SERVED: APRIL 19, 2013 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

) 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ) 

) 

Complainant, ) FAA Docket No. [To Be Assigned] 

) 

v. ) (Civil Penalty Action) 

) 

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC. ) 

) 

Respondent. ) FDMS Nos. FAA-2011-0782 

) 

INITIAL DECISION 

OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RICHARD C. GOODWIN 

Found: The charges were not proven. The Complaint is dismissed. 

I. Background 

Respondent SkyWest Airlines, Inc. ("Respondent," "SkyWest," or "the carrier"), is a Part 

121 regional air carrier whose operations specifications ("op specs") require it to maintain its 

aircraft in accordance with the carrier's Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program 

("CAMP"). This case turns on the question of whether SkyWest followed its CAMP by the 

manner in which it handled a discrepancy. 

The underlying facts are undisputed. Complainant Federal Aviation Administration 

("Complainant," "FAA," or "the agency") and SkyWest agree that on May 30, 2010, the carrier's 

flight #6140, operated by a Bombardier CR} 200 regional jet, model CL,600, 2B19 (registration · 

N948SW), was preparing for takeoff from San Francisco ("SFO") when the cockpit received a 

display warning concerning pressure in the right air conditioning "pack." Sky West treated the ,.,. 

problem and returned the aircraft to service based at least in part on the pilot's Quick Referen~e .. -· 

Handbook ("QRH"). The QRH is an operations manual. 
2 

The agency contends that using the QRH was improper and violated the carrier's CAMP. 

As such, the next eight flights SkyWest operated with this aircraft, Complainant continues, 

were unairworthy. Sky West counters that it was permitted to use the QRH to address the 

discrepancy. It violated no Federal Aviation Regulation ("FAR"), it maintains (see, e.g., Tr. 11~ 12; 

seeTr. 55; Exh. C~7). 

. The FAA charged that Respondent violated the following FARs (all in 14 CFR): section 

ll9.5(g), which prohibits a direct air carrier from operating in violation of an appropriate 

certificate and operations specifications; ll9.5(1), which prohibits a Part 121 air carrier from 

operating in violation of its operating certificate or operations specifications; §121.153(a)(2), 

which requires an aircraft to operate in an airworthy condition; §121. 709(b )(2 )(i ), requiring that 

an airworthiness release or log entry permitting aircraft operation after maintenance or 

alterations be prepared in accordance with procedures set out in appropriate manuals; and 

§121.605, proscribing the dispatch of an airplane unless it is airworthy. The Complaint asks for a 

total assessment in the amount of $68,500. 

An oral evidentiary hearing took place on October 1 and 2, 2012, in Salt Lake City, UT. 

The parties have now filed briefs and the matter is ready for decision.1 

II. Discussion and Findings 

After careful consideration of all the evidence, I find and conclude that Complainant has 

not carried its burden of proof. The charges will be dismissed. 

A. The Occurrence 

Flight 6140 displayed a caution message during takeoff. The pilot's maintenance log 

entry notes an "overpress [overpressure] condition display" in the right air conditioning pack 

Complainant witness Wendell "Skeeter" Gehring, an aviation safety inspector employed at the 

carrier's Certificate Management Office ("CMO") at the Salt Lake City Airport and a pilot who 

holds an airframe and powerplant ("A & P") rating, explained. He testified that the message 

meant that the aircraft lacked the ability to regulate high pressure into the pack. The pilot could 

not pressurize the airplane. The left pack had been deferred per the Minimum Equipment Ust 

("MEL") earlier that day, so the right pack had been the only source providing air conditioning 

and pressurization for the aircraft. The system shut off. After consulting the maintenance 

controller the pilot aborted the flight and returned to the gate (Tr.17~20, 27~31, 61; Exh. C~2). 

A SkyWest mechanic then undertook corrective action. Coordinating with the 

maintenance controller, he reset the pack using the pilot's QRH and tested. The mechanic 

demonstrated to the cockpit that advancing the throttle slowly would avoid a spike in pressure. 

The log entry states that the mechanic "[r]eset Rt/Pack as needed per QRH. System op checks 

good at this time. Static throttle with no overpress [overpressure] message displayed." The 

aircraft was given an airworthiness release. It proceeded to its next destination (Exh. C~2; Exh. 

c~s, pp. 2, 4, 8; Tr. 31~32, 43, 47~49, 84, 205). 

