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REGULATORY FREEZE FOR JOBS ACT OF 2012 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, COMMERCIAL 

AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON

H.R. 4078 

FEBRUARY 27, 2012 

Serial No. 112–90 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS ROSS, Florida 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

JARED POLIS, Colorado 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Majority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Vice-Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DENNIS ROSS, Florida 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

JARED POLIS, Colorado 

DANIEL FLORES, Chief Counsel 

JAMES PARK, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

FEBRUARY 27, 2012 

Page 

THE BILL 

H.R. 4078, the ‘‘Regulatory Freeze for Jobs Act of 2012’’ ..................................... 3 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial 

and Administrative Law ...................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 9 

The Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial 

and Administrative Law ...................................................................................... 10 

WITNESSES 

Allan H. Meltzer, Carnegie Mellon University and Hoover Institution 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

John B. Taylor, Stanford University and Hoover Institution 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

Robert Weissman, President, Public Citizen 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 29 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Letter from the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, 

submitted by the Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, 

Commercial and Administrative Law ................................................................. 52 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee 

on the Judiciary ................................................................................................... 55 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law .............................................. 57 

Letter from the Coalition for Sensible Safeguards ............................................... 59 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Robert Weissman, President, Public 

Citizen ................................................................................................................... 61 

Material submitted by the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law .............................................. 64 

(1) 

REGULATORY FREEZE FOR JOBS ACT OF 2012 

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, 

COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4 p.m., in room 2141, 

Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Howard Coble 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Coble, Cohen, Conyers, and Johnson. 

Staff Present: (Majority) John Hilton, Counsel; John Mautz, 

Counsel; Ashley Lewis, Clerk; (Minority) James Park, Subcommittee Chief Counsel; and Rosalind Jackson, Professional Staff 

Member. 

Mr. COBLE. Good afternoon. We will come to order. I have my 

opening statement, I recognize the gentleman from Michigan, and 

Mr. Cohen is on his way here, I am told. It has been said that 

there are three types of lies; lies, damn lies, and statistics. All 

three species abound in Washington—perhaps they abound everywhere. Last month, the Department of Labor reported the national 

unemployment rate as 8.3 percent. It is certainly better than 10 

percent unemployment Labor reported in October, but a far cry 

from where we would like for it to be. And by the way, folks, you 

all pardon my raspy voice. I am trying to come down with my annual winter cold, so I will make it as inoffensive as possible. 

In reality, many millions of able-bodied Americans are still out 

of work, as bills pile up and hopes dwindle, the only statistic that 

matters to them and their families is that they are unemployed. 

We who voted against President Obama’s so-called stimulus plan 

know that Washington really cannot create jobs, and the Federal 

Government certainly can destroy jobs. But what I found out is 

that people just will oftentimes just want Washington to get out of 

the way. A recent Gallup poll, for example, found out that almost 

half of small business owners who aren’t hiring, are not looking for 

new employees because they are worried about new government 

regulations, and no wonder. 

With ObamaCare and Dodd-Frank on top of everything else, the 

red tape has been flying fast and furious lately in Washington. 

While the Bush administration issued an average of 63 major regulations every year, the Obama administration has issued an average of 88 regulations annually. The number of economically significant regulations also has increased. Under President Bush, the OfVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
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fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs, reported reviewing an 

average of 77 economically significant regulations biannually. 

OIRA’s biannual average under President Obama, however, is 125. 

The Heritage Foundation, conservatively estimates that President Bush added approximately 60 billion in annual regulatory 

costs over 80 years, but that in his first 26 months alone, President 

Obama added another 40 billion in annual regulatory costs. To give 

job creators some breathing room, Mr. Griffin, in his bill, has introduced the Regulatory Freeze for Jobs Act of 2012. Chairman Smith 

and I, along with several on the Subcommittee, and the full Committee, are original cosponsors of the Freeze Act, which would put 

a moratorium on new significant regs until the national unemployment rate stabilizes at or below 6 percent. 

The Freeze Act uses concepts and definitions that are well established in administrative law. For example, it defines significant 

regulatory action consistent with President Clinton’s long-standing 

executive order, 12866, but with one important difference or exception: The bill only freezes economically significant regulations that 

would cost the economy $100 million or more, while executive order 

12866 speaks to effects on the economy of 100 million or more. If 

the President’s common sense and the law of economics notwithstanding create jobs through regulation, then the Freeze Act won’t 

stop them from doing so; nor would the Freeze Act permit the 

President from making necessary regulations such as for national 

security and public safety and health. 

What the Freeze Act will do is to give job creators a respite from 

unnecessary regulations until the unemployment rate gets back 

down to 6 percent, which we haven’t seen in 31⁄2 years, since the 

lame-duck days of the last Administration. The regulatory agency 

should lay off the red tape. 

In closing, I want to thank Mr. Griffin for sponsoring this important bill. The Freeze Act would give the economy a much needed 

boost and it deserve the Subcommittee’s attention. I look forward 

to the witness’ testimony, and reserve the balance of my time. 

[The bill, H.R. 4078, follows:] 

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HR4078-2.eps
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HR4078-3.eps
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HR4078-4.eps
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HR4078-5.eps
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HR4078-6.eps
9 

Mr. COBLE. It is good to see the gentleman, my good friend from 

the banks of the Mississippi, Steve Cohen, Ranking Member. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, and it is good to be seen and I would 

like to yield my time at first, if I can, to the distinguished Chairman from the State of Michigan, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Conyers, are you headed for the floor as well? 

Mr. CONYERS. I was, but they tell me that our measure isn’t coming up today. 

Mr. COBLE. Okay. 

Mr. CONYERS. But I would like to go in front of the Ranking Subcommittee Member anyway. 

Mr. COBLE. All right, very well. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. We welcome our distinguished guests here from the Hoover Institute, well, both from the 

Hoover Institute. This is the ninth hearing on the subject so-called 

regulatory reform, and nearly all of these hearings there is always 

some discussion about how regulations depress job creation. And I 

am going to defer to the head of public citizens to help us examine 

that, but I invite our two other distinguished witnesses to join in 

in this evaluation. What the measure does is attempt to link regulations with employment by preventing agencies from engaging in 

regulatory actions if the average monthly unemployment rate exceeds 6 percent in any quarter. 

This is legislatively unwise because the measure fails to acknowledge the fact that regulations play a critical role in ensuring the 

health and safety of Americans as well as through the economic 

well-being of our Nation. So what we would do is prevent agencies 

under this proposal from fulfilling the job that we in Congress entrusted them to do; namely, to ensure the safety of the foods we 

eat, the cars we drive, and the places where we work. 

Cass Sunstein who heads the agency charged with reviewing 

Federal regulations recently said this: A moratorium would not be 

a scalpel or a machete, it would be more like a nuclear bomb in 

the sense that it would prevent regulations that cost very little, 

and have very significant economic or public health benefits. 

And so I think unwittingly, the sponsors of this measure could 

not possibly be intending to deliberately jeopardize the health and 

safety of Americans in order to pursue their anti-regulatory political agenda, but I am afraid that that is exactly what would be the 

effect were this measure taken seriously and enacted into law. 

Finally, there isn’t any credible evidence that regulations have 

any substantive impact on job creation. Last year, one of the conservatives’ own witness testified before this Subcommittee that 

‘‘the focus on jobs can lead to confusion and regulatory debates.’’ 

And that, quoting again, ‘‘the employment effects of regulation 

while important, are indeterminate.’’ 

And so I approach this hearing with the hope that we will recognize that our statements are going into the record as a permanent 

part of the Judiciary Committee’s responsibility, and I urge you to 

be as careful as you can in giving us your well thought out observations and convictions from the Hoover Institution. And with that, 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time, and thank you. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, gentleman from Michigan. 

10 

I am now pleased to recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. 

Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Coble. This bill, the Regulatory 

Freeze for the Jobs Act is an instrument that creates a mistaken 

cure for a problem that doesn’t exist. There is no ascertainable link 

between regulations and unemployment. There is anecdotal evidence, there is political jargon, but there is no empirical proof data 

that regulations affect unemployment, and to not have regulations 

until unemployment hits 6 percent is absolutely nonsensical. There 

is no reason for that. And the bill, even if it gives exemptions for 

the President to do certain things, gives judicial review over that 

process and it takes away from the Administration, and what the 

Constitution gives the executive otherwise. 

It also awards attorney’s fees and costs to small businesses 

whenever an agency changes its position regarding a significant 

regulatory action, the subject of a lawsuit, independent of whether 

or not the change was because of filing the lawsuit; ipso facto, no 

correlation. It is premised on false assertions that regulations undermine job creation. And as I said, there is no evidence; all of it 

is anecdotal. 

One of the majority’s own witnesses from a hearing last year testified that, at most, the effect of regulations on employment was indeterminate. Based on a review of their written statements, the 

two witnesses also did not offer evidence of an actual link, but an 

unemployment and regulation. They hang their arguments on unsupported notions that the creation of new rules creates uncertainty that causes businesses to hesitate in hiring. Yet surveys of 

business and economists show regulations have little to do with 

lack of hiring. It is basically the lack of demand, the destruction 

of the middle class, which has been done over and over through 

laws and policies, advocated by the majority of this House of Representatives. But it has hurt us, by being more austere rather than 

more robust in our economic policy, we have set the middle class 

back. And that has been a serious flaw. 

The Wall Street Journal surveyed business economists last summer and found the main reason U.S. Companies are reluctant to 

step up is scant demand, not uncertainty. National Federation of 

Independent Business, 45 percent said, dampening business confidence is why they are not getting sales. Only 10 percent cited regulations. Proponents of this particular provision and other anti-regulatory measures forget that our unemployment problems can be 

traced right back to lack of regulation in the financial services industries, and the housing industry. And in this failure created the 

2008 great recession, also known as the Bush recession. 

There are far greater economic costs to stopping agencies from 

regulating, than there is allowing new regulations to take effect. It 

raises many questions this particular bill, when does the 6 percent 

go into effect if it drops? But it is not worth going into all of those 

things because this bill is so bad on its face that going into the particulars of what would and if happen on such a poor-drawn bill is 

not worthy of the time of this Committee. 

There are issues that should be addressed as far as regulations. 

In my home city there is a regulation that says that you can’t get 

11 

your car inspected if you have a light that goes on that says that 

your engine needs to be checked. That may or may not relate to 

emissions. There should be a better way to test emissions than a 

light that your manufacturer puts on that basically says, do not 

pass the driver’s license station; go directly to your mechanic, and 

put your hands up, and surrender. That is a regulation that could 

stop and I am going to work on that. 

There are regulations in my city concerning football stadiums, 

the number of seats that you have to have for people with disabilities. I may be one of those people that needs one of those seats 

with a disability sometime in the future, but right now, we don’t 

have enough people to attend the games to merit the number of 

seats that they are requiring us to have, which could cost us a prohibitive amount of money, and maybe hamper the improved stadium that could get us an approved team and get some people with 

disabilities the interest to go into the games. The reality is, our 

team has been atrocious, and the average is about 8,000 people a 

game, and the people with disabilities have got better things to do 

because only 13 of them show up at an average game. But because 

of regulations, the Department of Justice wants us to create 250 

seats and create all of these stands for the nonexistent fans that 

come and watch a terrible team that has many disabilities, which 

we hope will be cured with our new coach. 

Nevertheless, there are changes that can be made to some regulations. In EPA, it cost a lot of people a lot of money to get their 

light fixed who can’t afford it, and that is something where there 

should be a waiver. In the football stadium, that makes no sense. 

For some reason, the University of Michigan got whatever they 

wanted. They had to have the same number of seats for people 

with disabilities as the University of Memphis has. Yet there is no 

comparison. One place averages 120,000 people; one averages 

8,000. We have the same number of seats for the stadiums. 

Well, I don’t know, who went to Michigan? I don’t know. Maybe 

somebody went to Michigan who cares about Michigan, but that is 

wrong. Regardless, I thank the gentleman for his opportunity, and 

he knows because East Carolina, his alma mater, also makes our 

team look awful and destroys us on the football field. I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. COBLE. I didn’t realize that you all were that inept. Steve, 

I will not provide you with that. 

Mr. COHEN. Obviously, you have not watched us play enough. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Steve, I appreciate that. Gentlemen, it is 

good to have you all with us. Professor Meltzer, is a distinguished 

visiting fellow at the Hoover Institute and professor of political 

economy at the Temple School of Business at Carnegie Mellon University. Professor Meltzer has served as a consultant on economic 

policy for Congress, U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the World 

Bank, and foreign governments, and chaired as well the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission. 

Professor Meltzer’s writings have appeared in numerous journals. He is the author of numerous papers on economic theory and 

policy and of several books, including the newly released, Why Capitalism? Professor Meltzer earned his AB and MA from Duke UniVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
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versity, and his Ph.D. From UCLA. Thank you, Professor, for coming to testify before the Subcommittee today. 

Professor Taylor, John B. Taylor, is a George P. Shultz Senior 

Fellow in economics at the Hoover Institute, and professor of economics at Stanford University. He was director of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy and Research, and founder—founding 

director of Stanford’s introductory Economic Center. Professor Taylor has the distinguished record of public service. 

Among other roles, he served as a member of the President’s 

Council on Economic Advisors from 1989 to 1991, and Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs from 2001 to 2005. 

He currently is a member of the California Governor’s Council of 

Economic Advisors. Professor Taylor received a BA in economics, 

summa cum laude from Princeton University, and a Ph.D. In economics from Stanford University. In recognition of his many 

achievements, in 2010, he received the prestigious Bradley Prize. 

We look forward to your testimony as well, Professor Taylor. Good 

to have you with us. 

Our final witness, Mr. Robert Weissman, as President of Public 

Citizens, Mr. Weissman works in the areas of economics, health 

care, trade, and globalization, intellectual property, and regulatory 

policy, and on issues related to financial accountability and corporate responsibility. He has worked to lower pharmaceutical 

prices for AIDS victims and others in the developing world. 

Mr. Weissman has appeared on television and radio and is published—and has been published and quoted in many newspapers. 

He earned his JD degree, magna cum laude, from Harvard School 

of Law and has led Public Citizens since 2009. Previously, he was 

director of the nonprofit organization, Central Action, and edited 

the magazine, Multinational Monitor, which tracks the activities of 

multinational corporations, and reports on the global economy. 

Thank you as well, Mr. Weissman, for being with us today. 

