block improvements planned for many of these capabilities, but I am concerned 

that we pay attention to innovation as we look to the future and 

make sure that we are in a position to innovate, as we have done 

in the past, at the appropriate times in the appropriate ways, so 

that we can continue to provide the leading edge capabilities that 

we need. 

Those three things, sir, are the things that are keeping me 

awake at night. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. 

And on the—let me go back to the cyber component of your answer since that is something that I pay a lot attention to as well. 

Does the Cyber Command that the Pentagon is standing up, will 

that answer the concerns that you have in those areas? Will that 

provide both enhanced capabilities, but also a career path for those 

individuals that we hope to attract and retain in the cyber workforce in our Nation’s military? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I think that is a big step in that direction. 

And I believe, you know, the Secretary of Defense has looked at the 

services and has said, ‘‘I need you to be prepared to contribute capabilities and forces to the new U.S. Cyber Command.’’ And so the 

activities that we have taken to stand up a new numbered Air 

Force, the 24th Air Force in our case, and to begin new training 

efforts to set up a new cyber career field to look at how we will acquire capabilities for cyberspace faster because, you know, the 

shelf-life on information technology-related things is pretty short. 

All of those steps, Mr. Chairman, are under way in major part 

because the Secretary elected to stand up U.S. Cyber Command 

and has told the services to be ready to contribute forces to that 

command. So I think that is a big step in the right direction, recognizing that, you know, we are still only a small piece of the bigger 
11 

government effort, but it is certainly a stimulus for us, and that 

positive direction, I think, will make a big difference. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. On another topic, in 2007 the Commander of the Army Space Missile Defense Command said that 

within three years, China may be able to challenge the U.S. at a 

near-peer level in space. 

With the Chinese test of an anti-satellite interceptor in January 

2007 and the test of an anti-ballistic missile interceptor in this past 

January, there is a real risk, obviously, to our satellites, that the 

satellites might not be able to—might not be available in a future 

contingency. 

And I was kind of surprised that, of the things that might keep 

you awake at night, that redundancy and contingencies were not 

on the list. But, General, do we have the military operational plans 

or contingency plans that reflect the possibility that certain satellites may be unavailable during times of crisis and war? And how 

quickly could we reconstitute? 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, the message that we have taken 

away from the recent activities that we have seen is that space is 

not a sanctuary. Not only is it a naturally hostile environment, but 

we have seen through the demonstration of the anti-satellite test 

and ground-based jammers that are proliferating around the world. 

You know, I tell people sometimes if you are interested, go to your 

home computer and go to a search engine on there and type in 

‘GPS jammers,’ and see what you get. You will be surprised, I 

think. Maybe you won’t probably be surprised, but some would be 

surprised at what you find there. 

And so we know that space and the capabilities that are in space 

are not a sanctuary. The question is, what do we do about that? 

And in response to our concerns here, a little over two years ago, 

the Director of the NRO and I decided to put together a joint effort 

called the Space Protection Program. And that is bearing fruit for 

us. 

We understand that this is about layering protection activities. 

In some cases and, in fact, in a couple of important cases, I think, 

we find that the most important thing we can do to protect ourselves is to be able to figure out with high confidence what happened. And that is space situational awareness, and we have to get 

better at space situational awareness. In fact, the budget request 

contains some enhancements for space situational awareness. 

The second thing we have to do is we have to go back to design 

and engineering. In some cases we are going to have to build some 

protection in. Some of our assets today are very well protected. We 

have mentioned Advanced EHF a couple of times. Advanced EHF 

is designed to survive in a hostile environment against certain 

kinds of threats—not all threats, but certain kinds of threats. 

Those were design considerations that were taken into account 

when we were building AEHF. We are going to have to do that in 

a bigger way. GPS is another example with some design considerations. 

The third thing we have to do, and what we are doing is we are 

adjusting our tactics, our techniques, and our procedures. This gets 

to the planning question that you asked. Do we have contingency 
12 

plans in place? And the answer is, we are in the process of addressing all of those. 

Much of this stems from a clear understanding of where our 

vulnerabilities are and what our interdependencies are with all of 

the things we use from space for national security purposes. And 

we have a much better view of all of that today than we have ever 

had before. 

And then finally, contingency planning really gets down to mission assurance. In some cases, we may not want to protect a certain space asset at all. It may be best to back up that capability 

with something else—an air asset, for example. And so we are looking very carefully at those places where we must protect something 

in space and then looking at what is the best way to go about that. 

So I think we have responded to this concern about space not 

being a sanctuary—and by the way, that is not new. We can go 

back to the Cold War. We watched the Soviet Union in those days 

test anti-satellite weapons, et cetera. What is different today is the 

consequences of loss. I would argue that today the consequences 

are far greater than they probably would have been, had the Cold 

War turned into a hot war. 

So we are much more mindful of this issue today. It doesn’t keep 

me awake at night, because I think we have got a good handle on 

it. We don’t have all the fixes in place, but I think we have a long 

way in the last two to three years in understanding where the 

problems are and coming up with the ways to deal with them. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Well, on that point there is nothing 

better to undermine an aggressor’s confidence that they can disrupt 

those capabilities than to have multiple layers of redundancy. And 

so the more we can do in that area, the better. 

Thank you, General, for the work you are doing and for your answers. 

Mr. Butler, I wanted to address, if I could, your insights into the 

progress that is being made to establish an overall national space 

policy and the work remaining to complete the national security 

space posture. And we hope that you could share with us any additional findings from these ongoing efforts at this point. 