1 "Compl. Br." =Complainant's Brief; "Resp. Br." =Respondent's Post Trial Brief; and "Compl. Reply Br." = 

Complainant's Reply Brief. 
3 

On June 1, 2010, following a complete system failure on approach to SFO, SkyWest 

mechanics replaced the right pack pressure regulating and shutoff valve. 2 This was 

accomplished in accordance with the carrier's General Maintenance Manual ("GMM"). The 

aircraft had been operated eight times since the May 30, 2010 occurrence (Exh C~7, pps. 1, 10, 

and 17; Tr. 55~58, 150). 

B. Complainant's Position 

I find that Complainant's witnesses were credible. 

Inspector Gehring testified that Sky West had failed to follow correct procedures for 

handling the occurrence. In using the QRH, an operations manual, Respondent had failed to 

address what he characterized as a "mechanical irregularity." Using the CAMP, which is 

manufacturer's data for maintenance, was the proper course. The QRH, by contrast, is 

"manufacturer's data for flight." It is not part of the CAMP, Gehring stated (Tr. 27, 33, 61, 102; 

Com pl. Br., p. 4 ). 

Complainant witnesses testified further about the nature of the QRH and its appropriate 

role. A pilot manual kept in the cockpit, it gives pilots a checklist of how to operate the aircraft 

in an "abnormal" event during flight (Tr. 32~ 33). Andrew Ayers, SkyWest's principal operations 

inspector and Complainant's second witness, elaborated that the QRH is "essentially an extract" 

from the manufacturer's Airplane Flight Manual ("AFM") which allows the airplane to continue 

flight while having irregularities or abnormalities addressed. It is an operational document and, 

Ayers stressed, not meant for "corrective action of mechanical irregularities."3 

Mechanics attempting to operate some system on the aircraft must follow the CAMP, 

inspector Gehring continued. The CAMP stems from other SkyWest maintenance manuals, 

including provisions of the carrier's GMM- in which SkyWest's CAMP is described- plus its 

Fault Isolation Manual ("FIM") (Exh. C~3) and Aircraft Maintenance Manual ("AMM") (Exh. 

C~4 ). And every maintenance task is addressed in the CAMP, he insisted: it will include "all the 

relevant instructions for maintenance personnel to do their work ... " (Tr. 107). The witness 

maintained that mechanics may not consult an operations manual under any conditions. 

Inspector Gehring asserted that the AMM should have been used to address the 

occurrence. The AMM contains a three~part operational test of the air conditioning system. This 

test is not in the QRH. Gehring also cited the FIM as a useful guide (T r. 25~ 26, 32~41, 54, 61~63, 

96, 106, 126, 129, 258~60). 

Inspector Gehring concluded that using a QRH procedure rendered the aircraft 

unairworthy. The pack following the purported fix was unable to handle high~pressure air, he 

2 The Aircraft Maintenance Log entry, at paragraph #3, Corrective Action, reads, "Replaced Rt A/C Pack PROSOV 

IA W AMM 21-51-43 ." That is, the mechanic replaced the right air conditioning pack pressure regulating and 

shutoff valve in accordance with Aircraft Maintenance Manual21-51-43. Exhs. C-2 and R-1, p. I (which consist of 

the same documents); see Tr. 55-56, Ill, 116, 125-26, 198. The entry goes on to say, "ops check good." 

3 Tr. 140-41; Exh. C-10; Compl. Br., p. 5. The witness mistakenly referenced an "Aircraft Flight Manual" (Tr. 139) 

but it is clear that he meant the Airplane Flight Manual. See Exh. C-1 0. 
' 4 

testified; as such, it did not meet its type design. 4 Further, because maintenance had not been 

properly performed, the aircraft's safety was unknown. As such the aircraft had to be 

considered unsafe (Tr. 66~68). 

C. Respondent's Position 

I find that Respondent's witnesses were credible as well. 

Respondent asserted that SkyWest's response to the occurrence violated no FAR. Its 

use of the QRH was proper. Maintenance personnel may consult operational manuals such as 

the QRH in appropriate circumstances in determining the nature of a problem and in fashioning 

a solution, SkyWest states- and these were such circumstances. 