So welcome to all three of you. There is a timer on your desk 

that will reflect the green light. The green light will turn to amber, 

and when the amber light appears, the ice on which you are skating is getting thinner. We would like you all to close down on or 

about 5 minutes if you could. And then the red light will appear 

that will indicate that the final time has been exhausted. 

Mr. Meltzer, why don’t you start us off? You all can see that 

timer, can you not? Mr. Meltzer, you will be our lead witness. 

TESTIMONY OF ALLAN H. MELTZER, CARNEGIE MELLON 

UNIVERSITY AND HOOVER INSTITUTION 

Mr. MELTZER. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I support the 

proposed regulatory freeze—I support the proposed Regulatory 

Freeze for Jobs Act of 2012. It restricts new regulation during the 

current recession until the unemployment rate falls to 6 percent of 

the labor force. This is not an anti-regulation bill; it is a prioritysetting bill. The proposed legislation includes safeguards that permit the restriction to be set aside for reasons of national security, 

public safety, or for some other purposes. 

I have urged repeatedly that Congress limit new, costly regulation in the interest of increasing the speed and size of the economic 

recovery. The proposed legislation does not oppose regulation. As 

13 

the short title suggests, its recovery and reduced unemployment 

are set as priorities, badly needed priorities. We all recognize that 

unemployment rates remain high, growth and investment slow. 

Forecasters expected slow growth to continue. One main reason is 

that investors and producers are uncertain about regulation and 

taxation. 

Current and prospective regulation make estimates of future returns hard highly uncertain. Who can predict with acceptable confidence what new or pending regulation will do to future costs for 

energy, healthcare, finance, labor, or what they will do to productivity. 

I have taught in the business school for 50 years. We teach the 

students in the business school to estimate what the future rate of 

return is going to be. They can’t do that in the current conditions 

of uncertainty with any accuracy. That is why regulation is costly. 

That is a recent survey by Michael Porter and Jan Rivkin of the 

Harvard Business School, asked thousands of HBS alumni about 

impediments to investment and job creation in the United States. 

The responses cited the U.S. Tax Code, the regulatory burden and 

uncertainty, as well as the absence of job skills among the unemployed. 

Unless changes are made to reduce these costs and burdens, the 

alumni expect the job-creating investment to decline over the near 

future. During the period where new regulations would be restricted, Congress can and should improve regulatory processes and 

administration. Mr. Cohen, I agree with you that much regulation 

is well intentioned, but wrong headed. Much current regulation is 

ineffective and doesn’t accomplish the ends that the regulation is 

intending to achieve. Capture is one reason. The regulated become 

the regulators, or the regulators have one eye focused on a career 

change to work for the firms or industries that they regulate. 

The Securities and Exchange Commission is often cited as an example. We know that the SEC did nothing to stop Bernard 

Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, despite several administrations—demonstrations by a financial professional directly warning the SEC of 

Madoff’s claims could not be true. 

Examples of regulatory capture are common in the academic and 

policy literature. The claims are supported in practice. Steve 

Linnick, Inspector General of the Federal Housing Agency, issued 

a report stating that Fannie Mae knew about extensive foreclosure 

abuses by its outside law firms in 2003, 4 years before the crisis 

started. Regulators did not stop the bad practices when they could 

have prevented some of the costly failures that followed. Regulation 

failed in that case, as in many others. 

Banks are regulated by several agencies. Prior to the housing 

and financial crisis that started in 2007, the Federal Reserve had 

hundreds of regulators working inside the largest banks in New 

York and Charlotte. They examined the loans made during these 

periods. They did not prevent any bad loans. Regulation failed. 

Prior to the crisis, an agreement by all principal developed countries required commercial banks that lend on mortgages to increase 

their capital if they increase their mortgage loans. The banks circumvented the regulation by setting up subsidiaries to hold the 

14 

mortgages. Instead of more capital per dollar of mortgages, there 

was less. 

Regulators did not object. Regulation failed. I am not opposed to 

all regulation. I repeat, not opposed to all regulation. Congress 

should work to develop effective regulation. My third principle of 

regulation will guide you to a more effective regulation. That principle says that regulation is effective if it changes the incentives of 

the regulated entity. 

In closing, I would like to repeat that I support the bill. But I 

urge you to be concerned about the broader consequences of the 

large increase that has taken place in regulation. Much of the regulation we have replaces the rule of law, with the rule by regulators. 

The rule of law, has been a pillar of successful capitalist development here and elsewhere. Increased regulation erodes the rule of 

law, and invites corruption. Under the rule of law, all citizens and 

companies are treated alike, or nearly alike as possible. Under rule 

by regulators, this is no longer so. Some gain advantages over others, distorting resource allocation and making us poorer. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meltzer follows:] 

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Mr. COBLE. Professor Meltzer, I notice that you earned two of 

your degrees from Duke University. Did you have North Carolina 

connections prior to your enrollment? 

Mr. MELTZER. Yes, lots of—I have many examples of regulations 

which are misguided, or misdirected, or don’t end up doing what 

they want. That is more likely to be the usual case, rather than 

the—the second, my first law of regulation, is that regulations are 


Meltzer-5.eps
20 

written by lawyers and bureaucrats, and markets learn to circumvent them. I gave a talk about that to the Council on Foreign 

Relations in New York, full of Wall Street people. The first question that came was from one of the lawyers who worked on Wall 

Street. He said, who do you think shows them how to circumvent 

them? We do. That was all I needed. I didn’t have to argue with 

that. 

My second law of regulation is that regulations are static, and 

markets are dynamic. So if they don’t learn to circumvent the regulation early, they will learn later, and the regulations get circumvented all the time. The only way that you can successfully 

regulate to bring social and private cost together, is to change the 

incentives of the people you regulate. 

I proposed that four times in hearings before the banking committees when they were discussion what became the Dodd-Frank 

regulation. One center introduced my legislation. It said, look, we 

now subsidize people who are too big to fail. Let’s get rid of Too 

Big To Fail by saying the amount of capital that you have to hold 

rises with the size of the assets. So instead of being peanut subsidized, you are going to be penalized. 

Mr. COBLE. Well, let’s move on. 

Mr. MELTZER. Because we the public pay for the costs of what 

you do. 

Mr. COBLE. Well, I thank you for that, Professor. I appreciate 

that. We have been joined by the distinguished gentlemen from 

Georgia, Mr. Johnson. Hi, good to have you with us. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Taylor, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN B. TAYLOR, STANFORD UNIVERSITY 

AND HOOVER INSTITUTION 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cohen 

and other Members of the Committee. I would like to submit my 

written testimony for the record and just summarize very briefly. 

Mr. COBLE. Without objection. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am very concerned about this recovery from the 

recession that ended in 2009. It is 21⁄2 years old now, and it is like 

we don’t have a recovery. And I make that assessment by comparing it to the most recent recovery from a deep recession and 

that was in the early 1980’s. In the 10 quarters of this recovery, 

growth has averaged 2.4 percent. In the 10 quarters following the 

recession that ended in 1982, growth was 5.9 percent. There is just 

no comparison. 

So there is a real problem here. That is why unemployment is 

remaining high. That is why people are dropping out of the labor 

force, and that is why employment growth is as weak as it is. 

This recovery has been weak from the start, and as a result, a 

year and a half ago, I wrote an op ed for the Journal along with 

the distinguished gentlemen on my right, and also with George 

Shultz, former Treasury Secretary, Secretary of State, and several 

other distinguished economists. We had a comprehensive strategy 

we recommended to get the economy moving. One part of that 

strategy, was, and I will quote, ‘‘To enact an moratorium on all new 

regulations with exceptions of national security, and public safety.’’ 

21 

We thought that should be part of a more comprehensive strategy which would include deficit reduction as well as a more rulesbased monetary policy. Unfortunately, that recommendation was 

not enacted on, and as a result, this recovery, I believe, has continued to be very weak. 

And that is why I am so supportive of this bill, which really 

takes action along those lines, I think in an improved way. Ranking Member Cohen mentioned in his remarks that the problem is 

a lack of demand, not too many regulations. Well, I think the demand is low because of those regulations. Business firms create demand by investing and hiring people, and one of the reasons they 

are concerned about this, is uncertainty about what the regulations 

are actually going to be. 

I believe there is a growing recognition about the difficulty of 

regulating the economy when it gets too far. And in my testimony, 

I just offered this really very, I think excellent, recent issue in The 

Economist Magazine, entitled on the cover, The Overregulated 

America. And there is a detailed description of the things that really make it difficult for firms to expand. They are worried about the 

future. They don’t know what the regulatory apparatus is going to 

be. By the way, there are also very worried about the tax laws, 

many things. So it seems to be very important to take this action 

now, and to really get this recovery moving. 

I think the—in addition to the normal kind of growing regulation, and cost of regulation that we are seeing, we have two bills 

passed recently that I think make this problem worse. And the one 

that I focus on mostly because that is my area, and that is the financial reform bill. There is lots of discussion about what caused 

the financial crisis, who caused it, you heard Professor Meltzer say 

a few things about that. In my view, it wasn’t that there was not 

enough regulation; it was that the regulations on the books were 

not enforced. I think it is very clear when you look at the details 

of what happened. 

So in this sense, the analysis that led to the financial reform bill, 

misdiagnosed the crisis, instead added many new regulations 

which have nothing to do with the financial crisis; regulating payday loans for example, but I could go on and on. And the regulatory 

rules that the regulators must write now are just overwhelming to 

them, far more than they have had to write in the past. So it is 

like an order of magnitude difference. 

I know that is why so many firms are sitting on cash; why banks 

are sitting on cash. They don’t know exactly what to do. So at this 

point, I think it is very important to enact some kind of a freeze 

like what is being proposed here. That is why I support the bill. 

And in a way, it addresses two problems which are holding the 

economy back. Number one is the growing amount of regulations 

that we are seeing. Number two, these recent bills that are still 

being implemented, the Congress gives instructions to the agencies 

to write the rules, and they are busy every day writing rules, and 

no one knows quite what to expect. 

So I think in this case, you kind of need a time-out on those bills; 

a time-out basically to digest what the rulemaking should be about. 

Give people a chance to digest what is going on. Maybe change 

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poses which are, to me, extraordinarily important to get the economy moving again. Thank you. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Professor Taylor. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor follows:] 


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Mr. COBLE. Mr. Weissman. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT WEISSMAN, PRESIDENT, 

PUBLIC CITIZEN 

Mr. WEISSMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Cohen, Mr. Johnson. I think it is an excellent thing that the ComVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA

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mittee is focusing on the jobs crisis facing this country. And I agree 

completely with Professor Taylor that it needs to be a top priority 

for the Congress. However, I think the legislation is a misguided 

way of trying to address that problem. The legislation would effectively amount to a 5-year moratorium on new significant regulation. That is, I believe, a wrong and dangerous remedy for the 

problem we face. We have not addressed the problem, but would 

create many new problems. It is worth pointing out that the waivers in the bill are very limited, particularly in the area of health 

and safety, where it is only—the waiver is permissible only where 

necessary to meet an imminent problem or a pending emergency; 

not why most health and safety regulations are adopted. 

Let me try to make five quick points that summarize the testimony that I have submitted in writing. First point is that the evidence does not support the claim that regulation is a significant 

problem for a job preservation, or job creation. The real problem, 

as Mr. Cohen said, is indeed, the lack of demand. To the extent 

that there is a problem with uncertainty in the economy, the uncertainty is over the future of the economy, but not the future of regulation. And I go over in some detail evidence that I think that supports that claim. 

One data point that is relevant is that when employers report 

the reason for mass layoffs, they cite lack of sales or lack of demand as 100 times greater factor than regulation. That is retrospective, not prospective, but that is two orders of magnitude, and 

highly suggestive of what we are looking at. A second data point 

is, rather than analyzing this theoretically, to just look at the actual significant regulations that are proposed. And if you go back 

over the last 10 years at almost any point, you will see the cost of 

almost every major regulation, is overwhelmed by the benefits, and 

the aggregate total of benefits exceeds the cost by 2 to 15 times. 

It is measured by the Office of Management & Budget under both 

the Obama Administration, and the Bush II administration. 

The second point is that the jobs crisis we now face, I agree with 

Professor Taylor, is a tribute to regulatory failure. I disagree 

with—I am sorry, with Professor Meltzer. I disagree with Professor 

Taylor that it is only a problem of regulatory enforcement, although it surely was that. There were many areas in which the 

failure to adopt new regulations to deal with an evolving and increasingly complicated financial sector contributed to the failure. I 

think that suggests a need for new regulations to address those 

problems going forward, some of them mandated by Dodd-Frank. 

Third point is that regulation, not abstracted but looked at concretely, makes our country stronger and makes us more prosperous 

and makes us healthier, safer, makes our country cleaner and more 

livable. I give a variety of examples of this in my written testimony, but it is worth mentioning that many regulations that will 

make our country stronger, and that are supported by the regulated industries, would be blocked for roughly 5 years by this legislation, including regulations proposed to increase the fuel efficiency 

of our Nation’s automobiles and trucks, to improve food safety, and 

to enable the introduction of generic versions of biotech pharmaceuticals. 

29 

A fourth point: Beyond the area of traditional health and safety 

regulation, this bill would impede many of the routine functions of 

government in ways that I am sure the drafters do not intend, but 

which I think are relatively inescapable under the framework of 

the legislation. They would prevent issuance of new annual rules 

that authorize bird hunting. They would prevent issuance of rules 

that provide for stop-loss pay for Veterans. They would prevent 

issuance of rules enabling compensation for Vietnam vets. They 

would prevent the issuance of rules, of which there are many, and 

a significant portion of the annual significant regulations issued 

that deal with Medicare reimbursement. 

A fifth and final point is to say that although I think the legislation is misguided as I have said, and I think regulation makes our 

country stronger and better, is not to suggest that we don’t need 

to significantly reform the regulatory process. I absolutely agree 

with Professor Meltzer that regulatory captures a serious problem 

facing the country, and it would be an excellent thing for there to 

be bipartisan legislation to try to address that particular problem. 

I think another area of fruitful investigation is the problem of 

under enforcement of existing rules, and the failure to have sanctions for violations of rules that are sufficiently strong. 

Mr. Conyers, for example, has introduced legislation that would 

make it a criminal violation to introduce products into commerce 

or to expose workers to life-threatening hazards without sufficiently warning them. And I think that is something that this Congress ought to be looking at as well. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Weissman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weissman follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Robert Weissman, President, Public Citizen 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on H.R. 4078, the Regulatory 

Freeze for Jobs Act of 2012. I am Robert Weissman, president of Public Citizen. 