Mr. BUTLER. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. 

We have been meeting within the interagency here for the last 

couple of months now on building up the national space policy. We 

have a robust process in place that is moving us through a sharing 

of ideas and common themes that move us beyond guiding principles to a product which we believe will be ready sometime late 

spring. 

We have also gone ahead and, based on what we have been 

asked to do from the congressional side as well as within the executive branch, begun to sequence these activities in a much more logical way. So the rationale for waiting on the final Space Posture 

Review was to benefit from the insights of the development of the 

national space policy and the national security space strategy, 

which we will be working on as we complete the national space policy. 

We are also dovetailing into that in congressionally-directed activity with regard to the space investment strategy and looking at 

export control reform and the like. 
13 

As we move forward in time, the themes that I talked about 

within the interim Space Posture Review have come up and have 

been corroborated, for the most part, as part of the overarching 

characterization of the environment that we will be working in. 

And as we do that, there is a bridge that we are working across 

the national security community, the science community and the 

commerce community as we build the national space policy. 

So my sense right now is we have a good, coherent, and integrated plan for moving forward from policy and guiding principles 

to the ideas for response, and then moving toward an investment 

strategy that will help us implement those particular principles. 

As we move forward, our intent, of course, is to share with you 

these ideas as we work with the White House and get them agreed 

upon, and then continue to look at ways that we can build on the 

principles that I talked about in the latter part of my opening remarks—namely, the ideas of international cooperation, looking at 

ways that we can build upon, I know, themes that you are concerned about with the industrial base as part of the strategy principles that we would like to implement. 

If there is no other follow-up questions on that, I would like to 

build on the cyber discussion for just a moment. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, if—I would like to hear your thoughts on 

that, but since we are on space policy and Space Posture Review, 

we haven’t completed it. Could you talk about how we might apply 

deterrence in space, the threats that we face in the 21st century? 

Can we deter others from holding our space systems at risk? 

What are the merits of a declaratory policy that signals our intent and lays out consequences very clearly? And do you see merit 

in establishing international rules of the road and/or codes of conduct in space? 

Mr. BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All great questions, and 

all questions that we are in the process of considering. When we 

think about deterrence, our major focus is on dissuading belligerent 

actions in space. And it begins with what General Kehler was describing as space situational awareness, having an understanding 

of what the environment is like in space, and being able to be more 

predictive about how that environment is changing. 

Behind that idea of space situational awareness, then, is the idea 

of improving the way that we protect our own space capabilities. 

I mean, it goes back to the space protection strategy that General 

Kehler outlined. 

A key aspect of the thinking more broadly as we build out in this 

process of deterrence is the idea of working with like-minded nations in different ways. One way in which we look to do that is 

through space situational awareness and data sharing. 

Another way is what you suggested in terms of looking at rules 

of the road. We have done some of that already as we have worked 

in our existing cooperation agreements. We have done that with 

the United Nations over the last couple of years in looking at debris mitigation rules of the road. 

In terms of aspects of declaratory policy and red lines and 

thresholds, we are working through that with the national space 

policy. And as we work through that discussion and come to some 
14 

conclusions, I will be happy to come back and discuss, you know, 

the specifics with regards to those particular areas. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. Well, we would certainly welcome that. Before I turn to the ranking member, you said you wanted to comment on cyber. 

Mr. BUTLER. Sure. I would just like to build a little bit on General Kehler’s thoughts. We are working within OSD (the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense) on not only the standup of Cyber Command, but an emphasis area for the Secretary is cyber cadre development. Within that, we are looking at best pre-models that are 

coming from the different services and looking across generational 

issues as well as private-public sector cross-flow. 

I had the privilege this past weekend to be in San Antonio, 

where I looked at one of those models, the National Collegiate 

Cyber Defense competition, where colleges are getting together now 

and competing in new and different ways on teams to promote and 

create a dream about being involved with cyber defense. 

My sense is, as we move forward with the development of the defense cyber strategy, which is in progress right now, we will have 

that as a major focus area, which will be a critical element of organizing and resourcing Cyber Command for success. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you for that additional comment. I have other questions for Ms. Sapp and Mr. Payton. I hope 

we can do that in a second round when it is my turn, but for now 

we are going to turn to the ranking member for his questions. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have quite a few 

members that are interested in asking questions. I am eager to get 

to their thoughts also. 

As I had said in my opening statement, we have concerns about 

the NPOESS program restructure. The National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite System was a joint 50–50 cost 

share program between DOD, Air Force and NOAA and NASA. It 

experienced significant technical costs and schedule problems, including a Nunn-McCurdy breach in 2006, but was put back on 

track. 

However, differences among the defense and civilian users could 

not be resolved, and in February 2010 the White House decided to 

restructure the program, allowing each party to go their own way. 

Neither DOD nor NOAA and NASA have made decisions on whether to continue with the current contract with Northrop Grumman 

or to acquire NPOESS satellite to terminate that contract and pursue an alternative approach. 

Without a clear plan, the FY 2011 budget request of $351 million 

to continue NPOESS system program design may be unjustified. 

General Kehler and Mr. Payton, what are your thoughts on the 

next steps for NPOESS program? And should it be continued by 

DOD or replaced by an alternative new approach? And are there 

risks of a gap in capacity and capability? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I will start and then defer to Mr. Payton. 