Respondent contended that the CRJ~ 200 was known to experience an overpressure 

situation in a one~pack setting when the throttle was accelerated too quickly. Darrell Cook, 

Sky West's director of quality and a licensed A &: P mechanic who has performed maintenance 

on the make and model of aircraft involved in this matter, testified that this condition has been 

recognized among line mechanics and maintenance controllers for at least fifteen years. Neither 

. the GMM nor the AMM addresses this situation, he contended, but asserted that the MEL 

appendix does: it instructs the pilot to perform a "Normal Static ... takeoff procedure" and to 

"[a ]dvance the thrust levers slowly to prevent an overpressure of the operating pack." (Exh. R~ 2; 

Tr.l57~6I). -

The pilots simply had failed to follow this protocol, said Respondent's witness Craig 

Fabian, an attorney and a licensed A &: P mechanic who has worked on the flight line and as a 

maintenance controller. It was then appropriate, he said, to reset the system- per the QRH ~~ 

and attempt another takeoff. A reset procedure is not maintenance, Mr. Fabian asserted. But it 

enabled the ops check, which does constitute maintenance, to take place. The corrective action 

noted in SkyWest's aircraft maintenance log, which set out the reset and the ops check, was a 

mixture of nonmaintenance and maintenance, he concluded (Tr.l72, 206; Exh. C~2; see Initial 

Decision ("I.D."), p. 2). 

Mr. Fabian believed that the aircraft was airworthy when it was subsequently 

dispatched. In his view, application of the MEL had returned it to its properly altered condition. 

That it flew without fault for eight legs also demonstrates its airworthiness, he stated (Tr. 192~ 

93). 

D. Decision 

I find and conclude that Complainant failed to show that Respondent's actions violated 

any FARs. The carrier's reliance on the QRH was appropriate. The fix SkyWest performed had 

operational elements sufficient to deny Complainant its proof. The aircraft was airworthy 

following SkyWest's actions addressing the discrepancy. 

4 To be airworthy an aircraft must conform to its type design and be in a condition for safe operation. See, e.g., 

Husted and Husted Air Charter, Inc., FAA Order No. 2010-9 (June 16, 2010), p. 13. 
5 

Mr. Fabian's explanation of the matter was pithy and persuasive. The left air 

conditioning pack for this aircraft had been deferred per the MEL The MEL appendix instructs 

pilots in a single pack configuration to "advance the thrust levers slowly" to prevent 

overpressure (Exh. R~ 2). The cockpit either was unaware of or ignored the protocol, and did 

not follow it. The pilots received a display warning of overpressure.5 Following consultation 

with maintenance, the cockpit reset the system- an operational procedure~~ per the QRH. An 

ops check, a maintenance procedure, was successfully accomplished (Tr.183~84, 192). The 

pilots then advanced the throttle relatively slowly per the MEL instructions. This time, no 

display warning appeared. The aircraft had been returned to its properly altered condition (Tr. 

192). It was airworthy and ready to go (Tr. 193). These events had violated no FAR. 

Once the pilot wrote up the discrepancy, maintenance indeed was triggered under 

SkyWest's GMM (Tr. 205). Yet it had been unnecessary to have maintenance review the 

occurrence in the first place. Signing off on the discrepancy and formally returning the aircraft 

to service was done out of an abundance of caution. The reset had addressed the situation 

adequately and correctly. The maintenance controller could have allowed the pilot to continue 

flight rather than return to the gate~~ and the agency would never have become involved (Tr. 47~ 

48, 172~73, I78; Resp. Br., pp. 2, 5; see Exh. C~5, p. 8 (maintenance controller stated to 

interviewers that "I could have had them [the flight crew] reset it there, but thought it was 

better to have maintenance check it out ... ")). No maintenance necessary to render the aircraft 

airworthy, then, had been performed, I conclude. In this light, Complainant could show no 

violations. 

This decision also relies on the idea that maintenance technicians in appropriate 

circumstances may employ operational methods and techniques to fashion solutions to 

discrepancies. SkyWest documents themselves, I find, endorse this mixture of maintenance~ 

and operation~based approaches. Standard Procedure ("SP") 8600 is a Sky West maintenance 

document and part of the carrier's GMM. Yet it references the QRH as containing the 

procedure the pilot would use for a known condition after leaving the gate but prior to actually 

taking off-just like the scenario under review. It permits the maintenance controller to 

instruct the crew to reset and go (Exh. R~4; Tr. 50, 176~78, 261). Additionally, SP 7555, also part 

of the GMM, references the Airplane Flight Manual- which is the source document of the QRH 

(Exh. R~5; Tr. 50, 198, 207). 

As a corollary to the above principle, I do not find it inappropriate, as Complainant 

contends, for a mechanic to refer to an operational manual not specifically included ip the GMM 

or the CAMP (Tr.179). I agree with Mr. Fabian's assertion that mechanics sometimes need . 

operating manuals to determine how a system should operate or to perform certain functions. 