Public Citizen is a national public interest organization with 250,000 members and 

supporters. For more than 40 years, we have advocated with some considerable success for stronger health, safety, consumer protection and other rules, as well as for 

a robust regulatory system that curtails corporate wrongdoing and advances the 

public interest. 

Public Citizen co-chairs the Coalition for Sensible Safeguards (CSS). CSS is an alliance of more than 75 consumer, small business, labor, scientific, research, good 

government, faith, community, health and environmental organizations joined in the 

belief that our country’s system of regulatory safeguards provides a stable framework that secures our quality of life and paves the way for a sound economy that 

benefits us all. Time constraints prevented the Coalition from reviewing my testimony in advance, and today I speak only on behalf of Public Citizen. 

The Regulatory Freeze for Jobs Act would impose a moratorium on all significant 

regulatory action until the national unemployment rate drops to 6.0 percent. The 

legislation defines ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as steps toward issuance of a rule 

having an impact on the economy of $100 million or more, or which meets other 

criteria. The legislation exempts action that would repeal a rule, but not to modify 


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1The Congressional Budget Office projects that unemployment will be 6.9 percent by the end 

of 2015 and 5.6 percent by the end of 2017. Congressional Budget Office. (2012). The Budget 

and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http:// 

cbo.gov/publication/42905 2Mouzoon, N., & Lincoln, T. (2011). Regulation: The Unsung Hero in American Innovation. 

Public Citizen. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.citizen.org/documents/regulationinnovation.pdf 3Shapiro, I., & Irons, J. (2011). Regulation, Employment, and the Economy: Fears of job loss 

are overblown. Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.epi.org/ 

files/2011/BriefingPaper305.pdf 

it (even if the modification weakened a standard). The legislation authorizes the 

president to waive the moratorium in certain limited cases (to address an ‘‘imminent’’ threat to human health or safety or other emergency; to enforce criminal laws; 

for national security; or pursuant to legislation implementing international trade 

agreements). 

Given current unemployment projections, the Act would impose a roughly fiveyear moratorium on significant regulatory action.1

In the current context of scandalously high unemployment, the Committee is right 

to focus attention on the causes of unemployment and on needed remedies. However, excessive regulation is neither the cause of the jobs crisis nor a meaningful 

impediment to job creation. The Regulatory Freeze for Jobs Act is the wrong cure 

for the nation’s serious job ailment—it wouldn’t remedy the problem, could well 

make the problem worse, and would cause devastating side effects. 

The first section of this testimony argues that regulation does not have a meaningfully harmful impact on jobs and delivers significant net economic benefits. The 

second section argues that regulatory failures—deregulation, underregulation and 

lack of enforcement—had a central role in causing the Wall Street crash and the 

Great Recession. Recognizing the regulatory failures undergirding the current jobs 

crisis emphasizes the need for new and evolving rules to prevent another job-destroying, Wall Street-induced financial crisis. The third section discusses the vital 

function of regulation in making our country better and stronger, and shows some 

of the damage that would be done by a five-year moratorium on significant regulatory action. The fourth section analyzes the ways in which the legislation would, 

perhaps unintentionally, interfere with a diverse set of government programs and 

initiatives, including matters such as rules authorizing bird hunting. The conclusion 

emphasizes that the regulatory system is in need of significant reform, but not in 

the direction proposed by the Regulatory Freeze for Jobs Act. 

I. REGULATORY PROTECTIONS STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMY

The central premise of the Regulatory Freeze for Jobs Act is that regulatory protections meaningfully interfere with job preservation and creation. This premise is 

mistaken. 

While regulators commonly do not have job creation as a mission priority, they 

are mindful of regulatory cost, and by statutory directive or on their own initiative 

typically seek to minimize costs; relatedly, the rulemaking process gives affected industries ample opportunity to communicate with regulators over cost concerns, and 

these concerns are taken into account. To review the regulations actually proposed 

and adopted is to see how much attention regulators pay to reducing cost and detrimental impact on employment. And to assess the very extended rulemaking process 

is to see how substantial industry is influence over the rules ultimately adopted— 

or discarded. 

Even where the cost of regulatory compliance is nontrivial, the net job impact may 

be minimal or even positive; firm expenditures on regulatory compliance typically 

create new jobs within affected firms or other service or product companies with 

which they contract. 

It is also the case that firms typically innovate creatively and quickly to meet new 

regulatory requirements, even when they fought hard against adoption of the rules.2

The result is that costs are commonly lower than anticipated. 

The economics literature on regulation does not support the claim that regulation 

meaningfully impedes job growth. A survey of the literature conducted by the Economics Policy Institute finds a rough consensus: regulation has little direct impact 

on job creation, and may offer a net positive benefit.3 A literature review by the Office of Management and Budget, included in the 2011 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulation, highlights several studies articulating theoretical approaches showing why different forms of regulation—including labor market, environmental and economic regulation—might increase or decrease employVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
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4Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. (2011). 2011 

Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations on Unfunded Mandates on 

State, Local, and Tribal Entities. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 

sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011lcb/2011lcbalreport.pdf 5 Congressional Budget Office. (2011, November 15). Statement of Douglas Elmendorf: Policies 

for Increasing Economic Growth and Employment in 2012 and 2013, page 49. Testimony before 

the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from 

http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/index.cfm/files/serve?Filelid=795c2267-9349-4c2c-a488- 

262dfd346a2c 6Shapiro, I., & Irons, J. (2011). Regulation, Employment, and the Economy: Fears of job loss 

are overblown. pp. 21–27 Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.epi.org/files/2011/ 

BriefingPaper305.pdf 7The Pew Environment Group. (2010, October). Industry Opposition to Government Regulation. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.pewenvironment.org/uploadedFiles/PEG/ 

Publications/FactlSheet/Industry%20Clean%20Energy%20Factsheet.pdf 8Shapiro, I., & Irons, J. (2011). Regulation, Employment, and the Economy: Fears of job loss 

are overblown. Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.epi.org/ 

files/2011/BriefingPaper305.pdf 9 Bivens, J. (2012). The ‘Toxics Rule’ and Jobs: The job-creation potential of the EPA’s new rule 

on toxic power-plant emissions. Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from 

http://www.epi.org/files/2012/ib325.pdf 10 National Association for Business Economics. (2011, August). Economic Policy Survey. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.nabe.com/publib/pol/11/08/nabepolicy1108.pdf 11See the analysis by Treasury Department Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Janice 

Eberly. Eberly, J. (2011, October 24). Is Regulatory Uncertainty a Major Impediment to Job 

Growth? U.S. Department of the Treasury. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http:// 

www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Is-Regulatory-Uncertainty-a-Major-Impediment-to-JobGrowth.aspx (‘‘If regulatory uncertainty was a major impediment to hiring right now, we would 

expect to see indications of this in one or more of the following: business profits; trends in the 

workforce, capacity utilization, and business investment; differences between industries undergoing significant regulatory changes and those that are not; differences between the United 

States and other countries that are not undergoing the same changes; or surveys of business 

owners and economists. As discussed in a detailed review of the evidence below, none of these 

data support the claim that regulatory uncertainty is holding back hiring.’’) 

ment and, in general, concludes the empirical evidence is ambiguous.4 Addressing 

the impact of a moratorium on environmental regulations, Congressional Budget Office Director Douglas Elmendorf in Senate testimony last year stated, ‘‘On balance, 

CBO expects that delaying or eliminating those regulations regarding emissions 

would reduce investment and output during the next few years, because the response to the factors that would tend to boost investment under those circumstances 

would probably be smaller than the response to the factors that would reduce investment.’’ 5

Prognostications of job loss and excess cost from specific rules routinely turn out 

to be significantly overstated, EPI has shown, both in government estimates of the 

cost of regulatory compliance with new rules and especially in industry claims.6 Impacted industries have a natural bias to overestimate costs of regulatory compliance, 

and projections of cost regularly discount the impact of technological dynamism. In 

the case of acid rain regulations, for example, industry projected costs of $5.5 billion 

initially, rising to $7.1 billion in 2000; ex-ante estimates place costs at $1.1 billion— 

$1.8 billion.7 And, ‘‘in the case of the regulation of benzene emissions, control costs 

were estimated at $350,000 per plant by the chemical industry, but soon thereafter 

the plants developed a new process in which more benign chemicals could be substituted for benzene, thereby reducing control costs to essentially zero.’’ 8 The last 

century teaches us that Chicken Little warnings about the costs of the next regulation should be, at the very least, heavily discounted. 

Indeed, careful examination of one of the most costly rules issued during the 

Obama administration—national standards for mercury, arsenic and other toxic air 

pollutants emitted by power plants, known as the ‘‘toxics rule’’—shows that it will 

lead to net job creation.9

We are, of course, living in a period of shamefully high unemployment and underemployment, and it is absolutely correct to focus attention on job creation. But excessive regulation is neither the cause of the nation’s mass unemployment—actually, to a very considerable extent, the opposite is the case, as discussed below— 

nor the barrier to job creation. Indeed, not only do business economists not cite regulation as a significant problem for business, they actually say the regulatory environment is ‘‘good’’ for business.10 The overriding reason why business—including 

particularly small business—is not hiring is lack of demand.11

While the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and industry trade associations regularly 

complain about regulation and argue that regulation is impeding job creation and 

injuring small business, that is not what actual small businesses say. They cite lack 

32 

12Small Business Majority. (2011). Opinion Survey: Small Business owners Believe National 

Standards Supporting Energy Innovation Will Increase Prosperity for Small Firms. Retrieved 

24 February, 2012, from http://smallbusinessmajority.org/energy/pdfs/CleanlEnergyl 

Reportl092011.pdf 13 Hall, K. G. (2011, 1 September). Regulations, taxes aren’t killing small business, owners say. 

McClatchy Newspapers. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/ 

01/122865/regulations-taxes-arent-killing.html 14 U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (2011, July). Small Business Outlook Survey. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1107usclsummit%20l harrisnteractive.pdf 15 Ibid. 16Dunkelberg, W., & Wade, H. (2012). NFIB Small Business Economic Trends. Retrieved 24 

February, 2012 from http://www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/sbet/sbet201202.pdf 17 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2011, November). Extended Mass 

Layoffs in 2010. Table 6. Reason for layoff: extended mass layoff events, separations, and initial 

claimants for unemployment insurance, private nonfarm sector, 2008–2010. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.bls.gov/mls/mlsreport1038.pdf 18 Ibid. 19Gattuso, J., Katz, D., & Keen, S. (2010). Red Tape Rising: Obama’s Torrent of New Regulation. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/10/red-tape-rising-obamas-torrent-of-new-regulation 20Public Citizen. (2010). Junk Math: How Public Interest Protection Opponents Count Costs 

and Ignore Benefits. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 

cafebenefits12222010.pdf 

of demand and uncertainty about when demand will pick up as their primary concerns. 

Small business owners listed ‘‘government regulation’’ far down their list of concerns in a survey commissioned by the American Sustainable Business Council, 

Main Street Alliance and Small Business Majority; the number one and number two 

identified biggest problems facing their businesses are ‘‘uncertainty about the future 

economy’’ and ‘‘rising costs of doing business,’’ both cited more than three times 

more frequently than ‘‘government regulation.’’ 12 In an informal survey, McClatchy/ 

Tribune News Service found no business owners complaining about regulation.13

The Chamber of Commerce’s survey of small business similarly shows a relatively 

low ranking of concern about regulation.14 More than half of small businesses in the 

Chamber rank ‘‘economic uncertainty’’ atop their list of obstacles to hiring new employees; ‘‘too much regulation’’ is ranked fifth.15 Similarly, a survey by the National 

Federation of Independent Businesses found small business owners ranking ‘‘poor 

sales’’ as the number one problem they face, outdistancing worries about ‘‘government regulation,’’ although as the economy has started to improve in recent months, 

small business respondents to the NFIB survey have expressed less concern about 

poor sales and more about regulation.16

Insufficient demand is also the primary reason for layoffs. In extensive survey 

data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, employers cite lack of demand 

roughly 100 times more frequently as the reason for mass layoffs than government 

regulation! 17

Reason for layoff: 2008–2010 18

Critics of regulation have relied on some muc-touted studies that emphasize the 

costs of regulation, but these studies are fundamentally flawed and should not inform policy debates. Several studies cite the ‘‘cost’’ of regulation, but neglect to identify correlative benefits. For example, The Heritage Foundation has issued a series 

of reports on the cost of regulation under the Obama administration. These reports 

simply ignore the benefits of rules, removing all context from the cost estimate. To 

take one example, The Heritage Foundation attributes more than a quarter of all 

costs of regulation issued under the Obama administration to fuel economy standards.19 Yet Heritage fails to mention that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration—the source of Heritage’s cost estimate—found those rules would confer 

benefits three times as great as the costs.20

Another study that replicates this error of counting costs but not benefits is the 

report issued by Nicole Crain and W. Mark Crain, consultants to the Small Business 

Administration Office of Advocacy.21 This study is thoroughly discredited, but the 


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21 Crain, N. V., & Crain, W. M. (2010). The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms. Prepared for Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from 

http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/rs371tot.pdf 22This concept as employed by Crain and Crain includes a range of elements that might properly be considered regulation, but which are not typically part of the regulatory policy debate. 

This includes matters such as tariffs, antitrust policy, complexity of the tax system, and ease 

of starting a new business. Ibid. 23 Irons, J., & Green, A. (2011, 19 July). Flaws Call For Rejecting Crain and Crain Model. 

Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.epi.org/page/-/ 

EPIlIssueBrief308.pdf 24 Eisenbrey, R., & Shapiro, I. (2011, August). Deconstructing Crain and Crain. Economic Policy Institute. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://web.epi-data.org/temp727/IssueBrief312- 

2.pdf; Irons, J. and Green, A., Flaws Call for Rejecting Crain and Crain Model.; Shapiro, S. A., 

& Ruttenberg, R. (2011, February). The Crain and Crain Report on Regulatory Costs. Center 

for Progressive Reform. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/SBAlRegulatorylCostslAnalysisl1103.pdf ; Copeland, C. W. (2011, April 6). Analysis 

of an Estimate of the Total Costs of Federal Regulations. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CRSlCrainl 

andlCrain.pdf 25Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. (2011). 

2011 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations on Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities. 