A couple of things that we know—one is that the decision that was 

made was to separate the responsibility for providing the satellites 

in the particular times of the day that those capabilities are needed. We will retain a common ground system and common command 
15 

and control, recognizing that all the data has to come and be fused 

together to be useful for us. And so that is one feature of this. 

Second, we have two Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

satellites left that are sitting here waiting to be launched. And so 

we are looking very carefully at when we will have to launch those, 

given this decision to make sure that we have phased those satellites correctly so that we do not have a gap in the time of the day 

that is going to be the responsibility for DOD, in particular. 

And then the third piece is, we are looking very hard at the requirements so that we make sure that we have now apportioned, 

if I can use that word, the requirements to the various responsible 

parties across those orbits to make sure that we have got that lined 

up right, and we are taking enough time to go back and look at 

the requirements, because what we know about acquisition programs that have gotten in trouble is that they started off without 

a clear understanding of requirements. So we are back looking at 

the requirements there. 

And then finally, we are also looking with a mind toward harvesting as much as we can possibly harvest out of the program that 

has already gone on for NPOESS that has taken us this far. The 

answers aren’t in yet, but we are working very carefully with our 

colleagues in the Department of Defense and the air staff to make 

sure that we get the answers right and that we are prepared to go 

forward smartly when the decisions are made. 

And with that, Mr. Payton, I will defer to you. 

Mr. PAYTON. I would offer that the Air Force is not going to get 

out of the business of Lower Earth Orbit weather observation 

spacecraft. Truthfully, we view Strategic Command as the first 

among equals for representing the warfighter for global weather 

forecasting. 

And Strategic Command has been very adamant that they cannot tolerate a gap in that early-morning orbit. And so that is the 

premier objective that we will maintain for future Air Force acquisitions in the Lower Earth Orbit weather mission. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, we have votes coming up. To ensure 

that everybody else gets an opportunity to ask questions, I will 

defer to the other members. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Fair enough. Thank you. I thank the ranking 

member. Mr. Lamborn is now recognized. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here. And like I told you each personally, thank you for your service in protecting our country. 

The first question is for General Kehler and Secretary Butler, 

multipart: How will the Air Force Cyber Command work with the 

new U.S. Cyber Command? 

Secondly, will the U.S. Cyber Command have the resources it 

needs? 

And what do you see as key issues in the cyber arena? 

General KEHLER. Well, sir, let me start. Again, the first part of 

the answer is how will 24th Air Force work with U.S. Cyber Command? 

We have stood up a numbered Air Force, a new numbered Air 

Force, that is identical in construction to every other numbered Air 
16 

Force that is attached to either the regional combatant commanders or the global combatant commanders. 

So, for example, in space, we have 14th Air Force, and that is 

assigned to U.S. Strategic Command, and that is how we package 

all of our space capabilities and hand them over to U.S. Strategic 

Command. 

We will do the same thing with our cyber capabilities. We will 

put them inside 24th Air Force, a step we have already taken. And 

24th Air Force will become the Air Force component to U.S. Cyber 

Command when it is stood up. 

In the meantime, it is the U.S. component to Strategic Command 

where the cyber responsibilities still reside. 

So we have constructed our method of presenting operational 

forces to a combatant commander for cyberspace the same way we 

do that if it was fighters or bombers or spacecraft or any other part 

of the family of Air Force capabilities that we bring to the fight. 

And I will defer the other parts of the question. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Mr. BUTLER. Sir, in terms of the relationship that General 

Kehler just described for the Air Force, that is exactly what the 

Army and Navy are doing, in terms of presentation of forces into 

U.S. Cyber Command. 

With regard to the resourcing issue, I think we—one of the key 

tenets of setting up Cyber Command was to leverage the existing 

capabilities that we have in place within the Department of Defense. 

So as you heard last week in General Alexander’s testimony, we 

are working to ensure that we leverage the technical back plane of 

the National Security Agency as we build capabilities around that. 

In terms of the future resourcing for the command, we have efforts under way to look at what will be required above and beyond. 

In terms of the specific issues that we are dealing with U.S. 

Cyber Command, again, I go back to General Alexander’s testimony 

from last Thursday to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Authorities and policies need to be put in place for greater protection 

of the networks. 

We are working through that. That extends out to the privacy 

and civil liberties groups, all the way out to doing full-spectrum operations. 

Certainly from the standpoint of capabilities, the ability to do 

rapid technology insertion with continuous risk mitigation is an important element that we need to continue to work on and grow. 

And then capacity—and inside of capacity is bridging with not 

only within our own Department of Defense and with other partners within the interagency, but building capacity with the private 

sector and building capacity with international partners. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

And my next question is for Director Sapp and Secretary Payton. 

And it has to do with budget and resources. I am concerned that 

this Administration is not prioritizing like it should be with a number of defense priorities to protect our country, as opposed to other 

budget initiatives that it is taking. 
17 

So, specifically, do you think the national security space programs have adequate funding to make sure they can be executed 

in a timely manner, in support of the various missions? 

And what do you see as possible problems, or is everything okay 

in the near future? 

Thank you. 

Mr. PAYTON. I will try that first. Our top priority is—and I use 

the term ‘‘constellation health.’’ Other people use the term ‘‘continuity of service.’’ 

But we have got—the Air Force has several missions in space. 

And the warfighter needs those services more and more every single day. And so as we lay out the projected lifetime of the spacecraft that are currently on-orbit, and as we project the acquisition 

time for new spacecraft, that continuity of service is foremost in 

our minds. 