An operating manual can help a mechanic determine if a problem exists that would require 

maintenance (Tr.186). This is a "common" scenario, Fabian said (Tr.182). In his own 

experience he noted that he was not always able to find a remedy by referring to a 

5 Exh. C-2. Inspector Gehring suggested that the crew initially had performed a "normal static takeoff'' per the 

MEL, and that this should not have led to spiking the system. Tr. 77, 83. He insisted that the resulting overpressure 

display was not a known condition. Tr. 75-76,81-85, 130; see Resp. Reply Br., pp. 8-9. The weight of the evidence, 

however, particularly the testimony of Mr. Cook, shows otherwise. Complainant's arguments in this regard are thus 

rejected. I note that Mr. Gehring, in contrast to Mr. Cook, has never performed maintenance on a CRJ. Tr. 73. 
6 

manufacturer's manual (Tr. H~~)~ ~onversely, I d.o'not endorse Complainant's argument that a 

mechanic must be limited to following documents found under the maintenance umbrella. 

Respondent showed that it is contrary to years of industry practice to suppose that such 

materials would cover every situation a mechanic will face (see Resp. Br., pp. 3, 7). In this case, 

neither of the maintenance manuals specifically cited by Complainant witnesses, the AMM and 

the FIM, offered a solution. There must be room for adaptation to the myriad circumstances 

maintenance personnel observe. Indeed, the statement in Sky West's GMM- a maintenance 

manual, of course ~~that "[q]uali.fied mechanics ... can determine or develop the method, 

technique, or practice to return the component or aircraft to its originally or properly altered 

condition" signals such a flexible approach, I find (Tr.l80~82, 206~07; Exh. C~l, p. 4, 9I.2(a); see 

Resp. Br., p.IO). Nothing stated in the GMM or in the regulations in any event limits mechanics 

to maintenance manuals in discerning the nature of a problem or formulating a proper solution 

(seeTr.l85~86, 190~91). It is the substance of any document usedby a maintenance person and 

not its title which should be the proper focus of an investigation and repair, I find (see Tr.l95). 

Finally, the fact that the airplane flew an additional eight legs until a subsequent system 

failure grounded the aircraft again neither proves nor disproves that it had been airworthy 

following the fix examined here. Complainant stated that these circumstances showed that 

each operation following the occurrence and release had been unairworthy; Respondent 

asserted that the breakdown following the eighth flight demonstrated that a "more persistent" 

fault had existed (seeTr.l94). The repair of June I, I find, proves nothing about the condition of 

the aircraft when Sky West had released it on May 30. Neither party demonstrated sufficiently 

probative causative factors. 6 

All arguments by both parties have been carefully considered. Those not explicitly 

discussed are rejected.7 

6 See also Tr. 122-24; Resp. Br., p. 1 I. No proof was adduced that, as inspector Gehring maintained, the aircraft 

following the fix could not handle high pressure air. See Tr. 66-68. 7 One additional matter will be addressed here. I find there is insufficient evidence to show, as Complainant 

contends, that the static throttle run failed to pressurize the system to the level necessary to test the system. Tr. 20 I02; see, e.g., Compl. Br., p. 3. 
7 

I find and conclude that the agency failed to prove that Respondent SkyWest Airlines 

violated any of the FARs with which it is charged. The Complaint is dismissed.8 

Attachment - Service List 

8 This decision may be appealed to the Administrator ofthe FAA. The notice of appeal must conform to sections 

13.210, 13.2Il(e) and 13.233 of the Rules of Practice, which require that a notice of appeal 1) be filed not later than 

10 days (plus an additional five days if mailed) from the service date of this decision, and 2) be perfected with a 

written brief or memorandum not later than 50 days (plus an additional five, if mailed) from the service date of this 

decision. The notice of appeal and brief or memorandum must either be a) mailed to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430, 

Wilbur Wright Building--,Suite 2WIOOO, or b) delivered personally or via expedited courier service to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2WIOOO, Washington, 

· D.C. 20591, Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. A copy of the notice of appeal and brief or memorandum also 

must be sent to agency counsel. Service upon the presiding judge is optional. 
8 

SERVICE LIST 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W10001 

.ONE COPY 

Todd C. Emerson, Respondent's Counsel 

Director - Government and Legal Affairs 

SkyWest Airlines 

444 South River Road 

St. George, UT 84 790 

TEL: 435-634-3530 

FAX: 435-634-3505 

Robert Spitzer, Complainant's Counsel 

Attorney, Office of Regional Counsel 

. Northwest Mountain Region, ANM-7 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1601 Lind Avenue, S.W. 

Renton, W A 98057 

TEL: 425-227-1417 

FAX: 425-227-1007 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

Office ofHearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-2139 Attorney-Advisor 

202-366-5121 Staff Assistant 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

FDMS No. FAA-2012-0872 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2WIOOO, Washington, 

DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.