Administration Office of Advocacy.21 This study is thoroughly discredited, but the 

study’s groundless conclusions (that regulation costs the U.S. economy $1.75 trillion 

annually, or more than $10,000 per small business employee) continues to be cited 

too frequently in policy debates, often without attribution to the original, discredited 

study. Crain and Crain attribute $1.236 trillion in costs to ‘‘economic regulation,’’ 22

a figure that is entirely derived from a regression analysis correlating ratings on 

a World Bank ‘‘regulatory quality index’’—which is itself based on nothing more 

than survey data from businesses and other sources—and national GDP per capita. 

It is remarkable enough to imagine that such a cross-cultural, international regression analysis would yield such a robust result that it should meaningfully inform 

U.S. policy; even more so, when it yields a total cost vastly out of line with other 

careful analysis, as well as such unlikely findings as a correlation between increased 

education and reduced economic growth. It turns out, as the Economic Policy Institute has shown, that with a more complete set of data than used by Crain and 

Crain—but still using the same regression equations—no statistical relationship between ‘‘regulatory quality’’ and GDP exists.23 Crain and Crain also include a cost 

for tax compliance—not typically considered a ‘‘regulatory’’ cost—which they pin at 

roughly $160 billion. A number of other fatal flaws bedevil the discredited study.24

A more robust system for assessing the impact of regulation on the economy— 

though significantly imprecise and heavily biased against the benefits of regulation—is not to conjure up a theory to which facts are made to conform, or to invent 

regression analyses that rely on poor data and far too few inputs and that demonstrate regulation to have an overdetermining impact on the overall economy, but 

to look at the actual impact of actual regulations. Although the federal government 

issues thousands of regulations every year, most of these are very limited in impact, 

and the universe of economically significant regulations—those that would be affected by the Regulatory Freeze act—is relatively small, identifiable and analyzable. 

Every year, the Office of Management and Budget analyzes the costs and benefits 

of rules with significant economic benefit. The benefits massively exceed costs. 

The principle finding of OMB’s 2011 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs 

of Federal Regulation is: 

The estimated annual benefits of major Federal regulations reviewed by 

OMB from October 1, 2000, to September 30, 2010, for which agencies estimated and monetized both benefits and costs, are in the aggregate between 

$132 billion and $655 billion, while the estimated annual costs are in the 

aggregate between $44 billion and $62 billion. These ranges reflect uncertainty in the benefits and costs of each rule at the time that it was evaluated.25

In other words, even by OMB’s most conservative accounting, the benefits of 

major regulations over the last decade exceeded costs by a factor of more than twoto-one. And benefits may exceed costs by a factor of 14. 

These results are consistent year-to-year: 

34 

26Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. (2011). 

2011 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations an Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities. Table 1–3, p. 19–20. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, 

from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011lcb/2011lcbalreport.pdf 27See, e.g., Shapiro, S. et al., CPR Comments on Draft 2010 Report to Congress on the Benefits 

and Costs of Federal Regulations 16–19 (App. A, Pt. C.) (2010), Retrieved 24 February, 2012, 

from http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/2010lCPRlCommentslOMBlReport.pdf; 

Steinzor, R. et al., CPR Comments on Draft 2009 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs 

of Federal Regulations 16–19 (App. A, Pt. C.) (2009), Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http:// 

www.progressivereform.org/articles/2009lCPRlCommentslOMBlReport.pdf; Sinden, A. & 

Goodwin, J., CPR Comments on Draft 2008 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of 

Federal Regulations 5–8 (2008), Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http:// 

www.progressivereform.org/articles/2008lCommentslOMBlReport.pdf. For all of the comments on OMB’s annual reports to Congress on the benefits and cost of federal regulation produced by CPR Member Scholars and staff, see Ctr. for Progressive Reform, OMB Reports on the 

Costs and Benefits of Regulation, Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http:// 

www.progressivereform.org/OMBCongress.cfm 28 In addition to the loss of human life with the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon platform, the oil disaster imposed billions in economic damage. BP has paid more than $6 billion in compensation under the Gulf Coast Claims Facility it established. Many other claims are pending. 

Gulf Coast Claims Facility. (2012). Overall Program Statistics: Status Report as of February 23, 

2012. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/ 

GCCFlOveralllStatuslReport.pdf Proper regulation could have averted the disaster. 29Pollin, R., Wicks-Lin, J., & Garret-Peltier, H. (2009, June). Green Prosperity: How CleanEnergy Policies Can Fight Poverty and Raise Living Standards in the United States. Political 

Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Retrieved 24 February, 

2012, from http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/otherlpublicationltypes/greenleconomics/ 

greenlprosperity/GreenlProsperity.pdf 

Total Annual Benefits and Costs of Major Rules by Fiscal Year (billions of 

2001 dollars) 26

The reason for the consistency is that regulators pay a great deal of concern to 

comparative costs and benefits (too great a concern, in our view, given the built-in 

bias of cost-benefit analysis against regulatory initiative 27). Very few major rules 

are adopted where projected costs exceed projected benefits, and those cases typically involve direct Congressional mandates. 

A final point on this topic: Missing from much of the literature on regulation and 

jobs are the economically systemic, positive impacts of regulation. Proper regulation 

can avert catastrophic damage not typically captured in prospective cost-benefit 

analyses, as the BP oil disaster shows.28 Proper regulation is also essential to enable markets to function efficiently and fairly. As the 2008 Wall Street crash shows, 

improperly and insufficiently regulated financial markets will fail with devastating 

consequences for job preservation and the real economy. Regulation also has an important role in promoting innovation and technological dynamism. Environmental 

and economic realities necessitate the development and deployment of transformative clean energy technologies. Markets alone do not offer sufficient incentive 

and reward for the timely deployment of such technologies, which promise both 

great economic savings and very significant job creation.29

II. REGULATORY FAILURES HELPED CREATE THE JOBS CRISIS

The present jobs crisis has particular and identifiable causes: the collapse of the 

housing bubble and the ensuing financial crash. The crisis also has identifiable culprits: The big banks and Wall Street, which fueled the bubble through practices 

ranging from issuing predatory mortgage loans to creation of esoteric financial inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA

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30The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. (2011, January). Final Report of the National 

Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. Retrieved 

24 February, 2012, from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf, p. xviii 31Stiglitz, J. (2009). Capitalist fools. Vanity Fair, 51(1). 32 Buffett, W. (2003). Report to Shareholders, February 21, 2003. Berkshire Hathaway. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf 

ranging from issuing predatory mortgage loans to creation of esoteric financial instruments that claimed to convert low-quality loans into top-notch investment opportunities. These practices were enabled not by too much regulation, but by too little. To a very considerable extent, the current jobs crisis should be understood as 

resulting from regulatory failure: deregulation, underregulation and underenforcement. The job loss stemming from this regulatory failure—the 8 million jobs shed 

following the Wall Street crash—vastly exceed any negative job impacts plausibly 

linked to regulation. 

Recognizing the regulatory failure underpinning the current jobs crisis suggests 

not only that a regulatory freeze will not contribute to or enable job growth, but 

that it risks imperiling our economy. An unregulated or under-regulated Wall Street 

will strongly tend to another crash, presenting the prospect of another major recession. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, to be sure, 

was an inadequate response to the crash—most notably in its failure to more aggressively confront the problem of too-big-to-fail financial institutions—but blocking 

implementation of Dodd-Frank or adoption of other financial regulations would be 

an invitation for the financial sector to engineer more mass rip-offs of consumers 

and make our economy more vulnerable to another job-devastating crash. 

There is by now a very considerable literature, and a very extensive Congressional 

hearing record, that documents in granular detail the ways in which regulatory failure led to financial crash and the onset of the Great Recession. ‘‘Widespread failures 

in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets,’’ concluded the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. ‘‘The 

sentries were not at their posts, in no small part due to the widely accepted faith 

in the self-correcting nature of the markets and the ability of financial institutions 

to effectively police themselves. More than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on 

self-regulation by financial institutions, championed by former Federal Reserve 

Chairman Alan Greenspan and others, supported by successive administrations and 

Congresses, and actively pushed by the powerful financial industry at every turn, 

had stripped away key safeguards, which could have helped avoid catastrophe. This 

approach had opened up gaps in oversight of critical areas with trillions of dollars 

at risk, such as the shadow banking system and over-the-counter derivatives markets. In addition, the government permitted financial firms to pick their preferred 

regulators in what became a race to the weakest supervisor.’’ 30

Here I highlight just a few of the regulatory failures that contributed to the financial crash, by way of illuminating the need for a robust financial regulatory system 

that prevents excessive concentration and interconnection among firms, protects 

consumers, promotes transparency and facilitates systemic stability. 

Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. The Financial Services Modernization Act of 

1999 formally repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (also known as the Banking 

Act of 1933) and related laws, which prohibited commercial banks from offering investment banking and insurance services. The 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall helped 

create the conditions in which banks created and invested in creative financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps, investment 

gambles that rocked the financial markets in 2008. More generally, the Depressionera conflicts and consequences that Glass-Steagall was intended to prevent reemerged once the Act was repealed. The once staid commercial banking sector 

quickly evolved to emulate the risk-taking attitude and practices of investment 

banks, with disastrous results. ‘‘The most important consequence of the repeal of 

Glass-Steagall was indirect—it lay in the way repeal changed an entire culture,’’ 

notes economist Joseph Stiglitz. ‘‘When repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment 

and commercial banks together, the investment-bank culture came out on top. There 

was a demand for the kind of high returns that could be obtained only through high 

leverage and big risk taking.’’ 31

Unregulated Financial Derivatives. The 2008 crash proved Warren Buffet’s 

warning that financial derivatives represent ‘‘weapons of mass financial destruction’’ 

to be prescient.32 Financial derivatives amplified the financial crisis far beyond the 

unavoidable troubles connected to the popping of the housing bubble. AIG made aggressive bets on credit default swaps (CDSs) that went bad with the housing bust, 

and led to a taxpayer-financed rescue of more than $130 billion. AIG was able to 

put itself at such risk because its CDS business was effectively subject to no governVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
36 

33 After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, Born issued a new call to regulate 

financial derivatives. ‘‘This episode should serve as a wake-up call about the unknown risks that 

the over-the-counter derivatives market may pose to the U.S. economy and to financial stability 

around the world,’’ Born told the House Banking Committee two days later. ‘‘It has highlighted 

an immediate and pressing need to address whether there are unacceptable regulatory gaps relating to hedge funds and other large OTC derivatives market participants.’’ But what should 

have been a moment of vindication for Born was swept aside by her adversaries, and Congress 

enacted a six-month moratorium on any CFTC action regarding derivatives or the swaps market. In May 1999, Born resigned in frustration. Born, B. (1998). Testimony of Brooksley Born, 

Chairperson, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Concerning Long-Term Capital Management Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Banking and Financial Services. 

Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/opaborn-35.htm. 34Faoila, A., Nakashima, E., & Drew, J. (2008, October 15). What Went Wrong. The Washington Post. Retrieved 24 February 2012, from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/ 

2008/10/14/ST2008101403344.html 35Tyson, J., Torres, C., & Vekshin, A. (2007, March 22). Fed Says It Could Have Acted Sooner 

on Subprime Rout. Bloomberg. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.bloomberg.com/ 

apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a1.KbcMbvIiA&refer=home 36Torres, C., & Vekshin, A. (2007, March 14). Fed, OCC Publicly Chastised Few Lenders During boom. Bloomberg. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 

news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6WTZifUUH7g&refer=us 37Li, W., & Ernst, K. (2006). The Best Value in the Subprime Market: State Predatory Lending 

Reforms. Center for Responsible Lending. Retrieved 24 February, 2012 from http:// 

www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/StateEffectsToolkit.pdf 

mental regulation or even oversight. That was because first, high officials in the 

Clinton administration and the Federal Reserve, including SEC Chair Arthur 

Levitt, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence 

Summers and Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, blocked the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) from regulating financial derivatives;33 and second, because Congress and President Clinton codified regulatory inaction with passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which enacted a statutory prohibition on CFTC regulation of financial derivatives. 

The SEC’s Voluntary Regulation Regime for Investment Banks. In 1975, 

the SEC’s trading and markets division promulgated a rule requiring investment 

banks to maintain a debt-to-net capital ratio of less than 12 to 1. It forbade trading 

in securities if the ratio reached or exceeded 12 to 1, so most companies maintained 

a ratio far below it. In 2004, however, the SEC succumbed to a push from the big 

investment banks—led by Goldman Sachs, and its then-chair, Henry Paulson—and 

authorized investment banks to develop their own net capital requirements in accordance with standards published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 

This essentially involved complicated mathematical formulas that imposed no real 

limits, and was voluntarily administered. With this new freedom, investment banks 

pushed borrowing ratios to as high as 40 to 1, as in the case of Merrill Lynch. This 

super-leverage not only made the investment banks more vulnerable when the housing bubble popped, it enabled the banks to create a more tangled mess of derivative 

investments—so that their individual failures, or the potential of failure, became 

systemic crises. On September 26, 2008, as the crisis became a financial meltdown 

of epic proportions, SEC Chair Christopher Cox, who spent his entire public career 

as a deregulator, conceded ‘‘the last six months have made it abundantly clear that 

voluntary regulation does not work.’’ 34

Failure to Prevent Predatory Lending. Preventing predatory lending practices would not have prevented the housing bubble and the subsequent financial 

meltdown, but it would have taken some air out of the bubble and softened the economic crisis—and it would have saved millions of families and communities across 

the country from economic ruin. Predatory lending was easily avoidable through 

sound regulation, but regulators failed to act. On the one hand, regulators failed to 

use then-existing authority to crack down on abusive lending practices. The Federal 

Reserve took three formal actions against subprime lenders from 2002 to 2007.35

The Office of Comptroller of the Currency, with authority over almost 1,800 banks, 

took three consumer-protection enforcement actions from 2004 to 2006.36 On the 

other hand, federal regulators refused to issue appropriate regulatory rules to stem 

predatory lending, despite persistent advocacy by consumer groups. By way of contrast, action at the state level showed that predatory lending rules could significantly limit abusive loans.37

Poorly Regulated Credit Ratings Firms. The credit rating firms enabled pension funds and other institutional investors to enter the securitized asset game, by 

attaching high ratings to securities that actually were high risk—as subsequent 

events revealed. The credit ratings firms have a bias toward offering favorable ratVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
37 

38The CEO of Moody’s reported in a confidential presentation that his company is ‘‘continually 

‘pitched’ by bankers’’ for the purpose of receiving high credit ratings and that sometimes ‘‘we 

‘drink the Kool-Aid.’ ’’ A former managing director of credit policy at Moody’s testified before 

Congress that, ‘‘Originators of structured securities [e.g., banks] typically chose the agency with 

the lowest standards,’’ allowing banks to engage in ‘‘rating shopping’’ until a desired credit rating was achieved. The agencies made millions on mortgage-backed securities ratings and, as one 

member of Congress said, ‘‘sold their independence to the highest bidder.’’ Banks paid large 

sums to the ratings companies for advice on how to achieve the maximum, highest quality rating. ‘‘Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters,’’ a Standard & Poor’s employee candidly revealed in an internal email obtained by congressional investigators. 