And so that is what underpins our budget request. That is what 

underpins our acquisition plans. And that is adequate to satisfy 

that top priority need. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Franks is now recognized. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, is it possible that we could hear from Secretary Sapp? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Certainly. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Because I think we will still have time for—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That is fine. 

Ms. SAPP. I would agree with what Mr. Payton said. We want to 

make sure that we have continuous service to the warfighter. We 

are budgeted to support that. 

I think where we struggle is to make sure we have continuity for 

our factories to support the industrial base. And I think we struggle to put new engineering, new capability insertion in those systems. 

The research and development investment has suffered over the 

past several years. So that is where we need to try and recover a 

bit. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Franks is now recognized. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess I might just take just a quick step from the previous 

questions. I know that when it comes down to ascertaining our 

budgets and the things that you need, I understand that probably 

one of the biggest challenges for space is just the growing hunger 

for bandwidth. 

And I know that, you know, our Global Hawk and the Predator 

and a lot of these things are demanding more and more bandwidth. 

And there is a review, a joint review that was due to Congress at 

some point. 

And I guess, General Kehler, I will put the first question to 

you—not so much—this is not a punitive question. I just appreciate 

all of you being here and appreciate your service. But, probably, 

there will be nothing—be a greater leverage, though, and I just 

want to make sure your budgets are sufficient, knowing what the 

bandwidth is going to be, so that we can make sure that we are 

dealing with the need first. 
18 

What are your concerns—I mean, when you look back at some 

of the history, here, there have been cancellations in the last couple 

years, you know, specifically the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) 

system, which was set to be, really, a follow-on program for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite, which itself was also 

a follow-on to Milstar. And that is not scheduled to launch its first 

satellite until later this year. 

So I guess—how can the DOD know, and how can they help us 

know what those bandwidth requirements are, and where are we 

in terms of what we need? 

And I will start with General Kehler, and then, Mr. Butler, if 

you would speak to it? 

General KEHLER. Well, sir, there are others at the table who can 

talk about the status of the studies. There is a bandwidth study 

under way. There is also a study under way looking at the requirements for what we are calling the Joint Space Communications 

Layer, the JSCL. 

There are a number of other studies under way that are coming 

to grips with this question about, what do we do after Advanced 

EHF and as we have canceled TSAT? 

What I would say is there is an insatiable appetite here. And this 

appetite—we don’t see it actually leveling off. There is always a demand for more and more and more bandwidth. 

And the way we have been managing that, to date, of course, is 

with those things that the government is out buying, now about to 

deploy the first of the Advanced EHF satellites, already having deployed the third of the Wideband Global satellites, all of which are 

performing very, very well. 

And so we are at the beginning of a huge enhancement to what 

the government is doing for itself. 

And then, secondly, we have been taking up the difference, if you 

will, with commercial. 

We also have allied participation in the satellite communications 

business. The Australians participate in WGS. Other countries participate in Advanced EHF. 

Those three elements, in my personal opinion, form the basis of 

how we are going to deal with this as we go to the future. There 

will be a government piece, and that is the piece that we are trying 

to decide, is how much does the government need to do for itself? 

There will be, we think, continuation. There is certainly goodness 

in continuing allied and friendly participation in some of these programs. And then the third piece is commercial. 

The question for us, I think, is what is that mixture as we go 

to the future? And I think we have some opportunity, here, to look 

at a way to do this with, maybe, a little bit more flexibility and 

foresight as we go to the future, and not be working to try to catch 

up as demand increases. 

But, sir, I will defer to those who are a little closer to this. 

Mr. BUTLER. Let me pick up on the bandwidth requirement 

study. We have completed the work within OSD on the National 

Information Infrastructure side, with our CIO, our chief information officer, and with the National Geospatial Agency. 

And that is in coordination. That should be completed—it should 

be finished, produced and over soon. I know it is late. 
19 

We have looked across, you know, a temporal period that takes 

us from 2008 out to 2023. And it substantiates what General 

Kehler was talking about, in terms of the expanded communications requirements in narrow-band, wide-band, and protected communications. It is also a kind of a pathfinder for us as we think 

about how we would implement the types of things that I described 

in the SPR in international engagement. 

It is one of those areas that, you know, we talked about. General 

Kehler mentioned Australia. It is not just unique to the United 

States and to the Department of Defense, this communications requirement need. There is opportunity to find ways to share with 

others and engage with others in this arena. 

But the bandwidth study has been completed, and you should be 

seeing that soon. 

I think Gary could take—Mr. Payton could take the TSAT question and provide some thoughts with regard to that—— 

Mr. PAYTON. TSAT was one of the programs that benefited from 

a conscious decision to prove the component technologies before we 

settled on a design for the spacecraft itself. 

What we are doing now, over these—current year and the next 

year is working with the warfighter to find out which one of those 

technologies should be fielded with the highest priority. 

And again, we want to take—we want to be responsive to the 

warfighter and deploy those technologies on whatever platform is 

best, but in the order and with the priority that the warfighter 

drives us to. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you to the lady. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. We have votes on—at this 

point, there are just under 8 minutes left on the clock. I have additional questions that I am going to submit for the record, since I 

took more time than I planned in my opening questions, and I will 

forego those right now, and I will turn to the ranking member for 

five minutes or so, the time he needs to ask some additional questions. 

