No. 85-341 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1986 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

WAYNE T. SNYDER, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

LENA R. SNYDER, 

R.espondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin, 

The Honorable Thomas Olson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Berger Law Firm; Chris J. Nelson, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

McKinley Anderson, Bozeman, Montana 

- 

Submitted on Briefs: Dec. 1.8, 1985 

Decided: February 20, 1986 

Filed: FEB 20 I986 

- Clerk 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The wife appeals from the property distribution in this 

dissolution of marriage. We affirm the order of the Gallatin 

County District Court. 

The issues presented on appeal are: 

1. Did the District Court erroneously fail to include a 

promissory note valued at $78,121 as part of the marital 

estate? 

2. Should the District Court have awarded. the wife 

either a one-half interest in the family home or its equiva- 

- lent in cash? 

The parties married late in life. Their marriage was 

dissolved six years later, in 1984, when the husband was 

sixty-nine years of age and the wife was sixty. Roth parties 

worked during at least part of the marriage. The wife testified that she had entered into the marriage with the understanding that the husband would provide for her financially. 

The husband brought to the marriage property worth over 

$161,000, including an interest in a family farm, $15,000 in 

retirement benefits, and a $55,000 home. While the parties 

were married, they sold his home and applied the proceeds to 

the purchase of a home which they held as joint tenants ("the 

marital home") . Also during the marriage, the interest in 

the family farm, which husband and his brother owned, was 

reduced to a promissory note from the brother in favor of 

husband and wife as tenants in common. The wife brought to 

the marriage miscellaneous furniture and appliances of unknown value. The parties acquired additional assets with a 

net value of $27,831 during their marriage. 

In its distribution of property, the District Court 

ordered that the marital home, valued at $105,000, be sold. 

The wife was to receive $20,000 of the proceeds after payment 
of the mortgage, and the husband was to receive the remaining 

proceeds. The court also award-ed the husband the promissory 

note representing the interest in the family farm. The 

balance payable on the note was $78,121 at the time of trial. 

The total va.lue of the property distributed to husband was 

$154,184. He was also assigned $43,855 in liabilities, which 

included the mortgage on the marita.1 home. The wife was 

awarded property with a total value of $31,800 and assigned 

liabilities totaling $6,438. The trial court further awarded. 

the wife $100 per month in maintenance, to continue until she 

dies or remarries. 

Did the District Court erroneously fail to include a 

promi-ssory note valued at $78,121 as part of the marital 

estate? 

The wife acknowledges tha.t husband's interest in the 

family farm existed before the parties married. However, she 

argues that because the promissory note representing that 

interest names her as a tenant in common, it establishes an 

irrevocable gift from husband to her, and she should receive 

half of the note's value. 

Section 40-4-202, MCA, governs division of property in a 

dissolution of marriage. That statute, in relevant part, 

provides that: 

. . . the court . . . shall . . . finally equitably 

apportion between the parties the property and 

assets belonging to either or both, however and 

whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is 

in the name of the husband or wife or both. 

Subsection (3) of that statute further provides that: 

Each spouse is considered to have a common ownership in marital property that vests immediately 

preceding the entry of the decree of dissolution . . . 
The question of title is not controlling under this statute. 

Morse v. Morse (1977), 174 Mont. 541, 545, 571 P.2d 1147, 

1149. In Morse, we upheld a property division in which the 

District Court did not give controlling weight to the fact 

that the wife quitclaimed certain property to the husband 

during the marriage. In a similar manner, we conclude that 

the District Court here was not required to give controlling 

weight to the tenancy in common form of ownership in its 

distribution of the promissory note. 

Section 40-4-202, MCA, further provides, in subsection 

(1) that: 

. . . In dividing property acquired prior to the 

marriage . . . the court shall consider those 

contributions of the other spouse to the marriage, 

including: (a) the nonmonetary contribution of a 

homemaker; (b) the extent to which such contributions have facilitated the maintenance of this 

property; and (c) whether or not the property 

division serves as an alternative to maintenance 

arrangements. 

Under this standard, prior acquired property may properly be 

included as part of the marital assets where, for example, 

contributions of the other spouse have facilitated maintenance o? the property. - See In re Marriage of Jorgensen 

(1978), 180 Mont. 294, 590 P.2d 606. In the present case, 

the interest in the family farm was undisputedly property of 

the husband prior to this marriage. In evaluating the facts 

of the present case under the above statutory standard, we 

note that the District Court found that both parties contributed to make the household operate satisfactorily during 

their marriage. There is nothing in the record or in the 

briefs submitted to us to support the notion that the wife's 

contributions facilitated the maintenance of the interest in 

the farm property at any time. The wife was awarded maintenance in addition to the property division in this matter. 
We have repeatedly stated that we will not alter the 

judgment of a district court in resolving a property distribution unless a c1ea.r abuse of discretion is shown. In this 

case, the findings of the District Court set out with particularity the assets which th.e husband and wife brought into 

their marriage. The order also set out the assets acquired 

and liabilities incurred during the marriage, which it labeled the "marital net estate." The court then provided for 

disposition of the property acquired both prior to and during 

the marriage. Under the above statutory standards, we cannot 

say that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding the promissory note for the farm from the "marital net 

estate", or in awarding it to the husband. 

Should the District Court have awarded the wife either a 

one-half interest in the family home or its equivalent in 

cash? 

The wife raises this issue on essentially the same 

grounds as her argument under the first issue. She claims 

that the husband gifted her with a one-half interest in the 

marital home, and argues that the fact that the home is owned 

jointly by the parties is evidence of the gift. She contends 

that she should tlzerefore be awarded one-half of the home's 

value. 

As we ha.ve pointed out, Montana's statutory scheme for 

disposition of marital property does not give controlling 

importance to the way in which title to the property is held. 

Rather, the district court is to make an equitable division 

of the property, considering the factors set out in 

5 40-4-202, MCA. The requirement that the property division 

be equitable does not mandate that the division be equal. 
Snell v. Snell (Mont. 1983), 668 P.2d 238, 240, 40 St.R.ep. 

1359, 1361. 

We have reviewed the facts in the record, including the 

relatively short duration of the parties' marriage and the 

fact that $55,000 toward the price of the marital home was 

contributed from husband's pre-marriage assets. The District 

Court's disposition of the marital home will allocate to the 

husband approximately $51,000 from the sale of the home--the 

$105,000 value less the $34,000 mortgage and the $20,000 to 

be distributed to the wife. We find no abuse of discretion 

in the way in which the District Court distributed the value 

of the marital home. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

We concur: d