Other evidence shows that the firms adjusted ratings out of fear of losing customers. For example, an internal email between senior business managers at one of the three ratings companies calls for a ‘‘meeting’’ to ‘‘discuss adjusting criteria for rating CDOs [collateralized debt obligations] of real estate assets this week because of the ongoing threat of losing deals.’’ In another 

email, following a discussion of a competitor’s share of the ratings market, an employee of the 

same firm states that aspects of the firm’s ratings methodology would have to be revisited in 

order to recapture market share from the competing firm. 

See, Weissman, R., & Donahue, J. (2009, March). Sold Out: How Wall Street and Washington 

Betrayed America. Essential Information and Consumer Education Foundation. Retrieved 24 

February, 2012, from http://wallstreetwatch.org/reports/soldlout.pdf 39 American Public Health Association. (2010, November 30). APHA Commends Senate for 

Passing Strong Food Safety Legislation. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http:// 

www.makeourfoodsafe.org/tools/assets/files/APHAlSenate-Passage-Food-ActlFINAL2.pdf 40 NHTSA’s vehicle safety standards have reduced the traffic fatality rate from nearly 3.5 fatalities per 100 million vehicles traveled in 1980 to 1.41 fatalities per 100 million vehicles traveled in 2006. Steinzor, R., & Shapiro, S. (2010). The People’s Agents and the Battle to Protect 

the American Public: Special Interests, Government, and Threats to Health, Safety, and the Environment: University of Chicago Press. 41 Clean Air Act rules saved 164,300 adult lives in 2010. In February 2011, EPA estimated 

that by 2020 they will save 237,000 lives annually. EPA air pollution controls saved 13 million 

days of lost work and 3.2 million days of lost school in 2010, and EPA estimates that they will 

save 17 million work-loss days and 5.4 million school-loss days annually by 2020. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation. (2011, March). The Benefits and Costs 

of the Clean Air and Radiation Act from 1990 to 2020. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from http:// 

www.epa.gov/oar/sect812/feb11/fullreport.pdf. 

ings to new instruments because of their complex relationships with issuers,38 and 

their desire to maintain and obtain other business dealings with issuers. This institutional failure and conflict of interest might and should have been forestalled by 

the SEC, but the Credit Rating Agencies Reform Act of 2006 gave the SEC insufficient oversight authority. In fact, under the Act, the SEC was required to give an 

approval rating to credit ratings agencies if they adhered to their own standards— 

even if the SEC knew those standards to be flawed. 

For purposes of evaluating the Regulatory Freeze and Jobs Act, the details of the 

regulatory failures that led to financial crash and Great Recession are less important than two overarching points: first, the cause of the current jobs crisis was too 

little regulation and too little enforcement, not too much regulation; and second, legislation that impedes financial regulators from issuing rules to control an overly 

complex, centralized and reckless financial sector risks enabling another financial 

meltdown with the attendant devastating jobs impact. 

III. REGULATORY PROTECTIONS MAKE OUR COUNTRY STRONGER, SAFER AND MORE JUST

Health, safety, environmental, financial and other regulatory protections make 

our country stronger, safer and more just. The Regulatory Freeze and Jobs Act 

would impede our ability to strengthen our nation, adjust to changing problems and 

technologies, act on new evidence of harms and threats to public and environmental 

well-being, and leave our country more vulnerable to economic shocks like the Great 

Recession. 

As discussed above, one underlying premise of the Act that we believe mistaken 

is that regulation impedes job creation. Another premise that we believe deeply misplaced is that the country can afford a lengthy regulatory moratorium. 

Rhetorical debates and cost-benefit abstractions can obscure the dramatic gains 

our country has made due to regulation. Regulation has: 

• Made our food safer.39

• Saved tens of thousands of lives by making our cars safer.40

• Made it safer to breathe, saving hundreds of thousands of lives annually.41

38 

42 EPA regulations phasing out lead in gasoline helped reduce the average blood lead level 

in U.S. children ages 1 to 5. During the years 1976 to 1980, 88 percent of all U.S. children had 

blood levels in excess of 10μg/dL; during the years 1991 to 1994, only 4.4 percent of all U.S. 

children had blood levels in excess of that dangerous amount. Office of Management and Budget, 

Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. (2011). 2011 Report to Congress on the Benefits 

and Costs of Federal Regulations an Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities. 

Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/ 

2011lcb/2011lcbalreport.pdf 43 National Council on Disability. (2007). The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 

Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2007/07262007 44There are important exceptions to the child labor prohibition; significant enforcement failures regarding the minimum wage, child labor and length of work week (before time and a half 

compensation is mandated). But the quality of improvement in American lives has nonetheless 

been dramatic. Lardner, J. (2011). Good Rules: 10 Stories of Successful Regulation. Demos. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 

goodrulesl1l11.pdf 45Deaths on the job have declined from more than 14,000 per year in 1970, when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration was created to under 4,500 at present. See AFL–CIO 

Safety and Health Department. (2011, April). Death on the Job: The Toll of Neglect. Retrieved 

23 February, 2012, from http://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memorial/upload/dotjl2011.pdf Mining deaths fell by half shortly after creation of the Mine Safety and Health Administration. 

Weeks, J. L., & Fox, M. (1983). Fatality rates and regulatory policies in bituminous coal mining, 

United States, 1959–1981. American journal of public health, 73(11), 1278. 46Through regulations facilitating effective implementation of the Drug Price Competition and 

Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (‘‘Hatch-Waxman’’), including by limiting the ability of 

brand-name pharmaceutical companies to extend and maintain government-granted monopolies. 

Troy, D. E. (2003). Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (HatchWaxman Amendments). Statement before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Retrieved 23 

February, 2012, from http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115033.htm 47See 16 CFR 410–460. 48See Stiglitz, J. E. (2010). Freefall: America, free markets, and the sinking of the world economy: WW Norton & Co Inc.; Kuttner, R. (2008). The Squandering of America: how the failure 

of our politics undermines our prosperity: Vintage. 

• Protected children’s brain development by phasing out leaded gasoline and 

dramatically reducing average blood levels.42

• Empowered disabled persons by giving them improved access to public facilities and workplace opportunities, through implementation of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act.43

• Guaranteed a minimum wage, ended child labor and established limits on the 

length of the work week.44

• Saved the lives of thousands of workers every year.45

• Saved consumers and taxpayers billions of dollars by facilitating generic competition for medicines.46

• Protected the elderly and vulnerable consumers from a wide array of unfair 

and deceptive advertising techniques.47

• For half a century in the mid-twentieth century, and until the onset of financial deregulation, provided financial stability and a right-sized financial sector, helping create the conditions for robust economic growth and shared prosperity.48

These are not just the achievements of a bygone era. Regulation continues to improve the quality of life for every American, every day. Ongoing and emerging problems and a rapidly changing economy require the issuance of new rules to ensure 

that America is strong and safe, healthy and wealthy. Consider a small sampling 

of rules recently issued, pending, or that are or should be under consideration, but 

which would likely be (or would have been) blocked for a half a decade or more by 

the Regulatory Freeze and Jobs Act: 

• Fuel efficiency standards. Pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation 

Act, the Energy Independence and Security Act and the Clean Air Act, the 

National Highway Safety and Transportation Agency and the Environmental 

Protection Agency have proposed new automobile and vehicular fuel efficiency 

standards. The new rules, on an average industry fleet-wide basis for cars 

and trucks combined, establish standards of 40.1 miles per gallon (mpg) in 

model year 2021, and 49.6 mpg in model year 2025. The agencies estimate 

that fuel savings will far outweigh higher vehicle costs, and that the net benefits to society from 2017–2025 will be in the range of $311 billion to $421 billion. The auto industry was integrally involved in the development of these 

proposed standards, and supports their promulgation. The Regulatory Freeze 

moratorium would prevent the adoption of the new fuel efficiency standards. 

39 

49List of Regulatory Actions Currently Under Review. Available at: http://www.reginfo.gov/ 

public/jsp/EO/eoDashboard.jsp 50 U.S. Department of Energy. (2007). Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 Prescribed Standards. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliancelstandards/m/eisa2007.html 51Federal Trade Commission. (28 November 2011). Rule Concerning Disclosures Regarding 

Energy Consumption and Water Use of Certain Home Appliances and Other Products Required 

Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (‘‘Appliance Labeling Rule’’). Federal Register. 

Vol. 76, No. 228. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from http://ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2011/11/ 

111118appliancelabelingfrn.pdf 52 U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. (2007). Preliminary Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis of the Preliminary Draft Standard for Occupational Exposure to Beryllium. 

While industry might adopt some fuel efficiency improvements in the absence 

of regulation, such a supposition is speculative and not supported by recent 

decades’ history, and it’s a virtual certainty that overall fuel efficiency performance will be substantially worse in the absence of new regulation. The 

costs would be high not just to the environment and human health, but to 

consumer pocketbooks. Our economy will be more efficient and stronger with 

the rules in place. 

• Food safety rules. In 2010, with support from both industry and consumer 

groups, and in response to a series of food contamination incidents that 

rocked the nation, Congress passed the Food Safety Modernization Act. The 

Act should improve the safety of eggs, dairy, seafood, fruits, vegetable and 

many processed and imported foods, but its effective implementation depends 

on rulemaking. FDA has proposed a series of implementing rules establishing 

food safety programs and standards. These are delayed at OMB—a problem 

in its own right—but would be put on hold for likely half a decade under the 

Regulatory Freeze legislation. As recent outbreaks of listeria in cantaloupe 

and other products evidence, such a delay will likely cost lives. Not so incidentally, it will also have major harmful economic impact on the agriculture 

and food industries and job creation and preservation in those industries. 

• Energy efficiency standards. Pursuant to the Energy Security and Independence Act, the Department of Energy currently has proposed energy efficiency standards for a range of products, including Department of Energy energy efficiency standards for a range of products, including Metal Halide 

Lamp Fixtures, Commercial Refrigeration Equipment, and Battery Chargers 

and External Power Supplies, Walk-In Coolers and Walk-In Freezers, Residential Clothes Washers.49 Under the Regulatory Freeze act, adoption of all 

of these standards would be delayed for a half decade. Such a delay would 

injure the U.S. economy and undermine job creation. The Department of Energy estimates the net savings from implementation of the Energy Security 

and Independence Act to be $48 billion—$105 billion (in 2007 dollars).50

Meanwhile, the Federal Trade Commission is undertaking a labeling rulemaking on energy efficiency, to protect consumers from misleading and deceptive claims about energy savings from product purchases.51 This would likely 

be caught in the Regulatory Freeze act net, with consumers significantly 

harmed and no plausible beneficial impact on job creation or maintenance. 

• Rules to avert workplace hazards. By way of example, consider the case 

of beryllium, a toxic substance to which workers in the electronics, nuclear, 

and metalwork sector are exposed. The current OSHA beryllium standard, 

based on science from the 1950s, allows workers to be exposed at levels that 

are ten times higher than those allowed by Department of Energy for nuclear 

power plant workers. Public Citizen petitioned OSHA to update the standard 

in 2001. In response, the agency began a rulemaking in November 2002. It 

is a testament to major problems in the regulatory process that OSHA has 

still not issued appropriate rules. OSHA’s estimates show that, if it were enacted nine years ago, the standard would have prevented 4,194 cases of 

chronic beryllium disease (a potentially fatal respiratory ailment), 5,413 cases 

of beryllium sensitization (a condition that often leads to chronic beryllium 

disease) and 216 cases of lung cancer.52 There is indeed very good reason 

under the current regime to be skeptical that this rule will be issued in the 

next five years, even as failure to act causes the loss of hundreds of lives 

among exposed workers and the long-existing health evidence should compel 

action. Under the Regulatory Freeze act, however, it is a certainty that the 

rule would not be issued; workers would needlessly be exposed to dangerous 

beryllium levels, and many would die or become seriously sick as a result. A 

40 

53 National Consumer Law Center. (2010). An Agenda for the Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau: Challenges for a New Era in Consumer Protection. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from 

http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/regulatorylreform/pr-cfpb-agenda.pdf 

number of other needed and pending OSHA rules would meet the same fate, 

with similar deadly consequences for workers. 

• Controls on Wall Street. As discussed above, the 2008 financial crash was 

a direct result of regulatory failures. These failures including inadequate regulation of mortgages and other consumer financial products, on the one hand, 

and esoteric financial products and the markets on which they trade, on the 

other. Another critical failure was permitting the rise of too-big-to-fail financial institutions, traceable both to the failure to enforce existing rules and 

policies, and the repeal and nonissuance of important rules. Few people are 

entirely satisfied with the Dodd-Frank legislation—Public Citizen is highly 

critical of a number of important omissions—but the Act does include an 

array of very important reforms that will make our financial system fairer 

and more stable—if properly implemented through robust rulemaking. To 

take three examples: 

• The Volcker Rule: While Dodd-Frank failed to revitalize the GlassSteagall separation between commercial and investment banking, or to 

break up the too-big-to-fail financial institutions, it does include the consequential Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule aims to prohibit institutions regulated under the Bank Holding Company Act (now including the largest remaining traditional investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) from engaging in proprietary trading—the kind of activity that exposes 

taxpayer-protected depository institutions to excessive risk, creates institutional complexity and conflicts of interest, and heightens the fragility and 

riskiness of both individual institutions and the overall financial system. 

The Volcker Rule is perhaps Dodd-Frank’s most important provision to contain the size of too-big-to-fail institutions and reduce systemic complexity 

and risk. The provision could not be implemented under the Regulatory 

Freeze act. 

• Consumer protections: Dodd-Frank created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, charging the agency with the single mission of protecting 

consumers and empowering it to issue new consumer protection rules. 