Mr. TURNER. Thanks. Looking at the clock, here on the—just on 

the House floor, with 7 minutes and 26 seconds to go before you 

all have to finish votes, the interim Space Posture Review: there 

was—you know, a number of members have made comments of the 

concern that it was a status quo posture review and that there is 

more that needs to be eliminated in it. 

We heard from Mr. Butler. I guess it would be nice if we took 

just our last moments to hear from General Kehler, Ms. Sapp and 

Mr. Payton on—just a few minutes, obviously, for each of you— 

what are some of the things that are missing that was not in it, 

in the interim, that you believe need to be addressed? 

Mr. TURNER. General Kehler. 

General KEHLER. Well, sir, I have—maybe I have a little bit different perspective on this since I know it is an interim report, and 

I know that there are other pieces that are being worked. 

What I think is positive about the interim report is it begins to 

look at this question of opportunity for the future. 

And although we find ourselves in a difficult position here in 

terms of an environment, a domain that is congested and contested, 
20 

and complex—and I think those are the three words that are actually used in the interim report, congested, contested, and complex— 

it also lays out a way for us to begin to look at the future here that 

leverages partnership opportunities. And I think that is a positive. 

I think that the final report will treat some of the issues a little 

bit more fully, and I will look forward to that. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sapp? Obviously, there are a number of people 

who have concerns that there are things in it that are missing. 

What do you see that is missing? 

Ms. SAPP. I do not see anything that is missing. I think we have 

some choices we will have to sort out as we go final with the report. And some of those were brought up, in terms of how declaratory are we, do we really lay out lanes in the road? 

I think there are some choices there in what we show and what 

we don’t that we will have to make before we go final with that 

report, and I think that is some of the things that are in discussion 

right now. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Payton, anything you would like to highlight 

that could be in addition to what we have seen? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. I helped work on the Space Posture Review, and I read both the interim report and some early drafts of 

the final report. And just as a foreshadow, I would predict that the 

final report will have significant—much more substance to it than 

what we have seen so far. 

Mr. TURNER. Great. Thank you. We will look forward to that. 

Well, you were all very, very effective. We only have 4 minutes 

and 46 seconds left, which is a long time for us to get there. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the ranking member. 

With that, I again want to thank our panel today for your statements, for your excellent answers to the questions. And the members, myself included, will have additional questions for you that 

we will submit for the record, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. 

And, again, thank you for your service to our country. 

General, in particular, I hope you will express our deep appreciation to the men and women who serve under you in your command. 

And all of you, for the people that you work with as well. 

With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 21, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 21, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Air Force Space Command established 24th Air Force as the Air 

Force’s operational component to STRATCOM. While there is a lot of attention 

being given to cyber, especially from a defensive standpoint, we are still catching 

up to the threat. What have we done in regard to cyber and what needs doing immediately in your opinion? I would also be interested to hear if there is anything that 

we can do to help speed our cyber defense from a policy, resources, or legal standpoint. 

General KEHLER. The Air Force has evolved its defensive strategy from a static 

perimeter defense strategy that focused on defending the network to a more dynamic and operational approach that focuses on assuring the mission and safeguarding the network. 

Our previous strategy relied on a series of sensors located at the entry point to 

each base. These intrusion detection systems were leading technology 15 years ago, 

but are no longer suitable for defending the Air Force portion of the Department 

of Defense (DOD) network. 

Twenty-Fourth Air Force (24 AF) has operationalized our approach to network defense. They have stood up an operations center (the 624th Operations Center) that 

has the ability to plan defensive operations and strategies and then command and 

control, and assess the execution of the plan by 24 AF units. They are also integrating network intelligence capabilities with the National Security Agency (NSA) 

and the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA), 

to help make us more proactive and get ahead of the threat. Finally, we are upgrading the Air Force Network to make it more securable by migrating multiple network 

enclaves into a single, more defendable, network. This will enhance our ability to 

patch and command and control our network resources. 

Mr. LAMBORN. While the National Space Policy and the Space Posture Review 

have not been completed, could you talk about how we might apply deterrence in 

space to the threats we face in the 21st century? Can we deter others from holding 

our space systems at risk? How might we respond to attacks against our space assets, and how do we manage the risk of escalation? Should we adopt clear ‘‘red 

lines’’ or thresholds for attacks against our space assets? What are the merits of a 

declaratory policy that signals our intent and lays out consequences? 

Mr. BUTLER. The United States has not promulgated clear red lines for attacks 

against our space systems (e.g., satellite, ground, and space segments, and supporting links). However, our current National Space Policy states that our space capabilities are vital to our national interests, and we will preserve our rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space. The Administration is reviewing the 2006 

national space policy and will update Congress accordingly on any changes. On 

March 15, 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) provided Congress with an ‘‘Interim’’ Space Posture Review, which provided our initial thinking on national security equities in space. 

The United States reserves the right to take the full range of appropriate responses, including military action as consistent with the law of armed conflict. The 

United States considers space systems to have rights of passage through, and operations in, space without interference. This is consistent with U.S. law, applicable 

international law including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and existing (2006) national space policy. The United States views purposeful interference with its space 

systems as an infringement on its rights and will take those actions necessary to 

preserve its freedom of action in space. 