Given the very considerable extent to which the financial industry has constructed a business model around trickery and unjust fees, there are many 

potential rules that it may issue. These may concern matters including: requiring mortgage lenders to consider borrowers’ ability to pay; prohibiting 

banks from charging excessive overdraft fees or tricking consumers into 

opting in to unreasonable overdraft fee harvesting schemes; eliminating 

forced arbitration provisions in consumer financial contracts; banning unfair practices in the payday loan industry; prohibiting kickbacks to auto 

dealers who steer buyers into overpriced loans; stopping student loan companies from tricking students into taking high-priced private loans before 

they exhaust cheaper federal loans.53 Under the Regulatory Freeze act, the 

CFPB would be shackled from advancing these needed consumer protections. 

• Position limits in commodities markets: Consumers are rightfully 

angry about rising prices for gasoline. There are many factors explaining 

the rise in price, and some of them cannot be addressed by governmental 

action. But some can. Speculation on the oil commodity markets is likely 

responsible for 20 percent or more of the price of oil. Even Goldman Sachs 

suggests that legal speculation may be adding 65–70 cents to the price of 

a gallon of gasoline. Speculators, in other words, are imposing a private tax 

on us, with the proceeds of this Wall Street-imposed tax going to Wall 

Street interests, giant oil companies and foreign oil interests. Dodd-Frank 

instructed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to impose position 

limits on speculators, limiting the portion of the market that could be controlled by individual traders. The CFTC, unfortunately, has adopted an inadequate rule; and Wall Street interests have sued the agency to block implementation even of this inadequate rule. Under the Regulatory Freeze 

act, however, we would be forced to accept the Wall Street-imposed private 

tax for 5 years, at very significant cost to consumers, the overall economy 

and job creation. 

41 

54 Consumer Federation of America. (2011, June 28). Senators, CPSC, Consumer Advocates 

Applaud Strong Crib Safety Standards to Prevent Infant Deaths and Injuries. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/crib-standards-press-release-6-28-11.pdf 55 U.S. Product Safety Commission. (2011, June 27). Statement of Commissioner Nancy Nord 

On The Vote To Extend The Compliance Date For The New Crib Standard. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http://www.cpsc.gov/pr/nord06272011.pdf The crib standard is only the second 

major rule issued by this agency in its entire history. (A major rule has an impact on the economy of over $100 million. The only other CPSC major rule dealt with the flammability of mattresses.) 56Fish and Wildlife Service. (24 September 2010). Migratory Bird Hunting; Late Seasons and 

Bag and Possession Limits for Certain Migratory Game Birds. Federal Register. Retrieved 23 

Continued 

• Generic competition for biotech medicines. An overlooked component of 

the Affordable Care Act was the creation of a process for the Food and Drug 

Administration to grant regulatory approval for generic biologic pharmaceutical products—essentially generic versions of biotech medicines. Because 

the molecular composition of biologic drugs is more complicated than traditional medicines, FDA had adopted the position that, with some exceptions, 

it could not grant regulatory approval for biologics under its previously existing authority. In an important provision of the Affordable Care Act—supported by the biotech industry—FDA was explicitly granted such authority. 

The provision wrongly grants extended monopolies to brand-name biologic 

manufacturers, but belated generic competition is better than none. Implementation of the new regulatory pathway for biogenerics, however, depends 

on issuance of rules by the FDA. Under the Regulatory Freeze act, FDA 

would likely be prevented from such action for a half a decade, pointlessly 

and needlessly costing consumers and taxpayers billions of dollars. 

• Crib safety. Pursuant to the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 

2008, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) finalized updated 

safety standards for cribs that halted the manufacture and sale of traditional 

drop-side cribs, required stronger mattress supports, more durable hardware 

and regular safety testing. These new crib safety standards mean ‘‘that parents, grandparents, and caregivers can now shop for cribs with more confidence—confidence that the rules put the safety of infants above all else.’’ 54

Under the Regulatory Freeze act, the CPSC would have been prevented from 

taking such action for half a decade, with the result that some families would 

have been experienced the preventable tragedy of a lost or seriously injured 

baby.55

In short, the costs of the Regulatory Freeze act would be very high. The act would 

forestall needed progress across the American panorama. If the legislation were 

made law, Americans would needlessly be exposed to more dangerous products; we 

would needlessly be forced to breathe dirtier air; we would needlessly be forced to 

spend more on gasoline; we would needlessly be subject to financial tricks and ripoffs; we would needlessly be forced to confront more hazardous conditions at work; 

we would needlessly pay more for biologic pharmaceuticals; we would needlessly be 

forced to live with a riskier financial system and a greater risk of another financial 

implosion; and much more. The act, in short, would weaken America. 

IV. A REGULATORY FREEZE WOULD IMPEDE EVERYDAY GOVERNMENTAL ACTION, 

INCLUDING ISSUANCE OF BIRD HUNTING RULES

The Regulatory Freeze for Jobs Act is vast in its scope, with implications perhaps 

exceeding the intentions of its drafters. A significant portion of the government’s 

work depends on rulemaking and regulation. As drafted, the legislation imposes a 

moratorium on all ‘‘significant regulatory actions’’ until unemployment drops to 6.0 

percent. Significant regulatory action is broadly defined, and the moratorium is subject to very limited exceptions: to combat ‘‘an imminent threat to health or safety 

or other emergency;’’ to enforce criminal laws; to ensure national security; or to comply with terms of an international trade agreement. 

Under this legislative rubric, many regulatory actions that do not fit the popular 

conception of ‘‘regulation’’ would be halted. Consider this selection of recent and prospective rules that would have been or will be affected: 

• Bird hunting. Every year, the Fish and Wildlife Service analyzes massive 

amounts of data and public comments to determine the appropriate bird 

hunting season for each state. The Migratory Bird Hunting; Late Seasons and 

Bag and Possession Limits for Certain Migratory Game Birds rule 56 tells 

42 

February, 2012, from: http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/09/24/2010-23754/migratorybird-hunting-late-seasons-and-bag-and-possession-limits-for-certain-migratory-game-birds 57See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense. (16 April 2010). Retroactive Stop Loss 

Special Pay Compensation. Federal Register. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from: 

http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/04/16/2010-8739/retroactive-stop-loss-special-paycompensation#p-29 58 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Veterans’ Diseases Associated with Agent Orange. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from: http://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/agentorange/diseases.asp 59 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. (31 August 2010). Diseases Associated with Exposure 

to Certain Herbicide Agents. Federal Register. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from: http:// 

www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/08/31/2010-21556/diseases-associated-with-exposure-to-certain-herbicide-agents-hairy-cell-leukemia-and-other-chronic#p-81 60 U.S Department of Homeland Security. (8 October 2010) Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee Schedule, GAO–11–104R. Retrieved 23 February, 

2012, from: http://www.gao.gov/decisions/majrule/d11104r.htm 61 U.S Department of Homeland Security. (20 August 2010) Department of Homeland Security, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA): Travel 

Promotion Fee and Fee for Use of the System, GAO–10–1010R. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, 

from: http://www.gao.gov/decisions/majrule/d101010r.htm 62 U.S. Department of Education. (23 November 2009). Student Assistance General Provisions; 

Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) Grant Program; Federal Pell Grant Program; Academic Competitiveness Grant Program and National Science and 

Mathematics Access to Retain Talent Grant Program. Federal Register. Retrieved 23 February 

2012, from: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-11-23/pdf/E9-28050.pdf 

hunters which birds they can hunt, how many of them they can take, where 

they can do it, and when the season begins. This is a significant regulatory 

action that would be caught in the Regulatory Freeze net. 

• Stop loss pay for service members. In 2009, Retroactive Stop Loss Special 

Pay Compensation 57 rule was implemented to pay back the debt we owe to 

soldiers who stayed for prolonged periods in Iraq and Afghanistan. This rule 

pays $500 per month of stop loss, and includes partial months. This is a significant regulatory action that would be caught in the Regulatory Freeze net. 

• Compensation for veterans. Agent Orange left many returning soldiers returning from Vietnam with lifelong debilitating illnesses. In 2010, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) expanded the list of ailments 58 attributable to 

Agent Orange and for which veterans could receive benefits. The VA also decided that it should create a schedule of back benefits for Vietnam veterans 

still suffering from these newly added diseases and for widows of sufferers. 

More than 85,000 Vietnam vets and their families will be eligible for these 

benefits.59 The rule written by the VA will give retroactive payments to sufferers of these newly added diseases and will allow 69,957 previously denied 

living veterans to receive payments that will greatly improve their living conditions. This is a significant regulatory action that would have been caught 

in the Regulatory Freeze net. 

• Medicare reimbursement rates. Every year, the Centers for Medicare & 

Medicaid Services publish new Medicare payment schedules for provision of 

medical care by physicians, hospitals, home health workers and others. These 

schedules are significant regulatory actions that would be caught in the Regulatory Freeze net. 

• Immigration visas and fees. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security issued a new fee schedule for visas and immigrant benefits 60, and adopted a fee for travel authorizations for nonimmigrant aliens entering the United 

States under a visa waiver program.61 This schedule is a significant regulatory action that would have been caught in the Regulatory Freeze net. 

• Pell grants. In 2009, the Department of Education issued new regulations 

concerning eligibility and other rules relating to the issuance of Pell, TEACH, 

Academic Competitiveness and National Science and Mathematics to Retain 

Talent and other grants. These regulations are significant regulatory actions 

that would have been caught in the Regulatory Freeze net.62

• Pharmaceutical approval standards. Every five years, Congress reauthorizes the Prescription Drug and User Fee Act (PDUFA), which establishes the 

framework for Food and Drug Administration approval of new medicines and 

for the level of user fees to be paid by industry for FDA review, as well as 

the Medical Device User Fee Act, which functions similarly for medical devices. Both acts are set to be reauthorized this year. Implementation of the 

legislation, which historically has been supported by the regulated industries 

and is formally negotiated with industry, depends on FDA regulation. Such 

43 

63 U.S Department of Health and Human Services. (1 August 2011). Prescription Drug User 

Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2012. Federal Register. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from http:// 

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-08-01/pdf/2011-19332.pdf 64 U.S. Department of Justice. (3 February 2011). National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and 

Respond to Prison Rape. Federal Register. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from: http:// 

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-02-03/pdf/2011-1905.pdf 65 49 CFR Ch. 111, Part 390 (1 October 2011). Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; General. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title49-vol5/pdf/ 

CFR-2011-title49-vol5-part390.pdf 66Proposed rule can be found at: U.S. Department of Labor. Wage and Hour Division. (15 February 2012.) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 CFR Part 825 RIN 1215—AB76, RIN 1235— 

AA03. The Family and Medical Leave Act. Federal Register. Retrieved 23 February, 2012, from: 

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2012-0001-0001 67See, for example, the Dangerous Products Warning Act, H.R. 322, introduced by Rep. John 

Conyers. 

regulation likely would be a significant regulatory action that would be 

caught in the Regulatory Freeze net.63

• Preventing prison rape. Pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 

2003, the Attorney General has proposed rules that aim to prevent prison 

rape. This regulation is a significant regulatory action that would be caught 

in the Regulatory Freeze net (although it might conceivably be subject to a 

waiver if the president determined it necessary to enforce criminal laws).64

• Medical examiner registry. Pursuant to the most recent transportation act, 

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration aims to propose a rule to establish a national registry of certified medical examiners responsible for certifying that truck drivers meet physical qualification standards. This regulation 

would be a significant regulatory action that would be caught in the Regulatory Freeze net.65

• Family and medical leave for military service personnel. The Department of Labor is proposing rules to ensure the Family and Medical Leave Act 

is applied fairly to military service personnel. This regulation would be a significant regulatory action that would be caught in the Regulatory Freeze 

net.66

These examples highlight the overreach of the Regulatory Freeze act. As the regulatory policy debate has heated up, perhaps some of the more textured understanding of how regulation works in practice—and its centrality to government carrying out its core functions—has been lost. As drafted, the Regulatory Freeze act 

would halt a wide range of governmental programs and initiatives not likely to be 

the target of the legislation’s supporters. However, there is no obvious fix to this 

problem; it is a direct result of the ill-advised broad brush approach of the legislation. 

V. STRENGTHENING THE SYSTEM OF REGULATORY SAFEGUARDS

TO STRENGTHEN AMERICA

To say that it would be a grave error to impose a 5-year moratorium on regulation 

is not to say that all is well with the regulatory system. It is in need of substantial 

reform to ensure that it serves the broad public interest, not the narrow commercial 

interests of regulated corporations. Many of the high-profile examples of regulatory 

failure in recent years—the Wall Street crash, the BP oil disaster, the Massey mine 

explosion, and others—evidence both the need for stronger rules to limit corporate 

wrongdoing, and stronger enforcement of existing rules. Those examples of regulatory failure also highlight the very serious problem of regulated industries exerting undue influence over the regulatory process itself. 

Congress could meaningfully improve the functioning of the regulatory system by 

working to ensure stronger enforcement of existing rules. In too many cases, it pays 

for corporations to violate the law, because penalties for regulatory violations are 

too small. As one step forward, Congress should act to make it a crime for businesses to recklessly expose consumers or workers to deadly products or working conditions.67 Congress should also increase the enforcement budgets of regulatory agencies, and hold those agencies accountable for enforcing the law. And citizens should 

be given some direct authority to enforce regulatory standards, loosely following the 

model of the False Claims Act. 

Congress should also prioritize addressing the problem of regulatory capture and 

excessive corporate influence over the regulatory process. Too many agencies are too 

cozy with the industries they are supposed to regulate. These relationships undermine effective rulemaking and enforcement, and fuel public frustration with our 

government. Progress could be made in addressing regulatory capture and undue inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
44 

68The Center for Progressive Reform has documented that OIRA meets with regulated parties 

five times more frequently than with public interest representatives; and that rules that were 

the subject of meetings were 29 percent more likely to be changed during the review than those 

that were not the subject of meetings. Steinzor, R., Patoka, M., & Goodwin, J. (2011). Behind 

Closed Doors at the White House: How Politics Trumps Protection of Public Health, Worker Safety, and the Environment. Center for Progressive Reform. Retrieved 24 February, 2012, from 

http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/OIRAlMeetingsl1111.pdf 

dustry influence with stronger revolving door (and reverse revolving door) rules for 

regulators. Another positive step would be to prevent regulated parties from meeting with staff at the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) about pending rules, or to adopt new rules relating to 

such meetings.68

It is not the position of Public Citizen that all is well with the regulatory process. 