DOD is addressing the possibility that some space systems may be unavailable 

during times of crisis and war via its operational and contingency planning processes. Numerous war games, such as the ‘‘Schriever’’ wargame series have shown 

that testing ourselves in a framework of diminished access to space may be an important part of our strategy development. Each of the Services conducted a ‘‘day 

without space’’ study to understand the impact of losing critical space capabilities; 

the results were stark and highlight the importance of your question. 

There may be merit in employing voluntary, non-treaty approaches (e.g., international rules of the road and/or a code of conduct) for the space domain. Over the 
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past two years, the United States engaged in dialogue with European experts regarding the European Union’s proposal for a ‘‘Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.’’ In addition, the United States is participating in a multi-year study of 

‘‘long-term sustainability of space activities’’ within the United Nations Committee 

on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This study is examining the feasibility of voluntary ‘‘best practices guidelines’’ to help reduce operational risks to all space systems; it should serve as a valuable cooperation opportunity with established and 

emerging members of the space-faring community and with the private sector to enhance spaceflight safety and preserve the space environment for future generations. 

In addition, DOD is continuing to develop concepts for best practices in space, and 

the Air Force is planning on conducting a simulation to assess the operational implications of a voluntary code as part of its May 2010 ‘‘Schriever’’ series wargame. The 

DOD is currently working with the office of the Director of National Intelligence to 

develop a National Security Space Strategy, which will further address questions of 

rules of the road/codes of conduct and declaratory policy. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The Missile Defense Agency is commencing a new space acquisition 

program this year with the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). The bulk of 

our national security space acquisition has traditionally been accomplished by the 

Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office. What is the Air Force’s reaction to 

MDA’s rationale and justification for wishing to undertake its own space acquisition 

program? 

Mr. PAYTON. MDA certainly has missile warning/missile defense domain expertise, as well as large, complex system development experience. Both of these are 

necessary to successfully develop PTSS. MDA has also reached out to the Air Force 

to leverage our space acquisition expertise. MDA has included an Air Force cell inside their PTSS Management Structure. This Air Force cell will assist MDA in designing the PTSS space segment and ground segment for long term operations and 

sustainment. The Air Force is migrating towards commonality among the space operations centers for command and control of spacecraft to minimize personnel, development, and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. In addition, ground antennas, communications links, and infrastructure must be leveraged in order to minimize personnel and O&M costs as well. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. A reprogramming action submitted last month would provide 

$45M for Operationally Responsive Space. Can you describe the benefits this reprogramming will provide our warfighters? 

General KEHLER and Mr. PAYTON. The reprogramming will cover funds required 

for the Operationally Responsive Space-1 (ORS–1) satellite program: an Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) system being built in response to an urgent 

need communicated by CDRUSSTRATCOM ORS–1 will be used predominately to 

address urgent Joint Force Commander needs in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). 

Mr. HEINRICH. It seems that much of the funding for ORS has occurred through 

these kinds of reprogramming actions as opposed to year-to-year budgeting. I fear 

this provides a lack of certainty and focus for the office as a whole. Since 

CENTCOM has expressed that it will likely need more of ORS–Sat 1’s unique capability after its lifetime, why isn’t the Department budgeting for this capability in 

the out-years? 

General KEHLER and Mr. PAYTON. Recent Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) 

reprogramming actions have addressed near-term funding to field the ORS–1 satellite system to meet a USSTRATCOM urgent need in support of CENTCOM. The 

CENTCOM urgent need is met by planned ORS–1 spacecraft mission capabilities 

and projected lifetime. No funds for additional spacecraft are required for the outyears in the President’s Budget. 

Mr. HEINRICH. With the preponderance of all military assets (smart munitions, 

aircraft, tanks, naval ships, etc) relying on the Global Positioning System (GPS) to 

target, navigate and conduct its daily operations, one has to ask, are we ready to 

operate in a GPS denied environment? 

General KEHLER and Mr. PAYTON. Efforts are underway on many fronts, through 

testing, simulation, exercises and gaming to develop NAVWAR Tactics, Techniques 

and Procedures (TTPs) and work through the effects of GPS denial. For the Air 

Force, our Space Aggressor and Test Squadrons, Weapons Schools and exercise 

teams are applying the most recent analysis and lessons learned to develop subject 

matter experts on GPS and NAVWAR to work through denial of service challenges. 

[A portion of this response is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files]. 
79 

Mr. HEINRICH. What are the current GPS denial capabilities of known/perceived 

enemies of the United States? 

General KEHLER and Mr. PAYTON. [The information referred to is classified and 

is retained in the subcommittee files]. 

Mr. HEINRICH. What counter-measures are in place and on the horizon to combat 

GPS denial? 

General KEHLER and Mr. PAYTON. On the horizon is the ability to use a new military-unique signal call M-code, which is more robust and powerful than the current 

signal. With the first GPS III satellites we will also have additional power available 

on M-code to further mitigate jamming. 

[A portion of this response is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files]. 

Mr. HEINRICH. What impact would GPS denial have on current operations (strategic)? 

General KEHLER and Mr. PAYTON. [The information referred to is classified and 

is retained in the subcommittee files]. 

Mr. HEINRICH. What impact would GPS denial have on the warfighter (tactical)? 

General KEHLER and Mr. PAYTON. [The information referred to is classified and 

is retained in the subcommittee files]. 

Mr. HEINRICH. A reprogramming action submitted last month would provide $45M for Operationally Responsive Space. Can you describe the benefits this reprogramming will provide our warfighters? 

Mr. BUTLER. The Department of Defense (DOD) submitted a March 2010 prior ap- proval (PA) reprogramming action on April 8, 2010 that would reprogram $44.2 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

(RDT&E) funds for Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) (Budget Authority 4, Program Element (PE) 06040857F). 

The explanation for the ORS PA reprogramming action stated the funds were required to 

maintain program schedule in support of the USCENTCOM’s urgent need for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability. During FY 2010, 

the program will complete fabrication of flight hardware, integrate key components including payload and modular bus, complete integration and test activities, and integrate the space vehicle with the Minotaur launch vehicle in preparation for the planned November 2010 launch. Without additional funding, the 

program will not be able to meet USCENTCOM’s need for the December 2010 

Initial Operational Capability. 

All four defense committees (House Armed Services Committee, Senate Armed 

Services Committee, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, and House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee (HAC–D)) supported the ORS PA. However, the HAC– 

D objected to the Global Hawk aircraft procurement decrease (-$48.9 million), which 

would have funded the ORS PA programming action. 

The ORS PA reprogramming action is now authorized but remains unfunded, 

which means the program will not be able to meet USCENTCOM’s need for the December 2010 Initial Operational Capability at this time. We intend to submit another ORS PA reprogramming action to meet USCENTCOM’s need in the future. 

Mr. HEINRICH. It seems that much of the funding for ORS has occurred through 

these kinds of reprogramming actions as opposed to year-to-year budgeting. I fear 

this provides a lack of certainty and focus for the office as a whole. Since 

CENTCOM has expressed that it will likely need more of ORS–Sat 1’s unique capability after its lifetime, why isn’t the Department budgeting for this capability in 

the out-years? 

Mr. BUTLER. The Department of Defense (DOD) budgeted for Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) funding via several program elements (PEs) dating back to 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, when the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) directed 

the Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in December 2002 to establish a joint program office to accelerate the ORS effort to meet 

the 2002 ORS Mission Needs Statement (MNS) requirements for responsive, on-demand access to, through, and from space. 

ORS funding started under DARPA in FY 2003 (PE 0603285E, Force Application 

and Launch from CONUS (FALCON)) to comply with DepSecDef direction. In FY 

2004, the Air Force opened PE 0604855F (Operationally Responsive Launch) in 

order to meet requirements from the 2002 ORS MNS. In FY 2007, the Air Force 

closed PE 0604855F and transferred funding to PE 0604857F (Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)) to recognize the broader scope of not just responsive space 

launchers, but also satellites and ranges, necessary for an ORS system. 

ORS funding involves Budget Authority 4, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations, which are two-year funds. DOD employs year-toyear budgeting and reprogramming actions in coordination with Congress to ensure 
80 

the best use of appropriated funds to achieve ORS objectives. The President’s FY 

2011 Budget funds ORS ($93.978 million); FY 2012–2015 out-year budget estimates 

average over $86.5 million per year, which demonstrates that DOD is planning and 

budgeting for ORS capability. 

Mr. HEINRICH. With the preponderance of all military assets (smart munitions, 

aircraft, tanks, naval ships, etc) relying on the Global Positioning System (GPS) to 

target, navigate and conduct its daily operations, one has to ask, are we ready to 

operate in a GPS-denied environment? 

Mr. BUTLER. Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) assets provide essential, precise, and reliable information that underpins nearly every military 

system and operation. PNT also contributes to precision attack, thereby helping to 

reduce collateral damage, and the ability to attack from stand-off distances, thereby 

allowing friendly forces to avoid threat areas. 

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is the cornerstone of U.S. military PNT. The 

wide reliance on GPS, beyond the U.S. military, acts as a deterrent against attack 

on the constellation of GPS satellites. However, potential adversaries continue to 

seek means to counter the advantages we obtain from space and to use space capabilities against us. Navigation warfare (NAVWAR) ensures that friendly forces have 

unfettered access to PNT, while denying adversarial use of the same. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is addressing the possibility that space systems, including GPS, may be unavailable during times of crisis and war via its operational and contingency planning processes. Numerous war games, such as the 

‘‘Schriever’’ wargame series have shown that testing ourselves in a framework of diminished access to space is an important part of our strategy development. Each 

of the Services conducted a ‘‘day without space’’ study to understand the impact of 

losing critical space capabilities; the results were stark and highlight the importance 

of your question. 

NAVWAR was established to address increasing military dependence on PNT in 

the face of emerging threats to GPS. NAVWAR strategies include employing tactics 

and technologies to gain and maintain a PNT information advantage for the U.S. 

military and allies including the prevention of hostile GPS exploitation within an 

area of operations while preserving civil use of GPS outside the area of operations. 

NAVWAR is deliberate military operations aimed at gaining and maintaining a 

PNT information advantage. Desired effects are generated through the coordinated 

employment of capabilities within Information, Space and Cyberspace Operations. 

The Joint Navigation Warfare Center (JNWC) was established under 

USSTRATCOM in Fiscal Year 2008 to integrate and coordinate NAVWAR across 

the DOD. Precise PNT has become one of the most critical enables of 21st century 

warfare. Therefore, it is imperative that access to very precise PNT remain 

unimpeded. The DOD can provide a classified presentation discussing specific 

NAVWAR issues or concerns at the committee’s convenience. 

Mr. HEINRICH. What are the current GPS denial capabilities of known/perceived 

enemies of the United States? 

Mr. BUTLER. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites broadcast navigation information on a continuous basis. The transmission has two levels of service—a 

standard positioning service (SPS) and a precise positioning service (PPS). 