But for all its flaws, the regulatory system has made, and continues to make, our 

country stronger, safer and more prosperous. We need to improve the regulatory 

system, not bring new rulemaking to a halt. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. We try to 

apply the 5-minute rule to ourselves as well. So if you can keep 

your responses terse, that would help us beat the red-light illumination. The gentleman from Tennessee. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask 

Professor Taylor first. We have had great periods of commercial 

success, and bullish periods. The Clinton years were very economically robust. Did we have regulations during that time period? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Absolutely, we had regulations. 

Mr. COHEN. And they didn’t impede job growth, did they? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I think one thing that is very important about 

the period of the—I referred to in the early 1980’s, was, there was 

a huge movement there to try to deregulate certain industries. The 

mode began in the Carter administration, and the airlines, and 

Fred Kahn. There was an effort to try to rationalize regulations. 

There was an effort to try to deal with regulatory capture. The important work done by economists like Stigler, who won a Nobel 

Prize, pointed out this regulatory capture, and that enabled the deregulation movement of many industries to occur. 

Mr. COHEN. Do you think that the deregulation of airlines is a 

good thing? Have you traveled lately? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I think that deregulation of airlines is a good thing, 

because I can travel across the country at a much lower rate than 

I could at that time, and there is other reasons too. 

Mr. COHEN. You don’t travel our of Memphis, sir. When you are 

a hub town, and you are basically a company town, we have got 

the highest rates of any place in the country. And back when you 

had Northwest and you had Southern, and you had Republic, and 

you had Delta, and you had American, and you had TWA, and you 

had Fly Eastern, and you know, any of those folks, you had competition. That kept prices down. That is America’s competition. Deregulation, I would submit, has not been the panacea that some 

thought it was—during the 1990’s, and regulations didn’t impede 

that expansionism, did it not? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I think when you have a lack of enforcement of antitrust or a competition policy you are going to get problems like 

this. And of course, there are some routes now where there is very 

high prices. So I think the advantage of deregulating, when you 

don’t need deregulations, is you let the markets work and the 

45 

prices are determined and there the new routes that would not 

have existed if there had not been the regulation. Now, to answer 

your question, because I think in some sense, what happened in 

the 1980’s, is an example of what can happen if you try to more 

rationalize these regulations more than we have been doing recently. 

We are now, in my view, moving in the other direction. And the 

fear that many businesses, economists have, that that moving of 

the direction is actually holding us back. Again, this recovery—— 

Mr. COHEN. A great example of what you are promoting or suggesting is that we drop the regulations, we are going to have this 

business boon, because businesses will be certain, is what you are 

saying. 

Mr. TAYLOR. No, I don’t want to drop regulations. Excuse me—— 

Mr. COHEN. Well, you would until the rates got down to 6 percent, until the unemployment rate gets to 6 percent under this bill, 

would it not be a moratorium on regulations? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Seems to me this bill is a freeze, while we have this 

terrible problem with recovery. After the freeze, you should put in 

the kind of reforms that have been discussed by my colleagues. I 

would believe that is something that you should rule on right now. 

Mr. COHEN. And I understand what you are saying, Professor 

Taylor, and I respect you. I think you have a tremendous background, and you are acclaimed, and I can’t compete with you really. 

But you know, I just had an Aspen Institute seminar on China. 

China has got this great booming economy. It is unbelievable what 

they are doing. But they have like no regulations. And children 

have got insects—or not insects, but some type of substances in 

their intestines to where they can’t absorb their food because they 

are eating food that is not well-regulated and it is not safe food, 

and the air is awful, and the conditions in China—so if you had 

to take away regulations, how do you make up for it when you put 

all of that in the air, or have those children that don’t get any nutrition because you don’t have regulations. And we have the same 

thing here with air quality, and food quality, et cetera. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Seems to me that this bill here, allows for a lot of 

exceptions for things that have been mentioned already. The intent 

is for this to be temporary, or a period where people can take a 

breather, a time out, assess whether this is damaging the economy. 

And the issues you are raising, obviously, everyone wants to have 

a way to regulate in a sensible way. There is an important role for 

regulation in an economy. Economists have ways to describe when 

you should regulate, when you shouldn’t. There is a cost-benefit 

analysis, I think the cost-benefit analysis should be done in a little 

more independent way than it is now. 

Mr. COHEN. I thank you for your testimony. My time is about to 

run out. Professor Meltzer, I am going to follow up on the question 

that I think was attempted to ask you. Duke, UCLA? Who do you 

pull for? 

Mr. MELTZER. Pardon me? 

Mr. COHEN. Duke, UCLA? Who do you pull for? Who is your basketball team? 

Mr. MELTZER. Toss a coin. 

46 

Mr. COHEN. Toss a coin. I got you. Thank you, I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentlemen. Mr. Taylor, what do you 

mean by the uncertainty that arises from new regulatory authority, 

such as from the Administration’s health care and financial reform 

legislation? How can this uncertainty, as you say, hold back investment and firm expansion and how does this, in turn, affect job creation. 

Mr. MELTZER. I think that is to me? 

Mr. COBLE. No, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So, the financial firm regulations, now they are 

writing the rules. In normal periods, the Federal Reserve and other 

regulatory agencies would have a period of time to write rules. 

Now, they have roughly 200 they have to write. An example is the 

so-called Volcker rule, which was in the legislation, well-intentioned, to try to reduce the risk-taking of the large financial institutions. But the implementation of those rules, or rulemakings, 300 

pages, there is thousands of pages of remarks put in place, so people don’t know how that is going to be applied. The banks don’t 

know how it is going to be applied. People who would compete with 

the banks don’t know how it is going to be applied. 

So that is a huge degree of uncertainty that that legislation is 

causing. And of course, the alternatives, simply just to try to raise 

capital requirements on the financial institutions. So I think that 

is a big one in terms of giving an example of what you are looking 

for. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. Were you finished Mr. Taylor? I didn’t mean to cut you off. 

Mr. MELTZER. Were you finished? 

Mr. TAYLOR. It is off now. 

Mr. WEISSMAN. Were you finished with your answer? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Melter, you cite housing and the mortgage market as examples of how regulators are undermining recovery. Describe that in a little more detail, if you would. 

Mr. MELTZER. Well, on one day, the Administration says we want 

more mortgages issued. We really want the banks to issue more 

mortgages. A few days later, or even on the same day, some other 

agency of government sues the mortgage lenders for some practice 

that they had in the past. Now, they may have committed some 

egregious action, but that is not going to get more mortgages. So 

that creates uncertainty. Are there going to be more mortgages? 

Are we going to encourage the mortgage lenders to issue mortgages, or are we going to encourage the mortgage lenders to pay 

for the abuses, alleged abuses that occurred in the past? Is that 

going to get us more housing? No, it is not. It is going to get us 

less, fewer mortgages, and less housing. That is an example. Here 

is another example, if I may. 

We have just seen in the last couple of years the uncertainties 

created by the regulation that says women under 40, or at the age 

of 40, should not be given breast examinations. Well, the government is deciding that. Many women think that is not a good idea. 

The same thing is happening with contraceptives. The same thing 

is going to happen with the regulation, with hundreds of regulaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
47 

tions that are going to come down under the Health Care Act. The 

same thing is happening—the K Street lawyers are descending on 

the Administration agencies, like the Fed and Treasury, to get 

them to change the legislation. Even Mr. Volcker has complained 

about what is happening to the Volcker bill. Those are some of the 

uncertainties, and there are many, many of them. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, Professor. Mr. Weissman, some indicate 

that regulations do not inhibit job creation. And I am not—I probably don’t come down on that side. The President, in his State of 

the Union address, identified himself as a less prolific regulator 

than was President Bush. Can you square me on that? I mean, on 

the one hand, folks say that the regulations inhibit job creation, 

but yet the President claims that he is going to be a less prolific 

regulator. 

Mr. WEISSMAN. Well, as you know, Mr. Chairman, I don’t represent the Administration. However, I believe that the President’s 

position is, and I think it may have changed. At the time that he 

said that, I think that over the same time period he had issued 

fewer regulations than President Bush had. Be that as it may, I 

mean, obviously, the goal of issuing regulations is to advance social 

objectives, including financial protection, but not to issue regulations for regulations sake. And anyone can make up a regulation 

that would interfere with regular business operations, and I think 

the President was saying, look, we don’t make that. Our regulations are as careful as we can possibly do them. We go out of our 

way, which I believe to be true, to limit the impact and the complexity that we are imposing on business. There are surely examples where there is failure of that. But I think if you actually look 

at the regulations that are issued, and look especially at the rationales, the cost-benefit analysis, and so on, that are issued for those 

regulations, you have to be impressed with the care with which 

regulators generally put forward those rules. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, Mr. Cohen. I see that my red light has 

illuminated. The distinguished gentlemen from Georgia, Mr. Johnson. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Professor Meltzer. I see that you have 

been highly critical of the Federal Reserve’s decision to rescue AIG. 

Mr. MELTZER. Indeed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And was it—do you think it was because of regulations that AIG failed, or was it because of lack of regulation? 

Mr. MELTZER. I don’t think that regulation was a central issue. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Don’t you agree, though, that—— 

Mr. MELTZER. The regulation was a problem. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, you must then agree that it was the lack of 

regulation. 

Mr. MELTZER. No, I think that it—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what was it then? Either too much regulation, or not enough. 

Mr. MELTZER. The core problem was that both Administrations, 

that is, Republican and Democrat, believed that they were doing 

good things by encouraging housing for under-housed minorities. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let’s look at—is it a lack of regulation 

that—— 

Mr. MELTZER. No, the regulation—— 

48 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. That has gotten into problems? 

Mr. MELTZER. Mr. Johnson, there is an excellent book which I 

recommend to you by the—one of the editors of The New York 

Times, that goes through what happened when Jim Johnson, who 

had been the campaign chairman for Walter Mondale, became the 

head of an agency that was, at that time, 50 or 60 years old. The 

Federal—Fannie Mae. He then expanded Fannie Mae into doing 

many, many things that it had not done before, and he found—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Including, including—— 

Mr. MELTZER [continuing]. People in the private sector. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Including taking it out from under 

the Federal Government. 

Mr. MELTZER. Well, that happened in the Johnson administration. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I mean, so, now—— 

Mr. MELTZER. In the Johnson administration. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Let’s get our facts straight now. Tell me something. Do you still agree that Lehman Brothers should have been 

allowed to bite the dust? 

Mr. MELTZER. I am sorry, that who? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Lehman Brothers? 

Mr. MELTZER. Lehman. I believe that Lehman, we would have 

been better off if Lehman had gone into bankruptcy. That was fine. 

What we shouldn’t do—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. What about GM? 

Mr. MELTZER. What was a mistake—the mistake was not letting 

them go into bankruptcy. The mistake was that it had bailed out 

Bear Stearns, and that it convinced the people that the game was 

going to be played the way it usually was, and then suddenly, without any warning, the rules were changed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And there was a failure of regulatory authority basically, is what you are talking about. 

Mr. MELTZER. Yes, there was a failure. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Lack of regulations, in other words—— 

Mr. MELTZER. Not lack of regulation. It was the failure of the 

regulators. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, and you are not blaming any of that on 

President Obama, are you? 

Mr. MELTZER. No, President Obama had nothing to do with what 

happened in 2008. He was in the Senate at that time. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay, well, for 2 years. But Professor Taylor, you 

have indicted the current Administration, it would seem, for the 

lack of vitality in the recovery. In fact, you criticized the recovery 

as being kind of just piddling, I think you would agree to, but you 

would also agree with me, would you not, that there had been 27 

straight quarters of economic growth during the last 27 months? 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We have had 10 quarters of positive economic 

growth. The problem is the growth rate is only 2.4 percent. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, is that because of regulations, or is it because of Republican obstruction of the Congress, and the President’s initiatives to create a more stimulating environment? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The regulations are part of it, I believe. But in addition, you know, the stimulus packages and the cash for clunkers 

49 

and the first-time home buyers, which were all efforts to stimulate, 

I don’t think stimulated, but, in fact, had—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. How do you account for the 2.—how do you account for the 10.5 percent unemployment rate that has been reduced now to 8.5 under the Obama administration? How do you account for that? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, unfortunately, a big part of that is people 

dropping out of the labor force in unprecedented amounts. And 

I—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. It was under President Reagan, as soon as he 

came into office, that they changed the benchmarks for measuring 

unemployment insurance. Isn’t that—the unemployment rate. Isn’t 

that correct? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, this recent reduction in the labor force 

doesn’t—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. No, no, no, no. I am talking about changing the 

formula to determine who is employed, who is unemployed, and 

how much that rate is based on a number of different factors. That 

was changed as soon as President Reagan came into office to make 

his numbers look better, and now you are going to judge President 

Obama on the statistics that we have been relying upon since 1980, 

and that just doesn’t seem fair to me. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I don’t think the issue is measurement of the statistics. I think if you look at the growth rates of GDP. Again, GDP 

has grown 2.4 percent in this recovery, 5.9 percent in early recovery. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We didn’t have a obstruction of Congress, though, 

back then. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But I don’t think it is a partisan issue. I think it 

is a policy issue. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, sometimes it is political. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sometimes policies are good in different Administrations and sometimes they are bad. I do not think it is partisan. I 

have lots of examples where Republicans don’t follow good policy, 

lots of examples where Democrats follow good policy. And so I do 

not think this is partisan at all. I think it is a question of resolve 

to find the good policies. In the late 1990’s during the Clinton administration, we didn’t have all of these stimulus packages. We 

were able to reduce the role of the Federal Government in regulatory areas, and for that matter, for example, the welfare reform. 

I think if you go back into the 1970’s, a very poor time with the 

economy, Republicans, President Nixon, President Ford were there 

for part of that time. So I think it is a mistake to think of this as 

partisan. I honestly do. There are differences in the policy which 

can you learn from, and some work, and some don’t. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman’s time is expired. The distinguished 

gentlemen from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Coble. I would like to review with Attorney Weissman, the five points that he summarized 

against the conversation and interchange that we have had with 

our witnesses, and with the Members on the Subcommittee. The 

whole idea of strengthening the economy, creating jobs, safer— 

safer conditions for citizens, the unintended impeding of everyday 

government action, and the strengthening of America. 

50 

And the strengthening of America through regulatory safeguards. 

How has some of our discussion failed to take into consideration 

much, if not almost all of the points that you have made? 

Mr. WEISSMAN. Well, I think that the theory Professor Meltzer 

and Professor Taylor is that regulatory uncertainty is a significant 

problem for job creation and preservation. I think that is not true. 

And I think the best evidence for that is purely theoretical and almost philosophical, and existing empirical evidence doesn’t suggest 

it. And I think the discussion of concrete examples is very helpful 

for elaborating on that in a variety of ways. If you look at some 

of the examples that were highlighted, and I know they could point 

to others as well. The Volcker rule, for example is a very important 

regulation being proposed. I believe it has flaws too, for some of the 

reasons that Professors Meltzer and Taylor say. It is overly complicated. It would be much better if it was simpler. But it is a 

structural remedy for a very serious problem. 

It does, for sure, creates some uncertainty in the financial sector, 

but that doesn’t mean there is any connection to job creation. I 

don’t know what the story is about that. The standard for breast 

examinations, I am not even sure it constitutes a significant regulatory action as defined by the bill. I think one would be very hard 

placed to say how that has anything to do with economic uncertainty and job creation. The fact that the Justice Department is 

considering suing mortgage lenders for their rampant criminality 

in the mortgage market or that State AGs are doing that, first of 

all, is a positive thing. And it ultimately will be very important, I 

believe, for reducing principal owed, actually by mortgage borrowers, and expanding the economy. It has nothing to do with uncertainty in the economic market and impeding job creation. That 

is on the one hand. 

On the other hand, there is a failure to address what the bill 

would actually do. And what the bill would actually do is block for 

5 years with almost no relevant exceptions the issuance of new 

health, safety, environmental, and financial protections. It would 

also, not so trivially, undermine the ability of the government to do 

what it does on a day-to-day basis, including revamp the Medicare 

payment system every year. 

So I think there is a philosophy that I disagree with. There is 

a theoretical construct about what the bill would do and why it 

should be issued, and I think that is misguided and not supported 

by the evidence on the one hand. 

On the other hand, when you look at the actual details of what 

is at stake, you are looking at very serious things, both in the 

health safety environmental financial protection realm, traditionally what we think of regulation, but also a lot of what the government just does. I think it is a huge mistake out of a philosophical 

commitment to commit that error. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Meltzer, I would like to recognize you at this 

point. 

Mr. MELTZER. It isn’t what I say about uncertainty, the Harvard 

Business graduates, they are the people who make these decisions. 

They say this creates uncertainty, they say it deters hiring, that is 

their view. They are the people who do the hiring. I don’t hire anybody except one secretary. They hire hundreds of thousands of peoVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:19 Apr 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\COURTS\022712\72999.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
51 

ple. They are the leaders of American industry. They say it causes 

a problem. 

Second, I would like to say this bill does not prevent the Administration from doing anything that it believes is in the public interest. All it has to do under the bill is notify the Congress that that 

is what it is asking and then the Congress has a right as it should 

have, to make a judgment as to whether it prefers to do what the 

Administration is asking, or whether it prefers to avoid the regulation. It doesn’t hamper regulation. It is wrong to think of the bill 

as hampering regulation. It may delay regulation, but we have gotten along for hundreds of years without some of these regulations, 

so it is probable that we can survive very well for another 5 years. 

Mr. CONYERS. Could I ask for 2 additional minutes, sir? 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is allowed 2 additional minutes. 

Mr. CONYERS. And I would just like to return to Attorney 

Weissman because I haven’t heard anything about what Harvard 

said, with all due respect for Harvard, but let me yield to you for 

the last comments in this hearing. 

Mr. WEISSMAN. Well, I will avoid the impulse to make some comment about Jeremy Lin and the basketball team and things like 

that. I think that Professor Meltzer is misreading the bill. The bill 

provides for regulatory a regulatory freeze until unemployment hits 

6.0, that is it, that is the bill. 

Mr. CONYERS. You know—— 

Mr. WEISSMAN. There are exceptions that are permitted that is 

relatively routine for implementation of provisions required under 

international trade—legislation to implement international trade 

agreements. You could imagine that they would be easily granted 

in the case of national security as articulated in the legislation. But 

the requirement, as regards health and safety, is necessary because 

of an imminent threat to health or safety or other emergency. And 

there is quite a bit of jurisprudence on this, plus the plain language of the statute. Imminent threat means immediate, right now, 

something that has to be done to prevent something that is otherwise going to happen in a very near term with a high degree of certainty. That is just not why most regulation takes place. Take the 

example of food safety, we issue food safety rules usually because 

there has just been an outbreak of some problem, but not because 

we think it is about to happen again. 

You can go down the case of crib safety or auto safety or environmental protection or preventing another financial crisis, on and on, 

you go down the list—it will almost never meet the standard of an 

imminent threat to health or safety or other emergencies. I believe 

the proper interpretation of this bill is that will be a roughly 5-year 

moratorium on all health, safety, environmental, financial, et 

cetera, protections. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I thank you very much. And I think we need 

to examine the record as closely as we can, Chairman Coble, because there is a great discrepancy of interpretation about the measures as it has been brought forward. I thank you for the additional 

time. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman, without objection I want to 

enter into the record a letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

endorsing this bill. 

52 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Mr. COBLE. Gentlemen, thank you all for being with us, we appreciate your testimony today. Without objection, all Members will 

have 5 legislative days to submit to the Chair additional written 

questions for the witnesses, which we will forward and ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as they can do so with their answers 

that may be made a part of the record. 


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Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit any additional materials for inclusion in the record. And 

with that, again, I thank the witnesses and this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:11 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(55) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary 

Today’s hearing marks the ninth one held to date during this Congress on the 

subject of so-called ‘‘regulatory reform.’’ 

A common argument made by my friends on the other side of the aisle at nearly 

all of these hearings is that regulations somehow depress job creation. 

H.R. 4078, the ‘‘Regulatory Freeze for Jobs Act of 2012,’’ clearly attempts to link 

regulations with employment by preventing agencies from engaging in significant 

regulatory actions if the average monthly unemployment rate exceeds 6% in any 

quarter. 

Let me explain why H.R. 4078 represents the ultimate in legislative foolhardiness. 

First, the bill fails to acknowledge the fact that regulations play a critical role 

in ensuring the health and safety of Americans as well as to the economic well-being 

of our Nation. 

By imposing a moratorium on significant regulatory action, H.R. 4078 would prevent agencies from fulfilling the job that we in Congress entrusted them to do, 

namely, to ensure the safety of the foods we eat, the cars we drive, and the places 

where we work. 

As Cass Sunstein, who heads the agency charged with reviewing federal regulations, recently observed: 

‘‘A moratorium would not be a scalpel or a machete, it would be more like 

a nuclear bomb, in the sense that it would prevent regulations that . . . 

cost very little, and have very significant economic or public health benefits.’’ 

The proponents of this legislation could not possibly be intending to jeopardize the 

health and safety of Americans in order to pursue an anti-regulatory political agenda, but I’m afraid that would be the exact practical effect of H.R. 4078. 

Second, there is absolutely no credible evidence establishing that regulations 

have any substantive impact on job creation. 

Last year, the Majority’s own witness testified before this Subcommittee that the 

‘‘focus on jobs . . . can lead to confusion in regulatory debates’’ and that ‘‘the employment effects of regulation, while important, are indeterminate.’’ 

The truth is that regulations can, in fact, lead to job creation. And, here are just 

a few examples: 

• A pending regulation limiting the amount of airborne mercury will not just 

reduce the amount of seriously toxic pollutants, but create as many as 45,000 

temporary jobs and possibly 8,000 permanent jobs, as the New York Times 

noted last week. 

• Heightened vehicle emissions standards have spurred clean vehicle research, 

development and production efforts that, in turn, have already generated 

more than 150,000 jobs at 504 facilities in 43 states across the U.S. 

56 

It should, therefore, not come as a surprise that Bruce Bartlett, a former senior 

Republican Advisor in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations, says 

that there is ‘‘no hard evidence’’ that regulations stifle job creation and that it’s simply being ‘‘asserted as self-evident and repeated endlessly throughout the conservative echo chamber.’’ 

And, finally, this bill will result in greater, not less, business uncertainty. In 

fact, it will increase the cost of doing business. 

By its own terms, H.R. 4078 makes the regulatory process dependent on the national unemployment rate, which, as we all know, can fluctuate from quarter to 

quarter for any number of reasons, creating a tremendous amount of regulatory uncertainty for businesses. 

Factors that can depress employment include a devastating terrorist attack, a 

world-wide fuel shortage, or some cataclysmic natural disaster. 

So how is a company to plan in a regulatory regime that would start, then stop, 

and then at some indeterminate point re-start, and then possibly stop all over again, 

all as a result of outside events? 

Even if we were to accept the premise that regulatory uncertainty is currently a 

problem, there is no evidence that it is a significant problem. 

As Minority witness Professor Sidney Shapiro testified before this Subcommittee 

last year, ‘‘All of the available evidence contradicts the claim that regulatory uncertainty is deterring business investment.’’ 

This also explains why a July 2011 Wall Street Journal survey of business economists found that the ‘‘main reason U.S. companies are reluctant to step up hiring 

is scant demand, rather than uncertainty over government policies.’’ 

Similarly, a September 2011 National Federation of Independent Business survey 

of its members found that ‘‘poor sales’’—not regulation—is the biggest problem. 

Indeed, the Main Street Alliance, an small business organization, observes: ‘‘In 

survey after survey and interview after interview, Main Street small business owners confirm that what we really need is more customers—more demand—not deregulation.’’ 

And, we cannot ignore the fact that the lack of regulation can lead to greater costs 

for industry. 

Take, for example, the disastrous BP oil spill that occurred a couple of years ago. 

New regulations intended to prevent another such spill will cost the deep water 

drilling industry about $180 million. But compare that figure with the cost of one 

well blowout: $16.3 billion. 

This bill attempts to deal with a concern that is already being addressed by the 

current Administration. 

The Obama Administration has undertaken a series number of innovative initiatives to ensure that the regulations it approves result in net savings. 

For instance, the net benefits of regulations issued by this Administration in three 

fiscal years exceed $91 billion, which is more than 25 times the net benefits of regulations issued by the Bush Administration for a comparable period. 

Rather than pursuing solutions for problems that don’t exist, we should be using 

the resources of the Judiciary Committee to address real problems, like the ongoing 

home foreclosure crisis. 

And, with respect to the real problem of unemployment, our Committee should 

be promoting real solutions instead of discussing solutions that are in search of a 

problem. 

f 

57 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law 

H.R. 4078, the ‘‘Regulatory Freeze for Jobs Act of 2012,’’ is a blunt instrument 

designed to respond to a mistaken belief—namely, that there is a purported link between regulations and unemployment. 

The bill would prohibit agencies from engaging in any significant regulatory action until the average monthly unemployment rate for one quarter reaches 6% or 

less. 

The bill also provides for judicial review of agency action, including presidential 

determinations that certain circumstances exist that ought to permit significant regulatory action even when it is otherwise prohibited under this bill. 

Finally, the bill requires courts to award attorneys fees and costs to small businesses whenever an agency changes its position regarding a significant regulatory 

action that is a subject of a lawsuit, regardless of whether the change in agency position resulted from the filing of the lawsuit. 

H.R. 4078 is premised on the false assertion that regulations undermine job creation. Proponents of anti-regulatory legislation have asserted this again and again 

in favor of such measures, yet they have never provided evidence of such a link. At 

best, all I have ever heard in support of this assertion are anecdotes, and anecdotes 

are not evidence. 

Indeed, even one of the Majority’s own witnesses from a hearing last year testified 

before us that, at most, the effect of regulations on employment was ‘‘indeterminate.’’ 

Based on a review of their written statements, the two Majority witnesses today 

also do not offer evidence of an actual link between unemployment and regulation. 

At best, they hang their arguments on the unsupported notion that the creation of 

new rules creates ‘‘uncertainty’’ that causes businesses to hesitate in hiring. 

Yet survey after survey of businesses and economists has shown that regulations 

have little to do with a lack of hiring. Instead, they overwhelmingly point to a lack 

of demand among consumers as the primary culprit. 

For instance, the Wall Street Journal surveyed business economists last summer 

and found that the ‘‘main reason U.S. companies are reluctant to step up hiring is 

scant demand, rather than uncertainty over government policies.’’ 

Likewise, the National Federation of Independent Business found from a survey 

of its members that 45% cited faltering sales as the biggest factor in dampening 

business confidence. Only 10% of NFIB members identified ‘‘regulations’’ as a factor. 

Moreover, regulatory failure is more harmful to the economy than the existence 

or creation of new regulations. 

Proponents of H.R. 4078 and other anti-regulatory measures seem to forget that 

our current employment troubles can be traced to a lack of adequate regulation of 

the financial services and housing industries, which allowed for reckless private sector behavior that, in turn, led to the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession, 

the most severe economic recession since the Great Depression. 

In short, there is a far greater economic cost to stopping agencies from regulating 

than there is to allowing new regulations to take effect. 

In addition to problems with its philosophical underpinnings, H.R. 4078 raises a 

number of troubling questions 

First, when could non-exempt significant regulatory actions commence? While 

economists can take educated guesses as to when the quarterly unemployment rate 

will reach 6%, at best it would be just that—a guess. 

Second, what happens when the quarterly unemployment rate reaches 6% in one 

quarter, and becomes 6.1% in the next? By H.R. 4078’s terms, agencies potentially 

would have to re-freeze significant regulatory actions after one quarter. 

Third, what happens when the quarterly unemployment rate reaches 6.1% in one 

quarter? Should businesses start preparing for a slew new regulations to go into effect in the next quarter in anticipation of the unemployment rate reaching 6%? 

Fourth, with respect to judicial review of presidential waiver determinations, 

what would be the standard of review that a court should apply? Would the President be required to keep a record of his decisionmaking process, to be reviewed by 

58 

the court? Does this judicial review provision violate separation of powers and, in 

certain instances, executive privilege? 

Fifth, with respect to the attorney’s fee provision, why is there no link between 

the mandatory award of attorney’s fees and costs to small businesses, on the one 

hand, and the change in agency position with respect to the significant regulatory 

action? The language of this provision does not require the agency to have changed 

its position because of the filing of the civil action. 

I hope the witnesses will address these questions thoroughly. I thank them for 

being here today and eagerly await their answers. 

f 

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Letter from the Coalition for Sensible Safeguards 


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Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Robert Weissman, President, 

Public Citizen 


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Material submitted by the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law 


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