SPS is the unencrypted civilian positioning and timing service that is provided to 

all GPS users. PPS is a more accurate, military positioning, velocity, and timing 

service available to authorized encrypted users (U.S. military and some allies) on 

a worldwide basis with limited anti-jam capabilities. Access to PPS is controlled, 

and permits very precise matching of receiver-generated and satellite-generated 

waveforms; this allows precise measurement of the distance to each satellite. 

GPS has several limitations that known/perceived enemies of the United States 

may use: 

• Adversary use/exploitation of the GPS civil signal in their equipment can reduce 

the U.S. military advantage. 

• GPS receivers are vulnerable to jamming. 

• Jamming GPS can adversely affect civil and first responder operations, as well 

as joint military operations within a geographic area. The stronger the jammer, 

the larger the affected area. 

• False signals, also known as ‘‘Spoofing.’’ An adversary could generate false signals to mislead an authorized user with respect to PNT information. GPS has 

anti-spoofing technology designed to mitigate receiver compromise caused by intentionally misleading transmissions. 

Combatant Commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders should factor potential GPS jamming into their Operations Plans. The Department of Defense 
81 

can provide a classified presentation discussing specific GPS denial issues or concerns at the committee’s convenience. 

Mr. HEINRICH. What counter-measures are in place and on the horizon to combat 

GPS denial? 

Mr. BUTLER. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites broadcast navigation information on a continuous basis. The transmission has two levels of service—a 

standard positioning service (SPS) and a precise positioning service (PPS). 

SPS is the unencrypted civilian positioning and timing service that is provided to 

all GPS users. PPS is a more accurate, military positioning, velocity, and timing 

service available to authorized encrypted users (U.S. military and some allies) on 

a worldwide basis with limited anti-jam capabilities. 

Access to PPS is controlled by use of cryptography (encryption keys loaded in the 

terminal units). The positioning code in each level of service permits very precise 

matching of receiver-generated and satellite-generated waveforms. This allows for 

precise measurement of the distance to each satellite. 

GPS has anti-spoofing technology designed to mitigate receiver compromise 

caused by intentionally misleading transmissions. Future GPS planning enhancements include efforts to provide improved anti-jam capability. 

The GPS acquisition strategy calls for continued development of GPS user equipment (UE) to support current warfighter activities and GPS Modernization aimed 

at maturing counter-measures. The GPS UE program will continue Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) receiver production, prepare for Military code 

(M-code) receiver development, and work with platforms/users to identify requirements and upgrade paths for further GPS enhancements. Additionally, several antijam technology efforts will be pursued to combat any potential threat that may deny 

GPS signals. The Department of Defense can provide a classified presentation discussing specific GPS denial issues or concerns at the committee’s convenience. 

Mr. HEINRICH. What impact would GPS denial have on current operations (strategic)? 

Mr. BUTLER. The impact of Global Positioning System (GPS) denial on current operations (strategic) is dependent on the frequency and intensity of the denial. Each 

GPS satellite can store information on board for many days. In the event the GPS 

constellation cannot be updated, accuracy will gradually degrade. The rate of degradation is very slow in the first few days but increases with time. This allows GPS 

to be used for several days in a current operations (strategic) environment even if 

the update capabilities are interrupted. 

GPS capabilities (e.g., space, control, and user segments) play a key role in military operations in all four domains (land, sea, air, and space). U.S. military forces 

use GPS for their space-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information. GPS assets provide essential, precise, and reliable information that permit 

joint forces to plan, train, coordinate, and execute operations more effectively. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) uses GPS time as its standard to provide continuous global service. Service accuracy is determined by receiver type, number of 

GPS satellites in view, and satellite geometric configuration. However, GPS 

vulnerabilities to threats such as adversary exploitation, jamming, lack of line-ofsight reception, ionospheric scintillation, tropospheric errors, and signal multipath 

issues warrant that communication systems have a back-up capability to acquire 

timing information. The DOD can provide a classified presentation discussing specific GPS denial issues or concerns at the committee’s convenience. 

Mr. HEINRICH. What impact would GPS denial have on the warfighter (tactical)? 

Mr. BUTLER. The impact of Global Positioning System (GPS) denial on the tactical 

warfighter is dependent on the frequency and intensity of the denial. Each GPS satellite can store information on board for many days. In the event the GPS constellation cannot be updated, accuracy will gradually degrade. The rate of degradation is 

very slow in the first few days but increases with time. This allows GPS to be used 

for several days in a tactical environment even if the update capabilities are interrupted. 

GPS capabilities (e.g., space, control, and user segments) play a key role in military operations in all four domains (land, sea, air, and space). U.S. military forces 

use GPS for their space-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information. GPS assets provide essential, precise, and reliable information that permit 

joint forces to plan, train, coordinate, and execute operations more effectively. GPS 

gives the joint force the capability to improve communications security and effectiveness. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) uses GPS time as its standard to provide continuous global service. Service accuracy is determined by receiver type, number of 

GPS satellites in view, and satellite geometric configuration. However, GPS 

vulnerabilities to threats such as adversary exploitation, jamming, lack of line-of- 
82 

sight reception, ionospheric scintillation, tropospheric errors, and signal multipath 

issues warrant that communication systems have a back-up capability to acquire 

timing information. The DOD can provide a classified presentation discussing specific GPS denial issues or concerns at the committee’s convenience. 

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